Appellant's Opening Brief: PARDOE v. SALAZAR

CASE: B336831
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION 5
______________________________________________________
DIANE PARDOE et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents
v.
JUDE SALAZAR,
Respondent;
RICK SIEGEL,
Intervener and Appellant
______________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
______________________________________________________
Appeal from the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles
The Hon. Barbara Meiers, Judge Presiding Superior Court
Case No. 23STCP00683
______________________________________________________
SUBMITTED BY
Rick Siegel: 22971 Darien Street, Woodland Hills CA 91364 323.864.7474
[email protected] Pro Per for Appellant/Intervener
TABLE OF CONTENTS Pg. 2
FEDERAL CASES Pg. 4
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS Pg. 4
CALIFORNIA STATE CASES Pg. 4
CALIFORNIA STATE STATUTES Pg. 5
LEGAL PUBLICATIONS/LEGISLATIVE REPORT Pg. 6
LEGAL PUBLICATION Pg. 6
LEGISLATIVE REPORT Pg. 6
I. INTRODUCTION Pg. 7
II. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION AND ADJUDICATION Pg. 8
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Pg. 9
IV. NATURE OF THE CASE Pg. 10
V. FACTS, PROCEDURES & TIMELINESS OF APPEAL Pg. 11
VI. LEGAL ARGUMENT Pg. 17
A. History of the Legislation Pg. 18
B. Case Law Is Immaterial When Courts Are Ascertaining
Legislative Intent Pg. 24
C. The Commissioner’s Interpretation and Enforcement Of The
TAA Violates At Least 14 Of The Supreme Court’s 23 Rules
Of Statutory Construction (“RSC”) Pg. 25
1. The Commissioner’s Interpretation Conflicts
With RSC Rule 1, 2, 3, and 22 Pg. 25

With RSC Rule 4 Pg. 32
2
D. The Commissioner Ruling Civil Code §§ 1598 and 1599 Is The
Penalty Provision For The TAA Is Legally Unsupportable Pg. 47
E. As Applied, the TAA Violates the Excessive Fines Clause Of
The 8th Amendment of the United States Constitution Pg. 48
F. The Genesis Of The Misenforcement Pg. 51
G. The Superior Court Ignored The Need To Consider These
Matters De Novo Pg. 57
VII. CONCLUSION Pg. 50
3
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
8th Amendment/Excessive Penalties Clause Pgs. 8, 12, 48-51

13th Amendment Pg. 9, 25
14th Amendment/Due Process Clause Pgs. 8, 11-12, 41-42
14th Amendment/Equal Protection Clause Pgs. 8, 11-12, 41-42
FEDERAL CASES
BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) Pg. 39

Chevron USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) Pg. 17-18
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) Pg. 39-42
Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147 Pgs. 30-32
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) Pg. 38-39
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) Pg. 38, 41
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 35 (1983) Pg. 33
Lambert v. California 355 U.S. 225 (1957) Pg. 33-34
Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566 (1972) Pg. 33
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) Pg. 49, 50
Waters Pierce Oil Co. v Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909) Pg. 50
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998) Pg. 49-50
United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948) Pg. 34-35
CALIFORNIA STATE CASES
Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347 (1967) Pgs. 53-57
Consumer Advocacy Group Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America
150 Cal.App.4th 953 (2007) Pg. 34
De Anza Santa Cruise Mobil Estates Homeowners Assn. v.
De Anza Santa Cruz Mobile Estates, 94 Cal.App.4th 890 Pg. 34
Dyna-Med v. Fair Emp & Hous. Comm., 43 Cal. 3d 1385 (1987) Pgs. 28, 35, 38
Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, 11 Cal.5th 158 (2001) Pg. 17
Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal. 2d 603 (1949) Pgs. 53-55
Marathon v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974 (2008) Pgs. 20, 23, 26, 27, 32, 34, 39-40, 43, 45, 47, 48, 57
People v. Turnage, 55 Cal.4th 62 (2012) Pg. 49
4
Peralta v. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm., 52 Cal. 3d 40 (1990) Pgs. 28, 35, 38
Radin v Laurie, 120 Cal. App. 2d 778 (1953) Pgs. 52-54
Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co., 29 Cal.2d 561 (1947) Pgs. 53-54
Sierra Club v Superior Ct. of Orange County, 57 Cal.4th 157 (2013) Pg. 17
Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259 (1920) Pgs. 31, 52-54
Southfield v. Barrett, 13 Cal.App.3d 290 Pg. 30
Styne v. Stevens, 26 Cal.4th 42 (2002) Pgs. 11-13, 17, 56
Wachs v. Curry, 13 Cal.App.4th 616 (1993) Pgs. 39, 56
Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382 (1914) Pgs. 27, 53-54
FEDERAL STATUTE
42. U.S.C. § 1983 Pg. 9
CALIFORNIA STATE STATUTES
California Civil Code
§ 52.3 (a) Pgs. 9
§ 1598 Pgs. 13, 43-44, 47-48
§ 1599 Pgs. 12, 36
CA Labor Code
§ 1700 et seq Pgs. 7, 13
§ 1700 Pgs. 18, 30, 44
§ 1700.4 Pgs. 22, 24, 26
§ 1700.4 (a) Pgs. 12, 13, 20, 22, 25, 26, 32, 33, 46, 47
§ 1700.4 (b) Pg. 7 fn, 26
§ 1700.5 Pgs. 26, 29-30, 43, 47
§ 1700.29 Pg. 42
§ 1700.30 Pg. 22
§ 1700.44 (a) Pg. 7 (fn), 57
§ 1700.44 (b) Pg. 49
§ 1700.44 (c) Pg. 36
§ 1700.44 (d) Pg. 40
§ 1700.46 Pgs. 22, 24,
CA Business & Professions Code (BPC)
§ 1203 Pg. 28
§ 1270 Pg. 28
§ 1280 Pg. 36
§ 1281 Pg. 28
§ 1287 Pg. 36
§ 1700 Pg. 28, 36
5
§ 2052 Pg. 28
§ 2521 Pg. 36
§ 2790 Pg. 36
§ 2799 Pg. 36
§ 2861 Pg. 31
§ 2903 Pg. 30
§ 2861 Pg. 31
§ 2970 Pg. 29
§ 3760 (a), (b) Pg. 29
§ 4051 Pg. 29
§ 4825 Pg. 29
§ 4935 Pg. 29
§ 5120 Pg. 36
§ 5615 Pg. 31
§ 5640 Pg. 37
§ 6730 Pg. 29
§ 6980 Pg. 29
§§ 7026-7028 Pg. 35, 37
§ 7031 Pg. 35
§ 7402 Pg. 37
§ 7523 Pg. 37
§§ 7802-7803 Pg. 31
§ 7830 Pg. 29
§ 8550 Pg. 29
§ 10139 Pg. 357
Artists Managers Act
§ 1650 - 1661 Pgs. 20-21
General Employment Agencies Act
§ 1643 Pg. 52
§ 1644 Pg. 52
§ 1648 Pg. 52
Private Employment Agencies Act Pg. 18
LABOR COMMISSION DETERMINATIONS

Salazar v. Pardoe, TAC 52864 Pg. 7fn, 24, 42, 43, 47
Wesley Snipes v. Robinson Management, TAC 36-96 Pg. 46-47
6
I. INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal of a superior court’s rubber stamp, 1 rather than the de
novo review as legally required, from a determination by the CA State Labor
Commissioner (“CLC”, “Commissioner”) of a CA Talent Agencies Act (CA
Labor Code § 1700 et seq, “TAA”, “Act”) controversy.
Respondent alleged Appellants violated the Act by procuring
employment opportunities for her without a talent agency license. Appellants
argue the TAA, as written, neither statutorily reserves the procurement of
employment opportunities for an artist for licensees, nor has the Legislature
ever created and codified a penalty provision for unlicensed procuring 2 and
thus, entwining unlicensed persons in such controversies is an extrajudicial,
unconstitutional violation of unlicensed persons’ civil rights.
As detailed herein, the Commissioner is solely responsible for inventing
the prohibition, the voidance and choose to protect the legally unsupportable
enforcement without care for the businesses and lives affected by her actions.
The Court has the power and as the CA Supreme Court (“CSC”) and
United States Supreme Court (“U.S.S.C.”) hold, the responsibility to stop it.
1
The Superior Court Order, in full: “It is hereby adjudged and decreed that the Labor Commission Ruling of February
17, 2023 is affirmed. In accordance therewith, it is further adjudged that respondent Jude Salazar is to recover from
Diane Pardoe and Sara Pardoe, jointly and severally, the sum of $8,713.74 plus interest at a rate of 10% from February
17, 2023, in the sum of $726 for a total of $9,439.74.” giving no explanation as to why Appellants’ claims regarding
precedent, statutory issues and constitutionality – which the CLC did not and cannot consider – were rejected, despite
CA Civil Code 1700.44 (a) requiring the appeal to be “heard de novo.”
2
This and every future mention of the terms ‘procurement’, ‘procuring,’ ‘procurer’, or ‘procure’ mean procuring
employment opportunities for an artist, and every mention of the term ‘artist’ is as defined in CA Labor Code § 1700.4
(b): an actor, writer, performer or other creative “rendering professional services in motion picture, theatrical, radio,
television and other entertainment enterprises.”
7
II. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION AND ADJUDICATION
Violations of law are “made up of two parts, forbidden conduct and a
prescribed penalty. The former without the latter is no [violation].” Wayne
R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(d) (1st ed. 1986).
The TAA as written neither bars nor penalizes unlicensed procurement.
With these facts, Appellants ask this Court to determine if the TAA:
(1) Provides clear notice anyone procuring employment for artists,

and specifically personal managers, are subject to regulation,
and if not, does the Act violate the equal protection and
substantive due process clauses of the 14th Amendment?
(2) Without a provision expressly barring unlicensed persons or
one reserving procurement for licensees, is there clear notice
procuring employment is a regulated activity, and if not, is the
Act unconstitutional on its face, violating the equal protection
and substantive due process clauses of the 14th Amendment?
(3) Without the Act having a statute expressly barring such
activities, is there clear notice that persons procuring without a
license are acting unlawfully, and if not, is the Act is
unconstitutional as applied, violating the 14th Amendment’s
substantive due process and equal protection clauses?
(4) Does meting out never-codified remedies violate the due
process clause and equal protection clauses of the 14th and the
excessive penalties clause of the 8th Amendment?
(5) Is voiding the contractual rights of unlicensed persons without
statutory authority violates, among others, the basic civil right
of ensuring all persons receive the benefit of their labors
unconstitutional as applied by the Commissioner?
8
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Seventy-one years ago, the California Labor Commissioner pressed a
court of appeal to enforce a prohibition and remedy that had been enacted for
other employment licensing schemes, but as the Commissioner knew, were
not codified for the scheme regulating artists’ managers.
Every Commissioner since, either knowing or having the responsibility
to know neither the TAA nor its antecedent Artists Managers Act (“AMA”)
prohibits or has a remedy for unlicensed procurement, has unconstitutionally
enforced imaginary prohibitions and remedies and extrajudicially voided the
contractual rights of found violators, depriving unlicensed persons acting
lawfully of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured and protected by
the Constitution and the laws of California.
With no clarity as to who is being regulated, the Act is unconstitutional
on its face. By interpreting the Act as if there is authority to prohibit and
penalize unlicensed procurers when there is not, it is unconstitutional as it is
applied. In accepting, adjudicating, and ruling on petitions for controversy
based on allegations of unlicensed procurement, when procurement is a
lawful activity irrespective of one’s licensing status, the Commissioner and
all involved knowingly and inexplicably ignore a multitude of rules of
statutory construction, and in the prose violate CA Civil Code § 52.3 (a) and
42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with the Eighth and Thirteenth Amendments of the
United States.
9
IV. NATURE OF THE CASE
The Respondent is an actress; an artist as defined in CA Labor Code
1700.4 (b). Appellants and assignee are managers.3
In the entertainment industry, the artist is the chairman of the board and
the product being sold, synonymous to being Steve Jobs and the iPhone.
Publicists are the vice-presidents of public relations, transactional
attorneys the vp’s of business affairs, talent agents the vp’s of sales. Each are
involved with creating revenue; procurement. And all report to the artist’s
CEO: the manager, who supervise all professional aspects of their clients’
careers; provide guidance, create and direct the marketing strategies; once
appropriate, solicit the other professionals to join the team; and like CEOs of
all small businesses, managers must engage in the defining activities of the
other occupations until the artist has developed enough to when other reps
sign on to collaborate for the goal of changing their artists’ career plateaus.
As such, whether working solo for their client or overseeing a team of
representatives, it is absurd to think managers can fulfill their responsibilities
while remaining apart from the creating revenue for artists. If there were laws
forbidding it, the occupation of personal management would be for all intent
and purposes, forbidden. But no such laws exist, except by the wrongful and
unconstitutional practices of the Commissioner.
3
This and all future uses of the terms ‘managers’ and ‘manager’ unless otherwise noted denotes
personal manager.
10
V. FACTS, PROCEDURES & TIMELINESS OF APPEAL
Appellants filed this timely appeal on February 4, 2024, after a superior
court final judgment affirming a CLC ruling on January 23, 2024.
The matter began with a breach of contract suit against Respondent filed
on June 17, 2022, Case No. 22STLC04635 (Appendix Document (“Doc.”)
1). On July 19, 2022, Respondent petitioned the Commissioner, claiming
Appellants had procured employment for her without a talent agency license
(Doc. 2), and on August 3, 2022, Respondent filed a Motion To Stay the
superior court proceedings until the TAA case was adjudicated. (Doc. 3)
On August 23, 2022, Appellants filed an opposition to the stay motion,
asking the superior court to follow the instructions of Styne v. Stevens, 26
Cal.4th 42, 59 fn. 10 (2001) and determine if unlicensed procurement was a
colorable claim before referring the case to the administrative agency,
arguing that as the TAA has no prohibition or remedy statutes, there was no
colorable claim to adjudicate. (Doc. 6)
Appellants simultaneously submitted an amended complaint (Doc. 5)
with these additional claims:
(1) The TAA is unconstitutional on its face, violating the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment, because the Act has no clarity as to:
(a) who is being regulated;
(b) what activities are regulated or prohibited, and
(c) notice of consequences if one wrongly engages in
the regulated activity.
11
(2) By enforcing a prohibition and remedy that do not exist
against a specific group of people, CA Labor Code §§ 1700.4
(a) and 1700.5 violate the substantive due process clause of
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
(3) By denying Appellants’ right of the benefit of their labors

without finding of criminality, the enforcement violates the
13th Amendment;
(4) With no rationality between the remedy of voidance and that

the Legislature never chose to make unlicensed procurement
a violation of law, no less giving authority to in any way
infringe on an alleged violator’s right to contract, and among
others, the Act violates the Excessive Penalties Clause of the
8th Amendment.
On October 4, 2022, Appellants submitted a Motion for Summary
Judgment, citing 33 different State and United States Supreme Court
precedents in their motion, in particular, how Styne expressly directs the
superior court to consider and opine on without there being a prohibitionary
or penalty statute, whether alleging unlawful procurement is a colorable
claim, elucidating how the CLC’s ruling was legally unsupportable. (Doc. 7)
The hearing on the summary motion was set for January 11, 2023.
On October 12, 2022, Respondent submitted her reply in support of the
stay motion, claiming Appellants failed to support their arguments with any
legal authority. (Doc. 8)
On October 20, 2022 a hearing on the stay was held. A substitute judge
was on the bench, beginning the hearing by saying he did not have the time
12
to read the submitted papers. Ignoring Styne, the court ruled it was the CLC’s
purview to determine if there was a colorable claim and the stay was granted.
(Doc. 9.) Appellants are unable to submit transcripts of this or any hearing
before learning after the November 9, 2023 trial Los Angeles courts no longer
provide court reporters, nor do they record, proceedings, which can, as it did
here, compromise the efforts of those unknowing of this change and/or
cannot afford those costs.
On December 28, 2022, Appellants responded to Respondent’s accepted
CLC petition with a Motion for Directed Verdict (Doc. 10), asking the Labor
Commissioner to find:
1. neither § 1700.4 (a) nor any TAA statute expressly

reserves procurement for those with talent agency
licenses; and
2. as the TAA has no statutory remedy for unlicensed

procuring, unlicensed procurement is a lawful activity.
As the administrative agency is neither empowered nor will not rule on
constitutional claims; Appellants did not raise them in that forum.
On February 23, 2023, the Commissioner found Appellants had
unlawfully procured and voided Appellants’ contractual rights, finding their
authority to void not inside the TAA, CA Labor Code § 1700 et seq, but in a
wholly different set of laws: CA Civil Code §§ 1598 and 1599. (Doc. 12.)
Appellants filed the appeal of the CLC ruling March 2, 2023. For
procedural reasons, the appeal was a new case: 23STPCP00683.
13
Notices of Related cases were subsequently filed. (Doc. 13)
In a pre-conference brief and at the case management conference for
23STPC00683 held on September 12, 2023, Appellants requested a standard
appeals briefing schedule and a hearing; noting the facts in the case were
undisputed – Appellants stipulated they were unlicensed and procured – and
legal issues are appropriately decided by briefing. (Docs. 14-15.)
That request was denied and a trial date was set for November 9, 2023.
Along with the November trial date for the CLC appeal, the Court set a
case management conference for the original action/22STLC04635 for
January 2, 2024. However, Judge Meiers voiced her assumption the breach
of contract action conference would be moot, that once she rejected and
disposed the Labor Commission appeal, the breach claims would be mooted.
This was a clearly prejudicial statement by the bench, a declaration hearing
any claims/defenses/arguments are presented, her mind was made up: the
Labor Commission’s ruling would be affirmed. 4
As Appellants were still unaware court reporters are not axiomatically
provided and must be enlisted by litigants, the judge’s prejudice, which
played out just as she foretold, is not a basis for appeal. (Subsequent choices
where controlling law was ignored are the basis of this appeal.)
4
Appellants are unable to submit transcripts of this or any hearing before learning after the
November 9, 2023 trial Los Angeles courts no longer provide court reporters, nor do they record,
proceedings, which can, as it did here, compromise the efforts of those unknowing of this change
and/or cannot afford those costs.
14
On September 18, 2023, Appellants filed an ex parte motion asking for
clarification, noting as the issues were legal, not factual, having stipulated to
being unlicensed and having procured, briefing was the better way to forward
argument. On September 20, 2023, the motion was denied. (Doc. 16-17)
Appellants then filed motions to continue the trial and for summary
judgment, which again would allow the parties to fully detail their positions
and allow for a hearing on the legal and constitutional claims. (Doc 18.) The
bench denied both motions in an October 12, 2024 hearing, ruling Appellants
waited “over a year” to file the MSJ. In truth, the need the motion became
ripe only 21 days before when the Court denied standard appeal briefings and
just two months Judge Meiers combined and took on the related cases.
A trial on the appeal was held on November 9, 2023. After some two-
hours of testimony accusing Appellants of procuring, which they had already
stipulated to, a tentative was issued for Respondent, with the codicil the
bench will subsequently read the submitted papers to see if anything changes
her mind. The judge did not entertain any legal argument.
On November 16, 2023, the Court was given notice Rick Siegel had been
assigned all rights to on the cases. (Doc. 22). The Court refused to accept the
assignment for the appeal of the CLC ruling it came after the judgment. The
judgment was rendered seven weeks later: January 5, 2024. (Doc. 23)
On January 4, the Court issued an order finding “that the Labor
Commission Ruling of February 17, 2003 which is and has been the subject
15
of an appeal heard by this court [23STPC00683] is affirmed” and as
promised in the September 12, 2023 hearing, vacated the case management
conference for 22STLCO4635 scheduled for January 8, 20
In affirming the CLC without the de novo review as statutorily required,
the Superior Court ruling did not consider and opine the reasons for the
appeal: to have the court decide the relevant precedential and statutory issues.
Appellants submitted an ex parte motion for reconsideration, wanting
the court to consider and opine the unanswered issues. At the ex parte
hearing, where Assignee was barred from speaking, the Court agreed to hear
that motion on January 23, 2024. (Doc. 26.)
On January 23, 2024, with the applications for substitution submitted,
the Court accepted Assignee into case, but refused to remove Appellants. At
that hearing, the Court only heard discussion about Res Judicata, denying
Appellants the opportunity “to argue the merits of the case” (Doc. 28).
Among the other issues the Bench refused to consider: the constitutional
claims of the Amended Complaint in 22STLCO4635, which were not part of
the Labor Commission controversy or appeal of 23STPC00683 as the CLC
cannot and will not consider or rule on constitutional issues and thus fall
outside of any claim of collateral estoppel limitations.
The motion for reconsideration on the appeal of the CLC ruling was
denied and the original breach of contract suit dismissed. Along with the
Appeal of 23STPC00683 on February 3, 2024.
16
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
Appellants are asking, as pleaded in the amended complaint, the Court:
“ascertain the Legislature’s intent and commonsense meaning ... to discern
its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.”
Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, 11 Cal.5th 158, 168 (2001).
When there is a challenge based on the statutory construction of a law,
or as here, a licensing scheme, adjudicators have a fundamental task: “to
determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.”
Sierra Club v Superior Court of Orange County, 57 Cal.4th 157, 166 (2013).
To determine whether the Act is facially and as applied constitutional,
“We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense
meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of
the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and
purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.
“If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning
unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the
Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one
reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's
purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” Sierra Club supra.
While the Commissioner’s interpretations are “entitled to substantial
weight,” (Styne supra at 53), the construction “should be “disturb[ed]” when
17
it “appears from the statute or its legislative history is not one that Congress
would have sanctioned.” Chevron USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
The legislative history of the licensing scheme detailed below shows
there is not now and never was any statutory language making unlicensed
procurement unlawful. That alone makes the Commissioner’s enforcement
unconstitutional as applied; and a litany of State Supreme and United States
Supreme Court holdings to follow all cement the undeniable: there is and
never was a legislative purpose to reserve procurement for licensees, there is
no statutory remedy for unlicensed procurement, and the extrajudicial
enforcement of laws that do not exist must be extinguished.
A. HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION
Exhibit 1 is the codified history of the TAA and its antecedents, all
authenticated by LRI History LLC, a legislative history service, beginning
with The 1913 Private Employment Agencies Act (PEAA):
“An act regulating private employment agencies, providing

for a license for the operation thereof and a fee therefor,
providing forms of receipts and registers to be used and kept,
prohibiting any charge for registering or filing application for
help or employment, prohibiting the dividing of fees, providing
for the refunding of fees and expenses in the event of failure to
procure employment, and granting the commissioner of the
bureau of labor the power to prescribe rules and regulations to
carry out the purpose and intent of this act.” Id., Pg. 4.
Section 1.2 of the PEAA memorialized how the Act regulated and all
agencies that helped people find work in any occupation:
18
“The term ‘employment agency’ means and includes the
business of conducting, as owner, agent, manager, contractor,
subcontractor, or in any other capacity an intelligence office,
domestic and commercial employment agency, theatrical
employment agency, teachers’ employment agency, general
employment bureau, shipping agency, nurses’ registry, or any
other agency or office for the purposed of procuring or
attempting to procure help or employment or engagements for
persons seeking such help, employment or engagement.” Id.
Per Section 2 of the PEAA:
“A person shall not open, keep, maintain or carry on any

employment agency, as defined in the preceding section, unless
he shall have first procured a license therefor as provided in
this article from the commissioner of labor. ... Any person who
shall open or conduct such an employment agency without first
procuring said license shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
shall be punished as hereinafter provided.” Id., p. 5.
The phrase “as defined in the previous section” reserved the defining
activities of Section 1.2 for licensees, and Section 1.8...
“violating or omitting to comply with any of the provisions of

this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars
or more than two hundred and fifty dollars or by imprisonment
for a period of not more than sixty days or by both fine and
imprisonment. Id. p. 10.
... gave notice of the consequences should the prohibition be ignored.
The prohibition and remedies for procuring without a license remained
in place when the PEAA became the General Employment Agencies Act in
1925, but notably, they were removed from the licensing scheme the
19
Legislature created specifically for artists’ managers: Chapter 329, the 1943
Artists’ Managers Act (“AMA”), where...
...“Sections 1650, 1651 1652, 1653, 1654, 1655, 1656, 1657, 1658,
1659, 1660, and 1661 to Article 3 of Chapter 1 of Part 6 of
Division 2 of the Labor Code, relating to artists’ managers.”
It has long been assumed the 1978 enactment of the Talent Agencies Act
only made “minor changes in the statutory regime” past renaming it from the
Artists’ Managers Act to align its title with the modern term for talent agents
and that talent agents were previously referred to as ‘artists managers’. (See
Marathon Entertainment v. Blasi, 42 Cal.4th 972, 985 (2008).
The legislative history reveals the change was not in any way minor,
instead the legislators recognized and were regulating personal managers.
Whereas the defining activities of the TAA’s 1700.4 (a) aligns with talent
agents, where procurement is the primary responsibility of a talent agent, the
eliminated defining responsibilities of an artist’s manager, prioritizing the
advising, counseling and directing artists while noting procurement is an
unavoidable element, instead aligns with the tasks of a personal manager:
Per CA Labor Code § 1650: An artists’ manager is hereby

defined as a person, firm or corporation who engages in the
occupation of advising, counseling or directing artists in the
development or advancement of their professional careers; and
who, as an element of such occupation, endeavors to find
opportunities for the artists to whom the services above
described are rendered.”
The AMA aligns to the reality of management. Managers must procure
that to fulfill their responsibilities. As delineated above in Section III,
20
managers supervise the sales team/talent agents, the procurers. As they hire
and supervise the procurers, they are part of the procurement process.
Managers help create and choose the marketing materials (demo tapes,
pictures, resumes). As they oversee the publicists and lawyers; both of whom
create revenue, managers are part of that procurement process.
Among those who favored this new law: the Labor Commissioner.
Quoting from a memorandum from the Commissioner to the governor during
discussion of this bill: “Due to the peculiar nature of the services rendered
by artists’ manager, the business should be subject to different regulations
than those prescribed for employment agencies generally. This bill contains
proper regulations and I recommend its approval.” Exhibit 1, Pg. 37.
The State attorney general also approved enacting a licensing scheme for
those “who conduct a business similar to that of a theatrical agency,” yet
different; who direct, advise, and counsel; with procurement “an element” of
their responsibilities. Id. at 38.
In a letter to then-Gov. Earl Warren, the Artists’ Managers Guild’s
attorney explains how an artist’s manager’s “work is distinct and different”
than an employment agency, “which merely seeks employment for those who
patronize it. The seeking of employment is a small part of the services
rendered by artists’ managers.” Id., pg. 43.
While CA Labor Code § 1651 of the AMA (Id. p. 39) uses similar
language to its predecessor GEAA: “No person, firm or corporation shall
21
engage in or carry on the occupation of an artists’ manager without procuring
a license therefor from the Labor Commissioner,” the AMA omits the phrase
“as defined in the preceding section.”
With the 1943/AMA removal of that phrase, along with not codifying
statutes either barring unlicensed persons from procuring or levying a
consequence to procuring without a license, the Legislature clarified how
artists’ manager do not need a license to procure.
With Assembly Bill 885: the 1959 Amendments to the Artists’
Managers Act, the defining activities of an artists’ manager still mirrored the
responsibilities of a manager, only renumbered to Labor Code §1700.4, as
the Act was changed to begin at § 1700.
Bill 885 added § 1700.30: making it a misdemeanor should a licensee,
“sell, transfer or give away interest or participate in the profit of the artists’
manager without the written consent of the Labor Commissioner” (Id. p.
107), and § 1700.46: “Any person, or agent or officer thereof, who violates
any provision of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine
... or imprisonment ... or both” (Id., p. 110).
However, the AMA did not reinsert “as defined in section 1700.4 (a),”
nor did it add verbiage barring unlicensed procurement. meaning that
directing, counseling, and procurement, the defining activities of an artists’
manager, were left unregulated and lawful for anyone to do.
22
A reading of the Governor’s Chaptered Bill File of Assembly Bill 885
(Id., pgs. 101-104) offers context. In an “inter-departmental communication”
from the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations (at p. 102) to the
Legislative Secretary in the Governor’s office, speaking about the
amendments to the AMA, wrote, “there is no substantive change, merely
giving artists’ managers a chapter of their own as a separate category rather
than including them in the chapter dealing with employment agencies and
labor contractors generally as is the case now.
“The changes were introduced at the request of the artists’ managers.”
It would be absurd to think managers would request enacting criminal
sanctions that would interfere in their ability to properly serve their clients’
needs and objectives.
Chapter 1382, The Talent Agencies Act of 1978, is “An act to amend
the heading of Chapter 4” and to amend multiple sections “relating to talent
agencies.” Id., p. 122.
As stated above, Marathon thought ‘talent agent’ was synonymous with
artists’ manager, that until then the Legislature had only had a licensing
scheme to license talent agents, and in 1978 it was considering “establishing
a separate licensing scheme for personal managers.”
In changing the emphasis on procurement over directing and counseling,
it is clear the legislature is talking about a different occupation.
23
Thirty-six sections of law were amended with the 1978 passage of the
TAA (Id., p 122), but the 1700.46 penalty provision remained intact; it
remained without verbiage that would incorporate procurement into the
chapter, leaving procurement unregulated.
Chapter 682 of 1982 morphed the TAA, “[a]n act to amend, repeal and
add Sections 1700.4 and 1700.44 of, to repeal Section 1700.46... .” Id., p.
120. The repealed § 1700.46 was the Act’s penalty provision, leaving the
TAA from that time until today without remedies irrespective of the violation.
B. Case Law Is Immaterial When Courts Are Ascertaining Legislative Intent
In the underlying administrative agency proceeding, Pardoe v Salazar,
TAC-52864 (2008) (Doc. 12) the Commissioner sloughed off Appellants’
claims: their “principal argument is that because the Talent Agencies Act
lacks an explicit remedy for unlicensed procurement by a manager, the Labor
Commissioner cannot void or sever the contract. Correspondingly, they
argue, the Labor Commissioner must uphold the contract.
“Binding precedent clearly rejects this interpretation.” Id, P 5, lns 14-18.
Either by mistake or with intention, the Commissioner is wrong. Justice
Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner famously published “A Dozen Canons of
Statutory and Constitutional Text Construction;”5 none refer or infer any
value to considering precedent in an exam of statutory interpretation.
5
https://judicature.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Lastly-scalia.pdf
24
While California has no official list of ‘statutory construction rules,’
Colorado’s office of Legislative Legal Services publishes one; nothing in that
list mentions case law or holdings.6 Likewise, the Washington State
Legislature published “Examples of Statutory Construction Rules From Case
Law;” not one of their 23 examples point readers to precedent.7
The U.S. Supreme Court published a similar list of rules of statutory
construction (“RSC”); none of those 23 rules refer to or in any way infer
there is any import to previous holdings or case law.8
C. The Commissioner’s Interpretation and Enforcement Of The TAA Violates At

Least 14 Of The Supreme Court’s 23 Rules Of Statutory Construction
1. The Commissioner’s Interpretation Conflicts With RSC Rule 1, 2, 3, and 22
Rule 1: “The law should be given its plain meaning wherever possible.”
Rule 2: Statutes must be “entirely harmonious with all laws as a whole.”
Rule 3: “Every word within a statute is there for a purpose and should
be given its due significance.” Id.
Rule 22: Every word “used in legislative acts are to be given force and
meaning, otherwise they would be superfluous having been enough to have
written the act without the words.” A statute ought “to be so construed that,
6
https://leg.colorado.gov/agencies/office-legislative-legal-services/commonly-applied-
rules-statutory-construction
7
https://app.leg.wa.gov/committeeschedules/Home/Document/41619
8
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-
9575/102239/20190611092122150_00000055.pdf
25
if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void,
or insignificant.” Id. quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)
Following the Commissioner’s interpretation, Marathon notes how, “In
its present incarnation, the Act requires anyone who solicits or procures
artistic employment or engagements for artists to obtain a talent agency
license.(§§ 1700.4, 1700.5).” The Court’s language is careful not to make
that declaration a holding, perhaps because it recognized those statutes do no
such thing. As noted above, § 1700.4 (a) is a list of the three activities that
define a talent agent, § 1700.4 (b) defines what an artist is, and § 1700.5
states that one must obtain a license to engage in the occupation of a talent
agent. Irrespective of how prior cases have been decided, nothing in those
statutes, or any other TAA statute, expressly states it is unlawful to engage
in one or all of the defined activities makes one a talent agent or that one
must have a license to engage in those activities.
This Court has the power and responsibility to find the application of
these statutes to be unconstitutional. To do otherwise adds a prohibition to
the legislature’s chosen verbiage, a violation of Scalia/Garner’s Omitted-
Case (6th) Canon: “Nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably
implies (casus omissus pro omisso habendus est). That is, a matter not
covered it to be treated as not covered.”
26
Per Rule 1, the plain meaning of the verbiage, and Canon 6, that
procurement is to be treated as not covered; the Act has no clarity as to
whether procurement is regulated, making the enforcement unsupportable.
With the Act void of verbiage either expressly barring unlicensed
persons from procuring or assigns a penalty for unlicensed procurement, the
CLC should follow the maxim of CA Civil Code 3530: “That which does not
appear to exist is to be regarded as if it did not exist.”
It should likewise follow the relevant case law related to the implications
of the TAA’s lack of a remedy provision. In Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382
(1914), “the court had before it a statute that required personal property
brokers to give to borrowers a notice of the contents of notes and chattel
mortgages taken to secure loans and imposed a penalty for failure to comply
with the statute.” Nome State Bank v. Brendmoen, 295 N.W. 82 (N.D. 1940).
Marathon v. Blasi, 140 Cal.App. 4th 1001, 1010 (2006) noted how Wood
“enforced a promissory note despite the plaintiff pawnbroker's violation of a
municipal business licensing statute that, like the [Talent Agencies] Act, did
not expressly prohibit the enforcement of contracts made in violation of the
statute ... The ordinance does not declare that a contract made by any one in
the conduct of the various businesses for which licenses are provided to be
procured under the ordinances, shall, if a license is not obtained, be invalid;
nor is there any provision therein indicating in the slightest that this failure
was intended to affect in any degree the right of contract. (Wood at p. 387.)"
27
“An administrative agency cannot by its own regulations create a remedy
which the Legislature has withheld. 'Administrative regulations that alter or
amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void and courts not only
may, but it is their obligation to strike down such regulations.” Dyna-Med
Inc. v. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm., 43 Cal. 3d 1385,1388 (1987).
Dyna-Med limited its review and prohibition to creating a remedy to
punitive damages. Peralta v. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm., 52 Cal. 3d 40,
60 (1990) similarly held that without statutory authority, administrative
agencies are barred from creating compensatory remedies as well.
The CLC’s enforcement of the TAA is anomalous to how all other
licensing schemes are interpreted, which violates the Supreme Court’s Rule
2, that statutes should be “entirely harmonious with all laws as a whole. If
the CLC interpretation is correct and procurement is reserved for licensees
because it is a defining activity of a talent agent, every clause, sentence and
word of every CA statute expressly reserving a defining activity is rendered
superfluous. Conversely, if those terms and phrases are necessary,
axiomatically the legislature’s decision not to put these terms into the TAA
must be given their due significance.
BPC § 1203 gives clear notice that only licensed clinical bioanalysts
“may perform” the specific activities detailed in §§ 1203 (a-c).
BPC § 1270 (a) plainly states that only licensed cytotechnologists can
lawfully examine cytological slides.
28
BPC § 1281 makes it, “unlawful for any person to own, operate,
maintain, direct, or engage in the business of operating a clinical laboratory,
as defined in this chapter, unless he or she possesses a valid clinical
laboratory license issued by the department.”
BPC § 2052 plainly states how only licensed doctors can prescribe drugs.
BPC § 6980 makes it clear that only those with valid locksmith licenses
can engage in the defined activities of a locksmith.
Similarly, the occupational licensing schemes for dentists (BPC § 1700),
respiratory therapists, (BPC 3760 (a) and (b)), pharmacists (BPC § 4051 (a)),
veterinarians (BPC § 4825), acupuncturists (BPC § 4935), professional
engineers (BPC § 6730), geologists (BPC § 7830), and among others, pest
control specialists (BPC § 8550 (a)) all create clear demarcation lines
between activities anyone can engage in and those requiring licensure.
Per Labor Code § 1700.4 (a): “’talent agency’ means a person or
corporation who engages in the occupation of offering, promising, or
attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists ...
Talent Agencies may, in addition, counsel or direct artists in the development
of their professional careers.” Neither 1700.4 (a) nor any other statute in the
TAA has any express language reserving any of its three defining activities –
procuring, counseling or directing – to licensees.
If Labor Code § 1700.5 had, like the above licensing schemes, and as
the Private and General Employment Agencies Acts had, verbiage matching
29
or mirroring, “It is unlawful to engage in the business of a talent agent as
defined in this chapter without a license” (emphasis added), then procuring,
directing and counseling artists would be reserved for licensees.
But neither § 1700.5 nor any other TAA statute has like language.
Not all CA licensing schemes regulate their defining activities. BPC §
2903 (a) of the Psychologists Act defines the practice of psychology as,
“rendering or offering to render … any psychological service involving the
application of psychological principles, methods, and procedures of
understanding, predicting, and influencing behavior, such as principles
pertaining to learning, perception, motivation, emotions, and interpersonal
relationships…”
BPC § 2903 (c) defines psychotherapy as using “psychological methods
in a professional relationship to assist a person or persons to acquire greater
human effectiveness or to modify feelings, conditions, attitudes, and
behaviors that are emotionally, intellectually, or socially ineffectual
or maladaptive.”
The Psychologists Act has no statute expressly reserving those activities
to those with a psychologist’s license, and accordingly, there are no examples
of Scientologists, who regularly engage in constructing, administering and
interpreting tests of mental abilities, aptitudes, interests, etc. to affect others’
behavior being found in violation of § 2903.
30
Nor has any court found a pastor, rabbi, salesperson, life coach, teacher,
trainer, doctor, physical or drug rehabilitation counselor, advertising
executive, nurse or any others that use psychological principles to understand
and influence the behavior of others in violation of law without the violator
falsely claiming to be a psychologist.
Among the other licensing schemes without statutes expressly barring
non-licensees from engaging in the defined activities of the regulated
profession: the Landscape Architects Act (BPC § 5615/maintaining and
beautifying outdoor areas) and the Geologists Act (BPC §§ 7802.1/7803,
examining the Earth’s materials). No California Court has ever found anyone
engaging in any of the defining activities of those professions, unless the
accused has also held themselves out as a licensee, in violation of law.
As stated in the CA Vocational Nursing Act, non-licensees can engage in
all the activities as a licensee, “provided that such person shall not in any way
assume to practice as a licensed vocational nurse.” BPC 2861. If the TAA is
correctly interpreted where just being a defined activity reserves it for
licensees, all the above statutes are unnecessary, superfluous; which per the
U.S.S.C. rules of statutory construction, is incorrect. There is an exception:
even if the licensing scheme has no express prohibition, “where a statute
contains a penalty, that penalty is equivalent to an express prohibition.” Smith
v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 262 (1920).
31
2. The Commissioner’s Interpretation Conflicts With RSC Rule 4
Rule 4: Courts should “construe laws in harmony with the legislative
intent and seek to carry out legislative purpose.” U.S.S.C Rules supra.
As delineated in Section IV.A, the legislative history of the TAA makes
it inarguably clear the legislature never had an interest in requiring managers
to have a license to procure. First, it created the AMA, where the express
purpose was to allow managers to procure, an ‘element’ of their job, without
a license, and, during further revisions never restored the “as defined in this
chapter” phrase which would have made licensure a requirement.
Rule 5: “Presumption may not be used in determining a statute.” Id.
Marathon (at 986) found managers are subject to TAA regulation based
on (1): Labor Code § 1700, as "any individual, company, society, firm,
partnership, association, corporation, limited liability company, manager, or
their agents or employees", and (2): procurement is reserved for licensees
because a ‘talent agent’ is defined in § 1700.4 (a) as “a person or corporation
who engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or
attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists. ...
Talent agencies may, in addition, counsel or direct artists in the development
of their professional careers."
32
Both conclusions were presumptions; not determined by the statutes’
words; the Act has no express directions matching the conclusions reached.
Rule 6: “Laws are void for vagueness if the persons subject to the law
cannot deduce its meaning; “we insist laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he
may act accordingly.” U.S.S.C Rules supra.
§ 1700.4 (a) lists three defining activities of talent agents, but neither it
nor any statute expressly states any of those activities are reserved for
licensees, or conversely, bans unlicensed persons from engaging in directing,
counseling or procuring.
All persons have a constitutional right to know what is required and what
is prohibited. No law should be drafted or interpreted to encourage or
facilitate arbitrary and potentially discriminatory enforcement. See City of
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52, 58-59 (1999); Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1972).
Rule 8: “A term’s definition is not to be implied.” Id.
“Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice.
Notice is sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend
charges. Notice is required before property interests are disturbed, before
33
assessments are made, before penalties are assessed.” Lambert v. CA. 355
U.S. 225, 228 (1957) See Consumer Advocacy Group Inc. v. Kintetsu
Enterprises of America, 150 Cal.App.4th 953, 960 (2007).
The Talent Agencies Act “is silent – completely silent – on the subject of
the proper remedy for illegal procurement.” Marathon supra at 991.
“The Act provides no remedy for its violation.” Id.
“The Legislature has not seen fit to specify the remedy for violations of
the Act.” Id. at 996.
Marathon was asked to decide (1): whether personal managers were
subject to TAA regulation; and (2): a violator’s contractual rights should
always be voided or can severance be appropriate. It was not asked and did
not opine as to whether the Legislature’s silence affected the right to contract.
As a mountain of case law holds, it does.
“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in this Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct
that will subject him to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that
a State may impose.” De Anza Santa Cruise Mobil Estates Assn. v. De Anza
Santa Cruz Mobile Estates, 94 Cal.App.4th 890, 904.
Even if there were legislative history showing the State wanted to punish
unlicensed procurers, The U.S.S.C. holds without notice of remedy, the
procurer cannot be penalized. See U.S. v Evans, 333. U.S. 483 (1948).
34
Evans was convicted for harboring an illegal alien, violating a federal
statute prohibiting both smuggling and harboring undocumented persons.
However, as Congress had only enacted a remedy for smuggling – five
years in prison – the Court ruled itself without authority to assign and mete
out a remedy for harboring, holding that assigning penalties is a legislature
responsibility; “a task outside the bounds of judicial interpretation.” Id. at
495. And as there is no remedy for unlicensed procurement, it is not unlawful.
As held in Dyna-Med and Peralta, California expressly bars
administrative agencies from assigning and enforcing uncodified remedies.
The Commissioner labels unlicensed procurement as a civil infraction,
but the penalty the Commissioner metes out is a criminal one.
The lawful rationales for forfeiting otherwise-owed compensation for a
civil infraction is fraud or non-performance. Here, the benefits to one’s labor
is forfeited or engaging in an unlawful activity, which makes it a criminal
remedy, an unconstitutional response for a civil wrong.
The CA Contractors Act gives notice unlicensed persons cannot “bring
or maintain any action, or recover in law or equity in any action, in any court
in this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act
or contract where a license is required … regardless of the merits of the cause
of action.” See BPC § 7031. It also memorializes repeatedly in §§ 7027 –
7028.17 that such actions are criminal, misdemeanors.
35
The TAA provides no such or similar notice. Just the opposite, per CA
Labor Code 1700.44 (c), the failure to procure a license “shall not be
considered a criminal act under any law of this state.
Per BPC § 1280 of the Clinical Laboratory Act, it is illegal for unlicensed
persons to represent themselves or “act as a licensed individual, and, per BPC
§ 1287, such violations are misdemeanors punishable with imprisonment of
up to six months and/or a fine of up to $1,000.
Per BPC § 1700, it is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of ten
days to one year and/or a fine between $100 and $1,500 to assume the degree
of a dental hygienist, to represent oneself as a dental hygienist, or engage in
the practice of dental hygiene without the proper certifications.
Per BPC § 2521, “Any person who violates this article [which regulates
licensed midwives] is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
Per BPC § 2790, it is a misdemeanor “punishable by imprisonment” for
up to six months, and/or “a fine not exceeding” $2,000, for an unlicensed
person to claim to be a psychologist.
Per BPC § 2799, “any person who violates the provision of this chapter
[regulating nurses] is guilty of a misdemeanor” and can be imprisoned for up
to a year and/or fined up to $1,000.
Per BPC § 5120, non-licensees engaging in the activities reserved only
for those with public accountancy licenses are “guilty of a misdemeanor,
punishable for not more than six months,” and/or a fine up to $1,000.
36
Per BPC § 5640, it is a criminal misdemeanor punishable by a fine of
$100 to $500 and/or imprisonment not exceeding six months, for an
unlicensed person to engage in the practice of landscape architecture, use that
title or other that implies having a license, use the stamp of a licensee, or
advertise in ways imply having a license.
Per BPC § 7027.1, it is a criminal misdemeanor punishable by a fine
between $700 and $1000 to advertise to do construction work or engage in
any of the defining activities of a contractor without a valid contractor’s
license.
Per BPC 7402, it is a criminal misdemeanor punishable by fines up to
$2500 and imprisonment of up to six months for an unlicensed person to
represent themselves to be a cosmetologist or barber.
Per BPC § 7523, it is a misdemeanor punishable by a $10,000 fine and/or
a year in prison for an unlicensed person to act as or represent oneself to be a
private investigator or in any way have identification, business card,
letterhead or electronic messaging that indicate being a licensed private
investigator.
Per BPC § 10139, it is “a public offense punishable by a fine” up to
$20,000, and/or “by imprisonment” of up to six months to act “as a real estate
broker, real estate salesperson, or mortgage loan originator … or who
advertises using words indicating” an unlicensed person has a license.
37
Every state licensing scheme reserving defining activities for licensees
also gives notice that engaging in those actions without a license is a criminal
offense, and thus, any contract made by an unlicensed person to engage in
those activities is invalid. Except for the TAA, which provides no such notice,
and thus, as all these rules instruct, should not be enforced as if it does.
As the TAA has no prohibitionary statute or penalty provision, and as
Peralta and Dyna-Med bar the Labor Commissioner and all administrative
agencies from creating remedies that the Legislature has withheld, it is clear
the Act as it has been enforced against Appellants and others is extrajudicial
and unconstitutional.
Rule 10: “It is a violation of due process of law to employ a ‘statutory
presumption,’ needing to guess about the definition of a word.” RSC supra.
“It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. … we insist that laws
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.” Grayned v. Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
The U.S. Supreme Court has established specific guidelines for
constitutional clarity: "Living under a rule of law entails various
suppositions, one of which is that ‘[all persons] are entitled to be informed
38
as to what the State commands or forbids.’” FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012).
In 2014, a 9th Circuit Court invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance banning
people from sleeping in their cars, finding it unconstitutionally vague for
failing, “to draw a clear line between innocent and criminal conduct.”
Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147.
The Desertrain opinion pointed to multiple questions the statute left
unanswered, leaving what was and was not permissible by law ambiguous:
“Is it impermissible to eat food in a vehicle? Is it illegal to keep a
sleeping bag? Canned food? Books? What about speaking on a cell phone?
Or staying in the car to get out of the rain?” Those unanswered questions
leave the statute, “impossible for citizens to know how to keep their conduct
within the pale.” Id. at 1156.
Clarity is essential whether an imposed sanction is civil or criminal. Civil
matters must receive the “same basic protections against ‘judgments without
notice’ as criminal matters.” BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)
Does the TAA offer the essential clarity for unlawful procurement?
Wachs v. Curry, 13 Cal.App.4th 616, 629 (1993) found ‘procurement’
constitutional but noted the term was likely unconstitutional as applied; and
Marathon (at 990) explained why that is: “The act contains no definition, and
the Labor Commissioner has struggled over time to better delineate which
39
actions involve mere general assistance to an artist's career and which stray
across the line to illicit procurement.”
The most basic accepted responsibility personal managers engage in is
working with neophyte clients and working with them until appropriate talent
agents are willing to join in with the representation. See Marathon at 983-984.
Per Labor Code § 1700.44 (d), managers can work in conjunction with,
and at the request of, a licensed talent agency, but can managers solicit agents
to come aboard? Is it lawful for manager to put the artist’s sales team together,
as that is clearly part of the procurement process?
The Act, as written, leaves this unanswered.
It is universally accepted that personal managers work with their clients
to choose the photos, refine the resume, and edit the videos that first are used
to garner an agent’s interest and then used by the agents to pitch buyers. But
can a personal manager lawfully create the sales materials, an essential part
of the procuring process?
Is it lawful for personal managers to forward sales materials to buyers?
In a reply brief to a legal challenge brought in Federal Court by the National
Conference of Personal Managers, the Labor Commissioner wrote it was legal
to, “send out resumes, photographs, videotapes, or written materials for an
artist.” (Doc. 7, Pgs. 108-109). But the Commissioner is making a
supposition; the Act as written leaves the question unanswered.
40
If one accepts that managers can lawfully send out a client’s marketing
materials, is it unlawful to follow up that submission with a call or email?
Is it unlawful if the recipient of the marketing materials proactively calls
the unlicensed representative about the artist?
Is it unlawful if an unlicensed representative receives a call from a buyer
late at night who cannot reach the client’s agent and wants to hire the actor
to report to work at 6AM the next morning? And if receiving the call is legal,
if the manager tells the artist about the opportunity, has the legal line been
crossed? What if the artist takes the job; has that made the manager’s actions
unlawful, even if the manager just received an offer and passed it on and did
not engage in procurement past sharing information with the client?
The Act, as written, leaves all of these questions unanswered.
Assuming it is lawful for an unlicensed representative to receive a call
and can inform their client about a job starting hours away, if the manager
asks the buyer for more money than originally offered by the buyer; are these
actions unlawful?
The Act, as written, leaves this and all the above questions unanswered.
“It is a basic principle of due process an enactment is void for vagueness if
its prohibitions are not clearly defined” (Grayned supra at p. 108 (1972)).
Without clarity as to what procurement activities may be unlawful, along
41
with violating the U.S.S.C. rules of statutory construction, the statutory
scheme is unconstitutional as applied, violating the substantive due process
clause and equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.
Rule 12: Expressum Facit Cessare Tacitum: “What is expressed makes
what is silent cease: where we find an express declaration, we should not
resort to implication.” U.S.S.C. Rules supra.
As shown above, when the Legislature wants to regulate and assign
remedies to when the regulation is violated, it expresses declares its intention
with prohibition and penalty statutes. The Commissioner’s interpretation is
not just unsupportable, it is absurd and extrajudicial.
Per CA Labor Code § 1700.29, the Commissioner is to “adopt, amend,
and repeal such rules and regulations as are reasonably necessary for the
purpose of enforcing and administering this chapter and as are not inconsistent
with this chapter.” The CLC’s refusal to accept any of the above arguments in
Pardoe v. Salazar shows the administrative agency has abdicated its
responsibility, or any sense of fairness.
Rule 14: There must be fair notice: “laws must provide persons of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.”
U.S.S.C. Rules supra.
42
No person of ordinary intelligence would read Labor Code §§ 1700.4 (a)
and 1700.5 and be able to ascertain that one must have a talent agency license
to help change the professional plateau of their artist clients.
But the Commissioner’s interpretation is now more blatantly prejudicial
and discriminatory against the occupation of personal managers.
There are over two hundred published TAA opinions.9
Pardoe was the first and only time the CLC cited CA Civil Code § 1598
and §1599 to void an unlicensed person’s contractual rights. See Salazar
supra (at p.6, fn. 1).
Those Civil Code sections are the statutory manifestation of the doctrine
of severability. They are mitigation, not penalty statutes. Instead of just using
severability arbitrarily, as the CLC had done for decades, (see Marathon, pgs.
991-993), Marathon (at p. 981) holds adjudicators “have the discretion to
apply the doctrine of severability to partially enforce these contract’ versus
voiding “manager-talent contracts ab initio for unlicensed procurement.” See
also Id. at p. 995.
If the severability statutes could serve as penalty rather than mitigation
statutes – which they cannot – and had it wanted the severability statutes to
stand as the penalty provision of the TAA, the Legislature would have cross-
referenced the Civil Code statutes inside the Labor Code licensing scheme.
9
See https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/DLSE-TACs.htm
43
They know how to do that: see the list of 306 Civil Code cross-references
inside of the Labor Code, compiled by the Legislative Intent Service.10
Further, were the Civil Code statutes standing as the penalty provision
for a Labor Code infraction, with nothing in the TAA directing one to those
other set of laws, it would be the epitome of unconstitutionally vague.
Conversely, if the severability statutes serve as sufficient notice, the
penalty provisions in every other scheme where the penalty of voidance are
expressed is surplusage; § 1598 and § 1599 would suffice for every chapter,
which as noted above, violates RSC Rule 22.
Rule 15: “Judges may not extend the meaning of word used within a
statute but must rely only on the things clearly included in the statute itself,
and nothing more.”
Again, no prohibition or remedy is included in the statute.
Rule 17: Noscitur a sociis: “words grouped in a list should be given
related meaning.”
The list of terms in CA Labor Code § 1700 – “individual, company,
society, firm, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability company,
10
https://www.scribd.com/document/731324747/Westlaw-List-of-306-Results-for-Adv-
Civil-Code
44
manager, or their agents or employees" – define one’s place in an
organization, not an occupation.
For a reader to assume that one of these eleven terms is not about one’s
organizational status, but their occupation, conflicts with noscitur a sociis,
the ‘whole-text canon’, the ‘presumption of consistent usage canon’, the
harmonious reading canon, the fixed meaning canon (words must be given
the meaning they had when the text was adopted), and the associated words
contextual canon of statutory construction.
Rule 21: “Laws are void if they are vague.” Id.
Quoting Marathon supra at 990: “The Act contains no definition, and the
Labor Commissioner has struggled over time to better delineate which
actions involve mere general assistance to an artist's career and which stray
across the line to illicit procurement.”
Along with the High Court justices, among those who recognize the
statute fails to give sufficient notice: the Commissioner, the very person who
metes out these draconian penalties. ln 1984, the Legislature created the CA
Entertainment Commission (CEC) and appointed the Labor Commissioner
to serve as its chair, “to recommend to the Legislature a model bill regarding
this licensing.” Exhibit 2: “1986 Report of the California Entertainment
Commission.” Pg. 1 (Pg. 3 of exhibit).
45
After studying the Act for over two years; the Commission submitted the
Report, authored by the Commissioner, distilling the CECs conclusions and
recommendations on how to improve the TAA.
In the Report, the Commissioner warns of the vagueness of § 1700.4 (a):
“There is, however, an inherent inequity – and some

question of constitutional due process – in subjecting one
to criminal sanctions in violation of a law which is so
unclear and ambiguous as to leave reasonable persons in
doubt about the meaning of the language or whether a
violation has occurred.
‘Procure employment’ is just such a phrase … [and
it] has left the personal manager uncertain and highly
apprehensive about the permissible parameters of their
daily activity.” Id., Pgs. 24-25 (Pgs. 4-5 of exhibit).
What greater admission of the inequities of this enforcement can there
be: the very person who metes out these penalties admitting to being unable
to ascertain a bright line between lawful and illicit activities.
Another admission: this very case. Here, the Commissioner ruled that,
“the agent must advise the manager or request the manager’s activity for each
and every submission. At the very minimum an agent must be aware of the
manager’s procurement activity.”
But notably in Wesley Snipes v. Robinson Management, TAC 36-96,
among other cases, the CLC held just the opposite: “The requirements of the
46
statute cannot be construed to call for a game of ‘Mother May I?’ every time
an artist manager11 takes some action during a long-term relationship.”
D. The Commissioner’s Ruling That CA Civil Code §§ 1598 and 1599 Is The
Penalty Provision For The TAA Is Legally Unsupportable
The CLC has a published list of over two-hundred published TAA Labor
Commission opinions dating back to 1971.12
Salazar is the first and only time the Commissioner has found CA Civil
Code §§ 1598 and §1599 gives her the authority to void the contractual rights
of unlicensed procurers who violate CA Labor Code §§ 1700.4 (a) and
1700.5. See Salazar supra (at p.6, fn. 1).
However, §§ 1598 and 1599, the statutory manifestation of the doctrine
of severability, are not penalty, but mitigation statutes. As Marathon (at p.
981) holds, adjudicators “have the discretion to apply the doctrine of
severability to partially enforce these contract’ versus voiding “manager-
talent contracts ab initio for unlicensed procurement.”
Also: if the severability statutes could serve as penalty rather than
mitigation statutes – which they cannot – and had the Legislature wanted the
severability statutes to stand as the penalty provision of the TAA, it would
11
It is important to note that as recently as 1996, the Labor Commissioner was referring
to a personal manager as an artist’s manager, further cementing that that the Artists’
Managers Act was created to specifically regulate personal managers, who were then
removed from regulation with the passage of the Talent Agencies Act in 1978.
12
See https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/DLSE-TACs.htm
47
have cross-referenced the Civil Code statutes inside the Labor Code licensing
scheme. (See https://www.scribd.com/document/731324747/Westlaw-List-
of-306-Results-for-Adv-Civil-Code): list of 306 Civil Code cross-references
inside of the Labor Code, compiled by the Legislative Intent Service.)
Further, it would be the epitome of unconstitutionally vague were the
Civil Code statutes the penalty provision for a Labor Code infraction, with
nothing in the TAA directing one to those other set of laws. If the severability
statutes were sufficient notice, it would mean the penalty provisions in every
other scheme are surplusage; just § 1598 and § 1599 would suffice.
Just finding the TAA has a penalty provision irrespective of where it may
reside wrongly ignores Marathon (See Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court,
57 Cal. 2d 450, 455 (1962), which holds that, "The decisions of [the CA
Supreme Court] are binding upon and must be followed” by all adjudicators
of inferior jurisdiction), but to find the remedy in a wholly different set of
laws only shows the administrative agency’s desperation to defend its wholly
indefensible policy.
E. As Applied, The TAA Violates The Excessive Fines Clause Of The

8th Amendment Of The United States Constitution
“Excessive bail shall not be shall not be required, not excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted.” The 8th Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution.
48
As here is no violation of law, any imposition of a punishment is cruel,
unusual and excessive, no less the enforcement here: the voiding of one’s
right to labor, a criminal infraction for a violation that per Labor Code
1700.44 (b) cannot be criminal. It is just that simple, and just that inarguable.
CA has a rule about forfeiture: "the public importance of discouraging
such prohibited transactions outweighs equitable considerations of possible
injustice between the parties" Southfield v. Barrett, 13 Cal.App.3d 290, 294
(1970). But here, there is no prohibited action to discourage.
As held in People v. Turnage, 55 Cal.4th 62, see 74-75 (2012), there must
be a proportionality standard between remedy and wrongdoing. With the Act
having no fine, no penalty, no consequence, no statutory authority to in any
way impair contractual rights, there is zero remedy to wrongdoing rationality
and thus the Commissioner’s application and enforcement violates the
Excessive Fines Clause of the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
While the disgorging of Plaintiffs’ contracts would result in the loss of
no more than $20,000, other such voidings have been in the hundreds of
thousands and in several instances many millions of dollars.
In describing what constituted "gross disproportionality," the Supreme
Court could not find any guidance from the history of the Excessive Fines
Clause and so relied on Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause case law:
We must therefore rely on other considerations in

deriving a constitutional excessiveness standard, and
there are two that we find particularly relevant. The
49
first, which we have emphasized in our cases
interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, is that judgments about the appropriate
punishment for an offense belong in the first instance
to the legislature. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 290 (1983) (“Reviewing courts … should grant
substantial deference to the broad authority that
legislatures necessarily possess in determining the
types and limits of punishments”).
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998)
Here, as the Legislature did not assign a penalty, determining that no one
should face a consequence – any consequence – for helping someone find
work as an artist.
A penalty or fine imposed is considered excessive when it constitutes…

“…a taking of the defendant's property without due
process of law. It is not contended in this connection
that the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment to the
federal Constitution against excessive fines operates
to control the legislation of the states. The fixing of
punishment for crime or penalties for unlawful acts
against its laws is within the police power of the state.
We can only interfere with such legislation and
judicial action of the states enforcing it if the fines
imposed are so grossly excessive as to amount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.”
Waters Pierce Oil Co. v Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 87 (1909)
Just as being pulled over for no reason is considered a violation of due
process, being entwined into a CLC controversy without a colorable claim is
a due process violation. For the Commissioner to deprive Appellants and
generations of personal managers of their contractual rights – their property
– without having to follow the judicial rules of evidence, arbitrarily decide if
50
and how many depositions can be taken, who can testify, it all violates
constitutional due process.
The Commissioner’s forfeiture of the rights, without either legislative
guidance or the due process of law, is outside the State’s police power and
creates a grossly excessive deprivation of property, a clear violation of the
Excessive Fines Clause of the 8th Amendment of the Constitution.
F. The Genesis Of The Misenforcement
One might expect to learn how legally unsupportable enforcement was
the result of an unintentional assumption the Legislature had codified statutes
inside the Talent Agencies Act that barred unlicensed persons from procuring
and attached a remedy to that activity. To the contrary, it is the result of
intentional, discriminatory actions by the Commissioner.
1953 was the height of McCarthyism and the Hollywood Blacklist, a
period in our history as much about anti-Semitism as anti-Communism.13
“[A]nti-Semitism, and the systematic recruitment and display of Jewish
collaborators, were very much on HUAC’s (House Un-American Activities
Committee) only half-hidden agenda.” 14
13
See “Why The Blacklist is a Jewish Story,” https://forward.com/culture/film-tv/413485/why-
the-hollywood-blacklist-is-a-jewish-story-and-also-a-milwaukee-story/
14
https://books.google.com/books?id=qaowDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA126&lpg=PA126&dq=%22s
ystematic+recruitment+and+display+of+Jewish+collaborators%22&source=bl&ots=1jC9-
S4uwa&sig=ACfU3U0w4cBzsfvu7N46nuGiWgKkWlu7dQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj
Q_4ub4YaEAxWnOkQIHYgMAtAQ6AF6BAgIEAM#v=onepage&q=%22systematic%20recr
uitment%20and%20display%20of%20Jewish%20collaborators%22&f=false
51
After a teenaged actress left her manager and her mother withheld
commissions, the resultant breach of contract lawsuit, Radin v. Laurie, 120
Cal. App.2d 778 (1953), reached a Court of Appeals after a summary
judgment ruling that the manager unlawfully procured. Along with the
Parties’ briefs, the Commissioner submitted an amicus curiae. Doc. 18, Pgs.
211-212.
The brief clearly wants readers to think the AMA statutorily prohibits
and penalizes unlicensed procurers. Quoting:
“The laws of this state [] require the licensing of

employment agents (Sec. 1581), theatrical employment agents
(Sec. 1643), and artists managers (Sec. 1651);15 call for prior
submission and approval of their contract forms (Secs. 1644,
1955) and in numerous other and allied provisions establish a
clear intent on the part of the legislature to regulate closely
activities of such agents and managers.
“Violation of the provisions of the above legislation
constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment.
(Sec. 1648).” Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259.”
A close examination reveals how the scheme regulating artists’ managers
is different than the other schemes. In a declaration subject to the penalties
of perjury, Legislative Intent Service (“LSI”) attorney Jenny S. Lillge
memorialized how the LSI had been asked...
“ to find the statutes that were the historical derivation of the Artists’
Managers Act” that were in effect in 1953. ... Upon review, we noted there
was no penalty provision with regard to unlicensed procurement in 1953. ...
15
In 1953, ‘booking agents’ were referred to as theatrical employment agents.
52
We have provided you with a true and correct copy of this chaptered law
attached to this declaration.” Doc. 18, Pgs. 214-220.
The amicus was carefully written to make it seem the AMA barred and
penalized unlicensed procurers by authors who clearly knew the licensing
scheme did no such thing. It is hard to think the Commissioner would have
intentionally, nefariously deceived the Court of Appeal had he a family
member, a former classmate, a friend from the country club or church who
was a manager. Such actions are only done to those thought of as ‘lesser
than,’ which especially in 1953 included those with semitic names like Mr.
Radin’s working as a manager, an occupation then almost exclusively Jewish.
The Radin court accepted the Commissioner’s interpretation but ruled
the summary judgment was wrongly decided; remanding the case to superior
court for a finding of facts to determine if the manager had not procured.
In 1967, a Court of Appeal was again presented with a dispute about an
alleged unlicensed procurer, the personal manager of the Jefferson Airplane.
The Labor Commissioner again submitted an amicus brief, and following the
Commissioner’s interpretation, Buchwald v. Superior Court, Cal. App. 2d
347, 351 (1967) found:
“Since the clear object of the Act is to prevent improper

persons from becoming artists’ managers and to regulate such
activity for the protection of the public, a contract between an
unlicensed artists’ manager and an artist is void. (See Wood v.
Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, Loving Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603,
608-609) ... Contracts otherwise violative of the Act are void
53
(see Severance v. Knight-Counihan, 29 Cal.2d 561, 568, Smith
v Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 262.)”
It is bad law; a judicial error that haunts personal managers to this day.
All four of the cited precedents hold exactly the opposite of what Buchwald
claims they hold.
This brief has already spoken how Wood upheld a contract because, like
the TAA, the pawnbrokers’ licensing scheme did not expressly give authority
to impact a violator’s contractual rights.
Smith holds, at p. 262: “The imposition by statute of a penalty implies a
prohibition of the act to which the penalty is attached, and a contract founded
upon such act is void.”. As the TAA has no such implication, Buchwald
should have upheld the contract.
As stated above, the Commissioner’s amicus in Radin also cites Smith at
p. 262: “It has been long held in this state that where a statute contains a
penalty, that penalty is equivalent to an express prohibition, and a contract in
violation thereof is void. Refusal by our courts to allow any recovery by
unlicensed persons where licensing was required is but one example of this
general rule.”
As the TAA has no remedy, no penalty provision, there is no express
prohibition and following Smith, the Airplane’s manager’s contractual rights
should have been upheld.
Loving holds: “[I]t has been repeatedly declared in this state that ‘a
contract made contrary to the terms of a law designed for the protection of
54
the public and prescribing a penalty for the violation thereof is illegal and
void, and no action may be brought to enforce such contract.’” (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 608.
Had Buchwald properly followed Loving, as the TAA has no prescribed
penalty, it would have upheld the personal manager’s right to contract.
Per Severance:
“The general rule controlling in cases of this character is
that where a statute prohibits or attaches a penalty to the
doing of an act, the act is void, and this, notwithstanding
that the statute does not expressly pronounce it so, and it
is immaterial whether the thing forbidden is malum in se
or merely malum prohibitum.”
“If the statute does not provide expressly its violation
will deprive the parties to sue on the contract and the
denial of the relief is wholly out of proportion to the
requirements of public policy or appropriate individual
punishment, the right to recover will not be denied.” Id.
at 572.
Had Buchwald properly followed Severance, as the licensing scheme has
neither a penalty provision nor expressly provides that if one is found to have
procured for an artist without a talent agency license the contractual rights
are to be voided, it would have upheld the manager’s contractual rights
versus extinguishing them.
Buchwald is the only case, until the instant matter where the parties
directly asked for and it specifically held adjudicators have the authority to
void contracts. Every subsequent published case that speaks to this issue does
so as dicta, accepting Buchwald while deciding other questions.
55
Wachs v. Curry, 13 Cal.App.4th 616, 626 (1993) was asked to decide
whether the term ‘procurement’ was unconstitutionally vague. Wachs simply
accepts Buchwald at p. 351 is not "so patently vague and so wholly devoid
of objective meaning that it provides no standard at all.” Wachs at p. 629.
That Court, though not asked, added that while the term procurement was not
vague on its face, “Whether the Act is unconstitutional as applied [] is a
question for another day.”
Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, 41 Cal.App.4th 246, 252-253
(1996) was asked whether and opined that a single instance of unlicensed
procurement tainted the entire agreement. At p. 261, Waisbren simply accepts
Buchwald at p. 351.
Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1471-1472 (1999), was asked to
determine and opined that even if there is no compensation involved, setting
up live bookings for musicians is a violation of the Act; and to discern
whether Waisbren or Wachs should be followed. At p. 1470 Park follows the
reasoning of Waisbren, mirroring Waisbren’s verbiage accepting Buchwald.
Styne was asked to and opined on two issues: when does the statute of
limitations end when using the TAA as a defense to a breach of contract
action; and whether all TAA controversies must begin at the administrative
agency. Styne simply accepts (at 51) the holding of Buchwald at 351.
Yoo v. Robi, 126 Cal.App.4th 1089 (2005) at 1104 simply accepts Park
and Waisbren in denying “all recovery”, and as stated above, Park and
56
Waisbren simply accepts Buchwald at 351.
Despite Pardoe claiming that Marathon holds that the TAA gives
adjudicators the right to void contracts, it does not. Marathon was asked to
decide and opined two that voidance is not always appropriate, and while it
speaks about unlicensed persons being vulnerable to being found in violation
of the Act, it simply accepts the holdings of the other cases that lean on
Buchwald. Marathon was not asked and did not opine on the relevance of the
Act having no remedy.
G. The Superior Court Ignored The Need To Consider These Matters De Novo
Per Labor Code 1700.44 (a), TAA disputes are “subject to an appeal ...
to the superior court where the same shall be heard de novo.”
According to the uscourts.gov glossary of legal terms, “de novo” means
“anew.” “A trial de novo is a completely new trial.” “[R]eview de novo
implies no deference” to the original ruling.
Judge Meier’s order of the appeal, below in toto, gives complete
deference to the Commissioner, in its affirmation of unlawful procurement
and of the financials, which were not even debated at the superior court:
“It is hereby adjudged and decreed the Labor Commission

Ruling of February 17, 2023 which is and has been the
subject of an appeal on case number 23STCP00683 heard
by this Court on November 9, 2023 is affirmed. In
accordance therewith, it is further adjudged that respondent
Jude Salazar is to recover from Diane Pardoe and Sara
Pardoe, jointly and severally, the sum of $8,713.74 plus
57
interest at a rate of 10% from February 17, 2023, in the sum
of $726 for a total of $9,439.74.
On the Court's own motion, the Non-Appearance Case
Review [for the breach of contract action] scheduled for
01/08/2024 is advanced to this date and vacated.
The superior court not only refused to hear the CLC appeal anew, as
required, the bench refused to consider Appellants’ constitutional claims in
the original breach of contract action; issues not raised in the appeal because
they were not part of the CLC dispute: administrative agencies cannot opine
on constitutional challenges.
Quoting from the lower court Order in this case:

The Court grants the Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal
in case number 22STLC04635 since the issues and the
parties in this 22STLC04635 case are the same as in the
already adjudicated case number 23STCP00683, and the
judgment in that case bars the 22STLC04635 action under
principles of res judicata. If there are any differences in the
issues, the 22STLC04635 action is still barred under
principles of res Judicata and collateral estoppel.
Accordingly, case number 22STLC04635, now barred from
proceeding by principles of Res Judicata and/or collateral
estoppel, is dismissed with prejudice.
The Legal Information Institute of Cornell Law defines res judicata as
“the principle that a cause of action may not be relitigated once it has been
judged on the merits.” As the superior court never considered a single issue
“anew,” and the constitutional issues were not considered by any tribunal,
the lower court decision cannot stand. In the interests of justice, as justice
delayed is justice denied, Appellants prey this court will determine the legal
58
issues and that for the reasons above and below finding the TAA is being
enforced unconstitutionally, only remanding the case back to the superior
court for a ruling on the facts surrounding the breach of contract claim.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons elucidated above, this Court should give declarative
and injunctive relief, finding that the TAA is unconstitutional on its face and
as applied, and that this matter should be remanded to the trial court to
ascertain the facts of the breach of contract claim.
Respectfully Submitted,
Rick Siegel, Intervener and Appellant
59
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.504(d)(1))
The text of this petition, including footnotes (but excluding tables,
this certificate, and any signature blocks or attachments,) consists of 12,563
words as counted by the Flesch Reading Program, part of the Microsoft
Word application used to generate this brief.
Submitted on June 17, 2024 by,
Rick Siegel, Appellant and Intervener
60
APP-009E
PROOF OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE (Court of Appeal)
Notice: This fonn may be used to provide proof that a document has been
served in a proceeding in the Court of Appeal. Please read Information
Sheet for Proof of Service (Court of Appeal) (fonn APP-009-INFO) before
completing this fonn.
Case Name: PARDOE ET AL V SAf.AZ.AR

Court of Appeal Cese Number: B336831
Superior Court Case Number: 23STCP00683
1. At. the time of service I was at least 18 years of age.

2. a. My D residence m business address is (specify):
21350 LASSEN STREET. G1 CHATSWORTH CA 91311
b. My electronic service address is (specify): TRUEFILING
3. I electronically ser ed the following documents (exa t tit es):

APPELLANrs OPENING BRIEF, APPELLANT S APPENDI , MOTION FOR CALENDAR PREFERENCE APPELLANTS
APPLICATION FOR ALLOWANCE OF ATTACHMENTS OF OVER TEN PAGES, DESIGNATED RECORD
4. I electronically ser ed the documents listed in 3.. as follows:

a. Name of person ser ed: JUDE SA1.N.AR
On behalf of (name or names of parties represented, if person ser ed is an attorne ):
also gi en notice: Casey Raymond: [email protected] Diane Pardoe, diane@iristalentmanagementcom
Sarah Pardoe, sarah@iristalentmanagementcom
b. Electronic ser ice address of person ser ed: [email protected]

c. On (date): June 18. 2024
[!]The documents listed in 3. were ser ed electronically on the persons and in the manner described in an attachment ( rite
"APP-009E, Item 4" at the top of the page).
l declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date: June 18, 2024
Jennie Nigrosh
(TYPE 04'! PRINT tw1E Of FfRSON CXlfD'I.EJING n-11SFORIA)
,..1Cl!I
Fenn,._e,J tcr-Op:,cml u,,. PROOF OF ELECTRONtc SERVICE

.t.=>f Ccux:ll d wilami
(Court of Appeal)
I 1
f>W,«E: • Jan:wy 1, Nl7]
>ti cy, please press I.be Clear Tbi:s Form buttDn iiller y1
Ii Print this form
11 Save this fonn j Clear this fonn
61

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CASE: B336831

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DIANE PARDOE et al.,

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

2. The Commissioner’s Interpretation Conflicts

VII. CONCLUSION Pg. 50

8th Amendment/Excessive Penalties Clause Pgs. 8, 12, 48-51

BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) Pg. 39

CALIFORNIA STATE CASES

LABOR COMMISSION DETERMINATIONS

This is an appeal of a superior court’s rubber stamp, 1 rather than the de

novo review as legally required, from a determination by the CA State Labor

Commissioner (“CLC”, “Commissioner”) of a CA Talent Agencies Act (CA

Labor Code § 1700 et seq, “TAA”, “Act”) controversy.

Respondent alleged Appellants violated the Act by procuring

employment opportunities for her without a talent agency license. Appellants

argue the TAA, as written, neither statutorily reserves the procurement of

thus, entwining unlicensed persons in such controversies is an extrajudicial,

unconstitutional violation of unlicensed persons’ civil rights.

As detailed herein, the Commissioner is solely responsible for inventing

Violations of law are “made up of two parts, forbidden conduct and a

prescribed penalty. The former without the latter is no [violation].” Wayne

R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(d) (1st ed. 1986).

The TAA as written neither bars nor penalizes unlicensed procurement.

(1) Provides clear notice anyone procuring employment for artists,

Seventy-one years ago, the California Labor Commissioner pressed a

other employment licensing schemes, but as the Commissioner knew, were

not codified for the scheme regulating artists’ managers.

Every Commissioner since, either knowing or having the responsibility

prohibits or has a remedy for unlicensed procurement, has unconstitutionally

enforced imaginary prohibitions and remedies and extrajudicially voided the

contractual rights of found violators, depriving unlicensed persons acting

lawfully of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured and protected by

the Constitution and the laws of California.

With no clarity as to who is being regulated, the Act is unconstitutional

on its face. By interpreting the Act as if there is authority to prohibit and

penalize unlicensed procurers when there is not, it is unconstitutional as it is

applied. In accepting, adjudicating, and ruling on petitions for controversy

based on allegations of unlicensed procurement, when procurement is a

lawful activity irrespective of one’s licensing status, the Commissioner and

all involved knowingly and inexplicably ignore a multitude of rules of

The Respondent is an actress; an artist as defined in CA Labor Code

1700.4 (b). Appellants and assignee are managers.3

Publicists are the vice-presidents of public relations, transactional

As such, whether working solo for their client or overseeing a team of

representatives, it is absurd to think managers can fulfill their responsibilities

unconstitutional practices of the Commissioner.

Appellants filed this timely appeal on February 4, 2024, after a superior

court final judgment affirming a CLC ruling on January 23, 2024.

on June 17, 2022, Case No. 22STLC04635 (Appendix Document (“Doc.”)

1). On July 19, 2022, Respondent petitioned the Commissioner, claiming

On August 23, 2022, Appellants filed an opposition to the stay motion,

asking the superior court to follow the instructions of Styne v. Stevens, 26

Cal.4th 42, 59 fn. 10 (2001) and determine if unlicensed procurement was a

colorable claim before referring the case to the administrative agency,

colorable claim to adjudicate. (Doc. 6)

Appellants simultaneously submitted an amended complaint (Doc. 5)

with these additional claims:

(3) By denying Appellants’ right of the benefit of their labors

(4) With no rationality between the remedy of voidance and that