Diane Pardoe/Sarah Pardoe

312 N. Kenwood St. Apt. A

Burbank, CA 91505
323.363.3803 Phone
[email protected]
[email protected]
Acting pro per

SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY

FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

) CASE NO. 22STLC04635

)
) AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR:
DIANE PARDOE and )
SARAH PARDOE, individuals, ) (1) BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT
Plaintiffs, ) (2) DECLARATIVE RELIEF RE: LABOR
) CODE §§ 1700.4(A) AND 1700.5 BEING,
vs. )
Electronically Received 08/23/2022 12:27 PM

ON THEIR FACE AND AS APPLIED,

) VIOLATIVE OF SUBSTANTIVE
JUDE SALAZAR, ) DUE PROCESS, EQUAL
an Individual, ) PROTECTION, COMMERCE
Defendant. ) CLAUSES, AND THE 8 TH
_______________________ ) AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED
) STATES CONSTITUTION
)

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff Diane Pardoe is an individual living and working in the County of Los
Angeles. Diane Pardoe has been an entertainment industry professional for almost two
decades, working primarily as a personal manager since 2008.

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
 2. Plaintiff Sarah Pardoe has had a varied entertainment career, working as an actor
for many years, and for over two years as a personal manager.
3. Defendant Jude Salazar is an individual living and working in the County of Los
Angeles. A law school graduate, she works as a brand consultant, model and actress.

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

4. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court as this controversy is first and foremost about
violations of state law and those actions are first to be heard in a superior court.
5. Venue is proper in this Court because the causes of action arose in Los Angeles
and Plaintiffs and Defendant currently reside and conduct business in this district (C.C.P.
§§393, 395(a).)

BACKGROUND AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

6. Diane Pardoe is a Los Angeles-based personal manager. In early 2020, her

daughter Sarah made the decision to transition from acting to working as a full-time
manager, partnering with her mother to start Iris Talent Management. Like all reputable
talent representatives, their compensation is commission-based, only paid when their
clients are employed by a studio, network, or other talent buyer.
7. On June 20, 2021, Jude Salazar contacted Plaintiffs through Instagram and said
she had met one of their clients on set and would “love to send over my stuff and chat with
you lovely ladies.” Plaintiffs, thinking Defendant had potential, agreed to represent her.
She was excited to sign, even recommending a close friend for Iris Talent Management to
represent, as well.
8. On June 26, 2021, Defendant signed the written management agreement. As
memorialized in the contract, the commission structure was 10% on any project she or her
agent booked, and 15% on any project Iris Talent Management facilitated (if the
audition/booking request first came to Plaintiffs before being turned over to the agent).
9. Plaintiffs submitted Defendant for projects on all three of the major casting sites,
highlighting her on their social media, advising her on her photoshoots, promoting her
with her theatrical agent and following-up on her behalf multiple times to build their
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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
 relationship; generally supporting and facilitating Defendant’s acting career. In less than a
month, Defendant booked her first commercial with Iris Talent Management: for
Hennessy Cognac.
10. On many occasions, Defendant shared her recognition of the representatives’
hard work. On November 30, 2021, she sent Plaintiffs an email saying, “Appreciate you
all very much.” On January 18, 2022: “Thanks for caring so early in the morning.
Appreciate you both.” On March 8, 2022: “Thank you ladies ❤️”.
11. On March 11, 2022, during a disagreement, Defendant stated that she wanted to
“end our existing contract.” Plaintiffs offered to stop submitting her and consider her
“booked-out” until their one-year contract concluded, but Defendant decided they should
keep working together at least until the initial term of her contract ended and all monies
were paid.
12. Plaintiffs continued to get Defendants auditions - and some of her subsequent
bookings are from those auditions. Defendant is using pictures Plaintiffs chose for her,
media Plaintiffs helped select and edit, and branding Plaintiffs played a part in crafting. In
short, Defendant did and is continuing to receive the benefit of the Plaintiffs’ labors.
13. On June 8th, 2022, Plaintiffs again made the contractual terms clear to
Defendant: that Defendant would continue to be bound by the contract until all monies
due were paid, as Defendant continued to receive monies on jobs procured during the
contract’s term, or they could alternatively agree to compromise on a mutually-beneficial
agreement regarding future revenues, and thus release her from her contract. Defendant
instead expressed her unwillingness to remit commissions on any projects she had booked
during the term, on any revenue received after the contract’s end. It is standard industry
practice, especially on commercial work, for talent representatives to be paid for however
long the advertising runs and monies for that job continue to accumulate, irrespective of
whether the artist has remained a client or not. It is, of course, fine for a client to leave
their representative. What is not fine, however, and a civil infraction, is for the artist to
also renege on the financial obligation to the personal manager.

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
 14. On June 17, 2022, Defendant declined a theatrical audition from Plaintiffs,
stating she was “unavailable for their shoot window.” When asked for her book-out dates,
Defendant stated it would be for over two weeks, completely covering the production’s
shoot schedule and taking her past the one-year term of the parties’ contract.
15. On June 22, 2022, Defendant sent Plaintiffs an email, copying attorney Max
Sprecher, stating she had terminated their Agreement. On June 24, 2022, she sent a further
email, also copying Max Sprecher, stating all Payment Authorization forms she had
signed were also terminated. She made numerous allegations that the Agreement &
Authorization forms were unenforceable, and that she had been “more than generous in
my attempt to remain amicable about this since March,” directing Plaintiff to
communicate with Mr. Sprecher moving forward.
16. Plaintiffs did reach out to Sprecher offering to discuss settlement terms, but Mr.
Sprecher was adamant: no further payments to the personal management firm would be
made. Plaintiffs have not been compensated for 4 projects (to their knowledge) that
Defendant booked while still under contract.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT

17. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference each and every allegation
of paragraphs 1-16.
18. Breach of contract occurs when a party involved in a written or oral contract
does not follow through on their part of the agreement. In the instant matter, Defendant
sought out Plaintiffs with the express desire for Plaintiffs to facilitate and guide her acting
career. Plaintiffs agreed to do just that, and, through their advice, consultation, and hard
work, Plaintiffs furthered Defendant’s career, in a manner to where Defendant’s objective
was reached: her career was furthered.
19. The parties made a written agreement to work together, where Plaintiffs came
aboard on a contingency, if/come basis, only receiving percentages of the compensation
Defendant received from employers.

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
 20. There is no dispute the parties entered into a written contract and the Defendant
received the benefit of that contract. This action has been initiated because Defendant has
refused to compensate Plaintiffs, leaving them without the benefit of their labors.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ALLEGATIONS

21. There is actual and present controversy between the parties hereto in that
Plaintiffs contend Defendant, via the application and enforcement of the TAA, deny
Plaintiffs of their Constitutional rights of Due Process and are subjected to indentured
servitude absent conviction of a crime in direct violation of the Commerce Clause, the
Commercial Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
and as the remedy Defendant aims to have affirmed is the ability to not remit the monies
due for the benefit of Plaintiffs’ labors, the due process rights provided by the Fifth
Amendment before extracting a criminal remedy. As Plaintiffs should be afforded these
Constitutional Rights, the TAA should be found unconstitutional facially and as applied,
and Defendant must be prohibited from accepting TAA controversies.

22. The enforcement of the TAA finds anyone without a valid talent agency
license working to procure employment opportunities in violation of law is based upon a
judicial mistake made in Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347 (1967).
23. Buchwald voided the contractual rights of the Jefferson Airplane’s personal
manager, using for authority to do so four State Supreme Court holdings1 which all in

1
Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382 (1914) holds that for an adjudicator to have the authority to impair or
void a violator’s contractual rights, the licensing scheme must “declare that a contract made by any one in
the conduct of the various businesses for which licenses are provided to be procured … be invalid.”
Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 262-263 (1920) holds, “The imposition by statute of a penalty implies a
prohibition of the act to which the penalty is attached, and a contract founded upon such act is void.”
As held in Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal. 2d 603, 607, the CA Supreme Court “has repeatedly
declared in this state that ‘a contract made contrary to the terms of a law designed for the protection of the
public and prescribing a penalty for the violation thereof is illegal and void, and no action may be brought
to enforce such contract.’”
Per Severance v. Knight-Counihan, 29 Cal. 2d 561 at 568, “The general rule controlling in cases of
this character is that where a statute prohibits or attaches a penalty to the doing of an act, the act is
void…” which hints that only a statute expressly prohibiting someone from engaging in a specific activity
is enough to render an activity unlawful. But Severance then immediately quotes Smith, likewise holding
that for an adjudicator to have authority to void a contract, there must be an “imposition by statute of a
penalty [which] implies a prohibition of the act to which the penalty is attached.”
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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
different ways find that when a licensing scheme provides a prohibition of activity and a
penalty for anyone engaging in a regulated activity without a license, the found violator
loses their right to contract.
24. The Talent Agencies Act, in Labor Code § 1700.4 (a), defines a talent agent
as one who procures employment opportunities for artists, and may in addition, counsel
or direct artists in the development of their careers.
25. The Act does not, however, have a statute expressly changing the procuring
of employment opportunities from a defining responsibility of a talent agent that anyone
licensed or unlicensed can do – like BPC § 5051 subdivisions (f) to (i); to a regulated
activity that reserves activities only for licensees, as § 5051 subdivisions (a) to (e) does
for those with a valid public accountancy license. Nowhere does it reserve the right to
find employment for artists to only those with a valid talent agency license.
26. This is not unique: several licensing schemes, like the CA. Landscape
Architects Act, which defines a landscape architect as one who maintains and beautifies
outdoor areas, or the CA Psychology Act, which defines psychologists as those who use
psychological principles to affect another’s behavior, have defining activities that do not
require a license.
27. Nor does the TAA have any notice of penalty.
“The Act is silent – completely silent – on the subject of the proper
remedy for illegal procurement.” Marathon v. Blasi, 42 Cal.4th 974, 991 (2008).
“The [Talent Agencies] Act has no remedy for its violation.” Id., at 991.
28. If Buchwald correctly followed the four holdings it claimed authority from,
because the TAA has no statute expressly prohibiting non-licensees from procuring
employment opportunities, and no statute that imposes a penalty to an unlicensed person
who procures, the Buchwald Court would have, as the Wood v. Krepps Court did when an
unlicensed locksmith was found to have done locksmithing without a license, ruled that it
had no authority to in any way impair or void the personal manager’s contract.

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
 29. The Buchwald error has been authority the Labor Commission has used ever
since to void all, and after Marathon at times some of an unlicensed talent representative’s
contractual rights. This mistake has led to some $500,000,000 of otherwise deserved
compensation to personal managers, attorneys, producers and other representatives that has
been forfeited, abandoned, diverted to litigators and/or settled out.
30. The mistake is in some ways caused by the unclear language of the Act,
which leaves it in part unconstitutional on its face, but even more, has created enforcement
that has rendered the Act unconstitutional as it is applied. By this Court properly declaring
that Buchwald cannot be followed, either because it was judicial error, or because an
adjudicator cannot choose to follow a Court of Appeals holding over four higher Court
rulings that find differently, and because procuring employment for an artist is an activity
anyone, licensed or unlicensed can engage in, there can be no TAA violation for procuring
work for an artist and thus no reason for the Labor Commission to be involved in this or
like contractual disputes.

31. The reason for the declaration is clear: without the declaration enjoining
Defendant from applying and enforcing the TAA, Plaintiffs and other like unlicensed talent
representatives who are acting lawfully will continue to be wrongly entwined into TAA
controversies and by being so victimized, be irreparably harmed.

FIRST CLAIM FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF:

With No Clarity As To Who Is Being Regulated, What, If Any, Activity Is Regulated,
And Devoid Of A Penalty Provision, The TAA Is Unconstitutionally Vague
(Due Process Clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution)

32. Paragraphs 1-31 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.

33. The TAA has neither a specific provision reserving the activity of procuring
employment for an artist to licensees nor one gives notice of consequence if a non-licensee
is found to have procured employment for an artist. The vague provisions of the TAA
violate Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights because there is no clarity that will enable
Plaintiffs to reasonably ascertain what specific activities are being restricted, and the lack of
clarity will continue to make application of the TAA in a uniform manner unattainable. As
written the TAA permits multiple interpretations with no standards to govern application of

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
its provisions, in violation of law. E.g., Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, 376-77;
State Board of Education v. Honig (3rd Dist. 1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 720, 750.
34. For a law to pass the bar of constitutionality, there must be clear notice of (1)
who is being regulated, (2) notice of what activities are being regulated or prohibited, and
(3) clear notice of the consequence if one wrongly engages in the regulated activity. (See
Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, Virginia Law Review (Sept. 1973),
Vol. 59, No. 6, pg. 1108.) As the TAA fails on all three fronts, it is unconstitutionally vague
on its face.
35. Though this is a civil matter, the penalties meted out, which is the voiding of
the right for the unlicensed person to be paid for the job they did, is a criminal penalty. As
stated in the Thirteenth Amendment, no adjudicator has the right to void the right for
someone to receive the benefit for their labor, “except as a punishment for a crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted.”

SECOND CLAIM FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF:

In Enforcing A Prohibition and Remedy That Do Not Exist,
The Act As Applied Is Unconstitutional
(Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution)

36. Paragraphs 1-35 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.

37. The 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part: “No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
process without due process of law….”
38. The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution extends through its
Due Process Clause so as to apply against state government agencies.
39. The enforcement of the TAA ignores the Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to
notice and reasonable opportunity to know what is required and prohibited. No law can be
drafted or interpreted to encourage or facilitate arbitrary and potentially discriminatory
enforcement. See City of Chicago v. Morales (1999) 527 U.S. 41, 52, 58-59; Kolender v.
Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357; Smith v. Gougen (1972) 415 U.S. 566, 575.
40. Assigning penalties without statutory guideposts “is a task outside the bounds
of judicial interpretation … We could do no more than make speculation law.” U.S. v.
Evans (1948) 333 U.S. 483, 495. “Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in this Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct
that will subject him to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose.” BMW of America v. Gore (1995) 517 U.S. 559, 574. “Engrained in our concept of
due process is the requirement of notice. Notice is sometimes essential so that the citizen
has the chance to defend charges. Notice is required before property interests are disturbed,
before assessments are made, before penalties are assessed.” Wolff v. Fox (1977) 68 Cal.
App. 3d 280 citing Lambert v. California (1957) 355 U.S. 225, 228.

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
 41. The vague, uncertain and inconsistent provisions and enforcement of the TAA
violate Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights. As written, the TAA permits multiple
interpretations with no standards to govern application of its provisions, in violation of law.
42. The enforcement of the Talent Agencies Act: (1) regulates activity, allowing
only licensed talent agents to engage in the occupation’s defined activity, attempting and/or
procuring employment opportunities for artists; and (2) that those found to have procured
employment without a license will lose their right to contract, an action that can only be
proper when meting out a penalty for a criminal act.
43. For this enforcement to pass the bar of constitutionality there must be clear
notice that: (1) anyone who attempts to procure is being regulated, (2) clear notice that only
those licensed as talent agents may procure, and (3) clear notice of what the
consequence/penalty will be if one wrongly engages in the regulated activity. The TAA
fails on all three fronts.
44. The current verbiage employed by the TAA fails to set forth with any
ascertainable certainty who or what person(s) are to be subject to the restrictions contained
in the TAA.
45. ‘Procure employment’ has never been defined by any court. The uncertainty
of knowing when such activity may or not have occurred has left Plaintiffs uncertain and
highly apprehensive about the permissible parameters of their daily activity.
46. The enactment and enforcement of the TAA, mandating that anyone who
procures work for an artist be licensed, unreasonably precludes Plaintiffs from performing
tasks directly related to its occupation of furthering their clients’ careers while at the same
time depriving Plaintiffs of their right to be properly compensated for their labor.
47. The enactment and enforcement of the TAA under color of State law
impermissibly infringes upon the right of Plaintiffs to pursue life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness while denying Plaintiffs compensation for their efforts.
48. Based on the aforementioned lack of specificity with regard to who or what is
to be regulated the TAA is Constitutionally deficient on its face and thus should be found
unconstitutional. Similarly, the Labor Commission’s creating remedies that the state’s
Legislature had withheld is unconstitutional as applied and thus should be found
unconstitutional. If there is no notice of penalties, no penalties can be meted out.
49. As a direct and proximate result of these violations of the 14th Amendment,
Plaintiffs have and will continue to suffer irreparable harm, entitling Plaintiffs to
declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

THIRD CLAIM FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF:

Disgorging The Right To Benefit From Ones’ Labor Without Claims of Fraud,
Non-Performance, Or Findings Of Criminality, TAA Enforcement Is Unconstitutional
(U.S. Constitution 13th Amendment)

50. Paragraphs 1-49 are alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

51. Those who bring petitions to the Labor Commission request the disgorgement
of their obligation to pay the alleged violator of the TAA for the work done on their behest
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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
and for their benefit. With no allegations of fraud or non-performance and no criminality –
Section § 1700.44(b) expressly states that the “failure of any person to obtain a license from
the Labor Commissioner pursuant to this chapter shall not be considered a criminal act
under any law of this state,” the disgorging of the right to compensation for those who are
found to have violated the Act is a violation of the 13 th Amendment.
52. The 13th Amendment of the United States Constitution states in part: “Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, nor any place subject to their
jurisdiction.”
53. The enactment, application and enforcement of the TAA is contrary and
infringes upon Plaintiffs’ 13th Amendment right against involuntary servitude unless as
punishment for commission of a crime.
54. Plaintiffs were hired, supervised, paid and fired by Defendant, and are paid
exclusively on the contingency of success, through commissions based on a percentage,
usually between 10% and 15%, of the artist’s income.
55. As the current application and enforcement of the Talent Agencies Act affects
Plaintiffs being paid for their labor without being convicted of a crime, with no language
prohibiting enforcement of contracts by an unlicensed talent agent, it conflicts with every
tenet of statutory construction, the doctrine of ejusdem generis, and is unconstitutional.
56. To be compliant with the 13th Amendment, the rights to the benefit of one’s
labor can only be voided when there is: (1) a statute stating that such labor was criminal;
and (2) the person whose rights to payment for their labors have been forfeited must have
been found duly convicted of that crime.
57. The Talent Agencies Act expressly states that the “failure of any person to
obtain a license from the Labor Commissioner pursuant to this chapter shall not be
considered a criminal act under any law of this state” (§ 1700.44(b)).
58. As a direct result and proximate result of the violation of Plaintiffs’ 13th
Amendment rights, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm,
including the loss of their Constitutional rights, entitling Plaintiffs to declaratory and
injunctive relief, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
59. Plaintiffs seek such equitable relief and other relief precluding Defendant
from applying and enforcing the TAA. Other than this action for injunctive and declaratory
relief, Plaintiffs have no clear, speedy and effective remedy for deprivation of their rights,
privileges and immunities.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF:

With No Rationality Between The Remedy Of Disgorging Compensation And The
Activity Found Violators Are Being Punished, The Act is Unconstitutional As Applied
(U.S. Constitution 8th Amendment)
60. Paragraphs 1-59 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
 61. The Labor Commission metes out only one remedy when it finds someone
has violated the TAA’s licensing scheme: the disgorgement of full voidance of their right to
compensation.
62. Applicable either if the disgorgement is considered civil (see Austin v United
States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) or as the Plaintiffs allege, criminal, the forfeiture of what is on
a regular basis millions of dollars for a licensing infraction where the legislature withheld
all remedies must be viewed as a violation of The Excessive Fines Clause of the 8th
Amendment. This Amendment was ratified in part to ensure that no American was
burdened with a legal penalty that has no rationality with the activity they engaged in.
63. The 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ensures that no “excessive fines,
nor cruel and unusual punishments” are inflicted on its citizens.
64. The Amendment limits the Government's power to extract payments, whether
in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense. Forfeitures – payments in kind – are
thus fines if they constitute punishment for an offense.
65. The 8th Amendment is applicable for civil forfeitures when the forfeiture is
directly related to the commission of an infraction and utilized to deter and punish.
66. While the instant Plaintiffs allege the disgorging of contracts resulting here
would result in the forfeiture of $10,000 - $20,000, found infraction of trying to obtain
employment for a client looking for employment, despite no claims of either damage or
harm, can be in the hundreds of thousands and in several instances many millions of
dollars. As such, it is excessively harsh. The government gets all its requested taxes and
Defendant receives their requested benefit. Thus, there is no rational relationship between
these disgorgements and the activity, even if they were in fact infractions, and thus the
remedy clearly is excessive. The lack of relationship between the punishment meted out
and the appropriate punishment the Legislature chose to codify – none – also makes the
penalty, or any penalty, infinitely excessive.
67. As a direct and proximate result of this violation of Plaintiffs’ 8th Amendment
rights, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm, including the
loss of their Constitutional rights, entitling Plaintiffs to declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201 and 2202.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF:

Enforcement Of The Act Violates The Free Commercial Speech Clause
Of The United States Constitution
(U.S. Constitution 1st Amendment)

68. Paragraphs 1-67 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.

69. The 1st Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part:
“Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech… or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble....”
70. The 1st Amendment to the United States Constitution extends through its Due
Process Clause so as to apply against state government agencies.

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
 71. The enforcement of the TAA has resulted in disgorgement of compensation
payable to personal managers for their alleged attempts to procure employment as the result
of such common commercial free speech activities as “sending out resumes and
photographs”, “distributing resume and videotapes”, and sending “written materials.”
72. The enforcement of the TAA restricts Plaintiffs’ commercial speech and does
not directly advance a substantial state interest and is far more extensive than necessary.
73. The enforcement of the TAA, resulting in disgorgement of compensation
payable to Plaintiffs, imposes more than an incidental burden on “protected expression” and
“imposes a burden based on the content of speech and the identity of the speaker.
75. Freedom of association is the individual right guaranteed by the 1st
Amendment to come together with other individuals and collectively express, promote,
pursue and defend common interests.
76. The enforcement of the TAA, mandating that anyone who attempts to procure
work for an artist be licensed unreasonably precludes Plaintiffs from communicating and
performing tasks directly related to their occupation of furthering their clients’ careers
while at the same time depriving Plaintiffs of their right to be properly compensated for
their labor.
77. The enforcement of the TAA under color of State law impermissibly infringes
upon the right of Plaintiffs to pursue constitutionally protected freedoms of expression and
association while denying compensation for their efforts.
78. As a direct and proximate result of this violation of Plaintiffs’ 1st Amendment
Rights, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm, including the
loss of their Constitutional rights, entitling Plaintiffs to declaratory relief, under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201 and 2202.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

This lawsuit asks a judge to rule that Jude Salazar made an agreement to compensate
Plaintiffs, enjoyed the benefits of Plaintiffs’ labors, then refused to honor her financial
commitments. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the following relief:
1. For compensatory, consequential and incidental damages to be determined at
trial, together with interest on this sum at the prevailing or legal rate,
whichever is greater;
2. For a declaration that the California Labor Code §§1700 et seq., commonly
referred to as the “Talent Agency Act” is, on its face and as applied, vague
and overbroad and in violation of Plaintiffs’ right to Due Process under the
14th Amendment;

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
 3. For a declaration that the California Labor Code §§1700 et seq., commonly
referred to as the “Talent Agency Act” is, on its face and as applied, vague
and overbroad and in violation of Plaintiffs’ right against indentured servitude
under the 13th Amendment;
4. For a declaration that the California Labor Code §§1700 et seq., commonly
referred to as the “Talent Agency Act” is, on its face and as applied, in direct
violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution;
5. For a declaration that the California Labor Code §§1700 et seq., commonly
referred to as the “Talent Agency Act” is, on its face and as applied, in
violation of Plaintiffs’ right to Free Speech under the 1 st Amendment;
6. For Plaintiffs’ costs of suit; and
7. For such other relief as the court deems just, equitable and proper.

Signed by,
___________________ ___________________
Plaintiffs

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF
 PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

On August , 2022, I served the interested party in the action entitled DIANE
PARDOE AND SARAH PARDOE v. JUDE SALAZAR by placing a true copy
thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope as follows:

[ X ] BY U.S. MAIL I deposited such an envelope in the mail at Los Angeles,

California, with postage thereon fully prepaid.

[ ] BY FAX I caused such documents to be faxed to the

above mentioned address(es).

[ ] BY MESSENGER I caused such envelope to be messengered to the above

mentioned address(es).

[ ] BY PERSONAL I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the

offices of the SERVICE address(es).

[ X ] STATE I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the
State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

[ ] FEDERAL I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of

the bar of this Court whose direction the service was
made.

Executed on _________, 2022 in Los Angeles, California

_________________________
Name (printed): _________________

14

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATIVE RELIEF