Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171631

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

-versus- CARPIO-MORALES,*
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO
R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ,
and GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ,
represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ, Promulgated:
Respondents.
November 15, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

[1]
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court
[2]
of Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents application for registration and confirmation of title over a
parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by
[3]
Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of land under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD
1529) otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square
meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of
Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for registration, respondents
submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the
application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084)
with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development, Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5)
Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng
mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land patent or any public
land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the tax on the real
property for the year 2003 has been paid.
 [4]
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated
June 18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property
from their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng
[5]
Namatay dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they
have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since they acquired it in
1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a
period of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of the application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that the subject
property is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with
the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for
registration on the following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that
the muniments of title, and/or the tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application,
do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the parcel of land applied
for is a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there was no other
oppositor to the application.
[6]
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default against the whole world except as against the Republic. Thereafter,
respondents presented their evidence in support of their application.

In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for registration of the subject property. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the
title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal
address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation
of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825)
Square Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree.

After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of all taxes and other charges due on the land, the order
for the issuance of a decree of registration shall be accordingly undertaken.

[7]
SO ORDERED.

[8]
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. The CA, in its Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that they have been in continuous, open, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject property through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that respondents
acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to present sufficient
evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition
raising the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE
CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
 II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME
CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND
[9]
DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was
unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of an
owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
The subject property remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.

In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious,
continuous and adverse possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994
and 2000, issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's
Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents maintain that the
annotations appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues raised by the petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should
not consider in a petition for review under Rule 45.

The petition is meritorious.

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not
of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a
[10]
misapprehension of facts. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that
the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of
[11]
discretion.

In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the subject land is part of the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain.

Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and
(2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
[12]
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. These the respondents must prove
[13]
by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source
of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private
 [14]
person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that
[15]
the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.

To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-
[16]
000084 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following annotation:

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon
City on Jan. 03, 1968.

Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.

[17]
In Republic v. Sarmiento, the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the
conversion and subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that this survey is
inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry, is
insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable
public domain.

[18]
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation, the Court held that:

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance
Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative
act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case
at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to
the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed
alienable and disposable.

[19]
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche, the Court held that the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of
the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the
DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable,
and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls
within the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to establish that
the subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove
[20]
that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.
Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the records failed to show that the respondents by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the subject property consists of the testimonies of
Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents predecessors-
[21]
in-interest' possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19, 1939,
[22]
testified that since he attained the age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this case belonged to them. Amado testified
[23]
that he was a tenant of the land adjacent to the subject property since 1950, and on about the same year, he knew that the respondents
[24]
were occupying the subject land.
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest
began actual occupancy of the land subject of this case. While Jose testified that the subject land was previously owned by their parents
Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to show Alejandro's
mode of acquisition of ownership and that he had been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession
required by law. It is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and
[25]
cannot suffice. An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but
[26]
must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land.

Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year
1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
[27]
possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in the
concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for
purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes
in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely
[28]
indicia of a claim of ownership.

The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the
public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of
the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The application for registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz,
and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred
twenty-five (25,825) square meters situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per raffle dated May 13, 2009.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring; rollo, pp. 53-60.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 61-64.
[3]
Records, pp. 1-6.
[4]
Id. at 11-12.
[5]
Id. at 13-14.
[6]
Id. at 55
[7]
Rollo, pp. 63-64.
[8]
Records, pp. 100-101.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[10]
Raquel-Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 174986, 175071, 181415, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 169, 195, 196; Fangonil-Herrera v. Fangonil, G.R. No. 169356, August 28, 2007, 531
SCRA 486, 505.
[11]
FGU Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 494 Phil. 342, 356 (2005).
[12]
Mistica v. Republic, G.R. No. 165141, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 401, 408, citing In Re: Application for Land Registration of Title, Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corporation v.
Republic, 550 SCRA 92, 103 (2008).
[13]
Mistica v. Republic, supra, at 408-409.
[14]
Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91,101-102.
[15]
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.Yap, G.R. Nos. 167707 and 173775, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164, 192.
[16]
Exhibit N-3, records, p. 7.
[17]
G.R. No. 169397, March 13, 2007, 518 SCRA 250, 259, citing Menguito v. Republic, 401 Phil. 274 (2000).
[18]
Supra note 14, at 102.
[19]
G.R. No. 175846, July 6, 2010, citing Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 555 SCRA 477, 488-489 (2008).
[20]
Arbias v. Republic, G.R. No. 173808, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 582, 596.
[21]
Id. at 39.
[22]
Id. at 8.
[23]
Id. at 10.
[24]
Id. at 16.
[25]
Mistica v. Republic, supra note 12, at 410-411.
[26]
Lim v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 158630 and 162047, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 247, 262.
[27]
Republic v. Bibonia, G.R. No. 157466, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 268, 276-277.
[28]
Arbias v. Republic, supra note 20, at 593-594.