Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 
 
FIRST DIVISION
 
 
HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE,   G.R. No. 169913
namely: JOSEFA DELESTE, JOSE  
RAY DELESTE, RAUL HECTOR  
DELESTE, and RUBEN ALEX  
DELESTE,  
Petitioners, Present:
   
- versus -  
  CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
  VELASCO, JR.,
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
(LBP), as represented by its Manager, DEL CASTILLO, and
LAND VALUATION OFFICE OF PEREZ, JJ.
LBP COTABATO CITY; THE  
REGIONAL DIRECTOR REGION 12  
OF COTABATO CITY, THE  
SECRETARY OF THE  
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN  
REFORM; THE REGIONAL  
DIRECTOR OF REGION X  
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,  
represented by MCMILLAN  
LUCMAN, in his capacity as  
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer  
(PARO) of DAR Lanao del Norte;  
LIZA BALBERONA, in her capacity  
as DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform  
Officer (MARO); REYNALDO  
BAGUIO, in his capacity as the  
Register of Deeds of Iligan City as  
nominal party; the emancipation  
patent holders: FELIPE D.  
MANREAL, CUSTUDIO M. RICO,  
HEIRS OF DOMINGO V. RICO,  
HEIRS OF ABDON T. MANREAL,  
MACARIO M. VELORIA, ALICIA B.  
MANREAL, PABLO RICO,  
SALVACION MANREAL, HEIRS OF  
TRANQUILIANA MANREAL,  
HEIRS OF ANGELA VELORIA,  
HEIRS OF NECIFURO CABALUNA,  
HEIRS OF CLEMENTE RICO,  
HEIRS OF MANTILLANO OBISO,  
HEIRS OF HERCULANO  
BALORIO, and TITO BALER, Promulgated:
Respondents. June 8, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
DECISION
 
VELASCO, JR., J.:
 
The Case
 
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to
reverse and set aside the October 28, 2004 Resolution [1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) and its September 13, 2005 Resolution[2] denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
 
The Facts
 
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria)
were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City,
consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject property). Said spouses were childless, but
Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman.
Virgilio had been raised by the couple since he was two years old. Gregorio also
had two daughters, Esperanza and Caridad, by still another woman.[3]
 
 When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject
property.[4] On February 16, 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the subject property to
Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000.[5] The deed of sale was notarized on
February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax declaration in the
name of Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of
Deleste. The arrears in the payment of taxes from 1952 had been updated by
Deleste and from then on, he paid the taxes on the property.[6]
 
On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died.[7] Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman, was
appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses.
Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular administrator of
the joint estate.[8]
 
On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the
deceased spouses, filed before the Court of First Instance, Branch II, Lanao del
Norte an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property,
docketed as Civil Case No. 698.[9] Said case went up to this Court in Noel v. CA,
where We rendered a Decision[10] on January 11, 1995, affirming the ruling of the
CA that the subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio
and Hilaria and that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject
property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate
of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-
half (1/2) interest in it.[11]
 
Notably, while Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the CFI,
particularly on October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This
law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the
subject property was placed under the said program.[12] However, only the heirs of
Gregorio were identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the
landowners. Concomitantly, the notices and processes relative to the coverage
were sent to these heirs.[13]
 
In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the
Zoning Regulation of Iligan City, reclassifying the subject property as
commercial/residential.[14]
  
Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of
the subject property.[15] The CLTs were registered on July 15, 1986.[16]
 
In 1991, the subject property was surveyed.[17] The survey of a portion of the
land consisting of 20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1407, was approved on
January 8, 1999.[18] The claim folder for Lot No. 1407 was submitted to the LBP
which issued a Memorandum of Valuation and a Certificate of Cash Deposit on
May 21, 2001 and September 12, 2001, respectively. Thereafter, Emancipation
Patents (EPs) and Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) were issued on August 1,
2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, in favor of private respondents over their
respective portions of Lot No. 1407.[19]
 
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1999, the City of Iligan filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Iligan City for the expropriation of a
5.4686-hectare portion of Lot No. 1407, docketed as Special Civil Action No.
4979. On December 11, 2000, the RTC issued a Decision granting the
expropriation. Considering that the real owner of the expropriated portion could
not be determined, as the subject property had not yet been partitioned and
distributed to any of the heirs of Gregorio and Deleste, the just compensation for
the expropriated portion of the subject property in the amount of PhP 27,343,000
was deposited with the Development Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, in trust
for the RTC in Iligan City.[20]
 
On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking
to nullify private respondents EPs.[21] This was docketed as Reg. Case No. X-471-
LN-2002.
 
On July 21, 2003, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
rendered a Decision[22] declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the
pending issues of ownership, the subsequent reclassification of the subject property
into a residential/commercial land, and the violation of petitioners constitutional
right to due process of law.
 
 Dissatisfied, private respondents immediately filed their Notice of Appeal on
July 22, 2003. Notwithstanding it, on July 24, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for a
Writ of Execution pursuant to Section 2, Rule XII of the Revised Rules of
Procedure, which was granted in an Order dated August 4, 2003 despite strong
opposition from private respondents.[23] On January 28, 2004, the DARAB nullified
the Order dated August 4, 2003 granting the writ of execution.[24]
 
Subsequently, the DARAB, in DARAB Case No. 12486, reversed the ruling
of the PARAD in its Decision[25] dated March 15, 2004. It held, among others, that
the EPs were valid as it was the heirs of Deleste who should have informed the
DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at the time the subject property was
placed under the coverage of the OLT Program considering that DAR was not a
party to the said case. Further, it stated that the record is bereft of any evidence that
the city ordinance has been approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB), as mandated by DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of
1990, and held that whether the subject property is indeed exempt from the OLT
Program is an administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies
exclusively with the DAR Secretary or the latters authorized representative.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the DARAB in its
Resolution[26] dated July 8, 2004.
 
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 85471, challenging the Decision and Resolution in DARAB Case
No. 12486. This was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated October 28, 2004 for
petitioners failure to attach the writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of
execution, and such material portions of the record referred to in the petition and
other supporting papers, as required under Sec. 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied by the appellate court in a
Resolution dated September 13, 2005 for being pro forma.
 
On November 18, 2005, petitioners filed a petition for review with this
Court. In Our Resolution[27] dated February 4, 2008, We resolved to deny the said
petition for failure to show sufficiently any reversible error in the assailed
judgment to warrant the exercise by the Court of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction in this case.
 
 On March 19, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[28] On
April 11, 2008, they also filed a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.[29]
 
In Our Resolution[30] dated August 20, 2008, this Court resolved to grant
petitioners motion for reconsideration and give due course to the petition, requiring
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
 
The Issues
 
 
I.                   [WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING] OUTRIGHT
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW OF PETITIONERS X X X.
 
II.                [WHETHER] THE OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF PETITIONERS MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION BASED ON A MISAPPRECIATION OF
FACTS IS JUSTIFIED; AND [WHETHER THE] OUTRIGHT
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION IS JUST CONSIDERING THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN.
 
XXXX
 
III.             [WHETHER PETITIONERS LAND IS] COVERED BY AGRARIAN
REFORM GIVEN THAT THE CITY OF ILIGAN PASSED [CITY]
ORDINANCE NO. 1313 RECLASSIFYING THE AREA INTO A
STRICTLY RESIDENTIAL AREA IN 1975.
 
IV.             [WHETHER THE LAND] THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY AND
PARTIALLY EXPROPRIATED BY A CITY GOVERNMENT [MAY]
STILL BE SUBJECT[ED] TO AGRARIAN REFORM.
 
V.                [WHETHER DAR VIOLATED] THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS TO
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
 
VI.             [WHETHER] THE COMPENSATION DETERMINED BY DAR AND
LBP IS CORRECT GIVEN THAT THE FORMULA USED HAD BEEN
REPEALED.
 
VII.          [WHETHER] THE ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS [IS]
LEGAL GIVEN THAT THEY WERE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL
PROCEEDING.
 
VIII.       [WHETHER] THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE [ARE] VALID GIVEN
THAT THEY WERE DIRECTLY ISSUED TO THE FARMER-
 BENEFICIARIES IN GROSS VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(E) OF
R.A. 6657 X X X.[31]
 
Our Ruling
 
The petition is meritorious.
 
Effect of non-compliance with the requirements
under Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
 
 
In filing a petition for review as an appeal from awards, judgments, final
orders, or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions, it is required under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court that
it be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of
the award, judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from, with certified true
copies of such material portions of the record referred to in the petition and other
supporting papers. As stated:
 
Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the
full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies
either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts
and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of
the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with
certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to
therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification
against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42.
The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within
the period fixed herein. (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Non-compliance with any of the above-mentioned requirements concerning
the contents of the petition, as well as the documents that should accompany the
petition, shall be sufficient ground for its dismissal as stated in Sec. 7, Rule 43 of
the Rules:
 
Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the
payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service
of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should
 accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
(Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
In the instant case, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471
for petitioners failure to attach the writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of
execution, and such material portions of the record referred to in the petition and
other supporting papers.[32]
 
A perusal of the issues raised before the CA would, however, show that the
foregoing documents required by the appellate court are not necessary for the
proper disposition of the case. Specifically:
 
Is [Lot No. 1407] within the ambit of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program]?
 
Can the OLT by DAR over the subject land validly proceed without notice to the
landowner?
 
Can the OLT be validly completed without a certification of deposit by Land
Bank?
 
[I]s the landowner barred from exercising his right of retention x x x [considering
that EPs were already issued on the basis of CLTs]?
 
Are the EPs over the subject land x x x valid x x x?[33]
 
 
Petitioners complied with the requirement under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court when they appended to the petition filed before the CA certified
true copies of the following documents: (1) the challenged resolution dated July 8,
2004 issued by the DARAB denying petitioners motion for reconsideration; (2) the
duplicate original copy of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated April 6,
2005; (3) the assailed decision dated March 15, 2004 issued by the DARAB
reversing on appeal the decision of the PARAD and nullifying with finality the
order of execution pending appeal; (4) the Order dated December 8, 2003 issued
by the PARAD reinstating the writ of execution earlier issued; and (5) the Decision
dated July 21, 2003 issued by the PARAD in the original proceedings for the
cancellation of the EPs.[34] The CA, therefore, erred when it dismissed the petition
based on such technical ground.
  
Even assuming that the omitted documents were material to the appeal, the
appellate court, instead of dismissing outright the petition, could have just required
petitioners to submit the necessary documents. In Spouses Espejo v. Ito,[35] the
Court held that under Section 3 (d), Rule 3 of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals,[36] the Court of Appeals is with authority to require the parties to
submit additional documents as may be necessary to promote the interests of
substantial justice.
 
Moreover, petitioners subsequent submission of the documents required by
the CA with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with
Section 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. [37] In Jaro v. CA, this Court held that
subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure. Particularly:
 
The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the
original petition had but the Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the
amended petition. The Court of Appeals reasoned that non-compliance in the
original petition is admittedly attributable to the petitioner and that no highly
justifiable and compelling reason has been advanced to the court for it to depart
from the mandatory requirements of Administrative Circular No. 3-96. The hard
stance taken by the Court of Appeals in this case is unjustified under the
circumstances.
 
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and
substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules
of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, we ruled that the subsequent submission of the missing
documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial
compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in these two cases to
comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What we found
noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners therein substantially
complied with the formal requirements. We ordered the remand of the petitions in
these cases to the Court of Appeals, stressing the ruling that by precipitately
dismissing the petitions the appellate court clearly put a premium on technicalities
at the expense of a just resolution of the case. [38] (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied.)
 
 
 Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of
technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice.[39] As held in Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo:[40]
 
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. If the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to
promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules or except
a particular case from their operation. Law and jurisprudence grant to
courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural rules, even
the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to
put an end to litigation speedily and the parties right to an opportunity to be
heard.
 
Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:
 
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary
situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us,
depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give
due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the
technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of
the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently
apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the
commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have
always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement
of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full
opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Clearly, the dismissal of the petition by the CA on mere technicality is
unwarranted in the instant case.
 
On the coverage of the subject property
by the agrarian reform program
 
 
Petitioners contend that the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is
outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment of
City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City of Iligan reclassifying the area into a
residential/commercial land.[41]
 
 Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is bereft of
any evidence that the city ordinance has been approved by the HLURB, thereby
allegedly casting doubt on the validity of the reclassification over the subject
property.[42] It further noted that whether the subject property is exempt from the
OLT Program is an administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies
exclusively with the DAR Secretary, not with the DARAB.
 
Indeed, it is the Office of the DAR Secretary which is vested with the
primary and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
the agrarian reform program.[43] However, this will not prevent the Court from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition considering that the issues raised in it may
already be resolved on the basis of the records before Us. Besides, to allow the
matter to remain with the Office of the DAR Secretary would only cause
unnecessary delay and undue hardship on the parties. Applicable, by analogy, is
Our ruling in the recent Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph
International v. Department of Labor and Employment Secretary,[44] where We
held:
 
But as the CA did, we similarly recognize that undue hardship, to the
point of injustice, would result if a remand would be ordered under a
situation where we are in the position to resolve the case based on the records
before us. As we said in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of
Appeals:
 
[w]e have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the
lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the
Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before
it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for the
expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the
merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved
by the remand of the case.
Thus, we shall directly rule on the dismissal issue. And while we rule that
the CA could not validly rule on the merits of this issue, we shall not hesitate to
refer back to its dismissal ruling, where appropriate. (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied.)
 
 
Pertinently, after an assiduous study of the records of the case, We agree
with petitioners that the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the
coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment by the City
of Iligan of its local zoning ordinance, City Ordinance No. 1313.
 
It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify
agricultural into non-agricultural lands. In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association,
Inc. v. CA,[45] this Court held that pursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA)
2264, amending the Local Government Code, municipal and/or city councils are
empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in
consultation with the National Planning Commission. It was also emphasized
therein that [t]he power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands
[from agricultural to non-agricultural lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not
subject to the approval of the [DAR].[46]
 
Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was
enacted by the City of Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a
commercial/residential area. DARAB, however, believes that the approval of
HLURB is necessary in order for the reclassification to be valid.
 
We differ. As previously mentioned, City Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted
by the City of Iligan in 1975. Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of
during that time. It was the Task Force on Human Settlements, the earliest
predecessor of HLURB, which was already in existence at that time, having been
created on September 19, 1973 pursuant to Executive Order No. 419. It should be
noted, however, that the Task Force was not empowered to review and approve
zoning ordinances and regulations. As a matter of fact, it was only on August 9,
1978, with the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that local governments
were required to submit their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances,
enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry of Human Settlements for
review and ratification. The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC)
was the regulatory arm of the Ministry of Human Settlements.[47]
 
Significantly, accompanying the Certification[48] dated October 8, 1999
issued by Gil R. Balondo, Deputy Zoning Administrator of the City Planning and
Development Office, Iligan City, and the letter[49] dated October 8, 1999 issued by
Ayunan B. Rajah, Regional Officer of the HLURB, is the Certificate of Approval
issued by Imelda Romualdez Marcos, then Minister of Human Settlements and
Chairperson of the HSRC, showing that the local zoning ordinance was, indeed,
approved on September 21, 1978. This leads to no other conclusion than that City
Ordinance No. 1313 enacted by the City of Iligan was approved by the HSRC, the
predecessor of HLURB. The validity of said local zoning ordinance is, therefore,
beyond question.
 
Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial
land with the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be
considered as an agricultural land within the ambit of RA 6657. As this Court held
in Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc.,
[50]
 To be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one valid reclassification of the
land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency
before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect.
 
Despite the foregoing ruling, respondents allege that the subsequent
reclassification by the local zoning ordinance cannot free the land from the legal
effects of PD 27 which deems the land to be already taken as of October 21, 1972,
when said law took effect. Concomitantly, they assert that the rights which accrued
from said date must be respected. They also maintain that the reclassification of the
subject property did not alter its agricultural nature, much less its actual use.[51]
 
Verily, vested rights which have already accrued cannot just be taken away
by the expedience of issuing a local zoning ordinance reclassifying an agricultural
land into a residential/commercial area. As this Court extensively discussed
in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA:[52]
 
In the main, REMMAN hinges its application for exemption on the ground
that the subject lands had ceased to be agricultural lands by virtue of the zoning
classification by the Sangguniang Bayan of Dasmarias, Cavite, and approved by
the HSRC, specifying them as residential.
 
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, this Court resolved
the issue of whether lands already classified for residential, commercial or
industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) and its precursor agencies, i.e., National Housing Authority and Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission, prior to 15 June 1988, are covered by
Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988. We answered in the negative, thus:
 
 We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to
as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable
agricultural lands and do not include commercial, industrial and residential
land.
 
xxx xxx xxx
 
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the
coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-
agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies
other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations
Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural
Uses, DAR itself defined agricultural land thus
 
. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988
for residential, commercial or industrial use.
 
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988,
respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. . . . .
 
However, Natalia should be cautiously applied in light of Administrative
Order 04, Series of 2003, which outlines the rules on the Exemption on Lands
from CARP Coverage under Section (3) of Republic Act No. 6657, and
Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990. It reads:
 
I. Prefatory Statement
 
Republic Act (RA) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), Section 3, Paragraph (c) defines agricultural land as referring to
land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
 
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, (or DOJ
Opinion 44-1990 for brevity) and the case of Natalia Realty versus
Department of Agrarian Reform (12 August 2993, 225 SCRA 278) opines
 that with respect to the conversion of agricultural land covered by RA
6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) to approve such conversion may be exercised from the
date of its effectivity, on 15 June 1988. Thus, all lands that are already
classified as commercial, industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no
longer need any conversion clearance.
 
However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall
not operate to divest tenant[-]farmers of their rights over lands covered
by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, which have been vested prior to 15
June 1988.
 
As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot
be applied to defeat vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential
Decree No. 27.
 
Indeed, in the recent case of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v.
Amante, where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the
contentious property therein is agricultural in nature on the ground that the same
had been classified as park since 1979 under the Zoning Ordinance of Cabuyao,
as approved by the HLURB, the Court said:
The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify
and convert lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is
approved by the HLURB. Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 dated
November 3, 1979, enacted by the Municipality of Cabuyao, divided the
municipality into residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural and
institutional districts, and districts and parks for open spaces. It did not
convert, however, existing agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
industrial, or institutional. While it classified Barangay Casile into a
municipal park, as shown in its permitted uses of land map, the ordinance
did not provide for the retroactivity of its classification. In Co vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, it was held that an ordinance converting
agricultural lands into residential or light industrial should be
given prospective application only, and should not change the nature
of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships
existing over such land. . . . .
A reading of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, series of
1981, does not disclose any provision converting existing agricultural
lands in the covered area into residential or light industrial. While it
declared that after the passage of the measure, the subject area shall be
used only for residential or light industrial purposes, it is not provided
therein that it shall have retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights
previously acquired over lands located within the zone which are neither
residential nor light industrial in nature. This simply means that, if we
apply the general rule, as we must, the ordinance should be given
prospective operation only. The further implication is that it should
 not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the
legal relationships existing over such lands. (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
 
 
This, however, raises the issue of whether vested rights have actually
accrued in the instant case. In this respect, We reckon that under PD 27, tenant-
farmers of rice and corn lands were deemed owners of the land they till as of
October 21, 1972. This policy, intended to emancipate the tenant-farmers from the
bondage of the soil, is given effect by the following provision of the law:
 
The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall
be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family size farm of five (5) hectares
if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated. (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are deemed
owners as of October 21, 1972, this is not to be construed as automatically vesting
upon these tenant-farmers absolute ownership over the land they were tilling.
Certain requirements must also be complied with, such as payment of just
compensation, before full ownership is vested upon the tenant-farmers. This was
elucidated by the Court in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform:[53]
 
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-
farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a
portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land
owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a
full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative.It was
understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to
be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
 
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
 
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of
October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 27.
 
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the
said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers
cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also
perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the lease rentals
paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending
 transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be
considered as advance payment for the land.
 
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or
LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.(Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements, tenant-farmers have,
at most, an inchoate right over the land they were tilling. In recognition of this, a
CLT is issued to a tenant-farmer to serve as a provisional title of ownership over
the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of [just
compensation] or for as long as the [tenant-farmer] is an amortizing owner. [54] This
certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to
rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the
land[55] he was tilling.
 
Concomitantly, with respect to the LBP and the government, tenant-farmers
cannot be considered as full owners of the land they are tilling unless they have
fully paid the amortizations due them. This is because it is only upon such full
payment of the amortizations that EPs may be issued in their favor.
 
In Del Castillo v. Orciga, We explained that land transfer under PD 27 is
effected in two (2) stages. The first stage is the issuance of a CLT to a farmer-
beneficiary as soon as the DAR transfers the landholding to the farmer-beneficiary
in recognition that said person is its deemed owner. And the second stage is the
issuance of an EP as proof of full ownership of the landholding upon full payment
of the annual amortizations or lease rentals by the farmer-beneficiary.[56]
 
In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all
intents and purposes, it was only in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-
beneficiaries, were recognized to have an inchoate right over the subject
property prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements. Considering
that the local zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and subsequently
approved by the HSRC in 1978, private respondents still had no vested rights
to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that private respondents
were issued the CLTs and were deemed owners.
 
The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, since
reclassification had taken place twenty-six (26) years prior to their issuance.
Undeniably, no vested rights accrued prior to reclassification and its
approval. Consequently, the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is
outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
 
On the violation of petitioners right to due process of law
 
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the
subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their
right to due process of law was violated.[57] Citing De Chavez v. Zobel,[58] both the
DAR and the private respondents claim that the enactment of PD 27 is a statutory
notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production,
[59]
 implying that there was no need for an actual notice.
 
We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a
property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-
compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of
administrative due process of law.[60] Our ruling in Heirs of Jugalbot v. CA[61] is
particularly instructive:
 
Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of
constitutional due process. The Court of Appeals was correct in pointing out
that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process because the DAR failed to send
notice of the impending land reform coverage to the proper party. The
records show that notices were erroneously addressed and sent in the name of
Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not the proper party in the instant
case. The ownership of the property, as can be gleaned from the records, pertains
to Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore served on her, and not
Pedro N. Roa.
 
xxxx
 
In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a
DAR certification signed by team leader Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988
stating that the subject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and
 primarily devoted to rice and corn despite the fact that there was no ocular
inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation and report to verify the truth of
the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the property. The
absence of such ocular inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and report
likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to property through the denial of
due process.
 
By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals applies to the case at
bar since there was likewise a violation of due process in the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law when the petitioner was not notified of
any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR before
acquisition of the property was to be undertaken. Neither was there proof that
petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention
area in those portions to be acquired. Both in the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law and Presidential Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how this
right is exercised, is guaranteed by law.
 
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of
expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful
compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the
procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be
observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by
the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation.
Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its
failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a
violation of constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Markedly, a reading of De Chavez invoked by both the DAR and private
respondents does not show that this Court ever made mention that actual notice
may be dispensed with under PD 27, its enactment being a purported statutory
notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production
that their lands are subjected to the OLT program.
 
Quite contrarily, in Sta. Monica Industrial & Devt. Corp. v. DAR,[62] this
Court underscored the significance of notice in implementing the agrarian reform
program when it stated that notice is part of the constitutional right to due process
of law. It informs the landowner of the States intention to acquire a private land
upon payment of just compensation and gives him the opportunity to present
evidence that his landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from the
agrarian law.
The Court, therefore, finds interest in the holding of the DARAB that
petitioners were not denied the right to due process despite the fact that only the
Nanamans were identified as the owners. Particularly:
 
Fourthly, the PARAD also ruled that the petitioners were denied the right
to be given the notice since only the Nanamans were identified as the owners. The
fault lies with petitioners who did not present the tax declaration in the name of
Dr. Deleste as of October 21, 1972. It was only in 1995 that Civil Case No. 698
was finally decided by the Supreme Court dividing the 34.7 hectares between the
Delestes and the Nanamans. Note that Dr. Deleste died in 1992 after PD 27 was
promulgated, hence, the subject land or his share was considered in his name only
(see Art. 777, New Civil Code). Even then, it must be borne in mind that on
September 26, 1972, PD No. 2 was issued by President Marcos proclaiming the
whole country as a land reform area, this was followed by PD 27. This should
have alarmed them more so when private respondents are in actual possession and
cultivation of the subject property.
 
 
But it was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner
of the subject property. It should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria
in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2, 1954, and such registration serves
as a constructive notice to the whole world that the subject property was already
owned by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. In Naval v. CA, this Court
held:
 
Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the registration of an
instrument involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates
constructive notice and binds third person who may subsequently deal with the
same property.[63] x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is to notify other
persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property has been
entered into.[64] There was, therefore, no reason for DAR to feign ignorance of the
transfer of ownership over the subject property.
 
Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the
Nanamans, is bolstered by the fact that the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio
was already canceled and a new one issued in the name of Deleste. [65] Although tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are nonetheless good indicia of possession in the concept of an
owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or, at least, constructive possession.[66]
 
Petitioners right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR
failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of
the agrarian reform program.
 
On this note, We take exception to our ruling in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA,
[67]
 where, despite a finding that there was a violation of due process in the
implementation of the comprehensive agrarian reform program when the petitioner
was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the
DAR before acquiring the property, thereby effectively depriving petitioner the
opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be
acquired,[68] this Court nonetheless ruled that such violation does not give the Court
the power to nullify the certificates of land ownership award (CLOAs) already
issued to the farmer-beneficiaries, since the DAR must be given the chance to
correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.
 
Manifesting her disagreement that this Court cannot nullify illegally issued
CLOAs and should first ask the DAR to reverse and correct itself, Justice Ynares-
Santiago, in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, [69] stated that [i]f the acts of
DAR are patently illegal and the rights of Roxas & Co. violated, the wrong
decisions of DAR should be reversed and set aside. It follows that the fruits of the
wrongful acts, in this case the illegally issued CLOAs, must be declared null and
void. She also noted that [i]f CLOAs can under the DARs own order be cancelled
administratively, with more reason can the courts, especially the Supreme Court,
do so when the matter is clearly in issue.
 
In the same vein, if the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the
Court must immediately take action and declare the issuance as null and void.
There being no question that the CLTs in the instant case were improperly issued,
for which reason, their cancellation is warranted.[70] The same holds true with
respect to the EPs and certificates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as
there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLTs on which they were
grounded are void.[71] Cancellation of the EPs and OCTs are clearly warranted in
the instant case since, aside from the violation of petitioners right to due process of
law, the subject property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
 
Issue of Validity of EPs Not Barred by Res Judicata
 
The LBP maintains that the issue of the EPs validity has already been settled
by this Court in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
[72]
 where We held that the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 had already become
indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time the petitioners therein instituted the
case in 2005; hence, their issuance may no longer be reviewed.[73]
 
In effect, the LBP raises the defense of res judicata in order to preclude a
relitigation of the issue concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private
respondents.
 
Notably, the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (1) bar by
prior judgment,[74] wherein the judgment in a prior case bars the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action; [75] and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment,[76] which precludes relitigation of a particular fact or
issue in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action.[77]
 
Citing Agustin v. Delos Santos,[78] this Court, in Spouses Antonio v. Sayman,
[79]
 expounded on the difference between the two aspects of res judicata:
 
The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) bar by prior
judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. This Court had occasion to explain
the difference between these two aspects of res judicata as follows:
 
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where
the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred,
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this
instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
  
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases,
but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive
only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the
concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated
differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent
court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject
matter of the two actions is the same. (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied.)
 
 
To be sure, conclusiveness of judgment merits application when a fact or
question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a
former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.[80] Elucidating further on this
second aspect of res judicata, the Court, in Spouses Antonio, stated:
 
x x x The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the
parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-
interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains
standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the
conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future or
other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in
the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for
a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are
required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
[81]
 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Applying the above statement of the Court to the case at bar, We find that
LBPs contention that this Courts ruling in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy that the
EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 had already become indefeasible and
incontrovertible precludes a relitigation of the issue concerning the validity of the
EPs issued to private respondents does not hold water.
 
In the first place, there is no identity of parties in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman
Lonoy and the instant case. Arguably, the respondents in these two cases are
similar. However, the petitioners are totally different. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman
Lonoy, the petitioners are the more than 120 individuals who claim to be
descendants of Fulgencio Nanaman, Gregorios brother, and who collectively assert
their right to a share in Gregorios estate, arguing that they were deprived of their
inheritance by virtue of the improper issuance of the EPs to private respondents
without notice to them. On the other hand, in the instant case, petitioners are the
heirs of Deleste who seek nullification of the EPs issued to private respondents on
grounds of violation of due process of law, disregard of landowners right of
retention, improvident issuance of EPs and OCTs, and non-coverage of the
agrarian reform program, among others. Evidently, there is even no privity among
the petitioners in these two cases.
 
And in the second place, the issues are also dissimilar. In Heirs of Sofia
Nanaman Lonoy, the issue was whether the filing of a petition for prohibition was
the proper remedy for the petitioners therein, considering that the EPs and OCTs
had already been issued in 2001, four (4) years prior to the filing of said petition in
2005. In the instant case, however, the issue is whether the EPs and OCTs issued in
favor of private respondents are void, thus warranting their cancellation.
 
In addition, the factual circumstances in these two cases are different such
that the necessity of applying the rule on indefeasibility of title in one is wanting in
the other. InHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the petition for prohibition was filed
by the petitioners therein in 2005, notwithstanding the fact that the EPs and OCTs
had already been issued in 2001. For that reason, apart from making a ruling that
[p]rohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli,
it becomes incumbent upon this Court to hold that:
 
x x x Considering that such EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, they had
become indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time petitioners instituted CA-
G.R. SP No. 00365 in 2005, and may no longer be judicially reviewed.
[82]
 (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
On the contrary, in the instant case, the petition for nullification of private
respondents EPs and OCTs was filed on February 28, 2002. Taking into account
that the EPs and OCTs were issued on August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001,
respectively, the filing of the petition was well within the prescribed one year
period, thus, barring the defense of indefeasibility and incontrovertibility. Even if
the petition was filed before the DARAB, and not the Regional Trial Court as
mandated by Sec. 32 of the Property Registration Decree,[83] this should necessarily
have the same effect, considering that DARABs jurisdiction extends to cases
involving the cancellation of CLOAs, EPs, and even of certificates of title issued
by virtue of a void EP. As this Court held in Gabriel v. Jamias:[84]
 
It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the
DARAB and its regional and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-
judicial functions and jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to an agrarian dispute
or controversy and the implementation of agrarian reform laws. Pertinently, it is
provided in the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure that the DARAB has
primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and related agrarian reform
laws. Such jurisdiction shall extend to cases involving the issuance, correction
and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and
Emancipation Patents which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority.
 
This Court has had the occasion to rule that the mere issuance of an
emancipation patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary
beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations
of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. Section 12 (g) of P.D. No. 946 (issued on
June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over
cases involving the cancellation of emancipation patents issued under P.D. No.
266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged with the DARAB
under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
 
For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be deemed to
disappear the moment a certificate of title is issued, for, such certificates are
not modes of transfer of property but merely evidence of such transfer, and
there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLOA, on which it was
grounded, be void. The same holds true in the case of a certificate of title
issued by virtue of a void emancipation patent.
 
From the foregoing, it is therefore undeniable that it is the DARAB and
not the regular courts which has jurisdiction herein, this notwithstanding the
issuance of Torrens titles in the names of the petitioners. For, it is a fact that the
petitioners Torrens titles emanated from the emancipation patents previously
issued to them by virtue of being the farmer-beneficiaries identified by the DAR
under the OLT of the government. The DAR ruling that the said emancipation
patents were erroneously issued for failing to consider the valid retention rights of
respondents had already attained finality. Considering that the action filed by
respondents with the DARAB was precisely to annul the emancipation patents
issued to the petitioners, the case squarely, therefore, falls within the jurisdiction
of the DARAB. x x x (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
  
 
Inevitably, this leads to no other conclusion than that Our ruling in Heirs of
Sofia Nanaman Lonoy concerning the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the
EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 does not bar Us from making a finding in the instant
case that the EPs and OCTs issued to private respondents are, indeed, void.
 
With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the
other issues raised by the parties.
 
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition
and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CAs October 28, 2004 and September 13,
2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471. The Emancipation Patents and
Original Certificates of Title covering the subject property, particularly Lot No.
1407, issued in favor of private respondents are herebydeclared NULL and VOID.
 
The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation Patents
and Original Certificates of Title erroneously issued in favor of private
respondents.
 
No pronouncement as to costs.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 
 
 
 
 

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 72-73. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by
Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.
[2]
 Id. at 75-78. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro and concurred in by Associate Justices
Arturo G. Tayag and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.
[3]
 Id. at 126-127.
[4]
 Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 175049, November 27, 2008, 572
SCRA 185, 192.
[5]
 Rollo, p. 127.
[6]
 Id. at 153-154.
 [7]
 Id. at 127.
[8]
 Heirs of  Sofia  Nanaman Lonoy v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, supra note 4, at 193.
[9]
 Rollo, p. 127.
[10]
 Noel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 59550 and 60636, January 11, 1995, 240 SCRA 78.
[11]
 Heirs of  Sofia  Nanaman Lonoy v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, supra note 4, at 193.
[12]
 Rollo, pp. 154-155;  Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, supra note 4, at 193-
194.
[13]
 Id. at 155.
[14]
 Id. at 127.
[15]
 Id.
[16]
 Id. at 155.
[17]
 Id.
[18]
 Id. at 156.
[19]
 Id. at 990, 263-292.
[20]
 Id. at 156; supra note 4, at 195.
[21]
 Id. at 128.
[22]
 Id. at 152-163.
[23]
 Id. at 133.
[24]
 Id. at 634-635.
[25]
 Id. at 126-141.
[26]
 Id. at 102-103.
[27]
 Id. at 822-823.
[28]
 Id. at 824-861.
[29]
 Id. at 862-881.
[30]
 Id. at 959-960.
[31]
 Id. at 991-992. Original in lowercase.
[32]
 Id. at 72.
[33]
 Id. at 87.
[34]
 Id. at 99-163.
[35]
 G.R. No. 176511, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 192, 206; citing  Spouses Lanaria v. Planta, G.R. No.
172891, November 22, 2007, 538 SCRA 79.
[36]
 Rule 3, Sec. 3(d) reads: When a petition does not have the complete annexes or the required number of
copies, the Chief of the Judicial Records Division shall require the petitioner to complete the annexes or file the
necessary number of copies of the petition before docketing the case. Pleadings improperly filed in court shall be
returned to the sender by the Chief of the Judicial Records Division.
[37]
 Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 139131, September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA 124, 130.
[38]
 G.R. No. 127536, February 19, 2002, 377 SCRA 282, 296-297.
[39]
 Id. at 298; citing Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz, G.R. No. 140436, July 18, 2000, 336 SCRA 113.
[40]
 G.R. No. 164340, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 463, 477.
[41]
 Rollo, pp. 1010-1014.
[42]
 Id. at 135.
[43]
 Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo, supra note 40, at 480; citing DAR v. Abdulwahid, G.R. No. 163285,
February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 30, 40.
[44]
 G.R. Nos. 167401 & 167407, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 185, 207
[45]
 G.R. Nos. 142359 & 142980, May 25, 2004, 429 SCRA 109, 134-135.
[46]
 Id. at 135.
 [47]
 Under Sec. 18 of PD 1396, the Human Settlements Commission established pursuant to PD 933 was
renamed as the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and was made the regulatory arm of the Ministry of
Human Settlements. PD 1396 was issued on June 2, 1978.
[48]
 Rollo, p. 340.
[49]
 Id. at 341.
[50]
 G.R. Nos. 131481 & 131624, March 16, 2011.
[51]
 Rollo, pp. 1078-1081, 1098-1101; 1207-1216.
[52]
 G.R. Nos. 132073 & 132361, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 378, 391-393.
[53]
 G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 390-391.
[54]
 Del Castillo v. Orciga, G.R. No. 153850, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 498, 506.
[55]
 Id. at 505-506.
[56]
 Id. at 506.
[57]
 Rollo, p. 976.
[58]
 No. L-28609, January 17, 1974, 55 SCRA 26.
[59]
 Rollo, pp. 1080, 1102.
[60]
 Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 106, 134.
[61]
 G.R. No. 170346, March 12, 2007, 518 SCRA 202, 210-213.
[62]
 G.R. No. 164846, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 97, 104.
[63]
 G.R. No. 167412, February 22, 2006, 483 SCRA 102, 111.
[64]
 Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza, G.R. No. 185477, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 807, 817.
[65]
 Rollo, p. 153.
[66]
 Republic v. Spouses Kalaw, G.R. No. 155138, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 401, 413.
[67]
 Supra note 60.
[68]
 Heirs of Jugalbot v. CA, supra note 61, at 212.
[69]
 Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA, supra note 60, at 158-177.
[70]
 See Justice Melos Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in  Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA, supra note 60, at 155-
158.
[71]
 Gabriel v. Jamias, G.R. No. 156482, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 443, 457; citing  Hermoso v. C.L.
Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA 556, 562.
[72]
 Supra note 4.
[73]
 Rollo, pp. 1216-1220.
[74]
 In Re: Petition for Probate of Last Will & Testament of Basilio Santiago, G.R. No. 179859, August 9,
2010, 627 SCRA 351, 362.
[75]
 Linzag v. CA, G.R. No. 122181, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 304, 319.
[76]
 In Re: Petition for Probate of Last Will & Testament of Basilio Santiago, supra note 74, at 362.
[77]
 Linzag v. CA, supra note 75.
[78]
 G.R. No. 168139, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 576, 585.
[79]
 G.R. No. 149624, September 29, 2010, 631 SCRA 471, 480.
[80]
 Id.
[81]
 Id. at 480-481.
[82]
 Heirs of  Sofia  Nanaman Lonoy v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, supra note 4, at 207-208.
[83]
 Sec. 32 of the Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.  The decree of registration shall not
be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including
the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court]
a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the
entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the
phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an
innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the
decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such
decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud.
[84]
 G.R. No. 156482, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 443, 456-458.