Intramuros vs. Offshore Construction

5/1/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 857

G.R. No. 196795. March 7, 2018.*

INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs.
OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the
remedy from an adverse decision rendered by a Regional Trial
Court (RTC) exercising its appellate jurisdiction is to file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA).—Under Rule
42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the remedy from an adverse
decision rendered by a Regional Trial Court exercising its
appellate jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review with
the Court of Appeals: Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.
—A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial
Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may
file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the
amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial
Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The
petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due
time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the
full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for
costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only
within which to file the petition for review. No further extension
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Question of Law; The
Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the jurisdiction of a court over
the subject matter of a complaint and the existence of forum
shopping are questions of law.—“A question of law exists when
the law applicable to a particular set of facts is not settled,
whereas a question of fact arises
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000171cf490a34aaa52780003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/43
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* THIRD DIVISION.

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Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction
Development Company
when the truth or falsehood of alleged facts is in doubt.” This

Court has ruled that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter of a complaint and the existence of forum shopping are
questions of law. A petition for review under Rule 42 may include
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. This
Court has recognized that the power to hear cases on appeal in
which only questions of law are raised is not vested exclusively in
this Court. As provided in Rule 42, Section 2, errors of fact or law,
or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court in its
decision must be specified in the petition for review.
Same; Same; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and the Supreme Court (SC)
has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these
exceptions is the exigency of the situation being litigated. Here, the
controversy between the parties has been dragging on since 2010,
which should not be the case when the initial dispute — an
ejectment case — is, by nature and design, a summary procedure
and should have been resolved with expediency.—Petitioner’s
direct resort to this Court, instead of to the Court of Appeals for
intermediate review as sanctioned by the rules, violates the
principle of hierarchy of courts. In Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 (2015): The doctrine that
requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this
court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its
designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts
do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the
evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may include the validity of an
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are
territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their
writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of
inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically

presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within
their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual
case’ that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of
such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in
scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at
their level would not be practical considering their decisions could
still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the

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Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of

courts is not inviolable, and this Court has provided several
exceptions to the doctrine. One of these exceptions is the exigency
of the situation being litigated. Here, the controversy between the
parties has been dragging on since 2010, which should not be the
case when the initial dispute — an ejectment case — is, by nature
and design, a summary procedure and should have been resolved
with expediency.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Possession; It is
settled that the only issue that must be settled in an ejectment
proceeding is physical possession of the property involved.—It is
settled that the only issue that must be settled in an ejectment
proceeding is physical possession of the property involved.
Specifically, action for unlawful detainer is brought against a
possessor who unlawfully withholds possession after the
termination and expiration of the right to hold possession. To
determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the
court, the allegations in the complaint must be examined. The
jurisdictional facts must be evident on the face of the complaint.
There is a case for unlawful detainer if the complaint states the
following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2)
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff
to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Metropolitan Trial Courts;

Regardless of the claims or defenses raised by a defendant, a
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) has jurisdiction over an
ejectment complaint once it has been shown that the requisite
jurisdictional facts have been alleged.—Not even the claim that
there is an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will remove
the Metropolitan Trial Court’s jurisdiction over the complaint. To
emphasize, physical possession, or de facto possession, is the sole
issue to be resolved in ejectment proceedings. Regardless of the
claims or defenses raised by a defendant, a Metropolitan Trial
Court has jurisdiction over an ejectment complaint once it has
been shown that the requisite jurisdictional facts have been
alleged, such as in this case. Courts are

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reminded not to abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the

issue of physical possession, as there is a public need to prevent a
breach of the peace by requiring parties to resort to legal means to
recover possession of real property.
Same; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping is
the practice of resorting to multiple fora for the same relief, to
increase the chances of obtaining a favorable judgment.—Forum
shopping is the practice of resorting to multiple fora for the same
relief, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable judgment.
In Spouses Reyes v. Spouses Chung, 839 SCRA 615 (2017): It has
been jurisprudentially established that forum shopping exists
when a party avails himself of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues
either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
courts. The test to determine whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia
are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another. Simply put, when litis pendentia or res
judicata does not exist, neither can forum shopping exist. The
requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at
least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b)

the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. On the
other hand, the elements of res judicata, also known as bar by
prior judgment, are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the
court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d)
there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
Same; Same; Counterclaims; Compulsory Counterclaims; A
compulsory counterclaim is a defendant’s claim for money or other
relief which arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
subject matter of the complaint.—A compulsory counterclaim is a
defendant’s claim for money or other relief which arises out of, or
is necessarily connected with, the subject matter of the complaint.
In

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Spouses Ponciano v. Hon. Parentela, Jr., 331 SCRA 605

(2000): A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other
relief which a defending party may have against an opposing
party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily
connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of plaintiff’s complaint. It is compulsory in the
sense that if it is within the jurisdiction of the court, and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be set up
therein, and will be barred in the future if not set up.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Judgments; A
judgment of eviction against respondent will affect its sublessees
since the latter’s right of possession depends entirely on that of the
former.—A sublessee cannot invoke a superior right over that of
the sublessor. A judgment of eviction against respondent will
affect its sublessees since the latter’s right of possession depends
entirely on that of the former. A complaint for interpleader by
sublessees cannot bar the recovery by the rightful possessor of

physical possession of the leased premises. Since neither the
specific performance case nor the interpleader case constituted
forum shopping by petitioner, the Metropolitan Trial Court erred
in dismissing its Complaint for Ejectment.
Same; Same; Same; Possession by Tolerance; Petitioner’s
tolerance of respondent’s occupation and use of the leased premises
after the end of the lease contracts does not give the latter a
permanent and indefeasible right of possession in its favor.—But
petitioner’s tolerance of respondent’s occupation and use of the
leased premises after the end of the lease contracts does not give
the latter a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in its
favor. When a demand to vacate has been made, as what
petitioner had done, respondent’s possession became illegal and it
should have left the leased premises.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 173.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

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Obligar Law Firm for respondent.
LEONEN, J.:

The sole issue in ejectment proceedings is determining
which of the parties has the better right to physical
possession of a piece of property. The defendant’s claims
and allegations in its answer or motion to dismiss do not
oust a trial court’s jurisdiction to resolve this issue.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 14, 2011
Decision2 of Branch 173, Regional Trial Court, Manila in
Civil Case No. 10-124740. The Regional Trial Court
affirmed in toto the October 19, 2010 Order3 of Branch 24,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila in Civil Case No. 186955-
CV, dismissing Intramuros Administration’s (Intramuros)
Complaint for Ejectment against Offshore Construction

and Development Company (Offshore Construction) on the
grounds of forum shopping and lack of jurisdiction.
In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties of the
national government, which it administered to Offshore
Construction. Three (3) properties were subjects of
Contracts of Lease: Baluarte De San Andres, with an area
of 2,793 sq. m.;4 Baluarte De San Francisco De Dilao, with
an area of 1,880 sq. m.;5 and Revellin De Recoletos, with an
area of 1,036 sq. m.6 All three (3) properties were leased for
five (5) years, from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 2003.
All their lease contracts also
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 15-69.
2 Id., at pp. 70-73. The Decision
was penned by Judge Armando A. Yanga.
3 Id., at pp. 74-80. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Jesusa
S. Prado- Maningas.
4 Id., at pp. 96-106.
5 Id., at pp. 107-116.
6 Id., at pp. 117-126.

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made reference to an August 20, 1998 memorandum of
stipulations, which included a provision for lease renewals
every five (5) years upon the parties’ mutual agreement.7
Offshore Construction occupied and introduced
improvements in the leased premises. However,
Intramuros and the Department of Tourism halted the
projects due to Offshore Construction’s nonconformity with
Presidential Decree No. 1616, which required 16th to 19th
centuries’ Philippine-Spanish architecture in the area.8
Consequently, Offshore Construction filed a complaint with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order against Intramuros and the Department
of Tourism before the Manila Regional Trial Court,9 which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91587.10
Eventually, the parties executed a Compromise

Agreement on July 26, 1999,11 which the Manila Regional
Trial Court approved on February 8, 2000.12 In the
Compromise Agreement, the parties affirmed the validity
of the two (2) lease contracts but terminated the one over
Revellin de Recoletos.13 The Compromise Agreement
retained the five (5)-year period of the existing lease
contracts and stated the areas that may be occupied by
Offshore Construction:

FROM:
(1) Baluarte de San Andres
TO:
(1) Only the stable house, the gun powder room and
two (2) Chambers with comfort rooms, will be utilized
for restaurants. All other structures built
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 128, 132, 136.

8 Id., at p. 22.
9 Id.
10 Id., at p. 147.
11 Id., at pp. 139-146.
12 Id., at pp. 147-152.
13 Id., at p. 142.

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and introduced including trellises shall be
transferred/relocated to:
(a) Two (2) restaurants as Asean Garden.
Each will have an aggregate area of two
hundred square meters (200 sq. m.);
(b) One (1) kiosk at Puerta Isabel Garden
fronting Terraza de la Reyna with an
aggregate area of twenty (20) square
meters;
(c) Three (3) restaurants at the chambers of
Puerta Isabel II with an aggregate area of
1,180.5 sq. m.;

(d) One (1) restaurant at Fort Santiago
American Barracks. Subject to IA
Guidelines, the maximum floor area will be
the perimeter walls of the old existing
building.
FROM:
(2) Baluarte De San Francisco Dilao
TO
(2) All seven (7) structures including the [Offshore
Construction] Administration Building and Trellises shall
be transferred [t]o Cuartel de Sta. Lucia [O]therwise known
as the PC Barracks[.]14

During the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to
pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite several demand
letters.15 Intramuros tolerated the continuing occupation,
hoping that Offshore Construction would pay its arrears.
As of July 31, 2004, these arrears allegedly totaled
P6,762,153.70.16
_______________
14 Id., at p. 141.
15 Id., at p. 24.
16 Id., at p. 25.

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To settle its arrears, Offshore Construction proposed to
pay the Department of Tourism’s monthly operational
expenses for lights and sound equipment, electricity, and
performers at the Baluarte Plano Luneta de Sta. Isabel.
Intramuros and the Department of Tourism accepted the
offer, and the parties executed a Memorandum of
Agreement covering the period of August 15, 2004 to
August 25, 2005.17
However, Offshore Construction continued to fail to pay
its arrears, which amounted to P13,448,867.45 as of
December 31, 2009. On March 26, 2010, Offshore

Construction received Intramuros’ latest demand letter.18
Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the
Manila Metropolitan Trial Court on April 28, 2010.19
Offshore Construction filed its Answer with Special and
Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim.20
On July 12, 2010, Offshore Construction filed a Very
Urgent Motion,21 praying that Intramuros’ complaint be
dismissed on the grounds of violation of the rule on non-
forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction over the case, and litis
pendentia. First, it claimed that Intramuros failed to
inform the Metropolitan Trial Court that there were two (2)
pending cases with the Manila Regional Trial Court over
Puerta de Isabel II.22 Second, it argued that the
Metropolitan Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case since the relationship between the parties was not
one of lessor-lessee but governed by a concession
agreement.23 Finally, it contended that Intramuros’ cause
of action was barred by litis pendentia,
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 161-167.

18 Id., at p. 178.
19 Id., at pp. 81-95.
20 Id., at p. 27.
21 Id., at pp. 180-183.
22 Id., at p. 180.
23 Id., at p. 181.

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since the pending Regional Trial Court cases were over the
same rights, claims, and interests of the parties.24
In its October 19, 2010 Order,25 the Metropolitan Trial
Court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
Preliminarily, it found that while a motion to dismiss is a
prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, Offshore Construction’s motion was grounded
on the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.26
The Metropolitan Trial Court found that Intramuros

committed forum shopping and that it had no jurisdiction over
the case.27
First, it pointed out that there were two (2) pending
cases at the time Intramuros filed its complaint: Civil Case
No. 08-119138 for specific performance filed by Offshore
Construction against Intramuros, and SP CA No. 10-
123257 for interpleader against Offshore Construction and
Intramuros filed by 4H Intramuros, Inc. (4H Intramuros),28
which claimed to be a group of respondent’s tenants.29
The Metropolitan Trial Court found that the specific
performance case was anchored on Offshore Construction’s
rights under the Compromise Agreement. In that case,
Offshore Construction claimed that it complied with its
undertakings, but Intramuros failed to perform its
obligations when it refused to offset Offshore
Construction’s expenses with the alleged unpaid rentals.
The interpleader case, on the other hand, dealt with
Offshore Construction’s threats to evict the tenants of
Puerta de Isabel II. 4H Intramuros prayed that the
Regional Trial Court determine which between Offshore
Con-
_______________
24 Id.
25 Id., at pp. 74-80.
26 Id., at p. 76.
27 Id., at pp. 78-79.
28 Id., at p. 76.
29 Id., at pp. 285-286.

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struction and Intramuros was the rightful lessor of Puerta
de Isabel II.30
The Metropolitan Trial Court found that the cause of
action in Intramuros’ complaint was similar with those in
the specific performance and interpleader cases. Any
judgment in any of those cases would affect the resolution
or outcome in the ejectment case, since they would involve

Offshore Construction’s right to have its expenses offset
from the rentals it owed Intramuros, and the
determination of the rightful lessor of Puerta de Isabel II.
The Metropolitan Trial Court pointed to the arrears in
rentals that Intramuros prayed for as part of its complaint.
Further, Intramuros failed to disclose the specific
performance and interpleader cases in its certification
against forum shopping.31
Second, the Metropolitan Trial Court held that it had no
jurisdiction over the complaint. While there were lease
contracts between the parties, the existence of the other
contracts between them made Intramuros and Offshore
Construction’s relationship as one of concession. Under this
concession agreement, Offshore Construction undertook to
develop several areas of the Intramuros District, for which
it incurred expenses. The trial court found that the issues
could not be mere possession and rentals only.32
Intramuros appealed the October 19, 2010 Order with
the Regional Trial Court. On April 14, 2011, the Regional
Trial Court affirmed the Municipal Trial Court October 19,
2010 Order in toto.33
On May 25, 2011, Intramuros, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review on Certiorari (Motion for
Extension) be-
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 76-77.

31 Id., at pp. 77-78.
32 Id., at p. 79.
33 Id., at pp. 70-73.

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fore this Court. It prayed for an additional 30 days, or until
June 16, 2011, within which to file its petition for review on
solely on questions of law.34
On June 16, 2011, Intramuros filed its Petition for

Review on Certiorari,35 assailing the April 14, 2011
Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
In its Petition for Review, Intramuros argues that the
Regional Trial Court erred in upholding the Metropolitan
Trial Court’s findings that it had no jurisdiction over
Intramuros’ ejectment complaint36 and that it committed
forum shopping.37
First, Intramuros argues that Offshore Construction’s
Very Urgent Motion should not have been entertained by
the Metropolitan Trial Court as it was a motion to dismiss,
which was prohibited under the Rule on Summary
Procedure.38 It claims that the Metropolitan Trial Court
could have determined the issue of jurisdiction based on
the allegations in its complaint. It points out that
“jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations [in] the complaint” and that the trial court’s
jurisdiction is not lost “just because the defendant makes a
contrary allegation” in its defense.39 In ejectment cases,
courts do not lose jurisdiction by a defendant’s mere
allegation that it has ownership over the litigated property.
It holds that the Metropolitan Trial Court did not lose
jurisdiction when Offshore Construction alleged that its
relationship with Intramuros is one of concession, that the
cause of action accrued in 2003, and that there was litis
pendentia and forum shopping. It contends that the sole
issue in an ejectment suit is the summary restoration of
possession of a piece of land or
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 2-7.

35 Id., at pp. 15-69.
36 Id., at pp. 32-37.
37 Id., at pp. 37-52.
38 Id., at p. 33.
39 Id., at p. 34.

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building to the party that was deprived of it.40 Thus, the

Metropolitan Trial Court gravely erred in granting
Offshore Construction’s motion to dismiss despite having
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Intramuros’
complaint.41
Second, Intramuros avers that it did not commit forum
shopping as to warrant the dismissal of its complaint. It
claims that while there were pending specific performance
and interpleader cases related to the ejectment case,
Intramuros was not guilty of forum shopping since it
instituted neither action and did not seek a favorable
ruling as a result of an earlier adverse opinion in these
cases.42 Intramuros points out that it was Offshore
Construction and 4H Intramuros which filed the specific
performance and interpleader cases, respectively.43 In both
cases, Intramuros was the defendant and did not seek
possession of Puerta de Isabel II as a relief in its answers
to the complaints.44 Moreover, the issues raised in these
earlier cases were different from the issue of possession in
the ejectment case. The issue in the specific performance
case was whether or not Intramuros should offset the
rentals in arrears from Offshore Construction’s expenses in
continuing the WOW Philippines Project.45 Meanwhile, the
issue in the interpleader case was to determine which
between Intramuros and Offshore Construction was the
rightful lessor of Puerta de Isabel II.46
Finally, Intramuros maintains that there is no
concession agreement between the parties, only lease
contracts that have already expired and are not renewed. It
argues that there is no basis for alleging the existence of a
concession agreement.
_______________
40 Id., at p. 35.
41 Id., at p. 37.
42 Id., at pp. 39-40.
43 Id., at pp. 41-42.
44 Id., at p. 45.
45 Id., at pp. 43-44.
46 Id., at p. 45.

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It points out that in the Contracts of Lease and
Memorandum of Agreement entered into by Intramuros
and Offshore Construction, the expiry of the leases would
be on August 31, 2003. Afterwards, Intramuros tolerated
Offshore Construction’s continued occupation of its
properties in hopes that it would pay its arrears in due
course.47
On July 20, 2011, this Court issued its Resolution48
granting the Motion for Extension and requiring Offshore
Construction to comment on the Petition for Review.
On October 10, 2011, Offshore Construction filed its
Comment49 to the Petition for Review. In its Comment,
Offshore Construction argues that the Petition for Review
should be dismissed because it violates the principle of
hierarchy of courts and raises questions of fact.50 It points
out that Intramuros did not move for the reconsideration of
the Regional Trial Court’s April 14, 2011 Decision. Instead
of directly filing with this Court, Intramuros should have
filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, in
accordance with Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.51 It claims
that Intramuros raises questions of fact in its Petition for
Review, namely, the expiration of the Contracts of Lease
and the business concession in favor of Offshore
Construction.52
In its November 21, 2011 Resolution, this Court noted
the Comment and required Intramuros to file its Reply.53
On March 12, 2012, Intramuros filed its Reply54 to the
Comment. It argues that direct resort to this Court is
proper because the issues it raises in its Petition for Review
do not
_______________
47 Id., at pp. 52-54.

48 Id., at p. 569.
49 Id., at pp. 577-586.
50 Id., at p. 577.
51 Id., at p. 578.
52 Id., at pp. 581-582, 584.
53 Id., at pp. 587-588.
54 Id., at pp. 599-610.

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require review of evidence to resolve, and the facts of the
case are undisputed.55 It claims that the nature of
Intramuros and Offshore Construction’s relationship is
never an issue because all the documents referenced and
relied upon by the parties were lease agreements.56
On August 23, 2012, this Court gave due course to the
Petition for Review and ordered both parties to submit
their memoranda.57
On January 7, 2013, Intramuros filed its
58
Memorandum, while Offshore Construction filed its
Memorandum59 on August 16, 2013.
In its Memorandum, Offshore Construction claims that
it occupies Puerta de Isabel II by virtue of a legal
concession based not only on the parties’ contracts but also
on the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of
Intramuros and Offshore Construction. It argues that
under the Contracts of Lease, Offshore Construction was
required to invest around P20,000,000.00 worth of
investments in the leased properties and that it lost its
initial investments, which were demolished due to adverse
criticism by then — Intramuros Administrator Anna Maria
L. Harper. Under the Compromise Agreement, Offshore
Construction was again required to make new
developments, again worth millions of pesos. Offshore
Construction claims that these conditions make their
relationship not one of mere lessor and lessee.60
Further, it attests that Intramuros committed illegal
and inhuman acts, and injustice against it and its
sublessees,
_______________
55 Id., at p. 604.
56 Id., at p. 605.
57 Id., at pp. 612-613.
58 Id., at pp. 619-662.
59 Id., at pp. 677-696.
60 Id., at pp. 685-686.

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allegedly because the Contracts of Lease had expired.61
Moreover, it points out that Intramuros only filed the
ejectment complaint in 2010, even though the Contracts of
Lease expired on August 31, 2003. It argues that
Intramuros was guilty of estoppel in pais, since it
continued to accept rental payments as late as July 10,
2009.62 Assuming that the lease contracts had expired,
these contracts were impliedly renewed by the mutual and
voluntary acts of the parties, in accordance with Article
1670 of the Civil Code.63 Offshore Construction claims that
there is now novation of the Contracts of Lease, and the
courts may fix a period for them,64 pursuant to Article 1687
of the Civil Code.65 It reiterates its prayer that the Petition
for Review be dismissed, due to ques-
_______________
61 Id., at pp. 686-688.

62 Id., at p. 688.
63 Civil Code, Art. 1670 states: Article 1670. If at the end of the
contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen
days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to
the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood
that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original
contract, but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other
terms of the original contract shall be revived.
64 Rollo, p. 691.
65 Civil Code, Art. 1687 states:
Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is
understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from
month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly;
and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though
a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts
may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the
premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may
likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession
for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer
period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.

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tions of fact more properly cognizable by the Court of
Appeals.66
The issues to be resolved by this Court are:
First, whether or not direct resort to this Court is
proper;
Second, whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court had
jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint filed by
Intramuros Administration;
Third, whether or not Intramuros Administration
committed forum shopping when it filed its ejectment
complaint despite the pending cases for specific
performance and interpleader; and
Finally, whether or not Intramuros Administration is
entitled to possess the leased premises and to collect
unpaid rentals.

I

At the outset, petitioner should have filed a petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to assail the
Regional Trial Court’s ruling upholding the Metropolitan
Trial Court’s October 19, 2010 Order instead of filing a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this
Court.
Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the
remedy from an adverse decision rendered by a Regional
Trial Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction is to file a
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.—A party

desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial
Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
may file a verified petition for review with the Court of
Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court
the corresponding docket and other lawful
_______________
66 Rollo, p. 693.

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fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and

furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party
with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and
served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision
sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion
for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full
amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit
for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period,
the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for
review. No further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
days.
Petitioner puts in issue before this Court the findings of

the Metropolitan Trial Court that it has no jurisdiction
over the ejectment complaint and that petitioner
committed forum shopping when it failed to disclose two (2)
pending cases, one filed by respondent Offshore
Construction and the other filed by respondent’s group of
tenants, 4H Intramuros. Both of these cases raise
questions of law, which are cognizable by the Court of
Appeals in a petition for review under Rule 42.
“A question of law exists when the law applicable to a
particular set of facts is not settled, whereas a question of
fact arises when the truth or falsehood of alleged facts is in
doubt.”67 This Court has ruled that the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject matter of a complaint68 and the
existence of forum shopping69 are questions of law.
_______________
67 Ronquillo, Jr. v. National Electrification Administration, G.R. No.

172593, April 20, 2016, 790 SCRA 611, 630.
68 Philippine Migrants Rights Watch, Inc. v. Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration, 748 Phil. 349, 356; 742 SCRA 383, 391-392 (2014) [Per J. Peralta,
Third Division].
69 Daswani v. Banco de Oro Universal Bank, 765 Phil. 88, 97; 764 SCRA
160, 168 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

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A petition for review under Rule 42 may include
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law.70 This Court has recognized that the power to hear
cases on appeal in which only questions of law are raised is
not vested exclusively in this Court.71 As provided in Rule
42, Section 2, errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly
committed by the Regional Trial Court in its decision must
be specified in the petition for review:
Section 2. Form and Contents.—The petition shall be

filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties
to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges
thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the
specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c)
set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the
issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or
both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and
the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of
the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate
originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of
both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of
the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain
copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support the allegations of
the petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the
petition a certification under oath that he has not
theretofore commenced any other action involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency;
if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the
status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn
_______________
70 Republic v. Malabanan, 646 Phil. 631, 637; 632 SCRA 338, 344-
345 (2010) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division].
71 Tan v. People, 430 Phil. 685, 693; 381 SCRA 74, 83
(2002) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

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that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is

pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency,
he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and
other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s direct resort to this Court, instead of to the

Court of Appeals for intermediate review as sanctioned by
the rules, violates the principle of hierarchy of courts.72 In
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections:73
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of

courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of
the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective
and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the
facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before
them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of
law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute,
or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they
are territorially organized into regions and then into
branches. Their writs generally reach within those
territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the
all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence
as these are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial
jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that
makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such
action. The consequences, of course, would be national in
scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to
courts at their level would not be practical considering their

decisions could still be ap-
72 Barcenas v. Tomas, 494 Phil. 565; 454 SCRA 593
(2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
73 751 Phil. 301; 747 SCRA 1 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

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pealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of

Appeals.74 (Citation omitted)
Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not

inviolable, and this Court has provided several exceptions
to the doctrine.75 One of these exceptions is the exigency of
the situation being litigated.76 Here, the controversy
between the parties has been dragging on since 2010,
which should not be the case when the initial dispute — an
ejectment case — is, by nature and design, a summary
procedure and should have been resolved with expediency.
Moreover, this Court’s rules of procedure permit the
direct resort to this Court from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court upon questions of law, such as those which
petitioner raises in this case. In Barcenas v. Spouses Tomas
and Caliboso:77
Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken

for a review of the decisions, final orders or resolutions of
the RTC, but only on questions of law. Under Section 5 of
Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the
power to:
(2) Review, revise, reverse,modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
. . . .
(e) All cases in which only an error or question
of law is involved.
_______________
74 Id., at pp. 329-330; pp. 43-44.

75 Id.
76 Id., at p. 331; p. 48; See also Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, 717 Phil. 776;
705 SCRA 613 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
77 Supra note 72.

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This kind of direct appeal to this Court of RTC

judgments, final orders or resolutions is provided for in
Section 2(c) of Rule 41, which reads:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.—
. . . .
(c) Appeal by certiorari.—In all cases where only
questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal
shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

Procedurally then, petitioners could have appealed the
RTC’s Decision affirming the MTC (1) to this Court on
questions of law only; or (2) if there are factual questions
involved, to the CA — as they in fact did.78
Thus, petitioner’s resort to this Court is proper and

warranted under the circumstances.

II

In dismissing the complaint, the Metropolitan Trial
Court found that “[t]he issues. . . between the parties
cannot be limited to a simple determination of who has the
better right of possession of the subject premises or
whether or not [petitioner] is entitled [to] rentals in
arrears.”79 It held that the relationship between the parties
was a “more complicated situation where jurisdiction is
better lodged with the regional trial court,”80 upon a
finding that there was a concession, rather than a lease
relationship between the parties.81
_______________
78 Id., at p. 577; p. 607.

79 Rollo, p. 79.
80 Id.
81 Id.

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It is settled that the only issue that must be settled in
an ejectment proceeding is physical possession of the
property involved.82 Specifically, action for unlawful
detainer is brought against a possessor who unlawfully
withholds possession after the termination and expiration
of the right to hold possession.83
To determine the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in the complaint
must be examined. The jurisdictional facts must be evident
on the face of the complaint.84 There is a case for unlawful
detainer if the complaint states the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of
the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant
to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.85 (Citation omitted)

A review of petitioner’s Complaint for Ejectment shows
that all of these allegations were made.
_______________
82 See Barrientos v. Rapal, 669 Phil. 438; 654 SCRA 165
(2011) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
83 See Cruz v. Christensen, G.R. No. 205539, October 4, 2017, 842
SCRA 65 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
84 Valdez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 39, 48; 489 SCRA 369, 379
(2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
85 Cabrera v. Getaruela, 604 Phil. 59, 66; 586 SCRA 129, 136-137
(2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].

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First, petitioner alleges that respondent is its lessee by
virtue of three (3) Contracts of Lease. The validity of these
contracts was later affirmed in a Compromise Agreement,
which modified certain provisions of the previous leases but
retained the original lease period. Respondent does not
dispute these contracts’ existence or their validity.
Second, following respondent’s failure to pay rentals,
petitioner alleges that it has demanded that respondent
vacate the leased premises.
Third, respondent continues to occupy and possess the
leased premises despite petitioner’s demand. This is
admitted by respondent, which seeks to retain possession
and use of the properties to “recoup its multimillion pesos
worth of investment.”86
Fourth, petitioner filed its Complaint for Ejectment on
April 28, 2010,87 within one (1) year of its last written
demand to respondent, made on March 18, 2010 and
received by respondent on March 26, 2010.88 Contrary to
respondent’s claim, the one (1)-year period to file the
complaint must be reckoned from the date of last demand,
in instances when there has been more than one (1)
demand to vacate.89
The Metropolitan Trial Court seriously erred in finding
that it did not have jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint
because the parties’ situation has allegedly become “more
complicated”90 than one of lease. Respondent’s defense that
its relationship with petitioner is one of concession rather
than lease does not determine whether or not the
Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over petitioner’s
complaint. The
_______________
86 Rollo, p. 686.
87 Id., at p. 81.
88 Id., at p. 178.
89 Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107, 1117; 268 SCRA 640,
652 (1997) [Per CJ. Narvasa, Third Division].

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pleas or theories set up by a defendant in its answer or
motion to dismiss do not affect the court’s jurisdiction.91 In
Morta v. Occidental:92
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an

action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. “Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon a claim
asserted therein — a matter resolved only after and as a
result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court
be made to depend upon the defenses made by the
defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were
the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely upon the defendant.”93 (Citations omitted)
Not even the claim that there is an implied new lease

or tacita reconduccion will remove the Metropolitan Trial
Court’s jurisdiction over the complaint.94 To emphasize,
physical possession, or de facto possession, is the sole issue
to be resolved in ejectment proceedings. Regardless of the
claims or defenses raised by a defendant, a Metropolitan
Trial Court has jurisdiction over an ejectment complaint
once it has been shown that the requisite jurisdictional
facts have been alleged, such as in this case. Courts are
reminded not to abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the
issue of physical possession, as there is a public need to
prevent a breach of the peace
_______________
91Mendoza v. Germino, 650 Phil. 74, 84; 635 SCRA 537, 547- 548
(2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].
92 367 Phil. 438; 308 SCRA 167 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First
Division].
93 Id., at p. 445; p. 172.
94 Yuki, Jr. v. Co, 621 Phil. 194, 205; 606 SCRA 211, 224-
225 (2009) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

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by requiring parties to resort to legal means to recover
possession of real property.95

III

In its October 19, 2010 Order, the Metropolitan Trial
Court found that petitioner committed forum shopping
when it failed to disclose that there were two (2) pending
cases in other trial courts concerning the same parties and
similar causes of action. These two (2) cases were Civil
Case No. 08-119138 for specific performance filed by
respondent against petitioner; and SP CA Case No. 10-
123257 for interpleader filed by 4H Intramuros. Both cases
were pending with the Manila Regional Trial Court. The
Metropolitan Trial Court found that if it decides
petitioner’s Complaint for Ejectment, its ruling would
conflict with any resolution in the specific performance and
interpleader cases, since the same contracts were involved
in all three (3) cases. It found that the parties were the
same and the reliefs prayed for were the same.
Forum shopping is the practice of resorting to multiple
fora for the same relief, to increase the chances of obtaining
a favorable judgment.96 In Spouses Reyes v. Spouses
Chung:97
It has been jurisprudentially established that forum

shopping exists when a party avails himself of several
judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues

ei-
_______________
95 Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, 474 Phil. 557, 578; 430 SCRA 492, 512-
513 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
96 Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co., Inc., 611 Phil. 74, 84; 593 SCRA 440,
450 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
97 G.R. No. 228112, September 13, 2017, 839 SCRA 615
[Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].

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ther pending in or already resolved adversely by some other

courts.
The test to determine whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another. Simply put,
when litis pendentia or res judicata does not exist, neither
can forum shopping exist.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interests
in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other. On the other hand, the elements of res
judicata, also known as bar by prior judgment, are: (a) the
former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered
it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must
be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.98 (Citation omitted)
As observed by the Metropolitan Trial Court, there is an

identity of parties in the specific performance and
interpleader cases, and the Complaint for Ejectment.
However, there is no identity of asserted rights or reliefs
prayed for, and a judgment in any of the three (3) cases will
not amount to res judicata in the two others.
In respondent’s amended complaint for specific
performance, it prays that petitioner be compelled to offset
respondent’s unpaid rentals, with the expenses that
respondent supposedly incurred due to the Department of
Tourism’s WOW Philippines project,99 pursuant to a July
27, 2004
_______________
98 Id., at pp. 623-624.

99 Rollo, p. 225.

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Memorandum of Agreement. Concededly, one of
respondent’s reliefs prayed for is for petitioner to respect
respondent’s lease over Puerta de Isabel II, Asean Garden
and Revellin de Recoletos:
2. Order [Department of Tourism], [Intramuros

Administration] and [Anna Maria L. Harper] to perform their
obligation under the “Memorandum of Agreement” dated 27
July 2004 by OFFSETTING the rentals in arrears from the
expenses incurred by Offshore in the continuance of the
Department of Tourism’s WOW Philippines Project and to
allow Offshore to recover their investment at Intramuros by
respecting their lease over Puerta Isabel II, Asean Garden and
Revellin de Recoletos[.]100
Nevertheless, the Memorandum of Agreement expressly

stated that its purpose was for respondent to pay petitioner
and the Department of Tourism rentals in arrears as of
July 31, 2004:
WHEREAS, [respondent] has been indebted to

[petitioner] in the form of rental and utility consumption
arrears for the occupancy of Puerta Isabel Chambers, Asean
Gardens and Baluarte de San Andres (Stable House) in the
amount of Six Million Seven Hundred Sixty[-]Two
Thousand One Hundred Fifty[-]Three and 70/100

(P6,762,153.70) as of July 31, 2004 and as a way of settling
said arrears, [respondent] had proposed to pay its
obligations with [petitioner] as shown in the breakdown in
“Annex A” hereof through [respondent’s] assumption of
[Department of Tourism’s] monthly operational expenses for
lights and sound equipment, electricity, and performers at
the Baluarte Plano Luneta de Sta. Isabel in Intramuros,
Manila[.]101
_______________
100 Id., at p. 227.
101 Id., at p. 161.

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This was affirmed in petitioner’s May 29, 2005 letter to
respondent, in which petitioner stated:
During our meeting last May 5, 2005 with Mr. Rico

Cordova, it was reiterated that the subject of the
[Memorandum of Agreement] for the lights and sound at
Plano Luneta de Sta. Isabel was your accumulated account
as of July 2004. Subsequent rentals have to be remitted to
[Intramuros] as they become due and demandable. We have
emphasized this concern in our letter of November 12,
2004.102
A final judgment in the specific performance case will

not affect the outcome of the ejectment case. As pointed out
by petitioner, respondent’s right to possess the leased
premises is founded initially on the Contracts of Lease and,
upon their expiration, on petitioner’s tolerance in hopes of
payment of outstanding arrears. The July 27, 2004
Memorandum of Agreement subject of the specific
performance case cannot be the source of respondent’s
continuing right of possession, as it expressly stated there
that the offsetting was only for respondent’s outstanding
arrears as of July 31, 2004. Any favorable judgment
compelling petitioner to comply with its obligation under
this agreement will not give new life to the expired

Contracts of Lease, such as would repel petitioner’s
unlawful detainer complaint.
In its Amended Answer in the specific performance case,
petitioner sets up the counterclaim that “[respondent] be
ordered to pay its arrears of (P13,448,867.45) as of
December 31, 2009 plus such rent and surcharges as may
be incurred until [respondent] has completely vacated the
[leased] premises.”103 This counterclaim is exactly the same
as one of petitioner’s prayers in its ejectment complaint:
_______________
102 Id., at p. 168.
103 Id., at p. 532.

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most

respectfully prayed that JUDGMENT be rendered
ORDERING:
. . . .
(2) DEFENDANT [OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION] TO
PAY ITS ARREARS OF THIRTEEN MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND, EIGHT
HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN PESOS AND FORTY-FIVE
CENTAVOS (P13,448,867.45), PLUS INTEREST OF 1%
PER MONTH AS STIPULATED IN THE LEASE
CONTRACTS[.]104
A compulsory counterclaim is a defendant’s claim for

money or other relief which arises out of, or is necessarily
connected with, the subject matter of the complaint. In
Spouses Ponciano v. Hon. Parentela, Jr.:105
A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or

other relief which a defending party may have against an
opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is
necessarily connected with, the same transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff’s
complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that if it is within

the jurisdiction of the court, and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be set up therein,
and will be barred in the future if not set up.106 (Citation
omitted)
In its complaint for specific performance, respondent

claimed that petitioner should offset its outstanding rentals
and that it was petitioner which had an outstanding debt
to respondent:
_______________
104 Id., at pp. 342-343.

105 387 Phil. 621; 331 SCRA 605 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes,
Third Division].
106 Id., at p. 627; pp. 610-611.

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16. In compliance with the Memorandum of Agreement,

Offshore incurred expenses amounting to Seven Million
Eight Hundred Twenty[-]Five Thousand Pesos
(P7,825,000.00) by way of Expenses for Rentals of Lights &
Sound System, Electrical Bill and Performers Fees. This
amount is excluding the expenses incurred during the
period Offshore supplied the Light & Sound System, as well
as Performers, aforementioned started in October 2004. A
copy of the Statement of Account is hereto appended as
ANNEX “H” to “H-4”;
17. Based on Offshore’s records, upon recomputation of
Actual Area used during all these period[s] from July 2001
to March 30, 2008, copy of Statement of Accounts has been
sent to Intramuros Administration for reconciliation,
Offshore’s total obligation by way of back and current
rentals up to March 30, 2008 is only in the amount of Six
Million Four Hundred Three Thousand Three Hundred
Sixty[-]Four Pesos (P6,403,364.00);
18. Obviously, when both accounts are offset, it will

clearly show that [Intramuros] still owes Offshore the
amount of One Million Four Hundred Twenty[-]One
Thousand Six Hundred Thirty[-]Six Pesos (P1,421,636.00)
as of March 2008;
19. Unfortunately, despite this glaring fact that
[Intramuros] owes Offshore, Defendant [Anna Maria L.]
Harper (who has already showed sour and adverse
treatment of Offshore in the past), being the new
Administrator of Intramuros Administration, sent a Letter
dated 09 April 2008 demanding from Offshore to pay
[Intramuros] alleged rentals in arrears in the amount of
P12,478[,]461.74, within seven (7) days from receipt. A copy
of the Letter is hereto attached and marked as Annex “I” to
“I-1”;
20. It can be deduced from the attachment to the
aforementioned letter that [Intramuros] did not honor the
obligations imposed in the Memorandum of Agreement
because the monthly expenses incurred by Offshore for the
payment of the Lights and Sound System, Elec-

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tricity and Performers Fees for the continuance of the

Department of Tourism WOW Project at Baluarte Plano,
Luneta de Sta. Isabel which were duly furnished
[Intramuros] in the amount of Seven Million Eight Hundred
Twenty[-]Five Thousand Pesos (P7,825,000.00) as expressly
agreed by [Department of Tourism], [Intramuros] and
Offshore in the Memorandum of Agreement were NOT
deducted from the rentals due[.]107
Petitioner’s counterclaim in its Amended Answer was

set up to defend itself against such a claim:
26. [Offshore Construction] has not established its

right, or the reality is, [Offshore Construction] has been
delinquent in the payment of its financial obligations which
are specifically provided in its contract with defendant
[Intramuros], such as rental fees.
27. [Offshore Construction] has to pay rent for being

still in possession of Puerta Isabel II and Asean Garden.
Moreover, plaintiff has enjoyed the fruits of subleasing
these premises for years and yet it has continuously failed
to remit all rental fees and surcharges despite repeated
demands from defendants. It bears stressing that as of
December 31, 2009, [Offshore Construction’s] arrears has
already ballooned to thirteen million four hundred and
forty[-]eight thousand eight hundred and sixty[-]seven pesos
and forty[-]five centavos (P13,448,867.45).
28. Glaringly, [Offshore Construction] has been remiss
in performing its obligations stated in the Lease Contracts
(Annexes A to A-15; B to B-14 and C to C-14 of the
Complaint), Compromise Agreement (Annexes E to E-17 of
the Complaint) and Memorandum of Agreement (Annexes F
to F-16 of the Complaint). [Intramuros and Anna Maria L.
Harper] are therefore constrained to demand payment from
[Offshore Construction] for the latter’s failure or refusal to
honor its just and valid obligations. Necessarily,
[Intramuros and Anna Maria L. Har-
_______________
107 Rollo, pp. 224-225.

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per] will not hesitate to seek legal remedies if
[Offshore Construction] continues to be delinquent.
29. Essentially, [Offshore Construction] is protesting

the computation of its arrears (P12,478,461.74) in the
demand letter sent by Administrator [Anna Maria L.]
Harper on April 9, 2008. [Offshore Construction] also
asserts that it only owes defendant [Intramuros] six million
four hundred three thousand and three hundred sixty[-]four
pesos (P6,403,364.00).
30. [Offshore Construction] is misguided. The
[Memorandum of Agreement] dated July 27, 2004 was
executed because [Offshore Construction], at that time, had
been indebted to defendant [Intramuros] in the form of

rental and utility consumption arrears for the occupancy of
Puerta Isabel Chambers, Asean Gardens and Baluarte de
San Andres in the amount of six million seven hundred
sixty[-]two thousand one hundred fifty[-]three and seventy
centavos (P6,762,153.70). . . .
. . . .
32. Even after July 27, 2004, and up to this time,
[Offshore Construction] remained in possession of, used
and/or subleased the subject premises. As such, [Offshore
Construction] still has to pay rental fees, aside from the
aforesaid arrears. The rental fees continued to pile up and
triggered the imposition of surcharges as [Offshore
Construction] again failed to remit payments thereon. This
explains the demandable amount of P13,448,867.45 (Annex
I to II of Complaint). [Offshore Construction] is therefore
mistaken in believing that it only owes defendant
[Intramuros] the arrears subject of the [Memorandum of
Agreement] of July 27, 2004 and nothing more.108
Clearly, petitioner’s counterclaim is compulsory, arising

as it did out of, and being necessarily connected with, the
parties’ respective obligations under the July 27, 2004
Memoran-
_______________
108 Id., at pp. 519-522.

582

Development Company

dum of Agreement. Petitioner cannot be faulted for raising
the issue of unpaid rentals in the specific performance case
or for raising the same issue in the present ejectment case,
since it appears that respondent’s alleged failure to pay the
rent led to the nonrenewal of the Contracts of Lease.
However, it must be emphasized that any recovery made by
petitioner of unpaid rentals in either its ejectment case or
in the specific performance case must bar recovery in the
other, pursuant to the principle of unjust enrichment.109
A judgment in the Complaint for Interpleader will

likewise not be res judicata against the ejectment
complaint. The plaintiff in the interpleader case, 4H
Intramuros, allegedly representing the tenants occupying
Puerta de Isabel II, does not expressly disclose in its
Complaint110 for Interpleader the source of its right to
occupy those premises. However, it can be determined from
petitioner’s Answer111 and from respondent’s
112
Memorandum that the members of 4H Intramuros are
respondent’s sublessees.
_______________
109 See Civil Code, Art. 22 which states:

Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
110 Rollo, pp. 285-291.
111 Id., at pp. 304-318, 305, which states in part:
During the consultation meetings, plaintiff’s alleged members
acknowledged and realized that as sublessees of [Offshore Construction],
they cannot have any superior right over their sublessor. (Emphasis supplied)
112 Id., at pp. 677-696, 683, which states in part: This case involves the
same parties as Defendants ([Intramuros] and [Offshore Construction], the
Plaintiff 4H being the Sub- Lessees of [Offshore Construction]).
(Emphasis supplied)

583
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Development Company

A sublessee cannot invoke a superior right over that of
the sublessor.113 A judgment of eviction against respondent
will affect its sublessees since the latter’s right of
possession depends entirely on that of the former.114 A
complaint for interpleader by sublessees cannot bar the
recovery by the rightful possessor of physical possession of
the leased premises.
Since neither the specific performance case nor the
interpleader case constituted forum shopping by petitioner,
the Metropolitan Trial Court erred in dismissing its
Complaint for Ejectment.

IV

Ordinarily, this case would now be remanded to the
Metropolitan Trial Court for the determination of the
rightful possessor of the leased premises. However, this
would cause needless delay inconsistent with the summary
nature of ejectment proceedings.115 Given that there
appears sufficient evidence on record to make this
determination, judicial economy dictates that this Court
now resolve the issue of possession.116
It is undisputed that respondent’s occupation and use of
Baluarte de San Andres, Baluarte de San Francisco de
Dilao, and Revellin de Recoletos started on September 1,
1998 by
_______________
113 Heirs of Eugenio Sevilla, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 283 Phil. 490,
499; 206 SCRA 559, 566 (1992) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division].
114 Guevara Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 243 Phil. 620, 624-625;
160 SCRA 478, 482 (1988) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division].
115 Morales v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 262, 272; 285 SCRA 337,
349-350 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
116 See Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc., 738 Phil. 37; 728 SCRA 482 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third
Division].

584

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virtue of Contracts of Lease all dated August 20, 1998.117
The Contracts of Lease were modified through Addendums
to the Contracts likewise dated August 20, 1998.118
Then, to amicably settle Civil Case No. 98-91587
entitled Offshore Construction and Development Company
v. Hon. Gemma Cruz-Araneta and Hon. Dominador Ferrer,
Jr., then pending before Branch 47, Regional Trial Court,
Manila,119 the parties and the Department of Tourism
entered into a July 26, 1999 Compromise Agreement. In
the Compromise Agreement, the parties affirmed the
validity of the lease contracts, but agreed to transfer the

areas to be occupied and used by respondent in Baluarte de
San Andres and Baluarte de San Francisco de Dilao due to
improvements that it had introduced to the leased
premises.120 The lease over Revellin de Recoletos was
terminated.121 It appears that under this Compromise
Agreement, the original five (5)-year period of the
Contracts of Lease were retained,122 such that the leases
would expire on August 31, 2003, and renewable for
another five (5) years upon the parties’ mutual
agreement.123
Thereafter, the Contracts of Lease expired. Respondent
does not concede this, but there is no proof that there has
been any contract mutually agreed upon by the parties for
any extensions of the leases. Respondent can only argue
that petitioner’s continuing tolerance of respondent’s
possession and acceptance of respondent’s rental payments
impliedly renewed the Contracts of Lease.124
_______________
117 Rollo, pp. 96-126.

118 Id., at pp. 127-138.
119 Id., at p. 139.
120 Id., at pp. 139, 141.
121 Id., at p. 142.
122 Id.
123 Id., at pp. 128, 132, 136.
124 Id., at pp. 688-689.

585
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Development Company

But petitioner’s tolerance of respondent’s occupation and
use of the leased premises after the end of the lease
contracts does not give the latter a permanent and
indefeasible right of possession in its favor. When a
demand to vacate has been made, as what petitioner had
done, respondent’s possession became illegal and it should
have left the leased premises. In Cañiza v. Court of
Appeals:125
The Estradas’ first proffered defense derives from a literal

construction of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter
alia authorizes the institution of an unlawful detainer suit when
“the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.” They contend that since
they did not acquire possession of the property in question “by
virtue of any contract, express or implied” — they having been, to
repeat, “allowed to live temporarily. . . (therein) for free, out of. . .
(Cañiza’s) kindness” — in no sense could there be an “expiration or
termination of. . . (their) right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied.” Nor would an action for forcible
entry lie against them, since there is no claim that they had
“deprived (Cañiza) of the possession of. . . (her property) by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.”
The argument is arrant sophistry. Cañiza’s act of
allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not
create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in
the latter’s favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary
sense of fairness clearly require that act of liberality be
implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the
necessary burden on the Estradas of returning the house to
Cañiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court
adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at
the latter’s tolerance or permission without any contract
between them is necessarily bound
_______________
125 Supra note 89.

586

Development Company
by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,

failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. The situation is not much different
from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues
in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is
deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. In other

words, one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a
deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the
moment he is required to leave. Thus, in Asset Privatization
Trust v. Court of Appeals, where a company, having
lawfully obtained possession of a plant upon its undertaking
to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill
its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held
that “(a)fter demand and its repudiation, . . . (its) continuing
possession. . . became illegal and the complaint for unlawful
detainer filed by the. . . (plant’s owner) was its proper
remedy.”126 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The existence of an alleged concession agreement

between petitioner and respondent is unsupported by the
evidence on record. The Metropolitan Trial Court found
that a concession agreement existed due to the agreements
entered into by the parties:
This Court agrees with the defendant. The various

contracts of lease between the parties notwithstanding, the
existence of the other agreements involved herein cannot
escape the scrutiny of this Court. Although couched in such
words as “contracts of lease,” the relationship between the
parties has evolved into another kind — that of a concession
agreement whereby defendant [Offshore Construction]
undertook to develop several areas of the Intramuros
District, defendant [Offshore Construction] actually
commenced the development of the subject premises and
incurred expenses for
126 Id., at pp. 1115-1117; pp. 650-651.

587
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Development Company
the said development, effectively making the relationship

more than an ordinary lessor-lessee but one governed by
concession whereby both parties undertook other
obligations in addition to their basic obligations under the
contracts of lease. Consensus facit legem (The parties make
their own law by their agreement). It behooves this Court to

respect the parties’ contracts, including the memoranda of
agreement that ensued after it.127
Respondent claims that the parties’ agreement was for

it to operate the leased premises to recover its investments
and to make profits. However, a review of the Contracts of
Lease show that they are lease contracts, as defined in
Article 1643 of the Civil Code:
Article 1643. In the lease of things, one of the parties

binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a
thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be
definite or indefinite. However, no lease for more than
ninety-nine years shall be valid.
The restrictions and limitations on respondent’s use of

the leased premises are consistent with petitioner’s right as
lessor to stipulate the use of the properties being leased.128
Neither the Contracts of Lease nor their respective
Addendums to the Contract contain any stipulation that
respondent may occupy and use the leased premises until it
recovers the expenses it incurred for improvements it
introduced there. Instead, the
_______________
127 Rollo, p. 79.
128 Civil Code, Art. 1657(2) states:
Article 1657. The lessee is obliged:
. . . .
(2) To use the thing leased as a diligent father of a family,
devoting it to the use stipulated; and in the absence of stipulation, to
that which may be inferred from the nature of the thing leased, according
to the custom of the place[.]

588

Development Company

lease period was fixed at five (5) years, renewable for
another five (5) years upon mutual agreement:
3. CONTRACT TERM. (Leased Period) This

lease shall be for a period of FIVE YEARS (5
YRS) commencing from September 1,
1998 to August 31, 2003, renewable for another
period of FIVE YEARS (5 YRS) under such terms
and condition that may be mutually
agreed upon in writing by the parties[.]129
The subsequent contracts, namely, the July 26, 1999

Compromise Agreement and the July 27, 2004
Memorandum of Agreement, also do not point to any
creation of a “concession” in favor of respondent. The
Compromise Agreement affirms the validity of the lease
contracts, while the Memorandum of Agreement was for
the payment of respondent’s arrears until July 2004.
However, this Court cannot award unpaid rentals to
petitioner pursuant to the ejectment proceeding, since the
issue of rentals in Civil Case No. 08-119138 is currently
pending with Branch 37, Regional Trial Court, Manila, by
virtue of petitioner’s counterclaim. As the parties dispute
the amounts to be offset under the July 27, 2004
Memorandum of Agreement and respondent’s actual back
and current rentals due,130 the resolution of that case is
better left to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the
merits.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
GRANTED. The April 14, 2011 Decision of Branch 173,
Regional Trial Court, Manila in Civil Case No. 10-124740 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new decision is
hereby rendered ordering respondent Offshore
Construction and Development Company and any and all
its sublessees and
_______________
129 Rollo, pp. 128, 132, 136.

130 Id., at pp. 224, 252.

589
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Development Company
successors-in-interest to vacate the leased premises

immediately.
Branch 37, Regional Trial Court, Manila is DIRECTED
to resolve Civil Case No. 08-119138 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Martires and

Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.

Respondent Offshore Construction and Development
Company and any and all sublessees and successors-in-
interest ordered to vacate the leased premises immediately.
Notes.—As a general rule, the Board of Directors or

Board of Trustees of a corporation must authorize the
person who signs the verification and certification against
non-forum shopping of its petition. (University of the East
vs. Pepanio, 689 SCRA 250 [2013])
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him. (Catedrilla vs.
Lauron, 696 SCRA 341 [2013])

——o0o——
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5/1/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 857

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

when the truth or falsehood of alleged facts is in doubt.” This

inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically

VOL. 857, MARCH 7, 2018 551

Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Metropolitan Trial Courts;

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

reminded not to abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the

least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b)

VOL. 857, MARCH 7, 2018 553

Spouses Ponciano v. Hon. Parentela, Jr., 331 SCRA 605

sublessees cannot bar the recovery by the rightful possessor of

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Obligar Law Firm for respondent.

Complaint for Ejectment against Offshore Construction

VOL. 857, MARCH 7, 2018 555

Eventually, the parties executed a Compromise

7 Id., at pp. 128, 132, 136.

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1,180.5 sq. m.;

VOL. 857, MARCH 7, 2018 557

December 31, 2009. On March 26, 2010, Offshore

17 Id., at pp. 161-167.

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Metropolitan Trial Court found that Intramuros

VOL. 857, MARCH 7, 2018 559

or outcome in the ejectment case, since they would involve

30 Id., at pp. 76-77.

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On June 16, 2011, Intramuros filed its Petition for

34 Id., at pp. 2-7.

VOL. 857, MARCH 7, 2018 561

building to the party that was deprived of it.40 Thus, the

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction

47 Id., at pp. 52-54.

VOL. 857, MARCH 7, 2018 563

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

61 Id., at pp. 686-688.

VOL. 857, MARCH 7, 2018 565

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.—A party

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and

Petitioner puts in issue before this Court the findings of

67 Ronquillo, Jr. v. National Electrification Administration, G.R. No.

VOL. 857, MARCH 7, 2018 567

Section 2. Form and Contents.—The petition shall be

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is

Petitioner’s direct resort to this Court, instead of to the

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of

courts at their level would not be practical considering their

VOL. 857, MARCH 7, 2018 569

pealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of

Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not

Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken