1st case

First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s client remains unsubstantiated,

considering its detailed refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty.
Francisco was Clarion’s legal counsel and that complainant sought advice and requested
documentation of several transfers of shares and the sale of the Forbes property. This
was only successful in showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed, drafted the documents
pertaining to the transaction and that he was retained as legal counsel of Clarion. There
was no detailed explanation as to how she supposedly engaged the services of Atty.
Francisco as her personal counsel and as to what and how she communicated with the
latter anent the dealings she had entered into. With the complaint lacking in this
regard, the unrebutted answer made by Atty. Francisco, accompanied with a detailed
narrative of his engagement as counsel of Jimenez and Clarion, would have to prevail.

Second, there is a stark disparity in the amount of narrative details presented by the

parties. Atty. Francisco’s claim that he was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not
of the complainant, was clearly established in a sworn statement executed by Jimenez
himself. Complainant’s evidence pales in comparison with her claims of being the client
of Atty. Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity of circumstances.

Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty.
Francisco’s answer. This could have given her opportunity to present evidence showing
their professional relationship. She also failed to appear during the mandatory
conference with the IBP-CBD without even updating her residential address on record.
Her participation in the investigation of the case apparently ended at its filing.

In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence,

and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in
the complaint by preponderant evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than
that of the other. 

aca v. atty. Salvado

https://pdfcoffee.com/3-aca-v-atty-salvado-pdf-free.html
forster v. agtang ust check
Navarro v. solidum ust
manalang v. atty. buendia
f:
-m sought the services of atty. buendia for the declaration of nullity of his marriage.
-various fees were collected from m
-m was assured that everything was going smoothly despite months having passed with no
results being shown to him
-m then visited atty. and he was given a copy of the decision
-m checked such and found out that the facts were entirely different from what he narrated to
att. buendia
-m then found out that the case was never even filed.
-m filed a disbarment case against the atty.
-The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner25 found that Atty. Buendia
violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended the penalty of disbarment for gross misconduct.

i:
won atty. b should be disbarred

h:
-Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of lawyers:

SECTION 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A

member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.34

In dealing with clients, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer
shall uphold the law and promote respect for law and the legal processes. This Canon is
comprised of four (4) rules:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.

Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.35

The duty of a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for law and legal processes36 demands that he or she shall "not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element.

To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be

untrustworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and
straightforwardness. On the other hand, conduct that is "deceitful" means as follows:

Having the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is
used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party
imposed upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of the falsity or
acted in reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal
terms, and was done with the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed
acted in reliance of the false statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury
Heinz R. Heck vs. Judge Anthony E. Santos,
https://vdocuments.site/pale-case-digests-2.html
Lilia Tabang vs. Atty. Glenn C. Gacott
TABANG vs. GACOTTA.C. No. 6490 July 9, 2013By: Karen P. Lustica

FACTS:

Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of thirty (30) hectares ofagricultural land. Judge Gacott noted that under
the government’sagrarian reform program, Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vasttracts of agricultural land as
she already owned other parcels. Thus,Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under thenames of
fictitious persons.Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and obtained thecorresponding Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious persons.Complainants decided to sell the seven parcels as they
were in need of funds for their medication and other expenses. Claiming that he would help complainants by offering
the parcels to prospective buyers, respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the
parcels.Respondent then told the complainants that he had lost all seven titles.Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had
filed a new set of petitions,respondent executed several documents that included revocations ofSPAs and various
affidavits of recovery purportedly signed by theparcels’ (fictitious) owners. Respondent then caused the annotation of
these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels.Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he
represented himself as the owner of the parcels and announced thatthese were for sale. Later, respondent succeeded
in selling the sevenparcels.Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit,
complainants filed their complaint directly with theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines.

ISSUE: WON Gacott should be disbarred.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:

After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation of
Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that respondent committed gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he executed the revocations of SPAs and affidavits of
recovery and in arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven (7) subject parcels.

While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the complainant’s own
complicity does not negate,or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite thecontrary, his offense is
made even graver. He is a lawyer who is heldto the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately andcunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law
toprejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenanceillicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he
acquiesce toinjustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment.

Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred for any of the following grounds:
deceit;malpractice;gross misconduct in office;grossly immoral conduct;conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude;violation of the lawyer’s oath;willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; andwillfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is
proper whenlawyers commit gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in usurping the property rights of other
persons.

In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that respondent committed gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.DISPOSITION: Respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT,
having clearly violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
DE JESUS vs. SANCHEZ-MALIT ust
 she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her
notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is
hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.
Romeo A. Almario vs. Atty. Dominica Llera-Agn0,
A.C. No. 10689, January 18, 2018
https://legallymanila.blogspot.com/2018/12/ac-no-10689-romeo-almario-vs-atty.html

Immorality and Disbarment

Dr. Elmar O. Perez vs. Atty. Tristan Catindig,
March 10, 2015, A.C. No. 5816

PEREZ VS. CATINDIG

A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
By: Karen P. Lustica
 
FACTS:
 
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig admitted to Dr. Elmar Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez. Atty. Catindig
told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez,
and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty.
Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic.
 
On July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America (USA).Years
later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was
obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. Sometime in
1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify his
marriage to Gomez.Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the mail informing
her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter written
and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love
to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.”On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig
abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty.
Baydo was frequently seen.

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital
obligations. Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984.Atty. Catindig claimed
that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court
does not have any effect in the Philippines.Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour.
Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.anroblesvirtuallawlibrary

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez.For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an
affair with Atty. Catindig.

IBP – recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complaint against Atty. Baydo – dismissed for dearth of evidence.
 
ISSUE:WON the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.
 
HELD: YES.
 
RATIO:
 
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
 
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities
of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from
the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
 
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.” Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct
is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree,
or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.
The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly
immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission,
indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but
reprehensible to a high degree.Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr.
Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to
render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled
that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order to
give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally
decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with
the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be
considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral
conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s
desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous
marriage to Gomez.Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely
manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking
advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as
a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter
informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.

DISPOSITION: Catindig – disbarred. Baydo – dismissed.

ECRAELA V. PANGALANGAN (A.C. NO.

10676; SEPTEMBER 8, 2015)
CASE DIGEST: ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A.
PANGALANGAN. (A.C. No. 10676; September 8, 2015).
FACTS: This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan for his illicit relations,
chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous
activities" which cause "undue embarrassment to the legal profession."

Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the
University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part
of a peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar
examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both
registered with the IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom

he has three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin,
respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and
unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations
involved:

1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to
1992, which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;
2. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996,
despite being already married to Jardiolin;
3, CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically
involved with DDD;
4. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being
married to Jardiolin and while still being romantically involved with CCC;
5. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May
2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with
CCC.

ISSUE: Should Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred?

HELD: Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for grossly immoral conduct.

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY

THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral

or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely

reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for the profession. Good moral character is not
only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to
maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.

In the case at bar, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several

adulterous and illicit relations with both married and unmarried women between
the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies
of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit
relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant evidence.

In sum, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery

out of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by
attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the
proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of
him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment. 
GARCIA vs. SESBREÑO

A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 | February 3, 2015

By: Karen P. Lustica

FACTS:

Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an
action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria
Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia
returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned about his return, Sesbreño filed a Second
Amended Complaint against him.
 Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for
Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that
homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of
law.

In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase “with the inherent
accessory penalties provided by law” was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was not
deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide
does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad
faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.

ISSUES:

1. WON conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.

2. WON Sesbreño should be disbarred
HELD:

1. YES.
2. YES.
 

RATIO:

 1. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or
may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a
crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve
moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore,
that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of
judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.

The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not
do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado.

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights.
Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster his argument. In that case, Atty. Parcasio was granted “an absolute and
unconditional pardon” which restored his “full civil and political rights,” a circumstance not present in these cases.
Here, the Order of Commutation did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves,
commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In this case, the
executive clemency merely “commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years
imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only
partially extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbrefio’ s crime was never wiped out. He served the
commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison.

2. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney
by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is
the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.  Moral turpitude is an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general,
contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
DISPOSITION: Respondent Raul H. Sesbreno is DISBARRED.

EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES

Facts:
·         Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental
during the May 14, 2007 elections.
·         Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section
89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.
·         Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
·         The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of House of
Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.
·         Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the motion saying that since petitioner lost in the last 14 May 2007
congressional elections, it thereby rendered the instant MR moot and academic.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.

Held:
·         Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general.
·         The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he
has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a)
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such
interest by the Constitution or by law.
·         Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest
in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public
officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the
Constitution or by law.
·         In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or financial
interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
o   The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros
Oriental, owned the cockpit in question.
o   Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a
direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other
from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
o   Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of
1991.
·         However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral
turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered.
Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their
being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
·         The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to
what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the
Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibita do not.
·         Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It
must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not
its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.
·         Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that petitioner’s conviction does not involve moral
turpitude.
·         The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered
inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing
gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.

·         In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.
Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such
choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.
Gene M. Domingo vs. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla
https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/7dcde495/files/uploaded/LegalEthics_CaseDigests_2018.pdf
norma Nicolas v. atty. Laki
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/feb2021/pdf/ac_12881_2021.pdf
All told, the Comi finds more reason to disbar respondent here than it did in Mariano. But then
the Court cannot disbar respondent anew. For in this jurisdiction, we do not impose double
disbarment.26
Here, the Court finds justification in the imposition of a P40,000.00 fine on respondent. It is
distinct and separate from the P20,000.00 fine imposed by the IBP for respondent's failure to
comply with its various directives. The former is imposed in lieu of disbarment since respondent
cannot serve two (2) penalties of disbarment simultaneously; the latter, for his discourtesy
toward the IBP and his defiance of its directives to appear during the proceedings and respond
to the complaint filed against him.
Official Duties Not Connected to Duties as Lawyer
Atty. Virginia Rafael vs. Atty. Edna Alibutdan-Diaz,
November 26, 2014A.C. No. 10134

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES v. ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, AC. No.

10134, 2014-11-26

Facts:

The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention was submitted by Atty. Diaz only
on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national convention in Iloilo City[2]; that during the 12th convention, an
election of officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National Treasurer, but she was not elected;
that on the last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007, the outgoing Board of Directors, including Atty. Diaz,...
passed and approved Resolution No. 1-2007 appropriating the amount of P30,000.00 as term-end bonus for each
PACE official qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the 12th convention; that there
was no turn over of monies... belonging to the association as a matter of procedure despite a letter of demand, dated
June 20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz;[3] and that the new set of PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07
directing past president,... Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they failed to liquidate the
finances of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo conventions

In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010, Commissioner Fernandez recommended the dismissal of
the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. Atty. Diaz offered documentary evidence to show that she was able to
submit the liquidation reports for the two... aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also took note that Atty. Rafael
herself acknowledged the liquidation report made by Atty. Diaz with respect to the Davao City convention.

On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a resolution adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, and dismissed the complaint against Atty. Diaz.[
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended Resolution,[16] dated June 21, 2013, granting the
complainant's motion for reconsideration. It reversed and set aside its earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz
from the practice of law for one (1) year.[The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz'
liquidation of PACE funds; (ii) her running for re-election when she was no longer with the Judiciary; and (iii) her
entitlement to the term-end bonus when she was no longer working in the Judiciary, constituted... a "triple -
whammy" of questionable actions[18] committed by Atty. Diaz in contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

Issues: whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR),

Ruling:

This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution.

Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar
maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all
times, whether they are dealing with their... clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards
of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. It
bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession which society entrusts with the
administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For this, he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and
should not engage in unlawful, dishonest,... immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been exacting in
its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. They are always expected to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to refrain from any act or omission... which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of this noble profession

Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election, including her non-admission
that she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate of candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE
officers; and her involvement in the approval... or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers,
including herself even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary, were definitely not the candor the Court
speaks of. There was much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.
Arcatomy S. Guarin vs. Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin,
January 14, 2015, A.C. No. 10576

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.

FACTS:

In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as President of
OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his post and transferred to
St. Luke’s Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance. In, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy
Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for “updating
purposes”. The GIS4identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President. Mired with
allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI applied for voluntary
dissolution with the SEC. On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by
knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had
already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI.
He also never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He
has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI. IBP recommend her temporary suspension.

Issue: WON Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 of the CPR.

Ruling: Yes.

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek
exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law
commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27, 22 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2) any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice. After going through the
submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any
share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the
company.23 It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS.
While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she made
a due verification of the statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of
Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We also note that there was no submission which
would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained
false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR. We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business
practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the
rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed
Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Tan v. atty. Diamante
https://pdfcoffee.com/case-digests-for-ethics-pdf-free.html
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and
violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information

Unfounded Charges Against Members of the Judiciary

AMA Land Inc. against Justices Bueser, et al.,
March 11, 2014, OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J, 2014-03-
11

Facts:

AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium project located along Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue
corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack, Mandaluyong City.[1] Due to the project's location, AMALI would have to use
Fordham Street as an access road... and staging area for the construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed the
consent of the Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI,
which ignored the notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office along Fordham Street that it enclosed with a
temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field office and set up a fence to deny access to AMALI's
construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a petition for the enforcement of an easement of right of way in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City. The petition, which included an application for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI), was docketed as Civil Case No. 65668.[2] On
July 24, 1997, the RTC granted AMALI's prayer... for the WPMI.

In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project into a 34-storey building of mixed use (to be known as
the AMA Residences) after AMALI's petition for corporate rehabilitation was approved.
On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668 an urgent motion to set for hearing its prayer for a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) contained in its answer.
On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a decision granting the petition of
WWRAI.

AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had conspired with the counsels
of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty. Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust
judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of the CA... had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and
deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1,... Rules
10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Issues:
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01;
Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court?

Ruling:

The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the complaint by
substantial evidence. Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint for its lack of merit. This is because an
administrative... charge against any official of the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial evidence

AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment against
respondent Justices.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense. Article 204, Revised Penal Code,
provides that any judge who "knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision" is
punished with prision mayor and... perpetual absolute disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender must be a
judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely committed an error of
judgment or taken the unpopular side of a controversial point of law.[12] The term knowingly means "sure
knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice."[13] Thus, the complainant must not only prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the... evidence but that it
was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives
or improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust
decision.[14] In other words, the judge was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some other similar motive in
issuing the judgment.[15] Bad faith is, therefore, the ground for liability.[16] The failure of the judge to correctly...
interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him administratively
liable.

Moreover, AMALI's allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the CA through an administrative
complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious practice by disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of
resorting to administrative charges against... sitting judges instead of exhausting all their available remedies. We do
not tolerate the practice. In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-
GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.,... Hon. Ramon M.
Bato, Jr. and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,[18] we emphatically held that the filing
of administrative complaints or even threats of the filing subverted and undermined the independence of the
Judiciary

It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial officers who rule against it in its cases. That
impression is not at all devoid of basis. The complaint herein is actually the second one that AMALI has brought
against respondent Justices in relation to the... performance of their judicial duty in the same case. In its first
complaint entitled Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E.
Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,[19] AMALI accused respondent
Justices of: (a) dishonesty and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross misconduct, and knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment or order, in violation of Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; and (b) violating provisions of...
the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court dismissed the first complaint upon finding that it centered on the
propriety of the interlocutory orders issued by respondent Justices

The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an outright disrespect
of the authority of the CA and of this Court. Unfounded administrative charges against judges truly degrade the
judicial office, and interfere with the due... performance of their work for the Judiciary. Although the Court did not
then deem fit to hold in the first administrative case AMALI or its representative personally responsible for the
unfounded charges brought against respondent Justices, it is now time, proper and imperative... to do so in order to
uphold the dignity and reputation of respondent Justices, of the CA itself, and of the rest of the Judiciary. AMALI and
its representatives have thereby demonstrated their penchant for harassment of the judges who did not do its bidding,
and they have not... stopped doing so even if the latter were sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations of AMALI and its
representatives would be to reward them with undeserved impunity for an obviously wrong attitude towards the
Court and its judicial officers.
Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI's authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita, its Senior Assistant Vice
President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of AMALI who had authorized Usita to file the present
complaint, to show cause in writing why they should not be... held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the
unfounded and baseless charges against respondent Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the filing of
unfounded and baseless administrative charges against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt...
under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court

ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser,
Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for its utter lack of merit; and (b)
ORDERS Joseph B. Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice President of AMA Land, Inc., and all the members of the Board of
Directors of AMA Land, Inc. who had authorized Usita to bring the administrative complaint against respondent
Associate Justices to show cause in writing within 10 days from notice... why they should not be punished for indirect
contempt of court for degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate Justices, and for interfering with the due
performance of their work for the Judiciary.