gue of Cities in the Philippines v.

COMELEC
November 18, 2008

Facts: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law
Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100
million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills
were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without
the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House
of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and
forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve
the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The
16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities
from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On December 22, 2006, the
House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June
7, 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from
March to July 2007 without the President's signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the
COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners
filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation
of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal
revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and
are thus unconstitutional.

2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending

cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills.
The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference
to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income
requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or
determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood
bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities
that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the
purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from
converting into cities.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 180050 May 12, 2010

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA,

Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President
of the Philippines; SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
SENATE PRESIDENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by the
HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing
the Mother Province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO
VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us are two Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated February 10,
2010 − one filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of public
respondents, and the other filed by respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo Villaroman,
representing the Province of Dinagat Islands. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known
as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, is hereby declared
unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election
of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2)
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.

The arguments of the movants are similar. The grounds for reconsideration of
Governor Villaroman can be subsumed under the grounds for reconsideration of the
OSG, which are as follows:

I.

The Province of Dinagat Islands was created in accordance with the provisions of the
1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. Article 9 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations is merely interpretative of Section 461 of the
Local Government Code.

II.

The power to create a local government unit is vested with the Legislature. The acts of
the Legislature and Executive in enacting into law RA 9355 should be respected as
petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity or constitutionality.

III.

Recent and prevailing jurisprudence considers the operative fact doctrine as a reason
for upholding the validity and constitutionality of laws involving the creation of a new
local government unit as in the instant case.

As regards the first ground, the movants reiterate the same arguments in their
respective Comments that aside from the undisputed compliance with the income
requirement, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, creating the Province of Dinagat Islands,
has also complied with the population and land area requirements.

The arguments are unmeritorious and have already been passed upon by the Court in
its Decision, ruling that R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional, since it failed to comply
with either the territorial or population requirement contained in Section 461 of R.A.
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it
had an official population of only 106,951 based on the 2000 Census of Population
conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO), which population is short of the
statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.

Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census
of population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of
371,000, the result was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local Government
Code.1 Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the population count of
371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte)
would not be reduced to

less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the
new province.2

Less than a year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the
2007 Census of Population. The NSO certified that as of August 1, 2007, Dinagat
Islands had a total population of only 120,813,3 which was still below the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.

Based on the foregoing, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the population
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO.

Moreover, the land area of the province failed to comply with the statutory
requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. R.A. No. 9355 specifically states that the
Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of 802.12 square
kilometers. This was not disputed by the respondent Governor of the Province of
Dinagat Islands in her Comment. She and the other respondents instead asserted that
the province, which is composed of more than one island, is exempted from the land
area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9
which states that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands." The certificate of compliance
issued by the Lands Management Bureau was also based on the exemption under
paragraph 2, Article 9 of the IRR.

However, the Court held that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the IRR is null and void,
because the exemption is not found in Section 461 of the Local Government Code.4
There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and
regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and
regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.5

The movants now argue that the correct interpretation of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code is the one stated in the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.

In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nachura agrees that R.A. No. 9355 failed to
comply with the population requirement. However, he contends that the Province of
Dinagat Islands did not fail to comply with the territorial requirement because it is
composed of a group of islands; hence, it is exempt from compliance not only with
the territorial contiguity requirement, but also with the 2,000-square-kilometer land
area criterion in Section 461 of the Local Government Code, which is reproduced for
easy reference:

SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of
the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square

kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population,
and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than
the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands
or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province.
 (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income.6

Justice Nachura contends that the stipulation in paragraph (b) qualifies not merely the
word "contiguous" in paragraph (a) (i) in the same provision, but rather the entirety of
paragraph (a) (i) that reads:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as

certified by the Lands Management Bureau[.]7

He argues that the whole paragraph on contiguity and land area in paragraph (a) (i)
above is the one being referred to in the exemption from the territorial requirement in
paragraph (b). Thus, he contends that if the province to be created is composed of
islands, like the one in this case, then, its territory need not be contiguous and need
not have an area of at least 2,000 square kilometers. He asserts that this is because as
the law is worded, contiguity and land area are not two distinct and separate
requirements, but they qualify each other. An exemption from one of the two
component requirements in paragraph (a) (i) allegedly necessitates an exemption from
the other component requirement, because the non-attendance of one results in the
absence of a reason for the other component requirement to effect a qualification.

Similarly, the OSG contends that when paragraph (b) of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code provides that the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands," it necessarily dispenses the 2,000-sq.-km. land area
requirement, lest such exemption would not make sense. The OSG argues that in
stating that a "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands," the law could not have meant to define the obvious. The land mass of two or
more islands will never be contiguous as it is covered by bodies of water. It is then but
logical that the territory of a proposed province that is composed of one or more
islands need not be contiguous or be at least 2,000 sq. kms.

The Court is not persuaded.

Section 7, Chapter 2 (entitled General Powers and Attributes of Local Government

Units) of the Local Government Code provides:

SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a general rule, the creation of a local

government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

(a) Income. — It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide

for all essential government facilities and services and special functions
commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local
government unit concerned;

(b) Population. — It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants

within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
 (c) Land area. — It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more
islands, or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others;
properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and
sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of

Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).8

It must be emphasized that Section 7 above, which provides for the general rule in the
creation of a local government unit, states in paragraph (c) thereof that the land area
must be contiguous and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to
meet the requirements of its populace.

Therefore, there are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be
contiguous; and (2) the land area must be sufficient to provide for such basic services
and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. A sufficient land area in the
creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as provided by Section 461
of the Local Government Code .

Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code, providing the requisites for the
creation of a province, specifically states the requirement of "a contiguous territory of
at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers."

Hence, contrary to the arguments of both movants, the requirement of a contiguous

territory and the requirement of a land area of at least 2,000 square kilometers are
distinct and separate requirements for land

area under paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461 and Section 7 (c) of the Local Government
Code.

However, paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two instances of exemption from the
requirement of territorial contiguity, thus:

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands, or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.9

Contrary to the contention of the movants, the exemption above pertains only to the
requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly states that the requirement of territorial
contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province comprising two or more
islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province.

Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a

province is composed of two or more islands, or when the territory of a province is
separated by a chartered city or cities, such province need not comply with the land
area requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers or the requirement in paragraph
(a) (i) of Section 461of the Local Government Code.
Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions where none is provided from considerations of convenience, public
welfare, or for any laudable purpose;10 neither may it engraft into the law
qualifications not contemplated,11 nor construe its provisions by taking into account
questions of expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so as to
relax non-compliance therewith.12 Where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation, but only for application.13

Moreover, the OSG contends that since the power to create a local government unit is
vested with the Legislature, the acts of the Legislature and the Executive branch in
enacting into law R.A. No. 9355 should be respected as petitioners failed to overcome
the presumption of validity or constitutionality.

The contention lacks merit.

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution states:

SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."14

As the law-making branch of the government, indeed, it was the Legislature that
imposed the criteria for the creation of a province as contained in Section 461 of the
Local Government Code. No law has yet been passed amending Section 461 of the
Local Government Code, so only the criteria stated therein are the bases for the
creation of a province. The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the Local
Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province; hence, any
derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code
violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Contrary to the contention of the movants, the evidence on record proved that R.A.
No. 9355 failed to comply with either the population or territorial requirement
prescribed in Section 461 of the Local Government Code for the creation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands; hence, the Court declared R.A. No. 9355
unconstitutional.

In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary,15 the Court held:

Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to
enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.

It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the

Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. And where the acts
of the other branches of government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s
solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.
Citing League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,16 the movants
further contend that under the operative fact doctrine, the constitutionality of R.A No.
9355, creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, should be upheld.

The Court is not persuaded.

In League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that
the 16 cityhood laws, whose validity were questioned therein, were constitutional
mainly because it found that the said cityhood laws merely carried out the intent of
R.A. No. 9009, now Section 450 of the Local Government Code, to exempt therein
respondents local government units (LGUs) from the P100 million income
requirement, since the said LGUs had pending cityhood bills long before the
enactment of R.A. No. 9009. Each one of the 16 cityhood laws contained a provision
exempting the municipality covered from the P100 million income requirement.

In this case, R.A. No. 9355 was declared unconstitutional because there was utter
failure to comply with either the population or territorial requirement for the creation
of a province under Section 461 of the Local Government Code.1avvphi1

The Court, while respecting the doctrine of separation of powers, cannot renege on its
duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution, and determine whether illegality attached to the
creation of the province in question. To abandon this duty only because the Province
of Dinagat Islands has began its existence is to consent to the passage of a law that is
violative of the provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code,
rendering the law and the province created null and void. The Court cannot tolerate
such nullity to be in existence. Where the acts of other branches of the government go
beyond the limit imposed by the Constitution, it is the sacred duty of the judiciary to
nullify the same.17

Tan v. Comelec18 held:

x x x [T]he fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and
its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and
academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province, which
petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by
this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of
that error should not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this
court to yield to the respondents’ urging that, as there has been fait accompli then this
Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation, is an
unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose,
is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents’ submission will create a
dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of
interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those
who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives,
create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either
brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration of the
Decision dated February 10, 2010 are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities
of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas2 assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

The Facts

During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
9009),5 which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion
of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad
rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.6

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress7
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.
However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the
advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu
which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood
Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature.11

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether
the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their
municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional
for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of
the equal protection clause.12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal
revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.13

The Issues

The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the

Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petitions.

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are
thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is
a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001
while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including
the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because
they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities
from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section
450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions
are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.

Preliminary Matters

Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered
by the COMELEC,14 like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold
plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner League of Cities of the
Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government Code
tasks the League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and
crystallizing issues affecting city government administration and securing, through
proper and legal means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which are
existing cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be
reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treñas has
legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient
interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the release of more
Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows.

Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law
specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which now
provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of

barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at
least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square

kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
 (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply
where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality

into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased
income requirement.

Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills

pending in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the enactment of
RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.

During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No.
29, exempting from the income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during the 11th Congress.
This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without
the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved

Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through
their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common
provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income
requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various
dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign
them.

Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA
9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress.
The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law
only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-
retroactivity of laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier
law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively.

Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

 No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the
criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There
is only one Local Government Code.18 The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate
in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city,
including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation
of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The
clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political
units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in
the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria
prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took
effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code
required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100
million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent

municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when
Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA
9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income
requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is
thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood
Laws.

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code

are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local
government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides:

Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis
supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory,
there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government
units.

A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal,
should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of
P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed
in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such
criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local
government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the
income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair
and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,

Plain and Unambiguous

There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if the

language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of
the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four corners.19 If the
language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law
according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory
construction like the legislative history of the law.20

Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
did not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to
respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress
passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and
unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the
increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in
applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.

The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code

True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA

9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress.
However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law. Congress could
have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to
the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA
9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city,
including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local
Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such
criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law
that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local
Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution
prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by a general law.
Section 16 of Article XII provides:

The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or
controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the
interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or
regulation" of private corporations in a general law applicable to all without
discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private corporation through a special law
or charter.

Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable

Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the
11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th
Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on
unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress.
These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into
law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses.

The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in
one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be
re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress. When their respective
authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had to
start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up
for the first time, from the filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules
of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:

Sec. 123. x x x

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration
of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if
presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished

Business, states:

Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of

the following:

a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the

House at the time of its last adjournment. Its consideration shall be
resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end of a
session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as if
no adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a
 Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed terminated.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as
well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved
resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no legal significance.
They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent
Congresses.

Applicability of Equal Protection Clause

If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an

exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement, the criteria for such
exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal protection clause.
Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be
assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are
unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government
Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision
merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall
be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No.
9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or
guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not
exempted.

Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities
with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100 million income
requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection clause.
The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had
cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not
a valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from
the P100 million income requirement.

To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial

distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the
purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all
similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid

classification under the following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

 3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.24

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills

in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement.
The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the
level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not
have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law
which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a
pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from
the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they been informed, many
municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These
municipalities, even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent
municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their income is less than P100
million.

The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a
specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition
will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must
not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in
Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers
engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to
newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:

We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may
be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently
engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes
licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the
profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in
practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding
slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments.
The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a
regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the
protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to
those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those
who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the
classification bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally; that
the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse,
cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing,
we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might justify the
discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the
appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their
cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress - as against all other municipalities
that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.

Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the

requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities
with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities,
while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the

Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394,
9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

SO ORDERED.