Navarro v. Ermita 613 SCRA 131 2010 and 648 SCRA 400 2011
Navarro v. Ermita 613 SCRA 131 2010 and 648 SCRA 400 2011
Navarro v. Ermita 613 SCRA 131 2010 and 648 SCRA 400 2011
Ermita 613 SCRA 131 (2010) and 648 SCRA 400 (2011)
G.R. No. 180050
Author: SMDC
Topic: CREATION AND ABOLITION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; Income: Average two years
income requirement under Sec. 450 of the LGC
For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 20, 2010
filed by Movant-Intervenors[1] dated and filed on October 29, 2010, praying that the Court (a) recall the
entry of judgment, and (b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution.
To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a brief background of the
relevant antecedents
On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An
Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).[2] On December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under
the Local Government Code (LGC).[3] The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes.[4] With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del
Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial
officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized
elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1,
2007.[5]
On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former
political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R.
No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355.[6] The Court dismissed the petition on
technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.[7]
Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, filed another
petition for certiorari[8] seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the
creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and
would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was
passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951,
failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both
counts, viz.
Constitution, Article X Local Government
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
(ii)
a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision[9] granting the petition.[10] The Decision declared
R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in
the creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the
election of its officials as null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on
Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, [t]he land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands for
being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided
in the law.[11]
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective
motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution[12] dated May 12, 2010,[13] the Court
denied the said motions.[14]
Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of court to admit their
second motions for reconsideration, accompanied by their second motions for reconsideration. These
motions were eventually noted without action by this Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution.[15]
Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File
and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They alleged
that the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8790, relevant to this case, which provides
RESOLUTION NO. 8790
WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven (7) municipalities, were previously components of the
First Legislative District of the Province of Surigao del Norte. In December 2006 pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9355, the Province of Dinagat Island[s] was created and its creation was ratified on 02 December
2006 in the Plebiscite for this purpose;
WHEREAS, as a province, Dinagat Islands was, for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections, allocated one (1) seat for Governor, one (1) seat for Vice Governor, one (1) for congressional
seat, and ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats pursuant to Resolution No. 8670 dated 16
September 2009;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180050 entitled Rodolfo Navarro, et al., vs. Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, as representative of the President of the Philippines, et al. rendered a
Decision, dated 10 February 2010, declaring Republic Act No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply
with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code in
relation to Sec. 10, Art. X, of the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, respondents intend to file Motion[s] for Reconsideration on the above decision of the
Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member, House of Representatives
representing the lone congressional district of Dinagat Islands, (2) names of the candidates for the
aforementioned position, (3) position for Governor, Dinagat Islands, (4) names of the candidates for the
said position, (5) position of the Vice Governor, (6) the names of the candidates for the said position, (7)
positions for the ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members and, [8] all the names of the candidates for
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, have already been configured into the system and can no longer
be revised within the remaining period before the elections on May 10, 2010.
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether the Decision of
the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to declare that:
a.
If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current system configuration is in line
with the reconsidered Decision, meaning that the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao
del Norte remain as two (2) separate provinces;
b.
If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will
revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte.
But because of the current system configuration, the ballots for the Province of Dinagat Islands will, for
the positions of Member, House of Representatives, Governor, Vice Governor and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, bear only the names of the candidates for the said positions.
Conversely, the ballots for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of
Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First District of Surigao del Norte and
Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, show only candidates for the said position. Likewise, the whole
Province of Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of Governor and Vice Governor, bear only the names
of the candidates for the said position[s].
Consequently, the voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands will not be able to vote for the candidates of
Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and Member, House [of] Representatives, First Legislative District,
Surigao del Norte, and candidates for Governor and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte. Meanwhile,
voters of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Member, House of Representatives, Dinagat Islands. Also, the voters of
the whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for the Governor and Vice Governor,
Dinagat Islands. Given this situation, the Commission will postpone the elections for Governor, Vice
Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, because the election will result in
[a] failure to elect, since, in actuality, there are no candidates for Governor, Vice Governor, Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, and Member, House of Representatives, First
Legislative District (with Dinagat Islands) of Surigao del Norte.
c.
If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will
revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the
election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in Item b above. A special election for
Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del
Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands)
will have to be conducted.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions
will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is
not reversed, they have a legal interest in the instant case and would be directly affected by the
declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. Simply put, movants-intervenors election to their respective offices
would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be conducted for governor, vice
governor, and House of Representatives member and Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. Moreover, as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public
servants representing the interests of their constituents, they have a clear and strong interest in the
outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte will affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of the
province will have to be restructured; (2) the services of many employees will have to be terminated; (3)
contracts will have to be invalidated; and (4) projects and other developments will have to be
discontinued. In addition, they claim that their rights cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any
other proceeding since their rights would be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain
finality.
In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three (3)
main arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355
operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial
contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the
application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable
in the instant case.
In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010,[16] the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File
and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground
that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the
Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this
case.
On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution, citing several rulings[17] of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule
19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged
that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred
that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case. Even for the
sake of argument that they had notice of the pendency of the case, they pointed out that prior to the said
elections, Sol T. Matugas was a simple resident of Surigao del Norte, Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Second District of Surigao del Norte, and Mamerto D.
Galanida was the Municipal Mayor of Socorro, Surigao del Norte, and that, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 8790, it was only after they were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice Governor
of Surigao del Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of Surigao del Norte,
respectively, that they became possessed with legal interest in this controversy.
On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case
had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the above motion.
At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall
Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original
parties, and neither on Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion, which our
esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers as Dinagats third motion for reconsideration.
Inasmuch as the motions for leave to admit their respective motions for reconsideration of the May 12,
2010 Resolution and the aforesaid motions for reconsideration were already noted without action by the
Court, there is no reason to treat Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion differently. In relation to this, the
Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors could not be considered as a second
motion for reconsideration to warrant the application of Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court.[18] It should be noted that this motion prays for the recall of the entry of judgment and for
the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution which remained
unresolved. The denial of their motion for leave to intervene and to admit motion for reconsideration of the
May 12, 2010 Resolution did not rule on the merits of the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010
Resolution, but only on the timeliness of the intended intervention. Their motion for reconsideration of this
denial elaborated on movants-intervenors interest in this case which existed only after judgment had been
rendered. As such, their motion for intervention and their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010
Resolution merely stand as an initial reconsideration of the said resolution.
With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the records to support the claim that
this was a ploy of respondents legal tactician to reopen the case despite an entry of judgment. To be sure,
it is actually COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 that set this controversy into motion anew. To reiterate, the
pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
c.
If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will
revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the
election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in Item b above. A special election for
Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del
Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands)
will have to be conducted. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar circumstance of proper party interest for
movants-intervenors only with the specter of the decision in the main case becoming final and executory.
More importantly, if the intervention be not entertained, the movants-intervenors would be left with no
other remedy as regards to the impending nullification of their election to their respective positions. Thus,
to the Courts mind, there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by
movants-intervenors.
It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for certiorari way back
on October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors had nothing at stake in the outcome of this case.
While it may be argued that their interest in this case should have commenced upon the issuance of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it is obvious that their interest in this case then was more imaginary than
real. This is because COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 provides that should the decision in this case attain
finality prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the election of the local government officials stated therein
would only have to be postponed. Given such a scenario, movants-intervenors would not have suffered
any injury or adverse effect with respect to the reversion of Dinagat as part of Surigao del Norte since
they would simply have remained candidates for the respective positions they have vied for and to which
they have been elected.
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Because constitutional cases are
often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question
frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised.[19]
It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent Motion to
Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied
with finality. Indeed, they have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to their respective
positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to
naught. Given their unique circumstances, movants-intervenors should not be left without any remedy
before this Court simply because their interest in this case became manifest only after the case had
already been decided. The consequences of such a decision would definitely work to their disadvantage,
nay, to their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the dispute. Such decision would also
violate their right to due process, a right that cries out for protection. Thus, it is imperative that the
movants-intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause. We are not only a court of law, but also of
justice and equity, such that our position and the dire repercussions of this controversy should be weighed
on the scales of justice, rather than dismissed on account of mootness.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation
of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[20] The
second exception attends this case.
This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[21] where technicalities
of procedure on locus standi were brushed aside, because the constitutional issues raised were of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court. Along
parallel lines, the motion for intervention should be given due course since movants-intervenors have
shown their substantial legal interest in the outcome of this case, even much more than petitioners
themselves, and because of the novelty, gravity, and weight of the issues involved.
Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution
of movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment of a case, which, though merely a
statutory right that must comply with the requirements of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial
system, such that courts should proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the
judgment and its effects, and ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be directly
affected, would have the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause, freed from
the constraints of technicalities.[22]
Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of attendant
extraordinary circumstances.[23] The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final.[24] In this
case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they
would be adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but
also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local
government units. In this manner, the thrust of the Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the
LGC with respect to decentralization and the attainment of national goals, as hereafter elucidated, will
effectively be realized.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look, the Court finds that the first
and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors deserve affirmative consideration.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units
are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents.
The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish
these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each
of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.
Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province,
is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC. In this connection, the following
excerpts from congressional debates are quoted hereunder
HON. ALFELOR. Income is mandatory. We can even have this doubled because we thought
CHAIRMAN CUENCO. In other words, the primordial consideration here is the economic viability of the
new local government unit, the new province?
xxxx
HON. LAGUDA. The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than the House version,
because we also believe that economic viability is really a minimum. Land area and population are
functions really of the viability of the area, because you have an income level which would be the trigger
point for economic development, population will naturally increase because there will be an immigration.
However, if you disallow the particular area from being converted into a province because of the
population problems in the beginning, it will never be able to reach the point where it could become a
province simply because it will never have the economic take off for it to trigger off that economic
development.
Now, were saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a floor area where it could pay for overhead and
provide a minimum of basic services to the population. Over and above that, the provincial officials should
be able to trigger off economic development which will attract immigration, which will attract new
investments from the private sector. This is now the concern of the local officials. But if we are going to tie
the hands of the proponents, simply by telling them, Sorry, you are now at 150 thousand or 200 thousand,
you will never be able to become a province because nobody wants to go to your place. Why? Because
you never have any reason for economic viability.
xxxx
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, what about land area?
HON. LUMAUIG. 1,500 square kilometers
HON. ANGARA. Walang problema yon, in fact thats not very critical, yong land area because
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, ya, our, the Senate version is 3.5, 3,500 square meters, ah, square
kilometers.
HON. LAGUDA. Ne, Ne. A province is constituted for the purpose of administrative efficiency and delivery
of basic services.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Right.
HON. LAGUDA. Actually, when you come down to it, when government was instituted, there is only one
central government and then everybody falls under that. But it was later on subdivided into provinces for
purposes of administrative efficiency.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay.
HON. LAGUDA. Now, what were seeing now is that the administrative efficiency is no longer there
precisely because the land areas that we are giving to our governors is so wide that no one man can
possibly administer all of the complex machineries that are needed.
Secondly, when you say delivery of basic services, as pointed out by Cong. Alfelor, there are sections of
the province which have never been visited by public officials, precisely because they dont have the time
nor the energy anymore to do that because its so wide. Now, by compressing the land area and by
reducing the population requirement, we are, in effect, trying to follow the basic policy of why we are
creating provinces, which is to deliver basic services and to make it more efficient in administration.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, thats correct, but on the assumption that the province is able to do it
without being a burden to the national government. Thats the assumption.
HON. LAGUDA. Thats why were going into the minimum income level. As we said, if we go on a minimum
income level, then we say, this is the trigger point at which this administration can take place.[25]
Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a municipality, a city, and a province
as provided both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR, viz.
For a Barangay:
LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. (a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous territory
which has a population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions
or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand
(5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original
barangay or barangays to less than the minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays may be
created in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the criteria
prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang
panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities
within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay
consolidation plan can be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. (a) Creation of barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan shall
require prior recommendation of the sangguniang bayan.
(b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by Act of Congress, subject to
the limitations and requirements prescribed in this Article.
(c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created in the indigenous cultural
communities by Act of Congress upon recommendation of the LGU or LGUs where the cultural
community is located.
(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:
(1) Population which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000) inhabitants, except in municipalities
and cities within MMA and other metropolitan political subdivisions as may be created by law, or in highlyurbanized cities where such territory shall have a population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants,
as certified by the NSO. The creation of a barangay shall not reduce the population of the original
barangay or barangays to less than the prescribed minimum/
(2) Land Area which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or more islands. The territorial
jurisdiction of a barangay sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries.
Municipality:
LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, or at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos
(P2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of
at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a
contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or
income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the municipality
concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as
such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
this Code shall henceforth be considered regular municipalities.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. (a) Requisites for Creation A municipality shall not be created
unless the following requisites are present:
(i)
Income An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices, as certified by the provincial treasurer. The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring
income;
(ii)
Population which shall not be less than twenty five thousand (25,000) inhabitants, as certified
by NSO; and
(iii)
Land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square kilometers, as
certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed municipality is composed of one (1) or more
islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds.
The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses
incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
City:
LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at
least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisities:
(i)
a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii)
a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by
the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless the following
requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the
immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one
hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income
of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one
(1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or
LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses
incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
Provinces:
LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either of the following requisites:
(i)
a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii)
a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. (a) Requisites for creation A province shall not be created unless the
following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the
immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to
the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall
be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU
or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses
incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays,
land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities,
component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more
islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450
of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively.
This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section
461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but
not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a
greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created
province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative
policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities)
of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional
oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for
the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations underpinning the principle
of local autonomy.
Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment
of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall
be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the national government to the local government units.
This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3(a) of the LGC-IRR[26] and in the Whereas clauses of
Administrative Order No. 270,[27] which read
WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the State shall ensure the autonomy of
local governments;
WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, affirms, among others, that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State
shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals;
WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the President to convene an
Oversight Committee for the purpose of formulating and issuing the appropriate rules and regulations
necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of all the provisions of the said Code; and
WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations with all the concerned
sectors of society and consideration of the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the Local
Government Code of 1991, has completed the formulation of the implementing rules and regulations; x x
x
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local
autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should
be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the
February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and
impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities
which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of
islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442,
respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion
of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has
opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one
composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural
progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more
difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the
islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually
defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the
land area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity.
Another look at the transcript of the deliberations of Congress should prove enlightening:
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian,[28] with respect to his
CHAIRMAN LINA. Okay.
HON. CHIONGBIAN. At the outset, Chairman Lina, we would like to apprise the distinguished Senator
about the action taken by the House, on House Bill No. 7166. This was passed about two years ago and
has been pending in the Senate for consideration. This is a bill that I am not the only one involved,
including our distinguished Chairman here. But then we did want to sponsor the bill, being the Chairman
then of the Local Government.
So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the Congressmen, who were more or less interested in the creation
of the new provinces, because of the vastness of the areas that were involved.
At any rate, this bill was passed by the House unanimously without any objection. And as I have said a
while ago, that this has been pending in the Senate for the last two years. And Sen. Pimentel himself was
just in South Cotabato and he delivered a speech that he will support this bill, and he says, that he will
incorporate this in the Local Government Code, which I have in writing from him. I showed you the letter
that he wrote, and naturally, we in the House got hold of the Senate version. It becomes an impossibility
for the whole Philippines to create a new province, and that is quite the concern of the respective
Congressmen.
Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is concerned, there is nothing to stop the mother province
from voting against the bill, if a province is going to be created.
So, we are talking about devolution of powers here. Why is the province not willing to create another
province, when it can be justified. Even Speaker Mitra says, what will happen to Palawan? We wont have
one million people there, and if you look at Palawan, there will be about three or four provinces that will
comprise that island. So, the development will be hampered.
Now, I would like to read into the record the letter of Sen. Pimentel, dated November 2, 1989. This was
practically about a year after 7166 was approved by the House, House Bill 7166.
creation of the city to be urbanized, subject to the plebiscite. And why should we not allow that to happen
in the provinces! In other words, we dont want the people who wants to create a new province, as if they
are left in the devolution of powers, when they feel that they are far away from civilization.
Now, I am not talking about other provinces, because I am unaware, not aware of their situation. But the
province of South Cotabato has a very unique geographical territorial conglomerations. One side is in the
other side of the Bay, of Sarangani Bay. The capital town is in the North; while these other municipalities
are in the East and in the West. And if they have to travel from the last town in the eastern part of the
province, it is about one hundred forty kilometers to the capital town. And from the West side, it is the
same distance. And from the North side, it is about one hundred kilometers. So that is the problem there.
And besides, they have enough resources and I feel that, not because I am interested in the province, I
am after their welfare in the future. Who am I to dictate on those people? I have no interest but then I am
looking at the future development of these areas.
As a matter of fact, if I am in politics, its incidental; I do not need to be there, but I can foresee what the
creation of a new province will bring to these people. It will bring them prosperity; it will bring them more
income, and it will encourage even foreign investors. Like the PAP now, they are concentrating in South
Cotabato, especially in the City of
General Santos and the neighboring municipalities, and they are quite interested and even the AID people
are asking me, What is holding the creation of a new province when practically you need it? Its not 20 or
30 kilometers from the capital town; its about 140 kilometers. And imagine those people have to travel
that far and our road is not like Metropolitan Manila. That is as far as from here to Tarlac. And there are
municipalities there that are just one municipality is bigger than the province of La Union. They have the
income. Of course, they dont have the population because thats a part of the land of promise and people
from Luzon are migrating everyday because they feel that there are more opportunities here.
So, by creating the new provinces, not only in my case, in the other cases, it will enhance the
development of the Philippines, not because I am interested in my province. Well, as far as I am
concerned, you know, I am in the twilight years of my life to serve and I would like to serve my people
well. No personal or political interest here. I hope the distinguished Chairman of the Committee will
appreciate the House Bill 7166, which the House has already approved because we dont want them to
throw the Conference Committee Report after we have worked that the house Bill has been, you know,
drawn over board and not even considered by the Senate. And on top of that, we are considering a bill
that has not yet been passed. So I hope the Senator will take that into account.
Thank you for giving me this time to explain.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Thank you very much, Congressman James. We will look into the legislative history of
the Senate version on this matter of creation of provinces. I am sure there was an amendment. As I said,
Ill look into it. Maybe the House version was incorporated in toto, but maybe during the discussion, their
amendments were introduced and, therefore, Senator Pimentel could not hold on to the original version
and as a result new criteria were introduced.
But because of the manifestation that you just made, we will definitely, when we reach a book, Title IV, on
the matter of provinces, we will look at it sympathetically from your end so that the objective that you want
[to] achieve can be realized. So we will look at it with sympathy. We will review our position on the matter,
how we arrived at the Senate version and we will adopt an open mind definitely when we come into it.
Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government Code? Growth. To devolve powers in order for
the community to have its own idea how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas.
So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make a
generalization.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will the creation of a province, carved out of the existing province because of some
geographical id[i]osyncracies, as you called it, stimulate the economic growth in the area or will
substantial aid coming from the national government to a particular area, say, to a municipality, achieve
the same purpose?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Ano tayo dito sa budget. All right, here is a province. Usually, tinitingnan lang yun,
provision eh, hindi na yung composition eh. You are entitled to, say, 20% of the area.
Theres a province of Camarines Sur which have the same share with that of Camiguin and Siquijor, but
Camiguin is composed only of five municipalities; in Siquijor, its composed of six, but the share of Siquijor
is the same share with that of the province of Camarines Sur, having a bigger area, very much bigger.
That is the budget in process.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very seriously and even with sympathy
because of the explanation given and we will study this very carefully.[29]
The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly show the manifest
intention of Congress to promote development in the previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land
areas by allowing them to directly share in the allocation of funds under the
national budget. It should be remembered that, under Sections 284 and 285
of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land area,
population, and local revenue.[30]
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or
injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history
of the law,[31] or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances
in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.
It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of
members of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533[32] of the LGC. As
Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and
regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code,
thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It
was also mandated by the Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to
the organization and operation of the local units. (Emphasis supplied.)
These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain
decentralization and countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang
337, had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and cognizant of
the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption from the land
area requirement of local government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under
Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but
inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence, the void or
missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.
With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the
chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the
inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the
creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately
not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision
in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such
an exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due
deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and considered the operative
principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated.[33] Undoubtedly, this
amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court,[34]
but to legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four
leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee.
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the
LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood
to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But
Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted
R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the
creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its
plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of
Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both
Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative
intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the
creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR.
Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual
income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.
Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli
circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from
the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be
instrumental in stunting such capacity. As we have held in League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections[35]
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its
spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that
which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is
within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is
within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal,
courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law
and its legislators.
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of
government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of
constitutionality of statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the
corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a
becoming courtesy for each others acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its
official functions. Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring
of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is
the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is
infringed. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear
conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such
a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.