G.R. No.

180050 February 10, 2010

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, Petitioners,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines;
Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of
Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S.
BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE
ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being
unconstitutional.

Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina aver that they are taxpayers
and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte. They have served the Province of Surigao del
Norte once as Vice- Governor and members of the Provincial Board, respectively. They claim to
have previously filed a similar petition, which was dismissed on technical grounds.1 They allege that
the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of
Congress, and unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its territory,
Internal Revenue Allocation and rich resources from the area.

The facts are as follows:

The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under R.A. No. 2786 on June
19, 1960. The province is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao
City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of seven
municipalities, namely, Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon.

Based on the official 2000 Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National Statistics
Office (NSO),2 the population of the Province of Surigao del Norte as of May 1, 2000 was 481,416,
broken down as follows:

Mainland 281,111

Surigao City 118,534

Siargao Island & Bucas Grande 93,354

Dinagat Island 106,951

Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, a province
may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than ₱20 million based on 1991
constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000
inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of
the province.

On April 3, 2002, the Office of the President, through its Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs, advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Surigao del Norte of the deficient
population in the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands.3

In July 2003, the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census, with the
assistance of an NSO District Census Coordinator, in the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual
population in support of the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. The special census
yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the proposed province. The NSO, however, did
not certify the result of the special census. On July 30, 2003, Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor
Robert Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which declared as official, for all purposes,
the 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371,576.4

The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed
Province of Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was
₱82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed province is 802.12 square kilometers.

On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively, passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted
into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

On December 2, 2006, a plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to
determine whether the local government units directly affected approved of the creation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands into a distinct and independent province comprising the municipalities of
Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo (Albor), Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon. The result of the
plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.5

On December 3, 2006, the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of
Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct province was ratified and approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite.6

On January 26, 2007, a new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their
appointment by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Another set of provincial officials was elected
during the synchronized national and local elections held on May 14, 2007. On July 1, 2007, the
elected provincial officials took their oath of office; hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its
corporate existence.7

Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not
valid because it failed to comply with either the population or land area requirement prescribed by
the Local Government Code.

Petitioners prayed that R.A. No. 9355 be declared unconstitutional, and that all subsequent
appointments and elections to the new vacant positions in the newly created Province of Dinagat
Islands be declared null and void. They also prayed for the return of the municipalities of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the return of the former districts to the mother Province of Surigao
del Norte.

Petitioners raised the following issues:

 I

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9355, CREATING THE NEW PROVINCE OF DINAGAT
ISLANDS, COMPLIED WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS UNDER
SECTION 461 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE CREATION OF DINAGAT AS A NEW PROVINCE BY THE

RESPONDENTS IS AN ACT OF GERRYMANDERING.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESULT OF THE PLEBISCITE IS CREDIBLE AND TRULY REFLECTS
THE MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE.8

In her Memorandum, respondent Governor Geraldine B. Ecleo-Villaroman of the Province of Dinagat

Islands raises procedural issues. She contends that petitioners do not have the legal standing to
question the constitutionality of the creation of the Province of Dinagat, since they have not been
directly injured by its creation and are without substantial interest over the matter in controversy.
Moreover, she alleges that the petition is moot and academic because the existence of the Province
of Dinagat Islands has already commenced; hence, the petition should be dismissed.

The contention is without merit.

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,9 the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be
relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. In the same vein, with respect to other alleged procedural flaws,
even assuming the existence of such defects, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, brushes
aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering its importance and in
keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution.10

Further, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.11 The courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.12

The main issue is whether or not R.A. No. 9355 violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Petitioners contend that the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is not qualified to become a
province because it failed to comply with the land area or the population requirement, despite its
compliance with the income requirement. It has a total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers,
which falls short of the statutory requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers. Moreover, based
on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the total population of the proposed Province of Dinagat
Islands is only 106,951, while the statutory requirement is a population of at least 250,000
inhabitants.

Petitioners allege that in enacting R.A. No. 9355 into law, the House of Representatives and the
Senate erroneously relied on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991, which states that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands."13 The preceding italicized
provision contained in the Implementing Rules and Regulations is not expressly or impliedly stated
as an exemption to the land area requirement in Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
Petitioners assert that when the Implementing Rules and Regulations conflict with the law that they
seek to implement, the law prevails.

On the other hand, respondents contend in their respective Memoranda that the Province of Dinagat
Islands met the legal standard for its creation.
1avv phi 1

First, the Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the
proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for the years 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices
was ₱82,696,433.25.

Second, the Lands Management Bureau certified that though the land area of the Province of
Dinagat Islands is 802.12 square kilometers, it is composed of one or more islands; thus, it is
exempt from the required land area of 2,000 square kilometers under paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code.

Third, in the special census conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte, with the
assistance of a District Census Coordinator of the NSO, the number of inhabitants in the Province of
Dinagat Islands as of 2003, or almost three years before the enactment of R.A. No. 9355 in 2006,
was 371,576, which is more than the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.

In his Memorandum, respondent Governor Ace S. Barbers contends that although the result of the
special census conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte on December 2, 2003
was never certified by the NSO, it is credible since it was conducted with the aid of a representative
of the NSO. He alleged that the lack of certification by the NSO was cured by the presence of NSO
officials, who testified during the deliberations on House Bill No. 884 creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands, and who questioned neither the conduct of the special census nor the validity of the
result.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is granted.

The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
states:

SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected."14

Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed the criteria for the
creation of a province, thus:

SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
 (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.15

As a clarification of the territorial requirement, the Local Government Code requires

a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau. However, the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities that do not contribute to the income of the province.

If a proposed province is composed of two or more islands, does "territory," under Sec. 461 of the
Local Government Code, include not only the land mass above the water, but also that which is
beneath it?

To answer the question above, the discussion in Tan v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC)16 is
enlightening.

In Tan v. COMELEC, petitioners therein contended that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating the new
Province of Negros del Norte, was unconstitutional for it was not in accord with Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the
Constitution, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local Government Code. Although what was
applicable then was the 1973 Constitution and the former Local Government Code, the provisions
pertinent to the case are substantially similar to the provisions in this case.

Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution provides:

Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio (barangay in the 1987 Constitution) may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

The requisites for the creation of a province in Sec. 197 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 are similar to
the requisites in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but the requirements for
population and territory/land area are lower now, while the income requirement is higher. Sec. 197 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local Government Code, provides:

SEC. 197.—Requisites for Creation.—A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three
thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an
average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million
pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and
income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands.

The average estimated annual income shall include the income allotted for both the general and
infrastructure funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income.17

In Tan v. COMELEC, petitioners therein filed a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping the
COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite scheduled on January 3, 1986. Since the Court was in
recess, it was unable to consider the petition on time. Petitioners filed a supplemental pleading,
averring that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held as scheduled, but there were
still serious issues raised in the case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such
exercise which should properly be passed upon and resolved by the Court.

At issue in Tan was the land area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, and the validity of the
plebiscite, which did not include voters of the parent Province of Negros Occidental, but only those
living within the territory of the new Province of Negros del Norte.

The Court held that the plebiscite should have included the people living in the area of the proposed
new province and those living in the parent province. However, the Court did not direct the conduct
of a new plebiscite, because the factual and legal basis for the creation of the new province did not
exist as it failed to satisfy the land area requirement; hence, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating the
new Province of Negros del Norte, was declared unconstitutional. The Court found that the land area
of the new province was only about 2,856 square kilometers, which was below the statutory
requirement then of 3,500 square kilometers.

Respondents in Tan insisted that when the Local Government Code speaks of the required territory
of the province to be created, what is contemplated is not only the land area, but also the land and
water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. The respondents submitted that in
this regard, the marginal sea within the three mile limit should be considered in determining the
extent of the territory of the new province.

The Court stated that "[s]uch an interpretation is strained, incorrect and fallacious."18 It held:

The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the
"territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in
this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly,
reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the
waters over which the political unit exercises control.

Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical
contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, [n]ext, or adjacent (Webster's New World
Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous," when employed as an adjective, as in the above
sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses
of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words
associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R.,
p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the
"territory" — the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the
word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also
territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section
197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute
should be given the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the
words are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).19
The discussion of the Court in Tan on the definition and usage of the terms "territory," and
"contiguous," and the meaning of the provision, "The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two or more islands," contained in Sec. 197 of the former Local Government Code, which provides
for the requisites in the creation of a new province, is applicable in this case since there is no reason
for a change in their respective definitions, usage, or meaning in its counterpart provision in the
present Local Government Code contained in Sec. 461 thereof.

The territorial requirement in the Local Government Code is adopted in the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR),20 thus:

ART. 9. Provinces.—(a) Requisites for creation—A province shall not be created unless the following
requisites on income and either population or land area are present:

(1) Income — An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos
(₱20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and
nonrecurring income; and

(2) Population or land area - Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by National Statistics Office; or land area which
must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands
or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be
created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.

However, the IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code
when it added the italicized portion above stating that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands." Nowhere in the Local
Government Code is the said provision stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local
Government Code, the only instance when the territorial or land area requirement need not be
complied with is when there is already compliance with the population requirement. The Constitution
requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such criteria,
must all be written in the Local Government Code.21 There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy
between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law
prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law.22

Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that "[t]he land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" is
null and void.

Respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that rules and regulations
have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects and purposes of the law.
They contend that the exemption from the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers is
germane to the purpose of the Local Government Code to develop political and territorial
subdivisions into self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment
of national goals.23 They assert that in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor,24 the
Court declared as valid the implementing rules and regulations of a statute, even though the
administrative agency added certain provisions in the implementing rules that were not found in the
law.

In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor, the provisions in the implementing rules
and regulations, which were questioned by petitioner therein, merely filled in the details in
accordance with a known standard. The law that was questioned was R.A. No. 9207, otherwise
known as "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003." It was
therein declared that the "policy of the State [was] to secure the land tenure of the urban poor.
Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing,
socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes." Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207 created
the National Government Center Administration Committee, which was tasked to administer,
formulate the guidelines and policies and implement the land disposition of the areas covered by the
law.

Petitioners therein contended that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixed the selling rate of a lot at
₱700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 did not provide for the price. In addition, Sec. 3.2 (c.1) of the IRR
penalizes a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within six (6) months from the approval
of the subdivision plan by imposing a price escalation, while there is no such penalty imposed by
R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that the assailed provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and
should be nullified.

In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., the Court held:

Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being
implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the
nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed
by the law.

In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to administer, formulate
guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in
this authority and the statute’s objective of urban poor housing is the power of the Committee to
formulate the manner by which the reserved property may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under
this broad power, the Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of
beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions governing the sale and other key
particulars necessary to implement the objective of the law. These details are purposely omitted
from the statute and their determination is left to the discretion of the Committee because the latter
possesses special knowledge and technical expertise over these matters.

The Committee’s authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the rate-fixing power of
administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement
as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that
the selling price of the lots is unreasonable.

The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary who fails to
execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period is also within the Committee’s authority to
formulate guidelines and policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay
down the terms and conditions governing the disposition of said lots, provided that these are
reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the
parties must execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell
and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.25

Hence, the provisions in the implementing rules and regulations that were questioned in Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc. merely filled in the necessary details to implement the objective of the
law in accordance with a known standard, and were thus germane to the purpose of the law.

In this case, the pertinent provision in the IRR did not fill in any detail in accordance with a known
standard provided for by the law. Instead, the IRR added an exemption to the standard or criteria
prescribed by the Local Government Code in the creation of a province as regards the land area
requirement, which exemption is not found in the Code. As such, the provision in the IRR that the
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one or more
islands is not in conformity with the standard or criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code;
hence, it is null and void.

Contrary to the contention of respondents, the extraneous provision cannot be considered as

germane to the purpose of the law to develop territorial and political subdivisions into self-reliant
communities because, in the first place, it already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in
creating a territorial subdivision.

Further, citing Galarosa v. Valencia,26 the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the IRRs
issued by the Oversight Committee composed of members of the legislative and executive branches
of the government are entitled to great weight and respect, as they are in the nature of executive
construction.

The case is not in point. In Galarosa, the issue was whether or not Galarosa could continue to serve
as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan beyond June 30, 1992, the date when the term of office of
the elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon expired. Galarosa was the incumbent
president of the Katipunang Bayan or Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of the Municipality of
Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon; and was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
of Sorsogon pursuant to Executive Order No. 342 in relation to Sec. 146 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, the former Local Government Code.

Sec. 494 of the Local Government Code of 199127 states that the duly elected presidents of
the liga [ng mga barangay] at the municipal, city and provincial levels, including the component cities
and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang
bayan, sangguniang panglungsod, and sangguniang panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as
such only during their term of office as presidents of the liga chapters which, in no case, shall be
beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned. The section, however, does not fix the
specific duration of their term as liga president. The Court held that this was left to the by-laws of
the liga pursuant to Art. 211(g) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991. Moreover, there was no indication that Secs. 49128 and 494 should be given
retroactive effect to adversely affect the presidents of the ABC; hence, the said provisions were to be
applied prospectively.

The Court stated that there is no law that prohibits ABC presidents from holding over as members of
the Sangguniang Bayan. On the contrary, the IRR, prepared and issued by the Oversight Committee
upon specific mandate of Sec. 533 of the Local Government Code, expressly recognizes and grants
the hold-over authority to the ABC presidents under Art. 210, Rule XXIX.29 The Court upheld the
application of the hold-over doctrine in the provisions of the IRR and the issuances of the DILG,
whose purpose was to prevent a hiatus in the government pending the time when the successor
may be chosen and inducted into office.
The Court held that Sec. 494 of the Local Government Code could not have been intended to allow
a gap in the representation of the barangays, through the presidents of the ABC, in the sanggunian.
Since the term of office of the punong barangays elected in the March 28, 1989 election and the
term of office of the presidents of the ABC had not yet expired, and taking into account the special
role conferred upon, and the broader powers and functions vested in the barangays by the Code, it
was inferred that the Code never intended to deprive the barangays of their representation in
the sangguniang bayan during the interregnum when the liga had yet to be formally organized with
the election of its officers.

Under the circumstances prevailing in Galarosa, the Court considered the relevant provisions in the
IRR formulated by the Oversight Committee and the pertinent issuances of the DILG in the nature of
executive construction, which were entitled to great weight and respect.

Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law within the law’s four
corners.30 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law
according to its express terms.31 If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or
injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history
of the law,32 or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive
issuances in the nature of executive construction.

In this case, the requirements for the creation of a province contained in Sec. 461 of the Local
Government Code are clear, plain and unambiguous, and its literal application does not result in
absurdity or injustice. Hence, the provision in Art. 9(2) of the IRR exempting a proposed province
composed of one or more islands from the land-area requirement cannot be considered an
executive construction of the criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code. It is an extraneous
provision not intended by the Local Government Code and, therefore, is null and void.

Whether R.A. No. 9355 complied with the requirements of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code in creating the Province of Dinagat Islands

It is undisputed that R.A. No. 9355 complied with the income requirement specified by the Local
Government Code. What is disputed is its compliance with the land area or population requirement.

R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains an approximate land
area of eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less,
including Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47) islets x x x."33 R.A. No. 9355, therefore,
failed to comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.

The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less
than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population
conducted by the NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only
106,951.

Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population
in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified
by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code.34 Moreover, respondents failed to prove that
with the population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao
del Norte) would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time
of the creation of the new province.35

Respondents contended that the lack of certification by the NSO was cured by the presence of the
officials of the NSO during the deliberations on the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands, since they did not object to the result of the special census conducted by the Provincial
Government of Surigao del Norte.

The contention of respondents does not persuade.

Although the NSO representative to the Committee on Local Government deliberations dated
November 24, 2005 did not object to the

result of the provincial government’s special census, which was conducted with the assistance of an
NSO district census coordinator, it was agreed by the participants that the said result was not
certified by the NSO, which is the requirement of the Local Government Code. Moreover, the NSO
representative, Statistician II Ma. Solita C. Vergara, stated that based on their computation, the
population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants would be attained by the Province of Dinagat Islands
by the year 2065. The computation was based on the growth rate of the population, excluding
migration.

The pertinent portion of the deliberation on House Bill No. 884 creating the Province of Dinagat
reads:

THE CHAIRMAN (Hon. Alfredo S. Lim): . . . There is no problem with the land area
requirement and to the income requirement. The problem is with the population requirement.

xxxx

Now because of this question, we would like to make it of record the stand and reply of
National Statistics Office. Can we hear now from Ms. Solita Vergara?

MS. VERGARA. We only certify population based on the counts proclaimed by the
President. And in this case, we only certify the population based on the results of the 2000
census of population and housing.

THE CHAIRMAN. Is that…

MS. VERGARA. Sir, as per Batas Pambansa, BP 72, we only follow kung ano po ‘yong
mandated by the law. So, as mandated by the law, we only certify those counts proclaimed
official by the President.

THE CHAIRMAN. But the government of Surigao del Norte is headed by Governor Robert
Lyndon Ace Barbers and they conducted this census in year 2003 and yours was conducted
in year 2000. So, within that time frame, three years, there could be an increase in
population or transfer of residents, is that possible?

MS. VERGARA. Yes, sir, but then we only conduct census of population every 10 years and
we conduct special census every five years. So, in this case, maybe by next year, we will be
conducting the 2006.

THE CHAIRMAN. But next year will be quite a long time, the matter is now being discussed
on the table. So, is that the only thing you could say that it’s not authorized by National
Statistics Office?
MS. VERGARA. Yes, sir. We have passed a resolution—orders to the provincial offices—to
our provincial offices stating that we can provide assistance in the conduct, but then we
cannot certify the result of the conduct as official.

THE CHAIRMAN. May we hear from the Honorable Governor Robert Lyndon Ace Barbers,
your reply on the statement of the representative from National Statistics Office.

MR. BARBERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good morning.

Yes, your Honor, we have conducted a special census in the year 2003. We were
accompanied by one of the employees from the Provincial National Statistics Office.
However, we also admit the fact that our special census or the special census we conducted
in 2003 was not validated or certified by the National Statistics Office, as provided by law.
So, we admit on our part that the certification that I have issued based on the submission of
records of each locality or each municipality from Dinagat Island[s] were true and correct
based on our level, not on National Statistics Office level.

But with that particular objection of Executive Director Ericta on what we have conducted, I
believe, your Honor, it will be, however, moot and academic in terms of the provision under
the Local Government Code on the requirements in making one area a province because
what we need is a minimum of 20 million, as stated by the Honorable Chairman and, of
course, the land area. Now, in terms of the land area, Dinagat Island[s] is exempted because
xxx the area is composed of more than one island. In fact, there are about 47 low tide and
high tide, less than 40? xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Governor. xxxx

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN. Although the claim of the governor is, even if we hold in abeyance this
questioned requirement, the other two requirements, as mandated by law, is already
achieved – the income and the land area.

MS. VERGARA. We do not question po the results of any locally conducted census, kasi po
talagang we provide assistance while they’re conducting their own census. But then, ang
requirement po kasi is, basta we will not certify—we will not certify any population count as a
result noong kanilang locally conducted census. Eh, sa Local Government Code po, we all
know na ang xxx nire-require nila is a certification provided by National Statistics Office. ‘Yon
po ‘yong requirement, di ba po?

THE CHAIRMAN. Oo. But a certification, even though not issued, cannot go against actual
reality because that’s just a bureaucratic requirement. Ang ibig kong sabihin, ipagpalagay, a
couple – isang lalaki, isang babae –nagmamahalan sila. As an offshoot of this undying love,
nagkaroon ng mga anak, hindi ba, pero hindi kasal, it’s a live-in situation. Ang tanong ko
lang, whether eventually, they got married or not, that love remains. And we cannot deny
also the existence of the offspring out of that love, di ba? Kaya…’yon lang. Okay. So, we just
skip on this….

MS. VERGARA. Your Honor.

REP. ECLEO (GLENDA). Mr. Chairman.

 THE CHAIRMAN. Please, Ms. Vergara.

MS. VERGARA. ‘Yong sinasabi n’yo po, sir, bale we computed the estimated population po
ng Dinagat Province for the next years. So, based on our computation, mari-reach po ng
Dinagat Province’yong requirement na 250,000 population by the year 2065 pa po based on
the growth rates during the period of ….

THE CHAIRMAN. 2065?

MS. VERGARA. 2065 po.

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN. . . . [T]his is not the center of our argument since, as stated by the
governor, kahit ha huwag na munang i-consider itong population requirement, eh,
nakalagpas naman sila doon sa income and land area, hindi ba?

Okay. Let’s give the floor to Congresswoman Ecleo.

REP. ECLEO (GLENDA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is in connection with the special census. Before this was done, I went to the NSO. I
talked to Administrator Ericta on the population. Then, I was told that the population, official
population of Dinagat is 106,000. So, I told them that I want a special census to be
conducted because there are so many houses that were not reached by the government
enumerators, and I want to have my own or our own special census with the help of the
provincial government. So, that is how it was conducted. Then, they told me that the official
population of the proposed province will be on 2010. But at this moment, that is the official
population of 106,000, even if our special census, we came up with 371,000 plus.

So, that is it.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Congresswoman.

Your insights will be reflected in my reply to Senate President Drilon, so that he can also
answer the letter of Bishop Cabahug.

MS. VERGARA. Mr. Chairman, may clarifications lang din po ako.

THE CHAIRMAN. Please.

MS. VERGARA. ‘Yon po sa sinasabi naming estimated population, we only based the
computation doon sa growth rate lang po talaga, excluding the migration. xxxx

MR. CHAIRMAN. No’ng mga residents.

MS. VERGARA. Yes, sir, natural growth lang po talaga siya.36

To reiterate, when the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had
an official population of only 106,951 based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population. Less than a
year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the 2007 Census of Population.
The NSO certified that as of August 1, 2007, Dinagat Islands had a total population of only
120,813,37 which was still below the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.38

In fine, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the population requirement for the
creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands.

The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code.39 Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria
prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.40

Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a
province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code.

Whether the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of gerrymandering

Petitioners contend that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of gerrymandering
on the ground that House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, with a population of 118,534
inhabitants, from the new province for complete political dominance by Congresswoman Glenda
Ecleo-Villaroman. According to petitioners, if Siargao were included in the creation of the new
province, the territorial requirement of 2,000 square kilometers would have been easily satisfied and
the enlarged area would have a bigger population of 200,305 inhabitants based on the 2000 Census
of Population by the NSO. But House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, because its inclusion
would result in uncertain political control. Petitioners aver that, in the past, Congresswoman Glenda
Ecleo-Villaroman lost her congressional seat twice to a member of an influential family based in
Siargao. Therefore, the only way to complete political dominance is by gerrymandering, to carve a
new province in Dinagat Islands where the Philippine Benevolent Members Association (PMBA),
represented by the Ecleos, has the numbers.

The argument of petitioners is unsubstantiated.

"Gerrymandering" is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so

contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power.41 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined "gerrymandering" as the formation of one legislative
district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party.42 The
Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far
as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.43

As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one
island and about 47 islets closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate territories. It is
an unsubstantiated allegation that the province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-
Villaroman.

Allegations of fraud and irregularities during the plebiscite cannot be resolved in a special civil action
for certiorari

Lastly, petitioners alleged that R.A. No. 9355 was ratified by a doubtful mandate in a plebiscite held
on December 2, 2005, where the "yes votes" were 69,9343, while the "no votes" were 63,502. They
contend that the 100% turnout of voters in the precincts of San Jose, Basilisa, Dinagat, Cagdianao
and Libjo was contrary to human experience, and that the results were statistically improbable.
Petitioners admit that they did not file any electoral protest questioning the results of the plebiscite,
because they lacked the means to finance an expensive and protracted election case.
Allegations of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of a plebiscite are factual in nature; hence, they
cannot be the subject of this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which is a remedy designed only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.44 Petitioners should have filed the proper action
with the Commission on Elections. However, petitioners admittedly chose not to avail themselves of
the correct remedy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as [An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands], is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of
the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared NULL and
VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133064 September 16, 1999

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and

ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO
VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ,
in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE
HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his
capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial
Treasurer, respondents, GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an
independent component city to a component city.

On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into
an independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified
R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.1

On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among
others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component
city, viz.:

AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720

— AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN
INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF
SANTIAGO.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

Sec. 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words
"an independent" thereon so that said Section will read as follows:

Sec. 2. The City of Santiago. — The Municipality of Santiago shall be

converted into a component city to be known as the City of Santiago,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present
territory of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial
jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and bounds
of the Municipality of Santiago.

Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire
section and in its stead substitute the following:
 Sec. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and any Elective Provincial
Position for the Province of Isabela. — The voters of the City of
Santiago shall be qualified to vote in the elections of the Provincial
Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and
other elective provincial positions of the Province of Isabela, and any
such qualified voter can be a candidate for such provincial positions
and any elective provincial office.

Sec. 3. Repealing Clause. — All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 4. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. 2 They alleged as ground the lack of provision
in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite.
Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at bar. Petitioner
Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and
Babaran are residents of Santiago City.

In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the
petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.

Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The Solicitor
General also contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is
contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city
to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units," hence, a plebiscite of the people of
Santiago is unnecessary.

A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao, 3 a member of the
provincial board of Isabela. 4 He contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991 do not require a plebiscite "to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in
provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He
also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.

Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They
defended their standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a
result of its reclassification.

We find merit in the petition.

First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule that
the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. 5 Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present petition in
his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent of the city council
of Santiago. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of Santiago from independent
component city to a mere component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown hereafter. The
injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and immediate and not a
mere generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago City. Similarly, the standing of the other
petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of Santiago. They have the
right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The
denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike the law as unconstitutional.
1âw phi1.nêt

Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the
ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal
especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as
including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government." To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by
this Court in many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Tañada v. Cuenco, 6 we held:

xxx xxx xxx

The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers "to those questions which under the Constitution are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.

In Casibang v. Aquino, 7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:

A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable,
an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by
law, for said breach of right.

Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No.
8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not
petitioners have the said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws
passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that
this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the
meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.

Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that
the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city
should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the Constitution requires a
plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged,

abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

This constitutional requirement is reiterrated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local

Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with
 the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government
units belongs to Congress. 8 This power is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution
vested in Congress. 9 The exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an independent
component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a
plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within the
meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal
that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator — material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the
Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to
appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our
previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the
people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in
the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the
vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local
government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of
legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government
units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them
— direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite
requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local
government units.

The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one,
the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under
the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city
council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be
collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners pointed out these far
reaching changes on the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz.: 10

Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528 had
"merely re-classified" Santiago City from an independent component city into a
component city, the effect when challenged (sic) the Act were operational would be,
actually, that of conversion. Consequently, there would be substantial changes in the
political culture and administrative responsibilities of Santiago City, and the Province
of Isabela. Santiago City from an independent component city will revert to the
Province of Isabela, geographically, politically, and administratively. Thus, the
territorial land area of Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising the
province of Isabela. This will be to the benefit or advantage of the Provincial
Government of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of its share from the
internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A.
No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based on land area
and population of local government units, provinces included.

The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City Government,
and which taxes shall accrue solely to the City Government, will be redefined
(Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the province such as taxes on
sand, gravel and other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160), professional
taxes (Section 139, R.A. No. 7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No.
 7160). The Provincial Government will allocate operating funds for the City.
Inarguably, there would be a (sic) diminished funds for the local operations of the
City Government because of reduced shares of the IRA in accordance with the
schedule set forth by Section 285 of R.A. No. 7160. The City Government's share in
the proceeds in the development and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted
since certain portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A.
No. 7160).

The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial
officials (Section 451 and 452 [c], R.A. No. 7160).

The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the Provincial
Governor who is tasked by law to ensure that every component city and municipality
within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review
(Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders submitted by the former (Section
455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with respect to the
local governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No.
7160). Elective city officials will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial
Governor (Section 63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will be the great change in the state of
the political autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue of R.A. No. 7720,
it is the Office of the President which has supervisory authority over it as an
independent component city (Section 25, R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X),
1987 Constitution).

The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the Sangguniang

Panlungsod will be subject to the review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections
56, 468, (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No. 7160). Likewise, the
decisions in administrative cases by the former could be appealed and acted upon by
the latter (Section 67 R.A. No. 7160).

It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a
municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a
plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite
should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No.
8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people
when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with the
Constitution when it provides that:

(f) Plebiscite — (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial

alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The
plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within
one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance
prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

xxx xxx xxx

The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they
result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change
in the political and economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No.
8528 on the ground that Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power
of amendment, however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when
an amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
He also contends that the amendment merely caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a city.
Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A.
No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the
people of the local government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a
material change in their rights and responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a
component city as a mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will
radically change its physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its
people.

On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if the
classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is
there a need for such changes to be approved by the people . . . ."

With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of Section 10, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." It is clear that the Constitution
imposes two conditions — first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on
income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."

In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said
criteria and they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements,
however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government unit
concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed,
the Local Government Code does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its
requirements on income, population and land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10,
Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes
casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said
plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date
of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes
another
date. 11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines
that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory.12

It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different purposes.
The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area are designed
to achieve an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified indicators, hence, section 7,
Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these "indicators shall be attested by the
Department of Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required
to achieve a political purpose — to use the people's voice as a check against the pernicious political
practice of gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess committed by the political
representatives of the people themselves than the exercise of direct people power. As well-observed
by one commentator, as the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries are ". . . basic to local government, it is also imperative that these acts be done not only
by Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality concerned. . . . By giving the
inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision will also eliminate the old practice of
gerrymandering and minimize legislative action designed for the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it
promotes the autonomy of local government units." 13

The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of its people.
In the debates in Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has
been converted to an independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years ago and the
conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes. Some legislators expressed surprise for the
sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been no significant change in its
socio-economic-political status. The only reason given for the downgrading is to enable the people of the
city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say the least, the alleged reason is unconvincing for it
is the essence of an independent component city that its people can no longer participate or be voted for
in the election of officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they gave up that
privilege when they voted to be independent from the province of Isabela. There was an attempt on the
part of the Committee on Local Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people via
a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when a recess was called. After
the recess, the chairman of the Committee announced the withdrawal of the amendment "after a very
enlightening conversion with the elders of the Body." We quote the debates, viz.: 14

BILL ON SECOND READING

H.B. No. 8729 — City of Santiago

Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move

that we consider House Bill No. 8729
as reported out under Committee
Report No. 971.

The President. Is there any objection?

[Silence] there being none, the motion
is approved.

Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of the
Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without prejudice to inserting in
the Record the whole text thereof.

The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled:

AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A.

NO. 7720 ENTITLED "AN ACT CONVERTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN
INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN
AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO

The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729

Insert

Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the

sponsorship, I ask that the
 distinguished Chairman of the
Committee on Local Government be
recognized.

The President. Senator Sotto is

recognized.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO

Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729,

which was introduced in the House by
Congressman Antonio M. Abaya as its
principal author, is a simple measure
which merely seeks to convert the City
of Santiago into a component city of
the Province of Isabela.

The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically an integral

part of the Province of Isabela. As an independent component city, however, it is
completely detached and separate from the said province as a local political unit. To
use the language of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, the City of Santiago is
an "island in the provincial milieu.

The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they qualified
to run for any elective positions in the Province of Isabela.

The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power and
authority of general supervision over the city and its officials, which power and
authority are now exercised by the Office of the President, which is very far away
from Santiago City.

Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of Santiago is
affected, one way or the other, by the happenings in the said province, and is
benefited by its progress and development. Hence, the proposed bill to convert the
City of Santiago into a component city of Isabela.

Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this august

Body Committee Report No. 971 of the Committee on Local Government,
recommending approval, with our proposed committee amendment, of House Bill No.
8729.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is

recognized.

Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved

(sic) that we close the period of
interpellations.
 The President. Is there any objection?
[Silence] There being none, the period
of interpellations is closed.

Senator Tatad. I move that we now

consider the committee amendments.

Senator Roco. Mr. President.

The President. What is the pleasure of

Senator Roco?

Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I

ask for a reconsideration of the ruling
on the motion to close the period of
interpellations just to be able to ask a
few questions?

Senator Tatad. May I move for a

reconsideration of my motion, Mr.
President.

The President. Is there any objection

to the reconsideration of the closing of
the period of interpellations? [Silence]
There being none, the motion is
approved.

Senator Roco is recognized.

Senator Roco. Will the distinguished

gentlemen yield for some questions?

Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.

Senator Roco. Mr. President, together

with the Chairman of the Committee
on Local Government, we were with
the sponsors when we approved this
bill to make Santiago a City. That was
about two and a half years ago. At that
time, I remember it was the cry of the
city that it be "independent." Now we
are deleting that word "independent."

Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I
want some explanation on what happened between then and now that has made us
decided that the City of Santiago should cease to be independent and should now
become a component city.
 Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the
officials of the province said during the
public hearing that they are no longer
vested with the power and authority of
general supervision over the city. The
power and authority is now being
exercised by the Office of the
President and it is quite far from the
City of Santiago.

In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some sectors that
they want to participate in the provincial elections.

Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not

mean to delay this. I did want it on
record, however. I think there was a
majority of 14,000 who approved the
charter, and maybe we owe it to those
who voted for that charter some
degree of respect. But if there has
been a change of political will, there
has been a change of political will,
then so be it.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be

very frank about it, that was a very
important point raised by Senator
Roco, and I will have to place it on the
Record of the Senate that the reason
why we are proposing a committee
amendment is that, originally, there
was an objection on the part of the
local officials and those who oppose it
by incorporating a plebiscite in this bill.
That was the solution. Because there
were some sectors in the City of
Santiago who were opposing the
reclassification or reconversion of the
city into a component city.

Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr.

President — because the two of us
had special pictures (sic) in the city —
is that I thought it should be put on
record that we have supported
originally the proposal to make it an
independent city. But now if it is their
request, then, on the manifestation of
the Chairman, let it be so.
 Thank you.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman

yield for a few questions, Mr.
President.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further

to the interpellation of our good friend,
the Senator from Bicol, on the matter
of the opinion of the citizens of
Santiago City, there is a resolution
passed by the Sanggunian on January
30, 1997 opposing the conversion of
Santiago from an independent city.

This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And that is the
reason why, as mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the amendments is that a
plebiscite be conducted before the law takes effect.

The question I would like to raise — and I would like to recall the statement of our
Minority Leader — is that, at this time we should not be passing it for a particular
politician.

In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that the
additional territory be added to the election of the provincial officials of the province
of Isabela.

Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware

of it, Mr. President.

Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.

The President. With the permission of

the two gentlemen on the Floor,
Senator Alvarez is recognized.

Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred

citizen of this city, Mr. President, may I
share some information.

Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial leadership, it will
not be to the benefit of the provincial leadership, because the provincial leadership
will then campaign in a bigger territory.
As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of Santiago
who will now be enfranchised in the provincial electoral process, and whose children
will have the opportunity to grow into provincial leadership. This is one of the prime
reasons why this amendment is being put forward.

While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those who
signed the resolution were not the whole of the council. This bill was sponsored by
the congressman of that district who represents a constituency, the voice of the
district.

I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice must
be heard, and if we have to fathom the interest of the people, the law which has been
crafted here in accordance with the rules should be given account, as we do give
account to many of the legislations coming from the House on local issues.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the

reason why I am raising this question
is that, as Senator Roco said, just two
and-a-half years ago we passed a bill
which indeed disenfranchized — if we
want to use that phrase — the citizens
of the City of Santiago in the matter of
the provincial election. Two-and-a-half
years after, we are changing the rule.

In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a plebiscite
in order to approve the conversion of the city into an independent city. I believe that
the only way to resolve this issue raised by Senator Roco is again to subject this
issue to another plebiscite as part of the provision of this proposed bill and as will be
proposed by the Committee Chairman as an amendment.

Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the

Constitution does not require that the
change from an independent to a
component city be subjected to a
plebiscite.

Secs. 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those
enumerated. So the proposal coming from the House is in adherence to this
constitutional mandate which does not require a plebiscite.
 Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key
word here is "conversion". The word
"conversion" appears in that provision
wherein we must call a plebiscite.
During the public hearing, the
representative of Congressman Abaya
was insisting that this is not a
conversion; this is merely a
reclassification. But it is clear in the
bill.

We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a component city.
That is how the members of the committee felt. That is why we have proposed an
amendment to this, and this is to incorporate a plebiscite in as much as there is no
provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we would like not only to give the
other people of Santiago a chance or be enfranchised as far as the leadership of the
province is concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who are opposing it.
To them, this is the best compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political
leaders of Isabela deciding for them.

Senator Tatad. Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is

recognized.

Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr.

President, I think we can move to
close the period of interpellations.

The President. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

Senator Tatad. I move that we now

consider the committee amendments,
Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none the motion
is approved.

Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line

13, insert a new Section 3, as follows:

Sec 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED BY

DELETING THE ENTIRE SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE
FOLLOWING:

Sec. 49. PLEBISCITE. — THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF

SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE PROVINCE OF
ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RETIFICATION OF
THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A
PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE
WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND
SUPERVISE SUCH PLEBISCITE.

The President. Is there any objection?

Senator Enrile. Mr. President.

The President. Senator Enrile is

recognized.

Senator Enrile. I object to this

committee amendment, Mr. President.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-

minute suspension of the session.

The President. The session is

suspended for a few minutes if there is
no objection. [There was none].

It was 7:54 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is

resumed.

Senator Sotto is recognized.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a

very enlightening conversation with
the elders of the Body, I withdraw my
amendment.

The President. The amendment is

withdrawn.

Senator Maceda. Mr. President.

The President. Senator Maceda is

recognized.
 Senator Maceda. We wish to thank
the sponsor for the withdrawal of the
amendment.

Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela — I am no great fan of
the Senator from Isabela — but it so happens that this is a local bill affecting not only
his province but his own city where he is a resident and registered voter.

So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national importance,
senatorial courtesy demands that we, as much as possible, accommodate the
request of the Senator from Isabela as we have done on matters affecting the district
of other senators. I need not remind them.

Thank you anyway, Mr. President.

Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.

The President. Senator Alvarez is

recognized.

Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I

express my deepest appreciation for
the statement of the gentleman from
Ilocos and Laguna. Whatever he may
have said, the feeling is not mutual. At
least for now, I have suddenly become
his great fan for the evening.

May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of
Santiago not because I do not want it to be a city but because it had disenfranchised
the young men of my city from aspiring for the leadership of the province. The town is
the gem of the province. How could we extricate the town from the province?

But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman of the
Committee.

Senator Tatad. Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is

recognized.

Senator Tatad. There being no

committee amendments, I move that
the period of committee amendments
be closed.

The President. Shall we amend the

title of this bill by removing the word
"independent" preceding "component
city"?
 Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We
are merely citing the title. The main
title of this House Bill No. 8729 is "An
Act Amending Certain Sections of
Republic Act 7720". The title is the title
of Republic Act 7720. So, I do not
think that we should amend that
anymore.

The President. What is the pending

motion? Will the gentleman kindly
state the motion?

Senator Tatad. I move that we close

the period of committee amendments.

The President. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

Senator Tatad. Unless there are any

individual amendments, I move that
we close the period of individual
amendments.

The President. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the period
of individual amendments is closed.

APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING

Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move

that we vote on Second Reading on
House Bill No. 8729.

The President. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, we shall
now vote on Second Reading on
House Bill No. 8729.

As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.

Several Members. Aye.

As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silences]

House Bill No. 8279 is approved on Second Reading.

The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the
downgrading of the city of Santiago. There is all the reason to listen to the voice of the
people of the city via a plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. v. COMELEC,15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of Negros
Occidental without consulting its people in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the
law as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose behind its
enactment, viz:

The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was "to have the creation of the new
Province a fait accompli by the time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The
transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the new Governor and other officials
shall by then have been installed in office, ready to function for purposes of the
election for President and Vice-President." Thus, the petitioners reported after the
event: "With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up
and proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government
officials headed by Governor Armando Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the
elections were held on February 7, 1986, the political machinery was in place to
deliver the "solid North" to ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What happened
in Negros del Norte during the elections — the unashamed use of naked power and
resources — contributed in no small way to arousing "people's power" and steel the
ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to
be a Filipino today.

The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the
implementing acts complained of, viz., the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new
province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are equally void. The
limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as
provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas
of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod,
Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las Castellana, Isabela, Moises
Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladoid, San
Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes
and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973
Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially
altered without "the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in
the unit or units affected." It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the
province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new province,
comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire province
of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite,
because the whole is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its
boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and
seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the
secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the
majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.

Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when allegedly independent
component cities were downgraded into component cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the
City of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, 16 and the City of San Carlos, Pangasinan 17 whose charters
were amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the election of officials of the province to
which their city belongs without submitting the amendment to a plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of
Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities then were
not independent component cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two cities were chartered but were not
independent component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were considered
independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San Carlos City was under consideration by the
Senate, Senator Pimentel explained: 18
 . . . Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers
the voters of San Carlos to vote in the elections of provincial officials. There is no
intention whatsoever to downgrade the status of the City of San Carlos and there is
no showing whatsoever that the enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish the
powers and prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City
of San Carlos as of now, is a component city. It is not a highly urbanized city.
Therefore, this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of the city, the power
to vote in provincial elections, without in any way changing the character of its being
a component city. It is for this reason that I vote in favor of this bill.

It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill 19 allowing qualified voters of the city of
Oroquieta to vote in provincial elections of the province of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship
speech, he explained that the right to vote being given to the people of Oroquieta City was
consistent with its status as a component city. 20 Indeed, during the debates, former Senator
Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy the anomalous situation then obtaining ". . .
where voters of one component city cannot vote simply because their charters so
provide." 21 Thus, Congress amended other charters of component cities prohibiting their people
from voting in provincial elections.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and
the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing
said law.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992

HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on November 13, 1991, Resolution
No. 2312 which reads as follows:

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa,
Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and
Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.

WHEREAS under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution 1 the creation of a municipality
shall be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
337) 2 said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections;

WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155 provides that the expenses in holding the
plebiscite shall be take out of the Contingent Fund under the current fiscal year appropriations;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves, to promulgated (sic)

the following guidelines to govern the conduct of said plebiscite:

1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or units
affected, namely the barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labor, Camarines
Norte (Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986).

xxx xxx xxx

In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its creation
while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the
political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes. 3

Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the
plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be
undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and
that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No.
2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan,
Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the
remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. 4

In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, particularly
Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan v. COMELEC 5 relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe,
thus reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary 6 which held that where a local unit is to be segregated
from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated should be included in the plebiscite. 7
Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently, whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas
comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is
valid.

We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the
plebiscite, which rejected the creation of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.

Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that
since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case is no
longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 especially since the latter provision deleted
the words "unit or."

We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its
precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution not affected our ruling in Tan vs. Comelec as explained by
then CONCOM Commissioner, now my distinguished colleague, Associate Justice Hilario Davide, during the debates
in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:

Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the
Committee that under the formulation in the present Local Government Code, the words used are
actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words.
Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about this.

Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the part
of the two Gentlemen from the floor?

Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in the
plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay
plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.9 (Emphasis supplied)

It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly
affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a
portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units
directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. 10 Logically, those to be
included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."1

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners
Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo
Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of
the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan,
Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of
R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive
term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law

(the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three
(3) years following the return of every census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of
the bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord

with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest
 survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
450,000.

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned
citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as
aforestated.

We find no merit in the petitions.

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a
highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the
City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in
Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by
Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on
the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the
City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.

The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate
agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of
territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government
units. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes
and bounds with technical descriptions.2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of
the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers
which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local
Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the
description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.
We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area
of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality."

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the
proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the
time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-
equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to
decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could
decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its
exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.3 We take judicial notice of the fact that
Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other
local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable
difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing
boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to
hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor
General in this regard, viz.:

Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil
that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or
converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical
descriptions" — was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said
cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and
bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is
not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be
reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring
municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent
behind the law has been sufficiently served.

Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein
detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as
petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine
qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local
Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower
local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local
governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same
time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on
the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would
serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the
master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the
intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it
may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the
letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.
(Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which,
for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes
(Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the
case at bar.

II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No.
7854. Section 51 states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall
exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and
the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The
appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their
functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government
of the City of Makati.

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution which provide:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of
three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the
House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more
than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new
corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point
that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already
served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and
eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998
and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term
as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been
conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a
litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the
same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has no jurisdiction.

III

Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of
R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:

Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city,
Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially
correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the
next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu
of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis
supplied)

They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not
expressed in the title of the bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled
that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not
more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than
a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting
R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the
legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation
for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city
or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population
of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia,
that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative
district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias
v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-
one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command
that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence,
we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to such general subject."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146319 October 26, 2001

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 146342 October 26, 2001

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF
SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF BACON, respondents.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806
which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.

On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act
Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The
Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor."1

Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,2 the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on
December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and
submitted the matter for ratification.

On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed3 the creation of
the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite.4

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon, Benjamin E.
Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking
the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:

A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period
from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and

B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day
extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before
conducting the plebiscite.

Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another petition
(G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No.
8806 for being unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:

1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution)
 which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city"; and

2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon
and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one
subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated.5

Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May 14, 2001 elections, the
newly-created Sorsogon City had the first election of its officials. Since then, the City Government of
Sorsogon has been regularly discharging its corporate and political powers pursuant to its charter,
R.A. No. 8806.

We shall first delve on petitioner's constitutional challenge against R.A. No. 8806 in G.R No. 146342.

Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.6 This presumption is rooted in the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the
Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts.7 The theory is that every law, being the joint
act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord
with the fundamental law.8 This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not merely a doubtful or argumentative one.9 In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond
reasonable doubt,10 for to doubt is to sustain.11

Petitioner initially reject R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
which provides, inter alia:

"SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." (Emphasis ours)

The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (the Code), thus:

"SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
 (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created
is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." (Emphasis ours)

Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No. 8806 complied
with the criteria set by the Code as to income, population and land area. What he is assailing is its
mode of creation. He contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be
created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two
municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

This contention is devoid of merit.

Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but
simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of local
government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:

"SECTION 8. Division and Merger. — Division and merger of existing local government units
shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided,
however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local
government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this
Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit
or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. . . . ."
(Emphasis ours)

Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing
local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or
division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no "compelling" reason for merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon considering that the
Municipality of Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. This argument
goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In Angara v.
Electoral Commission,12 this Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that "the judiciary
does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of
judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable,"13 and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply
because we feel it is unwise or impractical. "14

Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated
in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:

"SECTION 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof." (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1)
the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon
City, petitioner claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.

The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject
embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation
of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a
subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but
the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary
means by which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the
City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon,
and Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the
two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this
consequence.

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein.15 The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,16 and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation.17 Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."18

Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the
presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.

We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity of the plebiscite conducted by
the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City.

Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be conducted within 120 days
from the "approval" of said Act per express provision of its Section 54, viz:

"SECTION 54. Plebiscite. — The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon
the ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a
plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Act. x x x ." (Emphasis ours)

The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner
claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the
120-day period after the approval of the Act. This 120-day period having expired without a plebiscite
being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite
held on December 16, 2000.

In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on December 16, 2000 based
on the date of the effectivity of the Act. Section 65 of the Act states:

"SECTION 65. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general and local circulation."
The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a newspaper of general
circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the
Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on September 1, 2000, which
date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period
within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the
law had not yet been published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for
the effectivity of a law, citing the landmark case of Tañada vs. Tuvera,19 it could only schedule the
plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000
plebiscite was well within the 120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.

The COMELEC is correct.

In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:

"SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. — No creation, division, merger, abolition, or

substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political
unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or
ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date." (Emphasis
ours)

Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be conducted within
120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its approval. While the same provision
allows a law or ordinance to fix "another date" for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be
reckoned from the date of the effectivity of the law.

Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be read together
with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only mean "effectivity" as used and
contemplated in Section 10 of the Code. This construction is in accord with the fundamental rule that
all provisions of the laws relating to the same subject should be read together and reconciled to
avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established jurisprudence. As we stated in Tañada:

"ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the
clause 'unless it is otherwise provided' refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication." (Emphasis supplied)

To give Section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the Act effective even
before its publication, which scenario is precisely abhorred in Tañada.

Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive information campaign on
the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11
(b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code. However, no proof whatsoever
was presented by petitioner to substantiate his allegation. Consequently, we sustain the
presumption20 that the COMELEC regularly performed or complied with its duty under the law in
conducting the plebiscite.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.