Navarro vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050 - Case Digest
Navarro vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050 - Case Digest
Navarro vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050 - Case Digest
If the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to
extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law, or may consider the
implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative
construction—Article 9(2) of the Local Government Code Implementing Rules and Regulations (LGC-IRR)
should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the Local Government Code (LGC)
FACTS:
The case is a motion to recall entry of judgement filed by the movant-intervenors in this case, to assail
the resolution of the Court of Appeals which declared the unconstitutionality of RA 9355 or the law which
created the province of Dinagat Islands. The background of the case were as follows:
When RA 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) was signed into law in October 2006,
Thus Dinagat Islands which used to be part of the mother province, Surigao del Norte, became a duly
independent province. and after a plebiscite was also conducted by the COMELEC, wherein the votes
yielded a majority vote approving the creation, the Dinagatnons then elected their new set of
provincial officials during the May 14, 2007 elections.
However in November 2006 after the law was passed, Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene
O. Medina, the former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed a petition for certiorari to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9355. They alleged that apart from unjustly depriving the people of Surigao del
Norte a large chunk of the provincial territory, the internal revenue allocation (IRA), and resources
from Dinagat, they also insisted that Dinagat did not meet the land area and population requirement in
the creation of provinces as provided for under Sec 10, Art X of the Constitution and Sec 461 of the
Local Government Code. The pertinent provisions, to wit:
Constitution, Article X—Local Government Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
LGC, Title IV, Chapter I “Section 461. Requisites for Creation.—(a) A province may be
created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of
the following requisites: (i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population
of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province. (c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income.”
Dinagat however argued on their part that Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LGC (LGC-IRR), provided that it was exempt from the land area requirement, because the IRR states
the land area requirement is not applicable if the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands.
Thus in February 10, 2010, the court granted the petition and declared RA 9355 as unconstitutional, it
also declared the proclamation of Dinagat, the election of its officials as null and void, and also Art.
9(2) of the LGC-IRR as null and void, for going beyond the ambit of the LGC (as the exemption was
not provided in said law).
The Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective Motions for Reconsiderations, and
also a second motion for reconsideration. However the same were still denied in May 12, 2010.
Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of court to admit
their second motions for reconsideration. These motions were eventually “noted without action” by the
Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution.
Then on June 18, 2010, the movants-intervenors1 filed this Motion for Reconsideration on the Court’s
resolution dated May 12, 2010. The movant-intervenors here by the way, were the duly elected
officials of Surigao del Norte who claimed to be affected by the declaration of nullity of RA 9355.
This was because prior the May 10, 2010 elections – their legal interest did not yet arise. But as the
COMELEC issued a resolution which stated among others that if the Motion for Reconsiderations filed
by Dinagat would not be granted, then the current status quo would remain (meaning they would
remain the elected officials of Surigao del Norte, and Dinagat also would retain its own duly elected
officials as a province) Now apparently, since the Motions were denied by the court in May 12, 2010,
then Dinagat would remain to be part of the Surigao del Norte, then it would also follow that a special
election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, for Surigao del Norte (with
1
Congressman Francisco T. Matugas, Hon. Sol T. Matugas, Hon. Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr., Hon. Simeon Vicente G. Castrence, Hon. Mamerto D.
Galanida, Hon. Margarito M. Longos, And Hon. Cesar M. Bagundol
Digested by: Alena Icao-Anotado pg. 1
Doctrines:
If the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to
extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law, or may consider the
implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative
construction—Article 9(2) of the Local Government Code Implementing Rules and Regulations (LGC-IRR)
should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the Local Government Code (LGC)
Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted, per the COMELEC resolution, since the voters for Dinagat
and Surigao del Norte, voted separately for these positions during the May 10 elections.
Thus the movant-intervenors claim that if RA 9355 would be nullified then, their positions as the newly
elected officials of Surigao del Norte would also be nullified, therefore they claim a strong interest in
the case, as well as having their rights stepped on.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the passage of RA 9355 or the Act which created the new province of Dinagat
Islands, was null and void for being unconstitutional because:
1. Its approval amounted to Congress amending Article 461 of the LGC, since the
exemption for the land area requirement was only provided for in the IRR;
2. The exemption for territorial contiguity as provided for in the LGC, which stated: when
the intended province consists of two or more islands, did not include the said exemption
on the land area requirement.
RULING:
NO.
The court in its decision gave the movants-intervenors the right to be heard in this case,
thus it held that they had locus standi since they would be adversely affected by the
judgement in this case even though they were not initially original parties of it.
The court also highlighted that the central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are 1) economic viability, 2) efficient administration; 3) capability to
deliver basic services to their constituents. And although the LGC provides that the criteria
in the creation of these local government units are income, population, land area, etc.
among others – these were however designed to accomplish the central policy
considerations, one of which is the economic viability as the primordial criterion. And this
was instead the clear intent of the framers of the LGC.
Moreover, the court also pointed out that the Land area requirement is provided for under
the LGC for the creation of municipalities, cities and provinces, but it is not provided for in
the creation of barangays. While, this demonstrates that land area requirement was
specifically intended by the legislators.
However, it also notes that an exemption from the land area requirement is provided for by
the LGC for cities and municipalities which consists of one (1) or more islands, but the
exemption is not given in the creation of provinces, but instead such exemption is given in
the LGC-IRR. Therefore, the court says that it sees no reason not to apply the same
exemption to provinces, as it is also the national policy to provide local government units
local autonomy. Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of
the LGC—and to reflect the true legislative intent.
The court also added that if it were to apply a strict interpretation, such a decision would be
counter-productive, absurd, awkward, and impractical. This would mean that Congress
would display a distinctive preference to create a province only for those with contiguous
land areas versus those which are composed of islands—and if this were to be adopted, then
it would negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural
progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituents.
Hence, the court held that the land area requirement should be read together with
territorial contiguity.
And since the court adheres to the principle that if the literal application of the law results
in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then it could resort to extrinsic aids of statutory
construction or in this case consider the implementing rules and regulations in the nature of
executive or legislative instruction. Therefore, pursuant to such principle, the court held
that Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.
Lastly, the court also highlighted that even though land area is considered an indicator of
viability of a local government unit – it cannot the conclusive in showing that Dinagat
cannot become a province, without taking into account is average annual income of P82M.
This should instead be considered and seen from a perspective that given an income which
is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20M for the creation of a province, it
clearly showed that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province since it could
accomplish the delivery of basic services to its constituents.
Thus in view of the foregoing, the court moved to grant the intervenors motion for
Reconsideration, and also held that Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991—is also valid. Thus accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355
(An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) was declared as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL, as well as the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the
election of the officials thereof are declared VALID;
The Court held that, on several occasions, it sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of attendant
extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final. In this
case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be
heard since they would be adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being
original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the
LGC with respect to the creation of local government units. In this manner, the thrust of the
Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to decentralization and the
attainment of national goals, as hereafter elucidated, will effectively be realized.
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic
services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and
land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective
wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of
them should enjoy preferential consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of
local government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the
framers of the LGC.
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays,
land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities,
component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for. But it must be pointed out that when
the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land
area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government
unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this
exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical
configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands
would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in
Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of
the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461
of the LGC—and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to
uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
Therefore, consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful
local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units
should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by
the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward,
and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities
which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of
islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442,
respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion
of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted
to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of
islands—and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress,
and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult
and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are
separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass. Moreover, such a very
restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of
local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement
should be read together with territorial contiguity.
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction,
such as the legislative history of the law, or may consider the implementing rules and
regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative
construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed
incorporated in the basic law, the LGC. It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the
Oversight Committee consisting of members of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant
to Section 533 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue
the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and
all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined
under the Constitution. It was also mandated by the Constitution that a local government code shall be
enacted by Congress.
The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned
sectors of society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the Local
Government Code (LGC) when the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) was formulated, amounting
not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court, but to
legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of
local government units as members of the Oversight Committee; In effect, pursuant to its plenary
legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the Local
Government Code-Implementing Rules and Regulations (LGC-IRR) and transformed it into law when it
enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat. The bill that eventually became R.A. No.
9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress —thereby, and by necessity, the
Local Government Code (LGC) was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual
income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.
Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli
circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from
the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be
instrumental in stunting such capacity.
Thus in view of the foregoing, the court moved to grant the intervenors motion for Reconsideration, and
also held that Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
—is also valid. Thus accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands)
was declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, as well as the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat
Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID;