Evergreen Manufacturing v. BCDA (Eminent Domain)

7/20/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 839

G.R. No. 218628. September 6, 2017.*

EVERGREEN MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS, respondent.

G.R. No. 218631. September 6, 2017.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
petitioner, vs. EVERGREEN MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; Factual Findings; The factual issues pertaining to
the value of the property expropriated are questions of fact which
are generally beyond the scope of the judicial review of the
Supreme Court (SC) under Rule 45.—We note that only questions
of law should be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.

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VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 201

Evergreen Manufacturing Corporation vs. Republic
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001736c2c340ed93af550003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/33
Factual findings of the lower courts will generally not be

disturbed. Thus, the factual issues pertaining to the value of the
property expropriated are questions of fact which are generally
beyond the scope of the judicial review of this Court under Rule
45. However, we have consistently recognized several exceptions
to this rule, to wit: The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought
before it from the appellate court is limited to reviewing errors of
law, and findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive
upon the Court since it is not the Court’s function to analyze and
weigh the evidence all over again. Nevertheless, in several cases,
the Court enumerated the exceptions to the rule that factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
Expropriation Proceedings; Just Compensation; Words and
Phrases; Just compensation in expropriation cases is defined as
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator.—Just compensation has been defined as the fair
and full equivalent of the loss. More specifically, just
compensation has been defined in this wise: Notably, just
compensation in expropriation cases is defined “as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The Court repeatedly stressed that the true
measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word
‘just’ is used to modify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to
be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.”

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202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; This determination of just compensation, which

remains to be a judicial function performed by the court, is usually
aided by the appointed commissioners.—The determination of just
compensation in expropriation proceedings is essentially a judicial
prerogative. This determination of just compensation, which
remains to be a judicial function performed by the court, is
usually aided by the appointed commissioners. In Spouses Ortega
v. City of Cebu, 602 SCRA 601 (2009), we held: Likewise, in the
recent cases of National Power Corporation v. dela Cruz and
Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National
Railways, we emphasized the primacy of judicial prerogative in
the ascertainment of just compensation as aided by the appointed
commissioners, to wit: Though the ascertainment of just
compensation is a judicial prerogative, the appointment of
commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property
sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation
cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be
disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of
the value, it may only do so for valid reasons; that is, where the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either
grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus, “trial with the aid of the
commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away
with capriciously or for no reason at all.”
Same; Same; Just compensation must be the value of the
property at the time of taking.—We note that while the amount of
just compensation in this case is not an authority to be applied
blindly and invariably in other expropriation cases, this Court has
allowed reference to similar cases of expropriation to help
determine the amount of just compensation. However, the cases
relied on by the commissioners were decided in the year 2000,
while the taking of the Subject Premises in this case happened in
2004 when Republic-DPWH filed a case for expropriation against
Evergreen. Moreover, the BIR Zonal Valuations considered by the
commissioners were also for the year 2000. Evidently, these
reflect the value of the Subject Property in 2000. Just
compensation must be the value of the property at the time of
taking. If there were other documentary evidence to show the
value of the property at a point nearer to the time of the taking, in
this case the year 2004, then consideration of year 2000
documents would not be fatal. However, if the only documents to

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support the finding of just compensation are from a year

which is not the year when the taking of the expropriated
property took place, then this would be plainly inaccurate.
Same; Same; While documentary evidence is indeed important
to support the finding of the value of the expropriated property, the
commissioners are given leeway to consider other factors to
determine just compensation for the property to be expropriated.—
While documentary evidence is indeed important to support the
finding of the value of the expropriated property, the
commissioners are given leeway to consider other factors to
determine just compensation for the property to be expropriated.
In National Power Corporation v. Spouses Asoque, 802 SCRA 582
(2016), we upheld the finding of the RTC therein and quoted:
x x x. Likewise, this Court takes cognizance of the fact that
the commissioner may avail or consider certain factors in
determining the fair market value of the property apart
from the proffered documentary evidences. Thus, the factors
taken into account by the commissioner in arriving at the
recommended fair market value of the property at Php800.00 per
square meter, aside from the evidence available, were valid
criteria or gauge in the determination of the just compensation of
the subject property. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied) This
determination, however, should still reflect the value of the
property as of the date of taking. In this case, the commissioners
found that the properties in the area, as of the time of the ocular
inspection in 2008, had a demand selling price ranging from
P35,000.00 to P40,000.00 per square meter. A reading of their
individual reports shows that they considered the location of the
Subject Premises, as well as its size and prospective uses, the
neighborhood, and the nearby establishments. This was well
within their prerogative to do so, as we have held that all the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as
well as its improvements and capabilities, must thus be
considered in determining just compensation. However, these
must be the conditions existing at the time the taking was made
by the government. While the size and location of the property
would not have changed from the time of taking until the time
when the ocular inspection was conducted, the establishments
and neighborhood surrounding the property may have undergone
changes after the property was taken by the government. The

improvements introduced after the time of taking should not
unduly benefit the property owner by unnecessarily increasing
the value of

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the property. Unfortunately, in this case, all of the conditions

they took into account in determining just compensation did not
reflect the value of the Subject Premises at the time of taking.
Documentary or otherwise, the commissioners failed to rely on
such evidence that would prove the value of the Subject Premises
at the time of the taking, which should be the basis for the
determination of just compensation. There was nothing to show
the value of the property in 2004, which was the year the taking
of the Subject Premises took place. The BIR Zonal Valuation and
the court decisions were reflective of the value of the property in
2000, four years before the taking of the Subject Premises by the
government. On the other hand, the ocular inspection was
conducted in 2008, four years after the time of taking. Clear
factual evidence must be presented for the correct determination
of just compensation.
Same; Same; Zonal Valuation; Zonal valuation, although one
of the indices of the fair market value of real estate, cannot by itself
be the sole basis of just compensation in expropriation cases.—We
cannot agree with the insistence of Republic-DPWH that the just
compensation for the Subject Premises is only Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00). As correctly found by the CA, this is merely
the zonal valuation of the commercial lots and therefore cannot be
made as the sole basis for the fair market value of the land. Zonal
valuation, although one of the indices of the fair market value of
real estate, cannot by itself be the sole basis of just compensation
in expropriation cases.
Same; Same; It has been settled that the value and character
of the land at the time it was taken by the government are the
criteria for determining just compensation.—It has been settled
that the value and character of the land at the time it was taken
by the government are the criteria for determining just
compensation. All three commissioners found that the property
was located in an area that was classified as commercial. It also
found that the property was best used as commercial. We find no
reason to disturb the findings of the commissioners who

conducted an ocular inspection, and the lower courts which
affirmed the findings of the commissioners.
Same; Same; Just compensation envisions a payment in full of
the expropriated property. Absent full payment, interest on the
balance would necessarily be due on the unpaid amount.—Section
9,

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Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no private

property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.”
Just compensation in expropriation cases has been held to
contemplate just and timely payment, and prompt payment is the
payment in full of the just compensation as finally determined by
the courts. Thus, just compensation envisions a payment in full of
the expropriated property. Absent full payment, interest on the
balance would necessarily be due on the unpaid amount. In
Republic v. Mupas, 769 SCRA 384 (2015), we held that interest on
the unpaid compensation becomes due if there is no full
compensation for the expropriated property, in accordance with
the concept of just compensation.
Same; Same; Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8974
specifically provides that “when the decision of the court becomes
final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the owner
the difference between the amount already paid and the just
compensation as determined by the court.”—Republic-DPWH had
complied with the requirements of Section 4, paragraph (a) of RA
8974 when it deposited the equivalent of 100% of the value of the
Subject Premises based on the BIR zonal valuation of the
property for the account of Evergreen. This deposit was made
before Republic-DPWH was able to take possession of the Subject
Premises through the issuance of the writ of possession. Verily,
under the law, the initial payment is a prerequisite for the
issuance of the writ of possession. However, this payment alone
and by itself does not constitute just compensation. We note that
this is only the first of the two payments the government must
make. Section 4 of RA 8974 specifically provides that “when the
decision of the court becomes final and executory, the
implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between
the amount already paid and the just compensation as
determined by the court.” Thus, under RA 8974, there must be a

completion of two payments before just compensation is deemed
to have been made.
Same; Same; As explained by the Supreme Court (SC) in Apo
Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 632 SCRA
727 (2010), the rationale for imposing interest on just
compensation is to compensate the property owners for the income
that they would have made if they had been properly compensated
— meaning if they had been paid the full amount of just
compensation — at the time of taking when they were deprived of
their property.—Just compensation should be made at the time of
taking, and the amount of payment

206

should be the fair and equivalent value of the property. In

this case, Republic-DPWH was able to take possession of the
Subject Premises even before making a full and fair payment of
just compensation because RA 8974 allowed for the possession of
the property merely upon the initial payment which forms part of
the just compensation. Thus, it is clear that the government has
not yet made the full and fair payment of just compensation to
Evergreen. As explained by this Court in Apo Fruits Corporation
v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 632 SCRA 727 (2010), the
rationale for imposing interest on just compensation is to
compensate the property owners for the income that they would
have made if they had been properly compensated — meaning if
they had been paid the full amount of just compensation — at the
time of taking when they were deprived of their property.
Same; Same; The delay in the payment of just compensation is
a forbearance of money. As such, this is necessarily entitled to earn
interest.—The delay in the payment of just compensation is a
forbearance of money. As such, this is necessarily entitled to earn
interest. The difference in the amount between the final amount
as adjudged by the court and the initial payment made by the
government — which is part and parcel of the just compensation
due to the property owner — should earn legal interest as a
forbearance of money. In Republic v. Mupas, 769 SCRA 384
(2015), we stated clearly: Contrary to the Government’s opinion,
the interest award is not anchored either on the law of contracts
or damages; it is based on the owner’s constitutional right to just
compensation. The difference in the amount between the

final payment and the initial payment — in the interim or
before the judgment on just compensation becomes final
and executory — is not unliquidated damages which do
not earn interest until the amount of damages is
established with reasonable certainty. The difference
between final and initial payments forms part of the just
compensation that the property owner is entitled from the
date of taking of the property. Thus, when the taking of the
property precedes the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the
Court orders the condemnor to pay the full amount of just
compensation from the date of taking whose interest shall
likewise commence on the same date. The Court does not rule
that the interest on just compensation shall commence [on] the
date when the amount of just compensation becomes certain, e.g.,
from the promul-

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gation of the Court’s decision or the finality of the eminent

domain case.
Interest Rates; The imposition of twelve percent (12%) interest
rate from the time of taking when the property owner was deprived
of the property, until 1 July 2013, when the legal interest on loans
and forbearance of money was reduced from 12% to six percent
(6%) per annum by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular
No. 799.—With respect to the amount of interest on the difference
between the initial payment and final amount of just
compensation as adjudged by the court, we have upheld in
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78
(1994), and in subsequent cases thereafter, the imposition of 12%
interest rate from the time of taking when the property owner
was deprived of the property, until 1 July 2013, when the legal
interest on loans and forbearance of money was reduced from 12%
to 6% per annum by BSP Circular No. 799. Accordingly, from 1
July 2013 onwards, the legal interest on the difference between
the final amount and initial payment is 6% per annum.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Law Firm of Chan, Robles and Associates for

Evergreen Manufacturing Corporation.
Office of the Solicitor General for the Republic.
CARPIO,** J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Evergreen
Manufacturing Corporation (Evergreen) is the petitioner in
G.R. No. 218628 while the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by
_______________
** Designated Acting Chief Justice.

208

the Department of Public Works and Highways (Republic-

DPWH), is the petitioner in G.R. No. 218631. Both
challenge the 26 June 2014 Decision1 and the 25 May 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 98157. The CA affirmed, with modification, the 30 June
2011 Decision3 and the 3 November 2011 Order4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 166 of Pasig City in
SCA No. 2641 for Expropriation.

The Facts

Evergreen is the registered owner of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Santolan, Pasig City, which covers an
area of 1,428.68 square meters and is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. PT-114857 (Subject Property).
Republic-DPWH seeks to expropriate a portion of the
Subject Property covering 173.08 square meters (Subject
Premises) which will be used for a public purpose — the
construction of Package 3, Marikina Bridge and Access
Road, Metro Manila Urban Transport Integration Project.
Based on the zonal, industrial classification and
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of the
real properties situated in Barangay Santolan, Evangelista

Street, in the vicinity of A. Rodriguez boundary where the
Subject Property is situated, the properties have an
appraised value of P6,000.00 per square meter. While
Republic-DPWH offered to acquire the Subject Premises by
negotiated sale. Evergreen declined this offer. Thus,
Republic-DPWH filed a complaint for expropriation on 22
March 2004.
_______________
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 218628), pp. 11-25. Penned by Associate Justice

Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and
Michael P. Elbinias, concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 27-28.
3 Id., at pp. 244-254. Penned by Presiding Judge Rowena De Juan-
Quinagoran.
4 Id., at pp. 255-256.

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VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 209

Evergreen, in opposing the complaint for expropriation,

alleged that the conditions for filing a complaint for
expropriation have not been met, and that there is no
necessity for expropriation. It argued that an expropriation
of the Subject Premises would impair the rights of
leaseholders in gross violation of the constitutional
proscription against impairment of the obligation of
contracts. It prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. In the alternative, in the
possibility that expropriation is deemed proper, Evergreen
prayed that in addition to the payment of just
compensation, Republic-DPWH be ordered to (a) cause a
resurvey of the remaining areas of the Subject Property
and draw a new lot plan and vicinity plan for each area; (b)
draw up a new technical description of the remaining areas
for approval of the proper government agencies; (c) cause
the issuance of new titles for the remaining lot; (d) provide
new tax declaration for the new title; and (e) pay incidental
expenses relative to the titling of the expropriated areas.
On 19 August 2004, after depositing One Million Thirty-
Eight Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Pesos
(P1,038,480.00) — which is equivalent to 100% of the value

of the Subject Premises based on the BIR zonal valuation of
P6,000.00 per square meter — Republic-DPWH filed a
Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession. On 6
December 2004, a Writ of Possession was issued by the
RTC. On 14 September 2005, Republic-DPWH filed a
Motion for Issuance of a New Writ of Possession as the first
writ of possession was not implemented. Subsequently, on
2 March 2006, Evergreen filed a Motion to Withdraw the
Initial Deposit. This was opposed by Republic-DPWH as it
was not yet allowed entry into the Subject Premises. On 21
April 2006, the parties entered into an agreement allowing
Republic-DPWH to enter into and/or possess the Subject
Premises. On 15 November 2006, the RTC granted the
Motion to Withdraw Initial Deposit.
During the pretrial, Evergreen and Republic-DPWH
agreed that the issue to be resolved in the expropriation
complaint

210

was the amount of just compensation. Three (3) real estate

brokers/appraisers were appointed as commissioners to
determine the current fair market value of the Subject
Premises.
On 15 October 2007, the RTC appointed the members of
the Board of Commissioners, namely: Norviendo Ramos,
Jr., (later replaced by Atty. Jade Ferrer Wy), the City
Assessor or his representative, and the RTC Clerk of Court
of Pasig City. Thereafter, the Commissioners submitted
separate Appraisal Reports. Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. of the
City Assessor’s office recommended the payment of
P15,000.00 per square meter, Atty. Jade Ferrer Wy
recommended P37,500.00 per square meter and Atty.
Pablita Migriño of the Office of the RTC Clerk of Court of
Pasig City recommended the amount of P30,000.00 per
square meter for the Subject Premises.

The Ruling of the RTC

On 30 June 2011, the RTC rendered its Decision5 fixing
the just compensation for the Subject Premises at Twenty
Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) per square meter. The
RTC directed Republic-DPWH to pay Evergreen the

amount of Three Million Two Hundred Eighty-Eight
Thousand Five Hundred Twenty Pesos (P3,288,520.00),
which was the amount due after deducting the deposit
made by Republic-DPWH which had already been
withdrawn by Evergreen. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered fixing the amount of just compensation for 173.08
square meters of the subject parcel of land being expropriated at
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) per square meter.
Plaintiff is directed to pay the said defendant the net amount
of Three Million Two Hundred Eighty-Eight
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 244-254.

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VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 211

Thousand Five Hundred Twenty Pesos (Php3,288,520.00) and

subject to payment by defendant of any unpaid real property
taxes and other taxes and fees due.
Other claims of defendant [are] denied, for lack of merit.
Cost of litigation is adjudged against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.6

Both Republic-DPWH and Evergreen filed their
respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration. Republic-
DPWH argued that the just compensation should be fixed
only at Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) per square
meter while Evergreen argued that the RTC erred in fixing
the just compensation at merely Twenty Five Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00). Evergreen further asked for the
payment of consequential damages as a result of its lost
income with its billboard lessee and decrease in value of
the Subject Property and legal interest on the amount of
just compensation. In an Order dated 3 November 2011,7
the RTC denied the motions. Thus, both parties appealed to
the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In a Decision dated 26 June 2014,8 the CA increased the
amount of just compensation for the Subject Premises at
Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) per square meter,
or a total of Six Million Fifty-Seven Thousand Eight
Hundred Pesos (P6,057,800.00). The CA held:
In their separate Commissioner’s Appraisal Report, Atty. Wy

and Atty. Pablita Migriño stated, that: (1) the selling price of the
properties in the surrounding area is within the range of
P35,000.00 and P40,000.00 per square
_______________
6 Id., at p. 254.
7 Id., at pp. 255-256.
8 Id., at pp. 11-25.

212

meter; and (2) in 2000, the just compensation of a nearby property

was P26,100.00 per square meter as determined by RTC-Branch
70, Pasig City, and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Light Rail
Transit Authority v. Clayton Industrial Corporation, et al. Thus,
just compensation of P25,000.00 per square meter set by the RTC,
is far too low for a property expropriated in 2004.
Consequently, it would be more in accord with justice and
equity to increase the just compensation of the subject property to
P35,000.00 per square meter, agreed to by two of the three
commissioners, Atty. Wy and RTC Clerk of Court, Atty. Migriño,
for a total of P6,057,800.00 for the 173.08 square meters sought to
be expropriated.9

The CA, however, denied the claim of consequential
damages or interest by Evergreen. The CA found that
based on the records of the RTC, the Subject Premises
expropriated by the Republic-DPWH did not include and
would not encroach on the residential building and
billboard owned by Evergreen. Evergreen also failed to
present any evidence to prove that its remaining properties
would be adversely affected or damaged by the
expropriation. As for the issue regarding the interest on the

amount of just compensation until final payment, the CA
held that Evergreen is not entitled to such interest as
Republic-DPWH’s payment was deposited in the account of
Evergreen months before it was able to take possession of
the Subject Premises pursuant to the Writ of Possession
issued by the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, both appeals are

PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated June 30, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 166, Pasig City, in SCA No. 2641, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the just compensation for
the 173.08 square meters of the property expropriated is
P35,000.00 per square meter, or a total of P6,057,800.00, minus
the
_______________
9 Id., at p. 21. Citations omitted.

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amount of P1,038,480.00 paid over by Republic-DPWH in order to

take possession of the expropriated property, and withdrawn by
Evergreen sometime on or after November 15, 2006. No costs.
SO ORDERED.10

In a Resolution dated 25 May 2015,11 the CA denied the
Motions for Partial Reconsideration filed by both Evergreen
and Republic-DPWH. Hence, Evergreen filed with this
Court its petition for review on certiorari dated 3 August
201512 while Republic-DPWH filed its own petition for
review on certiorari dated 29 July 2015.13

The Issues

In its petition, Evergreen argues that it is entitled to the
payment of interest for the Subject Premises expropriated
by Republic-DPWH:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH UTMOST

DUE RESPECT, GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST FOR
THE PROPERTY EXPROPRIATED BY THE RESPONDENT.14

On the other hand Republic-DPWH raises the following
arguments in its own petition:
THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, CONSIDERING THAT:
_______________
10 Id., at p. 24.
11 Id., at pp. 27-28.
12 Id., at pp. 32-50.
13 Rollo (G.R. No. 218631), pp. 31-73.
14 Rollo (G.R. No. 218628), p. 39.

214

I. THE JUST COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE COURT OF

APPEALS HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.
A. THE COMMISSIONERS’ REPORTS ARE MANIFESTLY
HEARSAY AND BEREFT OF ANY KIND OF EVIDENCE.
THEREFORE, IT SHOULD BE DISREGARDED PURSUANT
TO THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IN NPC V. YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION AND NAPOCOR V. DIATO-BERNAL.
B. SECTION 4, RULE 67 OF THE RULES OF COURT
MANDATES THAT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION
SHALL BE DETERMINED AS OF THE DATE OF THE
TAKING OF THE PROPERTY OR THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT, WHICHEVER COMES FIRST. HERE, THE
AMOUNT OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE
EXPROPRIATED INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY IS BASED ON
THE “CURRENT” SELLING PRICE OF COMMERCIAL
PROPERTIES.
C. THERE IS NO BONA FIDE VALUATION OF THE
EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY. THE COMMISSIONERS’
REPORT HINGED COMPLETELY ON THE VALUATION OF
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (BOC) IN THE LRTA

CASE.
1. THE JUST COMPENSATION PRONOUNCED IN LRTA
WAS NOT INTENDED TO BECOME A PRECEDENT, MUCH
LESS AN AUTHORITY TO BE APPLIED INVARIABLY IN
OTHER EXPROPRIATION CASES. THE JUST
COMPENSATION AWARDED THEREIN WAS A RESULT OF
THE DELIBERATION OF THE BOC IN THAT CASE PUR-

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SUANT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE

PARTIES.15

The Ruling of the Court

We partly grant the petitions.

Amount of Just
Compensation

First, we note that only questions of law should be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Factual findings of the lower courts will generally not be
disturbed.16 Thus, the factual issues pertaining to the value
of the property expropriated are questions of fact which are
generally beyond the scope of the judicial review of this
Court under Rule 45.17 However, we have consistently
recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit:
The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the

appellate court is limited to reviewing errors of law, and findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Court since
it is not the Court’s function to analyze and weigh the evidence all
over again. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court enumerated
the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are binding on the Court: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact
_______________
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 218631), pp. 51-52.

16 Plaza v. Lustiva, 728 Phil. 359; 718 SCRA 19 (2014), citing
Calanasan v. Dolorito, 722 Phil. 1; 710 SCRA 505 (2013).
17 National Power Corporation v. Asoque, G.R. No. 172507, 14
September 2016, 802 SCRA 582, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Costo, 700 Phil. 290, 300; 687 SCRA 122, 133 (2012).

216

are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of

Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.18

In this case, given that the findings on the amount of
just compensation of the RTC and CA differ, we find that a
review of the facts is in order.
Just compensation has been defined as the fair and full
equivalent of the loss.19 More specifically, just
compensation has been defined in this wise:
Notably, just compensation in expropriation cases is defined

“as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The Court repeatedly stressed that the
true measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The
word ‘just’ is used to modify the meaning of the word
‘compensation’ to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample.”20
_______________
18 Development Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal Bank, 642

Phil. 547, 556-557; 628 SCRA 404, 412-413 (2010).
19 National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 479 Phil. 850; 436
SCRA 195 (2004), citing Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286
(1915).
20 Republic v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892, 19 April 2016, 790 SCRA 217,
277, citing Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 647
Phil. 251; 632 SCRA 727 (2010).

217
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 217

The determination of just compensation in expropriation

proceedings is essentially a judicial prerogative.21 This
determination of just compensation, which remains to be a
judicial function performed by the court, is usually aided by
the appointed commissioners. In Spouses Ortega v. City of
Cebu,22 we held:
Likewise, in the recent cases of National Power Corporation v.

dela Cruz and Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine
National Railways, we emphasized the primacy of judicial
prerogative in the ascertainment of just compensation as aided by
the appointed commissioners, to wit:
Though the ascertainment of just compensation is a
judicial prerogative, the appointment of commissioners to
ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be
taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases.
While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be
disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own
estimate of the value, it may only do so for valid reasons;
that is, where the commissioners have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they
have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or
where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
excessive. Thus, “trial with the aid of the commissioners is a
substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all.”23
_______________
21 National Power Corporation v. Asoque, supra note 17, citing

National Power Corporation v. Zabala, 702 Phil. 491, 499-500; 689 SCRA
554, 562 (2013) and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, 515 Phil. 467,
477; 479 SCRA 495, 505 (2006).
22 617 Phil. 817; 602 SCRA 601 (2009).
23 Id., at p. 826; p. 608. Citations omitted.

218

Both the RTC and the CA relied on the reports of

commissioners Atty. Wy and Atty. Migriño to determine
the amount of just compensation for the Subject Premises.
However, Republic-DPWH argues that the reports of these
two commissioners were not supported by any documentary
evidence and were based solely on opinions and hearsay.
Further, Republic-DPWH argues that the
recommendations of Atty. Wy and Atty. Migriño are
incorrect as the value given by said commissioners was
computed at the time the inspection was undertaken in
2008, and not at the time of taking, which was in 2004. It
argues that the basis of just compensation should be the
value of the expropriated property at the time of taking
because the value of the property had already been greatly
enhanced since then.
We find merit in these arguments.
While Atty. Wy and Atty. Migriño relied on several
documents to support their finding of just compensation,
we find these to be insufficient and misleading. In
particular, they relied on the BIR Zonal Valuation for the
year 2000, and the 2000 decisions of the trial court in Light
Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) v. Clayton Industrial
Corporation and Alfonso Chua and LRTA v. Rodolfo L. See,
et al.,24 which decision was affirmed by this Court in
2002.25 The reliance on these cases was made by the
commissioners because they involved similar properties in
the vicinity. In those cases, the amount of just
compensation for the expropriated properties was
P26,100.00 per square meter, in addition to the
consequential damages or disturbance fee.
First, we note that while the amount of just
compensation in this case is not an authority to be applied
blindly and invariably in other expropriation cases, this
Court has allowed reference to similar cases of

expropriation to help determine
_______________
24 Rollo, (G.R. No. 218631), p. 102.

25 See Resolution in G.R. No. 150220, 23 January 2002.

219
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 219

the amount of just compensation.26 However, the cases

relied on by the commissioners were decided in the year
2000, while the taking of the Subject Premises in this case
happened in 2004 when Republic-DPWH filed a case for
expropriation against Evergreen. Moreover, the BIR Zonal
Valuations considered by the commissioners were also for
the year 2000. Evidently, these reflect the value of the
Subject Property in 2000. Just compensation must be the
value of the property at the time of taking.27 If there were
other documentary evidence to show the value of the
property at a point nearer to the time of the taking, in this
case the year 2004, then consideration of year 2000
documents would not be fatal. However, if the only
documents to support the finding of just compensation are
from a year which is not the year when the taking of the
expropriated property took place, then this would be
plainly inaccurate.
Next, while documentary evidence is indeed important
to support the finding of the value of the expropriated
property, the commissioners are given leeway to consider
other factors to determine just compensation for the
property to be expropriated. In National Power Corporation
v. Spouses Asoque,28 we upheld the finding of the RTC
therein and quoted:
x x x. Likewise, this Court takes cognizance of the fact that

the commissioner may avail or consider certain factors in
determining the fair market value of the property apart
from the proffered documentary evidences. Thus, the factors
taken into account by the commissioner in arriving at the
recommended fair market value of the property at Php800.00 per
square meter, aside from the evidence available, were valid

criteria or gauge in the determination of the just
_______________
26 See National Power Corporation v. Asoque, supra note 17.

27 Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v.
Tecson, 713 Phil. 55; 700 SCRA 243 (2013).
28 National Power Corporation v. Asoque, supra.

220

compensation of the subject property. (Boldfacing and

underscoring supplied)

This determination, however, should still reflect the
value of the property as of the date of taking. In this case,
the commissioners found that the properties in the area, as
of the time of the ocular inspection in 2008, had a demand
selling price ranging from P35,000.00 to P40,000.00 per
square meter.29 A reading of their individual reports shows
that they considered the location of the Subject Premises,
as well as its size and prospective uses, the neighborhood,
and the nearby establishments. This was well within their
prerogative to do so, as we have held that all the facts as to
the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well
as its improvements and capabilities, must thus be
considered in determining just compensation.30 However,
these must be the conditions existing at the time the taking
was made by the government. While the size and location
of the property would not have changed from the time of
taking until the time when the ocular inspection was
conducted, the establishments and neighborhood
surrounding the property may have undergone changes
after the property was taken by the government. The
improvements introduced after the time of taking should
not unduly benefit the property owner by unnecessarily
increasing the value of the property.
Unfortunately, in this case, all of the conditions they
took into account in determining just compensation did not
reflect the value of the Subject Premises at the time of
taking. Documentary or otherwise, the commissioners

failed to rely on such evidence that would prove the value
of the Subject Premises at the time of the taking, which
should be the basis for the determination of just
compensation. There was noth-
_______________
29 Rollo (G.R. No. 218631), p. 105.

30 National Power Corporation v. Asoque, supra note 17, citing
National Power Corporation v. Suarez, 589 Phil. 219, 225; 568 SCRA 232,
238 (2008).

221
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 221

ing to show the value of the property in 2004, which was

the year the taking of the Subject Premises took place. The
BIR Zonal Valuation and the court decisions were reflective
of the value of the property in 2000, four years before the
taking of the Subject Premises by the government. On the
other hand, the ocular inspection was conducted in 2008,
four years after the time of taking. Clear factual evidence
must be presented for the correct determination of just
compensation.
However, we cannot agree with the insistence of
Republic-DPWH that the just compensation for the Subject
Premises is only Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). As
correctly found by the CA, this is merely the zonal
valuation of the commercial lots and therefore cannot be
made as the sole basis for the fair market value of the land.
Zonal valuation, although one of the indices of the fair
market value of real estate, cannot by itself be the sole
basis of just compensation in expropriation cases.31
Another argument of Republic-DPWH is that the
commissioners erred in using the land valuation and listing
of commercial properties when the Subject Premises were
classified as industrial.
Again, we disagree. It has been settled that the value
and character of the land at the time it was taken by the
government are the criteria for determining just
compensation.32 All three commissioners found that the
property was located in an area that was classified as
commercial.33 It also found that the property was best used

as commercial.34 We find no reason to disturb the findings
of the commissioners who conducted
_______________
31 Republic v. Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation, 729 Phil. 402;

719 SCRA 50 (2014).
32 National Power Corporation v. Chiong, 452 Phil. 649, 664; 404
SCRA 527, 539 (2003).
33 Rollo (G.R. No. 218628), pp. 181-189.
34 Id.

222

an ocular inspection, and the lower courts which affirmed

the findings of the commissioners.
To recapitulate, we find that the commissioners and
lower courts correctly identified the Subject Premises as
commercial, based on the value and character of the land at
the time of the taking. We also find that there was
sufficient evidence — documentary and those obtained
through ocular inspection — to support a finding of just
compensation. However, we find that the lower courts and
the commissioners failed to consider the time of taking
when they arrived at their respective findings on the
amount of just compensation.
While remanding the case to receive evidence in order to
determine the amount of just compensation at the time of
taking would enable the court to clearly determine the
amount of just compensation due to Evergreen, we find
that it would be prejudicial to both the government and
Evergreen to do so. Remanding the case would
unnecessarily delay the payment of just compensation due
to Evergreen, and it would also increase the amount of
interest that would accrue against Republic-DPWH. Thus,
we find that a finding of just compensation based on
available records would be most beneficial to both parties
concerned.
In 2000, this Court found that the just compensation for
similar properties situated in the vicinity was P26,100.00.
In 2008, the commissioners found the selling price of the
properties in the surrounding area to be from P35,000.00 to

P40,000.00 per square meter. The time of taking was in
2004, or right in the middle of 2000 and 2008. Thus, we
may consider the mean of the prices of the properties for
the years 2000 and 2008 to arrive at the amount of just
compensation in 2004. Taking the higher value of the range
of price in 2008 and the amount of just compensation as
affirmed by this Court in 2000, we find that the amount of
just compensation in 2004 is P33,050.00 per square meter
or a total of P5,720,294.00.

223
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 223

Interest on the Payment

of Just Compensation

Evergreen argues that it is entitled to legal interest on
the balance of the just compensation, computed from the
time of the filing of the complaint until the judgment
attains finality.
We find merit in Evergreen’s arguments.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides
that “no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.” Just compensation in
expropriation cases has been held to contemplate just and
timely payment, and prompt payment is the payment in
full of the just compensation as finally determined by the
courts.35 Thus, just compensation envisions a payment in
full of the expropriated property. Absent full payment,
interest on the balance would necessarily be due on the
unpaid amount. In Republic v. Mupas,36 we held that
interest on the unpaid compensation becomes due if there
is no full compensation for the expropriated property, in
accordance with the concept of just compensation. We held:
The reason is that just compensation would not be “just” if the

State does not pay the property owner interest on the just
compensation from the date of the taking of the property. Without
prompt payment, the property owner suffers the immediate
deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income. The owner’s
loss, of course, is not only his property but also its income-
generating potential.
Ideally, just compensation should be immediately made

available to the property owner so that he may derive income
from this compensation, in the same manner
_______________
35 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hababag, Sr., G.R. No. 172352, 8

June 2016, 792 SCRA 399, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos,
G.R. No. 213863, 27 January 2016, 782 SCRA 441.
36 769 Phil. 21; 769 SCRA 384 (2015).

24

that he would have derived income from his expropriated

property.
However, if full compensation is not paid for the property
taken, then the State must pay for the shortfall in the earning
potential immediately lost due to the taking, and the absence of
replacement property from which income can be derived. Interest
on the unpaid compensation becomes due as compliance
with the constitutional mandate on eminent domain and
as a basic measure of fairness.
Thus, interest in eminent domain cases “runs as a matter
of law and follows as a matter of course from the right of
the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money
can accomplish, as of the date of taking.”37 (Emphasis
supplied)

In the present case, we find that there is still unpaid
compensation due to Evergreen. Republic-DPWH complied
with Republic Act No. (RA) 8974,38 the applicable law for
expropriation in this case. Section 4 of RA 8974 provides in
part:
Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings.—Whenever

it is necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or
location for any national government infrastructure project
through expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency
shall initiate the expropriation proceedings before the proper
court under the following guidelines:
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to
the defendant, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property the amount

equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the
value of the property based
_______________
37 Id., at pp. 194-195; p. 591. Citations omitted.

38 AN ACT TO FACILITATE THE ACQUISITION OF RIGHT-OF-WAY, SITE OR
LOCATION FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.

225
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 225

on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of

Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements
and/or structures as determined under Section 7 hereof;
x x x x
Upon compliance with the guidelines above mentioned, the
court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an
order to take possession of the property and start the
implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a writ of possession, the
implementing agency shall present to the court a certificate of
availability of funds from the proper official concerned.
In the event that the owner of the property contests the
implementing agency’s proffered value, the court shall determine
the just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days
from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the
decision of the court becomes final and executory, the
implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference
between the amount already paid and the just
compensation as determined by the court. (Emphasis
supplied)

Republic-DPWH had complied with the requirements of
Section 4, paragraph (a) of RA 8974 when it deposited the
equivalent of 100% of the value of the Subject Premises
based on the BIR zonal valuation of the property for the
account of Evergreen. This deposit was made before
Republic-DPWH was able to take possession of the Subject
Premises through the issuance of the writ of possession.
Verily, under the law, the initial payment is a prerequisite

for the issuance of the writ of possession. However, this
payment alone and by itself does not constitute just
compensation. We note that this is only the first of the two
payments the government must make. Section 4 of RA
8974 specifically provides that “when the decision of the
court becomes final and executory, the implementing
agency shall pay the owner the difference between the
amount already paid and the just compensation as

226

determined by the court.” Thus, under RA 8974, there must

be a completion of two payments before just compensation
is deemed to have been made.
Therefore, while Republic-DPWH had made the deposit
of the amount as prescribed in the first paragraph of
Section 4 of RA 8974, it still has not made the
constitutionally required payment of just compensation
because the amount deposited is much less than that
adjudged by the court. The law requires two payments to
constitute payment of just compensation. Again, in
Republic v. Mupas,39 we have explicitly stated that the
initial payment does not excuse the government from
paying the difference of the amount adjudged and the
interest thereon:
The Government’s initial payment of just compensation does

not excuse it from avoiding payment of interest on the difference
between the adjudged amount of just compensation and the initial
payment.
The initial payment scheme as a prerequisite for the issuance
of the writ of possession under RA 8974 only provides the
Government flexibility to immediately take the property for public
purpose or public use pending the court’s final determination of
just compensation. Section 4(a) of RA 8974 only addresses the
Government’s need to immediately enter the privately owned
property in order to avoid delay in the implementation of national
infrastructure projects.
Otherwise, Section 4 of RA 8974 would be repugnant to Section
9, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution which mandates that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. To reiterate, the Constitution commands the
Government to pay the property owner no less than the full and
fair equivalent of the property from the date of taking.40
_______________
39 Republic v. Mupas, supra note 36.

40 Id., at pp. 196-197; pp. 593-594.

227
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 227

Republic-DPWH avers that interest will only accrue if

there is delay in the payment of just compensation, and
that in this case, there is no such unjustified delay because
it has deposited the amount required by law before taking
possession of the Subject Premises.
We do not agree.
Again, just compensation should be made at the time of
taking, and the amount of payment should be the fair and
equivalent value of the property. In this case, Republic-
DPWH was able to take possession of the Subject Premises
even before making a full and fair payment of just
compensation because RA 8974 allowed for the possession
of the property merely upon the initial payment which
forms part of the just compensation. Thus, it is clear that
the government has not yet made the full and fair payment
of just compensation to Evergreen.
As explained by this Court in Apo Fruits Corporation v.
Land Bank of the Philippines,41 the rationale for imposing
interest on just compensation is to compensate the property
owners for the income that they would have made if they
had been properly compensated — meaning if they had
been paid the full amount of just compensation — at the
time of taking when they were deprived of their property.
The Court held:
We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals the need for

prompt payment and the necessity of the payment of interest to
compensate for any delay in the payment of compensation for
property already taken. We ruled in this case that:
The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is
considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of
the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the

seller in open market in the usual and or-
_______________
41 Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, supra note

20.

228

dinary course of legal action and competition or the fair

value of the property as between one who receives, and one
who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking
by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public
use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interest[s] on its just
value to be computed from the time the property is
taken to the time when compensation is actually paid
or deposited with the court. In fine, between the
taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a
position as good as (but not better than) the position
he was in before the taking occurred.
Aside from this ruling, Republic notably overturned the Court’s
previous ruling in National Power Corporation v. Angas which
held that just compensation due for expropriated properties is not
a loan or forbearance of money but indemnity for damages for the
delay in payment; since the interest involved is in the nature of
damages rather than earnings from loans, then Art. 2209 of the
Civil Code, which fixes legal interest at 6%, shall apply.
In Republic, the Court recognized that the just
compensation due to the landowners for their
expropriated property amounted to an effective
forbearance on the part of the State. Applying the Eastern
Shipping Lines ruling, the Court fixed the applicable interest rate
at 12% per annum, computed from the time the property was
taken until the full amount of just compensation was paid, in
order to eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and
inflation of the value of the currency over time.42 (Emphasis in
the original)
_______________
42 Id., at pp. 273-275; pp. 743-745.

229
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 229

The delay in the payment of just compensation is a

forbearance of money. As such, this is necessarily entitled
to earn interest.43 The difference in the amount between
the final amount as adjudged by the court and the initial
payment made by the government — which is part and
parcel of the just compensation due to the property owner
— should earn legal interest as a forbearance of money. In
Republic v. Mupas,44 we stated clearly:
Contrary to the Government’s opinion, the interest award is

not anchored either on the law of contracts or damages; it is based
on the owner’s constitutional right to just compensation. The
difference in the amount between the final payment and
the initial payment — in the interim or before the
judgment on just compensation becomes final and
executory — is not unliquidated damages which do not
earn interest until the amount of damages is established
with reasonable certainty. The difference between final
and initial payments forms part of the just compensation
that the property owner is entitled from the date of taking
of the property.
Thus, when the taking of the property precedes the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, the Court orders the condemnor to
pay the full amount of just compensation from the date of taking
whose interest shall likewise commence on the same date. The
Court does not rule that the interest on just compensation shall
commence [on] the date when the amount of just compensation
becomes certain, e.g., from the promulgation of the Court’s
decision or the finality of the eminent domain case. (Emphasis
supplied)
_______________
43 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 433 Phil. 106; 383 SCRA 611 (2002).
44 Republic v. Mupas, supra note 36 at p. 197; p. 594. Citations
omitted.

230

With respect to the amount of interest on the difference

between the initial payment and final amount of just
compensation as adjudged by the court, we have upheld in
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,45 and in
subsequent cases thereafter,46 the imposition of 12%
interest rate from the time of taking when the property
owner was deprived of the property, until 1 July 2013,
when the legal interest on loans and forbearance of money
was reduced from 12% to 6% per annum by BSP Circular
No. 799. Accordingly, from 1 July 2013 onwards, the legal
interest on the difference between the final amount and
initial payment is 6% per annum.
In the present case, Republic-DPWH filed the
expropriation complaint on 22 March 2004. As this
preceded the actual taking of the property, the just
compensation shall be appraised as of this date. No interest
shall accrue as the government did not take possession of
the Subject Premises. Republic-DPWH was able to take
possession of the property on 21 April 2006 upon the
agreement of the parties. Thus, a legal interest of 12% per
annum on the difference between the final amount
adjudged by the Court and the initial payment made shall
accrue from 21 April 2006 until 30 June 2013. From 1 July
2013 until the finality of the Decision of the Court, the
difference between the initial payment and the final
amount adjudged by the Court shall earn interest at the
rate of 6% per annum. Thereafter, the total amount of just
compensation shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum
from the finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.
_______________
45 304 Phil. 236; 234 SCRA 78 (1994).

46 Cited in Republic v. Mupas, supra note 36. See Reyes v. National
Housing Authority, 443 Phil. 603; 395 SCRA 494 (2003); Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Wycoco, 464 Phil. 83; 419 SCRA 67 (2004); Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 494 Phil. 494; 454 SCRA 516 (2005); Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Imperial, 544 Phil. 378; 515 SCRA 449 (2007), Philippine
Ports Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc, 557 Phil. 737; 531 SCRA 198 (2007);
and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, 608 Phil. 9; 590 SCRA 214
(2009).

231
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 231

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves

as follows:
1. The petition in G.R. No. 218631 is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of
Appeals and Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the just compensation
for the 173.08 square meters of the expropriated
property is P33,050.00 per square meter, or a total of
P5,720,294.00.
2. The petition in G.R. No. 218628 is PARTIALLY
GRANTED.
(a) The claim for legal interest on the difference
between the final amount of just compensation of
P5,720,294.00 and the initial deposit made by the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Department of Public Works and Highways, in the
amount of P1,038,480.00 shall earn legal interest of
12% per annum from the date of taking or 21 April
2006 until 30 June 2013.
(b) The difference between the total amount of just
compensation and the initial deposit shall earn legal
interest of 6% per annum from 1 July 2013 until the
finality of the Decision.
(c) The total amount of just compensation shall earn
legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of
this Decision until full payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa and Reyes, Jr., JJ.,

concur.
Petition in G.R. No. 218631 partially granted, judgments

of Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court affirmed with
modification; Petition in G.R. No. 218628 likewise partially
granted.

232

Notes.—To continue with the expropriation proceedings

despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the
project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment
in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the
essential element of public use. (Republic vs. Heirs of
Saturnino Q. Borbon, 745 SCRA 40 [2015])
The Supreme Court (SC) has uniformly ruled that the
fair market value of the property at the time of taking is
controlling for purposes of computing just compensation.
(Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways
vs. Tecson, 756 SCRA 389 [2015])

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Evergreen Manufacturing v. BCDA (Eminent Domain)

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7/20/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 839

G.R. No. 218628. September 6, 2017.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 201

Factual findings of the lower courts will generally not be

202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; This determination of just compensation, which

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 203

support the finding of just compensation are from a year

changes after the property was taken by the government. The

204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the property. Unfortunately, in this case, all of the conditions

reason to disturb the findings of the commissioners who

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 205

Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no private

determined by the court.” Thus, under RA 8974, there must be a

206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

should be the fair and equivalent value of the property. In

compensation. The difference in the amount between the

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 207

gation of the Court’s decision or the finality of the eminent

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and

The Law Firm of Chan, Robles and Associates for

** Designated Acting Chief Justice.

208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the Department of Public Works and Highways (Republic-

real properties situated in Barangay Santolan, Evangelista

1 Rollo (G.R. No. 218628), pp. 11-25. Penned by Associate Justice

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 209

Evergreen, in opposing the complaint for expropriation,

(P1,038,480.00) — which is equivalent to 100% of the value

210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

was the amount of just compensation. Three (3) real estate

RTC directed Republic-DPWH to pay Evergreen the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

5 Id., at pp. 244-254.

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 211

Thousand Five Hundred Twenty Pesos (Php3,288,520.00) and

The Ruling of the CA

In their separate Commissioner’s Appraisal Report, Atty. Wy

212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

meter; and (2) in 2000, the just compensation of a nearby property

expropriation. As for the issue regarding the interest on the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, both appeals are

9 Id., at p. 21. Citations omitted.

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 213

amount of P1,038,480.00 paid over by Republic-DPWH in order to

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH UTMOST

THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE

214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

I. THE JUST COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE COURT OF

THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (BOC) IN THE LRTA

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 215

SUANT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE

The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the

15 Rollo (G.R. No. 218631), pp. 51-52.

216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of

Notably, just compensation in expropriation cases is defined