Navarro V Executive Secretary
Navarro V Executive Secretary
Navarro V Executive Secretary
Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City
EN BANC
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T.
MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS,
HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY,
JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G.
CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D.
GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M.
LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M.
BAGUNDOL,
Intervenors.
Promulgated:
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder
a brief background of the relevant antecedents
Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the
interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26,
2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons
elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.[5]
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land
area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of
said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing
to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers,
and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of
one (1) or more islands for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC,
inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.[11]
Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions
for leave of court to admit their second motions for reconsideration,
accompanied by their second motions for reconsideration. These motions were
eventually noted without action by this Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution.[15]
WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member,
House of Representatives representing the lone congressional district
of Dinagat Islands, (2) names of the candidates for the aforementioned
position, (3) position for Governor, Dinagat Islands, (4) names of the
candidates for the said position, (5) position of the Vice Governor, (6)
the names of the candidates for the said position, (7) positions for the
ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members and, [8] all the names of
the candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, have already
been configured into the system and can no longer be revised within
the remaining period before the elections on May 10, 2010.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of
Surigao del Norte whose positions will be affected by the nullification of the
election results in the event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed,
they have a legal interest in the instant case and would be directly affected by the
declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. Simply put, movants-intervenors election
to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will
revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del
Norte and a special election will have to be conducted for governor, vice
governor, and House of Representatives member and Sangguniang Panlalawigan
member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. Moreover, as
residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of
their constituents, they have a clear and strong interest in the outcome of this
case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte will affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole
administrative set-up of the province will have to be restructured; (2) the services
of many employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts will have to be
invalidated; and (4) projects and other developments will have to be
discontinued. In addition, they claim that their rights cannot be adequately
pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights would be
foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.
In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-
intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above Resolution,
namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress
amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial
contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes
the exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and
(3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010,[16] the Court denied the Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was
before and not after the resolution of this case.
On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that
the decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence,
the above motion.
At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant
Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the
second motions for reconsideration of the original
parties, and neither onDinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion, which our
With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the
records to support the claim that this was a ploy of respondents legal tactician to
reopen the case despite an entry of judgment. To be sure, it is actually COMELEC
Resolution No. 8790 that set this controversy into motion anew. To reiterate, the
pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the
Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part
of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the
election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in Item
b above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member,
House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del
Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District,
Surigao del Norte (with DinagatIslands) will have to be conducted.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the
petition for certiorari way back on October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-
intervenors had nothing at stake in the outcome of this case. While it may be
argued that their interest in this case should have commenced upon the issuance
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it is obvious that their interest in this case then
was more imaginary than real. This is because COMELEC Resolution No. 8790
provides that should the decision in this case attain finality prior to the May 10,
2010 elections, the election of the local government officials stated therein would
only have to be postponed. Given such a scenario, movants-intervenors would
not have suffered any injury or adverse effect with respect to the reversion of
Dinagat as part of Surigao del Norte since they would simply have remained
candidates for the respective positions they have vied for and to which they have
been elected.
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Because constitutional cases are
often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a
preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional
question raised.[19]
It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event
their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied
and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with
finality. Indeed, they have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be not
reconsidered, their election to their respective positions during the May 10, 2010
polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to
naught. Given their unique circumstances, movants-intervenors should not be left
without any remedy before this Court simply because their interest in this case
became manifest only after the case had already been decided. The consequences
of such a decision would definitely work to their disadvantage, nay, to their
utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the dispute. Such decision
would also violate their right to due process, a right that cries out for
protection. Thus, it is imperative that the movants-intervenors be heard on the
merits of their cause. We are not only a court of law, but also of justice and
equity, such that our position and the dire repercussions of this controversy
should be weighed on the scales of justice, rather than dismissed on account of
mootness.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there
is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review.[20] The second exception attends this case.
This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
[21]
where technicalities of procedure on locus standi were brushed aside, because
the constitutional issues raised were of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court. Along parallel
lines, the motion for intervention should be given due course since movants-
intervenors have shown their substantial legal interest in the outcome of this
case, even much more than petitioners themselves, and because of the novelty,
gravity, and weight of the issues involved.
Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of
the May 12, 2010 Resolution of movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal
the judgment of a case, which, though merely a statutory right that must comply
with the requirements of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial system, such
that courts should proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to
question the judgment and its effects, and ensure that every party-litigant,
including those who would be directly affected, would have the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause, freed from the
constraints of technicalities.[22]
Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of
judgment in light of attendant extraordinary circumstances.[23] The power to
suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling
as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final.[24] In this
case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the
right to be heard since they would be adversely affected by the judgment in this
case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct
interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local
government units. In this manner, the thrust of the Constitution with respect to
local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to decentralization and the
attainment of national goals, as hereafter elucidated, will effectively be realized.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent
look, the Court finds that the first and second arguments raised by movants-
intervenors deserve affirmative consideration.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of
local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and
capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by
the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish
these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the
relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them
should enjoy preferential consideration.
Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units,
particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the
framers of the LGC. In this connection, the following excerpts from congressional
debates are quoted hereunder
xxxx
Now, were saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a floor area
where it could pay for overhead and provide a minimum of basic
services to the population. Over and above that, the provincial officials
should be able to trigger off economic development which will attract
immigration, which will attract new investments from the private
sector. This is now the concern of the local officials. But if we are going
to tie the hands of the proponents, simply by telling them, Sorry, you
are now at 150 thousand or 200 thousand, you will never be able to
become a province because nobody wants to go to your
place. Why? Because you never have any reason for economic viability.
xxxx
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Right.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, thats correct, but on the assumption that
the province is able to do it without being a burden to the national
government. Thats the assumption.
Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a
municipality, a city, and a province as provided both in the LGC and the LGC-
IRR, viz.
For a Barangay:
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for
barangays, based on the criteria prescribed in this Section, within his
territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang
panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate
action. In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila
area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay
consolidation plan can be prepared and approved by the sangguniang
bayan concerned.
(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are
present:
Municipality:
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund of the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds,
transfers and non-recurring income.
The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said
creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All
expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
City:
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not
be created unless the following requisites on income and either
population or land area are present:
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one
hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least
one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed
of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city
sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population,
and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to
less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses
incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
Provinces:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income.
The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said
creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All
expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to
the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of
viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component
cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to
provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created
consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as
expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city,
respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the
creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly
stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to
cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical
configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that
islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created
province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that
the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption
was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended
to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the
true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the
validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations
underpinning the principle of local autonomy.
Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides
This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3(a) of the LGC-IRR [26] and in the
Whereas clauses of Administrative Order No. 270,[27] which read
WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the
State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments;
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine
and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements
for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to
achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10,
2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd,
awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several
municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of
islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are
exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and
442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the
minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of
several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive
preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of
islands and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant
communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the
constituency.This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome
if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the
islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous
land mass.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian,
[28]
with respect to his
CHAIRMAN LINA. Okay.
So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the Congressmen, who were more
or less interested in the creation of the new provinces, because of the
vastness of the areas that were involved.
At any rate, this bill was passed by the House unanimously without any
objection. And as I have said a while ago, that this has been pending in
the Senate for the last two years. And Sen. Pimentel himself was just
in South Cotabato and he delivered a speech that he will support this
bill, and he says, that he will incorporate this in the Local Government
Code, which I have in writing from him. I showed you the letter that he
wrote, and naturally, we in the House got hold of the Senate version. It
becomes an impossibility for the whole Philippines to create a new
province, and that is quite the concern of the respective Congressmen.
So, we are talking about devolution of powers here. Why is the province
not willing to create another province, when it can be justified. Even
Speaker Mitra says, what will happen to Palawan? We wont have one
million people there, and if you look at Palawan, there will be about
three or four provinces that will comprise that island. So, the
development will be hampered.
Now, I would like to read into the record the letter of Sen. Pimentel,
dated November 2, 1989. This was practically about a year after 7166
was approved by the House, House Bill 7166.
That is the very context of the letter of the Senator, and we are quite
surprised that the Senate has adopted another position.
So, thats all what I can say, Mr. Senator, and I dont believe that it is not,
because its the wish of the House, but because the mother province will
participate anyhow, you vote them down; and that is provided for in
the Constitution. As a matter of fact, I have seen the amendment with
regards to the creation of the city to be urbanized, subject to the
plebiscite. And why should we not allow that to happen in the
provinces! In other words, we dont want the people who wants to
create a new province, as if they are left in the devolution of powers,
when they feel that they are far away from civilization.
General Santos and the neighboring municipalities, and they are quite
interested and even the AID people are asking me, What is holding the
creation of a new province when practically you need it? Its not 20 or
30 kilometers from the capital town; its about 140 kilometers. And
imagine those people have to travel that far and our road is not like
Metropolitan Manila. That is as far as from here to Tarlac. And there are
municipalities there that are just one municipality is bigger than
the province of La Union. They have the income. Of course, they dont
have the population because thats a part of the land of promise and
people from Luzon are migrating everyday because they feel that there
are more opportunities here.
So, by creating the new provinces, not only in my case, in the other
cases, it will enhance the development of the Philippines, not because I
am interested in my province. Well, as far as I am concerned, you know,
I am in the twilight years of my life to serve and I would like to serve my
people well. No personal or political interest here. I hope the
distinguished Chairman of the Committee will appreciate the House Bill
7166, which the House has already approved because we dont want
them to throw the Conference Committee Report after we have worked
that the house Bill has been, you know, drawn over board and not even
considered by the Senate. And on top of that, we are considering a bill
that has not yet been passed. So I hope the Senator will take that into
account.
But because of the manifestation that you just made, we will definitely,
when we reach a book, Title IV, on the matter of provinces, we will look
at it sympathetically from your end so that the objective that you want
[to] achieve can be realized. So we will look at it with sympathy. We will
review our position on the matter, how we arrived at the Senate
version and we will adopt an open mind definitely when we come into
it.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Title?
There are areas then, when since time immemorial, very few governors
ever tread on those areas. That is, maybe youre acquainted with the
Bondoc Peninsula of Quezon, fronting that is Ragay Gulf. From Ragay
there is a long stretch of coastal area. From Albay going to Ragay, very
few governors ever tread [there] before, even today. That area now is
infested with NPA. That is the area of Congressman Andaya.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Seven.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.L Seven. Anim.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very
seriously and even with sympathy because of the explanation given and
we will study this very carefully.[29]
The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting
clearly show the manifest intention of Congress to promote development in the
previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas
by allowing them todirectly share in the allocation of funds under the
of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on
land area, population, and local revenue.[30]
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in
absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of
statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law,[31] or may
consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive
issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to
this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the
basic law, the LGC.
These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with
the view to attain decentralization and countryside development. Congress saw
that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new law,
now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of
the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption from
the land area requirement of local government units composed of one or more
islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect
to the creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section
461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail
was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.
With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of
Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees on
Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight
Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the
creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by
Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and
this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure,
the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee evidently
conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of
society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in
the LGC when the IRR was formulated.[33] Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to
an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court,
[34]
but to legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of
representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of
the Oversight Committee.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and
favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers
of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the
LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation
of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only
in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the
enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of
a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become
a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at
the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance,
which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for
the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has
been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the
plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances
which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be
seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a
province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity. As we
have held in League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections[35]
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the
law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is
within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter,
and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within
the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the
lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless
within the intent of the lawmakers.Withal, courts ought not to interpret
and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of
the law and its legislators.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.