Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180050

April 12, 2011

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, Petitioners,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines,
represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR
ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO
VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents,
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON
VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M.
BAGUNDOL, Intervenors.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 20, 2010 filed by MovantIntervenors1 dated and filed on October 29, 2010, praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of judgment, and (b) resolve their motion
for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution.
To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a brief background of the relevant antecedents
On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands).2 On December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the
ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC). 3 The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes
and 63,502 negative votes.4 With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del
Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath
of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of
provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007. 5

On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del
Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9355.6 The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied. 7
Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, filed another petition for certiorari 8 seeking to
nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would
perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial
territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat
had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts, viz.
Constitution, Article X Local Government
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
LGC, Title IV, Chapter I
Section 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the
following requisites:
(i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which
do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision 9 granting the petition.10 The Decision declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for
failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, it
declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void

the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, "[t]he land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the
LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law. 11
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
Decision. In its Resolution12 dated May 12, 2010,13 the Court denied the said motions. 14
Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of court to admit their second motions for
reconsideration, accompanied by their second motions for reconsideration. These motions were eventually "noted without action" by
this Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution. 15
Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8790, relevant
to this case, which provides
RESOLUTION NO. 8790
WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven (7) municipalities, were previously components of the First Legislative District of the
Province of Surigao del Norte. In December 2006 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9355, the Province of Dinagat Island[s] was created and
its creation was ratified on 02 December 2006 in the Plebiscite for this purpose;
WHEREAS, as a province, Dinagat Islands was, for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, allocated one (1) seat for
Governor, one (1) seat for Vice Governor, one (1) for congressional seat, and ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats pursuant to
Resolution No. 8670 dated 16 September 2009;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180050 entitled "Rodolfo Navarro, et al., vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, as
representative of the President of the Philippines, et al." rendered a Decision, dated 10 February 2010, declaring Republic Act No. 9355
unconstitutional for failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government
Code in relation to Sec. 10, Art. X, of the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, respondents intend to file Motion[s] for Reconsideration on the above decision of the Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member, House of Representatives representing the lone congressional
district of Dinagat Islands, (2) names of the candidates for the aforementioned position, (3) position for Governor, Dinagat Islands, (4)
names of the candidates for the said position, (5) position of the Vice Governor, (6) the names of the candidates for the said position,
(7) positions for the ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members and, [8] all the names of the candidates for Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members, have already been configured into the system and can no longer be revised within the remaining period before
the elections on May 10, 2010.

NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether the Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs.
Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare that:
a. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current system configuration is in line with the reconsidered
Decision, meaning that the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del Norte remain as two (2) separate
provinces;
b. If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous
status as part of the First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte.
But because of the current system configuration, the ballots for the Province of Dinagat Islands will, for the positions of Member,
House of Representatives, Governor, Vice Governor and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, bear only the names of the
candidates for the said positions.
Conversely, the ballots for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of Governor, Vice Governor,
Member, House of Representatives, First District of Surigao del Norte and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, show only
candidates for the said position. Likewise, the whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of Governor and Vice
Governor, bear only the names of the candidates for the said position[s].
Consequently, the voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands will not be able to vote for the candidates of Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, and Member, House [of] Representatives, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and candidates for Governor
and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte. Meanwhile, voters of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will not be able
to vote for Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Member, House of Representatives, Dinagat Islands. Also, the voters of the
whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for the Governor and Vice Governor, Dinagat Islands. Given this
situation, the Commission will postpone the elections for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First
Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte,
because the election will result in [a] failure to elect, since, in actuality, there are no candidates for Governor, Vice Governor,
Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, and Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District
(with Dinagat Islands) of Surigao del Norte.
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status
as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified for the same
reasons given in Item "b" above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat
Islands) will have to be conducted.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.

They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions will be affected by the
nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal interest in the
instant case and would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. Simply put, movants-intervenors election to
their respective offices would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of
Representatives member and Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. Moreover, as
residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of their constituents, they have a clear and strong
interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte
will affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of the province will have to be restructured; (2) the
services of many employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts will have to be invalidated; and (4) projects and other
developments will have to be discontinued. In addition, they claim that their rights cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any
other proceeding since their rights would be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.
In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge
the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC;
(2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption
from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010,16 the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the
resolution of this case.
On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing several
rulings17 of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any
time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not
yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case. Even for the
sake of argument that they had notice of the pendency of the case, they pointed out that prior to the said elections, Sol T. Matugas
was a simple resident of Surigao del Norte, Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Second
District of Surigao del Norte, and Mamerto D. Galanida was the Municipal Mayor of Socorro, Surigao del Norte, and that, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it was only after they were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice Governor of Surigao del
Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of Surigao del Norte, respectively, that they became possessed with
legal interest in this controversy.
On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had become final and
executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the above motion.

At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of
movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original parties, and neither on Dinagats Urgent Omnibus
Motion, which our
esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers as Dinagats third motion for reconsideration. Inasmuch as the motions for
leave to admit their respective motions for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution and the aforesaid motions for
reconsideration were already noted without action by the Court, there is no reason to treat Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion
differently. In relation to this, the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors could not be considered as a
second motion for reconsideration to warrant the application of Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. 18 It
should be noted that this motion prays for the recall of the entry of judgment and for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration
of the July 20, 2010 Resolution which remained unresolved. The denial of their motion for leave to intervene and to admit motion for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution did not rule on the merits of the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010
Resolution, but only on the timeliness of the intended intervention. Their motion for reconsideration of this denial elaborated on
movants-intervenors interest in this case which existed only after judgment had been rendered. As such, their motion for intervention
and their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution merely stand as an initial reconsideration of the said resolution.
With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the records to support the claim that this was a ploy of respondents
legal tactician to reopen the case despite an entry of judgment. To be sure, it is actually COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 that set this
controversy into motion anew. To reiterate, the pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as
part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in
Item "b" above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao
del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar circumstance of proper party interest for movants-intervenors only with
the specter of the decision in the main case becoming final and executory. More importantly, if the intervention be not entertained, the
movants-intervenors would be left with no other remedy as regards to the impending nullification of their election to their respective
positions. Thus, to the Courts mind, there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movantsintervenors.
It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for certiorari way back on October 30, 2007. At that
time, movants-intervenors had nothing at stake in the outcome of this case. While it may be argued that their interest in this case
should have commenced upon the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it is obvious that their interest in this case then was
more imaginary than real. This is because COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 provides that should the decision in this case attain finality
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the election of the local government officials stated therein would only have to be postponed.
Given such a scenario, movants-intervenors would not have suffered any injury or adverse effect with respect to the reversion of

Dinagat as part of Surigao del Norte since they would simply have remained candidates for the respective positions they have vied for
and to which they have been elected.
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions." Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other
persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. 19
It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated
October 29, 2010 is denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with finality. Indeed, they have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to their respective
positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to naught. Given their unique
circumstances, movants-intervenors should not be left without any remedy before this Court simply because their interest in this case
became manifest only after the case had already been decided. The consequences of such a decision would definitely work to their
disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the dispute. Such decision would also violate their
right to due process, a right that cries out for protection. Thus, it is imperative that the movants-intervenors be heard on the merits of
their cause. We are not only a court of law, but also of justice and equity, such that our position and the dire repercussions of this
controversy should be weighed on the scales of justice, rather than dismissed on account of mootness.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts
will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 20 The
second exception attends this case.
This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 21 where technicalities of procedure on locus standi
were brushed aside, because the constitutional issues raised were of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance
deserving the attention of the Court. Along parallel lines, the motion for intervention should be given due course since movantsintervenors have shown their substantial legal interest in the outcome of this case, even much more than petitioners themselves, and
because of the novelty, gravity, and weight of the issues involved.
Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution of movants-intervenors is
akin to the right to appeal the judgment of a case, which, though merely a statutory right that must comply with the requirements of
the rules, is an essential part of our judicial system, such that courts should proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to
question the judgment and its effects, and ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be directly affected, would have
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. 22

Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of attendant extraordinary
circumstances.23 The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that
which this Court itself had already declared final. 24 In this case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors
the right to be heard since they would be adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto,
but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local government units. In
this manner, the thrust of the Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to decentralization and the
attainment of national goals, as hereafter elucidated, will effectively be realized.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look, the Court finds that the first and second arguments
raised by movants-intervenors deserve affirmative consideration.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability,
efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income,
population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on
the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.
Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is
the clear intent of the framers of the LGC. In this connection, the following excerpts from congressional debates are quoted hereunder

HON. ALFELOR. Income is mandatory. We can even have this doubled because we thought
CHAIRMAN CUENCO. In other words, the primordial consideration here is the economic viability of the new local government unit, the
new province?
xxxx
HON. LAGUDA. The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than the House version, because we also believe that
economic viability is really a minimum. Land area and population are functions really of the viability of the area, because you have an
income level which would be the trigger point for economic development, population will naturally increase because there will be an
immigration. However, if you disallow the particular area from being converted into a province because of the population problems in
the beginning, it will never be able to reach the point where it could become a province simply because it will never have the
economic take off for it to trigger off that economic development.
Now, were saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a floor area where it could pay for overhead and provide a minimum of basic
services to the population. Over and above that, the provincial officials should be able to trigger off economic development which will
attract immigration, which will attract new investments from the private sector. This is now the concern of the local officials. But if we
are going to tie the hands of the proponents, simply by telling them, "Sorry, you are now at 150 thousand or 200 thousand," you will

never be able to become a province because nobody wants to go to your place. Why? Because you never have any reason for
economic viability.
xxxx
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, what about land area?
HON. LUMAUIG. 1,500 square kilometers
HON. ANGARA. Walang problema yon, in fact thats not very critical, yong land area because
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, ya, our, the Senate version is 3.5, 3,500 square meters, ah, square kilometers.
HON. LAGUDA. Ne, Ne. A province is constituted for the purpose of administrative efficiency and delivery of basic services.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Right.
HON. LAGUDA. Actually, when you come down to it, when government was instituted, there is only one central government and then
everybody falls under that. But it was later on subdivided into provinces for purposes of administrative efficiency.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay.
HON. LAGUDA. Now, what were seeing now is that the administrative efficiency is no longer there precisely because the land areas
that we are giving to our governors is so wide that no one man can possibly administer all of the complex machineries that are
needed.
Secondly, when you say "delivery of basic services," as pointed out by Cong. Alfelor, there are sections of the province which have
never been visited by public officials, precisely because they dont have the time nor the energy anymore to do that because its so
wide. Now, by compressing the land area and by reducing the population requirement, we are, in effect, trying to follow the basic
policy of why we are creating provinces, which is to deliver basic services and to make it more efficient in administration.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, thats correct, but on the assumption that the province is able to do it without being a burden to the
national government. Thats the assumption.
HON. LAGUDA. Thats why were going into the minimum income level. As we said, if we go on a minimum income level, then we say,
"this is the trigger point at which this administration can take place." 25
Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a municipality, a city, and a province as provided both in the LGC
and the LGC-IRR, viz.

For a Barangay:
LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. (a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous territory which has a population of at least
two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila
and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a certified population of at
least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or
barangays to less than the minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays may be created in such
communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the criteria prescribed in this Section,
within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod
concerned for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan
political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan can be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. (a) Creation of barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan shall require prior recommendation of
the sangguniang bayan.
(b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by Act of Congress, subject to the limitations and
requirements prescribed in this Article.
(c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created in the indigenous cultural communities by Act of
Congress upon recommendation of the LGU or LGUs where the cultural community is located.
(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:
(1) Population which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000) inhabitants, except in municipalities and cities within
MMA and other metropolitan political subdivisions as may be created by law, or in highly-urbanized cities where such
territory shall have a population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO. The creation of a
barangay shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the prescribed minimum/
(2) Land Area which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
barangay sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries.

Municipality:
LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
provincial treasurer, or at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based
on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the original
municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement
on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the municipality concerned, exclusive of
special funds, transfers and non-recurring income.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered regular municipalities.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. (a) Requisites for Creation A municipality shall not be created unless the following requisites
are present:
(i) Income An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for the
immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the provincial treasurer. The
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and nonrecurring income;
(ii) Population which shall not be less than twenty five thousand (25,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; and
(iii) Land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed
municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be created shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the
time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne
by the petitioners.

City:
LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has
an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last
two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisities:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau;
or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or
units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land
area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and
non-recurring income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and
either population or land area are present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding
two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city
or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
city is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said
creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
Provinces:

LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office:
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which
do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. (a) Requisites for creation A province shall not be created unless the following requisites on income
and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding
two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as
certified by NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city
or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said
creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied.)

It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite
indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators
of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the
land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a
municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact,
considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would
form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the
genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC,
but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations underpinning the principle of local autonomy.
Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State
shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be
given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national
government to the local government units.
This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3(a) of the LGC-IRR 26 and in the Whereas clauses of Administrative Order No. 270, 27 which
read
WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments;
WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, affirms,
among others, that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable
them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of
national goals;

WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the President to convene an Oversight Committee for the
purpose of formulating and issuing the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of all
the provisions of the said Code; and
WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and
consideration of the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the Local Government Code of 1991, has completed the
formulation of the implementing rules and regulations; x x x
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and
minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired
results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright
absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in
themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum
land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with
the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has
opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate
the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the
constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province
is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local
autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with
territorial contiguity.
Another look at the transcript of the deliberations of Congress should prove enlightening:
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian, 28 with respect to his
CHAIRMAN LINA. Okay.
HON. CHIONGBIAN. At the outset, Chairman Lina, we would like to apprise the distinguished Senator about the action taken by the
House, on House Bill No. 7166. This was passed about two years ago and has been pending in the Senate for consideration. This is a
bill that I am not the only one involved, including our distinguished Chairman here. But then we did want to sponsor the bill, being the
Chairman then of the Local Government.
So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the Congressmen, who were more or less interested in the creation of the new provinces, because
of the vastness of the areas that were involved.

At any rate, this bill was passed by the House unanimously without any objection. And as I have said a while ago, that this has been
pending in the Senate for the last two years. And Sen. Pimentel himself was just in South Cotabato and he delivered a speech that he
will support this bill, and he says, that he will incorporate this in the Local Government Code, which I have in writing from him. I
showed you the letter that he wrote, and naturally, we in the House got hold of the Senate version. It becomes an impossibility for the
whole Philippines to create a new province, and that is quite the concern of the respective Congressmen.
Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is concerned, there is nothing to stop the mother province from voting against the bill, if a
province is going to be created.
So, we are talking about devolution of powers here. Why is the province not willing to create another province, when it can be justified.
Even Speaker Mitra says, what will happen to Palawan? We wont have one million people there, and if you look at Palawan, there will
be about three or four provinces that will comprise that island. So, the development will be hampered.
Now, I would like to read into the record the letter of Sen. Pimentel, dated November 2, 1989. This was practically about a year after
7166 was approved by the House, House Bill 7166.
On November 2, 1989, the Senator wrote me:
"Dear Congressman Chiongbian:
We are in receipt of your letter of 17 October. Please be informed that your House No. 7166 was incorporated in the proposed Local
Government Code, Senate Bill No. 155, which is pending for second reading.
Thank you and warm regards.
Very truly yours,"
That is the very context of the letter of the Senator, and we are quite surprised that the Senate has adopted another position.
So, we would like because this is a unanimously approved bill in the House, thats the only bill that is involving the present Local
Government Code that we are practically considering; and this will be a slap on the House, if we do not approve it, as approved by the
lower House. This can be [an] irritant in the approval of the Conference Committee Report. And I just want to manifest that insofar as
the creation of the province, not only in my province, but the other provinces. That the mother province will participate in the
plebiscite, they can defeat the province, lets say, on the basis of the result, the province cannot be created if they lose in the
plebiscite, and I dont see why, we should put this stringent conditions to the private people of the devolution that they are seeking.
So, Mr. Senator, I think we should consider the situation seriously, because, this is an approved version of the House, and I will not be
the one to raise up and question the Conference Committee Report, but the rest of the House that are interested in this bill. And they

have been approaching the Speaker about this. So, the Speaker reminded me to make sure that it takes the cudgel of the House
approved version.
So, thats all what I can say, Mr. Senator, and I dont believe that it is not, because its the wish of the House, but because the mother
province will participate anyhow, you vote them down; and that is provided for in the Constitution. As a matter of fact, I have seen the
amendment with regards to the creation of the city to be urbanized, subject to the plebiscite. And why should we not allow that to
happen in the provinces! In other words, we dont want the people who wants to create a new province, as if they are left in the
devolution of powers, when they feel that they are far away from civilization.
Now, I am not talking about other provinces, because I am unaware, not aware of their situation. But the province of South Cotabato
has a very unique geographical territorial conglomerations. One side is in the other side of the Bay, of Sarangani Bay. The capital town
is in the North; while these other municipalities are in the East and in the West. And if they have to travel from the last town in the
eastern part of the province, it is about one hundred forty kilometers to the capital town. And from the West side, it is the same
distance. And from the North side, it is about one hundred kilometers. So that is the problem there. And besides, they have enough
resources and I feel that, not because I am interested in the province, I am after their welfare in the future. Who am I to dictate on
those people? I have no interest but then I am looking at the future development of these areas.
As a matter of fact, if I am in politics, its incidental; I do not need to be there, but I can foresee what the creation of a new province
will bring to these people. It will bring them prosperity; it will bring them more income, and it will encourage even foreign investors.
Like the PAP now, they are concentrating in South Cotabato, especially in the City of
General Santos and the neighboring municipalities, and they are quite interested and even the AID people are asking me, "What is
holding the creation of a new province when practically you need it?" Its not 20 or 30 kilometers from the capital town; its about 140
kilometers. And imagine those people have to travel that far and our road is not like Metropolitan Manila. That is as far as from here to
Tarlac. And there are municipalities there that are just one municipality is bigger than the province of La Union. They have the income.
Of course, they dont have the population because thats a part of the land of promise and people from Luzon are migrating everyday
because they feel that there are more opportunities here.
So, by creating the new provinces, not only in my case, in the other cases, it will enhance the development of the Philippines, not
because I am interested in my province. Well, as far as I am concerned, you know, I am in the twilight years of my life to serve and I
would like to serve my people well. No personal or political interest here. I hope the distinguished Chairman of the Committee will
appreciate the House Bill 7166, which the House has already approved because we dont want them to throw the Conference
Committee Report after we have worked that the house Bill has been, you know, drawn over board and not even considered by the
Senate. And on top of that, we are considering a bill that has not yet been passed. So I hope the Senator will take that into account.
Thank you for giving me this time to explain.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Thank you very much, Congressman James. We will look into the legislative history of the Senate version on this
matter of creation of provinces. I am sure there was an amendment. As I said, Ill look into it. Maybe the House version was

incorporated in toto, but maybe during the discussion, their amendments were introduced and, therefore, Senator Pimentel could not
hold on to the original version and as a result new criteria were introduced.
But because of the manifestation that you just made, we will definitely, when we reach a book, Title IV, on the matter of provinces, we
will look at it sympathetically from your end so that the objective that you want [to] achieve can be realized. So we will look at it with
sympathy. We will review our position on the matter, how we arrived at the Senate version and we will adopt an open mind definitely
when we come into it.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Kanino yan?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Book III.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Title?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Title IV.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. I have been pondering on the case of James, especially on economic stimulation of a certain area. Like our case,
because I put myself on our province, our province is quite very big. Its composed of four (4) congressional districts and I feel it should
be five now. But during the Batasan time, four of us talked and conversed proposing to divide the province into two.
There are areas then, when since time immemorial, very few governors ever tread on those areas. That is, maybe youre acquainted
with the Bondoc Peninsula of Quezon, fronting that is Ragay Gulf. From Ragay there is a long stretch of coastal area. From Albay going
to Ragay, very few governors ever tread [there] before, even today. That area now is infested with NPA. That is the area of
Congressman Andaya.
Now, we thought that in order to stimulate growth, maybe provincial aid can be extended to these areas. With a big or a large area of
a province, a certain administrator or provincial governor definitely will have no sufficient time. For me, if we really would like to
stimulate growth, I believe that an area where there is physical or geographical impossibilities, where administrators can penetrate, I
think we have to create certain provisions in the law where maybe we can treat it with special considerations.
Now, we went over the graduate scale of the Philipppine Local Government Data as far as provinces are concerned. It is very surprising
that there are provinces here which only composed of six municipalities, eight municipalities, seven municipalities. Like in Cagayan,
Tuguegarao, there are six municipalities. Ah, excuse me, Batanes.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will you look at the case of --- how many municipalities are there in Batanes province?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Batanes is only six.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Six town. Siquijor?

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Siquijor. It is region?

CHAIRMAN LINA. Seven.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.L Seven. Anim.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Six also.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Six also.
CHAIRMAN LINA. It seems with a minimum number of towns?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, not even one congressional district. But tumaas in 1982.
Camiguin, that is Region 9. Wala dito. Nagtataka nga ako ngayon.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Camiguin, Camiguin.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. That is region? Camiguin has five municipalities, with a population of 63 thousand. But we do not hold it against
the province because maybe thats one stimulant where growth can grow, can start. The land area for Camiguin is only 229 square
kilometers. So if we hard fast on requirements of, we set a minimum for every province, palagay ko we just leave it to legislation, eh.
Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that in case we would like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang tao. Kung
maglalagay tayo ng set ng minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government Code?
Growth. To devolve powers in order for the community to have its own idea how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas.
So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make a generalization.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will the creation of a province, carved out of the existing province because of some geographical id[i]osyncracies, as
you called it, stimulate the economic growth in the area or will substantial aid coming from the national government to a particular
area, say, to a municipality, achieve the same purpose?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Ano tayo dito sa budget. All right, here is a province. Usually, tinitingnan lang yun, provision eh, hindi na yung
composition eh. You are entitled to, say, 20% of the area.
Theres a province of Camarines Sur which have the same share with that of Camiguin and Siquijor, but Camiguin is composed only of
five municipalities; in Siquijor, its composed of six, but the share of Siquijor is the same share with that of the province of Camarines
Sur, having a bigger area, very much bigger.
That is the budget in process.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very seriously and even with sympathy because of the explanation given
and we will study this very carefully.29
The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly show the manifest intention of Congress to
promote development in the previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing them to directly share in the
allocation of funds under the national budget. It should be remembered that, under Sections 284 and 285
of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land area, population, and local revenue. 30
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may
resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law, 31 or may consider the implementing rules
and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle,
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.
It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both the Executive and
Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533 32 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate and
issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of this
Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also mandated by
the Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum,
allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to
the organization and operation of the local units. (Emphasis supplied.)
These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain decentralization and countryside
development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991,
which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption from
the land area requirement of local government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450
of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the
creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.
With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of their respective
Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land
area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but
unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR.
To be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and

considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated. 33 Undoubtedly, this
amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court, 34 but to legislative construction as
well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight
Committee.
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to
implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately
translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged
province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of
provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress
breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355
creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of
both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area
requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGCIRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that
Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income ofP82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as
certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for
the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than
looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in
favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a
province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity. As we have held in League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections35
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is
within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not
within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the
letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal,
courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of government, it behooves the
Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tripartite system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government to
accord a becoming courtesy for each others acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions.
Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To
doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no

constitutional prescription or concept is infringed. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or
a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to
leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:
1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and filed on October 29, 2010;
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
3. GRANT the Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution is
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands," is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as
VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are
declared VALID; and
4. The petition is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 133064 September 16, 1999

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R.
CABUYADAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION

ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE
HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial
Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, respondents, GIORGIDI B.
AGGABAO, intervenor.

PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528
converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city to a component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was
signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. 1
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago
from an independent component city to a component city, viz.:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Sec. 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words "an independent" thereon so that
said Section will read as follows:
Sec. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted into a component city to be
known as the City of Santiago, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present
territory of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the
present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute the
following:
Sec. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and any
Elective Provincial Position for the Province of Isabela. The voters of the City of Santiago shall be qualified
to vote in the elections of the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and
other elective provincial positions of the Province of Isabela, and any such qualified voter can be a candidate
for such provincial positions and any elective provincial office.

Sec. 3. Repealing Clause. All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. 2 They alleged as ground the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the
law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of
the filing of the petition at bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige,
Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing
of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks
jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The Solicitor General also contends that
petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from
an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units," hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao, 3 a member of the provincial board of Isabela. 4 He
contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do not require a plebiscite "to approve a law that merely
allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a
plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They defended their standing. They also
stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be
challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 5Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City
when he filed the present petition in his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent of the
city council of Santiago. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of Santiago from independent component city to a
mere component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the
enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago City.
Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of Santiago. They

have the right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in
R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike the law as unconstitutional.1wphi1.nt
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground that it involves a political
question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution which defines judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." To be sure, the cut between a political
and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Taada v.Cuenco, 6 we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers "to those
questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In Casibang v. Aquino,

we defined a justiciable issue as follows:

A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such
right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that
whether or not petitioners have the said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress
comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this
Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the conversion of the city of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold
that the Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterrated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government units belongs to Congress. 8 This
power is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution vested in Congress. 9The exercise of the power must be in
accord with the mandate of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an
independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The
resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said
constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common denominator material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units
directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people
"in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987
Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of
the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local
government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the
people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism
to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is
one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them direct democracy of the people as
opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the
Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city are
many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city
mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council
of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be
shared with the province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching changes on the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz.: 10
Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528 had "merely re-classified" Santiago City from an
independent component city into a component city, the effect when challenged (sic) the Act were operational would be,
actually, that of conversion. Consequently, there would besubstantial changes in the political culture and administrative
responsibilities of Santiago City, and the Province of Isabela. Santiago City from an independent component city will
revert to the Province of Isabela, geographically, politically, and administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of
Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising the province of Isabela. This will be to the benefit or advantage of
the Provincial Government of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of its share from the internal revenue
allotment (IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991). The
IRA is based on land area and population of local government units, provinces included.

The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City Government, and which taxes shall accrue solely to
the City Government, will be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the province such as taxes
on sand, gravel and other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160), professional taxes (Section 139, R.A. No. 7160),
or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No. 7160). The Provincial Government will allocate operating funds for the City.
Inarguably, there would be a (sic) diminished funds for the local operations of the City Government because of reduced
shares of the IRA in accordance with the schedule set forth by Section 285 of R.A. No. 7160. The City Government's share
in the proceeds in the development and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted since certain portions shall accrue to
the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A. No. 7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials (Section 451 and 452 [c], R.A.
No. 7160).
The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the Provincial Governor who is tasked by law to ensure
that every component city and municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts within the scope of its
prescribed powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section 30, R.A. No. 7160)
all executive orders submitted by the former (Section 455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with
respect to the local governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160). Elective city
officials will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial Governor (Section 63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will be the
great change in the state of the political autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue of R.A. No. 7720, it is the
Office of the President which has supervisory authority over it as an independent component city (Section 25, R.A. No.
7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987 Constitution).
The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to the review of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468, (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No. 7160). Likewise, the
decisions in administrative cases by the former could be appealed and acted upon by the latter (Section 67 R.A. No.
7160).
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent
component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason
why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the
status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II,
Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with the
Constitution when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS
shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs
affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

xxx xxx xxx

The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a material change in the
local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No. 8528 on the ground that Congress has
the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power of amendment, however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Quite clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. He also contends that the
amendment merely caused atransition in the status of Santiago as a city. Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created
nor was a former city dissolved by R.A. No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the
people of the local government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere transition but they cannot blink away from
the fact that the transition will radically change its physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its
people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if the classification involves changes in
income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people . . . ."
With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which, to
repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions first, the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the
Local Government Code on income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria and they involve
requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements, however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of
the local government unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the
Local Government Code does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and land area
have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or
ordinance fixes another
date. 11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute
and mandatory. 12

It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local
Government Code on income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose. They are to be based on
verified indicators, hence, section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these "indicators shall be attested by the
Department of Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose to use the people's voice as a check
against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess committed by the political
representatives of the people themselves than the exercise of direct people power. As well-observed by one commentator, as the
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries are ". . . basic to local government, it is also
imperative that these acts be done not only by Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality concerned. . . . By
giving the inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision will also eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize
legislative action designed for the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the autonomy of local government units." 13
The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of its people. In the debates in Congress, it
was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has been converted to an independent component city barely
two and a half (2 1/2) years ago and the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes. Some legislators expressed surprise
for the sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been no significant change in its socio-economic-political
status. The only reason given for the downgrading is to enable the people of the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say
the least, the alleged reason is unconvincing for it is the essence of an independent component city that its people can no longer
participate or be voted for in the election of officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they gave up that
privilege when they voted to be independent from the province of Isabela. There was an attempt on the part of the Committee on
Local Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to
be voted upon when a recess was called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee announced the withdrawal of the
amendment "after a very enlightening conversion with the elders of the Body." We quote the debates, viz.: 14
BILL ON SECOND READING
H.B. No. 8729 City of Santiago
Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House Bill No. 8729 as
reported out under Committee Report No. 971.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being none, the motion is
approved.
Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title
of the bill without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled:

AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720 ENTITLED "AN ACT CONVERTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE
CITY OF SANTIAGO
The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729
Insert
Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the sponsorship, I ask that the distinguished
Chairman of the Committee on Local Government be recognized.
The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO
Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was introduced in the House by
Congressman Antonio M. Abaya as its principal author, is a simple measure which
merely seeks to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of the Province
of Isabela.
The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically an integral part of the Province of Isabela. As an
independent component city, however, it is completely detached and separate from the said province as a local political
unit. To use the language of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, the City of Santiago is an "island in the provincial
milieu.
The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they qualified to run for any elective positions in
the Province of Isabela.
The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power and authority of general supervision over
the city and its officials, which power and authority are now exercised by the Office of the President, which is very far
away from Santiago City.
Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of Santiago is affected, one way or the other, by the
happenings in the said province, and is benefited by its progress and development. Hence, the proposed bill to convert
the City of Santiago into a component city of Isabela.
Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this august Body Committee Report No. 971 of
the Committee on Local Government, recommending approval, with our proposed committee amendment, of House Bill
No. 8729.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that we close the period of
interpellations.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of
interpellations is closed.
Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments.
Senator Roco. Mr. President.
The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco?
Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a reconsideration of the ruling on the
motion to close the period of interpellations just to be able to ask a few questions?
Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection to the reconsideration of the closing of the
period of interpellations? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
Senator Roco is recognized.
Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentlemen yield for some questions?
Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.
Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with the Chairman of the Committee on Local
Government, we were with the sponsors when we approved this bill to make
Santiago a City. That was about two and a half years ago. At that time, I remember
it was the cry of the city that it be "independent." Now we are deleting that word
"independent."
Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I want some explanation on what
happened between then and now that has made us decided that the City of Santiago should cease to be independent and
should now become a component city.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province said during the public
hearing that they are no longer vested with the power and authority of general
supervision over the city. The power and authority is now being exercised by the
Office of the President and it is quite far from the City of Santiago.
In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some sectors that they want to participate in the
provincial elections.
Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to delay this. I did want it on record,
however. I think there was a majority of 14,000 who approved the charter, and
maybe we owe it to those who voted for that charter some degree of respect. But
if there has been a change of political will, there has been a change of political will,
then so be it.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank about it, that was a very important
point raised by Senator Roco, and I will have to place it on the Record of the
Senate that the reason why we are proposing a committee amendment is that,
originally, there was an objection on the part of the local officials and those who
oppose it by incorporating a plebiscite in this bill. That was the solution. Because
there were some sectors in the City of Santiago who were opposing the
reclassification or reconversion of the city into a component city.
Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President because the two of us had
special pictures (sic) in the city is that I thought it should be put on record that
we have supported originally the proposal to make it an independent city. But now
if it is their request, then, on the manifestation of the Chairman, let it be so.
Thank you.
Senator Drilon. Mr. President.
Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a few questions, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the interpellation of our good friend, the
Senator from Bicol, on the matter of the opinion of the citizens of Santiago City,

there is a resolution passed by the Sanggunian on January 30, 1997 opposing the
conversion of Santiago from an independent city.
This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And that is the reason why, as mentioned by the
good sponsor, one of the amendments is that a plebiscite be conducted before the law takes effect.
The question I would like to raise and I would like to recall the statement of our Minority Leader is that, at this time
we should not be passing it for a particular politician.
In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that the additional territory be added to the
election of the provincial officials of the province of Isabela.
Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President.
Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen on the Floor, Senator
Alvarez is recognized.
Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this city, Mr. President, may I share
some information.
Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial leadership, it will not be to the benefit of the
provincial leadership, because the provincial leadership will then campaign in a bigger territory.
As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of Santiago who will now be enfranchised in the
provincial electoral process, and whose children will have the opportunity to grow into provincial leadership. This is one of
the prime reasons why this amendment is being put forward.
While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those who signed the resolution were not the
whole of the council. This bill was sponsored by the congressman of that district who represents a constituency, the voice
of the district.
I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice must be heard, and if we have to fathom
the interest of the people, the law which has been crafted here in accordance with the rules should be given account, as
we do give account to many of the legislations coming from the House on local issues.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why I am raising this question is that, as
Senator Roco said, just two and-a-half years ago we passed a bill which indeed
disenfranchized if we want to use that phrase the citizens of the City of
Santiago in the matter of the provincial election. Two-and-a-half years after, we are
changing the rule.
In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a plebiscite in order to approve the conversion of
the city into an independent city. I believe that the only way to resolve this issue raised by Senator Roco is again to
subject this issue to another plebiscite as part of the provision of this proposed bill and as will be proposed by the
Committee Chairman as an amendment.
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the Constitution does not require that the change
from an independent to a component city be subjected to a plebiscite.
Secs. 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those enumerated. So the proposal coming from
the House is in adherence to this constitutional mandate which does not require a plebiscite.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here is "conversion". The word
"conversion" appears in that provision wherein we must call a plebiscite. During
the public hearing, the representative of Congressman Abaya was insisting that
this is not a conversion; this is merely a reclassification. But it is clear in the bill.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a component city. That is how the members of the
committee felt. That is why we have proposed an amendment to this, and this is to incorporate a plebiscite in as much as
there is no provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we would like not only to give the other people of Santiago a
chance or be enfranchised as far as the leadership of the province is concerned, but also we will give a chance to those
who are opposing it. To them, this is the best compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political leaders of Isabela
deciding for them.
Senator Tatad. Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I think we can move to close the period
of interpellations.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is
approved.
Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments, Mr.
President.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none the motion is
approved.
Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a new Section 3, as follows:
Sec 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED BY DELETING THE ENTIRE SECTION AND IN ITS
STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:
Sec. 49. PLEBISCITE. THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE
PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RETIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE
PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS
FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE SUCH
PLEBISCITE.
The President. Is there any objection?
Senator Enrile. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.
Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr. President.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session.
The President. The session is suspended for a few minutes if there is no objection.
[There was none].

It was 7:54 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.
The President. The session is resumed.
Senator Sotto is recognized.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very enlightening conversation with the elders
of the Body, I withdraw my amendment.
The President. The amendment is withdrawn.
Senator Maceda. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.
Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor for the withdrawal of the
amendment.
Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela I am no great fan of the Senator from Isabela but it so
happens that this is a local bill affecting not only his province but his own city where he is a resident and registered voter.
So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national importance, senatorial courtesy demands that we,
as much as possible, accommodate the request of the Senator from Isabela as we have done on matters affecting the
district of other senators. I need not remind them.
Thank you anyway, Mr. President.
Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.
Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express my deepest appreciation for the
statement of the gentleman from Ilocos and Laguna. Whatever he may have said,
the feeling is not mutual. At least for now, I have suddenly become his great fan
for the evening.

May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of Santiago not because I do not want it to be a
city but because it had disenfranchised the young men of my city from aspiring for the leadership of the province. The
town is the gem of the province. How could we extricate the town from the province?
But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman of the Committee.
Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
Senator Tatad. There being no committee amendments, I move that the period of
committee amendments be closed.
The President. Shall we amend the title of this bill by removing the word
"independent" preceding "component city"?
Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are merely citing the title. The main title of
this House Bill No. 8729 is "An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act
7720". The title is the title of Republic Act 7720. So, I do not think that we should
amend that anymore.
The President. What is the pending motion? Will the gentleman kindly state the
motion?
Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is
approved.
Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual amendments, I move that we close
the period of individual amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of
individual amendments is closed.
APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING
Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading on House Bill
No. 8729.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, we shall now
vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.
As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.
Several Members. Aye.
As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silences]
House Bill No. 8279 is approved on Second Reading.
The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the downgrading of the city of Santiago. There is
all the reason to listen to the voice of the people of the city via a plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. v. COMELEC, 15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of Negros Occidental without consulting its
people in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the law as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit
political purpose behind its enactment, viz:
The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was "to have the creation of the new Province a fait accompli by the time
elections are held on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the new Governor and other
officials shall by then have been installed in office, ready to function for purposes of the election for President and VicePresident." Thus, the petitioners reported after the event: "With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte
was set up and proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government officials headed by Governor
Armando Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February 7, 1986, the political machinery
was in place to deliver the "solid North" to ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What happened in Negros del Norte
during the elections the unashamed use of naked power and resources contributed in no small way to arousing
"people's power" and steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be a
Filipino today.
The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of, viz.,
the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are equally
void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as provided by Section 4 of the
Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three
cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra,
Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladoid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni),
grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no
province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered without "the approval of a majority of the votes
in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros
Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the

whole and entire province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite, because the
whole is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the
voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the
secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic
principle of majority rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when allegedly independent component cities were downgraded into
component cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the City of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, 16 and the City of San Carlos,
Pangasinan 17 whose charters were amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the election of officials of the province
to which their city belongs without submitting the amendment to a plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos
are not similarly situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike the city of
Santiago. The two cities were chartered but were not independent component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which
alone were considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San Carlos City was under consideration by the Senate,
Senator Pimentel explained: 18
. . . Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers the voters of San Carlos to vote in the
elections of provincial officials. There is no intention whatsoever to downgrade the status of the City of San Carlos and
there is no showing whatsoever that the enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish the powers and prerogatives
already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City of San Carlos as of now, is a component city. It is not a highly
urbanized city. Therefore, this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of the city, the power to vote in provincial
elections, without in any way changing the character of its being a component city. It is for this reason that I vote in favor
of this bill.
It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill 19 allowing qualified voters of the city of Oroquieta to vote in provincial
elections of the province of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he explained that the right to vote being given to the
people of Oroquieta City was consistent with its status as a component city. 20 Indeed, during the debates, former Senator
Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy the anomalous situation then obtaining ". . . where voters of one component
city cannot vote simply because their charters so provide." 21 Thus, Congress amended other charters of component cities
prohibiting their people from voting in provincial elections.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby
issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Panganiban, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., pls. see separate opinion.

Mendoza, J., please see dissent.

Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., we join Justice Mendoza in his dissent.
Buena, J., please see dissent.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
I share the opinion of the majority of my colleagues that, for the reasons expressed in the ponencia, a plebiscite is essential in order to
render effective the conversion of the City of Santiago, Isabela, from an independent to a component city. I would not go to the extent,
however, of declaring Republic Act No. 7720 unconstitutional; instead, with due respect, I take the view that a plebiscite can be held
conformably with the provisions of the Local Government Code. I do not see, in this instance, a serious incompatibility in having
Republic Act No. 7720 stand along with the Local Government Code.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting opinion;
The issue in this case is whether the conversion of the City of Santiago in Isabela province from an independent component city to a
component city constitutes the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of a city within the
contemplation of Art. X, 10 of the Constitution so as to require the approval of the people in a plebiscite. The Court, in declaring R.A.
No. 8528 unconstitutional for lack of provision for a plebiscite, does not say that the reclassification of Santiago City as an ordinary
component city constitutes creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundary. Nonetheless, the Court today
holds that because the reclassification of the city would result in a "material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected as well as the people therein," the approval of the law in a plebiscite is required.1wphi1.nt
With all due respect I submit that not every change however "material" and far-reaching in the classification of a local
government unit requires popular approval. Only if the reclassification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the
local government unit is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people, for then there would be a creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of a local government unit, as the case may be, within the meaning of Art.
X, 10 of the Constitution. Thus, the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), in implementing the constitutional provision in question,
states:
Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one
level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators or viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and
services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit
concerned;

(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a local government
unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics
Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Sec. 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same
requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income,
population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units
shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division.
The income classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6) months from the effectivity of this
Code to reflect the changes in their financial position resulting from the increased revenues as provided herein.
Sec. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. A local government unit may be abolished when its income, population, or
land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under Book III of
this Code, as certified by the national agencies mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or to the sanggunian
concerned, as the case may be.
The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city, municipality, or barangay with
which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged.
The conversion from an independent component city to a component city involves no such changes in income, population, or land
area. There may be changes in the voting rights of the residents of the city, the supervision of the city's administration, and the city's
share in the local taxes, as petitioners point out, but such changes do not amount to the creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of the boundary of a local government unit so as to require a plebiscite for their approval. An independent
component city and an ordinary component city are both component cities, as distinguished from highly urbanized cities. 1 The only
difference between them is that the charters of the independent component cities prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials and such cities are independent of the provinces in which they are located. 2 Thus, the Local Government Code
provides:
Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city
if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos

(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau;
or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at
the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement
on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and nonrecurring income.
Sec. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided,however, That the criteria
established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
Sec. 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. (a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000.00)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office, and with the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer; shall be classified as highly urbanized
cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet the above requirements shall be considered component cities of the province in which they
are geographically located. If a component city is located within the boundaries of two (2) or more provinces, such city
shall be considered a component of the province of which it used to be a municipality.
(c) Qualified voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for elective provincial officials.
Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution or this Code, qualified voters of independent component cities shall be
governed by their respective charters, as amended, on the participation of voters in provincial elections.

Qualified voters of cities who acquired the right to vote for elective provincial officials prior to the classification of said
cities as highly urbanized after the ratification of the Constitution and before the effectivity of this Code, shall continue to
exercise such right.
The Court says that the changes resulting from the reclassification of Santiago City as an ordinary component city "cannot be
considered insubstantial." For one, it is said, its independence will be diminished because the city mayor will be placed under the
administrative supervision of the provincial governor. For another, the resolutions and ordinances of the city council will have to be
approved by the provincial board of Isabela.
The fact is that whether the City of Santiago is an independent component city or an ordinary component city, it is subject to
administrative supervision, with the only difference that, as an independent component city, it is under the direct supervision of the
President of the Philippines, whereas, as an ordinary component city, it will be subject to the supervision of the President through the
province. 3 That is hardly a distinction. For the fact is that under the Constitution, the President of the Philippines exercises general
supervision over all local governments. 4
Nor does it matter that ordinances passed by the city councils of component cities are subject to review (not approval as the Court
says) by the provincial boards for the purpose of determining whether the ordinances are within the powers of the city councils to
enact. 5 For that matter, ordinances passed by the city councils of independent component cities are likewise subject to review,
although by the Office of the President. 6 The reason for this is to be found in Art. X, 4 of the Constitution which provides:
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that
the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
In any case, these are not important differences which determine whether the law effecting them should be approved in a plebiscite.
The defining characteristics of a local government unit are its income, population, and local area, as 450 and 452 of the LGC provide.
These are referred to in 7 of the LGC and its Implementing Rules as the "verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to
provide services." Tested by these standards, there is no change in the City of Santiago requiring the approval of the people in a
plebiscite.
The majority states: "It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an
independent component city, it required the approval of its People thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor
reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8525 downgrades the
status of their city." The conversion of the then Municipality of Santiago in Isabela Province by R.A. No. 7720 was an act of creation. It
was based on the municipality's satisfying the requisites for the creation of a city as provided in the LGC, to wit:
Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city
if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of a least Twenty million pesos

(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau;
or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office;
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at
the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement
on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and nonrecurring income.
As thus indicated these requisites are based on the "verifiable indicators" of income, population, and land area and, therefore, the
conversion of what was once a municipality into a city needed approval in a plebiscite. But the conversion of Santiago City from an
independent component city into a component city involves no more than a change in the right of the people (i.e., the registered
voters of the city) to vote for provincial elective officials.
If an analogy is needed, it is to the reversion of a component city whether independent or ordinary to the status of a municipality.
For then the city is actually abolished and abolition, as stated in the Art. X, 10 of the Constitution, must be approved by the majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite. Stated otherwise, when a municipality is converted into a city, a city is created, and when the city is
reverted into a municipality, the city isabolished. Both acts of creation and abolition require the approval of the people in a plebiscite
called for the purpose. But when an independent component city is converted into a component city, it is not created into another
form, it is not divided, it is not merged with another unit of local government, it is not abolished, much less is its boundary
substantially altered.
Indeed, this is not the first time that an independent component city is converted into a component city without a plebiscite. The City
of Oroquieta, created as an independent component city in 1969 by R.A. No. 5518, was converted into a component city in 1989 by
R.A. No. 6726, while the City of San Carlos, created as an independent component city in 1965 by R.A. No. 4187, was converted into a
component city by R.A. No. 6843 in 1990. In both cases, the conversion was made without submitting the matter to a plebiscite.

There is, therefore, no reason for requiring that the reclassification of Santiago City as a component city must be approved by the
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite and for holding that, because R.A. No. 8528 contains no provision for such plebiscite, it is
unconstitutional.
It is easy to sympathize with calls for plebiscites as an exercise of direct democracy by the people. But, although the Constitution
declares that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them," it also provides that we are a
"republican State." 7 It is thus a representative form of government that we have. With few exceptions, we have vested the legislative
power in the Congress of the Philippines. 8 This means that when an act of the people's representatives assembled in Congress is duly
passed and approved by the President in the manner prescribed in the Constitution, the act becomes a law 9 without the need of
approval or ratification by the people in order to be effective. 10
This is the theory of representative government. Such a government is no less democratic because it is indirect. In some ways it is
better than direct government given the complexity of modern society, let alone the volatility of voters and their susceptibility to
manipulation. In this age of mass communication there is less reason to distrust the judgment of the people's representatives in
Congress on matters such as this and, therefore, no reason to require the people to manifest their sovereign will, except where this is
expressly required by the Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.
BUENA, J., dissenting opinion;
With all due respect to my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, whose well-written ponenciaexpresses his opinion with
clarity, I regret that I am unable to agree that Republic Act No. 8528 should be declared as unconstitutional for the following reasons:
1. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that
Sec. 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Sec. 10 Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides:
Sec. 10, Chapter 2. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance
effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

In short, conversion does not appear in the 1987 Constitution nor in the Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code.
Surprisingly, Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code included conversion in the
enumeration of the modes of changing the status of local government units, thus:
(f) Plebiscite. (1) No creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs
shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs
affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Other than that, the Local Government Code uses the term "conversion" only in the following instances: (1) Section 7, which provides
that "[a]s a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on verifiable
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: . . . . . .;" (2) Section 450, which provides for the requisites for
the "conversion" of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a component city; and (3) Section 462, which involves the
"conversion" of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. defines 1 "conversion," as "the elevation of an LGU from one level to another, like converting a
municipality to a city or a component city to a highly urbanized one or the raising of the classification of one municipality, city or
province from a fourth class category to third, second or first." It is my humble opinion therefore that the requirement of a plebiscite
does not apply to the case at bar which does not involve the upgrading or elevation of Santiago City but a downgrading thereof.
2. I am not convinced that a mere Rule and Regulation intended to implement the Local Government Code can expand the terms and
provisions clearly expressed in the basic law to be implemented. As aptly contended by the Solicitor General in his Comment on the
petition viz.:
It is a settled jurisprudence that the power of administrative agencies to promulgate rules and regulations must be in
strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Thus, in Tayug Rural Bank vs.Central Bank of the Philippines (146 SCRA
129-30), this Honorable Court ruled that in the case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation to
implement said law, the basic law prevails as said rule or regulation can not go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law. Neither can such rules and regulations extend or expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to implement.
(Iglesia ni Kristo vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA
529) 2
As a matter of fact, Mr. Justice Puno, in his ponencia in the above cited case of Iglesia ni Kristo, opined that "(T)his rule is void for it
runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they
seek to enforce. 3

3. The proceedings in the Senate show that the Committee on Local Government, to which H.B. No. 8729 was referred, reported back
to the Senate with the recommendation that it be approved with the following amendment:
Sec. 3. Section 49 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute
the following:
Sec. 49. PLEBISCITE. THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE
PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RATIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE
PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE WITHIN (60) DAYS FROM
THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE SUCH
PLEBISCITE.
However, after the deliberations in the Senate, the Committee on Local Government decided to withdraw the foregoing proposed
amendment. Hence, on February 6, 1998, the Republic Act No. 8528, the constitutionality of which is challenged by the petitioners,
was approved.
Be that as it may, may this Court properly require a plebiscite for the validity of said law when Congress itself, which had been given
the opportunity to include such a requirement, decided against it? Are we not supplanting our judgment over that of Congress, a coequal branch of government entrusted by the Constitution to enact laws? I respectfully submit that we may not do so without
disturbing the balance of power as apportioned and delineated by the Constitution.
4. I likewise submit that we must consider the ramifications of a declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 on Republic
Act No. 6726 (1989) and Republic Act No. 6843 (1990), respectively allowing the voters of the City of Oroquieta (Misamis Oriental) and
San Carlos City (Pangasinan) to vote and be voted for any of the respective provincial offices, in effect downgrading them from
independent component cities to component cities. The resulting confusion on the political structures of the local government units
involved would surely be disastrous to the order and stability of these cities.
5. Finally, in a situation where the supposed breach of the constitution is doubtful, equivocal and, at best, based on argumentative
implications, I believe that, as we have ruled in a plethora of cases 4, every law has in its favor, the presumption of constitutionality
and in case of doubt, the Court must exert every effort to prevent the invalidation of the law and the nullification of the will of the
legislature that enacted it and the executive that approved it.1wphi1.nt
I therefore vote to dismiss the petition.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992

HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on November 13, 1991, Resolution No. 2312 which reads
as follows:
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the
Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit,
Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.
WHEREAS under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution 1 the creation of a municipality shall be subject to approval
by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local
Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) 2 said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections;
WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155 provides that the expenses in holding the plebiscite shall be take out
of the Contingent Fund under the current fiscal year appropriations;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves, to promulgated (sic) the following guidelines to
govern the conduct of said plebiscite:
1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or units affected, namely the barangays
comprising he proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of
Labor, Camarines Norte (Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986).
xxx xxx xxx

In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439
voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the Plebiscite
Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes. 3
Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on
December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is
the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because
the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units
affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I,
Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included
the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. 4
In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, particularly Article X, Section
10, the ruling set forth in Tan v. COMELEC 5 relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe, thus reinstating the case of Paredes
v. Executive Secretary 6 which held that where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be
segrated should be included in the plebiscite. 7
Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently, whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.
We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which
rejected the creation of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.
Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus
reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section
3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987
Constitution, 8 especially since the latter provision deleted the words "unit or."
We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of
Article XI of the 1973 Constitution not affected our ruling in Tan vs. Comelec as explained by then CONCOM Commissioner, now my
distinguished colleague, Associate Justice Hilario Davide, during the debates in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:
Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the Committee that under
the formulation in the present Local Government Code, the words used are actually "political unit or units." However, I do
not know the implication of the use of these words. Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform
the Committee about this.

Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the part of the two Gentlemen
from the floor?
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in the plebiscite to be
conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It
would mean a loss of a territory. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means
that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in
said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which
would participate in the plebiscite.10 Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of
the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we
conclude that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER,
AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante
Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig,
Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and
450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in
violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3)
years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52
of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the
City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati
in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City
of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the
southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing
boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining
local government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that
the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions. 2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The
boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare.
This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be
spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of
R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause
confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that
cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not
defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute
between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to
co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the
land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that
Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress
from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress
maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate

resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated
therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds,
with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably
ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local
government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably
ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be
concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions
similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a
condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to
serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks
to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital
cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was
used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the
slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56
Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of
government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule
must indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the
officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and
the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new
corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions
and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a term
of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3)consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the
new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the
incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that
should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in
1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term asmunicipal mayor would not be
counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent
Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that
he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition
for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III

Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the
Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two
(2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held
after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district,
in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment 6 cannot made by a
special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill 7and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990
census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative
districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress
shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution
did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is
its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover,
to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by
Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the
people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible.
It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population
hasincreased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been
expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a
liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command
that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to add a few observations.
I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." These criteria are now set
forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit to be created or converted should be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of
Makati) to describe the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal.
The Constitution does not provide for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not absolute,
for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause "as a general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160
is unavailing Said section only applies to the conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a
highly urbanized city. It pertinently reads as follows:
Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if
it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. . . .
The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of Article X thereof provides:
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters
from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a
province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial
officials.
And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria
established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
II.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase
justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates
of the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows:
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.
In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
which reads:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines
under the Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commissionand subsequent elections, and until otherwise
provided by law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila Areaas follows:
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA

xxx xxx xxx

MAKATI one (1)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number
of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth
in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created, or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located
shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphases supplied)

Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to add a few observations.
I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." These criteria are now set
forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit to be created or converted should be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of
Makati) to describe the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal.
The Constitution does not provide for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not absolute,
for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause "as a general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160
is unavailing Said section only applies to the conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a
highly urbanized city. It pertinently reads as follows:

Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if
it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. . . .
The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of Article X thereof provides:
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters
from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a
province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial
officials.
And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria
established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
II.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase
justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates
of the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows:
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.
In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
which reads:

Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines
under the Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commissionand subsequent elections, and until otherwise
provided by law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila Areaas follows:
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA
xxx xxx xxx
MAKATI one (1)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number
of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth
in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created, or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located
shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphases supplied)
Footnotes
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 146319. October 26, 2001]
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE
Escudero, respondents.

COMMISSION

ON

ELECTIONS,

and

Rep.

Francis

Joseph

G.

[G.R. No. 146342. October 26, 2001]

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON,
MUNICIPALITY OF BACON, respondents.
DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of
Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By
Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor. [1]
Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, [2] the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted
a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification.
On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed [3] the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having
been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. [4]
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2,
2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in
violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another petition (G.R. No. 146342), this time for
prohibition, seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991
(in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the one subject-one bill rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI
of the Constitution.
Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated. [5]
Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May 14, 2001 elections, the newly-created Sorsogon City
had the first election of its officials. Since then, the City Government of Sorsogon has been regularly discharging its corporate and
political powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No. 8806.

We shall first delve on petitioners constitutional challenge against R.A. No. 8806 in G.R. No. 146342.
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. [6] This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each others acts. [7] The
theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in
accord with the fundamental law.[8] This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional, where a petitioner
has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. [9] In other words, the
grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, [10] for to doubt is to sustain.[11]
Petitioner initially rejects R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which provides, inter alia:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis ours)
The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code), thus:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has
an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of
said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land
area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and
non-recurring income. (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No. 8806 complied with the criteria set by the Code
as to income, population and land area. What he is assailing is its mode of creation. He contends that under Section 450(a) of the
Code, a component city may be created only by converting a municipality or a cluster of barangays, not by merging two municipalities,
as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

This contention is devoid of merit.

Petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of local government units
to create a province, city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the
Code distinctly provides:
Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements
herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of
the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That
the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such
division. x x x. (Emphasis ours)
Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units
is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by
the Code.
Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no compelling reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in
order to create the City of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a
component city. This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In Angara v.
Electoral Commission,[12] this Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, [13] and may not annul an act of the political departments simply
because we feel it is unwise or impractical. [14]
Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the one subject-one bill rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(emphasis ours)
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon,
and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the
creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon.
The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioners assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law,
that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and

Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City.Such abolition/cessation was but
the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon
was created.Hence, the title of the law, An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in
the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor, cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two
municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.
It is well-settled that the one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. [15] The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, [16] and where, as
here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. [17] Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation. [18]
Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.
We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the
ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City.
Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be conducted within 120 days from the approval of said Act
per express provision of its Section 54, viz:
Sec. 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes
cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon withinone hundred
twenty (120) days from the approval of this Act. x x x. (Emphasis ours)
The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000
plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period after the approval of the Act. This 120-day period
having expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be ratified and approved in the
plebiscite held on December 16, 2000.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on December 16, 2000 based on the date of the effectivity of
the Act. Section 65 of the Act states:
Sec. 65. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general and local circulation.
The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY, a newspaper of general circulation. Then on September 01,
2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed
on September 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within
which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published. The

COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, citing the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera,[19] it
could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect.Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well
within the 120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.
The COMELEC is correct.
In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:
Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political
unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another
date. (Emphasis ours)
Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be conducted within 120 days from the date of
the effectivity of the law, not from its approval.While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix another date for conducting
a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity of the law.
Consequently, the word approval in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be read together with Section 65 (effectivity of the
Act) thereof, could only mean effectivity as used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code. This construction is in accord with the
fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws relating to the same subject should be read together and reconciled to avoid
inconsistency or repugnancy to established jurisprudence. As we stated in Taada:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we
have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. (Emphasis
supplied)
To give section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the Act effective even before its publication, which
scenario is precisely abhorred in Taada.
Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive information campaign on the proposed Sorsogon
cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Code. However, no proof whatsoever was presented by petitioner to substantiate his allegation.Consequently, we sustain the
presumption[20] that the COMELEC regularly performed or complied with its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., on official leave.