Cross-Petitioner's Pre-Hearing Brief Atlas V Osuji
Cross-Petitioner's Pre-Hearing Brief Atlas V Osuji
Cross-Petitioner's Pre-Hearing Brief Atlas V Osuji
)
MARILYN R ATLAS individually, and ) CASE: TAC - 52902
doing business as MARILYN ATLAS )
MANAGEMENT, )
)
Cross-Petitioner, )
) PRE-HEARING BRIEF
vs. )
)
CASSANDRA OSUJI, an individual, )
)
)
Cross-Respondent )
___________________________________
1
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION AND ADJUDICATION
Does the plain language of the CA Talent Agencies Act reserve procuring1 for those
with talent agency licenses? If not, does the State Labor Commissioner (“Commissioner”,
“CLC”) have jurisdiction to demand an unlicensed person defend themselves when there
is no colorable claim?
LEGAL ARGUMENT
Per Labor Code § 1700.44 (a), “In cases of controversy arising under this chapter, the
parties involved shall refer the matters in dispute to the Labor Commissioner.” Per Styne v.
Stevens, 26 Cal.4th 42 (2001), at p. 56, fn. 6, it is for the Commissioner “alone to decide in
the first instance, whether the facts do bring the case within the Act.”
This power, however, is conditional. When a case, “despite a party’s contrary claim,
clearly has nothing to do with the Act” and “cannot be made [colorable] by mere utterance
of words,” the Commissioner has no jurisdictional authority. Id. at p. 59, fn. 10.
Such is the case when an unlicensed person procures employment for an artist.
Despite the enforcement, in the 71-year history of the Act and its predecessor, the
Legislature has never passed a law reserving procurement for licensees.
Cross-Petitioner is asking, as it this agency’s responsibility, to determine whether the
plain language of the Act gives the CLC jurisdiction to determine whether an unlicensed
person procured without a license, or whether there is no law forbidding such actions.
This role cannot be abdicated. No court has ever been asked to review this.
Adjudicators’ “fundamental task ... is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to
effectuate the law's purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain
and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the
context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose
and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must
generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd
1
All mentions of the term ‘procurement’ , ‘procure’ or ‘procuring’ means procuring employment for an artist.
2
consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than
one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's
purpose, legislative history, and public policy. Furthermore, we consider portions of a
statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part,
giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the
legislative purpose.” Sierra Club v Superior Court of Orange County, 57 Cal.4th 157,
166 (2013) (citations removed).
Plain Language: you know it when you see it. As stated in Sierra Club, “If the
language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal
interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.”
Business and Professions Code (“BPC”) § 1203 gives clear notice that only licensed
clinical bioanalysts “may perform” the specific activities detailed in §§ 1203 (a-c).
Labor Code § 1700.4 (a) defines a talent agent as one who procures and may direct
or counsel artists – but unlike how BPC §§ 1203 (a – c), the TAA has no express
language reserving any of its three defining activities to licensees.
Per BPC § 1281, “It is unlawful for any person to own, operate, maintain, direct, or
engage in the business of operating a clinical laboratory, as defined in this chapter,
unless he or she possesses a valid clinical laboratory license issued by the department.”
If Labor Code § 1700.5 likewise stated, “It is unlawful to engage in the business of a
talent agent as defined in this chapter without a license,” then procuring, directing or
counseling artists would be reserved for licensees. But it, nor any statute in the TAA, has
such language.
Per California law, there does not have to be an express prohibition if the statute
includes a consequence for engaging in that activity: “where a statute contains a penalty,
that penalty is equivalent to an express prohibition.” Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259 (1920).
However, the TAA has no statute similar to BPC § 1287, which details the consequences
when a person “violates any provision” of that licensing scheme.
3
Per Civil Code § 3530: “That which does not appear to exist is to be regarded as if it
did not exist.” The Talent Agencies Act has neither prohibitionary language nor a remedy
for unlicensed procurement, and as such, it is to be regarded that there is no such law.2
Along with the TAA having no language in the Act supporting enforcement – which
should be enough for a ruling in the Cross-Respondent’s favor – there is nothing in the
Act’s history that supports the current enforcement.
Exhibit 1 is the codified history of the TAA and its antecedent since the 1913
passage of Chapter 282, The 1913 Private Employment Agencies Act (PEAA)...
“An act regulating private employment agencies, providing
for a license for the operation thereof and a fee therefor,
providing forms of receipts and registers to be used and kept,
prohibiting any charge for registering or filing application for
help or employment, prohibiting the dividing of fees, providing
for the refunding of fees and expenses in the event of failure to
procure employment, and granting the commissioner of the
bureau of labor the power to prescribe rules and regulations to
carry out the purpose and intent of this act.” Exhibit 1, Pg. 4.
Per Section 1.2 of the PEAA:
“The term ‘employment agency’ means and includes the
business of conducting, as owner, agent, manager, contractor,
subcontractor, or in any other capacity an intelligence office,
domestic and commercial employment agency, theatrical
employment agency, teachers’ employment agency, general
employment bureau, shipping agency, nurses’ registry, or any
other agency or office for the purposed of procuring or attempting
to procure help or employment or engagements for persons
seeking such help, employment or engagement.” Id.
Per Section 2 of the PEAA:
2
Respondent’s Motion of Directed Verdict pgs. 12-14 details how no other licensing scheme with language similar
to the TAA punishes those engaging in those scheme’s defining activities and the precedents holding that without a
prohibition statute one cannot be punished for engaging in that activity. Pages 14-17 of the Motion details how the
lack of a remedy prohibits adjudicators from meting out a punishment, and in particular, how administrative
agencies are barred from creating remedies, as like with the TAA, the Legislature withheld.
4
“A person shall not open, keep, maintain or carry on any
employment agency, as defined in the preceding section, unless he
shall have first procured a license therefor as provided in this
article from the commissioner of labor. ... Any person who shall
open or conduct such an employment agency without first
procuring said license shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
be punished as hereinafter provided.” Id., p. 5.
This is clear notice that engaging in an activity defined in Section 1.2 was unlawful.
Likewise, Section 18 gave notice of the exact penalty: those...
“violating or omitting to comply with any of the provisions of this
act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof
shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars or more than
two hundred and fifty dollars or by imprisonment for a period of not
more than sixty days or by both fine and imprisonment. Id. p. 10.
However, the prohibition and penalty disappeared when the Legislature
created a licensing scheme specifically for artists’ managers.
...“An act to add Sections 1650, 1651 1652, 1653, 1654, 1655, 1656, 1657, 1658,
1659, 1660, and 1661 to Article 3 of Chapter 1 of Part 6 of Division 2 of the Labor Code,
relating to artists’ managers.”
It has long been assumed the 1978 legislative change from the Artists’ Managers to
the Talent Agencies Act was to align the title to the modern term for a practitioner of the
profession and that talent agents had previously been referred to as ‘artists manager’.
The laws as written shows is a misnomer. In signing the 1943 legislation; the
Legislature, Commissioner, Attorney General and Governor all recognized personal
management was, as it is today, a different occupation where procurement was essential
but not the primary function of the practitioner.
Per the 1943-minted Labor Code § 1650, “An artists’ manager is hereby defined as a
person, firm or corporation who engages in the occupation of advising, counseling or
directing artists in the development or advancement of their professional careers; and
who, as an element of such occupation, endeavors to find opportunities for the artists to
whom the services above described are rendered.”
5
This definition – prioritizing the advising, counseling and directing artists – while
noting procurement is an unavoidable element, is the exact definition of what a personal
manager does. Thinking a personal manager can do their job without procuring has no
understanding of the reality. The manager hires and supervise the sales team, the talent
agents, the procurers; creates/chooses the sales materials (demo tapes, pictures, resumes);
and overseeing the efforts of the agents, publicists and transactional attorneys; all of
whom are involved in creating revenue; procuring.
The Respondent is an actress, an artist as defined in CA Labor Code 1700.4 (b). In
the entertainment industry, the artist is the chairman of the board their business and the
product being sold, synonymous to being both Steve Jobs and the iPhone.
Publicists are the vice-presidents of public relations, transactional attorneys the vp’s
of business affairs. Talent agents are the vice presidents of sales. And each report to the
artist’s chief executive officer: the personal manager.
In a letter to then-Gov. Earl Warren, (Id., pg. 57-58), the Artists’ Managers Guild’s
attorney explains how an artist’s manager’s “work is distinct and different” than an
employment agency3 “which merely seeks employment for those who patronize it. The
seeking of employment is, as the 1943 definition states, only an element of the multiple
services rendered by artists’ managers.
While CA Labor Code § 1651 (Id. p. 39) uses similar language to its predecessor:
“No person, firm or corporation shall engage in or carry on the occupation of an artists’
manager without procuring a license therefor from the Labor Commissioner,” the AMA
omits the “as defined in the preceding section,” phrase that was in the PEAA.
With the 1943/AMA removal of that phrase, along with not codifying statutes either
barring unlicensed persons from procureming or levying a consequence to procuring
without a license, the Legislature made it clear no license was required to engage in the
defining activities of an artists’ manager.
3
While artist managers were given their own scheme, talent agents remained regulated by the PEAA, which had
been renamed the General Employment Act in 1927.
6
Among those in favor of this new law: the Labor Commissioner. Quoting from a
memorandum from the Commissioner to the governor during discussion of this bill: “Due
to the peculiar nature of the services rendered by artists’ manager, the business should be
subject to different regulations than those prescribed for employment agencies generally.
This bill contains proper regulations and I recommend its approval.” Exhibit 1, Pg. 51.
The State attorney general also approved enacting a licensing scheme for those “who
conduct a business similar to that of a theatrical agency,” yet different; who direct,
advise, and counsel; with procurement “an element” of their responsibilities. Id. at 52.
-----
With Assembly Bill 885: the 1959 Amendments to the Artists’ Managers Act, the
defining activities of an artists’ manager still mirrored the responsibilities of a manager,
only renumbered to Labor Code §1700.4, as the Act was changed to begin at § 1700.
The Act now had two penalty provisions. § 1700.30 made it a misdemeanor should a
licensee “sell, transfer or give away interest or participate in the profit of the artists’
manager without the written consent of the Labor Commissioner” (Id. p. 107), and §
1700.46: “Any person, or agent or officer thereof, who violates any provision of this
chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine ... or imprisonment ... or both”
(Id., p. 110).
However, § 1700.46 had no verbiage that reserved directing, counseling, or the
element of procurement, the defining activities of an artists’ manager, for licensees, nor
did it have the PEAA phrase prohibiting unlicensed procurement, “as defined in section
1700.4 (a),” nor any other verbiage barring unlicensed procurement.
A reading of the Governor’s Chaptered Bill File of Assembly Bill 885 (Id., pgs. 115-
119) offers context. In an “inter-departmental communication” from the Director of the
Department of Industrial Relations (at p. 115), who oversees the Labor Commission, to
the Legislative Secretary in the Governor’s office, speaking about the amendments to the
AMA, wrote, “there is no substantive change, merely giving artists’ managers a chapter
of their own as a separate category rather than including them in the chapter dealing with
employment agencies and labor contractors generally as is the case now.
7
“The changes were introduced at the request of the artists’ managers.”
It would be absurd to think managers would request enacting criminal sanctions that
would interfere in their ability to properly serve their clients’ needs and objectives.
--------
Chapter 1382, The Talent Agencies Act of 1978, is “An act to amend the heading
of Chapter 4” and to amend multiple sections “relating to talent agencies.” Id., p. 122.
As stated above, the Marathon Court thought that the term ‘talent agent’ was
synonymous with artists’ manager, that until then the Legislature had only had a licensing
scheme to license talent agents, and in 1978 it was considering “establishing a separate
licensing scheme for personal managers.”
If it was not clear enough the AMA regulated personal managers and talent agents
were under a different scheme, the TAA changed the definition of the activities the
regulated profession engages in, putting the emphasis on procurement over directing and
counseling for the first time:
"Talent agency" means a person or corporation who engages in
the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to
procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists ...
Talent agencies may, in addition, counsel or direct artists in the
development of their professional careers.” Id., p. 123.
That makes it clear the legislature is talking about two different jobs. Rather than
procuring just being an element of a professional who advises, counsels and supervises
the direction of an artist’s career, as a manager does, now the regulated profession’s sole
priority is procuring, and who “may” also counsel or direct, which is what agents do.
While the State Supreme Court only looked at the licensing scheme three times in its
history, its misunderstanding is understandable. However, the administrative agency
empowered to administrate and set the policies for the Act should have known, and had it
rightfully acted, the decades of managers being compromised would have been avoided.
Thirty-six sections of law were amended with the 1978 passage of the TAA (Id., p
122), but the 1700.46 penalty provision remained intact; it remained without verbiage
that would incorporate procurement into the chapter, leaving procurement unregulated.
8
In 1982, the Legislature passed Chapter 682, “An act to amend, repeal and add
Sections 1700.4 and 1700.44 of,” and among other laws being extinguished, “to repeal
Section 1700.46 ... of the Labor Code, relating to talent agencies.” Id., p. 134.
The amendments to §§ 1700.4 and 1700.44 are immaterial for this action. The
Legislature’s repeal of § 1700.46, the Act’s only penalty statute, leaves it inarguably clear
the Act, as it stands today, has neither a provision regulating procurement or a codified
consequence for unlicensed procuring.
III. CONCLUSION
Respectfully submitted,
Rick Siegel
Non-attorney representative for Counter-Petitioner
9
PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
On MARCH 18, 2024, I facilitated service of the within document described as:
PRE-HEARIN BRIEF
on the interested parties in this action as stated on the below service list.
10
Exhibit 1
11
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Legislative History of
CALIFORNIA
FORMER LABOR CODE
§ 1650 et seq
As Added By
Statutes of 1943, Chapter 329, § 1-14
Assembly Bill 201 – Waters
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cleansed of black marks or spots. Lastly, paging and relevant identification have been inserted.
Since 1983 LRI has specialized in the historical research surrounding the adoption,
amendment and/or repeal of California statutes, regulations and constitutional provisions
pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1859 which states in pertinent part: "In the
construction of a statute the intention of the Legislature ... is to be pursued, if possible ....”
Our research and expert witness services have assisted the courts in understanding and
applying the underlying purpose of enactments in countless cases, such as Redlands
Community Hospital v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Co, 23 Cal. App.4th 899 at 906
(1994). LRI also provides similar research for other states and at the federal level.
(Formerly Legislative Research Institute, Legislative Research, Incorporated, and Legislative
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ENACTMENT HISTORY
GENERAL
Correspondence..................................................................................................................................29
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CALIFORNIA
STATUTES OF 1959
CHAPTER 888
ASSEMLLY BILL 885
STATUTES OF 1959
CHAPTER 888
ASSEMLLY BILL 885
Table of Contents
1. Bill Versions
2. California Session Laws
3. Final History
4. Governor's Chaptered Bill File
Bill Versions
SOURCE:
CALIFORNIA STATE LAW LIBRARY
California Session
Laws
SOURCE:
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK
OFFICIAL ONLINE DATABASE
Final History
SOURCE:
CALIFORNIA STATE LAW LIBRARY
Governor's
Chaptered Bill
File
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