Multi International VS Martinez PDF

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 774 06/01/2019, 10)28 PM
G.R. No. 175378. November 11, 2015.*
MULTI-INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DATA SYSTEM,

INC., petitioner, vs. RUEL MARTINEZ, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on

Certiorari; Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, since „the
Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts.‰·Before going into the
merits of the petition, we stress the well-settled rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, since „the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts.‰ It is not our function to review, examine and
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.
When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the
CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable
by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions in jurisprudence. In the present case, the factual
findings of the trial court and the CA on whether respondent has
fully paid his car loan are conflicting. The trial court found that no
deductions were made from respondentÊs salary to establish full
payment of the car loan while the CA found otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The conflicting factual findings of
the trial court and Court of Appeals (CA) compel the Supreme Court
(SC) to reevaluate the facts of this case, an exception to the rule that
only questions of law may be dealt with in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 45.·The conflicting factual findings of the trial court
and CA compel us to reevaluate the facts of this case, an exception
to the rule that only questions of law may be dealt with in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45.
Same; Evidence; Handwriting; Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court explicitly authorizes the court to compare the handwriting
in issue with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
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satisfaction of the judge.·Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
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Multi-International Business Data System, Inc. vs.
Martinez
Court explicitly authorizes the court to compare the

handwriting in issue with writings admitted or treated as genuine
by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. In Jimenez v. Commission
on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian
Church in the USA, 383 SCRA 326 (2002), we held: It is also
hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts, even
those from the NBI and the PC, are not binding upon courts. This
principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere
handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by
a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with
those of the currently existing ones. Handwriting experts are
usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of
the technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to
these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination
or the comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not
depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because
the judge must conduct an independent examination of the
questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion
as to its authenticity.
Civil Law; Payment; Burden of Proof; The debtor has the
burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been
discharged by payment.·It is established that the one who pleads
payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the creditor
alleges nonpayment, the general rule is that the debtor has the
burden to prove payment, rather than the creditor. The debtor has
the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has
been discharged by payment. Where the debtor introduces some
evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence
· as distinct from the general burden of proof · shifts to the
creditor, who is then under a duty of producing some evidence to
show nonpayment.
Same; Same; The fact of payment may be established not only
by documentary evidence but also by parol evidence.·Although not
exclusive, a receipt of payment is the best evidence of the fact of
payment. We held that the fact of payment may be established not
only by documentary evidence but also by parol evidence. Except for
respondentÊs bare allegations that he has fully paid the P648,288.00
car loan, there is nothing in the records which shows that full
payment has indeed been made. Respondent did not present any
receipt other than the certification dated September 10, 1996 which
only
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576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Martinez
proves that respondent has already paid P337,650.00 of the car

loan. A balance of P310,638.00 still remained.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Westwood Law for petitioner.
Heinrich V. Garena for respondent.
JARDELEZA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 (petition)

under Rule 45 filed by Multi-International Business Data
System, Inc. (petitioner) to annul and set aside the
Decision2 dated October 18, 2006 rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA) Sixteenth Division in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
82686.
The Facts
Respondent Ruel Martinez (respondent) was the

Operations Manager3 of petitioner from the last quarter of
1990 to January 22, 1999.4 Sometime in June 1994,
respondent applied for and was granted a car loan
amounting to P648,288.00.5 Both parties agreed that the
loan was payable through deductions from respondentÊs
bonuses or commissions, if any.6 Further, if respondent
would be terminated for any cause before the end of
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-19.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and concurred in by
Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Apolinario D. Bruselas,
Jr., id., at pp. 32-44.
3 RTC Records, pp. 162, 320, 326.
4 Rollo, p. 33.
5 Id., at p. 23.
6 Id., at p. 24; see also RTC Records, p. 21.
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the term of the loan obligation, the unpaid balance

would be immediately due and demandable without need of
demand.7 On November 11, 1998, petitioner sent
respondent a letter informing him of the breakdown of his
outstanding obligation with petitioner amounting to
P418,012.78, detailing every bonus, loan or advance
obtained and deducted.8 The subject vehicle remains with
respondent.9
In a letter dated November 24, 1998, respondent
requested for a breakdown of his benefits from petitioner as

director/operations manager in case he will resign from his
position. In said letter, respondent stated that the
computation „is only for the assumed amount on my end to
deduct whatever I owe the Company.‰10
In a letter dated January 22, 1999 which respondent
received the next day, petitioner terminated respondent for
cause effective immediately and demanded that respondent
pay his outstanding loan of P418,012.78 and surrender the
car to petitioner within three days from receipt.11 Despite
this, respondent failed to pay the outstanding balance.
In a letter dated June 23, 1999, petitioner demanded
respondent to pay his loan within three days from receipt
thereof at petitionerÊs office.12 Again, despite demand,
respondent failed to pay his outstanding obligation.
On July 12, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint13 with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 148 (trial
court) against respondent praying that respondent be
ordered to pay his outstanding obligation of P418,012.78
plus interest, and
_______________
7 Rollo, p. 24.
8 Id., at pp. 20-21.
9 RTC Records, p. 60.
10 Id., at p. 162.
11 Id., at pp. 165-167.
12 Id., at pp. 163-164.
13 Id., at pp. 1-8.
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Martinez
that respondent be held liable for exemplary damages,

attorneyÊs fees and costs of the suit.14
In his answer15 dated August 28, 1999, respondent

alleged that he already paid his loan through deductions
made from his compensation/salaries, bonuses and
commissions.16 During trial, respondent presented a
certification dated September 10, 1996 issued by
petitionerÊs president, Helen Dy (Dy), stating that
respondent already paid the amount of P337,650.00 as of
the said date.17 Respondent alleged that a simple
accounting would show that the he already paid the loan
considering that it is payable within four years from
1994.18
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision19 dated November 22, 2002, the trial

court ruled in favor of petitioner. It decreed, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment i[s] hereby rendered in

favor of plaintiff as against the defendant[ ] as
follows:
1. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the balance
of his car loan in the amount of Four Hundred
Eighteen Thousand Twelve and 78/100 Pesos
([P]418,012.78) plus interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) [per annum] from [June 23,] 1999 until
full payment;
2. Ordering defendant Martinez to pay plaintiff the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos ([P]10,000.00), by way
of exemplary damages;
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 6-7.

15 Id., at pp. 21-27.
16 Id., at p. 22.
17 Id., at p. 303.
18 CA Rollo, p. 96.
19 Id., at pp. 36-42.
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3. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount

of Twenty Thousand Pesos ([P]20,000.00) by way of
attorneyÊs fees;
4. Dismissing the counterclaims interposed by
defendant;
5. Ordering defendant to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.20
In arriving at the above pronouncement, the trial court

held that the respondent failed to present evidence to prove
payment. The trial court also held that the due execution
and authenticity of the certification dated September 10,
1996 were not established. In respondentÊs direct
examination, he merely testified that he knows Dy and her
spouse but did not state that the document was actually
executed by Dy.21
On December 16, 2002, respondent filed a motion
seeking the reconsideration of the trial courtÊs decision
dated November 22, 2002. The trial court denied this
motion in its Order22 dated March 22, 2004.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondent appealed the trial courtÊs decision with the

CA. Docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 82686, the appeal
alleged that the parties agreed that the car loan would be
payable within four years from the time respondent
secured the loan in June 1994.23 Respondent alleged that
he already completed his payment in June 1998 and that
the payment was done through salary deductions because if
it were otherwise, petitioner would be seeking full payment
in the amount of
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 37-38.

22 Id., at p. 41.
23 Id., at p. 28.
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Martinez
P648,288.00 and not only the balance of P418,012.78.24

Respondent also assailed the finding that the due execution
of the certification dated September 10, 1996 was not
proven. Respondent alleged that by mere comparison, one
can safely say that the signatures appearing in the
certification and in DyÊs affidavit submitted before the
National Labor Relations Commission are signatures by
one and the same person, Dy. Respondent claims that he is
very much familiar with the signature of Dy, his former
boss for ten years and even petitionerÊs witness, who is also
its administrative manager, Aida Valle (Valle), also
identified the signature of Dy in the certification.25
The CA in its Decision26 dated October 18, 2006 reversed
the trial court and ruled in favor of respondent in holding
that the latter already fulfilled his loan obligation with
petitioner. The CA found credence in the following pieces of
evidence: (1) certification dated September 10, 1996 signed
by Dy; (2) deduction of the monthly installments from
respondentÊs salary pursuant to the agreement between
him and petitioner; and (3) petitionerÊs admission of
respondentÊs installment payments made in the amount of
P230,275.22.27 The CA held that Dy never denied nor
confirmed in open court the authenticity of her signature in
the certification dated September 10, 1996.28 Citing
Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde29 and
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK)
v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.,30 the CA held that Dy must
declare under oath that she did not sign the document or
that it is otherwise false or fabricated.31
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 28-29.
25 Id., at pp. 31-32.

26 Rollo, pp. 32-44.
27 Id., at pp. 38-39.
28 Id., at p. 40.
29 G.R. No. 140608, September 23, 2004, 439 SCRA 1.
30 G.R. No. 143338, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 117.
31 Rollo, p. 41.
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Thus, the CA reversed the trial courtÊs ruling and held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

November 22, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 148, in Civil Case No.
99-1295, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one is entered DISMISSING the
complaint for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.32 (Emphasis in the original)
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The issues for resolution are:

1. Whether respondent has fulfilled his obligation with
petitioner; and
2. Whether the certification dated September 10, 1996
should be admitted as basis for respondentÊs payment of his
loan with petitioner.33
Our Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Verification/Certification
on Non-Forum Shopping
Before going into the substantive merits of the case, we

shall first resolve the technical issue raised by respondent
in his Comment34 dated February 8, 2007 and
Memorandum35 dated November 6, 2007.
_______________
32 Id., at p. 44.
33 Id., at p. 8.
34 Id., at pp. 83-92.
35 Id., at pp. 115-129.
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Martinez
Respondent alleged that the petition should be

dismissed for failing to comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court in relation to Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court.36 Respondent alleged that the signature
of Dy in the Verification/Certification in the petition differs
from her signature in the letter dated November 11, 1998,
thus, inferred that someone not authorized signed the
Verification/Certification.37
Upon a review of the records, however, we found DyÊs
signature in the petition to be the same with DyÊs signature
in the Ex-Parte Manifestation of Compliance38 dated
February 22, 2005 which petitioner filed with the CA.
Respondent never objected to DyÊs signature in petitionerÊs
Ex-Parte Manifestation of Compliance. Further, Dy did not
refute that the signature in the petition is hers. Thus, we
find no reason to dismiss the petition outright based on
respondentÊs allegation.
Review of factual findings
Before going into the merits of the petition, we stress the

well-settled rule that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, since „the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts.‰39 It is not our function to review, examine and
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented.
When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of
fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and
_______________
36 Id., at p. 121.
37 Id., at p. 122.
38 CA Rollo, pp. 55-56.
39 New Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. v. Philippine
National Bank, G.R. No. 148753, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 565, 580,
citing Far East Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123569,
April 1, 1996, 256 SCRA 15, 18.
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are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls

under any of the recognized exceptions in jurisprudence.40
In the present case, the factual findings of the trial court
and the CA on whether respondent has fully paid his car
loan are conflicting. The trial court found that no
deductions were made from respondentÊs salary to establish
full payment of the car loan while the CA found otherwise.
The trial court held, thus:
Culled from the evidence adduced and the
testimony of the witnesses, it appears that the

defendant himself admitted on cross-examination
that no deductions were made in his monthly salary.
Thus, it was a mere presumption of fact on his part
that he had been able to fully pay off his car loan. The
testimony of the de-
_______________
40 Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers v. Cirtek

Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 656, 660.
„(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitionersÊ
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.‰ (Emphasis ours)
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Martinez
fendant creating merely an inference of payment

will not be regarded as conclusive on that issue. Thus,
payment cannot be presumed by a mere inference
from surrounding circumstances. At most, the

agreement that the payments for the car loan shall be
deducted from the defendantÊs salary and bonus is
only affirmative of the capacity or ability of the
defendant to fulfill his part of the bargain. But
whether or not there was actual payment through
deductions from the defendantÊs salary and bonus
remains to be proven by independent and credible
evidence. As the saying goes: „a proof that an act
could have been done is no proof that it was actually
done.‰ Hence for failure to present evidence to prove
payment, defendant miserably failed in his defense
and in effect admitted the allegations of plaintiff.41
The CA, on the other hand, found that respondent

sufficiently established that deductions were made from his
salary:
x x x Moreover, it had been sufficiently established

by witness Aida Valle (VALLE), Administrative
manager of plaintiff-appellee MULTI-
INTERNATIONAL, that defendant-appellant
MARTINEZ had been the only employee granted by
plaintiff-appellee MULTI-INTERNATIONAL a car
loan as such [sic]. With that, it can fairly be inferred
that plaintiff-appellee MULTI-INTERNATIONALÊs
asseveration that the deductions from the salary of
defendant-appellant MARTINEZ had not been
reflected in his payslips is for naught, since indeed, no
such „item‰ in the payslip is provided, considering
that it is only defendant-appellant MARTINEZ who
had been granted such car loan x x x.42
Thus, the conflicting factual findings of the trial court

and CA compel us to reevaluate the facts of this case, an
exception
_______________
41 Rollo, pp. 27-28.

42 Id., at pp. 39-40.
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to the rule that only questions of law may be dealt with

in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Admissibility of the certification

dated September 10, 1996
Respondent relies on the certification43 dated September

10, 1996 to bolster his defense that he already fully paid
his car loan to petitioner. We affirm the findings of the CA
that the certification is admissible in evidence.
Section 22,44 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly
authorizes the court to compare the handwriting in issue
with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against
_______________
43 RTC Records, p. 303. The certification reads:

This is to certify that MR. RUEL R. MARTINEZ has made a total
payment as of date in the amount of PESOS: THREE HUNDRED
THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY ONLY
([P337,650]) to BA Savings Bank for the purchase of one (1) unit 1994
Lancer GLI through Multi-International Business Data Systems, Inc.
Attached herewith are photocopies of validated [o]fficial [r]eceipts from
BA Savings Bank.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Martinez for whatever legal
purpose it may serve him.
(signed)
HELEN DY
President
44 Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved.·The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to
be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write,
or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the

handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may
also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge.
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Martinez
whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to

the satisfaction of the judge. In Jimenez v. Commission on
Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United
Presbyterian Church in the USA,45 we held:
It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of

handwriting experts, even those from the NBI and the
PC, are not binding upon courts. This principle holds
true especially when the question involved is mere
handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be
determined by a visual comparison of specimens of
the questioned signatures with those of the currently
existing ones.
Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the
examination of forged documents because of the
technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But
resort to these experts is not mandatory or
indispensable to the examination or the comparison of
handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend
entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts,
because the judge must conduct an independent
examination of the questioned signature in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity. x x x 46 (Citations omitted)
The documents containing the signature of Dy which
have been submitted by petitioner as authentic are the

following: (1) letter dated November 11, 1998;47 (2)
termination letter dated January 22, 1999;48 (3) promissory
note dated June 17, 1994;49 and (4) chattel mortgage signed
on June 27, 1994.50 Examining and analyzing the
signatures in these documents with DyÊs signature in the
certification, we find no substantial
_______________
45 G.R. No. 140472, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA 326.

46 Id., at p. 335.
47 RTC Records, p. 160.
48 Id., at pp. 165-167.
49 Id., at p. 266.
50 Id., at p. 268.
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reason to doubt the latterÊs authenticity. In fact, the

testimonies of Dy herself and Valle support our finding.
Dy testified on cross-examination as follows:
Q: Now, ms witness [sic], sometime in December 10, 1996, do you recall
having executed a certification to Mr. Martinez?
A: No.
Q: Just to refresh your memory, would you please identify if this is the
signature you signed given [sic] to Mr. Martinez?
A: Yeah. It looks like my signature, but⁄
Q: Is that your signature?
A: But I said it looks like my signature. I want you to notice something
because everytime⁄
Q: Just answer the question please. Is that your signature?
A: I said it looks like my signature.
xxx
Q: Just answer the question please.
A: I said it looks like my signature.51 (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Valle, on cross-examination testified

as follows:
Q: If I show you Certification dated September 10, 1996 will you be able to
confirm if this is a Certification signed by the president?
A: It looked like the signature of the president but I think she will
be the one to testify because she was the one who signed.52
(Emphasis supplied)
_______________
51 TSN, September 5, 2000, pp. 40-41.

52 TSN, August 17, 2000, p. 8.
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Martinez
Aside from supporting our finding that the signature in

the certification is genuine, the foregoing testimonies of Dy
and Valle substantially comply with the other modes of
authenticating a private document under Section 20,53 Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.
Dy never testified that any forgery or fraud attended the
certification.54 In fact, she did not deny the authenticity of
her signature but actually admitted that the signature
therein looks like hers. Additionally, Valle, who is familiar
with the signature of Dy because of the requirements of her
job, also positively testified that the signature in the
certification looks like that of DyÊs.55
The defenses of Dy that she does not have a copy or
record of the certification in her file and that the letterhead
shows an old address are weak and do not prove that the
certification was not duly executed.
For having established the due execution and
authentication of the certification dated September 10,

1996, the certification should be admitted in evidence to
prove that respondent partially paid the car loan in the
amount of P337,650.00.
Insufficient evidence to prove

full payment of loan
It is established that the one who pleads payment has

the burden of proving it. Even where the creditor alleges
non-
_______________
53 Section 20. Proof of private document.·Before any private

document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.
54 Rollo, p. 41.
55 See also TSN, August 17, 2000, p. 8.
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Martinez
payment, the general rule is that the debtor has the

burden to prove payment, rather than the creditor. The
debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that
the obligation has been discharged by payment. Where the
debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of
going forward with the evidence · as distinct from the
general burden of proof · shifts to the creditor, who is then
under a duty of producing some evidence to show
nonpayment.56
It must be emphasized that both parties have not
presented any written agreement or contract governing
respondentÊs obligation. Nevertheless, it has been
established that respondent obtained a car loan amounting
to P648,288.00 from petitioner. Thus, the burden is now on
respondent to prove that the obligation has already been
extinguished by payment.
Although not exclusive, a receipt of payment is the best
evidence of the fact of payment.57 We held that the fact of
payment may be established not only by documentary
evidence but also by parol evidence.58
_______________
56 Royal Cargo Corporation v. DFS Sports Unlimited, Inc., G.R. No.

158621, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 414, 422-423, citing Citibank,
N.A. (formerly First National City Bank) v. Sabeniano, G.R. No. 156132,
October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 378, 418 and Coronel v. Capati, G.R. No.
157836, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 205, 213.
57 Cham v. Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 1, 8,
citing Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116181,
April 17, 1996, 256 SCRA 309, 317.
58 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, id., citing Monfort v.
Aguinaldo, 91 Phil. 913 (1952).
„That the best evidence for proving payment is by the evidence of
receipts showing the same is also admitted. What respondents claim is
that there is no rule which provides that payment can only be proved by
receipts. While receipts are deemed to be the best evidence, they are not
exclusive. Other evidence may be presented in lieu thereof if they are not
available, as in case of loss, destruction or disappearance. The fact of
payment may be established not only by documentary evidence, but also
by parol evidence, (48 C.J. 727;
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Martinez
Except for respondentÊs bare allegations that he has

fully paid the P648,288.00 car loan, there is nothing in the
records which shows that full payment has indeed been
made. Respondent did not present any receipt other than
the certification dated September 10, 1996 which only
proves that respondent has already paid P337,650.00 of the
car loan. A balance of P310,638.00 still remained.
Even respondentÊs testimony lacks credence. He alleged
that the amortization of the car loan was deducted from his
salaries, bonuses and commissions. However, he could not
even answer nor give an estimate of how much bonuses and
commissions he receives from petitioner.59
Respondent also alleged that although deductions were
made from his salaries, bonuses and commissions, his
payslips do not reflect such deductions because „there is no
such car loan field‰ in the accounting program for the
payroll.60 Respondent admitted in his testimony that he
only presumed that the deductions were being made from
his salaries, bonuses and commissions, to wit:
Q: So my question was that, whether or not your regular salary which was
received twice a month, the monthly amortization[s] are being
deducted from that? [sic]
A: There is no reflection in the payslip.
Q: But do you know it was ever deducted from your monthly salary? [sic]
A: It must be deducted from my salary. [sic]
_______________
Greenleaf, Law of Evidence, Vol. II, p. 486; Jones on Evidence [1913]

Vol. II, p. 193) specially in civil cases where preponderance of evidence is
the rule. Here respondents presented documentary as well as oral
evidence which the Court of Appeals found to be sufficient, and this
finding is final.‰
59 TSN, January 18, 2001, p. 25.
60 Id., at p. 28.
591
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 11, 2015 591

Martinez
Q: You are assuming?

A: That is the agreement.
Q: That is the agreement but you donÊt know if it was indeed deducted?
A: Yes.61
If indeed deductions were made on his salaries, bonuses

and commissions, respondent should have been confident
in answering the questions propounded on him during
trial. He should have presented his payslips and shown
that even if his payslips did not reflect any deductions for
his car loan, deductions were indeed made, by comparing
the amount of compensation he could have gotten based on
his employment contract and the amount he actually
received. Respondent merely made calculations on what he
presumed he already paid. Further, respondent could have
presented testimonies of persons other than himself to
prove payment of the loans. The letter dated November 24,
1998 showed that respondent was aware that he still had
outstanding obligations with petitioner.
In Royal Cargo Corporation v. DFS Sports Unlimited,
Inc., we held that the defense of payment was not proven
by the respondentÊs failure to present any supporting
evidence such as official receipts or the testimony of the
person who made payment or who had direct knowledge of
the payment, among others.62 RespondentÊs witness therein
also assumed that payment was made even in the absence
of any receipt „once the accounting department of
respondent forwarded to her the original invoice which was
stamped PAID.‰ We held in this case that such testimony
and the invoices which were stamped paid, are all self-
serving and do not, by themselves, prove respondentÊs
claim of payment.63
_______________
61 Id., at p. 30.
62 Royal Cargo Corporation v. DFS Sports Unlimited, Inc., supra note
56 at p. 430.
63 Id.
592

Martinez
Nevertheless, even if the parties agreed to make

deductions from respondentÊs salary, bonuses and
commissions, we agree with the trial court that this is „only
affirmative of the capacity or ability of the [respondent] to
fulfill his part of the bargain. But whether or not there was
actual payment through deductions from [respondent]Ês
salary and bonus remains to be proven by independent and
credible evidence.‰64
Finally, we find it questionable why respondent would
agree on a setup where petitioner would not give him any
written acknowledgment receipt of his payments or
accounting of his loan.65 Respondent should have insisted
that receipts be issued in his favor in the first place if it
were true that the program for issuing the payslips could
not reflect the deductions from his salaries, bonuses and
commissions. Since he was the only employee who was
given a car loan, it would not have been an inconvenience
for the petitioner. His actions go against the legal
presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns.66
Statement of account
is self-serving
Similarly, we find that the statement of account,

showing the amount of P418,012.78 as respondentÊs
outstanding loan obligation to petitioner, is self-serving. Dy
admitted that she prepared the statement of account.67
However, she neither explained clearly, during her
testimony, the breakdown nor supported the amounts
stated therein with documentary evidence.68
Although petitioner refers to the amount of P418,012.78
in the statement to represent only the car loan obligation,
the
_______________
64 Rollo, p. 27.
65 RTC Records, p. 162. See also TSN, January 18, 2001, p. 36.
66 Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3, par. (d).
67 TSN, September 5, 2000, pp. 43-44.
68 Id., at pp. 20-21.
593
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 11, 2015 593

Martinez
statement itself shows that the amount also includes the

cash advances of respondent from the company. The trial
court has already ruled that judgment cannot be rendered
on the issue regarding cash advances because this was not
made subject of petitionerÊs complaint and the same was
not amended.69 Such issue was also not raised with us on
appeal. Further, it was not explained why Valle was not the
one who prepared the statement or was not asked to testify
on the document when her duties include supervising the
accounting department and assisting in the preparation of
the employeesÊ payroll.70
Thus, having only proven payment to the extent of
P337,650.00, respondent is obligated to pay petitioner the
balance of P310,638.00 with interest.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Court of AppealsÊ Decision dated October
18, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 82686 is SET ASIDE. The
respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner the balance of
the car loan in the amount of P310,638.00 plus interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from
January 23, 199971 until the date of finality of this
judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum72 until fully paid.
The trial courtÊs Decision dated November 22, 2002 is

AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr. and

Reyes, JJ., concur.
_______________
69 Rollo, p. 29.
70 TSN, August 1, 2000, pp. 4-5.
71 The records show that petitioner in its termination letter dated
January 22, 1999 extrajudicially demanded respondent to pay the
outstanding balance of the car loan. However, the letter was received by
respondent on January 23, 1999.
72 Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703
SCRA 439, 457-458.
594

Martinez
Petition partially granted, judgment set aside.
Notes.·The opinion of a handwriting expert, therefore,

does not mandatorily bind the court, the expertÊs function
being to place before the court data upon which it can form
its own opinion. (Krystle Realty Development Corporation
vs. Alibin, 733 SCRA 1 [2014])
The opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily
binding upon the court, the expertÊs function being to place
before the court data upon which the court can form its
own opinion. (Gepulle-Garbo vs. Garabato, 746 SCRA 189
[2015])
··o0o··
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 774 06/01/2019, 10)28 PM

G.R. No. 175378. November 11, 2015.*

MULTI-INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DATA SYSTEM,

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on

satisfaction of the judge.·Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 11, 2015 575

Court explicitly authorizes the court to compare the

576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

proves that respondent has already paid P337,650.00 of the car

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 (petition)

Respondent Ruel Martinez (respondent) was the

1 Rollo, pp. 3-19.

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 11, 2015 577

the term of the loan obligation, the unpaid balance

requested for a breakdown of his benefits from petitioner as

578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

that respondent be held liable for exemplary damages,

In his answer15 dated August 28, 1999, respondent

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision19 dated November 22, 2002, the trial

WHEREFORE, judgment i[s] hereby rendered in

14 Id., at pp. 6-7.

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 11, 2015 579

3. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount

In arriving at the above pronouncement, the trial court

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Respondent appealed the trial courtÊs decision with the

21 Id., at pp. 37-38.

580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

P648,288.00 and not only the balance of P418,012.78.24

24 Id., at pp. 28-29.

25 Id., at pp. 31-32.

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 11, 2015 581

Thus, the CA reversed the trial courtÊs ruling and held:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

Hence, this petition.

The issues for resolution are:

The petition is partly meritorious.

Before going into the substantive merits of the case, we

582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Respondent alleged that the petition should be

Review of factual findings

Before going into the merits of the petition, we stress the

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 11, 2015 583

are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls

Culled from the evidence adduced and the

testimony of the witnesses, it appears that the

40 Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers v. Cirtek

584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

fendant creating merely an inference of payment

from surrounding circumstances. At most, the

The CA, on the other hand, found that respondent

x x x Moreover, it had been sufficiently established

Thus, the conflicting factual findings of the trial court

41 Rollo, pp. 27-28.

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 11, 2015 585

to the rule that only questions of law may be dealt with

Admissibility of the certification