TITLE: Victorino B. Aldaba, Carlo Jolette S.

Fajardo,
Julio G. Morada, and Minerva Aldaba Morada,
petitioners,
vs. Commission on Elections
TOPIC: Creation and Abolition of Municipal
Corproations
PONENTE: Carpio, J.

AUTHOR: K. Guevarra
NOTES / QUICKIE FACTS:
District apportionment laws are subject to review by the
courts. Compliance with constitutional standards on the
creation of legislative districts is important because the
"aim of legislative apportionment is 'to equalize
population and voting power among districts.

Antecedent Facts
The province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative districts. The First Legislative District
comprised of the city of Malolos and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On
1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos' City Charter, by creating a separate legislative district for
the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162
(later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The
population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact. However, there is no dispute that House Bill No.
3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that
"the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population
growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000."
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is
unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation
in Congress as provided under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution.
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that Congress' use of projected
population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the "wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature
to determine compliance with [a constitutional requirement]."
FACTS:
This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative
district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the
creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented
in Congress through four legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later
converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of
Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by
the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of
250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan
is unconstitutional as petitioned.
Whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.

HELD:
1. Yes. It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000
population.
2. No, Malolos
RATIO:
1. Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was
declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the
Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President
Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:
2.

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the National

Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been
declared official by the NSCB.
3.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in which
case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.
a.
b.
c.

Certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared
official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).
Certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or
his designated certifying officer.
Intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.

4.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification issued
by Director Miranda was undated.

5.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos
population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.

6.

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment
is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.

AUTHOR: Yayie
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, andRENE O. MEDINA,
Petitioners, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of
the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE
PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER;
GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of
Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN,
representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents.
015

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS:
G.R. No. 180050
February 10, 2010
Its a long case and there are other issues
that were discussed, but I just focused with
the land area requirements.

TOPIC: Creation and Abolition of Municipal Corportations; Land Area

Requirements
PONENTE: Peralta, J.
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, otherwise known as An
Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional.
FACTS:
1. The mother province of Surigao del Norte is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City;
(2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island.
2. Section 461 The Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7610): a province may be created if:
a. it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of
Finance, AND
b. a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, OR a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square
kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not
contribute to the income of the province.
3. The special census conducted by Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte with the assistance of an NSO District Census
Coordinator, yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the proposed province.

The NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special census.
Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor Robert Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which declared as official, for
all purposes, the 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371,576
4. The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for
calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was P82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed province is 802.12
square kilometers.
5. The Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was
approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
6. A plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to determine whether the local government units directly affected
approved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands. The result of the plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes.
7. The Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct province
was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.
8. July 1, 2007: the elected provincial officials took their oath of office; hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its corporate
existence.

PETITIONERS:
Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina

taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte.

have served the Province of Surigao del Norte once as Vice- Governor and members of the Provincial Board, respectively.
allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and
unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and rich
resources from the area.
CONTENTIONS:

the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not valid because it failed to comply with either
the population or land area requirement prescribed by the Local Government Code.
Dinagat Islands has a total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers, which falls short of the statutory requirement of at least
2,000 square kilometers.
the total population of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is only 106,951, while the statutory requirement is a
population of at least 250,000 inhabitants.
the House of Representatives and the Senate erroneously relied on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, which states that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The preceding italicized provision contained in the Implementing
Rules and Regulations is not expressly or impliedly stated as an exemption to the land area requirement in Section 461 of the
Local Government Code.
assert that when the Implementing Rules and Regulations conflict with the law that they seek to implement, the law prevails

RESPONDENTS:

contend in their respective Memoranda that the Province of Dinagat Islands met the legal standard for its creation.
Annual income of Dinagat Islands for the years 2002-2003 was P82, 696, 433.25.
though the land area of the Province of Dinagat Islands is 802.12 square kilometers, it is composed of one or more islands;
thus, it is exempt from the required land area of 2,000 square kilometers under paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code.
the number of inhabitants in the Province of Dinagat Islands as of 2003 was 371,576.
respondent Governor Ace S. Barbers contends that although the result of the special census conducted by the Provincial
Government of Surigao del Norte on December 2, 2003 was never certified by the NSO, it is credible since it was conducted
with the aid of a representative of the NSO. He alleged that the lack of certification by the NSO was cured by the presence of
NSO officials, who testified during the deliberations on House Bill No. 884 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, and who
questioned neither the conduct of the special census nor the validity of the
result.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7
ISSUE: whether or not R.A. No. 9355 violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution?
HELD: YES. R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in
Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code.
RATIO:
1. As a clarification of the territorial requirement, the Local Government Code requires a contiguous territory of at least 2,000
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. However, the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities that do not contribute to the income of the province.
If a proposed province is composed of two or more islands, does territory, under Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code, include
not only the land mass above the water, but also that which is beneath it?
TAN V. COMELEC: the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of
the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence
thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area
and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.

Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact;
(b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, [n]ext, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed.,
p. 307). "Contiguous," when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes
physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute
may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs.
Assessors, 138 A.L.R., p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the
"territory" the physical mass of land area.There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word
contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial
waters.It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be
synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended
by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction
2. The IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized portion
above stating that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.
Nowhere in the Local Government Code is the said provision stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the
only instance when the territorial or land area requirement need not be complied with is when there is already compliance with
the population requirement. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from
such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law
and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic law.
Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands is null and void.
3. R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of eighty thousand two
hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less, including Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47)
islets x x x. R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.
The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified
by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as
of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which
yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code. Moreover,
respondents failed to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao
del Norte) would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the new
province.
Although the NSO representative to the Committee on Local Government deliberations dated November 24, 2005 did not object to
the result of the provincial governments special census, which was conducted with the assistance of an NSO district census
coordinator, it was agreed by the participants that the said result was not certified by the NSO, which is the requirement of the Local
Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as [An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands], is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials
thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or
more islands, is declared NULL and VOID.

AUTHOR: Yayie
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA,
Petitioners,
VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the
Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT;
House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR
ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte;
GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province
of Dinagat Islands, Respondents,
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON.
ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE,
HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON.
CESAR M. BAGUNDOL, Intervenors.
015

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS:
G.R. No. 180050
April 12, 2011
(Resolution)

TOPIC: Creation and Abolition of Municipal Corportations; Land Area

Requirements
PONENTE: Nachura, J.
FACTS:
1. On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered it decision which declared:

R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the creation of a
province under the LGC.

the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void.

as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that,
[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands for being
beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.
2. The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of
the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Court denied the said motions.
3. Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of court to admit their second motions for reconsideration,
accompanied by their second motions for reconsideration. These motions were eventually noted without action by this Court in
its June 29, 2010 Resolution.
4. The movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010.

Alleged that the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8790 :

If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous
status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified for the
same reasons given in Item b above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives,
First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte
(with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted.
movants-intervenors election to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its
previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be conducted for
governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte.
as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of their constituents, they have a clear and
strong interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte will affect the latter province such that:
(1) the whole administrative set-up of the province will have to be restructured;
(2) the services of many employees will have to be terminated;
(3) contracts will have to be invalidated; and
(4) projects and other developments will have to be discontinued.

In addition, they claim that their rights cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights
would be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.
In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge
the Resolution, namely:
(1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC;
(2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption
from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and
(3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
5. July 20, 2010: the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
6. October 5, 2010: the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had become final and
executory on May 18, 2010.
7. Movant-Intervenors filed an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment and praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of
judgment,
and
(b)
resolve
their
motion
for
reconsideration
of
the
July
20,
2010
Resolution.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 9(2) of the IRR of the Local Government code is valid?
Whether or not R.A. No. 9355 is valid?
HELD: YES. Article 9(2) of IRR-LGC is valid and RA 9355 is CONSTITUTIONAL.
RATIO:
With respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of
municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services,i.e.,
income, population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt
from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the
creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In
fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands
would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer
that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component
cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly
provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the
LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of
the LGC-IRR.
This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations underpinning the principle of local autonomy.
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and
minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired
results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright
absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in

themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum
land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with
the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has
opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate the
greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the
constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province
is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of
local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with
territorial contiguity.
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may
resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law, or may consider the implementing rules and
regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle,
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.

It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both the Executive
and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate
and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of this
Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution.

These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain decentralization and countryside
development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991,
which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption from
the land area requirement of local government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450
of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the
creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.
With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of their respective
Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land
area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but
unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGCIRR. To be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society
and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated. Undoubtedly, this
amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court, but to legislative construction as
well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight
Committee.
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to
implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately
translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged
province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of
provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress
breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No.
9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts
of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land
area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the
LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.

What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that
Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as
certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for
the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than
looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in
favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a
province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:
1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and filed on October 29, 2010;
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
3. GRANT the Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution
is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or
more islands, is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared
as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof
are declared VALID; and
4. The petition is DISMISSED.

016 League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) vs Comelec et

al. ( GR No. 176951, 177499, 178056 ) Nov. 18, 2008
TOPIC: Creation of Municipal Corporations is a legislative
matter
PONENTE: Carpio, J.

DOCTRINES: 1. As providec by Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987

Constitution, Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city (or any other political units) in the Local
Government Code (LGC) and not in any other law, including
Cityhod Laws.
2. The clear intent of the Constitution is to ensure that the creation
of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform,
non discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC, the criteria
for the creation of cities and other political units must follow the
guidelines provided by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution

FACTS
1.

Petitioners : League of City of the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, also in his
capacity as Mayor of City of Calbayog and in his personal capacity as taxpayer
2. Respondents: Commission on Elections; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of
Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur;
Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon.
3. During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did
not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic
Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After
the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought
to exempt from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and
forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the
advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The
16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirements in RA 9009. On December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. The Cityhood
Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.
4. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion
of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will
share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
5. Respondents contend that the Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Furthermore, the
respondents invoke the principle of non retroactivity of laws to prevent the application of RA 9009 on the 16 Cityhood Bills
that stood to be affected by RA 9009. http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7
ISSUE: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
HELD: The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

a. Applying the P100 million requirement in RA9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

RA9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Constitution requires that Congrss shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and
not in any other law, including Cityhood laws.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sec 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national
taxes to local government units.
The intent of the members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an
intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress or unapproved blls are not considered as extrinsic aids in interpreting a law

passed in the 13th Congress. Congress is not a continuing body, any unapproved cityhood bills are considered as mere scraps
of paper with any hearings and deliberations becoming worthless upon adjournment of Congress.

2. Yes. The exemption provisions in the Cityhood Laws contain no classification or guidelines to differentiate the supposedly
exempted municipalities from other municipalities in general. The exemption therefore, would be based solely on the fact that
the 16 of the municipalities had Cityhood Bills pending in the 11 th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. There is no
substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not
have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. This is not a valid classification to entitle an exemption
from the increased income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the
level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower
annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally
non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

RATIO/RELEVANT LAWS
Sec. 450 Requisites for creation (a) a municipality or a cluster of barangays maybe converted into a component city if it has
locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance of at least One Hundred Million pesos
(100,000,000.00) for the last two consecutive two (2) years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites;
i. A contiguous territory of 100 square kilometers , as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
ii. A population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation
to less than the minimum requirements prescribed therein.
b. the territorial jurisdiction of the newly created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement of land
area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
c. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds , transfers, and non
recurring income.

017 League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) vs.

COMELEC, 608 SCRA 636 (2009)
TOPIC: Creation of municipal corporation is a
legislative matter. (Sec. 14, LGC)
PONENTE: Velasco, JR., J.

AUTHOR: Christy Amor Lofranco

NATURE: Motion for Reconsideration
QUICKIE FACTS: The constitutionality of the 16 cityhood laws were
challenged by the LCP for violation of Article X, Section 10 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that no city shall be created except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
the equal protection clause under Article III, Section 1.
NOTE: 16 Cityhood Laws Constitutional.

FACTS:
Petitioners: League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP)
Respondents: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and 16 Municipalities
Background:
1.

This controversy has its origins in the 11th Congress when thirty-three (33) laws converting 33 municipalities into cities were
enacted into law. Throughout, twenty-four (24) other bills converting 24 municipalities into cities were not passed. At this
time, the annual income requirement for a municipality to become a city was 20 million pesos under the Local Government
Code.
2. During the 12th Congress, R.A. No. 9009 was enacted, which amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from 20 million pesos to 100 million
pesos.
3. As a result of the increased annual income requirement under R.A. No. 9009, the 24 municipalities could no longer qualify
under the increased annual income requirement. The House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29 seeking to exempt the remaining 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills had not been approved during the 11th
Congress from the 100 million-peso income requirement; this exemption did not materialize as the Senate did not join the
resolution.
4. During the 13th Congress, Joint Resolution No. 1, reiterating the sentiments of Joint Resolution No. 29 under the 12th
Congress, was adopted by the House of Representatives and forwarded to the Senate for approval; again, the Senate failed to
approve the exemption sought under Joint Resolution No. 1.
5. Sixteen (16) municipalities filed individual cityhood bills, all of which contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirement under R.A. No. 9009.
6. These cityhood bills were approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and lapsed into law without the
Presidents signature. The 16 cityhood laws directed the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each municipality approved of the conversion.
7. The 16 cityhood laws were challenged by the League of Cities of the Philippines.
Petitioner LCP:
1.

2.
3.

4.

That the 16 cityhood laws were unconstitutional for violation of Article X, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that no city shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
equal protection clause under Article III, Section 1.
Art. X, 10.
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Art. III, 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of
the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009.
That these indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute.
That the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities, the petitioners bemoan, will reduce the share of existing cities in
the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec.
285 of the LGC of 1991.
That the cityhood laws exempting the respondent LGUs from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009
offend the Constitution.

2008 Decision:
1.

In its first decision, the Court declared the 16 cityhood laws unconstitutional on the ground that they violated Article X,
Section 10 and the Equal Protection Clause under Article III, Section 1. In essence, the Court held that since the
municipalities did not meet the P100 million income requirement under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 9009, the cityhood laws converting the 16 municipalities into cities were unconstitutional.

Respondent LGUs motions:

1.
2.

Motion for reconsideration denied per Resolution dated April 28, 2009.
The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED and Motion for Leave to Admit
Attached Petition in Intervention also DENIED per Resolution dated May 14, 2009.
3. Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached 'Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18,
2008' as expunged per Resolution of June 2, 2009.
4. Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7
ISSUE: Whether or not the cityhood laws violate
(1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and
(2) the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. Declared as CONSTITUTIONAL the 16 cityhood laws, thus converting the 16 municipalities into cities.
***Earlier Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO:
Art. X, 10 In accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code Clause
1.

The only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause "in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria.
2. Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a 35 consolidated set of laws or a much
simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the
local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity.
Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier
codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified
income requirement from PhP20 million to PhP100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no
different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the
criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.
3. The Court said that based on Congress deliberations, the clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills
would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of P100 million and that R.A. No. 9009 would not have any
retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned.
Art. III, 1 Equal Protection Clause
4.

5.

No deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCP's claim that the IRA of its
member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice
to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to
already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the
municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional
protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its
property as such.
The favorable treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. The Court
stressed that the 16 municipalities were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 and to impose on
them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would be unfair. The reasoning behind was that
fairness would dictate that the 16 municipalities be given a means by which they could prove that they had the necessary
qualifications for cityhood under the old law, the Local Government Code of 1991, and not R.A. No. 9009.

018 League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. COMELEC,

628 SCRA 819 (2010)
TOPIC: Local Government Code as basis for the creation,
division, merger, abolishment or alteration of the boundary of
any province, city, municipality, or barangay

AUTHOR: Cielito Mateo

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS: LCP assailed constitutionality of 16
Cityhood Laws

PONENTE: J. Carpio

FACTS:
-Petitioners in this case are the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treaas,
Mayor of City of Iloilo; Mel Senen S. Sarmiento, Mayor of City of Calbayog.
-Respondents in this case are the Commission on Elections; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality
of Carcar, Province of Cebu; and Municipality of El Salvador, Misamis Oriental.
-Petitioners-in-intervention in this case are the City of Tarlac, City of Santiago, City of Iriga, City of Ligao, City of Legazpi, City of
Tagaytay, City of Surigao, City of Bayawan, City of Silay, City of General Santos, City of Zamboanga, City of Gingoog, City of
Cauayan, City of Pagadian, City of San Carlos, City of San Fernando, City of Tacurong, City of Tangub, City of Oroquieta, City of
Urdaneta, City of Victorias, City of Calapan, City of Himamaylan, City of Batangas, City of Bais, City of Cadiz and City of Tagum
-The petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention seek the following in this case:
a. ad cautelam motion for reconsideration
b. motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009 filed by the petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et.al.
c. ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City,
Cadiz City and Oroquieta City
- On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10
Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause.
- 31 March 2009- Supreme Court En Banc again by majority vote, denied the respondents first motion for reconsideration.
-28 April 2009- Supreme Court En Banc, by split vote, denied 2 nd motion for reconsideration of respondents. 18 November 2008
Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.
-Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motion for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstated the 18 November 2008
declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes, the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. Section 10 Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress
cannot
write
such
criteria
in
any
other
law,
like
the
Cityhood
Laws.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million
for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that
any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were
pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly
exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended
by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To
be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood
Laws.

Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its
declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is
an admission that the law is unconstitutional.

The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en banc Resolution requires no further explanation. If the voting of the Court en
banc results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Court's prior majority action on the main decision
stands affirmed.[4] This clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases heard by the Court en banc, which includes not only cases
involving the constitutionality of a law, but also, as expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, "all other cases
which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc."
The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion
for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote
cannot result in any court order or directive. The judgment stands in full force. Undeniably, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the
prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009
denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision
where there is no prior decision. Here, the tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008
Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied.
Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean that the present cases were left undecided because there
remain the Decision of 18 November 2008 and the Resolution of 31 March 2009 where a majority of the Court en banc concurred in
declaring the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March 2009
Resolution, which were both reached with the concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc, are not reconsidered but stand
affirmed. These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote
because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action.
The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion for reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18 November 2008 Decision final. In fact,
in its Resolution of 28 April 2009, denying the second motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc reiterated that no further
pleadings shall be entertained and stated that entry of judgment is made in due course.
The dissenting opinion stated that "a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does not constitute a rule with
precedential value."
Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority - a non-majority which cannot overrule a prior affirmative action, that is the 18 November 2008
Decision striking down the Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision stands affirmed. And assuming a non-majority
lacks any precedential value, the 18 November 2008 Decision, which was unreversed as a result of the tie-vote on the respondents'
second motion for reconsideration, nevertheless remains binding on the parties.
RATIO: Local Government Code should be the only basis for the creation, division, merger, abolishment or alteration of the
boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barangay.

019

AUTHOR: FREDERICK MAYUGA

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP)

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS:

v.

Sixteen Republic Acts (collectively known as the Cityhood Laws)

was passed, converting 16 municipalities into component cities.
The constitutionality of the conversion of these municipalities into
components was questioned the petitioner League of Cities of the
Philippines.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 176951

April 12, 2011

TOPIC: Creation and Abolition of Municipal Corporations >

Creation of Municipal Corporation is a Legislative Matter

In its Decision on 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court

declared the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.

PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:

Subsequently, multiple motions for reconsideration and motions to

amend resolutions have been filed by the respondent
LGUs/municipal corporations.
Consequently, the Supreme Court declared, in its Resolution
dated 21 December 2009, the Cityhood Laws valid and
constitutional.
As such, the LCP filed a motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution dated 24 August 2010, the Supreme Court reinstated
its Decision on 18 November 2008, declaring the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional.
The respondent LGUs/municipal corporations filed a new motion
for reconsideration. In its Resolution dated 15 February 2011,
the Supreme Court:
a.
b.
c.

granted the respondents Motion for Reconsideration,

reversed the Resolution dated August 24, 2010; and
declared the 16 Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

In turn, the LCP files the instant Ad Cautelam Motion for

Reconsideration.

PARTIES:
G.R. No. 176951
PETITIONERS:
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer
RESPONDENTS:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of
Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar;
and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon

G.R. No. 177499

PETITIONERS:
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP),
City of Calbayog; and
Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer,

RESPONDENTS:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan,
Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao
Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental

G.R. No. 178056

PETITIONERS:
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP);
City of Calbayog; and
Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer,
RESPONDENTS:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of El
Salvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and Department of Budget and Management
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.

4.

In its Resolution dated 24 August 2010, the Supreme Court reinstated its Decision on 18 November 2008, declaring
unconstitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407,
9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
The respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
In its Resolution dated 15 February 2011, the Supreme Court:
d. granted the respondents Motion for Reconsideration,
e. reversed the Resolution dated August 24, 2010; and
f. declared the 16 Cityhood Laws as constitutional.
Hence, the petitioners filed its Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration.

PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS:
1.
2.
3.

the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution

the Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause,
the Cityhood Laws violate the ight of local governments to a just share in the national taxes.

ISSUE:
1. WON the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution
2. WON the Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause
3. WON the Cityhood Laws violate the right of local governments to a just shared in the national taxes
HELD:
1.
2.
3.

No. Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage
of Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9009.
No. The increased income requirement of P100 million was not the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive
and remain viable as a component city.
No. The allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease.

RATIO:
1.

With respect to the issue on Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.cr
The apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable disparity between the income
requirement of P20 million under the Local Government Code (LGC) prior to its amendment, and the P100 million
under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively articulated in his interpellation of Senator Pimentel
during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President was cognizant of the fact that there were
municipalities that then had pending conversion bills during the 11 th Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No.
2157 as R.A. No. 9009, including the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that the
pertinent deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11 th Congress was in session, and the
conversion bills were then pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009
would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11 th Congress.
R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12 th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative
intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11 th Congress, the House of
Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in
Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act
on Joint Resolution No. 29. Even so, the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No.
1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for approval. Again, the Senate failed to
approve Joint Resolution No. 1.
It is worthwhile to consider the manifestation of Senator Pimentel with respect to Joint Resolution No. 1, to wit:
MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL
House Joint Resolution No. 1 seeks to exempt certain municipalities seeking
conversion into cities from the requirement that they must have at least P100 million in
income of locally generated revenue, exclusive of the internal revenue share that they
received from the central government as required under Republic Act No. 9009.
The procedure followed by the House is questionable, to say the least. The
House wants the Senate to do away with the income requirement of P100 million so that,
en masse, the municipalities they want exempted could now file bills specifically
converting them into cities.

My respectful suggestion is for the Senate to request the House to do what they
want to do regarding the applications of certain municipalities to become cities pursuant
to the requirements of the Local Government Code. If the House wants to exempt
certain municipalities from the requirements of the Local Government Code to
become cities, by all means, let them do their thing.
In my long years in the Senate, this is the first time that a resort to this
subterfuge is being undertaken to favor the creation of certain cities. I am not saying
that they are not qualified. All I am saying is, if the House wants to pass and create
cities out of certain municipalities, by all means let them do that. But they should do
it following the requirements of the Local Government Code and, if they want to
make certain exceptions, they can also do that too. But they should not use the Senate
as a ploy to get things done which they themselves should do.
Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually filed in the House of Representatives, and
were all unanimously and favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives. The bills, when
forwarded to the Senate, were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show
that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear
legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009,
and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the
exemption clauses.
2.

With respect to the issue on the Equal Protection Clause

Considering the Cityhood Laws are exempt respondents from meeting the new minimum income requirement of
Php100 million, the petitioners further contend that:
a.
b.

such income requirement is not arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with; and
there are several municipalities that have already complied with the requirement and have, in fact, been
converted into cities, such as Sta. Rosa in Laguna (RA No 9264), Navotas (RA No. 9387) and San Juan (RA No.
9388) in Metro Manila, Dasmarias in Cavite (RA. No 9723), and Bian in Laguna (RA No 9740)
However, as indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59) existing cities had failed as of 2006 to
post an average annual income of Php100 million based on the figures contained in the certification dated December 5, 2008
by the Bureau of Local Government. The large number of existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply with
the Php100 million threshold income five years after RA No. 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and probably unwarranted
for the petitioners to claim that the P100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply with.
Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of Php100 million from local sources under RA No. 9009
was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of Php100 million, no research or empirical data
buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to arise. As
already mentioned, even the danger the passage of RA No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become a reality. While the
Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it
cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment
imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside
development, and the concomitant national growth.

3.

With respect to the Right of Local Governments to just share in the national taxes
It suffices to state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the LGC,
not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area
(25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number of
cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. However, it should be noted that the allocation by the
National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming
entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will
decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary
consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC.

The respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities. They have demonstrated their
viability as component cities of their respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit slowly, because they had
previously to share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With their conversion into component cities, they will have to
share with only around 120 cities.

020 League of City of Philippines v Comelec (2011)

AUTHOR: Dann M.

TOPIC: Creation of municipal corporation is a legislative matter

(Sec. 14, LGC)

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS:

PONENTE: Justice Bersamin

PARTIES:
GR 176951:
PETITIONER: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P.
Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personal
capacity as Taxpayer,
RESPONDENT: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN
SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; AND MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON
GR 177499:
PETITIONER: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P.
Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personal
capacity as Taxpayer
RESPONDENT: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN
DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF
DAVAO ORIENTAL; AND MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL
GR 178056:
PETITIONER: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P.
Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personal
capacity as Taxpayer,
RESPONDENT: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN
DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR,
PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL; MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, CEBU; and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT

FACTS:
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP),
City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the
municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down the
Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.
In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a 7-5 vote, denied the first motion for reconsideration.
On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 6-6, which denied the second motion for
reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.
In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009 Resolution in this wise
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides that: No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained. Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for
reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the
Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second
motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In
effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for
reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn
the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for
reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.
Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the
Cityhood Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and the Ad Cautelam Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta
City, reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision x (Cityhood law unconstitutional). Hence, the aforementioned pleadings.
Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice changed its position on the constitutionality of the 16
Cityhood Laws, and especially taking note of the novelty of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated August 24, 2010 deserves favorable action by this Court
No arguments referred to for this case. Probably, the same arguments propounded on the previous cases were reiterated.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7
ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood laws are unconstitutional for failure to comply with RA 9009 which amended the LGC and now
requires a locally generated income of P100million for at least 2 consecutive years, as compared to its wordings before amendment,
which was average annual income of P20million for the last 2 consecutive years
HELD: No, they are constitutional because the aforesaid cityhood laws, at the time they were pending, which contain exempting
provisions from RA 9009, were recognized as an embodiment of the intention of the legislature to exempt them from the effect of the
amendment.

RATIO:

Article X, Section 10 provides

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution is that the exemption
clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC),
particularly Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, which took effect on June 30, 2001, viz.
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if
it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant
prices.
Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bills
filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities. During the 11th Congress (June 1998-June 2001), 33 of these bills were
enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities that were converted into component
cities through the Cityhood Laws.
The rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be gleaned from the sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel on Senate
Bill No. 2157, to wit [paraphrase ko na kasi mahaba] Due to the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities,
he is apprehensive that before long the Philippines will be a nation of all cities and no municipalities. What has been happening
is that the municipalities aspiring to become cities say that they qualify in terms of financial requirements by incorporating the Internal
Revenue share of the taxes of the nation on to their regularly generated revenue. Under that requirement, it looks clear that practically
all municipalities in this country would qualify to become cities.
While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion
bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws, desiring to become component cities
which qualified under the P20 million income requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC. The interpellation of
Senate President Franklin Drilon of Senator Pimentel is revealing, thus [summarized and paraphrased dahil
mahaba] it might not be fair to make this bill, on the assumption that it is approved, retroact to the bills that
are pending in the Senate conversion from municipalities to cities. However, they do not think it is necessary to
put an [exempting] provision because they were saying during the intertepllation will form part of the
interpretation of this bill. Furthermore, if there is no retroactivity clause, they do not think that the bill would
have any retroactive effect.So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber
will not be affected.
Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the
11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No.
9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of
the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged.
Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent
of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13 th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were
enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent
municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.

Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate President Drilon and Senator Pimentel, it cannot be
denied that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement
imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become
component cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers of trade and commerce, points of
convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this
regard, it is worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each respondent municipality, viz[mahaba kaya icucut ko na; pero eto yung
listing ng mga naging cities] 1. Batac, Ilocos Norte;2. El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, 3. Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte ; 4.
Borongan, Eastern Samar; 5. Lamitan, Basilan; 6. Catbalogan, Samar; 7. Bogo, Cebu; 8. Tandag, Surigao del Sur; 9. Bayugan,
10. Agusan del Sur; 11. Carcar, Cebu; 12. Guihulngan, Negros Oriental; 13. Tayabas, Quezon; 14. Tabuk, Kalinga; 15.
Baybay, Leyte; 16. Mati, Davao Oriental; and 17. Naga, Cebu.
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority,
under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.[10] The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in
their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative
power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution
has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all
subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. [11]
Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it
as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood
Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local
government unitsincome, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the
conversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed
only from locally-generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly
imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of
the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic
growth in their respective provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009
through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the
amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse
the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws,
particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.

021 Aquino III vs Comelec

Facts:
The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of aPetition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It
was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First
(1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from
such Reapportionment.

Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it
has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be
composed of 176,383 population count.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard with a minimum population of 250,000
for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the
petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance with the
minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.
Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via
the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an
indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
Held:
It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a city and a province was explained under the
second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was
mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a
population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation of
Ordinance, other than population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during the
deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent. The majority opinion wreaks havoc on the bedrock principle of our "democratic and republican State" 1that all votes are
equal. Instead, the majority opinion introduces the Orwellian concept that some votes are more equal than others. The majority
opinion allows, for the first time under the 1987 Constitution, voters in a legislative district created by Congress to send one
representative to Congress even if the district has a population of only 176,383. In sharp contrast, all other legislative districts created
by Congress send one representative each because they all meet the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
The assailed Republic Act No. 9716 (RA 9716) is unconstitutional for being utterly repugnant to the clear and precise "standards"
prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution for the creation of legislative districts. Section 5(4) 2 of Article VI
mandates that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards" fixed in Section 5. These
constitutional standards, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) minimum population of 250,000
per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity
in apportionment of legislative districts "in provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." The assailed RA 9716 grossly
violates these constitutional standards.

Legislators Represent People, Not Provinces or Cities

There was never any debate3 in the design of our government that the members of the House of Representatives, just like the members
of the Senate, represent people not provinces, cities, or any other political unit.4 The only difference is that the members of the
Senate represent the people at large while the members of the House represent the people in legislative districts. Thus, population or
the number of inhabitants in a district is the essential measure of representation in the House of Representatives. 5 Section 5(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, just like in the previous Constitutions, 6 could not be any clearer:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the idea of the people, as individuals, electing their representatives under the principle of "one person, one vote,"7 is the
cardinal feature of any polity, like ours, claiming to be a "democratic and republican State." 8 A democracy in its pure state is one
where the majority of the people, under the principle of "one person, one vote," directly run the government. 9 A republic is one which
has no monarch, royalty or nobility,10 ruled by a representative government elected by the majority of the people under the principle of
"one person, one vote," where all citizens are equally subject to the laws. 11 A republic is also known as a representative democracy.
The democratic and republican ideals are intertwined, and converge on the common principle of equality -- equality in voting power,
and equality under the law.
The constitutional standard of proportional representation is rooted in equality in voting power -- that each vote is worth the same as
any other vote,
not more or less. Regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, occupation, poverty, wealth or literacy, voters have an equal vote.
Translated in terms of legislative redistricting, this means equal representation for equal numbers of people 12 or equal voting weight
per legislative district. In constitutional parlance, this means representation for every legislative district "in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" 13 or proportional representation. Thus, the
principle of "one person, one vote" or equality in voting power is inherent in proportional representation.
It was in obedience to the rule on proportional representation that this Court unanimously struck down an apportionment law which:
(a) x x x gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) x x x gave Manila four
members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; (c) [gave] Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and
Cotabato x x x more than both, five members having been assigned to it; (d) [gave] Samar (with 871,857) four members while Davao
with 903,224 got three only; (e) [gave] Bulacan with 557,691 x x x two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three,
and (f) [gave] Misamis Oriental with 387,839 x x x one member only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two. 14 x x x x
for being repugnant to the constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution that the Members of the House of Representatives "shall be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants." 15
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is even more precise by providing that the Members of the House "shall be elected
from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x." The phrase "as nearly as may be according to the number of
their respective inhabitants" in the 1935 Constitution has been changed in the 1987 Constitution to the more precise "in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x." The addition of the phrase
"on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" was meant to stress that the rule on proportional representation shall apply uniformly
in the apportionment of every legislative district.
The phrase "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants," which precedes the phrase "provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area," means that legislative districts in provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area shall be apportioned
according to proportional representation or equal representation for equal numbers of people. Thus, there shall be one legislative
district for every given number of people, whether inhabiting in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area.
The phrase "on the basis of a uniform x x x ratio" means that the ratio of one legislative district for every given number of people shall
be applied uniformly in all apportionments, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area. Section 5(3) of Article VI
mandates that "[e]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x shall have at least one representative."
Consequently, a population of 250,000 serves as the default minimum population applicable to every legislative district following the
rule on uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or in the Metropolitan Manila area.

The phrase "progressive ratio" means that the number of legislative districts shall increase as the number of the population increases,
whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area. Thus, a province shall have one
legislative district if it has a population of 250,000, and two legislative districts if it has 500,000. This insures that proportional
representation is maintained if there are increases in the population of a province, city, or the Metropolitan Manila area. This is what is
meant by a "progressive ratio" in the apportionment of legislative districts, a ratio that must also be uniformly applied.
Obviously, the 1987 Constitution has laid down clear and precise standards in the apportionment of legislative districts compared to
the 1935 Constitution. What is inescapable is that the 1987 Constitution has strengthened and tightened the requirement of
uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area.
To now declare, as the majority opinion holds, that apportionment in provinces can disregard the minimum population requirement
because the Constitution speaks of a minimum population only in cities is logically flawed, constitutionally repulsive, and fatally
corrosive of the bedrock notion that this country is a "democratic and republican State." 16 This ruling of the majority strikes a
debilitating blow at the heart of our democratic and republican system of government.
Under the majoritys ruling, Congress can create legislative districts in provinces without regard to any minimum population. Such
legislative districts can have a population of 150,000, 100,000, 50,000 or even 100, thus throwing out of the window the constitutional
standards of proportional representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative districts. To disregard the minimum population
requirement of 250,000 in provincial legislative districts while
maintaining it in city legislative districts is to disregard, as a necessary consequence, the constitutional standards of proportional
representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." This
means that legislative districts in provinces can have a minimum population of anywhere from 100 (or even less) to 250,000, while
legislative districts in cities will always have a minimum population of 250,000. This will spell the end of our democratic and
republican system of government as we know it and as envisioned in the 1987 Constitution.
Constitutional Standards for Reapportionment: Population and Territory
The Constitution itself provides the "standards" against which reapportionment laws like RA 9716 will be tested, following its
command that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on thestandards provided in this
section,"17 referring to Section 5, Article VI. These standards relate to first, population, and second, territory. Section 5 admits of no
other standards.
On population, the standards of the 1987 Constitution have four elements. First is the rule on proportional representation, which is the
universal standard in direct representation in legislatures. Second is the rule on a minimum population of 250,000 per legislative
district, which was not present in our previous Constitutions. Third is the rule on progressive ratio, which means that the number of
legislative districts shall increase as the number of the population increases in accordance with the rule on proportional representation.
Fourth is the rule on uniformity, which requires that the first three rules shall apply uniformly in all apportionments in provinces, cities
and the Metropolitan Manila area.
The Constitution18 and the Ordinance19 appended to the 1987 Constitution fixes the minimum population of a legislative district at
250,000. Although textually relating to cities, this minimum population requirement applies equally to legislative districts apportioned
in provinces and the Metropolitan Manila area because of the constitutional command that "legislative districts [shall be] apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." To reiterate, the Constitution commands that this rule on uniformity shall apply to
legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." Otherwise, districts apportioned in provinces, if freed
from the minimum population requirement, will have constituencies two, four, ten times lower than in districts apportioned in cities,
violating the constitutional command that apportionment shall be based on a uniform ratio in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area."
In short, the constitutional "standards" in the apportionment of legislative districts under Section 5 of Article VI, as far as population is
concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) a minimum "population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" per legislative
district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in the
apportionment of legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area."
For territory, the Constitution prescribes the "standards" that a legislative district must be, "as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent."

To repeat, other than population and territory, there are no other standards prescribed in Section 5 of Article VI. This Court cannot add
other standards not found in Section 5.
The Malapportionment of RA 9716 Flouts the Constitutional Standards on Population
RA 9716 grossly malapportions Camarines Surs proposed five legislative districts by flouting the standards of proportional
representation among legislative districts and the minimum population per legislative district.
Based on the 2007 census, the proposed First District under RA 9716 will have a population of only 176,383, which is 29% belo w the
constitutional minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district. In contrast, the remaining four proposed districts have
populations way above the minimum with the highest at 439,043 (proposed Third District), lowest at 276,777 (proposed Second
District) and an average of 379,359. Indeed, the disparity is so high that three of the proposed districts (Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Districts) have populations more than double that of the proposed First District. 20 This results in wide variances among the districts
populations. Still using the 2007 census, the ideal per district population for Camarines Sur is 338,764. 21 The populations of the
proposed districts swing from this ideal by a high of positive 29.6% (Third
District) to a low of negative 47.9% (First District). 22 This means that the smallest proposed district (First District) is underpopulated
by nearly 50% of the ideal and the biggest proposed district (Third District) is overpopulated by nearly 30% of the ideal.
The resulting vote undervaluation (for voters in the disfavored districts) and vote overvaluation (for voters in the First District) fails
even the most liberal application of the constitutional standards. Votes in the proposed First District are overvalued by more than
200% compared to votes from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts and by more than 60% compared to votes in the Second District.
Conversely, votes from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts are undervalued by more than 200% compared to votes in the First
District while those in the Second District suffer more than 60% undervaluation.
Proportional representation in redistricting does not mean exact numbers of population, to the last digit, for every legislative district.
However, under the assailed RA 9716, the variances swing from negative 47.9% to positive 29.6%. Under any redistricting yardstick,
such variances are grossly anomalous and destructive of the concept of proportional representation. In the United States, the Supreme
Court there ruled that a variance of even less than 1% is unconstitutional in the absence of proof of a good faith effort to achieve a
mathematically exact apportionment.23
Significantly, petitioner Senator Aquinos attempt to redraw districting lines to make all five proposed districts compliant with the
minimum population requirement (and thus lessen the wide variances in population among the districts) was thwarted chiefly for
political expediency: his colleagues in the Senate deemed the existing districts in Camarines Sur "untouchable" because "[a
Congressman] is king [in his district]." 24 This shows a stark absence of a good faith effort to
achieve a more precise proportional representation in the redistricting under the assailed RA 9716. Clearly, RA 9716 tinkers with vote
valuation, and consequently with the constitutional standard of proportional representation, based solely on the whims of incumbent
Congressmen, an invalid standard for redistricting under Section 5 of Article VI.
Equally important, RA 9716 violates the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in creating the proposed First District, which
will have a population of only 176,383. The minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district admits of no variance and must be
complied with to the last digit. The Constitution mandates a population of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" for a legislative
district in a city, and under the principle of "uniform and progressive ratio," for every legislative district in provinces and in the
Metropolitan Manila area.
Entitlement of "Each Province" to "at Least One Representative"
No Basis to Ignore Standard of Uniform Population Ratio
The directive in Section 5(3) of Article VI that "each province, shall have at least one representative" means only that when a province
is created, a legislative district must also be created with it. 25 Can this district have a population below 250,000? To answer in the
affirmative is to ignore the constitutional mandate that districts in provinces be apportioned "in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." That the Constitution never meant to exclude provinces
from the requirement of proportional representation is evident in the opening provision of Section 5(1), which states:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x." (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

In short, the Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of legislative districts in provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area
must comply with proportional representation, on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. 26
Apportionment in the Ordinance Appended to the 1987 Constitution Distinct from Legislative Reapportionments
It will not do to hoist the apportionment under the Ordinance appended to the Constitution or Mariano v. COMELEC 27 and Bagabuyo
v. COMELEC28 as normative props to shore up the hollow proposition that reapportionment in provinces can dispense with the
minimum population of 250,000 as prescribed in Section 5 of Article VI. In the first place, the Constitutional Commission, exercising
constituent powers, enjoyed absolute discretion to relax the standards it textualized in Section 5, Article VI, in the interest of creating
legislative districts en masse cognizant of legitimate concerns.29 Only the people, through the instrument of ratification, possessed the
greater sovereign power to overrule the Constitutional Commission. By overwhelmingly ratifying the 1987 Constitution, the people in
the exercise of their sovereign power sanctioned the Constitutional Commissions discretionary judgments.
In contrast, Congress enacted RA 9716 in the exercise of its legislative powers under the 1987 Constitution and subject to the
reapportionment standards in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. Congress is strictly bound by the reapportionment standards in
Section 5, unlike the Constitutional Commission which could create one-time exceptions subject to ratification by the sovereign
people. Until it enacted RA 9716, Congress never deviated from the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in creating a
legislative district. Thus, in Republic Act No. 7854 (RA 7854) which doubled the legislative districts in Makati City, the Court in
Mariano v. COMELEC took note of the certification by the National Statistics Office that at the time of the enactment of RA 7854, the
population of Makati City was 508,174, entitling it to two representatives.30
Footnote 13 in Mariano v. COMELEC states: "As per the certificate issued by Administrator Tomas Africa of the National Census and
Statistics Office, the population of Makati as of 1994 stood at 508,174; August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on House Bill No. 12240
(converting Makati into a highly urbanized city) x x x."
Similarly, in Republic Act No. 9371 (RA 9371) which also doubled the legislative districts in Cagayan de Oro City, the two districts
created complied with the minimum population of 250,000 (254,644 and 299,322, respectively), as the Court noted in Bagabuyo v.
COMELEC.31 Contrary to the assertion of the majority opinion, neither Mariano v. COMELEC nor Bagabuyo v. COMELEC supports
the claim that Congress can create a legislative district with a population of less than 250,000. On the contrary, these cases confirm
that every legislative district must have a minimum population of 250,000. Only very recently, this Court in Aldaba v.
COMELEC32 struck down a law creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos, which has a population just short of the 250,000
minimum requirement.
RA 9716 Harbinger for Wave of Malapportionments
More than 20 years after the 1987 Constitution took effect, Congress has yet to comply with the Constitutions mandate that "[w]ithin
three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section." 33 Instead, Congress has contented itself with enacting piecemeal reapportionment laws for
individual areas, either for this sole purpose34or ancillary to the conversion35 or creation36 of a local government unit, at the behest of
legislators representing the area. As movements
of district lines spell doom or salvation for entrenched political interests, this process subjects Congress to intense pressure to keep off
certain districts.
Until RA 9716 came along, Congress was able to balance political exigency with constitutional imperatives. RA 9716 marks a
tectonic shift by tilting the balance in favor of entrenched interests, sacrificing the Constitution and ultimately, the ideals of
representative democracy, at the altar of political expediency. If left unchecked, laws like RA 9716 will fill the House of
Representatives with two breeds of legislators, one, representing districts two, four, ten times more populous than other favored
districts, elected by voters holding "mickey mouse votes" and another, representing small, favored districts, elected by voters holding
"premium votes" two, four, ten times more valuable than the votes in disfavored districts.
Our oath of office as Justices of this Court forbids us from legitimizing this constitutionally abhorrent scheme, a scheme that for the
first time under the 1987 Constitution creates a new politically privileged class of legislators in what is supposed to be a "democratic
and republican State."37 To uphold RA 9716 is to uphold the blatant violation of the constitutional standards requiring proportional
representation and a minimum population in the creation of legislative districts. This will derail our one person, one vote
representative democracy from the tracks clearly and precisely laid down in the 1987 Constitution.
And for what end -- to create a special class of legislative districts represented by a new political elite exercising more legislative
power than their votes command? Such a grant of privileged political status is the modern day equivalent of a royalty or nobility title,

which is banned under the 1987 Constitution. History will not be kind to those who embark on a grotesquely anomalous constitutional
revision that is repulsive to our ideals of a "democratic and republican State."
The ruling of the majority today could sound the death knell for the principle of "one person, one vote" that insures equality in voting
power. All votes are equal, and there is no vote more equal than others. This equality in voting power is the essence of our democracy.
This Court is supposed to be the last bulwark of our democracy. Sadly, here the Court, in ruling that there are some votes more equal
than others, has failed in its primordial constitutional duty to protect the essence of our democracy.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL Republic Act No. 9716 for grossly violating
the standards of proportional representation and minimum population in the creation of legislative districts as prescribed in Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

AUTHOR: Ernest
022 METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
[ G.R. No. 135962
March 27, 2000]
TOPIC: Powers of Metropolitan Political and Administrative Body
PONENTE: PUNO, J
FACTS:
1. Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village,
a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air
Village.
2. On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995
requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day,
respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would
be demolished.
3. Respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, for injunction. Respondent
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street
and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following
day. However, subsequently the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction.
4. Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune
Street and issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDA's proposed action. It ruled that
MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition
of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
5. Motion for Reconsideration Denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE/s:
WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) HAS THE MANDATE TO
OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS.
Petitioners Argument:
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed
with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves
the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the
police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court. From the
premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening
Neptune street to the public.
HELD: NO.
RATIO: The scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and
traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods.
It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro
Manila for traffic violations. Under the service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and
"coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer
a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. (Sec. 5 MMDA LAW)
There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924(MMDA LAW) that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro
Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions appropriate funds for
the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." It is
an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the
vast metropolitan area.
DOCTRINES:
Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative
boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of

local affairs." The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate."

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of 1991.

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative body of the
provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan,that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of
the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local
Government Code of 1991 empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as
the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5)
municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas,
Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, Navotas, Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the
passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a
development authority" referred to as the MMDA.
The implementation of the MMDA's plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local government units, national
government agencies, accredited people's organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by
the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other
arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required services Metro Manila.
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the mayors of the component
12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors' League and the president of the Metro Manila
Councilors' League.
The MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila
Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant
of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was
explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to the bill's presentation to Congress.
MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special
metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. MMC under P.D. No. 824 is
not the same entity as the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924.
Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority. The MMDA shall:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery of
metro-wide services, land use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development
objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services which
shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging of projects
and presentation to funding institutions;
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery of specific services under its
jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management
offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks
and adopt solutions to problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to
enforcement, engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation,including but not
limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of
traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses
in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its
traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed
security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such
conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of
basic services to the local government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the
local government unit concerned.
DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39549 are affirmed.SO ORDERED.

023 METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. DANTE GARIN., respondent.
TOPIC: Creation of autonomous regional bodies
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario J.

AUTHOR: John Jeffrey Ramirez

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS:
Lawyer was involved in an accident. MMDA issued a TVC and
confiscated his drivers license. SC ruled MMDA has no legal
basis to do so.

FACTS
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driverslicense was confiscated for parking illegally.
Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for
hiscase to be file in Court.
Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f)
of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix
and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties.
Garins arguments:
a. Absence of IRR for Sec. 5 (f) of RA 78942 pre-empting judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation
resulting in violation of due process
b. the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it
does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring
motorists;
MMDA:
a. powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and
penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to
determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of separation of powers does not
preclude admixture of the three powers of government in administrative agencies;
b. the governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the implementing rules for Sec.
5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and directed the courts attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 (Garin
countered that there is no quorum when the circular was passed)
RTC: Ruled in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating drivers
license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. Thus this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not MMDA is authorize to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers license in the enforcement of traffic rules and
regulations?
HELD: No, MMDA has no power to do so.
RATIO:
The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation
endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Police power, as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws
,statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and
welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of the same.
There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies, Peoples Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are administrative in nature.

024 MMDA v Viron Transportation Co., Inc.

AUTHOR: Jelena

TOPIC: Powers of Metropolitan Political and Administrative

Body
PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J.:

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS:
PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a
Mass Transport System for Greater Manila. Pursuant to this EO,
the Metro manila Council of the MMDA cited the need to remove
the bus terminals located in Metro Manila. Respondents,
provincial bus operators who had bus terminals that were
threatened to be removed, alleges that EO should be declared
unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights
of owners and operators of public land transportation units over
their respective terminals.
SC EO is unconstitutional.

NATURE: petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA)
and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Two assailed orders:

1st- of September 8, 2005, which resolved a motion for reconsideration filed by herein respondents, declared Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 179 (the E.O.), "unconstitutional as it constitutes an unreasonable exercise of police power."
2nd- of November 23, 2005 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
PARTIES:
(1) THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners,
vs.
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial
bus operation, respondent.;
&
(2) HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority,petitioners,
vs.
MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., another provincial bus operator, respondent.
FACTS:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

[Feb. 10, 2003] President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (PGMA) issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 (the E.O.) "Providing for the
Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System,"
The E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets and the
inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; and the MMDA had "recommended a plan to decongest traffic by
eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to
the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities" which plan is
referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).
The E.O. designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.
The Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued a resolution expressing full
support of the Project.
[February 24, 2003] Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila.
[VIRON]
a. alleged that the MMDA, through Chairman Fernando, was "poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or
tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of
traffic regulation." This would mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon
City.
b. The MMDAs authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bus
terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property.
c. Viron asked the court to construe the scope, extent and limitation of the power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under

R.A. No. 7924, "An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions,
Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes."
d. Also, asked for a ruling on whether the planned closure of provincial bus terminals would contravene the Public Service
Act and related laws, which mandate public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the
privilege of operating as common carriers.
7. Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), later filed a similar petition, which was later consolidated with Virons case.
8. [MENCORP]
a. asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and
operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals.
b. prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
impending closure of its bus terminals which it was leasing at the corner of EDSA and New York Street in Cubao and at
the intersection of Blumentritt, Laon Laan and Halcon Streets in Quezon City. DENIED.
9. [January 24, 2005] RTC sustained the constitutionality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to
administer Metro Manilas basic services including those of transport and traffic management. the E.O. was a valid exercise of
the police power of the State as it satisfied the two tests of lawful subject matter and lawful means, hence, Virons and Mencorps
property rights must yield to police power.
10. [Separate Motions for Reconsideration]
a. [Order of September 8, 2005], reversed its Decision. Unconstitutional E.O.
b. [Resolution of November 23, 2005] denied MR.
11. [This petition]
a. [Petitioners contend]
i. no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders
the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
ii. Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising
them of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.
iii. the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make
available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors.
iv. the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not
between third persons.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7
ISSUE: Is the E.O. unconstitutional?
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

It is true, as respondents have pointed out, that the alleged deficiency of the consolidated petitions to meet the requirement of
justiciability was not among the issues defined for resolution in the Pre-Trial Order of January 12, 2004. It is equally true,
however, that the question was repeatedly raised by petitioners in their Answer to Virons petition, their Comment of April 29,
2003 opposing Mencorps prayer for the issuance of a TRO, and their Position Paper of August 23, 2004.
In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents pleaded the existence of the essential requisites for their
respective petitions for declaratory relief, and refuted petitioners contention that a justiciable controversy was lacking.
The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition:
a. (a) there must be a justiciable controversy;
b. (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
c. (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
d. (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.
Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance by the MMDA of an order for the closure of respondents
bus terminals would be foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to bring would no longer be for declaratory relief which, under
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a breach or violation of rights.
As for petitioners contention that the E.O. is a mere administrative issuance which creates no relation with third persons, it does
not persuade. Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the Project for which the concerned government agencies are directed
to coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by third persons like respondents
would have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate from the common bus terminals.
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would mean,
among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a
deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.
[Respondents arguement] the MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination of their bus terminals under the E.O. which, is
unconstitutional because it violates both the Constitution and the Public Service Act; and that neither is the MMDA clothed with
such authority under R.A. No. 7924.
[Petitioners submit] tthe real issue concerns the Presidents authority to undertake or to cause the implementation of the Project.
The authority of the President is derived from E.O. No. 125, "Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications
Defining its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes," her residual power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the

9.

10.

11.

12.
13.

14.

15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.

21.

Administrative Code of 1987. The E.O. is also a valid exercise of the police power.
It is readily apparent from E.O. No. 125, as amended, that the President, then possessed of and exercising legislative powers,
mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative
entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC
includes the power to establishand administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications.
Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and projects for transportation, it follows that
the President may exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the Project, which admittedly is one for
transportation.
Such authority springs from the Presidents power of control over all executive departments as well as the obligation for the
faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution, which is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Notably, Section 38, Chapter 37, Book IV of the same Code defines the Presidents power of
supervision and control over the executive departments, viz:
a. SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other
laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined
as follows:
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of
acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the
relationship of particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this
paragraph. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate, the President may act directly or merely
direct the performance of a duty.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes
and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people. This power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus
populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being
delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as by the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of
1991.
The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the
implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized
to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to
establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which,
by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority
conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No.
7924.
To recall, R.A. No. 7924 declared the Metropolitan Manila area as a "special development and administrative region" and placed
the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region under the MMDA.
[Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.] In that case, the Court stressed:
a. Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services.
xxx
b. It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro
Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government
units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The
MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development authority. It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the
vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
charter itself,
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as
envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that
the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents terminals.

22. Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two tests
of a valid police power measure, viz:
a. (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and
b. (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
23. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes and the means.
24. Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. Indeed, the
E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so
determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing
transport systems. It is thus beyond cavil that the motivating force behind the issuance of the E.O. is the interest of the public in
general.
25. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly
oppressive?
26. With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila, the E.O. seeks to "eliminate[e] the bus terminals now located
along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provid[e] more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting
public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x." Common carriers with terminals along the major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated
common parking areas.
27. As to the alleged confiscatory character of the E.O., it need only to be stated that respondents certificates of public convenience
confer no property right, and are mere licenses or privileges. 52 As such, these must yield to legislation safeguarding the interest of
the people.
28. Even then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents terminals not only because no
authority to implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but also because the
elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure.
29. Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
a. Paragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now Section 5 of Executive Order No. 202, creating the
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested the Public Service Commission (PSC, now the
LTFRB) with "x x x jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and
other properties x x x."
30. Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC was empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment,
maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or
privilege.
31. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary
service to be provided by provincial bus operators like respondents, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or
lease of suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus run counter to the provisions of the Public Service Act.
32. This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pestering problem of
traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation
of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is
the DOTC as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to
promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications which has the power to establish and
administer a transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar.
33. No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any plan, strategy or project which it is not authorized to
implement cannot pass muster.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID for
being ultra vires.

025 ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M.

DIMALOTANG, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG and THE SECRETARY OF
BUDGET and MANAGEMENT EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, respondents.
TOPIC: Creation and abolition of Municipal Corporations;
RA 6766
PONENTE: Tinga, J.

AUTHOR: Arthur Archie Tiu

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS:
At stake in the present case is the fate of regional autonomy for
Muslim Mindanao which is the epoch-making, Constitution-based
project for achieving national unity in diversity.
Challenged in the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction. (Petition) are the constitutionality
and validity of Republic Act No. 8999 (R.A. 8999),[2] entitled
An Act Establishing An Engineering District in the First District
of the Province of Lanao del Sur and Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) Department Order No. 119 (D.O. 119)[3] on the subject,
Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office.

FACTS
1.

On Aug. 1, 1989, RA 6734 was passed (Organic Act of ARMM). Four provinces voted for inclusion in ARMM, namely:
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.
2. In accordance with it, EO 426 was issued by Pres. Cory Aquino on Oct. 12, 1990. The same devolved to the ARMM the
power of the DPWH.
3. On May 20, 1999, DO 119 was issued by DPWH Sec. Vigilar. It created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and
Lanao del Sur.
4. On Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which created a new Engineering District in the first district of Lanao del Sur was passed by Pres.
Estrada.
5. On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 which amended RA 6734 was passed. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to
join ARMM through said law.
6. Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang in their capacity as OIC and Enginer II respectively of the First Engineering District
of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur filed a petition questioning the constitutionality and validity of DO 119 and RA 8999 on
the ground that they contravene the constitution and the organic acts of the ARMM (autonomy)
7. Petitioners seek that 1) to annul and set aside D.O. 119; (2) to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing D.O.
119 and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH; and (3) to compel the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release all funds for public works projects intended for Marawi City and
the First District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only; and to compel
respondent DPWH Secretary to let the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur implement all public
works projects within its jurisdictional area
8. petition includes an urgent application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and, after hearing, a writ of
preliminary injunction, to enjoin respondent DBM Secretary from releasing funds for public works projects in Lanao del Sur
to entities other than the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, and also to restrain the DPWH Secretary
from allowing others besides the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur to implement public works
projects in Lanao del Sur
9. Respondents (thru OSG) filed a comment that DO 119 is valid and was issued in accordance with EO 124. For RA 8999 they
submit that the powers of the autonomous regions did not diminish the legislative power of Congress. (they also claim
petitioners have no locus standi)http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7
ISSUE: WON DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid and constitutionally infirm?
HELD: On RA 8999: It never became operative
On DO 119: yes

RATIO:
RA 8999
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

At the outset, let it be made clear that it is not necessary to declare R.A. No. 8999 unconstitutional for the adjudication of this
case. The accepted rule is that the Court will not resolve a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case, or if the
case can be disposed of or settled on other grounds.
R.A. 8999 was repealed and superseded by R.A. 9054 (ratified in plebiscite). Where a statute of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.
R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of
the ARG covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, one of which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and
rural planning. R.A. 8999, however, ventures to reestablish the National Governments jurisdiction over infrastructure
programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter laws objective.
R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts, R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054. The kernel
of the antagonism and disharmony lies in the regional autonomy which the ARMM Organic Acts ordain pursuant to the
Constitution. On the other hand, R.A. 8999 contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy. The
1987 Constitution mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and unequivocal answer to the cry for a meaningful, effective
and forceful autonomy
The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case of the Filipino Muslims and the Cordillera people who have been
fighting for it.
A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization.
Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or functionally
defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational units. It is typically a delegated
power, wherein a larger government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local governments. Federalism implies
some measure of decentralization, but unitary systems may also decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from
federalism in that the sub-units that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right against the
central government.
Decentralization comes in two formsdeconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it
involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and
local offices. This mode of decentralization is also referred to as administrative decentralization.
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources for
the performance of certain functions from the central government to local government units. This is a more liberal form of
decentralization since there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy to local
government units in cognizance of their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their
administrative and technical capabilities

DO 119
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi
City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. The Executive Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734
which initiated the creation of the constitutionally-mandated autonomous region and which defined the basic structure of the
autonomous government. E.O. 426 sought to implement the transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the
ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government. In particular, it identified four (4) District Engineering Offices in each of
the four (4) provinces, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Accordingly, the First Engineering District
of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the public works within the province.
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers
which have been previously devolved under the said executive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426.
The DPWHs order, like spring water, cannot rise higher than its source of powerthe Executive.
E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and Highways while
E.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM to the Autonomous
Regional Government. The latter statute specifically applies to DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to
E.O. 426 in the instant case.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in effect superseded E.O. 124. In case of an
irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails because it is the later legislative
will.
Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or
parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.With the repeal of
E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM
Organic Acts.

026 Sema v. Comelec & Dilangalen

AUTHOR: Nikki Tolentino

TOPIC: Creation of autonomous regional bodies - Sec. 1, Sec. 4,

Sec. 13 & Sec. 14 Article X

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS:

General Rule: An organic act creates autonomous regional bodies.

Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the

creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation
of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution

PONENTE: Carpio, J
FACTS

Petitions seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating
Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic
Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054). Although under the
Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII,
having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.
The ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of
Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845
stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act
201
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407
by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City).

Petitioner:

Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City,
prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast
in Cotabato City for that office.
Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which
maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution
No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.
Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion
legislative districts.

Respondent COMELEC:

Chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to
nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not
quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the
proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative
district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.

Respondent Dilangalen:

Countered that Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy
filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan
including Cotabato City.
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or
reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first legislative district.
COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as
the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress

Court:

Required the parties to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such new province.

Petitioner Sema:

Answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa v. Salas stated that when a province is
created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which
cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment; (b)
Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) affirms the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation
of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces.
Petitioner Comelec:

Abandoned its earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema,
contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is self-executing. Thus, every new province created by the
ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives even in the absence of
a national law;

Respondent Dilangalen:

Answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds: (a) the province contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of
provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures
relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of
Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the
disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinces
without regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than
250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.

On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054:

Petitioner Sema:

Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM
of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions,
through their organic acts, legislative powers over other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.
However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional
Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces
contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x
x x that do not comply with the minimum criteria under RA 7160.

Respondent Dilangalen:

Contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
o the power to create provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution; and
o the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe
standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause
Respondent COMELEC:

Joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance
with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because
o it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6, Article X of the Constitution; and
o the power to create provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7

ISSUES:
1.
2.

Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
If in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such province.

HELD:
We rule that
(1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces and cities;
(2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and
(3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
RATIO:
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan:
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such
creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with
any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act
of Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the
power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative
bodies
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress
of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended.
Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws,
the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1)

Administrative organization;

(2)

Creation of sources of revenues;

(3)

Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4)

Personal, family, and property relations;

(5)

Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6)

Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7)

Educational policies;

(8)

Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9)

Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region.

Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or
reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, The Regional Assembly may
exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x. Since the ARMM Regional
Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose
representative is elected in national elections.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to
the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x. The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that
the ARMM Government is established within the framework of the Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the
Constitution which mandates that the ARMM shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative
district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with
the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of
such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts.
In summary, SC ruled that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well
as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot
create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative
district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, SC ruled that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM
Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
[apologies for this long digest, but caveat as well, there is a whole other discussion regarding the requirements of
reapportionment/count of representatives in Congress which I didnt include anymore assuming that discussion sticks with the topic
outline]

000 DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity,

and in representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF
AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI
MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON
T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG,
ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and
BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive
Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and
ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines,Respondents.

AUTHOR: Gabriel Paulo R. Uy

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS: the case is 19 pages long

TOPIC: Autonomous Region and Organic act of ARMM

PONENTE: Justice Brion
Facts:
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao." A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully
establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
RA No. 9054 (entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734. This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in
the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM.
Congress passed RA No. 91401.This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to Nov 26, 2001. It
likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.it was later ratified.
RA 9333 reset the election on Aug 8 2011 but this was without ratification by a plebiscite.
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country
The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the
Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the elections in the May 2013 elections
Parties:
RA 10153 gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari ,Mandamus and Prohibition5 filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman,Rep. Jacino Paras as a member of the
House of Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition vs COMELEC filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer ,Petitioners
Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko
Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), to
assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Basically,the petitioners raised,among others, the following issues:

ISSUE# 1 Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates or necessitates the synchronization of elections of the ARMM elections
with the National and Local elections
Petitioners argue that there is no need to synchronize the elections of the ARMM with the National and local level. Hence, it shouldnt
be May 2013 (2 years after the ammended date of elections) until the elections shpi;d be held.
Respondent OSG argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5,
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution
HELD: While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent
towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to
which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.
Issue # 2 : whether RA 9333 and 10153 needs 2/3 vote of congress and majority vote in plebiscite for ammending RA 9054
Petitioners challenge the effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply with
Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast
in a plebiscite called for the purpose
Petitioner are saying that in every ammendment of Organic act of ARMM(RA 9054) there must be 2/3 vote of congress and plebiscite.
Held: In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054.RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of
the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these
subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or
revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the
subsequent regular elections.
Also, the clear intention of Congress isto treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct
from the Organic Acts.
Issue# 3 is the provision in RA 9054 requiring a supermajority vote of 2/3 of congress to ammend it valid?
Petitioners aver that the requirement of supermajority vote of 2/3 of the congress is invalid because it violates Sec 16(2) of the
constitutition where only a majority vote is needed to pass a law.
Held:No
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business." In other
words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum
needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the
plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed
It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. xxx This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.34 (Emphasis ours.)

Issue# 4: III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution. Is it valid?
Petitioners aver that RA 9054 enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Sec 18 Article X Consti
Held: NO
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for
determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. the settled rule is that
amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective. But what ammendment of
the organic act needs a plebicite?
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that "The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose.the requirement refers only amendments
to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite. These
amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the regions judicial
system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative
powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. 36
Issue# 5 what is the reasonable measure to fill in the elective officials from the time the elected officials ednd their term until
the synchronized elections?
Option 1. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative
positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section
8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
legislature cant extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where
the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official
term shall begin.
Option 2. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions
of the Constitution:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President,
Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to
whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power
Option 3 The Court or congress has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials
not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or
more, than the constitutionally mandated three years71 as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Option 4 E. giving the Presidents Power to Appoint OICs is the most reasonable
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. the assailed law(RA 10153 which gives the President the power to
appoint ARMM elective officials pendign elections) facially rests on clear constitutional basis.The appointing power is embodied in

Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint xxx. He shall also appoint
xxx those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion
that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be "elective and representative of the constituent
political units."
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only
if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions.What
RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office."
The RA 10153 has limited circumstances where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance both under
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as
well as the communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure
Issue# 5 does local autonomy of the ARMM prevail over the synchronization of elections? (this is the most relevant part of the
case in relation to local autonomy IMO)
Held:No
Petitioners argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national and local elections in order to maintain the
autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections
one mandate should not be given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear.
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted as a
whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force
and effect.
regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law that synchronizes does not in any way alter, change or
modify its governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances.
while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence.
The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national
policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous
determination.
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local
governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The
purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political
and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to
enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a
common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit,
and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of
September 13, 2011.

028 Ordillo vs COMELEC

AUTHOR: Jezreel E. Zapanta

G.R. No. 93054 : December 4, 1990

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS: A region cannot be comprised of

only one province.

TOPIC: Creation of Autonomous regional bodies

PONENTE: Gutierez, JR., J.:
PARTIES:
Petitioners: Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue) et al
Respondent: COMELEC
FACTS :

In January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao
and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region
was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676
votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
COMELEC on February 14, 1990 declared in its resolution that the organic for the region has been approved by the
province of Ifugao, with the secretary of justice issuing a memorandum for the President reiterating the resolution
stating that:
. . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in
the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably then, alone, legally and validly
constitutes the CAR."
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections in the Cordillera
Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.
Petitioners filed a petition with COMELC to declare the non-ratification of the organic act of the region arguing that
there can be can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
The petition was merely noted by the COMELEC and subsequently, the President issued Administrative Order No.
160 declaring that all the offices organized under E.O. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of the organic
act. Hence the casehttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7
ISSUE: Whether the province of Ifugao, which alone voted in favor of its creation, can validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region
HELD: No, The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
RATIO:
1.

It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:

"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis Supplied)

2.

The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than
one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact
that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous
provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No.
742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the
Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that:

"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance and
development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous
region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be impractical and illogical.

029 CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v. COA

AUTHOR: Danna Zerrudo

TOPIC: R.A. No. 6766 (Organic Act for Cordillera Autonomous

Region)
PONENTE: Cortes, J.

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS: Constitutionality of E.O. No. 220,

which created the Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on
the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic
act by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in
the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a
plebiscite.

FACTS
2.

April 1986 - Just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on ideological grounds from the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the New People's Army. (NPA). After President Aquino was
installed into office by People Power, she advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She called on all revolutionary forces
to a peace dialogue.
3. 13 September 1986 - Pres. Aquino and some members of her cabinet made an agreement with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg [As
Commander of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA)] and Ama Mario Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera Bodong
Administration). The agreement in principle is: the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and
violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations. The negotiations shall be a continuing process until the
demands of the Cordillera people shall have been substantially granted.
4. 27 March 1987 - Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the government], in pursuance of the 13 Sept 1986
agreement, signed with Fr. Balweg a joint agreement.
5. Pursuant to the joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives of
the Cordillera people.
6. 15 July 1987 - President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into law, known now as E.O. No. 220.
7. E.O. No. 220, issued by President Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.
8. E.O. No 220s main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region,
particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive departments of the National
Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities
in the region. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the region. The
CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an
implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional
government is established and organized.
9. Petitioners contentions:
By issuing E.O. No. 220, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an
organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. They saw it that as a "shortcut" for the creation of
the autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
E.O. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision.
The creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7
ISSUE #1: Whether or not Pres. Aquino, by creating E.O. No. 220, pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an
organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras
HELD: No
ISSUE #2: Whether or not E.O. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision
HELD: No
ISSUE #3: Whether or not the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces
HELD: No

RATIO:
For Issue #1
1.

2.

3.

[E.O. No. 220] does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the
ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we
shall show later.
The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for
some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and
the autonomous region created. These measures we find in E.O. No. 220. The steps taken by the President are obviously
perceived by petitioners as capitulation to the CPLA of Balweg, as unsound, but the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom
of the measures taken by the President. We can only inquire into whether or not the measures violate the Constitution.
Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was convened, enacted Republic Act No. 6658 which
created the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. The President then appointed its members. The commission
prepared a draft organic act which became the basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The
result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region, which was signed into law on
October 23, 1989. A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be conducted shortly, shall complete the process outlined
in the Constitution.
In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two years and we find that, despite E.O. No. 220,
the autonomous region in the Cordilleras is still to be created, showing the lack of basis of petitioners' assertion. Events have
shown that petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
was totally unfounded.

For Issue #2
1.

[T]he CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical
personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public
corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources
of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs
and services in the covered areas.
2. [C]onsidering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No.
220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may
be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional
development councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14].
For Issue #3
1.
2.
3.

[T]he constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of
local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these regions.
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy
for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political
subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

030 Bagabuyo v. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 176971; December 8, 2008 ]
TOPIC: Plebiscite Requirement
PONENTE: Brion, J.:

AUTHOR: Nikki A
NOTES:
Nature: petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus w/
prayer for issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction

PARTIES:
Petitioner: Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo
Respondent: Commission on Elections
FACTS:
1. On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859:
"An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro." This law
eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two.
2. For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second
district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own representative to
Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
3. On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371. .
4. Petitioner filed the present petition against COMELEC asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837
on constitutional grounds.
5. Since the prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction was not granted, the May 14 National and
Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: (petitioners reply to respondents Comment on the petition)
1. Under the case of Del Mar v. PAGCOR, the Court may take cognizance of this petition if compelling reasons, or the nature
and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction;
2. Cagayan de Oro City's reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
3. the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common
denominator - the material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected, as well
as of the people therein;
4. a voter's sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the entire city's Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at
least one half because the questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district designated
by the COMELEC;
5. a voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman and the members of the city council for the other
legislative district, and
6. Government funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
1. Petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the RTC is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the
constitutionality of a statue;
2. R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan De Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Sec. 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution;
3. the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and
4. R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan De Oros territory, population and income classification; hence no
plebiscite is required.
ISSUE(S): (I will only discuss the issue on the plebiscite requirement)
1. Is there a need for a plebiscite?
HELD:
1. No.
RATIO:

1. Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the local government units
(historically and generically referred to as "municipal corporations") that the Constitution itself classified into provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays. In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as "a body politic and
corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government
thereof." The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government (Article X).
2. Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority to act has been vested in the
Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise acts on
local government units by setting the standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and
by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through legislation.
3. The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and the means to make a legislative

district sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively heard. As above stated, the aim of legislative
apportionment is "to equalize population and voting power among districts." Hence, emphasis is given to the number of
people represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the representative districts; and accessibility and
commonality of interests in terms of each district being, as far as practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent territory.
4. In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10 expressly speaks of how
local government units may be "created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered." Its concern is the
commencement, the termination, and the modification of local government units' corporate existence and territorial coverage;
and it speaks of two specific standards that must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in
the local government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
5. A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The
Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision.
6. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a
local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a
province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the
validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The plebiscite requirement does not apply where there is a legislative apportionment of a political
subdivision.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

031 MOISES SAMSON v. HON. ALEXANDER

AGUIRRE (EXEC. SEC. of COMELEC), and DBM
G.R. No. 133076; Sept. 22, 1999
TOPIC: Creation and Abolition of Municipal Corporations
Plebiscite Requirement, Sec. 10 LGC
PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J.

AUTHOR: JANNA
One of SAMSONs arguments as to unconstitutionality of RA 8535 is
that it fails to conform to the requirement of having no adverse effect
to the mother city (Quezon City), but according to the SC, he was
unable to substantiate his claims, and Mayor Mathay Jr. was even
present during Senate deliberations, but he raised no such issue as to
adverse effects. His only concern was that all QC voters should be
included in the plebiscite. In the plebiscite contemplated in RA 8535,
all persons concerned would be able to raise those issues before they
vote.

Petitioner: Moises S. Samson Incumbent councilor of the first district of QC.

Respondents: Hon. Aguirre of COMELEC and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
FACTS :
1.

Feb. 23, 1998: President Fidel V. Ramos signed RA 8535 into law, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon
City.
2. Petitioner seeks/prays: (a)To enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the implementation of R.A. 8535, the COMELEC
from holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City of Novaliches. (b) To enjoin the DBM from disbursing funds for the
plebiscite (b) For the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction or TRO
3. Petitioners Arguments: R.A. No. 8535 fails to conform to the criteria established by LGC Sec. 7, 11(a), and 450 (a) as to
requirements of: (a) income, population and land area; (b) Seat of government; (c) Having no adverse effect to its mother city
(Quezon City) (d) Its Implementing Rules as provided in Art. 11 (b) (1) and (2) as to furnishing a copy of the QC Council
barangay resolution;

There is no certification attesting to the fact that the mother local government unit, Quezon City, would not be adversely
affected by the creation of the City of Novaliches, in terms of income, population, and land area ( note: this is the only part
that mentions the topic of plebiscite requirement in the SC discussion)

Certifications as to income, population, and land area were not presented to Congress during deliberations, which is clear from
the minutes of the public hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Local Government on the proposed charter of the
City of Novaliches
4. Respondents Comment (via SOLGEN):Councilor Samson failed to substantiate said allegations with convincing proof. (a)
Legal presumption = Congress considered all legal requirements under the LGC of 1991, in passing RA 8535 and Councilor
Samson has the burden of prove to show otherwise. (b) Petition itself is devoid of any pertinent document supporting
petitioners claim that R.A. 8535 is unconstitutional. Present petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC should be enjoined from conducting a plebiscite, because R.A. 8535 is unconstitutional in that it fails to
conform to the requirement of having no adverse effect to the mother city, Quezon City.
HELD: No. Instant petition is dismissed. The statute is presumed valid, and a person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving
his allegations clearly and unmistakably. This, Samson failed to do, so COMELEC cannot rightly be enjoined from pushing through
with the plebiscite.
RATIO:
Sec. 10 LGC: Plebiscite Requirement No creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs shall
take effect unless approved by a majority of the voted cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly
affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120 days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance
effecting such action, unless the law or ordinance fixes another date.
-RE: to the alleged adverse effect on Quezon City by the creation of the City of Novaliches, petitioner failed to present any
concrete evidence on this point.

Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., was present during the deliberations of the Senate Committee on Local Government, and made no
mention of anything concerning such adverse effects. As chief executive of Quezon City, Mayor Mathay would be the first to

protest any development that might prove detrimental to Quezon City.

[It is a] fact that [Mayor Mathay] did not raise any adverse issue during the public hearings on R.A. No. 8535, but instead he
Stressed his concern on the matter of inclusion of all Quezon City voters in the plebiscite that would decide the fate of the
City of Novaliches. [This] is indicative of the non-existence of such negative issues.
Moreover, in the plebiscite as contemplated on R.A. 8535, all persons concerned will obviously have the opportunity to raise
those issues even before they vote on the principal question of the cityhood of Novaliches.

Other issues discussed (in case Atty. Loanzon asks):

Petitioner argues: no certifications attesting compliance with the foregoing requirements were submitted to Congress, citing in
particular public hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government.
SC says: The bill that eventually became R.A. No. 8535 originated in the House of Representatives. Its principal sponsor is Cong.
Dante Liban of Quezon City. Samson did not present any proof, but only allegations that no certifications were submitted to the
House Committee on Local Government, as is the usual practice in this regard.
Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law passed by Congress, based on the bill
of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the requisites therefor.
Resource persons from NSO, Bureau of Local Govt (BLG). Finance, Land Management Bureau, and DBM, aside from officials of
QC itself were present during the public hearings.
o BLG rep. estimated the combined average income of the 13 barangays from 95-96 = Php26.95M. LGC only requires that a
proposed city must have annual income of at least P20M for the immediately preceding 2 yrs.
o NSO rep estimated the population = 347,310. Implementing rules only require 150k population
o LGC only requires proposed city to comply with requirements as to income and population or land area, so compliance with
either requisite number of inhabitants or land area, in addition to income is sufficient.
Petitioner argues: oral manifestation made by the representatives of government offices is not enough certification.
SC says: Their official statements could serve the same purpose contemplated by law requiring certificates.
Their affirmation as well as their oath as witnesses in open session of either the Senate or the House of Representatives give even
greater solemnity than a certification submitted to either chamber routinely.
Under the Implementing Rules, written certifications are required to be attached to the petition for the creation of a city, to be
submitted by interested municipalities or barangays to Congress in the form of a resolution.
o Petitioner failed to show that aside from oral declarations during the public hearings, the representatives present did
not also submit written certifications; he did not even bother to present a copy of said petition if only to prove that it was
without the written certifications attached as required by law.
o We are thus constrained to presume, as respondents urge, that these requirements were met appropriately in the passage of
the assailed legislative act.
Petitioner argues: R.A. No. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed City of Novaliches as required under
Section 11(a) of the Local Government Code.
SC says: This omission is not as fatal to the validity of R.A. No. 8535. SC agrees with respondents that under Section 12 of the LGC,
which applies to the proposed City of Novaliches by virtue of Section 54 of R.A. No. 8535, the City of Novaliches can still establish a
seat of government after its creation. While Sec. 12 speaks of the site of govt. centers, such site can very well also be the seat of govt.
from where governmental and corporate service shall be delivered.
Petitioner argues: QC Council was not furnished a copy of the petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of
Novaliches.
SC says: Even if true, it will also not render RA No. 8535 invalid. Purpose of the requirement is to inform the City Council, but the QC
City Council members are obviously aware of the petition, since its been widely publicized by mass media. QC Council members like
ner, could not now be heard to claim they have not known of the contents of the barangays petition to create the City of Novaliches.
Petitioner argues: Creation of the City of Novaliches will result in a prohibited amendment of the Constitution.
SC says: The ordinance appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of Representatives to the different
legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and
municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or appendix of the Constitution will only result in its
erroneous interpretation.
SAMSON failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality being enjoyed by R.A. No. 8535,
and he did not have substantial and persuasive legal reasons to convince SC to grant reliefs he seeks.

032 Tobias v. Abalos

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
TOPIC: PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT
PONENTE: Bidin, J..

AUTHOR: Jimi R. Arranchado

Note: On the one-title, one-subject rule - It suffices if the title
should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of
the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences
of the proposed law and its operation

PARTIES:
Petitioners: ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R.
TOBIAS, JR.
Respondents: HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
FACTS:
1. Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Mandaluyong."
2. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which
eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
3. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked
whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No.
7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted
"no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
The Petitioners Case
1. The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the
one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district
of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
2. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong
into separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution.
3 Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made
pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the number of the members of the House of Representative may be increased.
3. Whether or not the subject law has resulted in gerrymandering.
HELD:
1. NO
2. YES
3. NO
RATIO:
1. The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than 250, 000 indubitably ordains
compliance with the one city one representative as provided in Article VI, Section 5, par.3 of the Constitution.
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily,
the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong"
necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or

impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), the Court has ruled that the constitutional requirement as now
expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
As elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec: The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve
the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation
2. A reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regard to the petitioners' contention that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A.
No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district: The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject
involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had
nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
3. It should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San
Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency
has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Liberal construction should be applied to the one-title, one-subject rule. It should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. There is sufficient compliance with such a requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to that general subject.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

033 Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon et al v Hon. Mendez,

et al

AUTHOR: Em
NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS:

G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994

TOPIC: Status of a de facto municipal corporation
PONENTE: Vitug, J.
PARTIES:
Petitioner: Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon
Respondents: Hon . Antonio V. Mendez, Sr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, 4th Judicial Region, Gumaca,
Quezon; Municipality OF San Andres, Quezon
FACTS:
On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code,
as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of
San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their
respective sitios. Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the Provincial
Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24 May 1959. The municipal district of
San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation
of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. The executive order added that "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality
as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives."
On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, in
Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres.
Petitioners Contention:
1.

2.

The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the
Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective
offices.
Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order
No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the Municipality or
Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that righfully
belonged to the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.

Respondents Contention [answer]:

1.

In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative and special defenses, that
since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance of
Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new
municipality
2. That because the Municipality of San Andred had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be
assailed
3. Considering the petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that
prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General.
4. On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the case had become moot and
academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took
effect on 01 January 1991. The movant municipality cited Section 442(d) of the law, reading thusly:
Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth
be considered as regular municipalities.
*The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality
of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab
initio.

RTC: dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State, adding that "whatever
defects (were) present in the creation of municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and executive orders,
(were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991."
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ISSUE: Whether or not the Municpality of San Andres legally exists.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty
(30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of
San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto
municipal corporation.
Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San
Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The
ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be
the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the States recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality
of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San
Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15
October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San
Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon.
Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at
the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded.

034 Navarro v. Executive Secretary

AUTHOR: Myk

12 April 2011 G.R. No. 180050

NOTES:

TOPIC: Creation and Abolition of Municipal Corporations:

Plebiscite Requirement
PONENTE: Nachura, J.
FACTS:
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

7.

8.

9.

2 October 2006 RA 9355 was passed creating the Province of Dinagat Islands.
3 December 2006 the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC
(69,943 positive votes & 63,502 negative votes). The PGMA appointed interim provincial officials on 26 January 2007.
During the 2007 elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
Navarro, Bernal, and Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9355. But it
was dismissed on technical grounds. Their MR was also denied.
They filed another petition as taxpayers & residents of Suriago del Norte seeking to nullify RA 9355. They alleged that, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a
large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area.
They pointed out that Dinagat had a land area of only 802.12 square kilometers and a population of 106,951, failing to comply
with Article X of the Constitution & Section 461 of the LGC.
10 February 2010 the SC granted the petition:
a) Declared RA 9355 unconstitutional for failing to comply with the requirements set forth in the Constitution & LGC.
b) The proclamation of Dinagats elected officials as null and void.
c) It likewise declared null and void Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating
that, [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands
for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.
The Republic and Dinagat filed their motions for reconsideration of the decision but these were denied by the court. They also
filed their respective motions for leave of court to admit their second motions for reconsideration, accompanied by their
second motions for reconsideration but these were noted without action by the SC.
Movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration.
Their grounds for intervening are the following:
a) Movants-intervenors election to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will
revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will
have to be conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte as declared by COMELEC Resolution
No. 8790 stating:
If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert
to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election
will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in Item b above. A special election for Governor,
Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and
Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to
be conducted.
b) as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of their constituents, they have a
clear and strong interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte will affect the latter province such that:
the whole administrative set-up of the province will have to be restructured;
the services of many employees will have to be terminated;
contracts will have to be invalidated; and
projects and other developments will have to be discontinued.
The movants-intervenors raised 3 main arguments to challenge the Resolution:
a. that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC;
b. that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes
the exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and

c. that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.

10. 20 July 2010 the SC denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
11. 5 October 2010 the SC issued an order for Entry of Judgment stating that the case had already become final and executory
on 18 May 2010.
12. The movants-intervenors filed an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment and praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of
judgment, and (b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9355 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, RA 9355 is constitutional and article 9(2) of IRR-LGC is valid.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:
1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and filed on October 29, 2010;
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
3. GRANT the Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010
Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID; and
4. The petition is DISMISSED.

RATIO:
1.

2.

3.
4.

Requirements for the creation of an LGU/ province should be liberally construed.

a. It must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is
exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the
local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is
absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although
it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
i. The physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or a
group of islands would form part of the land area of a province. The SC inferred that the legislative
intent was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of
the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the
exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to
correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative
intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGCIRR.
b. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area
requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to
comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several
islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with
contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of selfreliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential
option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is
scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
c. A very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of
local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution.
d. The Oversight Committee formulated and issued the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient
and effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the
principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by
the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in
showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the
time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province.
The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.
Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances
which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is
ready and capable of becoming a province.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

1.

2.

It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic
viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by
the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. The primordial criterion in
the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability.
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or
injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the
law, or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of
executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be
deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.

3.

Constitution, Article X Local Government

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.

4.

LGC, Title IV, Chapter I

Section 461. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)