Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 104408)

9/10/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 223
*
G.R. No. 104408. June 21, 1993.
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and NENITA CUSTODIO,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; The Supreme Court
in Lacsamana vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. allows
a petition for review on certiorari from a decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals under Sec. 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court to be filed within 15 days from notice of judgment or of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration filed in due time and
paying at the same time the corresponding docket fee.—We digress
to reiterate, in view of erroneous submissions that we continue to
receive, that in the case of a petition for review on certiorari from
a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, Section 1, Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, which has long since been clarified in
Lacsamana vs. The Hon. Second Special Cases Division of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., allows the same to be filed
“within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at
the same time the corresponding docket fee.” In other words, in
the event a motion for reconsideration is filed and denied, the
period of fifteen (15) days begins to run all over again from notice
of the denial resolution. Otherwise put, if a motion for
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
522
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
reconsideration is filed, the reglementary period within which to

appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017475d54b0089085a74003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/25
is reckoned from the date the party who intends to appeal

received the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
Furthermore, a motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review may be filed with this Court within said reglementary
period, paying at the same time the corresponding docket fee.
Same; Evidence; It is now well-settled that while the findings

of fact of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and
even finality at times, that rule is not inflexible and is subject to
well established exceptions.—At this juncture, it suffices to note
that factual findings of the trial court may be reversed by the
Court of Appeals, which is vested by law with the power to review
both legal and factual issues, if on the evidence of record, it
appears that the trial court may have been mistaken particularly
in the appreciation of evidence, which is within the domain of the
Court of Appeals. The general rule laid down in a plethora of
cases is that such findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are
conclusive upon and beyond the power of review of the Supreme
Court. However, it is now well-settled that while the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even
finality at times, that rule is not inflexible and is subject to well
established exceptions, to wit: (1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in
the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Civil Law; Obligations and Contracts; Quasi-delict; Where the

injury is due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the
colliding vehicles, the drivers and owners of said vehicles shall be
primarily, directly and solidarily liable for damages and it is
immaterial that one action is based on quasi-delict and the other
on culpa-contractual.—With the allegation and subsequent proof
of negligence against the defen-
523
VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 523
dant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him

and his co-defendant MMTC in this instance, the case is
undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180. When the
employee causes damage due to his own negligence while
performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum
presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by
proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.
For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the
selection and supervision of employees, the employer is likewise
responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being the
relationship of pater familias or on the employer’s own negligence.
As early as the case of Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, and thereafter, we
have consistently held that where the injury is due to the
concurrent negligence of the drivers of the colliding vehicles, the
drivers and owners of the said vehicles shall be primarily, directly
and solidarity liable for damages and it is immaterial that one
action is based on quasi-delict and the other on culpa contractual,
as the solidarity of the obligation is justified by the very nature
thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Defense of due diligence in the selection

and supervision of employees; The mere formulation of various
company policies on safety without showing that they were being
complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability
arising from negligence of its employees.—In order that the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not
enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines
and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the
employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part
of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has
been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the
actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the
existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without
anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such
presumption. We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning
to all employers, that “(t)he mere formulation of various company
policies on safety without showing that they were being complied
with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising
from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner
to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the
recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and
safety were followed.” Paying lip-service to these injunctions or
merely going through the motions of compliance therewith will

warrant stern sanctions from the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Art. 2211 of the Civil Code

provides that in quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages
may be
524
awarded in the discretion of the court and not as a matter of right.

—Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise
of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial court’s award,
without requiring the payment of interest thereon as an item of
damages just because of delay in the determination thereof,
especially since private respondent did not specifically pray
therefor in her complaint. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides
that in quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may be
awarded in the discretion of the court, and not as a matter of
right. We do not perceive that there have been intentional
dilatory maneuvers or any special circumstances which would
justify that additional award and, consequently, we find no reason
to disturb said ruling.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for
petitioner.
Renato P. Decena and Restituto Abjero for private
respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
This appeal calls for a review of the legal validity and

sufficiency of petitioner’s invocation of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees as its defense
against liability resulting from a vehicular collision. With
the facility by which such a defense can be contrived and
our country having reputedly the highest traffic accident
rate in its geographical region, it is indeed high time for us
to once again address this matter which poses not only a
litigation issue for the courts but affects the very safety of
our streets.
The facts of the case at bar are recounted for us by

respondent court, thus—
“At about six o’clock in the morning of August 28, 1979, plaintiff-
appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public
utility jeepney with plate No. D7 305 PUJ Pilipinas 1979, then
driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-
defendant Victorino Lamayo, bound for her work at Dynetics
Incorporated located in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, where she
then worked as a machine operator earning P16.25 a day. While
the passenger jeepney was travelling at (a) fast clip along DBP
Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
525
VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 525

Manila another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp.

(MMTC, for short) bus bearing plate No. 3Z 307 PUB
(Philippines) ‘79 driven by defendant Godofredo C. Leonardo was
negotiating Honeydew Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila
bound for its terminal at Bicutan. As both vehicles approached
the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to
slow down and slacken their speed; neither did they blow their
horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision
between them occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left
side portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact caused
plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of
the passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom, falling
onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. She
was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained
consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined
for twenty-four (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to
1
work for three and one half months (3 1/2).”
2
A complaint for damages was filed by herein private
respondent, who being then a minor was assisted by her
parents, against all of therein named defendants following
their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former as
a result of the collision.
Said defendants denied all the material allegations in
the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each other
as being the party at fault. Further, herein petitioner
Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC), a government-
owned corporation and one of the defendants in the court a
quo, along with its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, contrarily3
averred in its answer with cross-claim and counterclaim
that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful
manner by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger

jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it hit
the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it was
defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and employer
of driver Calebag, who failed to exercise due diligence
_______________
1 Rollo, 24-25.
2 Civil Case No. C-8176, entitled “Nenita R. Custodio, assisted by her
parents, Rodolfo A. Custodio and Gloria R. Custodio vs. Agudo R. Calebag,
Victorino Lamayo, Godofredo C. Leonardo, and Metro Manila Transit
Corporation,” Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 35, Caloocan City;
Original Record, 1-4.
3 Ibid., 17-22.
526

in the selection and supervision of employees and should

thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the
MMTC bus through the fault and negligence of its
employees.
Defendant Victorino Lamayo, for his part, alleged
4
in his
answer with cross-claim and counterclaim that the
damages suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by
defendants MMTC and its driver, Godofredo Leonardo,
because the latter’s negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.
By order of the trial court, defendant Calebag was5
declared in default for failure to file an answer.
Thereafter, as no amicable6
settlement was reached during
the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued with
the opposing parties presenting their respective witnesses
and documentary evidence.
Herein private respondent Nenita Custodio, along with
her parents, were presented as witnesses for the
prosecution. In addition, Dr. Edgardo del Mundo, the
attending physician, testified on the cause, nature and
extent of the injuries
7
she sustained as a result of the
vehicular mishap. On the other hand, defendant MMTC
presented as witnesses Godofredo Leonardo, Christian
Bautista and Milagros Garbo. Defendant Lamayo, however,
failed to present any witness.
Milagros Garbo testified that, as a training officer of

MMTC, she was in charge of the selection of the company’s
bus drivers, conducting for this purpose a series of training
programs and examinations. According to her, new
applicants for job openings at MMTC are preliminarily
required to submit certain documents such as National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance, birth or residence
certificate, ID pictures, certificate or diploma of highest
educational attainment, professional driver’s license, and
work experience certification. Re-entry applicants, aside
from the foregoing requirements, are additionally supposed
to submit company clearance for shortages and damages
and rev-
_______________
4 Ibid., 36-41.
5 Ibid., 54.
6 Ibid., 57.
7 TSN, September 2, 1982, 4-16.
527
VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 527

enue performance for the preceding year. Upon satisfactory

compliance with said requisites, applicants are
recommended for and subjected to a preliminary interview,
followed by a record check to find out whether they are
included in the list of undesirable employees given by other
companies.
Thereafter, she continued, if an applicant is found to be
acceptable, a final interview by the Chief Supervisor is
scheduled and followed by a training program which
consists of seminars and actual driving and psycho-
physical tests and X-ray examinations. The seminars,
which last for a total of eighteen (18) days, include
familiarization with assigned routes, existing traffic rules
and regulations, Constabulary Highway Patrol Group
(CHPG) seminar on defensive driving, preventive
maintenance, proper vehicle handling, interpersonal
relationship and administrative rules on discipline and on-
the-job training. Upon completion of all the seminars and
tests, a final clearance is issued, an employment contract
8
is
executed and the driver is ready to report for duty.
MMTC’s Transport Supervisor, Christian Bautista,
testified that it was his duty to monitor the daily operation
of buses in the field, to countercheck the dispatcher on duty

prior to the operation of the buses in the morning and to
see to it that the bus crew follow written guidelines of the
company, which include seeing to it that its employees are
in proper uniform, briefed in traffic rules and regulations
before the start of duty, fit to drive and, in general, follow
other rules and regulations of the Bureau 9
of Land
Transportation as well as of the company.
The10
reorganized trial court, in its decision of August 1,
1989, found both drivers of the colliding vehicles
concurrently negligent for non-observance of appropriate
traffic rules and regulations and for failure to take the
usual precautions when approaching an intersection. As
joint tortfeasors, both drivers, as well as defendant
Lamayo, were held solidarily liable for damages sustained
by plaintiff Custodio. Defendant MMTC, on the
________________
8 Ibid., June 10, 1988, 3-12.

9 Ibid., April 29, 1988, 2-8.
10 Civil Case No. 8176, Regional Trial Court, Branch 125, Caloocan
City; Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding.
528

bases of the evidence presented was, however, absolved

from liability for the accident on the ground that it was not
only careful and diligent in choosing and screening
applicants for job openings but was also strict and diligent
in supervising its employees by seeing to it that its
employees were in proper uniforms, briefed in traffic rules
and regulations before the start of duty, and that it checked
its employees to determine whether or not they were
positive for alcohol and followed other rules and
regulations and guidelines of the Bureau of Land
Transportation and of the company.
The trial court accordingly ruled:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby

rendered dismissing the complaint against the Metro Manila
Transit Corporation and ordering defendants Agudo P. Calebag,
Victorino Lamayo and Godofredo C. Leonardo to pay plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the following:
a) the sum of P10,000.00 by way of medical expenses;

b) the sum of P5,000.00 by way of expenses of litigation;
c) the sum of P15,000.00 by way of moral damages;
d) the sum of P2,672.00 by way of loss of earnings;
e) the sum of P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
f) the sum of P6,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; and
g) costs of suit.
11
SO ORDERED.”
Plaintiff’s motion to have that portion of the trial court’s12

decision absolving MMTC from liability 13
reconsidered
having been denied for lack of merit, an appeal was filed
by her with respondent appellate court. After consideration
of the appropriate pleadings on appeal and finding the
appeal meritorious, the Court of Appeals modified the trial
court’s decision by holding MMTC solidarily liable with the
other defendants for the damages awarded by the trial
court because of their concurrent negligence, concluding
that while there is no hard and fast rule as to what
constitutes sufficient evidence to prove that an em-
________________
11 Original Record, 177.

12 Ibid., 178-181.
13 Ibid., 195.
529
VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 529

ployer has exercised the due diligence required of it in the

selection and supervision of its employees, based on the
quantum of evidence adduced the said appellate court was
not disposed to say that MMTC had exercised the diligence
required of a good father of a family in the 14selection and
supervision of its driver, Godofredo Leonardo.
The Court of Appeals was resolute in its conclusion and
denied the motions for reconsideration of appellee Custodio
and appellant
15
MMTC in a resolution dated February 17,
1982, thus prompting MMTC to file the instant petition
invoking the review powers of this Court over the decision
of the Court of Appeals, raising as issues for resolution
whether or not (1) the documentary evidence to support the
positive testimonies of witnesses Garbo and Bautista are
still necessary; (2) the testimonies of witnesses Garbo and

Bautista may still be disturbed on appeal; and (3) the
evidence presented during the trial with respect to the
proof of due diligence of petitioner MMTC in the selection
and supervision of its employees, particularly driver
Leonardo, is sufficient.
Prefatorily, private respondent questions the timeliness
of the filing of the petition at bar in view of the procedural
stricture that the timely perfection of an appeal is both a
mandatory and jurisdictional requirement. This is a
legitimate concern on the part of private respondent and
presents an opportune occasion to once again clarify this
point as there appears to be some confusion in the
application of the rules and interpretative rulings
regarding the computation of reglementary periods at this
stage of the proceedings.
The records of this case reveal that the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 16 1991, was
received by MMTC on November 18, 1991 and it
seasonably filed a motion
17
for the reconsideration thereof on
November 28, 1991. Said motion for reconsideration was
denied by respondent court in its resolution
________________
14 CA-G.R. CV No. 24680; per Justice Regina G. Ordoñez-Benitez, with

Justices Jose A.R. Melo and Emilio C. Cui, concurring; Rollo, 24-30.
15 Rollo, 33-34.
16 Ibid., 2.
17 Ibid., CA-G.R. CV No. 24680, 63-72.
530

dated February 17, 1992, 18which in turn was received by

MMTC on March 9, 1992. Therefore, it had, pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, fifteen (15) days
therefrom or up to March 24, 1992 within which to file a
petition for review on certiorari. Anticipating, however,
that it may not be able to file said petition before the lapse
of the reglementary period therefor, MMTC filed a motion
on March 19, 1992 for an extension of thirty (30) days to
file the present petition with proof of service of copies
thereof to respondent court and the adverse parties. The
Court granted said motion, with the extended period to be 19
counted from the expiration of the reglementary period.
Consequently, private respondent had thirty (30) days from

March 24, 1992 within which to file its petition, or up to
April 23, 1992, and the eventual filing of said petition on
April 14, 1992 was well within the period granted by the
Court.
We digress to reiterate, in view of erroneous submissions
that we continue to receive, that in the case of a petition for
review on certiorari from a decision rendered by the Court
of Appeals, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which
has long since been clarified in Lacsamana vs. The Hon.
Second Special20
Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., allows the same to be filed “within fifteen
(15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at
the same time the corresponding docket fee.” In other
words, in the event a motion for reconsideration is filed and
denied, the period of fifteen (15) days begins to run all over
again from notice of the denial resolution. Otherwise put, if
a motion for reconsideration is filed, the reglementary
period within which to appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court is reckoned from the date
the party who intends to appeal21 received the order denying
the motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review may be filed
with this Court within said reglementary
________________
18 Rollo, 2.
19 Ibid., 7.
20 143 SCRA 643 (1986).
21 American General Insurance Co. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
et al., 150 SCRA 133 (1987).
531
VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 531

period, paying at the same time the corresponding docket

fee.
1. The first two issues raised by petitioner shall be
correlatively discussed in view of their interrelation.
In its present petition, MMTC insists that the oral
testimonies of its employees who were presented as
witnesses in its behalf sufficiently prove, even without the
presentation of documentary evidence, that driver
Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance
requirements and had undergone all trainings, tests and

examinations preparatory to actual employment, and that
said positive testimonies spell out of the rigid procedure for
screening of job applicants and the supervision of its
employees in the field. It underscore the fact that it had
indeed complied with the measure of diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees
22
as enunciated in
Campo, et al. vs. Camarote, et al. requiring an employer,
in the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family,
to carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, experience and record service, and not
merely be satisfied with the possession of a professional
driver’s license.
It goes on to say that since the testimonies of these
witnesses were allegedly neither discredited nor impeached
by the adverse party, they should be believed and not
arbitrarily disregarded or rejected nor disturbed on appeal.
It assiduously argues that inasmuch as there is no law
requiring that facts alleged by petitioner be established by
documentary evidence, the probative force and weight of
their testimonies should not be discredited, with the
further note that the lower court having passed upon the
relevancy of the oral testimonies and considered the same
as unrebutted, its 23consideration should no longer be
disturbed on appeal.
Private respondent, on the other hand, retorts that the
factual findings of respondent court are conclusive upon the
High Court which cannot be burdened with the 24task of
analyzing and weighing the evidence all over again.
At this juncture; it suffices to note that factual findings
of the
________________
22 100 Phil. 459 (1956).

23 Memorandum for Petitioner, 11-15; Rollo, 16-21.
24 Comment of Private Respondent, 3-4; Rollo, 47-48.
532

trial court maybe reversed by the Court of Appeals, which

is vested by law with the power to review both legal and
factual issues, if on the evidence of record,
25
it appears that
the trial court may have been mistaken particularly in
the appreciation of evidence, which is within the domain of
26
26
the Court of Appeals. The general rule laid down in a
plethora of cases is that such findings of fact by the Court
of Appeals are conclusive upon 27
and beyond the power of
review of the Supreme Court. However, it is now well-
settled that while the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at
times, that rule is not inflexible and is subject to well
established exceptions, to wit: (1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of 28
evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.
When, as in this case, the findings of the Court of
Appeals and
________________
25 San Miguel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 185 SCRA 722
(1990).
26 Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., et al., 191 SCRA 218 (1990).
27 Cathay Insurance Co. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 151 SCRA 710
(1987); Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 160 SCRA 821 (1988);
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 183 SCRA 133
(1990); BA Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 201 SCRA 157
(1991).
28 Manlapaz vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 147 SCRA 236 (1987); Medina
vs. Asistio, Jr., supra; Calalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
194 SCRA 514 (1991).
533
VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 533

the trial court are contrary to each

29
other, this court may
scrutinize the evidence on record,
30
in order to arrive at a
correct finding based thereon.
A perusal of the same shows that since there is no
dispute as to the finding of concurrent negligence on the
part of the defendant Calebag, the driver of the passenger
jeepney, and co-defendant Leonardo, the bus driver of
petitioner MMTC, both of whom were solidarily held liable
with defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney, we are
spared the necessity of determining the sufficiency 31
of
evidence establishing the fact of negligence. The
contrariety is in the findings of the two lower courts, and
which is the subject of this present controversy, with
regard to the liability of MMTC as employer of one the
erring drivers.
The trial court, in absolving MMTC from liability ruled
that—
“On the question as to whether defendant MMTC was successful

in proving its defense that indeed it had exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of defendant Leonardo, this Court finds that based on
the evidence presented during the trial, defendant MMTC was
able to prove that it was not only careful and diligent in choosing
and screening applicants for job openings but also strict (and)
diligent in supervising its employees by seeing to it that its
employees were in proper uniforms, briefed in traffic rules and
regulations before the start of duty, checked employees to
determine whether they were positive for alcohol and followed
other rules and regulations and guidelines of the Bureau of Land
Transportation as well as its company. Having successfully
proven such defense, defendant MMTC, therefore, cannot be held
liable for the accident.
“Having reached this conclusion, the Court now, holds that
defendant MMTC be totally absolved from liability and that the
32
complaint against it be dismissed. x x x.”
________________
29 Valenzuela, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 191 SCRA 1 (1991).

30 Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 191 SCRA 411 (1990).
31 Cea vs. Villanueva, 18 Phil. 538 (1911); Barcelo, etc. vs. The Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Company, 29 Phil. 351 (1915); De la Riva vs.
Molina, 32 Phil. 277 (1915); Agdoro vs. Philippine Mining Industrial Co.,
45 Phil. 816 (1924).
32 Annex C, Petition; Rollo, 41-42.
534

whereas respondent court was of the opinion that—
“It is surprising though that witness Milagros Garbo did not

testify nor present any evidence that defendant-appellee’s driver,
defendant Godofredo Leonardo has complied with or has
undergone all clearances and trainings she referred to. The
clearances, result of seminars and tests which Godofredo
Leonardo submitted and complied with, if any, were not presented
in court despite the fact that they are obviously in the possession
and control of defendant-appellee. Instead, it resorted to
generalities. This Court has ruled that due diligence in (the)
selection and supervision of employee(s) are not proved by mere
testimonies to the effect that its applicant has complied with all
the company requirements before one is admitted as an employee
but without proof thereof. x x x.
“On the part of Christian Bautista, the transport supervisor of
defendant-appellee, he testified that it is his duty to monitor the
operation of buses in the field; to countercheck the dispatchers’
duty prior to the operation of the buses in the morning; to see to it
that bus crew follows written guidelines of the company (t.s.n.,
April 29, 1988, pp. 4-5), but when asked to present in court the
alleged written guidelines of the company he merely stated that
he brought with him a ‘wrong document’ and defendant-appellee’s
counsel asked for reservation to present such written guidelines
in the next hearing but the same was (sic) never presented in
33
court.”
A thorough and scrupulous review of the records of this

case reveals that the conclusion of respondent Court of
Appeals is more firmly grounded on jurisprudence and
amply supported by the evidence of record than that of the
court below.
It is procedurally required for each party in a case to
prove his own affirmative 34
assertion by the degree of
evidence required by law. In civil cases, the degree of
evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one
party which is more conclusive and credible than that of
the other party. It is, therefore, incumbent on the plaintiff
who is claiming a right to prove his case. Corollarily,
defendant must likewise prove its 35
own allegation to
buttress its claim that it is not liable.
________________
33 Annex B, ibid.; id., 28-29.

34 Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court.
35 Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et
535
VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 535

In fine, the party, wheter plaintiff or defendant, who

assesrts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of
presenting at the trial such amount of 36
evidence required by
law to obtain a favorable judgment. It is entirely within
each of the parties discretion, consonant with the theory of
the case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such
procedural strategy followed thereby, to present all
available evidence at its or his disposal in the manner
which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove its
or his position, provided only that the same shall measure
up to the quantum of evidence required by law. In making
proof in its or his case, it is paramount that 37
the best and
most complete evidence be formally entered.
Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule
which requires that testimonial evidence, to hold sway,
must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or even
object evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the witnesses’
testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot consider
the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was
observance of due
38
diligence in the selection and supervision
of employees. Petitioner’s attempt to prove its
diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and
supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as
it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence,
object or documentary, which 39 might obviate the apparent
biased nature of the testimony.
Our view that the evidence for petitioner MMTC falls
short of the required evidentiary quantum as would
convincingly and undoubtedly prove its observance of the
diligence of a good father of a family has its precursor in
the underlying rationale pronounced in the earlier case of
Central Taxicab Corp. 40 vs. Ex-Meralco Employees
Transportation Co., et al., set amidst an al., 173 SCRA
619 (1989).
________________
36 Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 182 SCRA 290 (1990), citing Tai
Tong Chuache & Co. vs. The Insurance Commission, et al., 158 SCRA 366
(1988); Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 204 SCRA 160 (1991).
37 U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303 (1910).
38 See Pleno vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 161 SCRA 160 (1991).
39 See Garcia, et al. vs. Gonzales, et al., 183 SCRA 72 (1990).
40 54 O.G., No. 31, 7415 (1958).
536

almost identical factual setting, where we held that:
“x x x. This witness spoke of an ‘affidavit of experience’ which a

driver-applicant must accomplish before he is employed by the
company, a written ‘time schedule’ for each bus, and a record of
the inspections and thorough checks pertaining to each bus before
it leaves the car barn; yet no attempt was ever made to present in
evidence any of these documents, despite the fact that they were
obviously in the possession and control of the defendant company.
xxx
“Albert also testified that he kept records of the preliminary
and final tests given him as well as a record of the qualifications
and experience of each of the drivers of the company. It is rather
strange, therefore, that he failed to produce in court the all
important record of Roberto, the driver involved in this case.
“The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any
‘record’ or other documentary proof tending to establish that it
had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its drivers and buses,
notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the trial court and the
opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.
“We are fully aware that there is no hard-and-fast rule on the
quantum of evidence needed to prove due observance of all the
diligence of a good father of a family as would constitute a valid
defense to the legal presumption of negligence on the part of an
employer or master whose employee has by his negligence, caused
damage to another. x x x (R)educing the testimony of Albert to its
proper proportions, we do not have enough trustworthy evidence
left to go by. We are of the considered opinion, therefore, that the
believable evidence on the degree of care and diligence that has
been exercised in the selection and supervision of Roberto Leon y
Salazar, is not legally sufficient to overcome the presumption of
negligence against the defendant company.”
Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family

has been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof which
under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been
clearly established. It is not felt by the Court that there is
enough evidence on record as would overturn the

presumption of negligence, and for failure to submit all
evidence within its control, assuming the putative
existence thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer the
consequences of its own inaction and indifference.
2. In any event, we do not find the evidence presented by
petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a
good
537
VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 537

father of a family, which for an employer doctrinally

translates into its observance of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees but which
mandate, to use an oft-quoted phrase, is more often
honored in the breach than in the observance.
Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company’s
procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its
employees in the field, through the testimonies of Milagros
Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian Bautista, as its
transport supervisor, both of whom naturally and
expectedly testified for MMTC. It then concluded with its
sweeping pontifications that “thus, there is no doubt that
considering the nature of the business of petitioner, it
would not let any applicant-drivers to be (sic) admitted
without undergoing the rigid selection and training process
with the end (in) view of protecting the public in general
and its passengers in particular; x x x thus, there is no
doubt that applicant had fully complied with the said
requirements otherwise Garbo should not have allowed
him to undertake the next set of requirements x x x and the
training conducted consisting of seminars and actual
driving tests were satisfactory otherwise he41 should have
not been allowed to drive the subject vehicle.”
These statements strike us as both presumptuous and in
the nature of petitio principii, couched in generalities and
shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity. As
earlier observed, respondent court could not but express
surprise, and thereby its incredulity, that witness Garbo
neither testified nor presented any evidence that driver
Leonardo had complied with or had undergone all the
clearances and trainings she took pains to recite and
enumerate. The supposed clearances, results of seminars
and tests which Leonardo allegedly submitted and
complied with were never presented in court despite the
fact that, if true, then they

42
were obviously in the possession
and control of petitioner.
The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Articles
2176 and 2177, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code
provisions on quasi-delicts, as all the elements thereof are
present, to wit:
________________
41 Petition, 6-7; Rollo, 14-15.

42 Supra, Fn. 34.
538

(1) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or negligence

of the defendant or some other person for whose act he
must respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between fault or negligence of43 the defendant and the
damages incurred by plaintiff. It is to be noted that
petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver
Leonardo under Article 2180, the pertinent parts of which
provide that:
“The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only

for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxx
“Employers shall be liable for damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx
“The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
The basis of the employer’s vicarious liability has been

explained under this ratiocination:
“The responsibility imposed by this article arises by virtue of a

presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons
made responsible under the article, derived from their failure to
exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to
prevent them from causing damage. Negligence is imputed to
them by law, unless they prove the contrary. Thus, the last
paragraph of the article says that such responsibility ceases if it is
proved that the persons who might be held responsible under it

exercised the diligence of a good father of a family (diligentissimi
patris familias) to prevent damage. It is clear, therefore, that is it
not representation, nor interest, nor even the necessity of having
somebody else answer for the damages caused by the persons
devoid of personality, but it is the non-performance of certain
duties of precaution and prudence imposed upon the persons who
become responsible by civil bond uniting the actor to them, which
44
forms the foundation of such responsibility.”
________________
43 Andamo, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 191 SCRA

195 (1990).
44 Tolentino, A., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines, Vol. V, 1959 ed., 519.
539
VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 539

The above rule is, of course, applicable only where there is

an employer-employee relationship, although it is not
necessary that the employer be engaged in business or
industry. Whether or not engaged in any business or
industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for torts
committed by his employees within the scope of their
assigned tasks. But, it is necessary first to establish the
employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff
must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee
was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the
tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the
defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose
the defense of due diligence
45
in the selection and
supervision of employees. The diligence of a good father of
a family required to be observed by employers to prevent
damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the
selection and
46
supervision of employees in order to protect
the public.
With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence
against the defendant driver and of an employer-employee
relation between him and his co-defendant MMTC in this
instance, the case is
47
undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict
under Article 2180. When the employee causes damage
due to his own negligence while performing his own duties,
there arises the juris48 tantum presumption that the
employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. For

failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the
selection and supervision of employees,
49
the employer is
likewise responsible for damages, the basis of the liability
being the relationship of 50
pater familias or on the
employer’s own negligence.
________________
45 Martin vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 205 SCRA 591 (1992).

46 Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 (1942).
47 Lanuzo vs. Ping, et al., 100 SCRA 205 (1980).
48 Bahia vs. Litonjua, et al., 30 Phil. 624 (1915); Campo vs. Camarote,
supra; Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
148 SCRA 353 (1987); McKee, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al., 211 SCRA 517 (1992).
49 Lanuzo vs. Ping, et al., supra, and cases cited therein.
50 Bahia vs. Litonjua, et al., supra; Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co., 33
Phil. 8 (1915; McKee, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
540

51
As early as the case of Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, and
thereafter, we have consistently held that where the injury
is due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the
colliding vehicles, the drivers and owners of the said
vehicles shall be primarily, directly and solidarily liable for
damages and it is immaterial that one action is based on
quasi-delict and the other on culpa contractual, as the
solidarity
52
of the obligation is justified by the very nature
thereof.
It should be borne in mind that the legal obligation of
employers to observe due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is not to be considered as an
empty play of words or a mere formalism, as appears to be
the fashion of the times, since the non-observance thereof
actually becomes the basis of their vicarious liability under
Article 2180.
On the matter of selection of employees, Campo vs.
Camarote, supra, lays down this admonition:
“x x x. In order that the owner of a vehicle may be considered as

having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he
should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a
professional driver’s license; he should have carefully examined
the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his

experience and record of service. These steps appellant failed to
observe; he has therefore, failed to exercise all due diligence
required of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of
driver.”
Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on the other

hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance
of proper instructions intended for the protection of the
public and persons with whom the employer has relations
through his or its employees and the imposition of
necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of
breach or as may be warranted to ensure the
________________
al., supra.
51 56 Phil. 177 (1913); Cf. Barredo vs. Garcia, supra; Viluan vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 16 SCRA 742, (1966); Anuran vs. Buño, 17 SCRA 224
(1966); Malipol vs. Tan, 55 SCRA 202 (1974); Poblete vs. Fabron, 93 SCRA
200 (1979); Pleno vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra; Kapalaran Bus Line
vs. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 (1989).
52 Art. 1207, Civil Code.
541
VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 541

performance of acts indispensable

53
to the business of and
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance
with said rules should be the constant concern of the
employer, acting through dependable supervisors who
should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and
plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence
of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and
supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to
the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer,
the latter has the burden of proving that it has been
diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in
the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of
the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies,
without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to
overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to

all employers, that “(t)he mere formulation of various
company policies on safety without showing that they were
being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner
from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and
employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures
and company
54
policies on efficiency and safety were
followed.” Paying lip-service to these injunctions or
merely going through the motions of compliance therewith
will warrant stern sanctions from the Court.
These obligations, imposed by the law and public policy
in the interests and for the safety of the commuting public,
herein petitioner failed to perform. Respondent court was
definitely correct in ruling that “x x x due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employee (is) not proved by
mere testimonies to the effect that its applicant has
complied with all the company requirements before one is
admitted as an employee but without
_______________
53 Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,

212 SCRA 637 (1992).
54 Pantranco North Express Inc. vs. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 (1989). See
also Franco, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 178 SCRA 331
(1989).
542

55
proof thereof.” It is further a distressing commentary on
petitioner that it is a government-owned public utility,
maintained by public funds, and organized for the public
welfare.
The Court feels it is necessary to once again stress the
following rationale behind these all-important statutory
and jurisprudential mandates, for it has been observed that
despite its pronouncement in Kapalaran Bus Line vs.
Coronado, et al., supra, there has been little improvement
in the transport situation in the country:
“In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from

common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence
against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of
their drivers. While the immediate beneficiaries of the standard of
extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and owners

of the cargo carried by a common carrier, they are not the only
persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers
carefully observe the statutory standard of extraordinary
diligence in respect of their own passengers, they cannot help but
simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the owners and
passengers of other vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe
and convenient use of our roads and highways. The law seeks to
stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether
passengers or not) and the destruction of property (whether
freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power
of which seem often to inflame the minds of their drivers. x x x.”
Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in the

exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial
court’s award, without requiring the payment of interest
thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in the
determination thereof, especially since private respondent
did not specifically pray therefor in her complaint. Article
2211 of the Civil Code provides that in quasi-delicts,
interest as a part of the damages may be awarded in the
discretion of the court, and not as a matter of right. We do
not perceive that there have been intentional dilatory
maneuvers or any special circumstances which would
justify that additional award and, consequently, we find no
reason to disturb said ruling.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision of respondent
Court of
________________
55 Rollo, 28.
543
VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 543

Villanueva vs. Sandiganbayan
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman) and Nocon, J., concur.

Padilla, J., On leave.
Decision affirmed.
Note.—To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting

from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish
the relation between the omission and the damage

(Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 714)
——o0o——
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Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 104408)

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9/10/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 223

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION, petitioner,

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Petition for review on

522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

reconsideration is filed, the reglementary period within which to

is reckoned from the date the party who intends to appeal

Same; Evidence; It is now well-settled that while the findings

Civil Law; Obligations and Contracts; Quasi-delict; Where the

VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 523

Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

dant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him

Same; Same; Same; Defense of due diligence in the selection

merely going through the motions of compliance therewith will

Same; Same; Same; Damages; Art. 2211 of the Civil Code

524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

awarded in the discretion of the court and not as a matter of right.

PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This appeal calls for a review of the legal validity and

The facts of the case at bar are recounted for us by

VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 525

Manila another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp.

manner by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger

526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

in the selection and supervision of employees and should

Milagros Garbo testified that, as a training officer of

VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 527

enue performance for the preceding year. Upon satisfactory

of buses in the field, to countercheck the dispatcher on duty

8 Ibid., June 10, 1988, 3-12.

528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

bases of the evidence presented was, however, absolved

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby

a) the sum of P10,000.00 by way of medical expenses;

Plaintiff’s motion to have that portion of the trial court’s12

11 Original Record, 177.

VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 529

ployer has exercised the due diligence required of it in the

still necessary; (2) the testimonies of witnesses Garbo and

14 CA-G.R. CV No. 24680; per Justice Regina G. Ordoñez-Benitez, with

530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dated February 17, 1992, 18which in turn was received by

Consequently, private respondent had thirty (30) days from

VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 531

period, paying at the same time the corresponding docket

requirements and had undergone all trainings, tests and

22 100 Phil. 459 (1956).

532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

trial court maybe reversed by the Court of Appeals, which

VOL. 223, JUNE 21, 1993 533

the trial court are contrary to each

“On the question as to whether defendant MMTC was successful

29 Valenzuela, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 191 SCRA 1 (1991).

534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

whereas respondent court was of the opinion that—

“It is surprising though that witness Milagros Garbo did not

A thorough and scrupulous review of the records of this

33 Annex B, ibid.; id., 28-29.