08 Navarro v. Ermita

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011.]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA ,

petitioners, vs . EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the
Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of
Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR
ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of
Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN,
representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands , respondents,
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS,

HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G.
CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M.
LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL , intervenors.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA , J : p
For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment
dated October 20, 2010 led by Movant-Intervenors 1 dated and led on October 29,
2010, praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of judgment, and (b) resolve their
motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution. CSHDTE
To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a

brief background of the relevant antecedents —
On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). 2 On December 3,
2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite
for the rati cation of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code
(LGC). 3 The plebiscite yielded 69,943 af rmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. 4
With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and
the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of
provincial of cials who took their oath of of ce on January 26, 2007. Later, during the
May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of
provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007. 5
On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene
O. Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, led before this Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 9355. 6 The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion
for reconsideration was also denied. 7
Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del
Norte, led another petition for certiorari 8 seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
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uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive
the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when
the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a
population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts, viz. —
Constitution, Article X — Local Government
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
LGC, Title IV, Chapter I
Section 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it

has an average annual income, as certi ed by the Department of Finance, of not
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices
and either of the following requisites:
(i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square

kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau ; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province .
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income. (Emphasis supplied.)
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision 9 granting the petition. 1 0
The Decision declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the
requirements on population and land area in the creation of a province under the LGC.
Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its of cials as
null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article 9
(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, "[t]he
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands" for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as
such exemption is not expressly provided in the law. 1 1
The Republic, represented by the Of ce of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat led
their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution 1 2 dated
May 12, 2010, 1 3 the Court denied the said motions. 1 4 DCSTAH
Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both led their respective motions for
leave of court to admit their second motions for reconsideration, accompanied by their
second motions for reconsideration. These motions were eventually "noted without
action" by this Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution. 1 5
Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors led on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8790, relevant to this case, which provides —
RESOLUTION NO. 8790
WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven (7) municipalities, were

previously components of the First Legislative District of the Province of Surigao
del Norte. In December 2006 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9355, the Province of
Dinagat Island[s] was created and its creation was rati ed on 02 December 2006
in the Plebiscite for this purpose;
WHEREAS, as a province, Dinagat Islands was, for purposes of the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections, allocated one (1) seat for Governor, one (1) seat for
Vice Governor, one (1) for congressional seat, and ten (10) Sangguniang
Panlalawigan seats pursuant to Resolution No. 8670 dated 16 September 2009;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180050 entitled "Rodolfo Navarro, et al.
vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, as representative of the President of the
Philippines, et al." rendered a Decision, dated 10 February 2010, declaring
Republic Act No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the criteria for
the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code in
relation to Sec. 10, Art. X, of the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, respondents intend to le Motion[s] for Reconsideration on the above

decision of the Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member, House of
Representatives representing the lone congressional district of Dinagat Islands,
(2) names of the candidates for the aforementioned position, (3) position for
Governor, Dinagat Islands, (4) names of the candidates for the said position, (5)
position of the Vice Governor, (6) the names of the candidates for the said
position, (7) positions for the ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members and,
(8) all the names of the candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members,
have already been con gured into the system and can no longer be revised within
the remaining period before the elections on May 10, 2010.
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system con guration, and depending on
whether the Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered
or not, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare that:
a. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current

system con guration is in line with the reconsidered Decision,
meaning that the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of
Surigao del Norte remain as two (2) separate provinces;
b. If the Decision becomes nal and executory before the election, the
Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part
of the First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte.
But because of the current system con guration, the ballots for the
Province of Dinagat Islands will, for the positions of Member, House
of Representatives, Governor, Vice Governor and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, bear only the names of the candidates
for the said positions.
Conversely, the ballots for the First Legislative District of Surigao del
Norte, will, for the position of Governor, Vice Governor, Member,
House of Representatives, First District of Surigao del Norte and
Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, show only candidates for the
said position. Likewise, the whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will,
for the position of Governor and Vice Governor, bear only the names
of the candidates for the said position[s].
Consequently, the voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands will not
be able to vote for the candidates of Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, and Member, House [of] Representatives, First
Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and candidates for Governor
and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte. Meanwhile, voters of the
First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote
for Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Member, House of
Representatives, Dinagat Islands. Also, the voters of the whole
Province of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for the
Governor and Vice Governor, Dinagat Islands. Given this situation,
the Commission will postpone the elections for Governor, Vice
Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative
District, Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, because
the election will result in [a] failure to elect, since, in actuality, there
are no candidates for Governor, Vice Governor, Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, and Member,
House of Representatives, First Legislative District (with Dinagat
Islands) of Surigao del Norte. ESCTIA
c. If the Decision becomes nal and executory after the election, the
of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the
election will have to be nulli ed for the same reasons given in Item
"b" above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member,
House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del
Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District,
Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected of cials of Surigao
del Norte whose positions will be affected by the nulli cation of the election results in
the event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal interest in
the instant case and would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No.
9355. Simply put, movants-intervenors' election to their respective of ces would
necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of
the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be
conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del
Norte. Moreover, as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing
the interests of their constituents, they have a clear and strong interest in the outcome
of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District
of Surigao del Norte will affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole
administrative set-up of the province will have to be restructured; (2) the services of
many employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts will have to be invalidated;
and (4) projects and other developments will have to be discontinued. In addition, they
claim that their rights cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other
proceeding since their rights would be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would
attain finality.
In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-
intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely:
(1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending
Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the
intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the
application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact
Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010, 1 6 the Court denied the Motion for Leave to
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the
appropriate time to le the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this
case.
On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors led a Motion for Reconsideration
of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing several rulings 1 7 of the Court, allowing
intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be
filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10,
2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case.
Even for the sake of argument that they had notice of the pendency of the case, they
pointed out that prior to the said elections, Sol T. Matugas was a simple resident of
Surigao del Norte, Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Second District of Surigao del Norte, and Mamerto D. Galanida was
the Municipal Mayor of Socorro, Surigao del Norte, and that, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 8790, it was only after they were elected as Governor of Surigao del
Norte, Vice Governor of Surigao del Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of
the First District of Surigao del Norte, respectively, that they became possessed with
legal interest in this controversy.
On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that
the decision in this case had become nal and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the
above motion.
At the outset, it must be clari ed that this Resolution delves solely on the instant
Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second
motions for reconsideration of the original parties, and neither on Dinagat's Urgent
Omnibus Motion, which our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers
as Dinagat's third motion for reconsideration. Inasmuch as the motions for leave to
admit their respective motions for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution and
the aforesaid motions for reconsideration were already noted without action by the
Court, there is no reason to treat Dinagat's Urgent Omnibus Motion differently. In
relation to this, the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors
could not be considered as a second motion for reconsideration to warrant the
application of Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. 1 8 It should
be noted that this motion prays for the recall of the entry of judgment and for the
resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution which
remained unresolved. The denial of their motion for leave to intervene and to admit
motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution did not rule on the merits of
the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, but only on the
timeliness of the intended intervention. Their motion for reconsideration of this denial
elaborated on movants-intervenors' interest in this case which existed only after
judgment had been rendered. As such, their motion for intervention and their motion for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution merely stand as an initial
reconsideration of the said resolution. jurcda
With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the records to
support the claim that this was a ploy of respondents' legal tactician to reopen the case
despite an entry of judgment. To be sure, it is actually COMELEC Resolution No. 8790
that set this controversy into motion anew. To reiterate, the pertinent portion of the
Resolution reads:
c. If the Decision becomes nal and executory after the election , the
Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the
First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will
have to be nulli ed for the same reasons given in Item "b" above. A special
election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives,
First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will
have to be conducted. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar circumstance of

proper party interest for movants-intervenors only with the specter of the decision in
the main case becoming final and executory. More importantly, if the intervention be not
entertained, the movants-intervenors would be left with no other remedy as regards to
the impending nulli cation of their election to their respective positions. Thus, to the
Court's mind, there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment by movants-intervenors.
It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the ling of the
petition for certiorari way back on October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors
had nothing at stake in the outcome of this case. While it may be argued that their
interest in this case should have commenced upon the issuance of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8790, it is obvious that their interest in this case then was more
imaginary than real. This is because COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 provides that
should the decision in this case attain nality prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the
election of the local government of cials stated therein would only have to be
postponed. Given such a scenario, movants-intervenors would not have suffered any
injury or adverse effect with respect to the reversion of Dinagat as part of Surigao del
Norte since they would simply have remained candidates for the respective positions
they have vied for and to which they have been elected.
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
dif cult constitutional questions." Because constitutional cases are often public
actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question
frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. 1 9
It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event
their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and
their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with nality. Indeed,
they have suf ciently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to
their respective positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects
would all be nulli ed and be put to naught. Given their unique circumstances, movants-
intervenors should not be left without any remedy before this Court simply because
their interest in this case became manifest only after the case had already been
decided. The consequences of such a decision would de nitely work to their
disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the
dispute. Such decision would also violate their right to due process, a right that cries
out for protection. Thus, it is imperative that the movants-intervenors be heard on the
merits of their cause. We are not only a court of law, but also of justice and equity, such
that our position and the dire repercussions of this controversy should be weighed on
the scales of justice, rather than dismissed on account of mootness.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2)
there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. 2 0 The second exception attends this case. ASHEca
This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo ,
21 where technicalities of procedure on locus standi were brushed aside, because the
constitutional issues raised were of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance deserving the attention of the Court. Along parallel lines, the motion for
intervention should be given due course since movants-intervenors have shown their
substantial legal interest in the outcome of this case, even much more than petitioners
themselves, and because of the novelty, gravity, and weight of the issues involved.
Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the
May 12, 2010 Resolution of movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the
judgment of a case, which, though merely a statutory right that must comply with the
requirements of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial system, such that courts
should proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the judgment
and its effects, and ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be
directly affected, would have the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of their cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. 2 2
Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of
judgment in light of attendant extraordinary circumstances. 2 3 The power to suspend or
even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even
that which this Court itself had already declared nal. 2 4 In this case, the compelling
concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they
would be adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original
parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the
LGC with respect to the creation of local government units. In this manner, the thrust of
the Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to
decentralization and the attainment of national goals, as hereafter elucidated, will
effectively be realized.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look,
the Court nds that the rst and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors
deserve affirmative consideration.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of
local government units are economic viability, ef cient administration, and capability to
deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e.,
income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this
light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of
these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential
consideration.
Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units,
particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of
the LGC. In this connection, the following excerpts from congressional debates are
quoted hereunder —
HON. ALFELOR.
Income is mandatory. We can even have this doubled because we thought . . .
CHAIRMAN CUENCO.
In other words, the primordial consideration here is the economic viability of the
new local government unit, the new province?
xxx xxx xxx

HON. LAGUDA.
The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than the
House version, because we also believe that economic viability is really a
minimum. Land area and population are functions really of the viability of
the area, because you have an income level which would be the trigger
point for economic development, population will naturally increase
because there will be an immigration. However, if you disallow the
particular area from being converted into a province because of the
population problems in the beginning, it will never be able to reach the
point where it could become a province simply because it will never have
the economic take off for it to trigger off that economic development.
ADSTCI
Now, we're saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a oor area where
it could pay for overhead and provide a minimum of basic services to the
population. Over and above that, the provincial of cials should be able to
trigger off economic development which will attract immigration, which
will attract new investments from the private sector. This is now the
concern of the local of cials. But if we are going to tie the hands of the
proponents, simply by telling them, "Sorry, you are now at 150 thousand or
200 thousand," you will never be able to become a province because
nobody wants to go to your place. Why? Because you never have any
reason for economic viability.
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL.
Okay, what about land area?
HON. LUMAUIG.
1,500 square kilometers
HON. ANGARA.
Walang problema 'yon, in fact that's not very critical, 'yong land area because . . .
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL.
Okay, ya, our, the Senate version is 3.5, 3,500 square meters, ah, square
kilometers.
HON. LAGUDA.
Ne, Ne. A province is constituted for the purpose of administrative ef ciency and
delivery of basic services.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL.
Right.
HON. LAGUDA.
Actually, when you come down to it, when government was instituted, there is
only one central government and then everybody falls under that. But it
was later on subdivided into provinces for purposes of administrative
efficiency.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL.
Okay.
HON. LAGUDA.
Now, what we're seeing now is that the administrative ef ciency is no longer there
precisely because the land areas that we are giving to our governors is so
wide that no one man can possibly administer all of the complex
machineries that are needed.
Secondly, when you say "delivery of basic services," as pointed out by Cong.
Alfelor, there are sections of the province which have never been visited by
public of cials, precisely because they don't have the time nor the energy
anymore to do that because it's so wide. Now, by compressing the land
area and by reducing the population requirement, we are, in effect, trying to
follow the basic policy of why we are creating provinces, which is to deliver
basic services and to make it more efficient in administration.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, that's correct, but on the assumption that the
province is able to do it without being a burden to the national government.
That's the assumption.
HON. LAGUDA.
That's why we're going into the minimum income level. As we said, if we go on a
minimum income level, then we say, "this is the trigger point at which this
administration can take place." 2 5 aDHCEA

Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a
municipality, a city, and a province as provided both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR, viz. —
For a Barangay:
LGC : SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A barangay may be created out of a
contiguous territory which has a population of at least two thousand (2,000)
inhabitants as certi ed by the National Statistics Of ce except in cities and
municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions
or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a certi ed population
of at least ve thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation thereof
shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than
the minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities,
barangays may be created in such communities by an Act of Congress,
notwithstanding the above requirement.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identi ed
by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for
barangays, based on the criteria prescribed in this Section, within his territorial
jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or
sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate action. In the case of
municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan
political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan can be prepared and
approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.
LGC-IRR : ARTICLE 14. Barangays. — (a) Creation of barangays by the
sangguniang panlalawigan shall require prior recommendation of the
sangguniang bayan.
(b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by
Act of Congress, subject to the limitations and requirements prescribed in this
Article.
(c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created
in the indigenous cultural communities by Act of Congress upon recommendation
of the LGU or LGUs where the cultural community is located.
(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are
present:
(1) Population — which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000)
inhabitants, except in municipalities and cities within MMA and other
metropolitan political subdivisions as may be created by law, or in highly-
urbanized cities where such territory shall have a population of at least ve
thousand (5,000) inhabitants, as certi ed by the NSO. The creation of a
barangay shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or
barangays to less than the prescribed minimum/
(2) Land Area — which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or
more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a barangay sought to be created
shall be properly identi ed by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries.
Municipality:
LGC : SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A municipality may be created if it
has an average annual income, as certi ed by the provincial treasurer, or at least
Two million ve hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least
twenty- ve thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certi ed by the National Statistics
Of ce; and a contiguous territory of at least fty (50) square kilometers as
certi ed by the Lands Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof
shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the original municipality or
municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly
identi ed by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of
one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands.
general fund of the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers
and non-recurring income.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal of cials holding of ce at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered regular municipalities. caSEAH
LGC-IRR : ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. — (a) Requisites for Creation — A

municipality shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:
(i) Income — An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for the immediately preceding
two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certi ed by
the provincial treasurer. The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special
accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income;
(ii) Population — which shall not be less than twenty ve thousand (25,000)
inhabitants, as certified by NSO; and
(iii) Land area — which must be contiguous with an area of at least fty (50)
square kilometers, as certi ed by LMB. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. The requirement on
land area shall not apply where the proposed municipality is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
municipality sought to be created shall be properly identi ed by metes and
bounds.
The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the
prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be
borne by the petitioners.
City:
LGC : SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual
income, as certi ed by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certi ed by the National Statistics Of ce: Provided, That,
the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income
of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly

identi ed by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands . The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands.
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
LGC-IRR : ARTICLE 11. Cities. — (a) Requisites for creation — A city shall not be
created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land
area are present:
(1) Income — An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million
Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices, as certi ed by DOF. The average
annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring
income; and
(2) Population or land area — Population which shall not be less than one
hundred fty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certi ed by the NSO; or
land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one hundred
(100) square kilometers, as certi ed by LMB. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed city is composed of one (1) or more islands . The
territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income
of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed
minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by
the petitioners.
Provinces:
LGC : SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it has
an average annual income, as certi ed by the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either of
the following requisites: SHDAEC
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,

as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province.
income.
LGC-IRR : ARTICLE 9. Provinces. — (a) Requisites for creation — A province shall
not be created unless the following requisites on income and either population or
land area are present:
(1) Income — An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices, as certi ed by DOF. The average
annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring
income; and
(2) Population or land area — Population which shall not be less than two
hundred fty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certi ed by NSO; or land
area which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certi ed by LMB. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands . The
territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the
prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be
borne by the petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to
the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However,
with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the
three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income,
population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created
consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as
expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government
unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is
absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section
461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to
cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical
con guration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or
group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in
most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative
policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for
component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for
provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9 (2) of the
LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section
461 of the LGC — and to re ect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for
the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
This interpretation nds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations
underpinning the principle of local autonomy.
Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides —
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment
of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the national government to the local government units. SETAcC
This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3 (a) of the LGC-IRR 2 6 and in the Whereas
clauses of Administrative Order No. 270, 2 7 which read —
WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the State shall
ensure the autonomy of local governments;
WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, af rms, among others, that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
of national goals;
WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the
President to convene an Oversight Committee for the purpose of formulating and
issuing the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the ef cient and
effective implementation of all the provisions of the said Code; and
WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations

with all the concerned sectors of society and consideration of the operative
principles of local autonomy as provided in the Local Government Code of 1991,
has completed the formulation of the implementing rules and regulations; . . .
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine
and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for
prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the
desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision
could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical.
Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component
cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and
municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area
requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the
province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000
square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress
has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land
area over one composed of islands — and negate the greater imperative of
development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic
services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more dif cult and
burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because
the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous
land mass.
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal
protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and
decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement
should be read together with territorial contiguity.
Another look at the transcript of the deliberations of Congress should prove
enlightening:
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian, 2 8 with respect to his . . .
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Okay.
HON. CHIONGBIAN.
At the outset, Chairman Lina, we would like to apprise the distinguished Senator
about the action taken by the House, on House Bill No. 7166. This was
passed about two years ago and has been pending in the Senate for
consideration. This is a bill that I am not the only one involved, including
our distinguished Chairman here. But then we did want to sponsor the bill,
being the Chairman then of the Local Government.
So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the Congressmen, who were more or less
interested in the creation of the new provinces, because of the vastness of
the areas that were involved.
At any rate, this bill was passed by the House unanimously without any objection.
And as I have said a while ago, that this has been pending in the Senate for
the last two years. And Sen. Pimentel himself was just in South Cotabato
and he delivered a speech that he will support this bill, and he says, that he
will incorporate this in the Local Government Code, which I have in writing
from him. I showed you the letter that he wrote, and naturally, we in the
House got hold of the Senate version. It becomes an impossibility for the
whole Philippines to create a new province, and that is quite the concern of
the respective Congressmen. IaECcH
Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is concerned, there is nothing to stop

the mother province from voting against the bill, if a province is going to be
created.
So, we are talking about devolution of powers here. Why is the province not
willing to create another province, when it can be justi ed. Even Speaker
Mitra says, what will happen to Palawan? We won't have one million
people there, and if you look at Palawan, there will be about three or four
provinces that will comprise that island. So, the development will be
hampered.
Now, I would like to read into the record the letter of Sen. Pimentel, dated
November 2, 1989. This was practically about a year after 7166 was
approved by the House, House Bill 7166.
On November 2, 1989, the Senator wrote me:
"Dear Congressman Chiongbian:
We are in receipt of your letter of 17 October. Please be informed that your

House No. 7166 was incorporated in the proposed Local Government Code,
Senate Bill No. 155, which is pending for second reading.
Thank you and warm regards.
Very truly yours,"

That is the very context of the letter of the Senator, and we are quite surprised that
the Senate has adopted another position.
So, we would like — because this is a unanimously approved bill in the House,
that's the only bill that is involving the present Local Government Code that
we are practically considering; and this will be a slap on the House, if we
do not approve it, as approved by the lower House. This can be [an] irritant
in the approval of the Conference Committee Report. And I just want to
manifest that insofar as the creation of the province, not only in my
province, but the other provinces. That the mother province will participate
in the plebiscite, they can defeat the province, let's say, on the basis of the
result, the province cannot be created if they lose in the plebiscite, and I
don't see why, we should put this stringent conditions to the private people
of the devolution that they are seeking.
So, Mr. Senator, I think we should consider the situation seriously, because, this is
an approved version of the House, and I will not be the one to raise up and
question the Conference Committee Report, but the rest of the House that
are interested in this bill. And they have been approaching the Speaker
about this. So, the Speaker reminded me to make sure that it takes the
cudgel of the House approved version.
So, that's all what I can say, Mr. Senator, and I don't believe that it is not, because
it's the wish of the House, but because the mother province will participate
anyhow, you vote them down; and that is provided for in the Constitution.
As a matter of fact, I have seen the amendment with regards to the
creation of the city to be urbanized, subject to the plebiscite. And why
should we not allow that to happen in the provinces! In other words, we
don't want the people who wants to create a new province, as if they are
left in the devolution of powers, when they feel that they are far away from
civilization.
Now, I am not talking about other provinces, because I am unaware, not aware of
their situation. But the province of South Cotabato has a very unique
geographical territorial conglomerations. One side is in the other side of the
Bay, of Sarangani Bay. The capital town is in the North; while these other
municipalities are in the East and in the West. And if they have to travel
from the last town in the eastern part of the province, it is about one
hundred forty kilometers to the capital town. And from the West side, it is
the same distance. And from the North side, it is about one hundred
kilometers. So that is the problem there. And besides, they have enough
resources and I feel that, not because I am interested in the province, I am
after their welfare in the future. Who am I to dictate on those people? I have
no interest but then I am looking at the future development of these areas.
As a matter of fact, if I am in politics, it's incidental; I do not need to be there, but I
can foresee what the creation of a new province will bring to these people.
It will bring them prosperity; it will bring them more income, and it will
encourage even foreign investors. Like the PAP now, they are concentrating
in South Cotabato, especially in the City of General Santos and the
neighboring municipalities, and they are quite interested and even the AID
people are asking me, "What is holding the creation of a new province
when practically you need it?" It's not 20 or 30 kilometers from the capital
town; it's about 140 kilometers. And imagine those people have to travel
that far and our road is not like Metropolitan Manila. That is as far as from
here to Tarlac. And there are municipalities there that are just one
municipality is bigger than the province of La Union. They have the
income. Of course, they don't have the population because that's a part of
the land of promise and people from Luzon are migrating everyday
because they feel that there are more opportunities here.
So, by creating the new provinces, not only in my case, in the other cases, it will
enhance the development of the Philippines, not because I am interested in
my province. Well, as far as I am concerned, you know, I am in the twilight
years of my life to serve and I would like to serve my people well. No
personal or political interest here. I hope the distinguished Chairman of the
Committee will appreciate the House Bill 7166, which the House has
already approved because we don't want them to throw the Conference
Committee Report after we have worked that the house Bill has been, you
know, drawn over board and not even considered by the Senate. And on
top of that, we are considering a bill that has not yet been passed. So I
hope the Senator will take that into account.
Thank you for giving me this time to explain.
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Thank you very much, Congressman James. We will look into the legislative
history of the Senate version on this matter of creation of provinces. I am
sure there was an amendment. As I said, I'll look into it. Maybe the House
version was incorporated in toto, but maybe during the discussion, their
amendments were introduced and, therefore, Senator Pimentel could not
hold on to the original version and as a result new criteria were introduced.
cCTAIE
But because of the manifestation that you just made, we will de nitely, when we
reach a book, Title IV, on the matter of provinces, we will look at it
sympathetically from your end so that the objective that you want [to]
achieve can be realized. So we will look at it with sympathy. We will review
our position on the matter, how we arrived at the Senate version and we
will adopt an open mind definitely when we come into it.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
Kanino 'yan?
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Book III.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
Title?
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Title IV.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
I have been pondering on the case of James, especially on economic stimulation
of a certain area. Like our case, because I put myself on our province, our
province is quite very big. It's composed of four (4) congressional districts
and I feel it should be ve now. But during the Batasan time, four of us
talked and conversed proposing to divide the province into two.
There are areas then, when since time immemorial, very few governors ever tread
on those areas. That is, maybe you're acquainted with the Bondoc
Peninsula of Quezon, fronting that is Ragay Gulf. From Ragay there is a
long stretch of coastal area. From Albay going to Ragay, very few
governors ever tread [there] before, even today. That area now is infested
with NPA. That is the area of Congressman Andaya.
Now, we thought that in order to stimulate growth, maybe provincial aid can be
extended to these areas. With a big or a large area of a province, a certain
administrator or provincial governor de nitely will have no suf cient time.
For me, if we really would like to stimulate growth, I believe that an area
where there is physical or geographical impossibilities, where
administrators can penetrate, I think we have to create certain provisions in
the law where maybe we can treat it with special considerations.
Now, we went over the graduate scale of the Philippine Local Government Data as
far as provinces are concerned. It is very surprising that there are provinces
here which only composed of six municipalities, eight municipalities, seven
municipalities. Like in Cagayan, Tuguegarao, there are six municipalities.
Ah, excuse me, Batanes.
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Will you look at the case of — how many municipalities are there in Batanes
province?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
Batanes is only six.

CHAIRMAN LINA.
Six town. Siquijor?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
Siquijor. It is region?
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Seven.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
Seven. Anim.
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Six also.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
Six also.
CHAIRMAN LINA.
It seems with a minimum number of towns? EHaCID
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, not even one congressional
district. But tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is Region 9. Wala dito.
Nagtataka nga ako ngayon.
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Camiguin, Camiguin.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
That is region? Camiguin has ve municipalities, with a population of 63

thousand. But we do not hold it against the province because maybe that's
one stimulant where growth can grow, can start. The land area for
Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers. So if we hard fast on
requirements of, we set a minimum for every province, palagay ko we just
leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that in case
we would like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang
tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo,
eh. Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government Code?
Growth. To devolve powers in order for the community to have its own idea
how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas.
So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we

cannot make a generalization.
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Will the creation of a province, carved out of the existing province because of
some geographical id[i]osyncracies, as you called it, stimulate the
economic growth in the area or will substantial aid coming from the
national government to a particular area, say, to a municipality, achieve the
same purpose?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
Ano tayo dito sa budget. All right, here is a province. Usually, tinitingnan lang yun,
provision eh, hindi na yung composition eh. You are entitled to, say, 20% of
the area.
There's a province of Camarines Sur which have the same share with that of
Camiguin and Siquijor, but Camiguin is composed only of ve
municipalities; in Siquijor, it's composed of six, but the share of Siquijor is
the same share with that of the province of Camarines Sur, having a bigger
area, very much bigger.
That is the budget in process.
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very seriously and even with
sympathy because of the explanation given and we will study this very
carefully. 2 9
The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting
clearly show the manifest intention of Congress to promote development in the
previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing them to directly
share in the allocation of funds under the national budget. It should be remembered
that, under Sections 284 and 285 of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local
governments, and the sharing is based on land area, population, and local revenue. 3 0
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in
absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of
statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law, 3 1 or may consider the
implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of
executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9 (2) of the
LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.
It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight
Committee consisting of members of both the Executive and Legislative departments,
pursuant to Section 533 3 2 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight
Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations
necessary for the ef cient and effective implementation of any and all
provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of
local autonomy as de ned under the Constitution . It was also mandated by the
Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit —
Section 3.The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide
f o r a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources , and
provide for the quali cations, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local of cials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units . (Emphasis
supplied.) DEAaIS
These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the
view to attain decentralization and countryside development. Congress saw that the old
LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of
1991, which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an
archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement
of local government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under
Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and
cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of
provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was lled in by the Oversight Committee in
the LGC-IRR.
With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of
Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local
Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the
exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces
consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not
expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an
express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just
arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR. The
Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all
the concerned sectors of society and considered the operative principles of local
autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated. 3 3 Undoubtedly, this
amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect
from this Court, 3 4 but to legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of
representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of the
Oversight Committee.
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and
legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already
been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to
immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing
the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full- edged province, enacted R.A. No.
9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to
the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In
effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed esh and blood
into that exemption in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it
enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was led and favorably
voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress
de nitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption
from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it
consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby,
and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local
government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province,
taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its
creation, as certi ed by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times
more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province.
The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and
sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010
elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of
Dinagat's existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat
is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in
stunting such capacity. As we have held in League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections 3 5 —
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be
read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the
statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within
the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and
that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within
the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not
accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of
Congress, a co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once
one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of statutes. This
presumption nds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the
corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the
government to accord a becoming courtesy for each other's acts, and not to
interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its of cial functions. Towards
this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of
course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context
being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no
constitutional prescription or concept is infringed. Consequently, before a law
duly challenged is nulli ed, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear con ict with, the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated
in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. STIcEA
WHEREFORE , the Court resolved to:

1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-
intervenors, dated and filed on October 29, 2010;
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT
the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
3. GRANT the Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE . The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared
VALID . Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL , and the proclamation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the of cials thereof are declared
VALID ; and
4. The petition is DISMISSED .
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED .
Corona, C.J., Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Carpio, Brion and Peralta, JJ., with dissenting opinion.
Del Castillo and Abad, JJ., with concurring opinion.

Separate Opinions
CARPIO , J., dissenting :
I join Justice Diosdado M. Peralta and Justice Arturo D. Brion in their dissents. I
le this separate dissenting opinion because the majority's ruling today, legitimizing the
creation of a province in blatant violation of the Constitution and the Local Government
Code, opens the oodgates to the proliferation of pygmy provinces and legislative
districts, mangling sacred and fundamental principles governing our democratic way of
life and exacerbating the scourge of local dynastic politics.
First. The Dinagat Islands province simply does not meet the criteria for
the creation of a province . To implement the Constitution and for reasons of
political practicality and economic viability, Section 461 of the Local Government Code
bars the creation of provinces unless two of three minimum requirements are met.
Section 461 of the Code provides:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income , as certi ed by the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either
of the following requisites :
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square

kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, that the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
contribute to the income of the province.
income. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 461 requires a province to meet the minimum income requirement and
either the minimum land area or minimum population requirement. In short, two of
the three minimum requirements must be satis ed, with the minimum income
requirement one of the two . The Dinagat Islands province, whose income at the time
of its creation in 2006 was P82,696,433.22, satis es only the minimum income
requirement. The Dinagat Islands province does not meet either the minimum
land area requirement or the minimum population requirement . Indisputably,
Dinagat Islands cannot qualify as a province under Section 461 of the Local
Government Code, the law that governs the creation of provinces. cEITCA
Based on the 2000 census, Dinagat Islands' population stood only at 106,951,
less than half of the statutory minimum of 250,000. In the census conducted seven
years later in 2007, one year after its creation, its population grew by only 13,862,
reaching 120,813, still less than half of the minimum population required. The province
does not fare any better in land area, with its main island, one sub-island and around 47
islets covering only 802.12 square kilometers, less than half of the 2,000 square
kilometers minimum land area required.
The Local Government Code contains no exception to the income and
population or land requirements in creating provinces. What the Code relaxed was the
contiguity rule for provinces consisting of "two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province." The
minimum land area of 2,000 square kilometers in the Code for the creation of a
province was never changed, and no exception was ever created by law . Hence,
the exception created in the implementing rule 1 of the Local Government Code,
exempting provinces "composed of one (1) or more islands" from the minimum land
area requirement, is void for being ultra vires, granting a statutory exception that the
Local Government Code clearly withheld. The implementing rule, being a mere
administrative regulation to implement the Local Government Code, cannot amend the
Code but must conform to the Code. Only Congress, and not any other body, is
constitutionally empowered to create, through amendatory legislation, exceptions to
the land area requirement in Section 461 of the Code.
The majority argues that since the exception of island provinces from the
minimum land requirement was inserted in the implementing rules by the congressional
Oversight Committee, the Court should extend great weight to this "legislative
construction" of the Code. This is gross error. First, in Macalintal v. Comelec , 2 we
ruled that a congressional oversight committee has no power to approve or disapprove
the implementing rules of laws because the implementation of laws is purely an
executive function. The intrusion of the congressional Oversight Committee in the
drafting of implementing rules is a violation of the separation of powers enshrined in
the Constitution. This Court cannot allow such intrusion without violating the
Constitution. Second, Congress has no power to construe the law. Only the courts are
vested with the power to construe the law. Congress may provide in the law itself a
de nition of terms but it cannot de ne or construe the law through its Oversight
Committee after it has enacted the law because such power belongs to the courts.
It is not dif cult to see why Congress allowed an exception to the land area
requirement in the creation of municipalities 3 and cities 4 but withheld it for
provinces . The province, as the largest political and corporate subdivision of local
governance in this country, serves as the geographic base from which municipalities,
cities and even another province will be carved, fostering local development. Today's
majority ruling, allowing the creation of an island province irrespective of population
and land area so long as it has P20 million annual income, wipes away the territorial and
population tiering among provinces, cities and municipalities the Local Government
Code has carefully structured, reducing provinces to the level of a rich municipality, 5
unable to host otherwise quali ed new smaller local government units for sheer lack of
space.
Despite the majority's ingenious resort to "legislative construction" in the
implementing rules to exempt Dinagat Islands from the minimum land area
requirement, the majority cannot escape one glaring fact: Dinagat Islands province
satis es only the minimum income requirement under Section 461 of the Local
Government Code. Even assuming that the minimum land area requirement
does not apply to island provinces, an assumption that is devoid of any legal
basis, Dinagat Islands still fail to meet the minimum population requirement.
Under Section 461 of the Code, two of the three minimum requirements must be
satis ed in the creation of a province, with the income requirement being one of the
two minimum requirements. The majority's ruling today creates the Dinagat Islands
province despite the indisputable fact that it satis es only one of the two necessary
requirements prescribed in Section 461. The majority's ruling clearly violates Section
461 of the Code, no question about it.
Second. It is mandatory that a province must have a population of at least
250,000. The 1987 Constitution mandates that "each province[,] shall have at least
one representative." 6 In Sema v. Commission on Elections , 7 we categorically ruled
that "the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to
create a legislative district." Thus, when Congress creates a province it necessarily
creates at the same time a legislative district. The province must comply with the
minimum population of 250,000 because the Constitution mandates that 250,000 shall
be the minimum population for the creation of legislative districts. 8aIETCA
The Constitution provides for proportional representation in the House of

Representatives when it declares that "legislative districts [shall be]
apportioned among provinces, cities , and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants . . . ." This means
that for every given number of inhabitants, " provinces, cities and the Metropolitan
Manila area" will be entitled to one representative. In consonance with this
constitutional rule on proportional representation and in compliance with the Equal
Protection Clause, the minimum population for the creation of legislative districts in
provinces and cities must be the same. Since the Constitution expressly provides
that the minimum population of legislative districts in cities shall be 250,000, 9 then it
necessarily follows that the minimum population of legislative districts in provinces
shall also be 250,000. Otherwise, there will be a blatant violation of two fundamental
principles of our democratic system — the constitutional requirement of proportional
representation in the House of Representatives for "provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area" and the "one person, one vote" rule rooted in the Equal
Protection Clause.
Moreover, to treat land area as an alternative to the minimum population
requirement (based on the conjunctive "either" in Section 461) destroys the supremacy
of the Constitution, making the statutory text prevail over the clear constitutional
language mandating a minimum population through the requirement of proportional
representation in the apportionment of all legislative districts. In short, in the
creation of a province neither Congress nor the Executive can replace the
minimum population requirement with a land area requirement because the
creation of a province necessarily creates at the same a legislative district,
which under the Constitution must have a minimum population of 250,000 .
Because of the majority's ruling today, the House of Representatives will now
count among its members a representative of a "premium" district consisting, as of the
2007 census, of only 120,813 constituents, well below the minimum population of
250,000 his peers from the other regular districts represent. This malapportionment
tolerates, on the one hand, vote undervaluation in overpopulated districts, and, on the
other hand, vote overvaluation in underpopulated ones, in clear breach of the "one
person, one vote" rule rooted on the Equal Protection Clause. To illustrate, the 120,813
inhabitants of Dinagat Islands province are entitled to send one representative to the
House of Representatives. In contrast, a legislative district in Metro Manila needs
250,000 inhabitants to send one representative to the House of Representatives. Thus,
one vote in Dinagat Islands has the weight of more than two votes in Metro
Manila for the purpose of representation in the House of Representatives.
This is not what our "one person, one vote" representative democracy is all about.
What special and compelling circumstances have the majority found that entitle
the inhabitants of Dinagat Islands to such a privileged position? Do the inhabitants of
Dinagat Islands have more than twice the IQ of inhabitants of Metro Manila? Do the
inhabitants of Dinagat Islands pay more than twice the amount of taxes that inhabitants
of Metro Manila pay? Are the inhabitants of Dinagat Islands the chosen people of God
to lead this country to greatness? Have the Filipino people, in a plebiscite, agreed to
confer on the inhabitants of Dinagat Islands such privileged position, which is the only
constitutionally justi able way to grant such privileged status? Indeed, the gross
malapportionment this case presents is just as constitutionally damaging as that in
Aquino v. Commission on Elections 1 0 where the population of the reapportioned ve
legislative districts in Camarines Sur, based on relevant census, uctuated from a high
of 439,043 (Third District) to a low of 176,383 (First District).
Aquino v. Commission on Elections , and now this Dinagat Islands province case,
will mangle beyond recognition the bedrock constitutional principles of proportional
representation in the House of Representatives, as well as the egalitarian rule of "one
person, one vote" universally honored in all modern civilized societies and rooted in the
Equal Protection Clause. With Aquino v. Commission on Elections , a legislative district
in provinces can be created with no minimum population requirement. Thus, a
municipality with a population of only 25,000 can have a legislative district. With this
Dinagat Islands province case, a province, and necessarily a legislative district, can be
created with a population of only 120,000 or even less. In fact, under both Aquino v.
Commission on Elections and this Dinagat Islands province case, there is no
minimum population requirement whatsoever in the creation of legislative
districts in provinces, and thus even a barangay with a population of 1,000
can be a legislative district. In sharp contrast, a legislative district in cities can only
be created with a minimum population of 250,000 as expressly required in the
Constitution. To repeat, the majority has thrown into the dustbin of history the bedrock
democratic principles of proportional representation in the House of Representatives
and the "one person, one vote" rule rooted in the Equal Protection Clause — both of
which are enshrined in our Constitution and in our democratic way of life. Where is the
majority of this Court bringing our representative democracy?
Third. Quasi-malapportionment laws like RA 9355 are double-edged knives thrust
at the heart of the anti-dynastic vision of the 1987 Constitution — it fosters
entrenchment of political dynasties and fuels feudalistic practices by assuring political
dynasties easy access to public funds. TAESDH
Members of Congress are entitled to an equal share of pork barrel funds

regardless of the size of their constituencies. Thus, each seat in the House of
Representatives translates to a potent platform for congressmen to cultivate
patronage by doling out development, livelihood and support projects using pork barrel
funds allocated in annual budgets. For each new province created — entailing at the
same time the creation of a legislative district — a pipeline to a huge pool of resources
is opened, with the Congressman enjoying wide discretion on how and where he will
dispense such legislative largesse.
Under the majority's ruling, not only land area but also population is immaterial
in creating island provinces. This is an open invitation to ruling political clans
strategically situated in this country's thousands of islands to sponsor the creation of
more underpopulated provinces within their political bailiwicks, 1 1 enabling them to
capture more pork barrel funds, thus tightening their grip on the levers of power. This
inevitably fuels the feudal practices plaguing Philippine local politics by fortifying
patron (congressman) — ward (constituents) relations upon which dynastic politics
thrive. All this at the expense of taxpayers, mostly residing in city legislative districts
with minimum populations of 250,000, who surely would not want their taxes to be
spent as pork barrel funds of political dynasties in underpopulated legislative districts
in island provinces.
The 1987 Constitution is not neutral on the scourge of dynastic politics, a
phenomenon that concentrates political power and public resources within the control
of few families whose members alternatively hold elective of ces, deftly skirting term
limits. Its exclusionary effect on access to public service led the framers of the 1987
Constitution to mandate that the State "guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service" and that Congress "prohibit political dynasties . . . ." 1 2 To the Filipino
people's misfortune, Congress' non-implementation of this constitutional directive is
now aggravated by this Court's wantonly loose translation of the Constitution's
apportionment standard of proportional representation. 1 3 Thus, instead of ensuring
compliance with the Constitution's mandate prohibiting political dynasties, this Court
has turned complicit to local politicians' predilection for dynastic entrenchment.
Fourth. Far from being dispensable components in the creation of local
government units, population and land area — not income — are the pivotal factors in
funding local government units. Under the Local Government Code, these components
determine 75% of the share from the national taxes (Internal Revenue Allotment or IRA)
each local government unit receives, the lifeblood of their operations, based on the
following formula:
1. Population — Fifty percent (50%)
2. Land Area — Twenty-five percent (25%)
3. Equal sharing — Twenty-five percent (25%). 1 4
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, population, with a weight of 50%, ranks rst in importance in determining the
nancial entitlement of local government units, followed by land area with a weight of
25%.
By treating Dinagat Islands' land area of 802.12 square kilometers as compliant
with the 2,000 square kilometers minimum under Section 461, the majority
effectively included in their land area computation the enclosed marine area
or waters of Dinagat Islands. This disposition not only reverses, without cause,
decades' old jurisprudence, 1 5 it also wreaks havoc on the national government's
allocation of the internal revenue allotment to existing island provinces which would be
justi ed in invoking today's ruling to clamor for increased revenue shares due to
increased "land area." In short, other island provinces, like Romblon, Marinduque, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi and Palawan, can now claim their enclosed marine areas as part of their
"land area" in computing their share of the IRA. 1 6
On the part of landlocked provinces hosting large bodies of water, like Rizal,
Laguna, Batangas, Cavite and Lanao del Sur, the situation is reversed. Finding
themselves holding, but not surrounded by, water, the submerged territory, no matter
how large, is excluded from the computation of their land area, thus proportionately
lowering their share in the revenue allotment compared to their island counterparts.

Thus, in its zeal to legalize the creation of an obviously disquali ed local
government unit, the majority unwittingly creates classes of elite and disadvantaged
provinces, using the most arbitrary factor of geographic accident as basis for
classi cation. Even under the most benign equal protection analysis, this does not pass
constitutional muster.
Fifth. The Constitution and the Local Government Code are normative guides for
courts to reasonably interpret and give expression to the will of the Filipino people as
encoded in their provisions. Members of this Court go beyond the bounds of their
sworn duties when they second guess the intent of the Constitution's framers and the
people's elected representatives, pretending to act as if they themselves have been
accorded electoral mandate to amend statutes as they see t. No amount of rhetoric
singing paeans to the virtues of promoting local autonomy can hide the blatant judicial
legislation the majority has succeeded in doing here today, to the detriment of
Constitution's requirements of proportional representation in the House of
Representatives, equal protection under the law and the prohibition against political
dynasties, not to mention the blatant violation of Section 461 of the Local Government
Code. ECTSDa
Accordingly, I vote to DENY the Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment, the Motion
for Leave to Intervene and to File and Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution dated 20 July 2010, and the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated 12 May 2010 filed by the intervenors.
BRION , J., dissenting :
I join the Dissents of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Diosdado M. Peralta on the
strict merits of the case — on why, based on the merits, Republic Act No. 9355 (RA
9355), otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, should be
declared unconstitutional.
Additionally, I submit this Dissenting Opinion to express my objections in the
strongest terms against the transgressions the Court committed in ruling on this
case. The result, which is obvious to those who have been following the developments
in this case and current Supreme Court rulings, is another flip-flop , made worse by the
violations of the Court's own Internal Rules. 1 This is not, of course, the Court's rst ip-
op in recent memory; we did a couple of remarkable somersaults in our rulings in the
case of League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. v. Comelec . 2 This Dissent is written
in the hope that the Court's violation of its own rules in this case will be the
last, and that the Court will re-think its disposition of this case.
The Court rendered its Decision in this case on February 10, 2010 , declaring
RA 9355 unconstitutional. The Of ce of the Solicitor General (OSG), in behalf of the
respondents, and respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman led their separate
Motions for Reconsideration . These were their first motions for reconsideration.
On May 12, 2010 , the Court denied these motions for lack of merit.
On May 26 and 28, 2010 , respondent Governor Ecleo-Villaroman and the OSG
respectively led their 2nd Motions for Reconsideration . The Court simply noted
these motions without action as they are prohibited pleadings under Section 2, Rule 52
of the Rules of Court. This procedural rule states:
Sec. 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. — No second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or nal resolution by the same party shall be
entertained.
The Court's Decision of February 10, 2010 became nal and executory, and Entry
of Judgment was made by the Clerk of Court on May 18, 2010 . At that point, the
Decision of the Court should have been beyond recall.
On June 18, 2010 (or a full month after entry of judgment) , new parties ,
namely — Congressman Francisco T. Matugas, Hon. Sol T. Matugas, Hon. Arturo Carlos
A. Egay, Jr., Hon. Vicente G. Castrence, Hon. Mamerto D. Galamida, Hon. Margarito M.
Longos, and Hon. Cesar M. Bagundol, led a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File
and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12,
2010. They prayed that they be allowed to intervene in the case since they were the
newly elected of cials of Surigao del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections, who were in
danger of losing their positions once the Court's February 10, 2010 decision, declaring
R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional, attained nality. Effectively, they took up the cause of
the original respondent Province of Surigao del Norte then represented by former
Governor Robert Ace Barbers.
The Court denied the motion in its Resolution of July 20, 2010 , pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court which allows a motion for intervention only
before the rendition of judgment by the trial court. Applying this rule to an action
originally led with the Court, we ruled that a motion for intervention could only be led
before, and not after, the final judgment in the case.
Respondent Governor Ecleo-Villaroman led, on October 22, 2010, an Urgent
Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Motion for Leave of Court to Admit 2nd Motion for
Reconsideration and, to Set Aside Entry of Judgment). Thus, despite the Entry of
Judgment, she sought the Court's ruling on her 2nd Motion for Reconsideration that
had simply been Noted Without Action by the Court for being a prohibited pleading. The
ploy to reopen the case and escape from the consequences of the nal judgment was
apparent from the move to set aside the Entry of Judgment. Effectively, she was
moving for the third time to secure the review of the February 10, 2010 Decision that
had been declared nal, and to re-submit the case for another deliberation on the
merits.
Side by side with the original respondent, the would-be intervenors — despite
the lack of personality to act on the case — led on October 29, 2010 an Urgent
Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment. Of course, this move was duly orchestrated with
the respondents whose own motions were led a week earlier. This was a motion
the would-be intervenors had no personality to le since their proposed
intervention, at that point, stood denied. ADEaHT
The Court en banc deliberated on the case and by a vote of 9 in favor and 6
against, decided to lift the entry of judgment and allow the intervention of the new
parties. By the same vote, it voted to completely reverse the Decision of February 10,
2010 and declare RA 9355, entitled An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands,
constitutional.
In acting as it did, the Court did not hesitate, by a 9-6 vote, to disregard
existing rules that the Court itself created.
After this vote, the ponente modi ed the majority resolution in reaction to the
original version of this Dissent. This time, the majority Resolution claimed that it was
acting only on the would-be intervenors' Motion to Lift Entry of Judgment, not on the
original respondents' motion to set aside judgment. The ploy apparently was to
avoid the Dissent's position that the Court acted on a prohibited 2nd motion
for reconsideration without the required vote.
The Court, for reasons of its own, has chosen to live with the public ction that
2nd motions for reconsideration are prohibited pleadings pursuant to Section 2, Rule
52 of the Rules of Court, cited and quoted above. In actual practice, exceptions to this
Rule are allowed and what governs is Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court which provides:
Sec. 3. Second Motion for Reconsideration. — The Court shall not entertain
a second motion for reconsideration and any exception to this rule can only
be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of
at least two-thirds of its actual membership . There is reconsideration "in the
higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous,
but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted
and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be
reconsidered becomes nal by operation of law or by the Court's
declaration . [Emphases supplied.]
In the present case, the Court simply noted without action respondent Governor
Ecleo-Villaroman's and the OSG's 2nd motions for reconsideration because they are
prohibited pleadings. The Court thereafter declared its judgment nal, and entry of
judgment followed. Thus, when Governor Ecleo-Villaroman sought to lift the entry of
judgment, her motion — which sought to reopen the case for another review — was
effectively a third motion for reconsideration that should have been governed by
Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules. With the modi ed position that the Court
was acting on the movants-intervenors' motion to lift entry of judgment, the
majority sought to avoid the restrictive rule on 2nd motions for
reconsideration .
How the Court acted on the respondents' and would-be intervenors' motions is
interesting.
a. Violation of the Rule on Reconsideration . By a 9-6 vote, the Court
declared the entry of judgment lifted. In so doing, it completely disregarded its own rule
that any 2nd motion for reconsideration can only be entertained through a vote of
2/3 of the actual membership, or of 10 members, of the Court. It likewise
disregarded the rule that a second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes nal by
operation of law or by the Court's declaration . It conveniently forgot, too, when it
subsequently claimed that the motion it was considering was not by respondent
Governor Ecleo but by the would-be intervenors, that what an original party could no
longer do with respect to a nal decision, would-be intervenors — practically
representing the same interests and who had not even been recognized by this Court —
cannot also do; otherwise, what is directly prohibited is allowed through indirect
means. Unbelievably, among the majority's supporting arguments to support their
violation, was that (1) a motion to lift entry of nal judgment is not a motion for
reconsideration of the decision sought to be declared non- nal; and that (2) no exact
provision of the Internal Rules covers the lifting of an entered final judgment.
b. Violation of the Rule on Finality of Judgments . Worse than the above
transgression, the Court turned a blind eye to the nality of the judgment it had reached
in the case.
The judgment in a case becomes nal by operation of law (after the lapse of
fteen [15] days from the parties' receipt of the judgment) or upon the Court's
declaration of the judgment's nality. Entry of Judgment by the Clerk of Court follows
the nality of a judgment, i.e., if no motion for reconsideration is led with the Court
within fifteen (15) days from the parties' receipt of the judgment.
As mentioned above, no second motion for reconsideration can be entertained
once a judgment has become nal. In this case, the Court disregarded its own rules and
entertained a motion to lift the entry of judgment and to reopen the case. It was not an
ordinary violation as the judgment lifted was already nal. The respondent Governor's
motion to lift entry of judgment was effectively a third motion for reconsideration
(as its objective is to open the nal decision for another consideration) and its
consequences need no elaborate argument to be understood. For the would-be
intervenors, it was a matter of putting the cart before the horse — a move to lift the
entry of judgment even before the would-be intervenors had their personality
recognized by the Court. aDSIHc
T h e principle of immutability of a nal judgment stands as one of the

pillars supporting a strong, credible and effective court. To quote what this Court has
repeatedly stated on this principle:
"It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become nal and executory,
it may no longer be modi ed in any respect , even if the modi cation is
meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modi cation is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest court of the land , as what remains to be done
is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.
The doctrine of nality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations

of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgment of adjudicating bodies must become nal and executory on
some de nite date xed by law. [. . .], the Supreme Court reiterated that the
doctrine of immutability of judgment is adhered to by necessity notwithstanding
occasional errors that may result thereby, since litigations must somehow
come to an end for otherwise, it would "be even more intolerable than
the wrong and injustice it is designed to protect." 3 [Emphases supplied.]
This same principle, incidentally, is what we teach students in law schools as

a basic bedrock principle in the administration of justice. This is the same
principle, too, that is often asked in the bar examinations. Unfortunately, this is
the same principle that the Court violated, through a 9-6 vote, when it decided to lift its
Entry of Judgment and to entertain the reopening of the nal judgment in the case for
renewed consideration. This, indeed, is a most unusual move. Did the Majority truly fail
to appreciate that the lifting of the entry of judgment is no different in effect from
entertaining a motion for reconsideration, and can be made, if at all, by the actual
parties, not by would-be intervenors? If a 2nd motion for reconsideration is prohibited
and requires a 2/3 vote, can a vote that removes the character of nality from a
judgment be any less?
c. Violation of the Rule on Intervention . The Court disregarded as well
the rule on interventions. The motion for intervention was initially denied since the
Court's decision was already nal, and intervention could no longer be
allowed . To go around this rule, the would-be intervenors, without rst successfully
securing leave to intervene, instead led its own motion to lift entry of judgment — the
same 2nd motion from the original respondents that the Court previously simply noted
without action. The Court granted the motion to lift judgment by a 9-6 vote, under the
ction that it was an intervening party, not the barred original respondents, who had
asked for it.
To complete this blow-by-blow account, the respondents' legal tactician used the
ploy of rst reopening the case (initially through the original respondents, and
subsequently solely through the would-be intervenors), and thereafter moved to allow
intervention since the original respondents had by then exhausted their arguments for
the constitutionality of RA 9355. On two previous attempts, the original respondents
had failed. To get around the insurmountable block posed by the rule on 2nd motions
for reconsideration, they fell back on their modi ed Resolution with the position that
another party — the would-be intervenors — wanted to lift the entry of judgment. Once
the entry of judgment was lifted and intervention was allowed, it was an easy step to
reopen the arguments, add to what the original respondents presented, and submit the
case for a ruling on the merits. The same magic numbers of course prevailed all
throughout: 9 to 6 .
In this manner, the original and nal ruling of the Court, in what is commonly
known as the "Dinagat case" was reversed. Unlike the case of Lazarus who rose from
the dead through a miracle, Dinagat resurrected because the Court disregarded its own
rules and established jurisprudential principles. Of course, it can similarly be called a
miracle as no reversal could have taken place if just one of the series of transgressions
pointed out did not take place. How such resurrection can happen in the Supreme Court
is a continuing source of wonder!
PERALTA , J., dissenting :
With due respect to the ponente, I register my dissent.

On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered a Decision in the instant case, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known
as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, is hereby declared
unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the
election of the of cials thereof are declared NULL and VOID . The provision in
Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and
VOID . cSDHEC
The Of ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) led a motion for reconsideration in

behalf of public respondents, and respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman,
representing the New Province of Dinagat Islands, also led a separate motion for
reconsideration of the Decision dated February 10, 2010.
On May 12, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution denying the motions for
reconsideration of the OSG and respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman,
representing the New Province of Dinagat Islands, for lack of merit. A copy of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 was received by the OSG on May 13, 2010, while
respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, representing the New Province of
Dinagat Islands, received a copy of the said Resolution on May 14, 2010.
The Decision dated February 10, 2010 became nal and executory on May 18,
2010, as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment 1 issued by the Clerk of Court.
On May 26, 2010, respondent New Province of Dinagat Islands, represented by
Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, led a Motion for Leave to Admit Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010) and the said Motion for
Reconsideration, while on May 28, 2010, the OSG led a Motion for Leave to File the
Attached 2nd Motion for Reconsideration (of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010) and
the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. On June 29, 2010, the Court noted without
action the foregoing motions of respondents, as the said pleadings were considered
second motions for reconsideration of the Decision, which shall not be entertained by
the Court, in accordance with Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. — No second motion for
entertained.
On June 18, 2010, movants-intervenors Congressman Francisco T. Matugas,

Hon. Sol T. Matugas, Hon. Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr., Hon. Simeon Vicente G. Castrence,
Hon. Mamerto D. Galanida, Hon. Margarito M. Longos, and Hon. Cesar M. Bagundol
led a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010.
Movants-intervenors claimed that they have legal interest in this case as they are
the duly elected of cials 2 of Surigao del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections, and their
positions will be affected by the nulli cation of the election results in the event that the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 in this case is not reversed and set aside.
On March 9, 2010, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 8790, 3
the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system con guration, and depending on
whether the Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered
or not, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare that:
a. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current
system con guration is in line with the reconsidered Decision,
meaning that the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of
Surigao del Norte remain as two separate provinces;
b. If the Decision becomes nal and executory before the election, the
of the First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte.
xxx xxx xxx
c. If the Decision becomes nal and executory after the election, the
of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte.
The result of the election will have to be nulli ed for the same
reasons given in item "b" above. A special election for Governor, Vice
Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative
District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands)
will have to be conducted. IHcTDA

Since movants-intervenors' elective positions would be adversely affected if the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 would not be reversed, they prayed that they be allowed
to intervene in this case and to le their Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, and that their motion for reconsideration be admitted
by the Court.
In a Resolution dated July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to
Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The Court held that, fundamentally, the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
4 Under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, a motion to intervene may be led at
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. The Court ruled that since this
case originated from an original action led before this Court, the appropriate time to
le the motion-in-intervention is before and not after resolution of this case, citing
Republic v. Gingoyon. 5
It should be noted that this case was decided on February 10, 2010, and the
motions for reconsideration of the Decision were denied in the Resolution dated May
12, 2010. The Decision dated February 10, 2010 became nal and executory on May 18,
2010. Movants-intervenors' Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 was led
only on June 18, 2010, clearly after the Decision dated February 10, 2010 had became
final and executory; hence, the said motion was correctly denied.
The ponente submits that the Court should grant movants-intervenors' motion
for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, in full agreement with their position
that their interest in this case arose only after they were elected to their respective
positions during the May 10, 2010 elections.
As stated by the ponente, in their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010
Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three main arguments: (1) that the passage of
R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160
(the Local Government Code of 1991); (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity,
when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption
from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative
Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, the ponente urges the Court to take
a hard and intent look at the first and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors.
Movants-intervenors contended that R.A. No. 9355 is equivalent to the passage
of an amendatory law to the Local Government Code, as instructed in the case of
League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. : 6
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via
either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment,
impose the said veri able criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied
in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as
much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a
codi cation, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators
earlier codi ed, just as ef caciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the
amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codi ed income requirement from PhP20
million to PhP100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws
is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws speci cally
exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned.
Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already
codi ed indicators. (Emphasis and [u]nderscoring supplied [by movants-
intervenors].)
De ning legislative power, movants-intervenors cited Yakazi Torres

Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 7 thus:
The legislative power has been described generally as the power to make, alter,
and repeal laws. The authority to amend, change, or modify a law is thus part of
such legislative power. It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe
general rules for the government of society. (Emphasis and [u]nderscoring
supplied [by movants-intervenors].)
In view of the foregoing, movants-intervenors argued that the Local Government

Code is susceptible to all legislative processes, including amendments, repeals or
modi cations. They asserted that there is no impediment for another statute, including
R.A. No. 9355, to amend or modify the Local Government Code as regards the criteria
established for the creation of a province. They noted that R.A. No 9355 relied on
Article 9 (paragraph 2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, particularly the provision that "[t]he land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands."
Movants-intervenors asserted that the said provision should be deemed incorporated
in R.A. No. 9355; hence, they purported that the land area requirement in the Local
Government Code was modi ed by R.A. No. 9355. They contended that "R.A. No. 9355,
with the incorporated Article 9 (2) of the IRR of the Local Government Code, became
part of the Local Government Code." TIaCcD
Movants-intervenors' argument is unmeritorious. As cited in Yakazi Torres

Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , legislative power is the power to make,
alter, and repeal laws; thus, the authority to amend, change, or modify a law is part of
such legislative power. However, in this case, R.A. No. 9355, is not a law amending the
Local Government Code on the criteria for the creation of a province. Instead, R.A. No.
9355 is a statute creating the Province of Dinagat Islands; hence, subject to the
constitutional provision on the creation of a province. The constitutional provision on
the creation of a province found in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution states:
SEC. 10. No province , city, municipality, or barangay may be created ,
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. 8
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991, in Section 461
thereof, prescribed the criteria for the creation of a province. 9 Hence, R.A. No. 9355 did
not amend the Local Government Code, but was subject to the criteria contained in
Section 461 of the Local Government Code in creating the Province of Dinagat Islands.
Moreover, Section 6 of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. — A local government
unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries
substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a
province , city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance
passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned
in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to
such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Thus, even the Local Government Code clearly provides that Congress may enact
a law creating a local government unit, which in this case involves the creation of a
province, but such creation is subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed
in the Local Government Code. Hence, the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is
subject to the requirements contained in Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
Since R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the land area or population requirement in the
creation of the province, it was declared unconstitutional in the Decision dated February
10, 2010.
League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections , which
was cited by movants-intervenors, does not apply to this case. The Court held in its
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, thus:
In League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections , the Court held
that the 16 cityhood laws, whose validity were questioned therein, were
constitutional mainly because it found that the said cityhood laws merely carried
out the intent of R.A. No. 9009, now Sec. 450 of the Local Government Code, to
exempt therein respondents local government units (LGUs) from the P100 million
income requirement since the said LGUs had pending cityhood bills long before
the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. Each one of the 16 cityhood laws contained a
provision exempting the municipality covered from the P100 million income
requirement.
In this case, R.A. No. 9355 was declared unconstitutional because there was utter
failure to comply with either the population or territorial requirement for the
creation of a province under Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
Contrary to the contention of the movants-intervenors, Article 9 (2) of the Rules

and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which exempts a proposed
province from the land area requirement if it is composed of one or more islands,
cannot be deemed incorporated in R.A. No. 9355, because rules and regulations cannot
go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Thus, in the Decision dated
February 10, 2010, the Court held that Article 9 (2) of the Implementing Rules of the
Local Government Code is null and void, because the exemption is not found in Section
461 of the Local Government Code. 1 0 There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy
between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the
basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law. 1 1
Next, movants-intervenors stated that assuming that Section 461 of the Local
Government Code was not amended by R.A. No. 9355, they still sought reconsideration
of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010, as they adopted the interpretation of the
ponente and Justice Perez of Section 461 of the Local Government Code in their
respective dissenting opinions. They asserted that the correct interpretation of Section
461 of the Local Government Code is that of Justice Nachura. AECacT
It must be stressed that the movants-intervenors' assertion was already

answered in the Resolution dated May 12, 2010, denying the motions for
reconsideration of the OSG and Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, representing the
Province of Dinagat Islands. The Court, in the said Resolution, answered the same
contention, thus:
The movants now argue that the correct interpretation of Sec. 461 of the Local
Government Code is the one stated in the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice
Antonio B. Nachura.
In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nachura agrees that R.A. No. 9355 failed to
comply with the population requirement. However, he contends that the Province
of Dinagat Islands did not fail to comply with the territorial requirement because it
is composed of a group of islands; hence, it is exempt from compliance not only
with the territorial contiguity requirement, but also with the 2,000-square-kilometer
land area criterion in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code, which is reproduced
for easy reference:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created
if it has an average annual income, as certi ed by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers , as certi ed by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(250,000) inhabitants as certi ed by the National Statistics Of ce:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of
said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which
do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to
the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income.
Justice Nachura contends that the stipulation in paragraph (b) quali es not
merely the word "contiguous" in paragraph (a) (i) in the same provision, but rather
the entirety of paragraph (a) (i) that reads:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers , as certified by the Lands Management Bureau[.]
He argues that the whole paragraph on contiguity and land area in paragraph (a)
(i) above is the one being referred to in the exemption from the territorial
requirement in paragraph (b). Thus, he contends that if the province to be created
is composed of islands, like the one in this case, then, its territory need not be
contiguous and need not have an area of at least 2,000 square kilometers. He
asserts that this is because as the law is worded, contiguity and land area are not
two distinct and separate requirements, but they qualify each other. An exemption
from one of the two component requirements in paragraph (a) (i) allegedly
necessitates an exemption from the other component requirement because the
non-attendance of one results in the absence of a reason for the other component
requirement to effect a qualification.
Similarly, the OSG contends that when paragraph (b) of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code provides that the "territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands," it necessarily dispenses the 2,000 sq. km.
land area requirement, lest such exemption would not make sense. The OSG
argues that in stating that a "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
(2) or more islands," the law could not have meant to de ne the obvious. The land
mass of two or more island will never be contiguous as it is covered by bodies of
water. It is then but logical that the territory of a proposed province that is
composed of one or more islands need not be contiguous or be at least 2,000 sq.
km.
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 7, Chapter 2 (entitled General Powers and Attributes of Local Government
Units) of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a general rule, the creation of a
local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level
shall be based on veri able indicators of viability and projected
capacity to provide services , to wit : TcSHaD
(a) Income. — It must be suf cient, based on acceptable standards, to

provide for all essential government facilities and services and special
functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the
local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. — It shall be determined as the total number of

inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit
concerned; and
(c) Land area. — It must be contiguous , unless it comprises two
(2) or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent
of the others; properly identi ed by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and suf cient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace .
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the
Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Of ce (NSO), and the
Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
It must be emphasized that Section 7 above, which provides for the general rule in
the creation of a local government unit, states in paragraph (c) thereof that the
land area must be contiguous and suf cient to provide for such basic services
and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Therefore, there are two requirements for land area: (1) The land area must be
contiguous; and (2) the land area must be suf cient to provide for such basic
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. A suf cient land
area in the creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as provided
by Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code, providing the requisites for the
creation of a province, speci cally states the requirement of " a contiguous
territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers. "
Hence, contrary to the arguments of both movants, the requirement of a
contiguous territory and the requirement of a land area of at least 2,000 square
kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land area under paragraph
(a) (i) of Section 461 and Section 7 (c) of the Local Government Code.
However, paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two instances of exemption from
the requirement of territorial contiguity, thus:
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which
do not contribute to the income of the province.
Contrary to the contention of the movants, the exemption above pertains only to
the requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly states that the requirement of
territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province comprising
two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that
when a province is composed of two or more islands or when the
territory of a province is separated by a chartered city or cities, such
province need not comply with the land area requirement of at least
2,000 square kilometers or the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of
Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions where none is provided from considerations of convenience, public
welfare, or for any laudable purpose; neither may it engraft into the law
quali cations not contemplated, nor construe its provisions by taking into
account questions of expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar
reasons so as to relax non-compliance therewith. Where the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, but only for
application.
Further, movants-intervenors pointed out that pursuant to R.A. No. 9355, the
Province of Dinagat Islands has been organized and is functioning as a province, which
cannot just be ignored. Thus, a more realistic and pragmatic view should have been
adopted by the Court in its Resolution dated May 12, 2010 following the Operative Fact
Doctrine, citing Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation. 1 2
In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation , petitioner Planters
Products, Inc. (PPI) and private respondent Fertiphil were private corporations, which
were both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and
agricultural chemicals. On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued LOI
No. 1465, which provides:
3.The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer
pricing formula a capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag.
This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to
make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic
sales of fertilizers in the Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10.00 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the
domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which amount FPA
remitted to the depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid FPA P6,689,144.00 from July 8,
1985 to January 24, 1986.
After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the
P10.00 levy. Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No.
1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand. Fertiphil led a complaint for
collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust,
unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial
of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately
owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer
industry.
The RTC ruled in favor of Fertiphil, and ordered PPI to pay Fertiphil the sum of
P6,698,144.00 with interest at 12% from the time of judicial demand; the sum of
P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and the cost of suit. Ruling that the imposition of the
P10.00 levy was an exercise of the State's inherent power of taxation, the RTC
invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied for
public purpose. On appeal, the Court of Appeals af rmed the RTC Decision, but deleted
the award of attorney's fees. SHaIDE
The Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals as LOI No. 1465 failed to
comply with the public purpose requirement for tax laws. As regards the argument of
PPI that Fertiphil cannot seek a refund based on the Operative Fact Doctrine, the Court
held:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void; the doctrine
of operative fact is inapplicable.
PPI also argues that Fertiphil cannot seek a refund even if LOI No. 1465 is
declared unconstitutional. It banks on the doctrine of operative fact, which
provides that an unconstitutional law has an effect before being
declared unconstitutional . PPI wants to retain the levies paid under LOI No.
1465 even if it is subsequently declared to be unconstitutional.
We cannot agree. It is settled that no question, issue or argument will be
entertained on appeal, unless it has been raised in the court a quo. PPI did not
raise the applicability of the doctrine of operative fact with the RTC and the CA. It
cannot belatedly raise the issue with Us in order to extricate itself from the dire
effects of an unconstitutional law.
At any rate, We nd the doctrine inapplicable. The general rule is that an
unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties
and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal
contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void,
Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in
accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The
general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only
applies as a matter of equity and fair play . It nulli es the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose
an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied
to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the
accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality
in reliance upon a law creating it.
Here, We do not nd anything iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the amounts
paid by Fertiphil under LOI No. 1465. It unduly bene ted from the levy. It was
proven during the trial that the levies paid were remitted and deposited to its bank
account. Quite the reverse, it would be inequitable and unjust not to order a
refund. To do so would unjustly enrich PPI at the expense of Fertiphil. Article 22
of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "every person who, through an act of
performance by another comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground shall return the same to him." We cannot
allow PPI to pro t from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity dictate that
PPI must refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil. 1 3
In this case, the general rule applies that an unconstitutional law is void, and
produces no legal effect. As stated in the decision above, the doctrine of operative fact,
as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. The
said doctrine recognizes that the actual existence of a statute prior to a determination
of unconstitutionality is an operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The doctrine was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy 1 4 or would put in limbo
the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it in the case of
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito . 1 5
In Municipality of Malabang v. Benito , the Court ruled that Executive Order
386 creating the Municipality of Malabang is void, and respondent of cials were
permanently restrained from performing the duties and functions of their respective
of ces. Nevertheless, the Court stated there was no basis for respondent of cials'
apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would
have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the
creation of that municipality, citing Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter
State Bank , thus: 1 6 AEIDTc
. . . The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative

fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects —
with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular
conduct, private and of cial. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested,
of status, of prior determinations deemed to have nality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
dif cult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal,
and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. 1 7
Therefore, based on the foregoing, any question on the validity of acts done
before the invalidation of R.A. No. 9355 may be raised before the courts.
Lastly, movants-intervenors contended that the inhabitants of the Province of
Dinagat Islands have expressed their will, through their votes in a plebiscite, to be a
province; hence, the Court should uphold the will of the people and uphold the validity of
R.A. No. 9355.
The contention does not persuade. The validity of R.A. No. 9355 creating the
province of Dinagat Islands depends on its compliance with Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which states:
SEC. 10. No province , city, municipality, or barangay may be created ,
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected . 1 8
Although the political units directly affected by the creation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands approved the creation of the said province, R.A. No. 9355 failed to
comply with the criteria for the creation of the province contained in Section 461 of the
Local Government Code; hence, it was declared unconstitutional.
As cited in the Resolution dated May 12, 2010, Tan v. Comelec 19 held:
. . . [T]he fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed
and its of cials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already
moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed
province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves
to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its
creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for
perpetuation of such wrong. For this court to yield to the respondents' urging that,
as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should passively accept and
accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the
instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief.
Respondents' submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court
decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and
should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power
to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the
boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, con dent that
this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they
manage to bring about a fait accompli.
In view of the foregoing, the Court acted in accordance with its sound discretion
in denying movants-intervenors' Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 as the
issues raised by them lacked merit or had already been resolved by the Court in its
Decision dated February 10, 2010 and its Resolution dated May 12, 2010 denying
respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. Moreover, under Section 2, Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court, a motion to intervene may be led at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. Since this case originated from an original action led
before this Court, the Court properly ruled that the appropriate time to le the motion-
in-intervention is before and not after resolution of this case, citing Republic v.
Gingoyon . 2 0 Further, when movants-intervenors led their Motion for Leave to
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on June 18, 2010 , the Decision of February 10, 2010
had already become final and executory on May 18, 2010 .
Aside from urging the Court to take a hard look on the rst and second
arguments raised by movants-intervenors, the ponente also wants the Court to
consider his arguments for a reconsideration of the Decision in this case.
The ponente states that the Court must bear in mind that the central policy
considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability, ef cient
administration and capability to deliver basic services, and the criteria prescribed by
the Local Government Code, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to
accomplish these results. He adds that in this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom,
has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on
which of them should enjoy preferential consideration. The ponente calls the attention
of the majority to the primordial criterion of economic viability in the creation of local
government units, particularly of a province, as intended by the framers of R.A. No.
7160.
The argument of the ponente has been discussed in his earlier Dissenting
Opinion. It must be pointed out that from the congressional debates cited by the
ponente, the framers of R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 nally
came out with the end result, that is, Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160, which is the basis for
the creation of a province. Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160 provides: HICEca
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if

it has an average annual income, as certi ed by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based
on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certi ed by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(250,000) inhabitants as certi ed by the National Statistics
Office:
income.
Thus, the requisites for the creation of a province, as provided by R.A. No. 7160,
is an annual income of not less than P20 million and either a contiguous territory of at
least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certi ed by the Lands Management
Bureau, or a population of not less than two hundred fty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certi ed by the National Statistics Of ce. As the wordings of the law are
plain and clear, compliance with the territorial requirement or population requirement
cannot be made light of or disregarded.
In this case, R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands failed to comply
with either the territorial or the population requirement of the Local Government Code.
The Court stated in its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, thus:
As the law-making branch of the government, indeed, it was the Legislature that
imposed the criteria for the creation of a province as contained in Sec. 461 of the
Local Government Code. No law has yet been passed amending Sec. 461 of the
Local Government Code, so only the criteria stated therein are the bases for the
creation of a province. The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the
Local Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province; hence,
any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local
Government Code violates Section 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Further, the ponente states that the provisions of both R.A. No. 7160 and the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC-IRR)
show that with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and
provinces, the three indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services,
i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for. He points out that the
exemption from the land area requirement when the local government unit to be
created consists of one (1) or more islands is expressly provided in Section 442 and
Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 and the LGC-IRR with respect to the creation of
municipalities and component cities, respectively, but the exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of R.A.
No. 7160, but is expressly stated under Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
The ponente opines that there does not appear any rhyme or reason why this
exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. He stated
that considering the physical con guration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a
greater likelihood that islands or groups of islands would form part of the land area of a
newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. According to the ponente,
it is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed
in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for cities) of R.A. No. 7160, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces).
The ponente submits that when the exemption was expressly provided in Article
9 (2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight
in Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160 — and re ect the true legislative intent; thus, it would be
in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9 (2), LGC-IRR.
The ponente also submits that Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR amounts to an
executive construction of the provisions, policies, and principles of R.A. No. 7160,
entitled to great weight and respect. He contends that it is actually a detail expressly
provided by the Oversight Committee to ll in the void, honest mistake and oversight
committed by Congress in Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160, taking into account the spirit
and intent of the law.
The ponente's argument does not persuade. The Local Government Code took
effect on January 1, 1992, so 19 years have lapsed since its enactment. If the
Legislature committed the "congressional oversight in Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160" as
alleged by Justice Nachura, it would have amended Section 461, which is a function of
Congress. Substantial "oversights" in the basic law, particularly as alleged with respect
to Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160, cannot be corrected in the implementing rules thereof,
as it is settled rule that the implementing rules of the basic law cannot go beyond the
scope of the basic law. aTcSID
Moreover, it should be pointed out that a province is "composed of a cluster of

municipalities, or municipalities and component cities," 2 1 and, therefore, has a bigger
land area than that of a municipality and a city, as provided by law. It is noted that the
former Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) did not provide for a
required land area in the creation of a municipality and a city, but provided for a required
land area in the creation of a province, which is 3,500 square kilometers, now lessened
to 2,000 square kilometers in the present Local Government Code. If only the income
matters in the creation of a province, then there would be no need for the distinctions in
the population and land area requirements provided for a municipality, city and province
in the present Local Government Code. It may be stated that unlike a municipality and a
city, the territorial requirement of a province contained in Section 461 2 2 of the Local
Government Code follows the general rule in Section 7, Chapter 2 (entitled General
Powers and Attributes of Local Government Units) of the same Code, thus:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a general rule , the creation of
a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level
shall be based on veri able indicators of viability and projected
capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a ) Income. — It must be suf cient, based on acceptable standards, to
provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions
commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local
government unit concerned;
(b) Population. — It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants
within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land area. — It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2)
or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent
of the others ; properly identi ed by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and suf cient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department
of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Of ce (NSO), and the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). 2 3
Moreover, the argument that Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR amounts to an executive
construction of the provisions, policies, and principles of R.A. No. 7160, entitled to
great weight and respect, citing the case of Galarosa v. Valencia , 2 4 has already been
ruled upon in the Decision dated February 10, 2010, thus:
Further, citing Galarosa v. Valencia , the Of ce of the Solicitor General contends
that the IRRs issued by the Oversight Committee composed of members of the
legislative and executive branches of the government are entitled to great weight
and respect, as they are in the nature of executive construction.
The case is not in point. In Galarosa, the issue was whether or not Galarosa could
continue to serve as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan beyond June 30, 1992,
the date when the term of of ce of the elective members of the Sangguniang
Ba y a n of Sorsogon expired. Galarosa was the incumbent president of the
Katipunang Bayan or Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of the Municipality
of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon; and was appointed as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Sorsogon pursuant to Executive Order No. 342 in
relation to Section 146 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local
Government Code.
Section 494 of the Local Government Code of 1991 states that the duly elected
presidents of the liga [ng mga barangay ] at the municipal, city and provincial
levels, including the component cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila,
shall serve as ex of cio members of the sangguniang bayan, sangguniang
panglungsod, and sangguniang panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as
such only during their term of of ce as presidents of the liga chapters which, in
no case, shall be beyond the term of of ce of the sanggunian concerned. The
section, however, does not x the speci c duration of their term as liga president.
The Court held that this was left to the by-laws of the liga pursuant to Article
211(g) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991. Moreover, there was no indication that Sections 491 and 494 should be
given retroactive effect to adversely affect the presidents of the ABC; hence, the
said provisions were to be applied prospectively.
The Court stated that there is no law that prohibits ABC presidents from holding
over as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. On the contrary, the IRR, prepared
and issued by the Oversight Committee upon speci c mandate of Section 533 of
the Local Government Code, expressly recognizes and grants the hold-over
authority to the ABC presidents under Article 210, Rule XXIX. The Court upheld the
application of the hold-over doctrine in the provisions of the IRR and the
issuances of the DILG, whose purpose was to prevent a hiatus in the government
pending the time when the successor may be chosen and inducted into office. HSaCcE
The Court held that Section 494 of the Local Government Code could not have
been intended to allow a gap in the representation of the barangays, through the
presidents of the ABC, in the sanggunian. Since the term of of ce of the punong
barangays elected in the March 28, 1989 election and the term of of ce of the
presidents of the ABC had not yet expired, and taking into account the special role
conferred upon, and the broader powers and functions vested in the barangays by
the Code, it was inferred that the Code never intended to deprive the barangays of
their representation in the sangguniang bayan during the interregnum when the
liga had yet to be formally organized with the election of its officers.
Under the circumstances prevailing in Galarosa, the Court considered the relevant
provisions in the IRR formulated by the Oversight Committee and the pertinent
issuances of the DILG in the nature of executive construction, which were entitled
to great weight and respect.
Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law within
the law's four corners. If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous,
courts simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application
of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to
extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law, or
may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive
issuances in the nature of executive construction.
In this case, the requirements for the creation of a province contained in Section
461 of the Local Government Code are clear, plain and unambiguous, and its
literal application does not result in absurdity or injustice. Hence, the provision in
Article 9(2) of the IRR exempting a proposed province composed of one or more
islands from the land-area requirement cannot be considered an executive
construction of the criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code. It is an
extraneous provision not intended by the Local Government Code, and is,
therefore, null and void.

The ponente also stated that it may be well to remember basic policy
considerations underpinning the principle of local autonomy, and cited Section 2, R.A.
No. 7160, which provides:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government units.
Indeed, the policy of the State is that "the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals."
However, it must stressed that in the creation of the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State, the requirements provided by the Local Government Code
must also be complied with, which R.A. No. 9355 failed to do.
Further, the ponente states that consistent with the declared policy to provide
local government units local autonomy, he submits that the territory, contiguity and
minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be
construed liberally in order to achieve the desired results. He adds that this liberal
interpretation is more appropriate, taking into account the rules on construction of the
LGC, viz.:
SEC. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the provisions of this
Code, the following rules shall apply:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of
life for the people in the community;
The ponente seeks for a liberal interpretation as regards the territorial

requirement in the creation of a province based on the rules of interpretation of the
general welfare provisions of the Local Government Code. General welfare is clari ed in
Section 16 of the Local Government Code, thus:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scienti c
and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
The Local Government Code provides that it is "[ t ] he general welfare

provisions in this Code which shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers
to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the
quality of life for the people in the community." Nowhere is it stated therein that the
provisions for the creation of a local government unit, the province in particular, should
be liberally interpreted. Moreover, since the criteria for the creation of a province under
the Local Government Code are clear, there is no room for interpretation, but only
application.
To reiterate, the constitutional basis for the creation of a province is laid down in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides that no province may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. The criteria for the creation of a province are found in Section 461 of the Local
Government Code. Moreover, Section 6 of the Local Government Code provides that "
[a] local government unit may be created . . . by law enacted by congress in the case of
a province . . . subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code."
Based on the criteria for the creation of a province provided for in Section 461 of
the Local Government, the Court found that R.A. No. 9355 creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands failed to comply with the population or territorial requirement; hence,
R.A. No. 9355 was declared unconstitutional.
The Decision in this case was promulgated on February 10, 2010. The motions
for reconsideration of the Decision was denied on May 12, 2010. The Decision of
February 10, 2010 became nal and executory on May 18, 2010, as evidenced by the
Entry of Judgment 2 5 issued by the Clerk of Court. Movants-intervenors led their
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 only on June 18, 2010, or after
the resolution of the case and one month after the Decision in this case already became
final and executory. Hence, the Court properly denied the said motion. EHSIcT
The ponente contends that there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to
Recall Entry of Judgment led on October 29, 2010 by movants-intervenors for the
simple reason that the Entry of Judgment was prematurely issued on October 5, 2010
in view of the pendency of the movants-intervenor's motion for reconsideration of the
July 20, 2010 Resolution, which was filed on September 7, 2010.
I cannot agree with such contention. Although Entry of Judgment was made on
October 5, 2010, it must be borne in mind that the Decision in this case became nal
and executory on May 18, 2010, as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment 2 6 issued by the
Clerk of Court. If the Court follows Section 2, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, the date of
finality of the judgment is deemed to be the date of its entry, thus:
Sec. 2. Entry of judgments and nal orders. — If no appeal or motion for
new trial or reconsideration is led within the time provided in these Rules, the
judgment or nal order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of
entries of judgments. The date of nality of the judgment or nal order
shall be deemed to be the date of its entry . The record shall contain the
dispositive part of the judgment or nal order and shall be signed by the clerk,
with a certi cate that such judgment of nal order has become nal and
executory.
The amendment in Section 2 above makes nality and entry simultaneous by
operation of law, and eliminates the confusion and guesswork whenever the parties
could not have access, for one reason or another, to the Book of Entries of Judgments.
2 7 It also avoids the usual problem where the physical act of writing out the entry is
delayed by neglect or sloth. 2 8
In addition, the Court properly denied on July 20, 2010 the movants-intervenors'
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010, since it was led after the
resolution of the case and after the Decision in this case had become nal and
executory on May 18, 2010. With the denial of the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May
12, 2010, the movants-intervenors' did not have legal standing to intervene; hence, their
motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution has no bearing on the
validity of the Entry of Judgment that was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments on October 5, 2010. Therefore, the Entry of Judgment cannot be recalled on
the ground of pendency of the movants-intervenor's motion for reconsideration of the
July 20, 2010 Resolution.
Since movants-intervenors' Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010
was denied in the Resolution dated July 20, 2010, the motion for reconsideration of the
July 20, 2010 Resolution led on September 7, 2010 by movants-intervenors was
recommended to also be denied, but has yet to be acted on by the Court.
Further, on October 22, 2010, respondent New Province of Dinagat Islands,
represented by Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, led an Urgent Omnibus Motion
(To resolve Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration and,
to set aside Entry of Judgment). Respondent admitted that it led the Motion for Leave
of Court to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration on May 26, 2010, twelve (12)
days after receipt of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 denying respondents' motion
for reconsideration.
It should be pointed out that the Court has acted on respondent New Province of
Dinagat Islands' Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration
and the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration, which were led on May 26, 2010 (after
the Decision had become nal and executory on May 18, 2010), in the Court's
Resolution dated June 26, 2010. Treated as a second motion for reconsideration of the
Decision, which is disallowed, the Court resolved to note without action the said
motions in view of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 denying the motions for
reconsideration of the February 10, 2010 Decision. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of
Court states:
SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. — No second motion for
entertained.
As the decision in this case became nal and executory on May 18, 2010, the
decision is unalterable. In Gomez v. Correa , 2 9 the Court held:
It is settled that when a nal judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modi ed in any respect, even if the
modi cation is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modi cation is attempted to be
made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is
founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time. HASTCa
The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making
of so-called nunc pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party,
and where the judgment is void.
To stress, the motion for reconsideration led by movants-intervenors on the

denial of the motion for intervention should have been denied since to grant the same
would be tantamount to reopening a case which is already nal. Worse, movants-
intervenors are not even original parties to the present case and therefore are not in a
position to file a motion to recall a judgment which is already final and executory.
In view of the foregoing, I maintain that the movants-intervenors' Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution dated May 12, 2010, which was led only on June 18, 2010 or after
resolution of the case and after the Decision of February 10, 2010 had become final and
executory on May 18, 2010, was properly denied in the Resolution dated July 20, 2010.
Consequently, I maintain my stand that movants-intervenor's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010, which motion was led on
September 7, 2010, be denied for lack of merit. Further, it is recommended that
movants-intervenors' Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment led on October 29,
2010, and the Omnibus Motion (To resolve Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Second
Motion for Reconsideration and to set aside Entry of Judgment) led on October 22,
2010 by respondent New Province of Dinagat Islands, represented by Governor
Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, be likewise denied for lack of merit.
DEL CASTILLO , J., concurring :
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great not
by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of
some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings
and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic
pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before
which even well settled principles of law will bend.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Northern Securities Co. v. United States 1
On the abstract principles which govern courts in construing legislative acts, no
difference of opinion can exist. It is only in the application of those principles that
the difference discovers itself.
Chief Justice John Marshall
United States v. Fisher 2
Considering the circumstances which supervened after the promulgation of the
Decision on February 10, 2010 and Resolution dated May 12, 2010, I nd myself
reconsidering my previous position. Mr. Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura has
himself identi ed factors not previously considered by this Court, which, in my view,
warrant a reversal of our previous rulings.
The case before us concerns the proper interpretation of Section 461 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code (LGC), which prescribes
the criteria for the creation of a province as follows:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certi ed by the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province. IECcAT
income. 3 (Underscoring supplied)
To implement the provisions of the LGC, the Oversight Committee (created

pursuant to Sec. 533 of the LGC) formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations
to carry out the provisions of the law. Article 9 of said Rules and Regulations provides:
Art. 9. Provinces. — (a) Requisites for Creation. — A province shall not be
created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land
area are present:
(i) Income — An average annual income of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices, as certi ed by the DOF. The average annual
income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring income; and
(ii) Population or land area — Population shall not be less than two hundred
fty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certi ed by NSO; or land area which must
be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certi ed by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute
to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial
jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly identi ed by
metes and bounds.
Since our May 12, 2010 ruling (which denied respondents' respective Motions for
Reconsideration), the Of ce of the Solicitor General (representing the Republic of the
Philippines) and Gov. Geraldine Ecleo Villaroman (representing the new Province of the
Dinagat Islands), each sought leave to le a Second Motion for Reconsideration on May
27, 2010 and May 26, 2010, respectively, which motions were noted without action. The
winning candidates for provincial and congressional seats in Surigao del Norte also
sought to intervene in this case; however, their motion for intervention was denied on
July 20, 2010.
Subsequent to the Motions for Reconsideration, Justice Nachura has taken pains
to compare the requisites for the creation of the different local government units
(LGUs) in order to highlight what, in my view, is a glaring inconsistency in the provisions
of the law. To summarize:
LGULand Area Requirement
BarangayNo minimum land area requirement. Rather, the barangay must
be created out of a contiguous territory with a population of at
least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants [Sec. 386 (a), LGC]
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands. [Sec. 386 (b), LGC]
MunicipalityContiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers
Note — the land area requirement is IN ADDITION to the income
requirement of at least Two Million Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (PhP2,500,000.00) in average annual income for the last 2
consecutive years AND the population requirement of at least
Twenty Five Thousand (25,000) inhabitants. [Sec. 442(a), LGC]
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands. [Sec. 442(b), LGC]
CityContiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers
Note — a city must have an average annual income of at least
Twenty Million Pesos (PhP20,000,000.00) for the last 2
consecutive years AND comply with either the land area
requirement OR have a population of at least one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants. [Sec. 450 (a), LGC]
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands.
more islands. [Sec 450 (b), LGC]
ProvinceContiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers.
Note — a province must have an average annual income of at
least Twenty Million Pesos (PhP20,000,000.00) AND comply
with either the land area requirement OR have a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants. [Sec.
461 (a), LGC] jurcda

more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which
do not contribute to the income of the province. [Sec. 461 (b),
LGC]
As Justice Nachura points out, as regards the creation of barangays, land area is
not included as a requirement. However, a minimum land area is provided for the
creation of municipalities, cities, and provinces. Furthermore, while an exemption 4 is
provided for municipalities and cities in cases where the LGU concerned is composed
of one or more islands, in stark contrast, no such exemption exists with respect to
provinces.
It is not dif cult to see why no exemption is needed for barangays — why exempt
them from a requirement that does not even apply to them? In fact, the inclusion of the
clause "[t]he territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands" in
Sec. 386 (b) of the LGC appears to be surplusage. But I cannot see why there would be
a difference in treatment between cities and municipalities, on one hand, and provinces,
on the other. In fact, as Justice Nachura points out, this may lead to anomalous results.
This leads me to conclude that Justice Nachura's interpretation is indeed correct — that
the legislature fully intended to exempt LGUs from the land area requirement in cases
where the LGU concerned encompassed two or more islands, as provided in Section
442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for cities), but this legislative policy was not
carried over to Section 461 (for provinces). Consequently, Article 9 (2) of the LGC's
Implementing Rules and Regulations were precisely enacted in order to correct the
congressional oversight.
Our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, suggests that this
interpretation is implausible because even if there were any such oversight, Congress
had every opportunity in the last 19 years to correct its mistake. To this I would only
observe that Congress has never, in the last 19 years, been faced with a situation where
an amendment to Section 461 of the LGC was necessary or desirable, and no case
concerning the land area requirement for provinces has ever been brought before this
Court since the LGC's enactment. 5 The only case that has mentioned the land area
requirement for provinces, Tan v. Commission on Elections, 6 (regarding the invalidation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 885 which created the province of Negros Del Norte) dealt
with the matter only tangentially, at best. 7
Justice Peralta also opines that there is no need to search for the legislative
intent, since the language of the law is plain, clear, and unambiguous. I would submit,
however, that it is equally true that the statute must be read as a whole, that its clauses
and phrases are not detached and isolated expressions, but that each and every part
must be considered in order to ascertain its meaning. 8
Therefore, the statute, read as a whole, in the light of its legislative history, cannot
be said to preclude the interpretation placed on it by the majority. But in
interpreting a statute [such as the Local Government Code], we cannot take one
sentence, one section, or even the entire statute alone and say that it has a "plain
meaning" as if there were an objective formula in the few words simply waiting to
be grasped by the courts. Instead the statute must be read as a whole, taking all
of its provisions and reading them in the context of the legal fabric to which they
are to be applied. An interpretation that creates an admittedly anomalous result is
not salved by the majority's apologia that, if we read the statute in that fashion,
Congress created the anomaly. Instead the question is whether the statute read as
a whole was intended by Congress to create such results. The law is not an
isolated bundle of capricious and inconsistent commands by a legislature
presumed to react mindlessly. 9
It is also relevant that the Senate and the House of Representatives, represented
by the Of ce of the Solicitor General, have asserted that Congress intended that
provinces composed of one or more islands should be exempted from the 2,000 sq.
km. land area requirement. Surely, the legislature's will in this case should be given
deference, as a co-equal branch of government operating within its area of
constitutional authority.
I also cannot help but note that the Dinagat Islands is not the rst small island-
province which has been separated from a larger province through legislative
imprimatur. The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that the island-provinces of
Batanes (previously annexed to Cagayan), 1 0 Camiguin (previously a sub-province of
Misamis Oriental), 1 1 Siquijor (previously a sub-province of Negros Oriental), 1 2 Biliran
(previously a sub-province of Leyte), 1 3 Guimaras (previously a sub-province of Iloilo),
1 4 and Marinduque (previously annexed to Tayabas) 1 5 also have land areas of well
below 1,000 square kilometers each. HaTAEc
To be clear, I am not making an equal protection argument, since none of these

provinces were created under the auspices of the LGC. I only point this out to show that
Congress, in drafting the LGC, was cognizant of the special circumstances surrounding
the creation of island-provinces, and evidently intended that economic development be
a more signi cant consideration than size. The Congressional deliberations bear this
out:
CHAIRMAN LINA:
Will you look at the case of — how many municipalities are there in Batanes
province?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR:
Batanes is only six.

CHAIRMAN LINA:
Six town. Siquijor?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR:
Siquijor. It is region?
CHAIRMAN LINA:
Seven.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR:
Seven. Anim.
CHAIRMAN LINA:
Six also.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR:
Six also.
CHAIRMAN LINA:
It seems with a minimum number of towns?

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR:
The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, not even one congressional
district. But tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is Region 9. Wala dito.
Nagtataka nga ako ngayon.
CHAIRMAN LINA:
Camiguin, Camiguin.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR:
That is region? Camiguin has ve municipalities, with a population of 63
thousand. But we do not hold it against the province because maybe that's
one stimulant where growth can grow, can start. The land area for
Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers. So if we hard fast on
requirements of, we set a minimum for every province, palagay ko we just
leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that in case
we would like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang
tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo
eh . Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government Code?
Growth. To devolve powers in order for the community to have its own idea
how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas.
So in every geographical condition, mayroong sariling idiosyncrasies eh. We
cannot make a generalization. 1 6
Though this Court certainly has the authority to override the legislative
interpretation, I do not believe it is appropriate or necessary in this instance. Rather, we
should acknowledge the "strong presumption that a legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the needs of its own people [and] that its laws are directed to
problems made manifest by experience." 1 7
I do not propose that the Court overturn its settled precedent to the effect that
Implementing Rules and Regulations cannot go beyond the terms of the statute. But
under these limited circumstances — where a reading of the entire law reveals
inconsistencies which this Court must reconcile, where the legislature has informed the
Court of its intentions in drafting the law, and where the legislative history of the LGC
leads one to the inescapable conclusion that the primary consideration in the creation
of provinces is actually administrative convenience, economic viability, and capacity for
development — then it would be far more just to give effect to the will of the legislature
in this case. cAaDCE
In the words of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the rst concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent
of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a
way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we
are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the
same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is nd a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law
is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to
its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them." While we admittedly may not legislate,
we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to re ect the
will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not
there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment.
In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to
give effect to the law maker's will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction,
hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is
within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter
thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not
within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of
the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a
thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless
within the intent of the lawmakers. 1 8
For these reasons, I thus concur in the opinion of Justice Nachura.
ABAD , J., concurring :
I fully concur in the resolution that Justice Antonio Eduardo Nachura wrote for
the majority. I would want, however, to reply brie y to the somewhat harsh criticism
hurled against the Court in connection with its action.
The Court is accused of " ip- opping" in this case as in the others before it,
speci cally the case of the sixteen municipalities that Congress converted into cities.
Since the Court is a collegial body, the implication is that its members or the majority
collectively flip-flopped in their decisions.
But, as I said in my concurring opinion in the Court's April 12, 2011 resolution in
the League of Cities case, 1 the charge is unfair, as it is baseless. The Court is not a
living person whose decisions and actions are ruled by the whims of one mind. As a
collegial body, the Court acts by consensus among its fifteen members.
In the League of Cities, 2 neither all the Justices nor most of them did a
somersault as implicitly suggested. Congress passed a number of laws converting
sixteen municipalities into cities. The League of Cities assailed these laws as
unconstitutional on the ground that the sixteen municipalities involved did not meet the
P100 million minimum income requirement of the Local Government Code. For their
part, the municipalities countered that their laws constituted valid legislative
amendments of such requirement.
The Court originally voted in the case on November 18, 2008. A majority of six
Justices voted to annul the laws, ve members dissented, and four took no part (6-5-4).
The lead of those who voted to annul the laws rmed up with an increase of 2 votes
when the Court took up the motion for reconsideration of the sixteen municipalities on
March 31, 2009. The vote was 7-5-2.
But when on April 28, 2009 the Court acted on the sixteen municipalities' second
motion for reconsideration, the vote resulted in a tie, 6-6-3. The Court was divided in its
interpretation of this 6-6 result. One group argued that the failure of the minority to
muster a majority vote had the effect of maintaining the Court's last ruling. Some
argued, however, that since the Constitution required a majority vote for declaring laws
passed by Congress unconstitutional, the new voting restored the constitutionality of
the subject laws. When a re-voting took place on December 21, 2009 to clear up the
issue, the result shifted in favor of upholding the constitutionality of the laws of the
sixteen municipalities, 6-4-3 (2 vacancies), with the new majority voting to uphold the
constitutionality of the laws that converted the sixteen municipalities into cities. IESTcD
But when the Court voted on the motion for reconsideration of the losing League
of Cities on August 24, 2010, the majority shifted anew on a vote of 7-6-2. The sixteen
municipalities led a motion for reconsideration of the new decision and voting took
place on February 15, 2011, resulting in a vote of 7-6-2 in favor of again upholding the
constitutionality of the laws of the sixteen municipalities.
To repeat what I said in my concurring opinion in the League of Cities, 3 those
who say that the Court, acting through its members, ipped- opped in the League of
Cities case should consider the following:
One . The Justices did not on each occasion simply decide to change their minds.
There were pending motions for reconsideration in the case and the Justices had a duty
to vote on them on the dates the matters came up for decision.
The Court is no orchestra with its members playing one tune under the baton of a
maestro. They bring with them a diversity of views, which is what the Constitution
prizes, for it is this diversity that filters out blind or dictated conformity.
Two . Of twenty-three Justices who voted in the case at any of its various
stages, twenty stood by their original positions. They never reconsidered their views.
Only three did so and not on the same occasion, showing no wholesale change of votes
at any time.
Three . To flip-flop means to vote for one proposition at rst (take a stand) ,
shift to the opposite proposition upon the second vote (flip) , and revert to his rst
position upon the third (flop) . Not one of the twenty-three Justices flipped-flopped.
Four . The three Justices who changed their votes did not do so in one direction.
Justice Velasco changed his vote from a vote to annul to a vote to uphold; Justice
Villarama from a vote to uphold to a vote to annul; and Justice Mendoza from a vote to
annul to a vote to uphold. None of them ipped- opped since the three never changed
their votes afterwards.
Notably, no one can dispute the right of a judge, acting on a motion for
reconsideration that the losing party les, to change his mind regarding the case. The
rules are cognizant of the fact that human judges could err and that it would merely be
fair and right for them to correct their perceived errors upon a motion for
reconsideration. Even God, who had decided to destroy the Israelites for worshipping a
golden calf, reconsidered after Moses stood in the gap for them. 4
Five . Evidently, the voting in the League of Cities is not a case of massive ip-
opping by the Justices of the Court. Rather, it is a case of tiny shifts in the votes,
occasioned by the consistently slender margin that one view held over the other. This
re ected the nearly even soundness of the opposing advocacies of the contending
sides.
Six . It did not help that in one year alone in 2009, seven Justices retired and were
replaced by an equal number. It is such that the resulting change in the combinations of
minds produced multiple shifts in the outcomes of the voting. No law or rule requires
succeeding Justices to adopt the views of their predecessors. Indeed, preordained
conformity is anathema to a democratic system.
In this Dinagat Islands case the vote changed when, acting on the intervention of
a third party with genuine interest in the outcome of the case, the majority in the Court
was persuaded to change its mind and uphold the act of Congress in creating the
province. The previous voting was too close and it took the vote of just two Justices,
changing their previous positions, to ensnare the victory from those who oppose the
conversion of the Dinagat Islands into a province.
Neither the Court nor its Justices ip- opped in this case. They did not take one
position, later moved to the opposite position, and then reverted to the rst. They
merely exercised their right to reconsider an erroneous ruling.
The charge of flip-flopping is unfair.
Footnotes
1.Congressman Francisco T. Matugas (incumbent Congressman of the First Legislative District

of Surigao del Norte), Hon. Sol T. Matugas, Hon. Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. (incumbent
Governor and Vice Governor, respectively, of the Province of Surigao del Norte), Hon.
Simeon Vicente G. Castrence, Hon. Mamerto D. Galanida, Hon. Margarito M. Longos, and
Hon. Cesar M. Bagundol (incumbent Board Members of the First Provincial District of
Surigao del Norte).
2.Passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on August 28, 2006 and August 14,
2006, respectively.
3.R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 10.
SECTION. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. — No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or
units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity
of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance xes another
date.
4.Rollo, pp. 124-127.
5.Id. at 143.
6.Rollo (G.R. No. 175158), pp. 3-20.
7.Per the November 28, 2006 Resolution, the Court dismissed the petition due to its defective or
insuf cient veri cation and certi cation of non-forum shopping and the failure of
petitioners' counsel to indicate an updated Integrated Bar of the Philippines of cial
receipt. In its February 13, 2007 Resolution, the Court dismissed the petition with nality.
On April 11, 2007, an Entry of Judgment was issued. (Id. at 77A and 112.)
8.Rollo, pp. 3-43.

9.Id. at 736-765.
10.Penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, with Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (now
retired) and Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, Arturo D.
Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, and Jose
Catral Mendoza, concurring.

11.Dissented to by Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, joined by Associate Justices
Renato C. Corona (now Chief Justice), Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Roberto A. Abad.
12.Penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, with Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (now
retired) and Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, Arturo D.
Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Jose Catral Mendoza,
concurring.
13.Dissented to by Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, joined by Associate Justices Renato
C. Corona (now Chief Justice), Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Roberto A. Abad.
14.Rollo, pp. 984-997.
15.Id. at 1153-1154.
16.Id. at 1155-1158.
17.Quinto v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010, 613 SCRA 385;
Of ce of the Ombudsman v. Miedes, Sr. , G.R. No. 176409, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA
148; Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, 457 Phil. 527 (2003); Mago v. Court of Appeals , 363 Phil.
225 (1999); Lim v. Pacquing , G.R. No. 115044, January 27, 1995, 240 SCRA 649;
Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals , 203 Phil. 652 (1982); and
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 181 Phil. 432 (1979).
18.Sec. 3. Second Motion for Reconsideration. — The Court shall not entertain a second motion
for reconsideration and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher
interest of just by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual
membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed
decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially
capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A
second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be
reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court's declaration.
19.The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic , G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA
402, citing Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 401 (1999) and Vicente
V. Mendoza, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 137 (2004).
20.David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
21.Id. at 223.
22.See Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Rodrigo Cosico , 434 Phil. 753 (2002); People v. Hon. Chavez ,
411 Phil. 482 (2001).
23.Id.
24.Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque , G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 18, 2008,
574 SCRA 468, 492.
25.Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting of the Committee on Local Government, May 22,
1991, 4th Regular Session, pp. 57-67.
26.ARTICLE 3. Declaration of Policy. — (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the Sate that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units (LGUs) shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and
resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government
to the LGUs.
27.Prescribing the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991.
28.Congressman Chiongbian is one of the sponsors of House Bill No. 34061, the House of
Representatives version of the proposed Local Government Code.
29.Bicameral Conference Committee on Local Government (Book III), March 13, 1991, pp. 18-
28.
30.Section 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. — Local government units shall have a
share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third scal
year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);
(b) On the second year, thirty-five percent (35%); and
(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%):
Provided, That in the event that the National Government incurs an unmanageable public
sector de cit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation
with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the "liga", to
make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government
units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection
of national internal revenue taxes of the third scal year preceding the current scal
year: Provided, further, That in the rst year of the effectivity of this Code, the local
government units shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal revenue allotment
which shall include the cost of devolved functions for essential public services, be
entitled to receive the amount equivalent to the cost of devolved personal services.
Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. — The share of local government units in
the internal revenue allotment shall be allocated in the following manner:
(a) Provinces — Twenty-three percent (23%);
(b) Cities — Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities — Thirty-four percent (34%); and
(d) Barangays — Twenty percent (20%):

Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined
on the basis of the following formula:
(a) Population — Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area — Twenty-five percent (25%) and

(c) Equal Sharing — Twenty-five percent (25%):
Provided, further, That the share of each barangay with a population of not less than one
hundred (100) inhabitants shall not be less than Eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) per
annum chargeable against the twenty percent (20%) share of the barangay from the
internal revenue allotment, and the balance to be allocated on the basis of the following
formula:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code:
(1) Population — Forty percent (40%); and
(2) Equal Sharing — Sixty percent (60%)
(b) On the second year:
(1) Population — Fifty percent (50%); and

(2) Equal Sharing — Fifty percent (50%)
(c) On the third year and thereafter:
(1) Population — Sixty percent (60%); and
(2) Equal Sharing — Forty percent (40%):
Provided, nally , That the nancial requirements of barangays created by local government
units after the effectivity of this Code shall be the responsibility of the local government
unit concerned.
31.Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corp. , 462 Phil. 96, 129-131, 416 SCRA 436
(2003); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 530, 559; 299 SCRA 199 (1998).
32.Sec. 533. Formulation of Implementing Rules and Regulations. — (a) Within one (1) month
after the approval of this Code, the President shall convene the Oversight Committee as
herein provided for. The said Committee shall formulate and issue the
appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the ef cient and effective
implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring
compliance with the principles of local autonomy as de ned under the
Constitution.
(b) The Committee shall be composed of the following:
(1) The Executive Secretary, who shall be the Chairman;
(2) Three (3) members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the
Senate, to include the Chairman of the Committee on Local Government;
(3) Three (3) members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the
Speaker, to include the Chairman of the Committee on Local Government;
(4) The Cabinet, represented by the following:

(i) Secretary of the Interior and Local Government;
(ii) Secretary of Finance;
(iii) Secretary of Budget and Management; and
(5) One (1) representative from each of the following;
(i) The League of Provinces;
(ii) The League of Cities;
(iii) The League of Municipalities; and
(iv) The Liga ng mga Barangay.
(c) The Committee shall submit its report and recommendation to the President within two
(2) months after its organization. If the President fails to act within thirty (30) days from
receipt thereof, the recommendation of the Oversight Committee shall be deemed
approved. Thereafter, the Committee shall supervise the transfer of such powers and
functions mandated under this Code to the local government units, together with the
corresponding personnel, properties, assets and liabilities of the of ces or agencies
concerned, with the least possible disruptions to existing programs and projects. The
Committee shall likewise recommend the corresponding appropriations necessary to
effect the said transfer.
For this purpose, the services of a technical staff shall be enlisted from among the quali ed
employees of Congress, the government of ces, and the leagues constituting the
Committee.
(d) The funding requirements and the secretariat of the Committee shall be provided by the
Office of the Executive Secretary.
(e) The sum of Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00), which shall be charged against
the Contingent Fund, is hereby allotted to the Committee to fund the
undertaking of an information campaign on this Code . The Committee shall
formulate the guidelines governing the conduct of said campaign, and shall determine
the national agencies or offices to be involved for this purpose. (Emphasis supplied.)
33.As found in the Whereas clauses of Administrative Order No. 270 prescribing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991, viz.:
WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations with all
the concerned sectors of society and consideration of the operative principles
of local autonomy as provided in the Local Government Code of 1991 , has
completed the formulation of the implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis
supplied.)
34.Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 728.
35.G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 636, 644-645.
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
1.Article 9, paragraph 2 ("[T]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one or more islands. . . .")
2.G.R. No. 157013, 10 July 2003.
3.Section 442 (b) ("The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly
identi ed by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply
where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. . . .") (emphasis supplied).
4.Section 450 (b) ("The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identi ed
by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. . . .")
(emphasis supplied).
5.Which, under Section 442, must have minimum income, population and land area of P2.5
million (based on 1991 prices), 25,000 and 50 square kilometers (contiguous),
respectively.
6.Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: "Each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative. " (Emphasis supplied)
7.G.R. Nos. 177597 & 178628, 16 July 2008.
8.Id.
9.Id.
10.G.R. No. 189793, 617 SCRA 623 (2010).
11.Much like in the creation of legislative districts, the creation of local government units is
done at the behest of legislators representing the relevant locality.
12.Section 26, Article II (emphasis supplied).

13.Paradigmatically shown in Aquino v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 189793, 617 SCRA
623 (2010).
14.Section 285.
15.In Tan v. Commission on Elections (No. L-73155, 11 July 1986, 142 SCRA 727), we rejected
as baseless the claim that "territory" for purposes of the creation of a province, includes
submerged land: "The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local
Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly re ects that "territory" as
therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the
waters over which the political unit exercises control. " (Id. at 749; emphasis
supplied).
16.Others island provinces would be Cebu, Bohol, Masbate, Catanduanes, Batanes, Basilan,
Siquijor, and Camiguin.
BRION, J., dissenting:
1.A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, effective May 22, 2010.
2.G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499 & 178056, February 15, 2011.
3.Vios v. Pantangco, Jr. , G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009, citing Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-BALAIS v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Philippines,
Inc., G.R. No. 155651, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 507, 513-514; Apo Fruits Corp. v. CA , G.R.
No. 164195, December 4, 2009, citing Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission , G.R.
No. 158971, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 154, 161-162, Kline v. Murray , 257 P. 465, 79
Mont. 530, Flores v. Court of Appeals , G.R. Nos. 97556 & 101152, July 29, 1996, Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Arceo , G.R. No. 158270, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 85, Temic
Semiconductors, Inc. Employees Union (TSIEU)-FFW v. Federation of Free Workers
(FFW), G.R. No. 160993, May 20, 2008, 554 SCRA 122, 134; Session Delights Ice and
Cream Fast Foods v. CA , G.R. No. 172149, February 8, 2010, citing Equitable Bank Corp.
v. Sadac , G.R. No. 164772, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 380, 417; and Navarro v.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company , G.R. No. 165697, August 4, 2009, citing Yau v.
Silverio, Sr., G.R. No. 158848, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 520, Social Security System v.
Isip, G.R. No. 165417, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 310, Lim v. Jabalde , G.R. No. 36786, April
17, 1989, 172 SCRA 211 (1983).
4.Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads: Time to intervene. — The
motion to intervene may be led at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served
on the original parties.
PERALTA, J., dissenting:
1.Rollo, p. 1202.
2.Based on the results of the May 10, 2010 elections, movant Congressman Francisco T.
Matugas is the Congressman-Elect of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte;
movants Hon. Sol T. Matugas and Hon. Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. are the Governor-Elect
and Vice-Governor-Elect, respectively, of the Province of Surigao del Norte; while
movants Hon. Simeon Vicente G. Castrence, Hon. Mamerto D. Galanida, Hon. Margarito
M. Longos, and Hon. Cesar M. Bagundol are the Board Members-Elect of the First
Provincial District of Surigao del Norte.
3.Entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE EFFECT OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
THE CASE OF "RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, ET AL. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA representing the President of the Philippines, ET AL." (G.R. No. 180050),
DECLARING THE CREATION OF THE PROVINCE OF DINAGAT ISLANDS AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL THEREBY REVERTING SAID PROVINCE TO ITS PREVIOUS
STATUS AS PART OF THE PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL NORTE.
4.Citing Heirs of Geronimo Restrivera v. De Guzman , G.R. No. 146540, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA
456.
5.G.R. No. 166429, February 1, 2006, 481 SCRA 457.

6.G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, 178056, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 636.
7.G.R. No. 130584, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 86, 97.
8.Emphasis supplied.
9.SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certi ed by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices a n d either of the
following requisites :
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers , as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or
is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis
supplied.)

10.For comparison, Section 461 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Article 9 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 are
reproduced:
The Local Government Code
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certi ed by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices a n d either of the
following requisites :
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers , as
is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
ART. 9. Provinces. — (a) Requisites for creation — A province shall not be created unless the
following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income — An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on
1991 constant prices, as certi ed by DOF. The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area — Population which shall not be less than two hundred fty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certi ed by National Statistics Of ce; or land area
which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certi ed by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if
it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or
cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall
be properly identified by metes and bounds. (Emphasis supplied.)
11.Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-34526, August 9, 1988, 164 SCRA 192.
12.G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485.
14.Tan v. Barrios, G.R. Nos. 85481-82, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 686.
15.No. L-28113, March 28, 1969.
16.308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
17.Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, supra note 15, p. 540.
19.No. L-73155, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 727, 741-742.
20.G.R. No. 166429, February 1, 2006, 481 SCRA 457.

21.Section 459, The Local Government Code of 1991.
22.SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certi ed by the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices
and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
24.G.R. No. 109455, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 728.

25.Rollo, p. 1202.
26.Id. at 1202.
27.Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Eight Revised Edition, Â© 2002, p.
381.
28.Id.
29.G.R. No. 153923, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 40, 46-47.
DEL CASTILLO, J., concurring:
1.193 U.S. 197, 400-411 (1904) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
2.6 U.S. 358 (1805).
3.Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution also provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected."
4.That "[t]he requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands."
5.Since the effectivity of the Local Government Code on January 11, 1992, no issue has been
raised concerning the land area requirement of provinces. The following provinces have
been successfully created since 1992 — Biliran, Guimaras, Saranggani, Kalinga, Apayao,
Compostela Valley, and Zamboanga Sibugay, and all of them had land areas of more
than 2,000 sq. km. each.
Biliran and Guimaras (previously subprovinces of Leyte and Iloilo, respectively) were
converted into regular provinces, pursuant to Sec. 462 of the Local Government Code.
Sec. 462 provides:
SEC. 462. Existing Sub-Provinces. — Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular
provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the
said subprovinces and the original provinces directly affected. The plebiscite shall be
conducted by the Comelec simultaneously with the national elections following the
effectivity of this Code.
Saranggani was separated from South Cotabato in accordance with Republic Act No. 7228,
An Act Creating the Province of Sarangani (1992). It has a land area of 3,972 sq. km.
(http://www.sarangani.gov.ph/seventowns.php).
Kalinga-Apayao was separated into the provinces of Kalinga and Apayao by virtue of
Republic Act No. 7878, An Act Converting the Sub-Provinces of Kalinga and Apayao Into
Regular Provinces to be Known as the Province of Kalinga and the Province of Apayao,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 4695 (1995). Kalinga has a land area of
3,164.3 sq. km. (http://www.nscb.gov.ph/rucar/fnf_kalinga.htm) while Apayao has a
land area of 4,120 sq. km. (http://www.nscb.gov.ph/rucar/fnf_apayao.htm)
Compostela Valley was separated from Davao by virtue of Republic Act No. 8470, An Act
Creating the Province of Compostela Valley from the Province of Davao Del Norte, and
for Other Purposes (1998), and has a land area of 4,667 sq. km.
(http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru11/prov_profile/comval.htm).
Zamboanga Sibugay was separated from Zamboanga del Sur by virtue of Republic Act No.
8973, An Act Creating the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay from the Province of
Zamboanga Del Sur and for Other Purposes (2000). It has a land area of 3,362.22 sq.
km. (http://www.zamboanga.com/zs/).
6.226 Phil. 624 (1986).
7.Tan v. Commission on Elections did not directly discuss the requirement of land area under
Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, but rather, concerned the proper construction of the "unit or
units affected" for a plebiscite. However, the Court did state that the "territory" in Section
197 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 was intended to apply to land area only.
8.Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit , G.R. No. 183517, June
22, 2010, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. AMS Farming Corporation , G.R. No.
174971, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 154, 183, Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Urgello , G.R. No. 162288, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 515, 535, and Smart
Communications, Inc. v. The City of Davao , G.R. No. 155491, September 16, 2008, 565
SCRA 237, 247-248.
9.United States v. Acres of Land Situated in Grenada and Yalobusha Counties Mississippi Jg
[1983] USCA5 583; 704 F.2d 800; 20 ERC 1025 (12 May 1983).

10.ACT NO. 1952, An Act to Provide for the Establishment of the Province of Batanes; to Amend
Paragraph Seven of Section Sixty Eight of Act Numbered Eleven Hundred Eighty Nine in
Certain Particulars; to Authorize the Approval of the Governor-General to extend the Time
for the Payment without Penalty and Taxes and Licenses; to Amend Section Five of Act
Numbered Fifteen Hundred and Eighty Two entitled the "Election Law" by Increasing the
Number of Delegates to the Philippine Assembly to Eighty One, and for other Purposes
(1909).
11.REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4669, An Act Separating the Subprovince of Camiguin from the Province
of Misamis Oriental and Establishing it as an Independent Province (1966).
12.REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6398, An Act Separating the Subprovince of Siquijor from the Province
of Oriental Negros and Establishing it as an Independent Province (1971).
13.Sec. 462 of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE.
14.Id.
15.ACT NO. 2880, An Act Authorizing the Separation of the Subprovince of Marinduque from
the Province of Tayabas and the Reestablishment of the Former Province of
Marinduque, and for other Purposes (1920).
16.Bicameral Conference Committee on Local Government (Book III), March 13, 1991, pp. 18-
28, in FN 14 of Justice Nachura's Reflections.
17.Enron Corp. v. Spring Independent School District , 922 S.W. 2d 931; Middleton v. Texas
Power & Light Co. (1919), 249 U.S. 152, at 157.
18.Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 234 Phil. 267, 272-273 (1987).
ABAD, J., concurring:
1.G.R, 176951, League of Cities, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., April 12, 2011.
2.Supra.
3.Supra.
4.Exodus 32:7-14

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011.]

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA ,

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS,

To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

LGC, Title IV, Chapter I

Section 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it

(i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square

WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven (7) municipalities, were

WHEREAS, respondents intend to le Motion[s] for Reconsideration on the above

a. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current

Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar circumstance of

xxx xxx xxx

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LGC-IRR : ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. — (a) Requisites for Creation — A

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,

WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations

Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian, 2 8 with respect to his . . .

Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is concerned, there is nothing to stop

"Dear Congressman Chiongbian:

We are in receipt of your letter of 17 October. Please be informed that your

Thank you and warm regards.

Very truly yours,"

Batanes is only six.

That is region? Camiguin has ve municipalities, with a population of 63

So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we

WHEREFORE , the Court resolved to:

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(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square

The Constitution provides for proportional representation in the House of

Members of Congress are entitled to an equal share of pork barrel funds

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BRION , J., dissenting :

T h e principle of immutability of a nal judgment stands as one of the

The doctrine of nality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations

This same principle, incidentally, is what we teach students in law schools as

PERALTA , J., dissenting :

With due respect to the ponente, I register my dissent.

The Of ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) led a motion for reconsideration in

On June 18, 2010, movants-intervenors Congressman Francisco T. Matugas,

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De ning legislative power, movants-intervenors cited Yakazi Torres

In view of the foregoing, movants-intervenors argued that the Local Government

Movants-intervenors' argument is unmeritorious. As cited in Yakazi Torres

Contrary to the contention of the movants-intervenors, Article 9 (2) of the Rules

It must be stressed that the movants-intervenors' assertion was already

(a) Income. — It must be suf cient, based on acceptable standards, to

(b) Population. — It shall be determined as the total number of

. . . The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative

SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if

Moreover, it should be pointed out that a province is "composed of a cluster of

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The ponente seeks for a liberal interpretation as regards the territorial

The Local Government Code provides that it is "[ t ] he general welfare

To stress, the motion for reconsideration led by movants-intervenors on the

DEL CASTILLO , J., concurring :

To implement the provisions of the LGC, the Oversight Committee (created