[CASE DIGEST] NAVARRO vs. ERMITA (G.R. No.

180050)
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL and RENE O. MEDINA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the
SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT
ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO
VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T.
MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G.
CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M.
BAGUNDOL, Intervenors

April 12, 2011

Ponente: Nachura, J.

FACTS:

Timeline of events:

➢ October 2, 2006: PGMA approved into law R.A. No. 9355, or An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands.

➢ November 10, 2006: Herein petitioners, who were former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed
before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9355. The said petition was dismissed on technical grounds.

Despite the initial dismissal of their petition, herein petitioners filed another petition for certiorari.
They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an
illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of
the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They
pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only
and a population of only 106,951. This was in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, viz:

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.

and of Section 461 of the LGC, viz:

Section 461. Requisites for Creation. x x x (i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office. x x x (b)
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

➢ December 3, 2006: The Comelec conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation
of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative
votes and 63,502 negative votes.
➢ January 26, 2007: The interim set of provincial officials of the Province of Dinagat Islands appointed by
PGMA took their oath of office.

➢ May 14, 2007: Registered voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands elected their new set of provincial
officials.

➢ February 10, 2010: The SC issued a 2nd resolution pertaining to the 2nd petition for certiorari filed by
herein petitioners. The SC declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the
requirements on population and land area in the creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, it
declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void. The SC's
decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, the land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of
the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.

➢ May 12, 2010: Prior to the June 2010 national elections, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 8790, which
indicated that once the SC’s 2nd resolution becomes final and executory before the June 2010
elections, then the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del Norte will remain as two
separate provinces. However, if the SC’s 2nd resolution becomes final and executory after the national
elections, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, which means the results of the 2010 election in Dinagat Islands
shall be nullified.

➢ June 18, 2010: Herein movants-intervenors, duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions
will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010
Resolution of the Comelec is not reversed, filed before the SC a motion for reconsideration of the
SC's February 20, 2010 resolution. They averred that: (1) the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as
an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity,
when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the
application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is
applicable in the instant case.

➢ July 20, 2010: The SC denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the
appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.

➢ September 7, 2010: Herein movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution, citing previous SC rulings allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that,
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. It was only
after they were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice Governor of Surigao del Norte and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of Surigao del Norte that they became possessed
with legal interest in this controversy.

➢ October 5, 2010: The SC issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had
become final and executory on May 18, 2010.

➢ October 29, 2010: Herein movants-intervenors filed an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment..

RULING:

Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment GRANTED. Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010 is GRANTED.
Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is GRANTED. The
Comelec’s May 12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.

The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of
one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID. Herein
petitioners’ petition to have R.A. No. 9355 declared unconstitutional is therefore DISMISSED.

Whether herein movants-intervenors have standing to intervene. – YES.

For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Because
constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons,
a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised.
This case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for certiorari way back on October 30, 2007. At
that time, movants-intervenors had nothing at stake in the outcome of this case.

Presently, though, it cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event
their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated May 12, 2010 is denied with finality. Indeed, they have sufficiently shown that they have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be not
reconsidered, their election to their respective positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its
concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to naught.

Given their unique circumstances, movants-intervenors should not be left without any remedy before
this Court simply because their interest in this case became manifest only after the case had already
been decided. The consequences of such a decision would definitely work to their disadvantage, nay,
to their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the dispute. Such decision would also
violate their right to due process, a right that cries out for protection. Thus, it is imperative that the
movants-intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause.

The motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution of
movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment of a case, which, though merely a
statutory right that must comply with the requirements of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial
system, such that courts should proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the
judgment and its effects, and ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be directly
affected, would have the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause, freed
from the constraints of technicalities.

The SC had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of attendant
extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final. In this
case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since
they would be adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties
thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to the
creation of local government units.

What are the criteria in the creation of LGUs? Which is more important?

The central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability,
efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria
prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these
results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of
these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.

The primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is
economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC as can be gleamed from the
transcript of House deliberations on the crafting of the LGC.

From the LGC, it can be seen that with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a
requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component
cities, and provinces, the three indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e.,
income, population, and land area, are provided for.

Whether the exemption from the land area requirement in the creation of component cities and
municipalities consisting of more than one islands as expressed in the LGC is similarly applicable in
the creation of provinces made up of two or more islands. – YES.

Whether the provision in the IRR of the LGC exempting provinces with more than one islands from the
land area requirement is valid even though such exemption is absent in the LGC. – YES.

When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the
land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is
absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the
LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

There appears no reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a
greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created
province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine
legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for
component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when
the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to
correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent.

This interpretation finds merit when the basic policy considerations underpinning the principle of local
autonomy are considered. Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case,
provides

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units.

Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local
autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units
should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results.

The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision (see Timeline in FACTS) could
prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical.
Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in
themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are
exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of
the LGC.

Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square
kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a
distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and
negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the
delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and
burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are
separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.

Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it
actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution.
Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity.

Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility,
or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative
history of the law, or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive
issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.

HOW THE IRR OF THE LGC WAS FORMULATED

The LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both the Executive
and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533[32] of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the
Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the
efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring
compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also
mandated by the Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain
decentralization and countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang
337, had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and cognizant of
the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption from the land
area requirement of local government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under
Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but
inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence, the void or
missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.

With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the
chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the
inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to
the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but
unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an
express provision in the LGC-IRR.
FILLING IN THE GAP

With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of
the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress
understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to
the LGC.

But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province,
enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect
to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect,
pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the
Island Province of Dinagat.

Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both
Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative
intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the
creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-
IRR.

Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is
NOT conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average
annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for
the creation of a province.

The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than
looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli
circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen
from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.

Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to
its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter,
and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit
differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within
the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the
intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation
that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.