GLOBAL INDEX OF

GLOBAL INDEX OF
ECONOMIC OPENNESS
ECONOMIC OPENNESS

Pathway to Prosperity
Ethiopia Case Study

2021
CREATING THE PATHWAYS FROM POVERTY TO PROSPERITY

ABOUT THE LEGATUM INSTITUTE

The Legatum Institute is a London-based think-tank with a bold vision to create a global movement of people committed to creating the
pathways from poverty to prosperity and the transformation of society.
We seek to do this by raising up leaders of character, restoring an ethical vitality to all sectors of society, and developing the practical
solutions and data tools that will help build inclusive and peaceful societies with open economies and empowered people.
• Our Centre for Metrics creates indexes and datasets to measure and explain how poverty and prosperity are changing.
• Our Research Programmes analyse the many complex drivers of poverty and prosperity at the local, national and global level.

• Our Practical Programmes identify the actions required to enable transformational change.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. Stephen Brien is Director of Policy at the Legatum Institute.
Preksha Dugar is a Research Analyst at the Legatum Institute.
Shaun Flanagan is Director of Impact and Partnerships at the Legatum Institute.
Carlos Montes is a Fellow at the Legatum Institute.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Abel Abate (Chatham House), Samuel Admasie (African Studies Centre, Leiden University) Tekie Alemu (Ethiopian Development Research
Institute), Mesele Araya (Young Lives in Ethiopia), Paul Brenton (The World Bank Group), Nic Cheeseman (International Development
Department, University of Birmingham), Steven Farji Weiss (The World Bank Group), Tadele Ferede (EfD center in Ethiopia, School of Economics
of Addis Ababa University), Jan Fransen (Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS), Erasmus University Rotterdam), Susan
Kayonde (The World Bank Group), Terrence Lyons (School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University), Daniel Mains
(University of Oklahoma), Gifawosen Markos (University of Kassel), Carlos Oya (School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)), Mesfin Tafesse
(Mesfin Tafesse and Associates Law Office), Aaron Tesfaye (William Paterson University), Yohannes Woldemariam (University of Colorado)

This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from Templeton World Charity Foundation, Inc. The
opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Templeton
World Charity Foundation, Inc.

The Legatum Institute would like to thank the Legatum Foundation for their sponsorship. Learn more about the Legatum Foundation at www.lega-
tum.org..

©2021 The Legatum Institute Foundation. All rights reserved. The word ‘Legatum’ and the Legatum charioteer logo are the subjects of trade mark registrations
of Legatum Limited. Whilst every care has been taken in the preparation of this report, no responsibility can be taken for any error or omission contained herein.

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and incorporated in England and Wales (company number 7430903)

Cover image: Shutterstock.comm

CONTENTS

Foreword.................................................................................................................................... 2

Executive Summary................................................................................................................. 3

Introduction..............................................................................................................................11

Infrastructure and Market Access....................................................................................... 19

Investment Environment......................................................................................................43

Enterprise Conditions............................................................................................................65

Governance.............................................................................................................................83

Conclusions........................................................................................................................... 107

Appendix................................................................................................................................108

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 FOREWORD

Our mission at the Legatum Institute is to create the pathways to prosperity by fostering open
economies, inclusive societies, and empowered people. Our work is focussed on understanding
how prosperity is created and sustained. Prosperity is more than material wealth; it encompasses
security, wellbeing, freedom, and opportunity. Without an open, competitive economy, it is
challenging to create lasting social and economic wellbeing where individuals, communities, and
businesses are empowered to reach their full potential.

While policymakers generally focus on fiscal and macroeconomic policy tools, the microeconomic
and institutional factors are often overlooked, and their potential to drive growth is
Stephen Brien underestimated. With the generous support of the Templeton World Charitable Foundation,
Director of Policy, we have measured over 150 countries’ openness to commerce, assessing the environment that
Legatum Institute enables or hinders their ability to trade both domestically and internationally and the quality of
the governance system underpinning it.

As part of this programme, we are undertaking in-depth studies of the Economic Openness of
different countries, including this report on Ethiopia in which we analyse key characteristics of
governance, openness to trade, investment, ideas, competition, and talent.

Research suggests that economically open countries are more productive. In contrast, in an
uncompetitive market, or one that is not designed to enhance the engagement and wellbeing of
all, growth stagnates, protected industries become entrenched, and crony capitalism thrives.

The pathway to prosperity progresses over decades, and the goal of this report on Ethiopia is
to provide a structural baseline for long-term development planning. Hence, it focusses on the
consequences of key governance and economic and business policies prevalent over the 27 years
of EPRDF and TPLF rule. The report is not yet in a position to assess the impact of more recent
policies introduced by the new administration of Prime Minister Abiy.

The ongoing challenges of the pandemic, the conflict in Tigray and in other areas of the country
and the severe locust infestation, may result in a greater call for state intervention. Nonetheless,
this report suggests that prosperity can be fostered by supporting the productivity of small
farmers and the independent (informal) sector.

The elections of June 2021, which resulted in a majority for the Prosperity Party, and the policies
of the new government will determine the path to prosperity in Ethiopia. We are hopeful that the
new Ethiopian government is able to find a national consensus that will lay the foundation for
prosperity.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ethiopia has the potential to become a prosperous country. However, as has been recognised by
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, this is likely to require changes in the way Ethiopian governments
have operated. This includes reforming how they traditionally gained and exercised power,
i.e., away from ‘winner-takes-all’ political contests and ruling in an authoritarian manner, with
limited checks and balances. It will require the adoption of more open and competitive markets,
away from a heavily state-led and controlled economy, to address the macroeconomic, foreign
exchange and investment constraints in the economy.

To date, large public investments in infrastructure have changed the face of the country and
contributed to GDP. However, they have not been accompanied by a sustained increase in
private investment (particularly local), partly because of the state-led and controlled economy.
In contrast, the nation’s future prosperity can be built upon a more open economy that harnesses
all the ideas and talents in society to create sustainable pathways out of poverty. Specifically, this
will involve a state that acts as an effective enabler of economic growth and ultimate guarantor
of the rights of citizens and investors and provider of effective public services, and a dynamic and
investment-friendly country open for international business.

With a more open economy and a stable political settlement, over the coming decades,
sustainable economic growth can take Ethiopia on a path to a solid upper middle-income status.

This report on Ethiopia is part of a series of case studies examining the links between a nation’s
economic openness and prosperity. Its goal is to provide an initial assessment of economic
and governance structures in Ethiopia. The report identifies the constraints to future economic
development and the type of actions needed to put Ethiopia on the road to prosperity, with the
ambition of achieving global median prosperity by 2050.

The topics discussed in this report on economic openness describe the extent to which elements
of Infrastructure and Market Access, Investment Environment, Enterprise Conditions and
Governance contribute to prosperity.

• Infrastructure and Market Access: Assessing the extent to which high-quality infrastructure
and open markets support trade and commerce.

• Investment Environment: Evaluating the ways property rights are protected and domestic
and foreign sources of finance are widely available, so investment can flow.

• Enterprise Conditions: Considering the ways business regulation ensures markets are
contestable and free from burdensome regulation, to enable entrepreneurship and
innovation.

• Governance: Analysing the extent to which governing institutions act with integrity, are
accountable to citizens, are subject to the rule of law, and operate effectively.

Ethiopia ranks 155th globally for Infrastructure and Market Access, 151st for Investment
Environment, 140th for Enterprise Conditions, and 125th for Governance.

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 The key findings on each of these pillars are as follows:

Infrastructure and Market Access (155th)

Good quality infrastructure is an essential component of a successful economy. The potential for
a prosperous Ethiopia is to have enhanced infrastructure that serves urban and rural populations
alike in terms of mobile communications, electricity, water and transport. In addition, the country
has the potential for a more open trade policy with smoother border facilitation leading to
agriculture and manufacturing exports with greater value-added.

Ethiopia ranks 155th in Infrastructure and Market Access. This is despite one of the highest rates
of public investment in the world. These public investments have extended the road network,
railways and air transport. Ethiopia has invested $2 billion of public funding in roads, railways,
and airports (Bole is now the largest airport in Africa) over the past five years, as part of the
Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II), which builds upon significant previous investment
by Government.1 However, ‘last mile’ connections and infrastructure maintenance have been
relatively weak. Similarly, poor logistics (because of yet insufficient competition) is one of the
key factors holding back international competitiveness. These large and expensive investments
have not yet been matched by a sufficient improvement in the business environment and the
relaxation of foreign exchange constraints. Private sector investment remains constrained.2

Public investment in electricity has been high; as a result, Ethiopia now has the second-largest
electricity capacity in Africa. This will be further increased by the completion of the GERD project.
Demand from the private sector will largely determine how profitable these investments in
electricity turn out to be.

On water resources, public-private partnerships could help deliver additional needed irrigation
projects.

Ethiopia ranks 153rd globally in Communications. While there have been improvements in internet
bandwidth and mobile coverage, the country has slipped in the rankings, as others have improved
at a faster rate. Notwithstanding the significant public investment in communications, barriers to
entry, the lack of an independent regulator and reliance on a monopolistic state-owned provider
have resulted in one of the lowest levels of mobile and internet access in the region. The new
Government has a plan for reforms that could lead to the opening of this sector. This is important
because the use of mobile phones in neighbouring countries has resulted in substantial gains for
those living in rural areas.

Through the introduction of its Electronic Single Window, Ethiopia has taken steps to address
the process barriers and procedural burdens that result in high costs and long periods to import
and export, and this is beginning to show positive results - Ethiopia ranks 109th in Border
Administration.

Ethiopia ranks 129th for Open Market Scale. It has benefitted from increased international access
for goods and services, securing preferential market access to the European Union, China, United
States, India, and other major markets. However, Ethiopia has not been able to benefit from these
open markets, given the constraints faced by the private sector. The percentage of goods subject
to tariffs and the high tariffs applied result in Ethiopia ranking 159th for Import Tariff Barriers.

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Investment Environment (151st)

Effective and broad-based allocation of capital is critical to unlocking the country’s economic
opportunities. The potential for a prosperous Ethiopia can be enhanced by property rights that
are administered efficiently and in an open and transparent manner. Prosperity could also
be supported by a robust and competitive financial sector, with domestic and international
participants, providing access to competitive services for all sectors of the private sector and
individuals.

Ethiopia’s Investment Environment has not kept pace with international developments over the
past decade, resulting in a fall of 23 places in the global rankings to 151st.

Property rights have weakened in Ethiopia over the past decade because of the increased risk of
land expropriation. Weak property rights are partly the result of a political system characterised
by limited constraints on the powers of the executive, a poorly applied legal and regulatory
framework implemented by a politicised judiciary, widespread corruption and insufficient
administrative capacity.

Investor protections have weakened in the last decade, and Ethiopia now ranks 143rd in the
world. Bankruptcy legislation has become outdated, with the insolvency recovery rate falling by
15% over the last decade, with a focus on liquidation rather than restructuring.3 Experts report a
deterioration in the quality of auditing and reporting standards and corporate governance. There
is also a lack of independence and transparency surrounding state-owned enterprises.

On the positive side, a reduction in the time it takes to resolve commercial disputes and an
improvement in alternative dispute mechanisms have led Ethiopia to improve 25 places in the
rankings for Contract Enforcement, to 89th. The recent ratification of a new Investment Law and
upcoming reforms to the Commercial Code may bring about further reforms to the financial
sector.

Ethiopia ranks 143rd in the world for Financing Ecosystems. The Government has followed a policy
of using state-controlled commercial banks to finance public sector infrastructure investments
and state-owned enterprises (and endowment companies), rather than relying on credit from the
private sector as a key engine of economic growth. Credit to the private sector in Ethiopia (and
SMEs in particular) is among the lowest in East Africa and declined in the previous 10 years. Poor
commercial independence and transparency in state-owned enterprises further constrains the
health of the financial sector.

Ethiopia is one of the most underbanked countries in the world, providing limited services to the
wider public, which particularly affects the rural population. Ethiopia is an outlier in relation to
digital finance services; mobile money and digital finance remain limited. The new Government
has introduced important financial reforms, but more is needed (including lowering barriers to
entry) to leverage the financial sector to improve the lives of the poorest.

Ethiopia is ranked fourth from the bottom, out of 167 nations, for Restrictions on International
Investment. This is particularly because of restrictions on foreign ownership of companies, the
restrictive environment created by investment proclamations, especially in services, and capital
and foreign exchange controls. In the past, only some types of FDI have benefitted from special
incentives.

Through targeted deals, Ethiopia has had impressive success in attracting some large global
manufacturing brands to the country. This is not an easy accomplishment, and it is essential
that is preserved by understanding the key needs of these investments. These include improved
coordination of policies and industrial park management between the federal and regional levels
and sustained improvement in transport logistics.
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 The new Government has introduced positive reforms such as the ‘one-stop-shop’ Ethiopian
Investment Commission, the provision of industrial parks and the 2020 Proclamation on
investment regulation.

Enterprise Conditions (140th)

Putting the private sector in the driving seat requires creating the environment where it can
flourish. Government can support prosperity in Ethiopia by enabling a competitive business
environment, reducing barriers to entry, discouraging restrictive practices, and regulating
monopolies that are contrary to the public interest. Government can also support prosperity
by simplifying the procedures and costs associated with starting and operating a business and
supporting the linkages between the formal sector and the informal (independent) sector of the
economy.

Overall, Enterprise Conditions in Ethiopia showed a small improvement over the past decade.
Ethiopia ranks 139th for Domestic Market Contestability. State-owned enterprises and politically-
linked companies (endowment companies and companies linked to politicians) continue to
dominate the economy and often receive preferential treatment (including in regulations,
licenses, foreign exchange, and procurement), resulting in weak competition and the absence
of a level playing field. The Government has signalled its intent to open more sectors (telecom,
energy, banking, shipping, etc) to the private sector.

The Government has committed to a privatisation process. However, this must be carried out
when the judiciary and the rule of law systems in the country have been strengthened, to avoid
the risks of corruption in these processes, as experienced in other countries.

Ethiopia ranks 144th for Environment for Business Creation. There are many business licenses and
procedural steps that are necessary to start and grow a business. Compliance costs with licensing
requirements are still high in Ethiopia, with more than 95% of the regulatory costs for businesses
resulting from cumbersome documentation and other time-consuming procedures.4 The new
Government has placed strong importance on improving the business climate, to increase the
productivity and competitiveness of Ethiopia’s private sector.5 However, progress is difficult to
achieve. In addition, there is a significant gap in the skillset of the newly joined workforce relative
to the structure of labour demand.

The Burden of Regulation in Ethiopia has significantly increased over the past decade, particularly
with respect to the time taken for businesses to comply with regulations. As a result, the country
has fallen 72 places in the rankings to 124th globally. While several reforms have been introduced
to reduce regulatory burdens and ease business operations, limited progress has been achieved.
Taxpayers report that the process of complying with taxation can be even more significant than
the amount of tax itself. This business and regulatory environment is particularly burdensome for
the large, so-called ‘informal’ or independent sector which needs all possible support (including
access to finance) to increase its productivity.

Ethiopia ranks 153rd for Labour Market Flexibility. Over the past decade, employers have reported
a deterioration in the flexibility of wage determination and worker contracts, and in labour-
employer relations. High turnover of staff, lack of a skilled workforce and low wages in Ethiopia
have resulted in a deterioration of the labour market. A large percentage of the labour force
is in the so called ‘informal’ or independent sector. Interviews with Ethiopian labour market
experts highlighted prominent cases of abuse of labour rights that have not been challenged by
Government.6 Although there have been some recent reforms to modernise labour practices in
Ethiopia, including a 2019 Labour Code, these reforms have yet to have a signficant impact.

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Governance (125th)

A politically stable, capable, and trustworthy state is one of the central components of economic
development. A prosperous Ethiopia is one where power is shared between different stakeholders
for the public good, there are meaningful checks and balances on how power can be exercised in
the political, institutional, and economic spheres, and the military is separate from party politics.
A competent and independent judiciary would guarantee that everyone, including the state, is
subject to the rule of law, without political interference in judicial processes. This environment
would also help ensure the Government delivers public services with integrity and competence.

The legacy of authoritarian rule enforced by successive governments in Ethiopia has undermined
strong governance. Its global ranking for Governance is 125th.

In Ethiopia, narrow-based elites have traditionally enjoyed a monopoly of power and have
exercised it with few constraints imposed by the legislature or the judiciary. The exercise of
authoritarian power and the resistance to transfer of this power has been driven by the nature
of the political system. Given Ethiopia’s political and ethnic polarisation, a key objective of the
winning side in political conflicts has been to be able to maintain power at all costs. This has
resulted in the political settlement being structured as ‘winner-takes-all’ with an authoritarian
government, as the dangers of losing power have been too high to contemplate.

Consequently, the political system in Ethiopia has been a one-group/one-dominant party system
that controls all key institutions within Ethiopian society, including the state, the military, the
judiciary, and key sectors of the economy. The security forces have been intertwined with the
ruling party and protected its political dominance. The legislature and judiciary have always
been under the effective control of the ruling party, allowing the executive to govern without
checks and balances. The institution of ethnic federalism by the 1995 Constitution could have
constrained the powers of the executive, but in practice, financial resources and political power
continued to be concentrated at the centre.

Ethiopia ranks 131st in Political Accountability. In Ethiopia, elites have historically gained
power by dynastic tradition or violent confrontation, rather than by a peaceful and democratic
transfer of power. Under the ‘revolutionary democracy’ of the EPRDF/TPLF the issue of political
accountability did not arise, as it was assumed that the Government did what the people needed
without requiring any formal mechanism of accountability. Elections under the EPRDF/TPLF were
generally not carried out freely and fairly. The way ethnic federalism was implemented (with
financial resources controlled in the centre) has contributed to ethnic polarisation and division in
many areas of the country.

Opposition parties, civil society organisations, and the media have been controlled through
legislation that curtailed civil liberties. At local (Kebele) level, clientelism has traditionally been
used to co-opt opposition and ensure votes for the ruling party, relying both on the distribution of
services and, when needed, on police intimidation.

Prime Minister Abiy has rejected this view of political accountability and has committed to
respect traditional democratic accountability. The June 2021 elections took place in a difficult
context, and were boycotted by the main opposition parties in Oromia. They were run by an
independent electoral board in six of the 10 regions, but the president of the electoral board
noted that in two of the regions electoral observers were not allowed.7

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 Ethiopia ranks 79th in the world for the Rule of Law. The 1995 Constitution provided for an
independent judiciary, however, Freedom House has summarised its judgment on the rule of
law in Ethiopia as “the judiciary is officially independent, but in practice it is subject to political
interference, and judgments rarely deviate from government policy. Due process rights are
generally not respected.”8 Corruption within the legal system has further weakened its integrity.

Ethiopia ranks 105th in terms of Government Integrity. Transparency International have noted that
“corruption poses a serious and multifaceted problem to the overall wellbeing of the population
and its economy.”9 The high level of corruption is explained by the fact that for decades the ruling
party has governed without checks and balances and without direct accountability to citizens,
civil society, and the free press. Given the ruling party has been focussed on consolidating its
power, this has meant diverting resources for the party or party members. Higher-ranking civil
servants are generally appointed not by merit but because of loyalty to the party or ethnic
factors, weakening civil service leadership.

Opportunities for corruption have been widespread. These have included managing large state-
owned enterprises and endowment companies, allocating land and mining resources, developing
large infrastructure investments funded by debt, intervening in and controlling financial markets
and foreign exchange, and devising restrictive and complex rules and regulations.

In the main, many prosecutions for corruption in Ethiopia have been seen as politically motivated,
given the lack of autonomy of the institutions to fight corruption and the judiciary.

Improving the integrity of Government in Ethiopia is intertwined with improving political

accountability, a competent and honest judiciary and making the state citizen-centred and
responsive to public demands.

The global ranking for Government Effectiveness is 109th. Ethiopia made the most progress
in government effectiveness in the early 2000s.10 International donors, including the US, UK,
EU, and the World Bank provided financial support to the EPRDF/TPLF Government without
sufficient regard for the capacity of the civil service in Ethiopia. While several civil service reform
programmes have been implemented in the last 20 years, limited progress in government
effectiveness has been achieved.

The ‘developmental state’ approach of the EPRDF/TPLF Government, controlling key aspects
of the economy through infrastructure investments, required high state capacity. However,
the ruling party did not devote the necessary financial resources (the civil service is poorly
remunerated and has a relatively low social status), or provide the civil service with sufficient
autonomy, to establish the highly competent and effective civil service that the developmental
state needed. The political priority was to strengthen the ruling party rather than to strengthen
the capacity of the state, with senior appointments made based on loyalty and ethnicity rather
than competence.11

Francis Fukuyama notes in relation to Ethiopia and Rwanda trying to follow the ‘developmental
state’ model, that they “have embarked in a process of ‘party development’ in the name of
national development…the imperfect implementation of the China model and the lack of
bureaucratic accountability, turnover, and capacity in these countries has created vulnerabilities
within the regimes that could catalyse domestic resistance.”12

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There has been a mismatch between the ambitions of the ‘developmental state’ model and the
civil service that the ruling party was able to provide given the political economy constraints and
limited resources.

The hope is that a process of dialogue and peace and reconciliation in Ethiopia could facilitate
a difficult transition away from the historically entrenched ‘winner-takes-all’ and authoritarian
political settlement into a democratic settlement and an independent and competent judiciary.
In this new political context, the emergence of a civil service that can put Ethiopian citizens at the
centre of its activities, has strong capabilities and high integrity, is well remunerated, and has a
high status in society becomes possible.

The reforms required to open the economy, attract foreign investment and the human and
financial resources of the Ethiopian diaspora, support the productivity of small farmers and the
so-called ‘informal’ or independent sector and provide high-quality social services, require a
strong civil service.

Endnotes
1 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The International Finance Corporation, 2019, p.
29.
2 Ibid.
3 “Resolving Insolvency,” World Bank Doing Business, May 2020.
4 “The Cost of Business Registration and Licensing in Ethiopia and Options for Reform,” The World Bank Group,
March 2016, p. 4.
5 “Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) (2015/16-2019/20) Volume I: Main Text,” Federal Democratic Repub-
lic of Ethiopia, National Planning Commission, May 2016, p. ix.
6 Expert interview.
7 Ayenat Mersie, “Ethiopians vote as opposition alleges some irregularities,” Reuters, June 2021.
8 “Freedom in the World: Ethiopia 2020,” Freedom House, 2020.
9 Kaunaim Rahman, “Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption in Ethiopia,” Transparency International, October
2018.
10 Elsa Araya, “Moving Further on Civil Service Reforms in Ethiopia: Findings and Implications from a Civil Service
Survey and Qualitative Analysis,” The World Bank Group, January 2019.
11 Francis Fukuyama and Hilary Matfess, “The March Is Not Linear: Big Party Politics and the Decline of Democracy
Worldwide,” Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
In book: “Beyond Convergence: World Without Order,” Edited by Hilary Matfess and Michael Miklaucic, 2016.
12 Ibid.

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Credit (Shutterstock.com)
INTRODUCTION

This case study on Ethiopia is part of a series of studies examining the links between a nation’s
Economic Openness and prosperity, comparing the performance of over 150 countries.
The purpose of this report is to provide a systematic assessment of the policy environment
underpinning the Ethiopian economy and, in so doing, help to identify specific actions that would
improve Economic Openness in Ethiopia.
The report analyses the underlying structural aspects of Ethiopia’s economy to assess what
changes are needed to enable the ambition of becoming a low middle-income country, as the
next milestone on its pathway from poverty to prosperity.
The analysis of Ethiopia’s performance in this report focusses on key drivers of economic
wellbeing across the world. These are organised around four pillars:
Infrastructure and Market Access measures the quality of the infrastructure that enables trade
(including communications, transport and resources), and the inhibitors on the flow of goods and
services to and from a country’s trading partners. Where markets have sufficient infrastructure,
few barriers to trade, and smooth border clearance, commerce can flourish. Such trade leads to
more competitive and efficient markets, enabling new products and ideas to be tested, funded
and commercialised, and ultimately benefitting consumers through a greater variety of goods at
more competitive prices.
Investment Environment measures the extent to which investments are protected adequately
through the existence of property rights, investor protections and contract enforcement, and
the extent to which domestic and international capital (both debt and equity) are available for
investment. The more a legal system protects investments, for example through property rights,
the more that investment can drive economic growth.
Enterprise Conditions measures how easy it is for businesses to start, compete, and expand.
Contestable markets with low barriers to entry are important for businesses to innovate and
develop new ideas. This is essential for a dynamic and enterprising economy, where regulation
enables business and responds to the changing needs of society.
Governance measures the extent to which checks and restraints on power exist and whether
governments operate effectively and without corruption. The nature of a country’s governance
has a material impact on its prosperity. The rule of law, strong institutions, and regulatory quality
contribute significantly to economic growth, as do competent governments that enact policy
efficiently and design regulations that deliver policy objectives without being overly burdensome.

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 Table 1: Pillars and Elements of Economic Openness

INFRASTRUCTURE AND INVESTMENT ENTERPRISE

GOVERNANCE
MARKET ACCESS ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS

– Communications – Property Rights – Domestic Market – Executive

Contestability Constraints
– Resources – Investor Protection
– Price Distortions – Political
– Transport – Contract Accountability
Enforcement – Environment for
– Border Business Creation – Rule of Law
Administration – Financing Ecosystem
– Burden of Regulation – Government
– Open Market Scale – Restrictions on Integrity
International – Labour Market
– Import Tariff Barriers Investment Flexibility – Government
– Market Distortions Effectiveness

– Regulatory Quality

Our analysis indicates a clear link between the extent to which a country’s economy exhibits
these characteristics and its productive capacity.1 This link is supported by a long history of
academic literature and can be seen in the economic histories of those countries that have
achieved a high level of economic wellbeing.
As part of our analysis, we have chosen a set of regional and global comparator countries that are
at a similar level of development, or because they provide an aspirational benchmark: Botswana
(82nd), Burundi (157th), Ghana (100th), Kenya (113th), Malawi (132nd), Mauritius (44th), Morocco
(96th), Mozambique (142nd), Namibia (88th), Rwanda (104th), South Africa (87th), Tanzania (117th),
Zambia (123rd) and Zimbabwe (143rd).
In carrying out this assessment we have relied on three major sources of information. The first
is the Legatum Prosperity Index, which uses global datasets from sources such as the World
Bank, World Economic Forum, and International Monetary Fund. (For a complete list of data
sources see the appendix.) We use this to benchmark Ethiopia’s performance on a wide range of
indicators. The second source is a wide-ranging literature review, in which we reviewed academic
articles, reports, and news articles to provide a solid evidence base for this report. Thirdly, we
interviewed over 20 experts, based in Ethiopia and around the world. This group consisted of
researchers, economists, academics, journalists, lawyers, NGO representatives and others. These
varied sources of information gave us a broad and rich perspective on the challenges facing
Ethiopia and some of the opportunities for reform.
The next chapter provides the economic context, and subsequent chapters examine in detail
Ethiopia’s performance across the four pillars and discrete elements that constitute our measure
of Economic Openness. We examine past performance and present conditions and identify how
the government might strengthen opportunities and neutralise potential threats moving forward.

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ECONOMIC CONTEXT
From 1991 to 2018, Ethiopia’s governing party, EPRDF/TPLF, mostly adopted a ‘developmental
state’ model, by which the state controlled many aspects of Ethiopian society and the economy.

The appointment of Abiy Ahmed as Ethiopia’s Prime Minister in April 2018 marked the end of
the long-standing dominance of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF),2 which had been
the dominant force within the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and
Ethiopia since 1991. Prime Minister Abiy formed the country’s first gender-balanced cabinet.

In December 2019, Prime Minister Abiy established the Prosperity Party as the successor of the
EPRDF, as a pan-Ethiopian, non-ethnic political party. The TPLF did not join the new party.

Macroeconomic developments
There has been strong and sustained GDP growth in Ethiopia, averaging around 10% a year
over the last decade – representing one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, and
considerably higher than the regional average of 5.4% annually. Despite the COIVD-19 pandemic,
Ethiopia’s economy expanded by 6.1% in 2020, which was lower than the 8.4% growth seen
in 2019,3 but a significant achievement against the backdrop of a 5% contraction in the global
economy. As the Government acknowledges in its recently published 2021-2030 plan, most
of this growth was largely the result of “the expansion of government-funded large-scale
infrastructure developments.”4 Between 2010 and 2020, the construction industry grew by
22.5% per annum, whereas agriculture and the service sector registered average annual growth
rates of 5.3% and 9.7% respectively. 5

Inflation has been rising since 2016, however, and the Consumer Price Index had risen 22% in the
twelve months to June 2021.6

A decade of infrastructure projects has contributed to improving the lives of many Ethiopians.
Through expansion of the electricity and water network, 45% of the population now has access
to electricity, up from 32% a decade previously; and 41% of Ethiopians have access to basic
water services, up from 29%. In addition, 50% more households have access to basic sanitation
services. National poverty rates have fallen from 29.6% in 2009/10 to 24% in 2016/17, with the
rate reducing from 30.4% to 25.6% in rural areas and urban poverty rates declining from 25.7%
to 14.8% over the same period.

Fiscal sustainability
To help finance infrastructure projects, the Ethiopian Government leveraged significant support
from the international community, including the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Union.
Ethiopia secured FDI to finance these projects, with China being the most significant player. China
invested an estimated $13.7 billion between 2000 and 20187 and accounted for about 60% of
FDI into the country in 2019.8

As a result of increased borrowing to finance these projects, public sector debt has risen from $10
billion in 2010 to $53 billion in 2019, or 60% of GDP.9 To make loan repayments, Ethiopia needed
to restructure some of this debt. In 2018, it restructured payments on the $4 billion loan provided
by China to finance the rail line from Addis Ababa to Djibouti’s Doraleh Port, extending the loan
period from 15 to 30 years. Furthermore, the Government announced in March 2021 that a
restructuring of its sovereign debt is planned under a new common framework of the G20 group

| 13
 of major economies, designed to help with the financial pressures of COVID-19.10 Rising external
debt repayments, together with persistent current account deficits and low foreign exchange
reserves, present risks to external debt sustainability,11 with foreign exchange reserves covering
less than two months of prospective imports.12

Productivity and competitiveness

Exports have been falling in recent years, from nearly 17% of GDP in 2011 to around 8% per year
for 2016-2018.13 At the same time, imports have increased on average by 12.5% per year during
the past 10 years, which has resulted in a growing trade deficit, from $6 billion in 2011 to $14
billion in 2015, although it has narrowed slightly over the past few years to stand at $12 billion
in 2019. The weakening export market has been further exacerbated by the pandemic – with an
estimated 20–25% drop in exports of goods and services during 2020. Around 150,000 jobs are
at risk in the flower business, as companies are exporting only 5% of normal volumes as demand
in Europe and the Middle East drops dramatically.14

In 2018, output per worker in Ethiopia was less than $5,000 per worker, half of that for sub-
Saharan Africa.15 Productivity varies considerably by sector, however, with productivity in industry
three times greater than in agriculture; in the service sector it was nearly four times greater.16

The economy in Ethiopia has diversified somewhat over the past decade. Although agriculture
continues to play an important role, it has become less dominant. In 2010, agriculture accounted
for 41.4% of GDP, whereas in 2019 it accounted for 33.4%. The contribution of the industrial
sector to GDP grew from 9.4% to 24.8%17over the same period, due primarily to the large
infrastructure projects. Manufacturing in Ethiopia contributed 5.6% of GDP in 2019. The
contribution of the service sector to the Ethiopian economy has remained broadly consistent
over the past decade, accounting for around 37% of GDP. Around two-thirds of the workforce are
employed in agriculture, down from around three quarters a decade previously.18

A low rate of entrepreneurial activity in Ethiopia means that while new business density (number
of new businesses per working age population) is nearly three times what it was a decade
previously, it was still less than half of that for sub-Saharan Africa in 2020. However, the rate of
patent applications in the country is now higher than that for sub-Saharan Africa.

Labour force
With a median age of 19.5 years, a projected two million workers will join the labour market each
year over the coming decade. By 2025, the number of young workers (aged 15 to 29) will increase
by 8.5 million.19 This growing work force provides readily available and inexpensive labour to
enhance the output of the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. According to official figures,
Ethiopia has a labour force participation rate of 82% (76% for females), compared to 68% (63%
for females) for sub-Saharan Africa, and an unemployment rate of 2.1% compared to 6.6% for
sub-Saharan Africa, although the urban unemployment rate stood at nearly 19% in 2019/20, with
a rate of 12.2% for men and 26.1% for women.20 Only 16% of workers in Ethiopia are waged and
salaried, one of the lowest rates in Africa and across the globe.

14 |
The Government's ten-year development plan lays out a long-term vision of making Ethiopia an
“African Beacon of Prosperity”. Given the lack of waged and salaried roles, a common route into
work is through joining the large independent (also called informal) economy. Although official
reporting of workers in the informal economy stood at 23% in 2013, experts view the reported
drop from 51% in 1999 as a statistical redefinition of the sector and believe the current figure is
much higher than the reported 23%.21

Considerable challenges exist for businesses to find employees with the right skillset — Ethiopia
currently ranks 140th out of 167 nations on the WEF measure of availability of skilled workers.22
Industrial park workers, for example, lack sufficient training, which creates problems as many
workers coming from rural areas are not familiar with working in an industrial environment.23
Significant other barriers impede starting a business in Ethiopia.

COVID-19 and looking ahead

The reported health impact of COVID-19 on Ethiopians is so far considerably less severe than on
people in other countries. However, the impact of the pandemic on an already fragile economy
is likely to be quite severe. The Government has put in place various support packages, including
loans, tax payment deferrals and tax reductions to help businesses. It has secured international
support to help with its debt payment. However, it will be some time before the full impact of
COVID-19 on the Ethiopian economy is known.

To address the challenges mentioned above and throughout this report, the Government
completed its homegrown economic reform (HGER) plan in April 2021, with the central
objectives of sustaining rapid economic growth, maintaining a stable macroeconomic
environment by reducing debt vulnerabilities and creating adequate and sustainable job
opportunities.

| 15
 The 10-Year Development Plan
The 2021-2030 development plan sets a long-term vision of making Ethiopia an “African Beacon
of Prosperity”, which will be brought about through the following objectives:
1. Building a prosperous country by creating a pragmatic market-based economic system and
enhancing the role and participation of the private sectors.
2. Maintaining macroeconomic stability, ensuring rapid and sustainable economic growth, and
creating decent jobs.
3. Ensuring structural economic transformation by promoting overall productivity and
competitiveness.
4. Creating an enabling environment where every citizen will become an owner and beneficiary
of the development endeavour by ensuring the quality and accessibility of basic social
services and the provision of infrastructure.
5. Ensuring competent, independent and quality civil service system by building the capacity of
the Government and establishing good governance.
6. Building strong and inclusive institutions to ensure a peaceful society, access to justice and
upholding the rule of law and human rights.
In delivering upon these objectives, the Government hopes to achieve the following development
outcomes:
1. Improvement in income levels and wealth accumulation so that every citizen can satisfy their
basic needs and aspirations.
2. Basic economic and social services such as food, clean water, shelter, health and education
will be accessible to every citizen regardless of their economic status.
3. Creation of an enabling and just environment where citizens can utilise their potentials and
resources to lead quality lives.
4. Improvement in social dignity, equality, and freedom where citizens can freely participate
in all social, economic, and political affairs of their country regardless of their social
background.

16 |
Endnotes
1 See “Global Index of Economic Openness”, Legatum Institute, May 2019.
2 In January 2021, the National Election Board of Ethiopia terminated TPLF’s registration, citing acts of violence and
rebellion committed by the party’s leadership against the Federal government in 2020 and a lack of representa-
tion.
3 “Ethiopia Economic Outlook,” African Development Bank Group, May 2021.
4 “Ethiopia 2030: The Pathway to Prosperity Ten Years Perspective Development Plan (2021 – 2030),” The Planning
and Development Commission, May 2021, p. 8.
5 Ibid.
6 Trading Economics (retrieved 21st July, 2021)
7 John Aglionby and Emily Feng, “China scales back investment in Ethiopia,” Financial Times, June 2018.
8 China remains to be top foreign investment source of Ethiopia in 2019: UN report,” Xinhuanet, January 2020.
9 “Ethiopia National Debt,” Country Economy, May 2020; “IMF Country Report No. 20/29, The Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia,” International Monetary Fund, January 2020, p. 5.
10 Duncan Miriri, “Impact of Ethiopia’s debt plan on private creditors not yet clear, says adviser,” Reuters, February
2021.
11 “Fitch Downgrades Ethiopia to ‘CCC’,” Fitch Ratings, February 2021.
12 “IMF Country Report No. 20/29, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,” International Monetary Fund,
January 2020, p. 4.
13 Ibid.
14 Marthe van der Wolf, “East African Flower Industry Wilts as Sales to Europe Dry Up,” VOA News, April 2020.
15 “Ethiopia Productivity Report,” Policy Studies Institute, January 2020, p. 24.
16 Ibid.
17 Arkebe Oqubay, “The Structure and Performance of the Ethiopian Manufacturing Sector,” The African Develop-
ment Bank Group, Working Paper Series N° 299, May 2018, p. 3.
18 Amy Copley, “Figures of the week: The nexus of manufacturing and services sectors in Ethiopia,” Brookings, May
2018.
19 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The International Finance Corporation, 2019, p.
29.
20 “Ethiopia 2030: The Pathway to Prosperity Ten Years Perspective Development Plan (2021 – 2030),” The Planning
and Development Commission, May 2021, p. 4.
21 “2020 Investment Climate Statement: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
22 “Nexus skills-jobs assessment Ethiopia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, February 2020, p. 7.
23 Marjorie van Elven, “Ethiopian garment workers paid the lowest wages in the apparel industry,” The Fashion
United, May 2019.

| 17
18 |
Credit (Shutterstock.com)
INFRASTRUCTURE AND MARKET ACCESS
(ETHIOPIA RANK: 155TH)
Good quality infrastructure is an essential component of a successful economy. An environment
supportive of trade and commerce allows new products and ideas to be tested, funded,
commercialised, and delivered easily to customers. Trade empowers individuals and encourages
competition. Offering choices to consumers and businesses about which products, services, and ideas
they can buy domestically and internationally is at the core of free trade.

Equally important is the role that trade provides in communicating new ideas and raising
productivity.1 Competition from international trade ensures that even when a business does not
export, it is forced to respond to new ideas from the increased competition in domestic markets.

The potential for a prosperous Ethiopia is to have enhanced infrastructure that serves urban
and rural populations alike in terms of mobile communications, electricity, water and transport.
In addition, the country has the potential for a more open trade policy with smoother border
facilitation leading to agriculture and manufacturing exports with greater value-added.

Ethiopia ranks 155th in Infrastructure and Market Access. It ranks below 150th on four of the
seven elements within the pillar. Public investment through state-owned enterprises over
the past decade has extended the transport network and expanded electricity and water
infrastructure, leading to greater connectivity across the country. ‘Last mile’ connections have
not been made, particularly in relation to rural areas, and maintenance of existing infrastructure
has been neglected. Ethiopia ranks 127th for Transport, 153rd for Communications and 153rd for
Electricity and Water Resources. Internal conflict, particularly in the Tigray region, has damaged
infrastructure.2

Non-tariff measures are a burden to many Ethiopian exporters and importers, reflected in
a ranking of 158th for Market Distortions. The percentage of goods subject to tariffs and the
relatively high tariffs applied result in Ethiopia ranking 159th for Import Tariff Barriers. Through
the introduction of its Electronic Single Window, Ethiopia has taken steps to address the
process barriers and procedural burdens that result in high costs and long periods of time to
import and export, and this is beginning to show positive results: Ethiopia ranks 109th in Border
Administration.

| 19
 Elements of Infrastructure and Market Access
Transport – the ease and efficiency with which people and goods travel between and within
countries. This is a measure of the quality, diversity, and penetration of all forms of transport: air
travel, shipping and seaport services, and road and rail infrastructure.
Communications – the means of communication and how widespread access to communication is.
Infrastructure for communications must necessarily be in place for strong communications within a
nation and the actual take-up and use of communications by the population.
Resources – the quality, reliability, and affordability of the energy network within a country, and the
access to, and use of, water resources.
Border Administration – the time and administrative cost of a country’s customs procedures,
alongside the efficiency of this process.
Open Market Scale – the size of the market to which providers of goods and services have privileged
access.
Import Tariff Barriers – the fees associated with trading products and services across borders, raising
an income for government and making foreign goods more expensive.
Market Distortions – how competitive markets are disrupted by non-tariff barriers to trade and the
extent of market liberalisation of foreign trade.

TRANSPORT (ETHIOPIA RANK: 127TH)

Transport underpins the ability for products and people to move efficiently, easily, and reliably.
An interconnected freight transportation network contributes to economic growth by supporting
resource development and expanding interstate commerce. We review both the quality of physical
infrastructure, including road, rail, ports, and air, and logistical performance, which measures the
efficiency of shipping products in and out of a country.

Ethiopia has a global ranking of 127th for Transport, with improvements over the past decade
driven principally by airport capacity expansion.

Ethiopia has prioritised transport investment, with $2 billion of public funding of roads, railways,
and airports over the past five years as part of the Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II),
which builds upon significant previous government investment.3 However, like other ‘backbone’
services in the country, private sector investment remains heavily restricted.4

Roads
In the past 15 years, through the Road Sector Development Programmes (RSDP), the Government
has given considerable focus to extending the road network throughout Ethiopia. Between
2014 and 2019, the total road length in the country increased from 99,500km to 144,900km.5
Nonetheless, the country’s road density remains sparse (see Figure 1).

20 |
Figure 1: Road density

Stronger Weaker
120

100
km per 100 sq km of land area

80

60

40
Global Median
20

0
us

wi

ia

ia

na

e
nd
d

an

ric

ny

bi
bw

qu
pi
c

an

ib
i

ala
oc

wa
an
rit

m
ru

io
am
Ke
Gh

Af

bi
ba

nz
or
Rw

Za
au

h
Bu

ts

am
h

Ta

Et
m

N
M

Bo
M

ut

Zi

oz
So

M
Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation 2019

Improvements have been made to the interurban network, including the country’s busiest road
corridor to Djibouti, and to the network that links industrial parks to the main transport corridors
within Ethiopia.6 The Addis to Djibouti road corridor accounts for 90% of Ethiopia’s external
trade,7 but this journey takes three days by truck,8 resulting in Ethiopia’s trade logistics being
expensive (see below).

The Government is focussing on connecting all Kebeles with all-weather roads, providing year-
round access through its Universal Rural Road Access Programme (URRAP). The proportion of
the population that are within two miles of an all-seasons road has increased from 50% in 2014
to 69% in 2019.9 URRAP road development has been associated with increasing household
consumption by up to 28% between 2012 and 2016.10 Despite this considerable investment, rural
accessibility remains low, constraining the development of markets for nonfarm activity.

A lack of maintenance is affecting the quality of low volume rural roads, which is primarily a
result of insufficient resources being made available.11 A study from the OECD in Peru found that
a continued lack of maintenance can be up to three times more costly in the long run.12 According
to surveys carried out by the World Economic Forum and by Gallup, the quality of roads in
Ethiopia is judged to have deteriorated, with less than 40% of the public expressing satisfaction
with the roads and highways where they live, compared to over 50% a decade previously.13

Recommendations
• The Government should consider building more rural all-weather roads that are connected
to the main network and ensure that weaknesses of previous programmes have been
addressed.
• The Government should ensure that resources are allocated and executed to conduct regular
maintenance of the rural road network, to avoid the need for much more costly replacement,
which should include both community-driven (labour-intensive) maintenance and more
traditional contractual approaches.

| 21
 Railways

Ethiopia invested substantially in railways over the past decade, with three railway lines totalling
1,339km recently being constructed as part of a 5,000km expansion programme. This includes a
new rail line linking Addis Ababa to Djibouti and a light railway system in Addis.14

The rail line from Addis to Djibouti has the potential to reduce the transportation time from up
to 50 hours to 10 hours.15 The new line can handle 30% of all Ethiopian imports but carries only
around 5% of them.16 As of June 2021, export and import goods have increased, along with their
service delivery, by 25 to 30% annually, which is a promising sign.17 However, conversations with
experts report that the ‘last mile’ railway works to connect Modjo Dry Port and Djibouti port to
the main rail line have not yet been completed. Currently, this journey is carried out by truck,
leading to inefficiency and adding to cost.

Recommendations
• The Government should renew efforts to complete ‘last mile’ rail works between the
mainline railway and Modjo Dry Port and between the mainline railway and Djibouti port, to
improve efficiency and reduce costs.
• The Government should explore the opportunity for using Assab and Massawa ports to
export goods and reduce overreliance on Djibouti.

Airports

The aviation sector has seen strong expansion in recent years, with a fourfold increase in airport
connectivity, resulting in Ethiopia rising from 106th to 90th in the World Economic Forum’s
rankings from 2010 to 2020.

In a landmark development, Bole International, Ethiopia’s largest airport, has recently overtaken
Dubai International as the leading gateway to the region.18 It completed the work on a new
terminal in mid-2020, which has doubled its annual passenger capacity to 21 million. The
Ethiopian Airports Enterprise, a subsidiary of Ethiopian Airlines (state-owned and the biggest
airline in Africa) plans to build a major airport outside of Addis Ababa with a capacity of 80
million passengers per year at a cost of $4 billion,19 although the future of this plan is uncertain
given the impact of COVID-19 on the aviation industry.

Air connectivity continues to be a challenge for the African aviation industry, with 22% of
Africans travelling between two cities on the continent doing so via non-African hubs (often
Europe or the Middle East).20 Ethiopia and Kenya, the two best-performing countries in Africa in
terms of intra-continental connectivity, still have direct connections with only 29 other countries
across the continent.21 In an attempt to capitalise on opportunities available, Ethiopia became a
signatory to the African Union’s Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM) when it launched
in January 2018. SAATM aims to open Africa’s aviation sector and improve intra-African air
connectivity,22 with 34 countries signing up so far, representing over 80% of the existing aviation
market in Africa.23

Ethiopian Airlines began operating a new air cargo terminal in 2019, with capacity to handle
600,000 tonnes of fresh food and dry goods.24 This is the largest air cargo terminal in Africa

22 |
and lays a foundation for key infrastructure to improve competitiveness. It has the potential to
become not only a key freight hub for the African continent, but also an international cargo hub.25
Ethiopian Cargo & Logistics Services won ‘Best Cargo Airline – Africa’ Award at the Air Cargo
News Awards 2020.26

The Government plans to increase the number of airports in the country from 20 to 25. The
economic case for these airports is unclear. Except for Bole International Airport, most of the
existing regional airports are underutilised and depend on government subsidies.27

Recommendations
• Given that Ethiopia is a land-locked country, it is logical to build upon the success of the
aviation sector and further develop and innovate it for both passengers and cargo.
• The Government should consider increasing passenger and cargo volume by establishing new
networks with African countries, under the SAATM Framework and with other nations.
• The Government should consider exporting more goods by air, making use of cold storage
facilities at Bole International Airport.
• The Government should consider decentralising the existing regional airports, to improve
performance and reduce subsidies, through public and private partnership agreements and
by the private sector providing key airport services such as handling, storage, and catering.

Logistics

Despite some competition in freight forwarding, the only provider of multimodal transport
services in Ethiopia is the Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise (ESLSE), a state-
owned enterprise. This has contributed to an ineffective and inefficient sector, which results in
delays and high costs to entrepreneurs.

Poor logistics is one of the key factors undermining the nation’s international competitiveness,
thus constraining growth.28 The Government is demonstrating its commitment to opening the
logistics sector by gradually allowing competition in value added services, followed by freight
transport and management of the ports. However, this is yet to be enacted by law.

Investments have been made to increase the capacity for handling goods within the country. For
example, Modjo Dry Port is currently undergoing a transformation to become the biggest logistics
hub in the country, funded through a $150 million loan from the World Bank.29 In late 2020, the
Government established the National Logistics Transformation Council as an autonomous entity
that will operate under the Office of the Prime Minister, to resolve the significant challenges faced
by the logistics sector.30 The lack of cold-chain storage facilities along the main transport routes
within the country has hindered Ethiopia from capitalising upon its strong agriculture sector.
Under a pilot project in late 2020, the first export of avocados by train, from the Modjo Dry Port
to Europe, was carried out as part of the National Cool Logistics Network.

Alongside the Council, the Government has drafted a 10-year national logistics document,
comprising six strategies, 22 sub-strategies and 98 interventions. This is an ambitious strategy,
and the Government has stated that it is consulting its policies in a participatory manner. For
example, logistics experts were consulted recently on the draft regulations that include allowing
domestic players to participate in the sector.

| 23
 There are challenges around the capacity within and coordination across the various government
agencies in relation to logistics. For example, experts say that while agency staff are reasonably
competent in discharging their duties, inadequate training is provided for them to carry out their
interventions effectively.

Recommendations
• The Government should consider allowing private multimodal operators, including foreign
operatives, to improve service and reduce costs.
• The Government should open ESLSE up to competition.
• The Government should improve ESLSE performance by adopting best practice from the
Ethiopian Cargo & Logistics Services and other countries with a strong capacity government.

COMMUNICATIONS (ETHIOPIA RANK: 151ST)

The free exchange of information, underpinned by good communications infrastructure, is a vital
component of Economic Openness. Moreover, the advent of communications technology as an end-
product has created economic opportunity for innovative companies and countries. Whole societies
have been transformed by this evolution in communications technology. Our measure looks at a wide
range of forms and measures of communication, from fixed line and mobile telecoms to broadband
speeds and penetration rates.

Ethiopia has committed significant investment to improving communications over the past
decade, although progress has been slower than in other countries because of the barriers to
entry in the telecoms market. As a result, Ethiopia has slipped 11 places in the global rankings, to
151st, for the Communications element.

Access
Over the past decade, the state-owned enterprise Ethio telecom has invested $3.1 billion
in telecom infrastructure and service expansion projects,31 which has supported improved
connectivity and accessibility. Despite these investments, the country still lags far behind
comparator countries on many communication measures:

• Internet penetration remains low, with only 19% of the population having access to the
internet, compared to 85% in Kenya, 39% in Uganda and 46% for Africa as a whole.32

• Only 42% of Ethiopians have a mobile phone, and only 14% have mobile broadband, which
is low compared with other countries of a comparable size within the region, including
Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda.33

• Subscription to fixed broadband is still less than half of that for sub-Saharan Africa, at a rate
of 0.55 per 100 people in 2017, compared with 1.3 for sub-Saharan Africa.34

• While 99% of the population has access to 2G coverage, 4G coverage is restricted to the
capital city of Addis Ababa and only two-thirds of the population can access 3G networks.35,36

24 |
Figure 2: 2G, 3G and 4G network coverage

Stronger Weaker
100
Global Median
90
80
70
Index (0-100)

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
co

da

ca

na

ia

ia

wi

i
nd
iu

ny

an

ni

bi
bw

qu
ib

op
fri

ala
oc

an

wa
rit

m
za

ru
am
Ke

Gh

bi
ba
hA

hi
or

Rw

Za
au

Bu
M
ts

m
Ta

Et
m
N
M

Bo
M

a
ut

Zi

oz
So

M
Source: Groupe Spéciale Mobile Association 2018.

Service quality

Inadequate telecommunications quality is cited as a serious problem for dynamic firms that rely
on fast, steady telephone and broadband service provision.37 Internet bandwidth is poor, with a
rate of 0.5 Mbit/s per 1,000 people in 2017, compared with 10 Mbit/s in Kenya.38

Reliability is a concern in Ethiopia, with government-decreed shutdowns of the internet. Since

2016, the internet has been shut down at least six times, sometimes for weeks at a time. In 2019
alone, Ethiopia experienced three major internet disruptions across the country. In addition to the
considerable disruption to individuals and businesses, it is estimated that a two-week blackout in
2019 cost the country nearly $70 million.39

Digital financial services

Ethiopia is an outlier in relation to digital finance services. Less than 0.05% of the adult
population accessed banking services through mobile accounts in 2017, compared with 73% in
Kenya, 51% in Uganda and 39% in Tanzania. The undeveloped telecoms sector contributes to a
poor offering of digital services.

Industry reform
Ethiopia is one of only three countries that still have a state monopoly on communications,40 and
this protected market has resulted in an underdeveloped telecoms market which has not allowed
competition and is a key constraint on growth.41

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signalled the liberalisation of the telecommunications industry in
2018, but a number of delays have taken place. Other countries that have liberalised the telecoms
sector have seen significant improvements. Myanmar, for example, liberalised its telecoms sector
in 2013, which resulted in mobile penetration increasing from 10% to 99% and mobile broadband
penetration from 3% to 67%, within only 4 years.42

| 25
 At the end of 2020, Government announced the sale of a 45% share of Ethio telecom.43
Subsequently, in May 2021, the Ethiopian Government awarded a telecom service license to the
Global Partnership for Ethiopia, a consortium of telecom companies. This consortium includes
Vodafone, Vodacom, Safaricom, Sumitomo Corporation, and the CDC Group. Government
statements mentioned that the move will create jobs for 1.5 million citizens and activate over $8
billion in domestic investment.44 This amount is the single largest foreign direct investment into
Ethiopia to date.45

Regulatory structure
Crucial to a successful mobile liberalisation is ensuring a level playing field for all participants.
In the past, the independent regulator, Ethiopian Communications Authority (ECA), has often
protected the interests of the state monopoly Ethio telecom. It is important that internet services
are open to all providers and that they do not have onerous requirements.46

Recommendations
• The Government should continue with the opening of the telecom market.
• The ECA should plan to finalise the partial privatisation of Ethio telecom in 2021.
• The ECA should encourage (not mandate) facilitation of infrastructure sharing (which avoids
unnecessary duplication of infrastructure).
• The ECA should treat all providers equally.
• The Government should strengthen ECA, to ensure its independence and professional
capacity.
• The Government should provide catalytic investment to develop mobile services in rural
areas and increase digital literacy.

26 |
 RESOURCES (ETHIOPIA RANK: 153RD)
Access to reliable and affordable resources, including water and energy, is crucial for a well-
functioning economy. An unreliable energy supply can limit the growth of a potential business
and act as an obstacle to effective trade. Our measure of resources aims to capture the quality,
reliability, and affordability of a country’s energy network, and the access to and use of water
resources.

Electricity capacity
As a result of over $10 billion of public investment over the past decade, Ethiopia now has
the second-largest electricity capacity in Africa.47 However, on a per capita basis, generation
capacity ranks 143rd globally. Over half the population is without electricity, and the
additional demand from businesses and population growth is increasing by around 15% per
year.
To help meet the currently unmet and new demand for electricity, Ethiopia’s electricity
generation capacity will be bolstered when the recently completed GERD plant starts
generating electricity in the next few years, although issues remain with Egypt and South
Sudan over the rate of filling of the dam. Ethiopia’s strong focus on hydroelectric generation
capitalises on the abundance of its water availability. However, the area is prone to
drought, as has been experienced in recent years, and this leaves Ethiopia exposed to power
shortages. Ethiopia has a reserve of 300 million tonnes of coal and 253 million tonnes of oil
shale that could be exploited.48

Figure 3: Installed electric capacity

Stronger Weaker
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
kilowatts per capita

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
a

na

co

ia

na

ia

wi

ia

da

di
iu
ric

bi

ny
bw

qu
ib

n
op

un
ala
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an
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am

Ke
sw

Gh
Af

bi
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r
hi
or

Rw
Za
au

Bu
M
am
t
th

Ta
Et
m
N
M
Bo
M
u

Zi

oz
So

Source: United Nations Energy Statistics Database.

| 27
 Electricity network

In the recent past, investment priority has been given to electricity generation rather than
transmission. Despite some network expansion, the progress on ‘last mile’ connections has
been slow, particularly to the nearly four in five households living in rural areas. The rural
electrification rate in Ethiopia is 32%, which is an improvement on 22% in 2010, but over
the same period the rural electrification rate in Kenya increased from 7% to 72%.49 The
electrification rate in urban areas in Ethiopia is higher at 92%, up from 85% in 2010.
In its National Electrification Program (NEP), published in 2017, the Government set a target
of 100% connection by 2025, with 35% being connected off-grid and 65% connected on-
grid.50 This is ambitious, given the current rate is under 50% and that increasing on-grid
access remains the responsibility of the state through the Ethiopian Electric Utility (EEU).
Off-grid projects have been opened to the private sector and are attracting strong interest,
which should help achieve the 35% target. For example, Lotus Energy are to provide 500MW
of solar in the Tigray region,51 although this may be delayed due to the current conflict in the
region.
The challenge in urban areas is the reliability of supply. Only a fifth of households have 24/7
supply.52 Electricity reliability is cited as the main operational constraint for small firms.
Frequent power outages, both for manufacturing industries and the services sector, force
firms to use costly generators and lower production capacity, leading to a loss of customers
and market share.53 In its focus on increasing electricity capacity, the Government has not
given sufficient attention to the maintenance, including upgrading, of existing infrastructure.

Electricity prices
Electricity prices in Ethiopia are subsidised, resulting in one of the lowest tariffs in sub-
Saharan Africa. Even without subsidies, electricity tariffs would still be low. According to the
Ethiopian Electric Utility (EEU), the current costs for electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution are, on average, $0.09 per kilowatt-hour (kWh), while existing tariffs lie
between $0.04 and $0.06 per kWh.54
Ethiopia’s electricity sector faces issues similar to other African power markets, including low
electricity prices that do not reflect the real cost of electricity. The Ethiopian Government is
revising the existing tariff rate structure to achieve cost recovery, and to incentivise private
sector participation in the power market, which is nascent.55 The tariff reform involves minor
price increases for the first 12 months, followed by higher increases for the following 36
months. Customers consuming fewer than 50 kWh of electricity per month will witness
no change in electricity prices. Households or firms that consume more electricity will
experience higher costs per kWh.56
Like many other ‘backbone’ services in Ethiopia, certain electricity services remain firmly in
the hands of the public sector.

28 |
Figure 4: Price per kWh, U.S. Dollar

Stronger Weaker
0.30

0.25
Price per kWh, U.S. Dollar

0.20

0.15

0.10

0.05

0.00
ia

na

wi

co

ia

ca

da
iu
bi

an

ni

ny
bw

qu
ib
op

fri
ala

oc
wa

an
rit
m

za

am

Ke
Gh

bi
ba

hA
hi

or

Rw
Za

au
n

M
ts

m
Ta
Et

N
M
Bo

M
a

ut
Zi

oz

So
M
Source: Global Petrol Prices 2020.

Recommendations
Opening the sector to more private sector involvement and reforming electricity pricing
structures will help address some of the challenges within the sector, but these reforms represent
a significant step change for the sector, which necessitates a strong independent regulator.
• The Government should continue its negotiated approach to resolve issues with Egypt and
South Sudan over water access from the Blue Nile.
• The Government should consider developing a 2040 strategy that sets out a timetable for
reviewing opportunities for electricity generation, with a roadmap towards greater electricity
diversification.
• The Government should strengthen the regulatory capacities of Ethiopian Energy Authority
across the whole electricity network, to ensure its independence and professional capacity.
• The Ethiopian Energy Authority should consider issuing licences for on-grid distribution and
transmission services, to accelerate the electrification programme.
• The Government should try to secure more private sector participation in off-grid projects,
including solar and geo-thermal.
• The Government should undertake ‘keep the lights on’ maintenance of existing transmission
and distribution assets, to ensure improved electricity reliability.

| 29
 Water management

The Federal Constitution provides that the water resources of the country are publicly owned
and that the federal Government has the overall mandate to determine the “management,
administration and utilisation of the waters that are inter-regional and trans-boundary in
nature, while Regional States have the mandate to administer the water resources within
their respective States in accordance with federal laws.”57 Therefore, the federal Government
has a primary role in determining the manner in which the country’s water resources will be
managed and utilised for various development purposes.58 Reforms since 2005 have given
town water supply services greater autonomy.59 National policies for water supply and
sanitation are set by the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy (MoWIE). Regional Water
Bureaus and Woreda Water Desks oversee investment planning, monitoring and technical
assistance to water service providers. In rural areas, community water and sanitation
committees operate water systems and promote sanitation. Private sector involvement in
the water and sanitation sector is limited and mainly based in Addis Ababa.60,61

Groundwater resources
Known as the ‘water tower of Africa’, Ethiopia has considerable surface and groundwater
resources from its 12 river basins, which supply 80% of the water in the Blue Nile. Despite
the abundant provision of natural water, only 36% of the population has access to a clean
water supply and of these only 7% has access to adequate sanitation services, with access in
rural areas even lower.62

Figure 5: Access to piped water

Stronger Weaker
100
Global Median
90
80
Percentage of population

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
s

ia

co

da

ia

ia

na

wi
nd
iu

an

ric

ny

bi
qu

bw
ib

n
op

ala
oc

a
an
rit

m
za

ru
am

Ke
sw

Gh
Af

bi

ba
hi
or

Rw

Za
au

Bu

M
m
t

Ta
Et

m
N

M
Bo
M

a
ut

Zi
oz
So

Source: WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation 2017.

30 |
Investment in water

As part of its planning under GTPII, Government identified $1.6 billion for new water and
sanitation projects for the period 2015/16-2019/20. About 49% was planned to be provided
by the Government and 31% by donors,63 although in practice Government was not able to
mobilise those resources.
Focussed attention has been given to extending water access in the country, possibly due to
pressure to achieve SDG 6 – to “ensure the availability and sustainable management of water
and sanitation for all”. As a result of this pressure, there has been less attention paid to the
essential need to maintain the existing system.64
The decentralisation of the water sector has led to nearly 1,500 local water services across
the country, resulting in a highly fragmented service provision framework.65 A lack of
coordination between the various water agencies at federal, regional, and local levels has
led to poor management information, slow-moving supply chains and a lack of adequate
funding at the local level, resulting in poor identification and repair of water-point failure.66

Irrigation
Only 5% of land in Ethiopia is irrigated, although this is a substantial increase since 2002.67
The Government has focussed on increasing irrigated arable land area, including dedicating
over $7.5 billion to this activity through the 2010-2020 National Agriculture Investment
Plan.68
There are strong economic arguments for increasing the amount of irrigated land in Ethiopia,
with estimated rates of return of 7-12% for large- and small-scale irrigation development.69
Even at a household level, those that use irrigation have over twice the average income of
households that do not.70
Countries that have been most successful in expanding irrigation are those that have
engaged the private sector. For example, Morocco has made extensive use of public-private
partnerships which encourage greater private sector involvement in the irrigation sector
and now has over 20% of irrigated land. This programme offers long-term leases on land for
private investors to develop new agricultural projects.71

Recommendations
• The Government should consider expanding water supply infrastructure and increasing
access to sanitation services, through greater involvement of the private sector.
• The Government should ensure it can maintain existing infrastructure, ensuring a
coordinated approach across federal, regional, and local agencies.
• The Government should accelerate land irrigation, through public/private sector style
partnerships, e.g. as in the case of Morocco.

| 31
 BORDER ADMINISTRATION (ETHIOPIA RANK: 109TH)
Inefficient and slow bureaucratic trade barriers limit the effectiveness, efficiency, and dynamism
of economies, with greater barriers often connected to corruption and cronyism. Our measure of
Border Administration considers the time and cost of a country’s customs procedures.
The amount of time and cost it takes to comply with customs-related regulations and
procedures are both high in Ethiopia, resulting in a global ranking of 109th for Border
Administration.
Multiple documents are required for export (on average eight documents are required to
export from Ethiopia, compared with fewer than five for Bangladesh). Smaller Ethiopian
firms face burdensome delays in arranging trade-related payments, due to problems in
obtaining foreign exchange.72 A lack of clarity around government rules and anti-competitive
practices exists in shipping and transport, all of which add to the shipping and export costs of
Ethiopian goods.73 The Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ECRA), now the Ministry
of Revenue, has been identified as the weakest-performing agency by firms because of its
lengthy bureaucratic processes.74
In a 2016 survey, nearly a third of cases (31%) reported as burdensome were due to
compliance with Ethiopian national regulations on exports: export clearance, licences,
subsidies, price controls and other export-related procedures.75 Many cases cited delays in
export clearance inspections conducted by the Ministry of Revenue (formerly ERCA) due
to long queues to access inspection sites, problems with network connections used by the
Ministry of Revenue and delays in confirming the similarity between samples taken for
analysis and the shipment itself.
Nearly one in two importers reported that burdens were due to pre-shipment inspections.
“Ethiopian importers often refer to clearance delays of their products due to officials’
lack of technical expertise, the numerous ‘windows’ to visit for procedures, changes in
rules that are not properly disseminated, the inexistence of electronic means to facilitate
clearance, such as electronic signature, and issues related to coordination with other
agencies in charge of conformity assessments. Importers refer to limited facilities in some
customs offices and dry ports.”76 In addition, “One in every five importers complained of
the compulsory use of the Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise (ESLSE)
and said that the lack of ships and trucks from this service provider creates import
bottlenecks.”77
Formerly, at least 75% of additional costs and delays in shipping had been “due to
administrative hurdles - multiple customs procedures, tax procedures, clearances and cargo
inspections.”78 To streamline processes and digitise procedures, the Ethiopian Customs
Commission launched the Electronic Single Window (eSW) on 1 January 2020. The eSW
system connects the 16 major cross-border regulatory agencies and enables traders to
submit documents and receive electronic permits for import and export through a single
window.

32 |
Figure 6: Time to comply with border regulations and procedures

250 Weaker Stronger

200

150
Hours

100

Global Median
50

0
a

ia

ca

wi

da

ia

co

na
nd

iu
ni

bi

an

ny
bw

qu
ib
op

fri

ala

oc
an

wa
rit
m
za

ru

am
Ke
Gh

bi
ba

hA
hi

or
Rw
Za

au
n

Bu

ts
m
Ta

Et
m

Bo
M
a
ut
Zi

oz
So

M
Source: World Bank Doing Business Index 2019.

There were some teething problems: there was an internet shutdown around the time of
the launch and there were queues at the Ministry to obtain login details. Nonetheless, the
Ethiopian eSW Service Program Office announced that during its first six months, around
4,000 traders had started using the system, which they estimate to have resulted in
efficiency savings of $0.41 million and more than 400,000 working hours. A total of 150,000
traders are expected to join the system.79,80 According to the World Bank, the eSW system
has helped eliminate the need to apply for and obtain permits face-to-face from the Ministry
of Trade for each export shipment, saving time and reducing transport costs.81
A second phase of the project will connect more regulatory agencies, including the Ethiopian
Shipping & Logistics Services Enterprise, to the eSW, which is expected further to reduce
trade times from 13 to just three days.82
As part of the Modjo Dry Port expansion, the World Bank has supported the development
and implementation of a modern record keeping, planning, and monitoring system. This is a
positive step in helping to reduce time to export and import.

Recommendations
• The Government should continue the process of rolling out the Electronic Single Window
(eSW) to all traders and across agencies.
• The Government should consider steps to improve coordination between various agencies
and to streamline and remove duplicate processes.
• The Government should consider upskilling agencies involved in import/export (the Ministry
of Revenue, The Ethiopian Conformity Assessment Enterprise, the Ministry of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, and the Ethiopian Food and Drug Administration) to have a client-
focussed mindset and capability, especially to carry out inspections.

| 33
 OPEN MARKET SCALE (ETHIOPIA RANK: 129TH)
The size of the economic opportunity for producers is constrained by the scale of the domestic
and international markets that are open to them. Tariffs on goods faced by exporters in many
countries can prevent those firms from selling goods, inhibiting their ability to compete in
the global market. We measure the extent to which producers have access to domestic and
international markets unhindered by tariffs, and the tariffs faced in destination markets.
Ethiopia ranks 129th for Open Market Scale. It has benefitted from increased international
access for goods and services, securing preferential market access to the European Union,
China, United States, India, and other major markets. The African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA) established a free trade area across Africa beginning in January 2021 (see box). It
has seen a reduction in tariffs applied to exports in destination markets. However, businesses
cite compliance with regulations and technical requirements, imposed by domestic
authorities and those in destination markets, acting as barriers to exporting.83 For exporters,
69% of cases reported as burdensome involved demonstrating that products comply with
regulations (43%) or private standards (26%) in destination markets.

African Continental Free Trade Area

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a free trade area established in 2018, with
free trade becoming operational as of 1 January 2021. It was created by the African Continental
Free Trade Agreement, brokered by the African Union. It is the first part of Agenda 2063, a
strategic plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future. The Agreement
initially requires members to remove tariffs from 90% of goods, allowing free access to
commodities, goods, and services across the continent among 54 of the 55 African Union nations;
Eritrea is not part of the Agreement.
The general objectives of the agreement are to:
• create a single market, deepening the economic integration of the continent.
• establish a liberalised market through multiple rounds of negotiations aiding the movement
of capital and people and facilitating investment.
• move towards the establishment of a future continental customs union.
• achieve sustainable and inclusive socioeconomic development, gender equality and
structural transformations within member states.
• enhance competitiveness of member states within Africa and in the global market.
• encourage industrial development through diversification and regional value chain
development, agricultural development, and food security.
• resolve challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships.
Ethiopia and 34 other countries are currently trading under the Agreement, which will open new
opportunities for Ethiopia’s goods and services exports. Ethiopia has also recently signed the
framework agreement of the African Continental Free Trade Area, under COMESA - Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, which provides preferential access to 21 African countries.
The future of COMESA is unclear, however, given AfCFTA essentially supersedes it.

34 |
For a country of Ethiopia’s size and level of development, exports would typically account
for around a quarter of total GDP,84 whereas they accounted for around a third of that in
2016. Ethiopia is dependent on a narrow set of export goods – coffee, vegetables, sesame
seeds, kidney beans, and fresh-cut roses make up 68% of exports.85 This reliance on a few
primary commodities leaves Ethiopia vulnerable to price volatility and potential impact
on trade.86 While the Government has prescribed various export and import incentives to
diversify the types of goods exported, research shows that the enabling environment, such as
the specialist infrastructure, skilled labour and local production capacity, is weak, restricting
diversification.87
The Government has enforced several export bans to protect domestic grain supplies.
However, there has been ambiguity from the Ministry of Trade and Agriculture around which
bans are still in place.88 Although the general export ban on cereals is no longer applied in
practice, it appears that it has not been revoked formally.89 Export bans create uncertainty
for producers and makes Ethiopia a less attractive destination for foreign investment.90

Recommendations
• The Government should increase exports by making more of preferential access to markets
(including AfCFTA).
• The Government should promote export diversification.
• The Government should establish a stronger dialogue with businesses to develop a more
client-focussed approach to exporting and identify and remove regulations that prevent
businesses from exporting.

IMPORT TARIFF BARRIERS (ETHIOPIA RANK: 159TH)

Typically, tariffs to trade raise the price of products and reduce the volume of trade, creating
barriers between people and the true market value of goods. We analyse the average applied
tariff rate, the complexity of tariffs, and the share of imports free of tariff duties.
High tariffs may offer some protection to domestic producers; they also reduce competition and
restrict innovation, resulting in higher prices for consumers. Tariffs push up prices in the value
chain, making final products and services more expensive to consumers in both domestic and
international markets.
Ethiopia ranks 159th for Import Tariff Barriers. Its burdensome tariff regime results in a
high proportion of goods and services (87%) being subject to import tariffs, with one of
the world’s highest average applied rates (13%). Certain goods attract a higher tariff.91
For example, textiles and processed foods attract an average tariff rate of 18% and 30%
respectively. Even higher tariffs of around 200% are applied to second-hand cars.92 Ethiopia’s
high tariffs raise substantial income for the Government.93,94

| 35
 Under the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), members are granted a 0 to 10% tariff preference (depending on the goods). Ethiopia
plans to become a full COMESA FTA member by 2021, reducing tariffs on imported goods and
services from the 20 other African nations in COMESA. From 1 January 2021, AfCFTA requires its
35 members, including Ethiopia, to remove tariffs from 90% of goods.95

Figure 7: Average applied tariff rate

Weaker Stronger
16

14

12

10
Percentage

8 Global Median
6

0
e

ia

co

wi

da

ia

na

ca

s
nd

iu
bi

an

ni

ny
bw

qu

ib
op

fri
ala
oc

wa
an

rit
m

za

ru

am
Ke
Gh

bi
ba

hA
hi

or

Rw
Za

au
n

Bu
M

ts
m
Ta
Et
m

N
M

Bo

M
a

ut
Zi

oz

So
M

Source: World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index 2019.

Figure 8: Share of imports free from tariff duties

Stronger Weaker
100
90
80
70
Global Median
Percentage

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
a

ia

ca

co

wi

na

ia
nd
iu
an

bi

nd

ni

ny
bw

qu
ib

op
fri

ala
oc

a
rit

za
ru
am

Ke
sw

Gh
bi
a
ba
hA

hi
or

Rw
Za
au

n
Bu

m
t

Ta

Et
m
N

M
Bo

a
ut

Zi

oz
So

Source: World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index 2019.

36 |
In recent years, Ethiopia has reduced customs duties on certain imports, including the
removal of tariffs on agricultural equipment, which will help the agricultural sector.
In addition to the prevalence of high tariffs, importers must jump through multiple hoops
before they can bring goods into the country. Importers are presented with a nine-step
process,96 which includes an in-person visit to the Ministry of Trade to obtain an import
license, obtaining a pre-import permit for certain goods and a two-stage payment process at
the bank, with several stages requiring extensive documentation. Importers face difficulties
in obtaining foreign exchange, due to the strict foreign currency regulatory regime applied by
the National Bank of Ethiopia.97

Recommendation
• The Government should revise the tariff schedule to assess opportunities for reducing some
tariffs and review import tariffs with a view to reducing them gradually.

| 37
Credit (Shutterstock.com)
 Endnotes
1 Sebastian Edwards, “Openness, productivity and growth: What do we really know?” The Economic Journal, Vol-
ume 108, No. 447, 1998, p. 383-398.
2 Alex de Waal, “The World Bank should not fund Ethiopia’s war in Tigray,” Financial Times, April 2021.
3 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The International Finance Corporation, 2019,
p. 29.
4 Ibid.
5 “ReCAP Impact Case study on Ethiopia,” Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, June 2019.
6 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The International Finance Corporation, 2019,
p. 6.
7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.
9 “Rural Access Index (RAI),” The Future of Transport, February 2020.
10 “ReCAP Impact Case study on Ethiopia,” Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, June 2019.
11 Ibid.
12 “Multi-dimension review of Peru, Volume 2,” OECD Development Pathways, October 2016.
13 World Economic Forum and Gallup.
14 “Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway Line Modernisation,” Railway Technology, June 2021.
15 “Addis Ababa – Djibouti Railway,” Global Infrastructure Hub, November 2020.
16 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The International Finance Corporation, 2019,
p. 49.
17 Tsegaye Tilahun, “Company Transports Over 3.4 Mln. Tons of Imports, Exports,” The Ethiopian Herald, June 2021.
18 “Africa Aviation Outlook 2019: Change may be in the air – at last,” Centre for Aviation, February 2019.
19 “Ethiopia: Aviation,” Privacy Shield Framework, March 2021.
20 “Experts urge Africa to explore “huge” aviation industry potential to spur connectivity,” Xinhua, March 2020.
21 David Casey, “Africa needs to 'get serious' over SAATM implementation,” Routes Online, 8 December 2019.
22 Ibid.
23 “The Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM),” IATA, March 2021.
24 “Case Study: Ethiopia challenges Dubai with Africa’s largest air cargo terminal,” Logistics Middle East, April 2019.
25 Ibid.
26 “Ethiopian Cargo & Logistics services wins Best Cargo Airline – Africa award,” African Aerospace, November 2020.
27 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The International Finance Corporation, 2019,
p. 48-49.
28 Yonas Bekele, “Ethiopia’s Transport Service Sector: Measuring its Value Chains and Exploiting its Potential,” June
2019.
29 “Ethiopia to build US$150M logistics hub,” Further Africa, January 2020.
30 Fasika Tadesse, “Bill afoot to establish National Logistics Council,” Addis Fortune, March 2020.
31 “Ethiopia Digital Foundations Project,” The World Bank Group, p. 7.
32 “Internet penetration in Africa 2020, Q1 March,” Internet World Stats, 2020.
33 Johann Adjovi, “The liberalisation of the telecoms market in Ethiopia presents a new opportunity to operators
worldwide,” Analysys Mason, June 2019.
34 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The International Finance Corporation, 2019,
p. 36.
35 Johann Adjovi, “The liberalisation of the telecoms market in Ethiopia presents a new opportunity to operators
worldwide,” Analysys Mason, July 2019, p. 4.
36 “Network Coverage (minimum 3G) rankings,” Inclusive Internet Index, 2020.
37 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The International Finance Corporation, 2019,
p. 26.
38 Johann Adjovi, “The liberalisation of the telecoms market in Ethiopia presents a new opportunity to operators
worldwide,” Analysys Mason, July 2019, p. 5.
39 Yohannes Eneyew Ayalew, “Internet shutdowns have disrupted millions of lives in Ethiopia,” Quartz Africa, April
2020.
40 Roku Fukui, “In Ethiopia, digital development just took a major leap forward,” World Bank Blogs, June 2019.

38 |
41 Tenzin Norbhu, “Myanmar’s telecom sector takes off,” The World Bank Group, December 2015.
42 Johann Adjovi, “The liberalisation of the telecoms market in Ethiopia presents a new opportunity to operators
worldwide,” Analysys Mason, July 2019, p. 5.
43 “Ethiopia plans to sell 45% of telecoms monopoly Ethio,” Reuters, November 2020.
44 Addis Getachew, “Global consortium wins Ethiopia’s telecom license for $850M,” AA, May 2021.
45 Fasika Tadesse and Samuel Gebre, “Ethiopia Awards New Telecoms License to Vodafone Consortium,” Bloomberg,
May 2021.
46 Alan Burkitt-Gray, “Ethiopia drops rule that new telcos must use Ethio Telecom infrastructure,” Capacity Media,
May 2021.
47 “Developing Ethiopia: First-mover Investment Opportunities,” Deloitte, May 2016, p. 4.
48 Mesfin Tafesse, Mekdes Mezgebu and Efliel Wabi, “Electricity regulation in Ethiopia: overview,” Mesfin Tafesse &
Associates Law Office, October 2020.
49 “Access to electricity, urban (% of urban population) - Ethiopia, Kenya,” World Bank, Sustainable Energy for All,
The World Bank Group, March 2021.
50 “National Electrification Program 2.0 Integrated Planning for Universal Access,” Ministry of Water, Irrigation, and
Energy, and Ethiopian Electric Utility, 2019, p. XV.
51 “Lotus signs world’s largest renewable energy contract,” Lotus Energy, November 2020.
52 “Ethiopia: Energy Access Diagnostic Report Based on the Multi-Tier Framework,” The World Bank Group, January
2018, p. x.
53 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The International Finance Corporation, 2019,
p. 26.
54 Abebe Damte Beyene, “Impacts and drivers of policies for electricity access,” Energy and Economic Growth, June
2021.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Imeru Tamrat, “Policy and Legal Framework for Water Resources Management in Ethiopia,” Forum of Federations,
2008.
58 Ibid.
59 “Tapping into the private sector?” WaterAid Ethiopia, December 2005.
60 Eyob Defere, “Private Sector Landscape for WASH in Ethiopia Bottlenecks and opportunities,” IRC: The Hague,
One WASH Plus Programme Report, December 2015.
61 Ibid.
62 Rebecca Shore, “Water in Crisis: Ethiopia,” the Water Project, March 2021.
63 “Finance Assessment of the Water Sector in Ethiopia,” IRC, May 2019.
64 Florence Pichon, “Rural water supply in Ethiopia, A political economy analysis,” Overseas Development Institute,
July 2019, p. 1.
65 “Finance Assessment of the Water Sector in Ethiopia,” IRC, May 2019, p. 7.
66 Florence Pichon, “Rural water supply in Ethiopia: A political economy analysis,” Overseas Development Institute,
December 2019, p. 7.
67 “WATER-WISE, Smart Irrigation Strategies for Africa,” The Malabo Montpellier Panel Report, 2018, p. 30.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 “Trade barriers,” Ethiopia Country Commercial Guide, International Trade Administration, October 2020.
73 Tilahun Esmael Kassahun, “Trade Facilitation in Ethiopia: The Role of WTO Accession in Domestic Reform,” Mizan
Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, September 2014, p. 146.
74 Abdi Yuya Ahmad and Moges Tufa Adinew, “Evaluating the impact of export promotion policy incentives in the
Ethiopian manufacturing sector,” Competitive Industries and Innovation Program, June 2018, p. 21.
75 Ethiopia: Company Perspectives. An ITC Series on Non-Tariff Measures,” International Trade Centre, September
2018, p. vii.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Dan Ciuriak, “Supply and Demand Side Constraints As Barriers For Ethiopian Exports - Policy Options,” BKP Devel-
opment Research and Consulting, Trade and Development Discussion Paper No. 2, March 2010, p. 12.

| 39
 79 Hizkel Hailu, “Esw Service Cuts 18 Million Birr, 400 Thousand Working Hours in 6 Months,” All Africa, July 2020.
80 Gelila Samuel, “Commission Obliges Import-Export Permit Issuance via E-Service,” Addis Fortune, July 2020.
81 In Ethiopia, Electronic Single Window Cuts Costs and Time to Trade,” The World Bank Group, April 2020.
82 Ibid.
83 “Ethiopia: Company Perspectives. An ITC Series on Non-Tariff Measures,” International Trade Centre, September
2018.
84 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The International Finance Corporation, 2019,
p. 10.
85 “Ethiopia: Company Perspectives. An ITC Series on Non-Tariff Measures,” International Trade Centre, September
2018, p. 5.
86 Ibid.
87 Abdi Yuya Ahmad and Moges Tufa Adinew, “Evaluating the impact of export promotion policy incentives in the
Ethiopian manufacturing sector,” Competitive Industries and Innovation Program, June 2018, p. 3.
88 “Cereals Export Restrictions in Ethiopia: A Review of Practice, Economic Costs and Benefits,” Ethiopian Agricultural
Transformation Agency, November 2019, p. 4.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 “Ethiopia, Import Tariffs,” Ethiopia Country Commercial Guide, International Trade Administration, October 2020.
92 Immanuel Igunza, “Why are cars so expensive in Ethiopia?” BBC News, January 2017.
93 “Ethiopia, Import Tariffs,” Ethiopia Country Commercial Guide, International Trade Administration, October 2020.
94 Chad P. Brown and Douglas A. Irwin, “Mainly Poor Countries Use Tariffs as a Major Source of Government Rev-
enue,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, July 2019.
95 Kingsley Ighobor, “Africa readying for free trade come January 2021,” Africa Renewal, November 2020.
96 “Import Profile Report 2020: Ethiopia,” Trade and Investment Section, Embassy of Pakistan, Addis Ababa, March
2020.
97 “Ethiopia, Import Tariffs,” Ethiopia Country Commercial Guide, International Trade Administration, October 2020.

40 |
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Credit (iStock.com)
42 |
Credit (Shutterstock.com)
INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT
(ETHIOPIA RANK: 151ST)
Ideas and businesses need investment to develop and grow effectively. Long-established
businesses and new entrepreneurs alike need investment, and investors need the protection and
confidence to back them. If investors do not have secure property rights, investment becomes
scarce.
Effective and broad-based allocation of capital is critical to unlocking the country’s economic
opportunities. A good investment environment will ensure that domestic and foreign financing is
available for commercial ventures, allowing microenterprises to grow into large companies.
The potential for a prosperous Ethiopia could be enhanced by property rights that are
administered efficiently and in an open and transparent manner. Prosperity could also be
supported by a robust and competitive financial sector, with domestic and international
participants, providing access to competitive services for all sectors of the private sector and
individuals.
Ethiopia’s Investment Environment has not kept pace over the past decade, resulting in a fall
of 23 places in the global rankings to 151st.
Weak property rights exist in Ethiopia, particularly in relation to land expropriation.
Outdated bankruptcy legislation does not reflect a modern business environment,
resulting in weak investor protection. On the positive side, a reduction in the time it takes
to resolve commercial disputes and an improvement in alternative dispute mechanisms
has led Ethiopia to rise 25 places in the rankings for Contract Enforcement, to 89th. The
recent ratification of the new Investment Law and upcoming reforms to the Commercial
Code may bring about further reforms of the financial sector. The heavily state-controlled
banking system is focussed on supporting state-owned enterprises rather than the private
sector. It does not put the private sector at the centre of the economic growth model. Poor
commercial independence and transparency in state-owned enterprises further constrains
the investment environment.

Elements of Investment Environment

Property Rights – how well property rights over land, assets and intellectual property are protected.
In addition to the protection of these rights, there must be lawful, efficient, and effective systems in
place to register and regulate property.
Investor Protection – the degree of investor protection, including the quality of corporate
governance, minority shareholder rights, and strength of insolvency regimes.
Contract Enforcement – the efficacy and efficiency of a country’s system to enforce the rights of
a contract holder. In addition, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms must be accessible and
efficient.
Financing Ecosystem – the availability of money for investment from sources such as banking and
bank debt to corporate debt and more sophisticated financial markets.
Restrictions on International Investment – the impact of policies that enhance or deter the volume
and quality or type of international investment into a country.

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 PROPERTY RIGHTS (ETHIOPIA RANK: 156TH)
Property rights are a key institution that makes it possible to accumulate wealth and effectively
participate in commerce. Where property rights are weak, people avoid taking risks, and this
has a substantial impact on investment and the levels of effective entrepreneurial activity
and wealth accumulation. The risks to property rights range from expropriation to limits on
repatriations of profits and restrictions on the sale or transfer of assets. Our measure of Property
Rights captures how well rights over land, assets, and intellectual property are protected.
Property Rights have weakened in Ethiopia over the past decade because of the increased
risk of expropriation, now ranking 156th globally. Weak property rights are partly the result of
a political system where the executive has not been constrained in their exercise of power,
a poorly applied legal and regulatory framework by a politicised judiciary, and an overall
system characterised by vulnerability to corruption and weak administrative capacity.1

Figure 9: Protection of property rights

Stronger Weaker
6

5
Global Median
Expert survey (1-7)

0
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co

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Source: World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index.

One of the findings from the comprehensive review of property rights commissioned by the
Chamber of Commerce in 2013 stated that “there are ambiguities, inconsistencies, gaps and
outdated features in the legislative protection of some property rights in Ethiopia."2 Others
have observed that the exercise of any legal property right in Ethiopia is not truly effective,
because the constitutionally guaranteed right to private property can easily be abused and
violated.3

Land law
Land ownership in Ethiopia resides with the state, as set out in the 1995 Constitution. The
Government allows leasing, sharecropping and inheritance (see box). “Private property is not
protected by law and the state, which leads to a further estrangement between state and
society.”4 Given the importance of land to the Ethiopian economy, particularly for agriculture
and manufacturing, this lack of protection results in uncertainty for businesses and foreign
investors.

44 |
Evolution of Land Law in Ethiopia
The 1975 Derg land reform entitled each household to an amount of land, conditional on self-
cultivation and permanent presence on the location. Peasant associations were created at Kebele
(community) level to administer these rules and redistribute land to improve efficiency.
The EPRDF/TPLF 1995 Constitution sets out the legal framework that governs the land and its use
and provides for additional legislation at federal and regional levels.5 Land proclamations in 2005
allow for urban land to be divided into private holding (peasants, semi-pastoralists, pastoralists),
communal holding and state holdings, and that all land in urban areas will be transferred to the
leaseholds system.
In 1997, the Government allowed for the leasing and sharecropping of land and inheritance of
land usage rights, introducing a national programme for the certification of land, starting in Tigray
in 1998 and in the Amhara region in 2001. The Amhara region has one of the most liberal land
regimes, with a clear process for leasing or bequeathing of land to family or to other farmers.6

Land expropriation

Land issues are among the most controversial issues in Ethiopia.7 Land and any property on
the land can be expropriated by Government for undefined ‘public purpose.’ Public purpose
includes leasing the land for private investment for commercial farms, industrial parks, or
infrastructure. In the last 5-6 years, over 3.6 million hectares of land have been allocated
to foreign investors, with thousands of local farmers losing access to land.8 In 2014, up to
70,000 people were forced to move from the western Gambella region.9
Some regional governments have developed regulations for expropriation and compensation.
However, wide discretion is given to multiple administrative authorities without judicial
scrutiny, which leads to discretionary and arbitrary administrative decisions and inconsistent
court rulings, thereby undermining the protection of property rights.10
Most of the issues related to the expropriation of rural land apply also to urban land lease-
holding, including the risks of administrative discretion in applying the definition of ‘public
purposes’ and weak processes for compensation and complaint procedures.11
The definitional deficiency in legislation results in judicial protection being marginalised, but
there are also challenges to judicial independence and competence.12 Judiciary judgments
discourage the expansion of family businesses and rental markets, disregard the use value of
land to which an individual or legal person is entitled and allow administrative authorities to
confer and revoke landholding titles at will.13
The uncertainty over land in Ethiopia is a concern. For example, the most recent World Bank
partnership strategy, concludes that land is a key constraint to business development (in
both rural and urban settings) and that it is important to address the risk of social unrest
because of resettlement disputes and land issues.14
Conflicts due to land expropriation led the US State Department in 2020 to advise US
investors to conduct thorough due diligence on land titles at both regional and federal
levels and conduct consultations with local communities regarding the proposed use of the
land before investing. They also advised researching the attitudes of local communities to
an investor’s use of that land, particularly in the region of Oromia, where conflict between
international investors and local communities has occurred.15 The US State Department

| 45
 acknowledged that although the Government claims to allocate only sparsely settled or
empty land to investors, some people have been resettled. Traditional grazing land has often
been defined as empty and expropriated, leading to resentment, protests and, in some cases,
conflict.

Land administration and use

Multiple institutions, coordinating weakly and responsible for administering land rights,
operate at federal, regional, and local levels, leading to ambiguity in responsibilities.16 The
responsibility for implementing land legislation and regulations resides with the Ministry
of Agriculture (rural land use and tenure) and the Ministry of Urban Development and
Construction (urban land). In addition, the Agriculture Investment Land Administration
Agency (set up in 2013) is responsible for large-scale agricultural investments. The Rural Land
Administration & Use Directorate (RLAUD), under the state minister for natural resources
development, conservation, and utilisation, is responsible for overseeing land use and land
tenure of rural lands outside large-scale agricultural investment lands.
Regional states have also formulated their own land policies and land laws, including
regulations and directives that relate to local levels.
Urban land management and administration is made more difficult by a complex
institutional environment with fragmented institutions. Urban land administration services
are provided at city level by regional governments under federal supervision.17 There is some
evidence that this situation has negatively affected the registration pilots of urban land.18
The lack of a comprehensive urban land cadastre limits urban development plans and the
enforcement of regulations and makes it more difficult to achieve more efficient use of land.
The absence of a comprehensive national land use policy is impacting the effectiveness of
rural land use regulations in Ethiopia.

Land certification
There has been considerable progress on land certification in Ethiopia, which is considered an
effective way to reduce land disputes and enhance tenure security among landholders and
users.19 Land use rights have been registered in most populated areas. There are also some
success stories in rural land administration in Ethiopia, specifically in first-level registration
and certification. Out of 11.5 million rural households, 9.4 million have received first-level
holding certificates. The certification programme has resulted in some positive benefits
– it has led to reduced conflict and improved investment, and to some improvements of
women’s control of land, but the quality of record updating varies across regions.20
Land certification in the Amhara region was one of the largest programmes across the
country and has been rolled out gradually. Reviews suggest that its administration seems
to be well structured and supports the approach of strengthening good governance in land
administration at local/village level.21
To help address some of the challenges around land and provide some certainty to foreign
investors, other nations including the United States and the United Kingdom have been
active in supporting land certification programmes in Ethiopia, with the US providing support
for land registration since 2005. A recent impact evaluation found relatively small impacts
of the US’s latest approach to certification,22 although it does appear to have improved
women’s land rights, as traditional law (supported by the Constitution) often limits women’s
right to inheritance.
Despite the extensive land certification programme, registration and certification of rural

46 |
land holdings is conducted without formally enacted registration and cadastral laws,
which potentially raises challenges when it comes to relying on this certification when
administering land.23

Recommendations
• The Government should consider introducing legislation that protects property rights of
citizens and supports a fair system of compensation.
• The Government should consider developing a comprehensive national land use policy that
is consistent and reflects the approach followed in different regions. It should encourage
collaboration between federal and regional agencies and between neighbouring areas.
• The Government should conduct a full consultation with local communities before
expropriating land, which minimises involuntary displacement and gives fair compensation
when deemed necessary.
• The Government should strengthen judiciary capability (including training through a new
supervisory body) to ensure the full protection of property rights with integrity.

INVESTOR PROTECTION (ETHIOPIA RANK: 143RD)

Investor Protection is important for any country wishing to enjoy sustained economic growth,
as they are a necessary enabler of the flow of capital to ventures.24 Our measure of Investor
Protection covers a range of indicators that gauge investor protection, from expropriation risk to
minority shareholder rights.
Investor protections have weakened in the last decade, and Ethiopia now ranks 143rd in
the world. Bankruptcy legislation has become outdated, with the insolvency recovery rate
deteriorating by 15% over the last decade.25 Experts report a deterioration in the quality of
auditing and reporting standards in the country and a lack of independence and transparency
surrounding state-owned enterprises.

Bankruptcy
The Ethiopian Commercial Code (Book V), which sets out the provisions around bankruptcy
proceedings, was created over 60 years ago. While progressive and forward-looking when
it was published in 1958, the legislation is no longer adequate to regulate a business
environment that has seen considerable developments over the past 60 years. Furthermore,
in drafting it, Ethiopia borrowed provisions from the legal frameworks in Italy and France,
which represented a different socio-political context and consequently led to limited
contextualisation within the legislation.26
Reflecting the views of bankruptcy at the time of its enactment, the legislation primarily
supports liquidation rather than restructure or reorganisation, which saw bankruptcy as a
“moral failure”.27 This is evidenced in the low insolvency recovery rate, which stands at 27%,
well below the sub-Saharan Africa average, and below even comparator countries such as
Kenya and Mozambique. This is compounded by the practice of foreclosure laws, which act

| 47
 against restructuring or reorganisation.28 Consequently, Ethiopia ranks 135th for the overall
strength of its insolvency framework.29

Figure 10: Insolvency recovery rate

Stronger Weaker
80

70

60

50
Percentage

40 Global Median

30

20

10

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Source: World Bank Doing Business Index.

The out-of-date nature of the legislation is reflected in the fact that application of
bankruptcy procedures is limited in Ethiopia, and cases might not even make it to court.30
When it is applied, it is often done so in a way that better reflects the current commercial
environment, which tends to view bankruptcy procedures as “debtor protection” and
“economic failure”, rather than the idea of “moral failure” and “debtor repression.”31

Auditing and reporting

Ethiopia’s Commodity Exchange signalled a change in accounting standards in 2009, stating
that all companies would be required to adhere to full IFRS standards and IFRS for small
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) by 2021.32 However, with fewer than 500 professional
accountants in Ethiopia, an accountancy knowledge gap presents a challenge if the country
is to achieve full compliance by 202133 and improve its current global ranking of 136th for
auditing and reporting standards.

Corporate governance
Ethiopia has fallen behind its peers to rank 117th on shareholder governance. Unlike the other
countries, it has not improved its weak corporate governance, according to corporate and
securities lawyers.
A particular area of weakness for corporate governance has been the lack of independence
around the structure and composition of state-owned enterprise (SOE) boards of directors,
which have sometimes comprised senior government officials and politically affiliated
individuals.34 Furthermore, until recently there was no requirement for the SOEs to publish
their financial data, which results in a lack of transparency.35 Following an IMF review, in

48 |
an effort to enhance SOE governance and transparency, the SOE authorities provided IMF
staff with individual financial statements for the majority of the companies, including
previously unavailable time series of SOE debt broken down by company.36 This undermines
the creation of a level playing field, limiting competition between the public and private
sector. EFFORT’s top officials, for example, included government and party officials and it has
not been audited, with little transparency over its governance and corporate management
structures.
In 2019, the Government established the Public Enterprises Holding and Administration
Agency, whose role includes developing modern corporate governance in public enterprises
and supervising the governance and management of these enterprises.
As Ethiopia embarks on its programme of privatisation reform of its largest enterprises,
commencing with Ethio telecom in 2021, many of these institutions have not adhered to
international guidelines on corporate governance.

Recommendations
• The Government should consider amending Bankruptcy and Foreclosure Laws to facilitate a
move to a culture that promotes business recovery.
• The Government should consider granting an independent body responsibility for overseeing
corporate governance of state-owned enterprises, ensuring they publish audited accounts
and improve transparency.
• The Government should consider requesting government educational institutions to
introduce training and courses to teach international accounting standards.

| 49
 CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT (ETHIOPIA RANK: 89TH)
Contract Enforcement is a critical proxy for trust, allowing economies of scale to grow beyond
one’s immediate circle of associates and family. Delays and costs in resolving contract disputes
benefit neither party. Our measure captures both the efficacy and efficiency of a country’s
system to enforce the rights of a contract holder.
Contract enforcement has improved, resulting in Ethiopia now ranking 89th. It takes less time
to resolve commercial disputes and practices within the court system have been improving.
The ratification of the new Investment Law in January 2020 offers alternatives for the
resolution of disputes.

Dispute resolution
The reform of Ethiopia’s Commercial Code should bring it in line with international best
practice. Unlike countries such as Rwanda and Kenya, Ethiopia at present has no specialised
courts for dealing with commercial cases, although, the federal and state courts do contain
specialised branches.37 The revised code will enable the creation of a commercial court under
the regular court system.38
Another area of reform is in arbitration, where in April 2021 Ethiopia enacted its new
arbitration law, the Arbitration and Conciliation Working Procedure. It applies to commercial
domestic arbitrations and international arbitrations whose seat is in Ethiopia. While
it generally aligns with the best practices in international arbitration, except for a few
provisions, the success of the law will be determined in its application by the Ethiopian
courts.39 At present arbitration is regulated by the Civil Procedure Code.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms can be an effective option, as they
can significantly improve court efficiency by reducing case backlogs and bottlenecks.40
Alternative dispute mechanisms are currently weak in Ethiopia, a ranking of 140th on the
measure by the World Justice Project. Ethiopia took a significant first step towards addressing
this weakness when, in August 2020, the Government ratified the New York Arbitration
Convention, becoming the 33rd African state to do so.41 This enables a foreign arbitral awards
to be enforced in Ethiopia, marking an improvement in the business environment for foreign
companies.42

Recommendations
• The Government should consider instituting a legal supervisory body to train judges to
adjudicate effectively on commercial matters (as happened in Rwanda’s successful reforms).
• The Government should ensure new arbitration law complies with international best
practice, including giving consideration to adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law.

50 |
FINANCING ECOSYSTEM (ETHIOPIA RANK: 143RD)
A sound financial system underpins prosperity, as it can efficiently flow funds toward their most
productive uses, helping generate jobs and improve productivity. It also helps governments raise
investment capital, maintain financial safety nets and speed payments securely across borders.
It gives people confidence to invest and save money. Capital markets help finance infrastructure
and manage unforeseeable risk.
“Good access to finance enables people to thrive and better manage their needs, expand their
opportunities, and improve their living standards. When people are financially included, it is
easier to manage consumption, payments and savings, access better housing, healthcare,
and education, start a small business, and use insurance products to protect themselves from
shocks.”43
Ethiopia ranks 143rd in the world for financing ecosystems. However, the finance sector
remains shallow, underdeveloped and focussed on state-owned enterprises, which results in
generally low rankings across the board.44 SME access to finance is limited, and the quality
and soundness of the banking system and the performance of capital markets is weak.
Ethiopia is one of the most underbanked countries in the world, providing limited services to
the wider public, which particularly affects the rural population.

Credit to the private sector

Credit to the private sector in Ethiopia is among the lowest in East Africa and declined in the
prior 10 years to about 12% of GDP in 2016.45 In contrast, credit for state-owned enterprises
trebled over the same period, reaching 54% of GDP in 2016.46 Although state-owned
enterprises have benefitted from receiving credit from state-owned banks at negative real
interest rates, the performance of these loans is uncertain given the limited transparency of
financial reporting by state-owned enterprises.47
Moreover, investment is largely closed off to foreign firms, further constraining the
development of the financial sector.48

Credit (iStock.com)

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 Ethiopia’s Financial Sector
The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) started its operations as a central bank in 1964. It issues
banking licenses and supervises banks in Ethiopia.
The two state-owned banks (The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and The Development Bank of
Ethiopia) dominate the financial sector, accounting for two-thirds of total deposits, and about
70% of total banking sector assets.49
The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia mobilises more than 60% of total bank deposits, bank loans,
and foreign exchange, directs a large share of its lending to state-owned enterprises and has used
its retail deposits to purchase bonds in public enterprises.50 The Development Bank of Ethiopia
provides loans to investors in priority sectors but has a large portfolio of non-performing loans.
The 16 private commercial banks are relatively small.
Of the 35 microfinance institutions, the five largest are owned by regional governments, with
almost 2,000 branches. Some microfinance institutions are relatively large; for example, the
Amhara Credit and Saving Institution is larger than most banks.
There are 17 insurance companies but an absence of private insurance markets outside the main
cities.

Finance policy

The Government has followed a policy of using state-controlled commercial banks to

finance public sector infrastructure investments and state-owned enterprises (including
endowment companies), rather than focussing on the credit needs of the private sector and
serving customers. Banking experts cite that the mindset, which has been present since the
1950s and 1960s, is for the banking system to ensure that the Government’s business plans
are achieved, rather than creating a thriving competitive banking system that underpins a
modern capitalist economy.51 This has contributed to low private sector investments and
limited structural transformation.
The focus is less on efficienct allocation of financial resources than on ensuring the strength
of Ethiopian banks. The National Bank of Ethiopia has regulated the financial sector so that
subsidised resources are directed to ‘preferred’ companies or to the state. The Governor of
the National Bank of Ethiopia has recently stated that “we have not [got fully operating]
international banks here; they are not allowed here because we want to make our local banks
strong”. These policies have had an impact on the financial sector and limited liquidity and
access to credit in the private sector.
For example, banks were required to allocate 60% of credit issued to long-term lending
mostly to public sector-driven infrastructure.52 The Development Bank of Ethiopia has
lent to ‘priority’ sectors with a capped interest rate and has accumulated substantial non-
performing loans.53 Banks were also required to invest 27% of loans disbursed in bills issued
by the National Bank of Ethiopia at below both inflation and deposit rates.54 Furthermore,
pension funds were required to invest in government bonds at negative rates of return,
putting them at risk in terms of meeting future pension obligations.

52 |
In recent years, the Ethiopian Government has turned to international markets as a source
of finance, relieving some of the financial repression domestically. Access to the Eurobond
market in 2014 with a $1 billion bond was an important step in supporting the financial
infrastructure in the country and facilitating foreign direct investment by pricing the country
risk. However, the recent announcement of possible default in the context of G20 debt
restructuring ran the risk of reversing important gains.
Recently, the new Government has introduced important financial reforms (see box below)
that, if sustained, have the potential to improve the sector. However, the COVID-19 crisis
postponed some reforms to make room for a large COVID-19 financing package in March
2020. The IMF has also recommended close monitoring of bank deposits and liquidity and
preparation for intervention in the financial sector with emergency lending and liquidity if
necessary.55

Recent Financial Reforms

• Treasury-bill auctions with market pricing. In December 2019, the National Bank of
Ethiopia began offering 28-day and 91-day Treasury bills at market-determined interest
rates. This expands its monetary policy tools and allows for financing the Government
in a more sustainable way. It should also allow for increases in interest rates and the
development of a government securities market.
• Elimination of the “27 percent rule,” a requirement of private banks to purchase 5-year
NBE bonds equivalent to 27% of gross credit extended (measure adopted in November
2019).
• Introducing overnight liquidity lending, but terms of access need to be reviewed and an
interbank-money market prepared.56
• Ceiling on domestic borrowing by state-owned enterprises and requirement for
publication of audited accounts.
• Phasing out IMF financing of The Development Bank of Ethiopia agreed.
• Granting representation offices to foreign-owned banks — such as Kenya’s Equity Bank
and KCB.
• Updated regulatory and supervisory standards and strengthened financial reporting and
disclosure, adhering to Basel II.
• Creating a credit reference bureau – but this covers only a small part of the population and
is not integrated with microfinance institutions and leasing.
• Removal of Ethiopia from Financial Action Task Force grey area because of improvements
in the Anti-Money Laundering/Combatting the Financing of Terrorism framework. This will
help Ethiopian banks maintain corresponding banking relations.
• Establishment of the Ethiopian stock market. Legislation is currently with Parliament for
approval.

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 Financial inclusion

The restricted financial system results in Ethiopia having one of the most underbanked
populations in the world. Ethiopians tend to use informal savings cooperatives rather than
formal financial institutions.57 Credit is also provided by international organisations and
informal institutions – cooperatives of saving and credit or Iqqub, money lenders and friends.
The bank branch to population ratio, at 1 in 25,000, is less than half the global median.58
Only 35% of the overall population has access to a bank account, compared to 82% in
Kenya and 50% in Rwanda. Banking services are largely confined to cities and larger towns,
with over one-third of bank branches in Addis Ababa.59 Only 1% of the rural population have
access to banking.60 Most of the 2,000 microfinance branches are concentrated in cities and
small towns. Consequently, rural Ethiopians save in cash, which tends to be eroded by high
inflation.
Ethiopia is an outlier in relation to digital finance services. Mobile money and digital finance
remain limited, with few people using digital banking services, including payments of
bills (see table below).61 This low usage is also a factor of poor internet infrastructure and
low levels of digital literacy. The recent reforms allowing non-financial Ethiopian firms to
participate in mobile money activities should help increase access.

Digital Financial Services: Ethiopia as an outlier

ETHIOPIA KENYA RWANDA SSA AVERAGE

Mobile money accounts (%, age 15+) 0.3 73 31 21

Debit card ownership (%, age 15+) 4 38 5 18

Made or received digital payments in

12 79 39 34
the past year (%)

Paid utility bills using a mobile phone

0 82 44 23
(% of adults who paid utility bills)

Paid utility bills using an account (% of

0.2 85 48 31
adults who paid utility bills)

Received wages into an account (% of

17 68 33 45
adults who received wages)

Received payments for agricultural

products into an account (% of adults 1 46 14 -
who received agricultural payments)

Used a mobile phone or the internet to

access a financial institution account
1 57 13 24
in the past year (% of adults aged 15+
with a financial institution account)

Source: Global Findex database. Financial inclusion in Ethiopia: 10 takeaways from the latest Findex, Mengistu Bessir, June 2018. World Bank Blog.

54 |
Benefits of liberalising financial sector

According to modelling by the World Bank, doubling the supply of funds to the private sector
– from one third to two-thirds of total credit – and allowing real deposit rates to be closer
to market interest rates – from 1% to 2.5% – could lead to a 15% increase in output and
an almost twofold increase in private investment. (These reforms could have unintended
consequences by increasing poverty and inequality, so other measures would need to be
implemented to assist those impacted).62

Recommendations
• The Government should consider further diversification of the financial sector, including
allowing foreign banks to enter the market.
• The Government should consider the removal of requirements for banks to lend to state-
owned enterprises, to allow more credit to the private sector, particularly in agriculture.
• The Government should consider ways to allow quick development of mobile banking
services, particularly in rural areas.
• The Government should provide incentives to allow banks to expand affordable banking
services to marginalised rural producers by reducing costs of micro-credits, insurance, and
the transfer of diaspora funds.
• Banks should simplify requirements and reduce the time taken to open bank accounts, to
support financial inclusion.
• Banks should open bank and microfinance branches closer to where people live.
• The Government should support the establishment of a vibrant insurance market, including
a digital market, to support households and businesses vulnerable to income shocks—for
example, through weather-related insurance.

RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT

(ETHIOPIA RANK: 163RD)
International investment shows a positive overall effect on economic growth. The benefit
of foreign direct investment (FDI) is not only the inflow of capital, but also the infusion of
managerial skills that accompany such investment. FDI brings competition in the form of
product and service innovation, new working practices and increases in productivity.
Out of 167 nations, Ethiopia is ranked 4th from the bottom for Restrictions on International
Investment, with a deteriorating performance over the last decade. The most significant
constraints have included restrictions on foreign ownership of companies, a restrictive
environment due to investment proclamations, particularly in services, and capital and
foreign exchange controls.
The Ethiopian Government has, nonetheless, supported some FDI. With their support, some
international investors have been able to make important investments, but the wider policy
environment has not been accommodating. However, in recent years some steps have been
taken to open other sectors to foreign investment.

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 Evolution of FDI in Ethiopia
Ethiopia is the largest recipient of FDI in East Africa. FDI flows into Ethiopia increased significantly, particularly during 2012-
2016, from $280 million to $4.1 billion, falling back to $2.5 billion in 2019.63 FDI is a particularly important contributor to
investment in Ethiopia, amounting to 56% of total capital of all licensed investment projects in 2017.64 About two-thirds of
FDI flows to Ethiopia in 2019 correspond to greenfield investments (new operational facilities).65
There have been significant investments in petroleum refining, mineral extraction, real estate, manufacturing, and
renewable energy. FDI flows also go to agriculture (especially horticulture), leasing of agricultural land and manufacturing
leather goods.66 Ethiopia has achieved great success in Africa by being able to attract some of the largest world brands.

Figure 11: FDI inflows

Stronger Weaker
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
Percentage of GDP

3.0
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Source: World Bank Doing Business Index 2018.

China is the dominant investor in Ethiopia, particularly in manufacturing and services, accounting for 60% of newly
approved FDI projects. Other large investors include Saudi Arabia, the United States, India, and Turkey.

Attracting foreign investment

Notwithstanding a restrictive policy environment, Ethiopia has had some successes in attracting foreign investment
due to its fast-growing economy, a large domestic market, industrial park opportunities (see box below), large
infrastructure investments and tax incentives in high-priority sectors. Stable political leadership in the last 30 years
has also been a key component of the success in attracting FDI. This is an important success to maintain.
As part of its reforms, the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) has sought to establish itself as a ‘one-stop-shop’
for foreign investors, consolidating investor services provided by other ministries and agencies, adopting customer
manager systems, and providing post-investment assistance to investors. Despite initial progress, US investors report
that the EIC has little influence at regional and local levels, which limits its effectiveness.67

56 |
Licensing of some investments has also been delegated to the Ethiopian Civil Aviation
Authority, the Ethiopian Energy Authority, and the Ethiopian Communications Authority.
The EPRDF/TPLF initially relied on investments from politically friendly foreign investors,
for example Sheik Mohammed Al-Amoudi (a joint Ethiopian and Saudi citizen who owns
the MIDROC business empire, which owns many agricultural investments in Ethiopia).68 Al-
Amoudi also invested in cement and gold in Oromia and the Sheraton Hotel in Addis. His
firm, Saudi Star Agricultural Development, cultivates a large amount of agricultural products;
however, its leases were revoked in October 2018 because the land had not been developed.
In 2018, he was named as one of the largest private sector employers in Ethiopia.69
As part of its support for foreign investors, the Government allocates land for greenfield
sites. The Government retains the right to expropriate land for the “common good,” which it
defines to include “expropriation for commercial farms, industrial zones, and infrastructure
development.”70 This process has often been controversial. For example, in the Oromia
Region, the US Investment Climate Report notes that there have been several isolated
incidents affecting investors in the name of “returning the land” to the “rightful owners” or
“creating job opportunities” for the youth.71 (See Property Rights for further discussion.)
Ethiopia is also a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, which issues
guarantees against non-commercial risks. Ethiopia has concluded more than 30 bilateral
investment promotion and protection agreements, with 11 EU Member States, China,
India, Russia, and South Africa and in the region (Egypt, Israel, and Sudan, to name a few).72
Ethiopia has recently ratified the New York Convention on Arbitration.73 These measures
should lead to an increase in investor confidence.
Ethiopia is in a region with high levels of conflict, and within the country high levels of ethnic
conflicts often arise over the use of resources and land disputes.74 This hampers investor
confidence and impetus to invest in the region.

| 57
 Industrial Parks in Ethiopia
Industrial parks have provided investment incentives in relation to tax and infrastructure
investment. Since 2014, the Ethiopian Industrial Park Development Corporation has been
entrusted with the development and management of industrial parks. In 2015, the China Civil
Engineering Construction Corporation started to construct the largest of these parks in the city of
Hawassa.
Industrial parks in operation include:
• Bole LemiI, operational since 2014 (about 13,000 jobs)
• Hawassa, operational since 2017 (about 60,000 jobs)
• Mekelle, operational since 2017
• Kombolcha, operational since early 2017
Other industrial parks in operation include Adama, Addis Industrial Village, Bahir Dar, Debre
Birhan, Dire Dawa, ICT Parks Addis and Jimma.
Industrial parks have been successful in attracting substantial foreign investment, offering several
advantages. Surveys with FDI entrepreneurs in industrial parks suggest that key factors in securing
FDI investors have been infrastructure (particularly the quality of the Chinese-built industrial
parks and the reliability of electricity they provide), the incentive of cheap labour and political
stability.75 However, foreign investment has been affected by high labour turnover. Industrial
parks are also beginning to suffer from strikes and other conflicts.76
Coordination between regional and federal levels required for the efficient administration of parks
is often weak.

Policy evolution

In 2012, the Government introduced provisions for the creation of state-run and private
industrial parks. While the 2012 investment Proclamation focussed on attracting FDI to
agriculture and establishing Ethiopia as a manufacturing hub, it also placed restrictions
on investing in many other sectors, including communications, the financial sector and
transport.77,78
The Ethiopian Government has recently introduced reforms to remove some of these
restrictions. In early 2018, it approved legislation to facilitate public-private partnerships;
in June 2018, it allowed foreign investors to be minority shareholders in state-owned
enterprises. More recently, in 2020 it issued a Proclamation and Investment Regulation that
enabled foreign investment into other sectors, particularly railways, cable car transport, cold-
chain transport, and freight transport. Other transport sectors have been partially liberalised
for joint investments with domestic partners. Restrictions in cement manufacturing,
education, management consultancy and other services have also been removed under
the new regulation. Foreign investors are now allowed to engage in retail trade carried out
via electronic commerce. In addition, under the Proclamation, the Ethiopian Investment
Commission has been given powers to change these restrictions/reservations.79 While a
positive step, the Proclamation lists 33 areas that are reserved for Ethiopian companies,
including the distribution of electrical energy through an integrated national grid system.80

58 |
Foreign exchange controls

Historically, Ethiopia has faced an underdeveloped capital market, prone to foreign currency
shortages. In addition to the restrictive nature of the investment code, foreign exchange
scarcity and tight controls also create uncertainties that inhibit further investment.
Twenty years of an economic growth model driven by public investment have led to a build-
up of debt and external vulnerabilities, including significant exchange rate overvaluation. In
this context, foreign exchange is scarce, despite substantial foreign exchange rationing and
recent attempts to liberalise the market.
The EIC has recently attempted to address this issue by giving foreign investors the right to
make remittances out of Ethiopia in convertible foreign currency at the prevailing rate of
exchange. In practice, however, companies have experienced delays of up to two years in the
repatriation of larger volumes of profits, due to foreign exchange shortages.81

Opportunity
Evidence suggests that sub-Saharan African countries that have managed to attract foreign
investors have done so by liberalising their economy and investment environment.82 Regional
comparators such as Ghana are evidence of the fact that business-friendly policies and
investment reforms have the potential to attract foreign investment.83
The achievement to date in attracting large and credible foreign investors is something
that is critical to maintain. However, it needs to become a more organic part of the
economic process so foreign investors can engage more freely and see the system as being
accommodating, rather than having to secure special concessions.

Recommendations
• The Government should continue its efforts to liberalise the foreign exchange market.
• The Government should build on the success of attracting large international brands by
ensuring effective coordination between federal and regional agencies, particularly in relation
to the management of industrial parks (for example to address labour turnover issues) and in
relation to the work of the Ethiopian Investment Centre.
• The Government should consider opening the logistics sector to ensure that it works
efficiently, for example to ensure smooth operation of the new Addis-Djibouti rail transport.
• The Government should reassure foreign investors in relation to regional and internal
stability, partly due to ethnic conflicts.

| 59
 Endnotes
1 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
2 Muradu Abdo, “Legislative protection of property rights in Ethiopia: an overview,” Mizan Law Review, Vol. 7, No.
2, St. Mary’s University. See also: Property rights protection and private sector development in Ethiopia. Research
team for the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce with financial support from Swedish Agency of International Coop-
eration, December 2013.
3 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
4 Ibid.
5 “Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation (No. 456/2005)”,
July 2005, and “Expropriation of Landholdings for Public Purposes and Payment of Compensation Proclamation
No. 455/200.” July 2005.
6 Heather Congdon Fors, Kenneth Houngbedji, Annika Lindskog, “Land certification and schooling in rural Ethiopia,”
World Development, Volume 115, 2019.
7 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
8 Klaus Deininger and Derek Byerlee with Jonathan Lindsay, Andrew Norton, Harris Selod, and Mercedes Stickler,
“Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits?”, The World Bank Group,
November 2011, p. 62.
9 Mark Tran, “Thousands ‘forcibly relocated’ in Ethiopia, says HRW report,” The Guardian, January 2012.
10 Muradu Abdo, “Legislative protection of property rights in Ethiopia: an overview,” Mizan Law Review, Vol. 7, No.
2, St. Mary’s University. See also: Property rights protection and private sector development in Ethiopia. Research
team for the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce with financial support from Swedish Agency of International Coop-
eration, December 2013.
11 Misganaw Gashaw Beza, “Corruption in the Post-1991 Urban Land Governance of Ethiopia: Tracing Major Drivers
in the Law,” African Land Policy Centre, Bahir Dar University School of Law, November 2019.
12 “Property rights protection and private sector development in Ethiopia,” the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce,
December 2013.
13 Ibid.
14 “World Bank Country Strategy Partnership, for Ethiopia 2018-2022,” May 2017.
15 “2020 Investment Climate Reports: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
16 “Land Governance Assessment Framework Implementation in Ethiopia,” The World Bank Group, January 2016.
17 “Fit-for-purpose land administration: lessons from urban and rural Ethiopia,” Survey Review 48(346), January
2016.
18 Fairlie, K., Burns, T., Zhang, Y., Adlington, G., Tamrat, I., Shibeshi, G., McDowell, A., Kebede, S., Zelul, A, “Estab-
lishing a Legal Cadastre for Good Governance in Ethiopia: Identifying Bottlenecks and Steps Towards Scale-up,”
Annual World Bank Land and Poverty Conference, 2017.
19 “Land Governance Assessment Framework Implementation in Ethiopia,” The World Bank Group, January 2016.
20 Logan Cochrane and Sebsib Hadis, “Functionality of the Land Certification Program in Ethiopia: Exploratory Evalu-
ation of the Processes of Updating Certificates,” Land, October 2019.
21 Achamyeleh Gashu Adam, Tadesse Amsalu Birhanu, “Decentralised rural land administration in Ethiopia,” Journal
of Land and Rural Studies, Volume 6, 2018.
22 “Ethiopia Strengthening Land Tenure Administration Programme Endline Report,” USAID, 2016; “Fit-for-purpose
land administration: lessons from urban and rural Ethiopia,” Survey Review 48(346), January 2016.
23 “Land Governance Assessment Framework Implementation in Ethiopia,” The World Bank Group, January 2016, p.
59.
24 Rachisan, Paula Ramona, Cristina Bota-Avram, and Adrian Grosanu, “Investor protection and country-level gov-
ernance: Cross country empirical panel data evidence,” Economic Research | Ekonomska Istraživanja Volume 30,
No. 1, 2017.
25 “Resolving Insolvency,” World Bank Doing Business, May 2020.
26 Tewodros Meheret, “An appraisal of the Ethiopian bankruptcy regime,” De Jure Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2017.
27 Ibid.
28 Kegnu Mulu Ankoro, “Major problems in practical applicability of bankruptcy law in Ethiopia: prospect for possible
application in future,” International Journal of Law, Volume 6; Issue 6; November 2020, p. 46.
29 “Doing Business, 2020: Ethiopia,” The World Bank Group, 2020.
30 Taddese Lencho, “Ethiopian Bankruptcy Law: A Commentary (Part I),” Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol. XXII, No. 2,
December 2008, p. 58.
31 Ibid.

60 |
32 Teferi Deyuu Alemi and J.S. Pasricha, “IFRS Adoption Progress in Ethiopia,” Research Journal of Finance and Ac-
counting, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2016, p. 79.
33 ACCA Global, November 2017.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 IMF Country Report No. 20/29, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,” International Monetary Fund, Janu-
ary 2020, p. 4.
37 “2020 Investment Climate Statements: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
38 Ibid.
39 Elizabeth Oger-Gross and Tolu Obamuroh, “Ethiopia Modernizes Arbitration Framework,” White and Case, May
2021.
40 “Enforcing Contracts, Doing Business 2020,” The World Bank Group, 2020.
41 “Ethiopia Ratifies the New York Convention,” DLA Piper, March 2020.
42 “Africa Arbitration Review,” DLA Piper, March 2020, p. 4.
43 “Financial Sector,” the World Bank Group, 2021.
44 Zins, Alexandra, and Laurent Weill, “The determinants of financial inclusion in Africa,” Review of Development
Finance, Volume 6, 2016.
45 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” the World Bank Group, 2019. Data for June
2017.
46 Ibid.
47 Strategic assessment of selected public enterprises is planned to be carried out in 2021, as part of the work of the
new Public Enterprise Holding and Administration Agency.
48 “2020 Investment Climate Reports: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
49 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” the World Bank Group, 2019. Data for June
2017.
50 “2020 Investment Climate Reports: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
51 “Ethiopia takes small steps towards bank liberalisation,” Financial Times, Special Report African Banking and
Finance, November 3, 2020.
52 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The World Bank Group, 2019. Data for June
2017.
53 “2020 IMF Article IV Consultation Ethiopia,” International Monetary Fund, January 2020.
54 This measure was removed in November 2019.
55 “IMF Reaches a Staff-Level Agreement for the First Review of the Extended Credit Facility: Extended Fund Facility
for Ethiopia,” International Monetary Fund, August 21, 2020.
56 “2020 IMF Article IV Consultation Ethiopia,” International Monetary Fund, January 2020.
57 Tekeste Berhanu Lakew and Hossein Azadi, “Financial Inclusion In Ethiopia: Is it in the Right Track?” International
Journal of Financial Studies, May 2020.
58 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” the World Bank Group, 2019. Data for June
2017.
59 Tirngo Dinku, “Financial inclusion in Ethiopia: Using core set of financial inclusion indicators,” Journal of Research
and Opinion, 2019.
60 Tekeste Berhanu Lakew and Hossein Azadi, “Financial Inclusion In Ethiopia: Is it in the Right Track?” International
Journal of Financial Studies, May 2020.
61 Tirngo Dinku, “Financial inclusion in Ethiopia: Using core set of financial inclusion indicators,” Journal of Research
and Opinion, 2019.
62 World Bank simulations in report: “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The World
Bank Group, 2019. Data for June 2017.
63 “World Investment Report 2020,” UNCTAD, November 2020.
64 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The World Bank Group, 2019. Data for June
2017.
65 “World Investment Report,” UNCTAD, June 2020.
66 “Ethiopia Foreign Investment,” Santander Trade Portal, February 2020.
67 “2020 Investment Climate Reports: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
68 Tom Lavers, “The role of foreign investment in Ethiopia’s smallholder focussed agricultural development strategy,”
Land Deals Politics Initiatives, 2011.

| 61
 69 “He Owns Much of Ethiopia. The Saudis Won’t Say Where They Are Hiding Him,” New York Times, March 2018.
70 “2020 Investment Climate Reports: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
71 Ibid.
72 Ethiopia Investment Commission Website, Feb 2021.
73 “2020 Investment Climate Reports: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
74 “Ethiopia Foreign Investment,” Santander Trade Portal, February 2020.
75 Expert interview.
76 Gifawosen Marko, “Labor rights, working conditions and workers’ power in the emerging textile and apparel indus-
tries in Ethiopia: The Case of Hawassa Industrial Park,” New Research in Global Political Economy, Working paper,
January 2019.
77 Al Emid, “An Early Opportunity, With Pros And Cons For Ethiopia,” Global Finance, August 2016.
78 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” the World Bank Group, 2019. Data for June
2017.
79 “Adoption of New Liberalisation Measures,” UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, 7 September 2020.
80 “Ethiopia’s new Investment Framework – the regulation,” Clifford Chance, January 2021.
81 “2020 Investment Climate Statements: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
82 Ludger Odenthal, “FDI in sub-Saharan Africa,” OECD Development Centre, Working Paper No. 173, March 2001, p.
16.
83 Payce Madden, “Figure of the week: Foreign direct investment in Africa,” Brookings, October 2019.

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Credit (iStock.com)
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Credit (Shutterstock.com)
ENTERPRISE CONDITIONS
(ETHIOPIA RANK: 140TH)
Entrepreneurial activity is one of the key drivers of long-term prosperity, and its importance
will only grow as the pace of technological change increases. Putting the private sector in the
driving seat requires creating the environment where it can flourish. A healthy economy is a
dynamic and competitive one, where regulation supports business, allowing and encouraging it
to respond to the changing priorities of society. In contrast, an economy focussed on protecting
incumbents is likely to produce lacklustre growth and job creation.
Government can support prosperity in Ethiopia by enabling a competitive business
environment, reducing barriers to entry, discouraging restrictive practices, and regulating
monopolies that are contrary to the public interest. Government can also support prosperity
by simplifying the procedures and costs associated with starting and operating a business
and supporting the linkages between the formal sector and the informal (independent)
sector of the economy.
Overall, Enterprise Conditions in Ethiopia have slightly improved over the past decade. Other
countries, however, have experienced greater progress during this time, and Ethiopia has
fallen 10 places in the global rankings, to 140th. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s overall improvement
masks significant deteriorations. While there have been some modest improvements
in reducing the barriers that businesses face, considerable business constraints remain,
including burdensome compliance with regulations.
The dominant presence of state-owned enterprises in many sectors of the economy creates
challenges for the private sector. They experience preferential treatment from Government,
often sidestepping the regulatory compliance that exists for the private sector. The private
sector also includes political party-owned companies and other politically connected
companies.
The Government has taken steps to remove some subsidies, although price distortions
remain, particularly in agriculture and electricity. These policies distort the market and create
an uneven playing field restricting competition.
The high turnover of staff, lack of a skilled workforce and low wages in Ethiopia have resulted
in considerable deterioration in the flexibility of the labour market. However, redundancy
costs have been reduced.

| 65
 Elements of Enterprise Conditions
Domestic Market Contestability – how open the market is to new participants, versus protection of
the incumbents. Market based competition and prevention mechanisms for monopolies are essential
to true contestability in any domestic market, and this market cannot be dominated by just a few
business groups.
Price Distortions – the extent to which regulatory restrictions, subsidies, and taxes distort market
prices, which cause resources to be inefficiently managed and diverted from activities that can
deliver much greater benefits to society
Environment for Business Creation – the legislative and policy-driven factors that encourage
entrepreneurialism. The skill of the labour force is essential to the business creation environment, as
is cluster development and protections for, and ease of, starting new businesses.
Burden of Regulation – how much effort and time are required to comply with regulations,
including tax regulations. Regulation can become burdensome due to the volume of regulations that
businesses must comply with and their complexity.
Labour Market Flexibility – how dynamic and flexible the workplace is for both employer and
employee in terms of the flexibility of employment contracts, including redundancy costs.

DOMESTIC MARKET CONTESTABILITY

(ETHIOPIA RANK: 139TH)
Open, fair, and competitive markets contribute to prosperity. One of the most useful things that
governments can do is to ensure competition, both domestic and international, and a strong and
effective anti-monopoly policy. A fair and effectively enforced competitive market benefits all
by helping to stimulate improvements in efficiency and innovation. Our measure of Domestic
Market Contestability captures how open the market is to new participants, versus protection of
the incumbents.
Ethiopia ranks 139th for Domestic Market Contestability. State-owned companies continue
to play a significant role within the Ethiopian economy and dominate many of the key
sectors of the economy. These organisations often receive preferential treatment, resulting
in the absence of a level playing field. The Government has signalled its intent to open these
sectors to the private sector.

Market dominance
The state continues to dominate certain strategic sectors of the economy in Ethiopia,
resulting in weak competition. Notably, of the small number of countries with
telecommunication monopolies, until recently, Ethiopia was one of only three with a state-
owned monopoly1. This will start to change with the process of partial privatisation of Ethio
telecom.2 There is a state monopoly or state dominance in energy, banking, insurance, air
transport, shipping, railway, industrial parks, and petroleum importing.3,4
The private sector has noted how state-owned enterprises and endowment companies
receive preferential treatment and have benefitted from the privatisation process, as
government and party officials are on the boards of many of these enterprises.5 Two of the

66 |
main commercial conglomerates that benefitted from the preferential treatment under
the EPRDF/TPLF Goverment were EFFORT (the Endowment Fund for Rehabilitation of the
Tigray), controlled by the TPLF, and MIDROC Ethiopia Investment Group, controlled by
Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Ali Al-Amoudi.6

Competition law
The Ethiopian Government introduced its first competition law to promote contestability
in the domestic market in 2003.7 The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection
Authority (TCCPA) was established in 2014 as an autonomous federal government body.8
Its major objective is to secure a fair and competitive process, ensuring “the prevention and
elimination of anti-competitive and unfair trade practices” while “safeguarding the interests
of consumers, through the prevention and elimination of any restraints on the efficient
supply and distribution of goods and services.”9
Competition laws are not equally enforced, given the close relationship between the state
and some monopolistic companies. The existing regulatory frameworks designed to combat
these monopolistic and cartelistic structures are not comprehensive, with rules often
unenforced by government agencies.10
This is evidenced by comments made by the World Bank Group, at the time of the opening of
the telecoms sector, noting the motivations of vested interests and preferential treatment in
many policy announcements, while pointing out the importance of a fair, competitive, level
playing field.11 While the Competition Directive published by the Ethiopian Communications
Authority12 stresses the importance of adhering to competitive practices, and how to deal
with any violations, it is not yet clear how this will be applied in practice.

Procurement
State-owned enterprises and endowment companies are more likely to have access to public
procurement and finance than the private sector, weakening government credibility to
deliver private sector-based reforms.
The lack of commitment to a level playing field is further evidenced in the preferential
treatment with respect to licenses, foreign exchange, and defence contracts.13 While the
Government recognises the important role foreign companies play in industrialisation of
the economy, there is nevertheless a “heavy concentration of market power in the hands of
party-affiliated companies and public enterprises.”14
Results from a recent study show that institutionalised corruption is still high, as the
systems used do not define responsibilities of each contracting party clearly.15 To enhance
the accountability, credibility and improvement of procurement processes, Ethiopia has
established, among others, the Public Procurement Complaint Handling Board (in 2012), the
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (in 2001) and the Public Procurement and Property
Administration Agency (in 2009).

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 Liberalisation

In the past two decades, Ethiopia has privatised 371 enterprises.16 In July 2018, the
Government of Ethiopia presented a privatisation programme that included the privatisation
(with minority shares) of Ethiopian Airlines, Ethio telecom, Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics
Service Enterprise, and power generation projects. It also announced the full privatisation
of sugar projects, railways, and industrial parks. To broaden the role and participation of
the private sector in the economy, a new privatisation law was passed by parliament in
2020.17 As of October 2020, privatisation had generated a revenue of 300 billion ETB ($7.59
billion).18
In its 10-year plan, the Government has committed itself to “Expediting the privatization
of large state-owned enterprises and liberalization of priority sectors opportunities.”19 The
plan is to implement the privatisation programme through public tenders open to local
and foreign investors. It will also allow greenfield firms to enter the market. Plans include
the partial privatisation of Ethio telecom in 2021, which has begun, and the opening of the
telecoms sector to the private market, with the Ethiopian Communications Authority (ECA)
issuing one license to the Global Partnership for Ethiopia in May 2021.

Recommendations
• The Government should require and enforce higher levels of transparency and accountability
of state-owned enterprises by establishing good governance practices, including publishing
annual audited accounts.
• The Government should ensure that banks provide a level playing field.

PRICE DISTORTIONS (ETHIOPIA RANK: 102ND)

Price distortions can arise from both regulatory restrictions and subsidies, which lead to
inefficient use of state resources. Our measure of Price Distortions captures how competitive
markets are disrupted by subsidies and taxes.
Ethiopia ranks 102nd for Price Distortions. While the Government has taken some positive
steps by removing its fuel subsidy, other price distortions remain, particularly in agriculture
and electricity.

Fuel and energy subsidies

In 2008, the Government removed all fossil-fuel subsidies, amounting to more than $600
million a year.20 Since this reform, Ethiopia has seen a decline in kerosene imports and an
increase in the use of biofuels and electricity.21 Ethiopia’s remaining energy subsidies are now
in line with the global median level, and ahead of several comparator countries.
Ethiopia has electricity subsidies, but they disproportionately benefit more affluent
households and do not encourage energy efficiency. Although the average household in
Addis Ababa received a subsidy of US$17.1 per month (which is about 4.8% of household
income) in 2015-16, due to the increasing block tariff (IBT) nature of pricing, the wealthiest
20% of households received 37% of the subsidies, whereas the poorest 20% received only
7% of the subsidies.22,23

68 |
Agriculture and food subsidies

The Government removed subsidies for fertilizers in the 1990s, relieving the Agricultural
Input Supply Enterprise (AISE), the Government parastatal, of its monopolistic role. These
actions, however, did not lead to a competitive fertilizer market due to the Government’s
continued intervention.24
The Government gave favourable treatment to regional holding companies, which included
the allocation of foreign exchange for the import and distribution of fertilizer through
government-provided credit to farmers. The credit provided by the state could not be used
to purchase fertilizer from the private sector. In the Amhara Regional State, Ambassel is the
regional holding company and the sole agent of AISE.25
As a result of these trading practices, the private sector was not able to compete and exited
the fertilizer market by 200026 and AISE became the default distributor of fertilizer imports.
Economies of scale due to bulk purchasing and foreign currency savings were the rationale
for its renewed monopolistic status.27
While a number of cooperatives were formed to carry out the functions of fertilizer
marketing, there has been a lack of private distributors and importers.28 Ethiopia’s nitrogen,
potassium, and phosphorus fertilizer imports have experienced significant fluctuations,
with imports of fertilizers increasing in the period 2008–2018 from 1,078 tonnes to 3,271
tonnes.29 The fluctuations of imports are attributed to budget constraints, government
intervention, changes in import and distribution policies, and supply chain inefficiencies.30
This weak fertilizer system has contributed to the low productivity of the subsistence-
oriented agricultural sector.31
The assessment of fertilizer regulatory bodies reveals that Ethiopia’s fertilizer import,
distribution, trade, and marketing sector is regulated by multiple institutions, with little
coordination between them.32
Ethiopia witnessed an increase in food prices from 2004, resulting in all-time high food prices
in 2008. To ease spiralling food prices, the Government decided to subsidise grains.33 The fuel
subsidy savings of $600 million were reassigned to stabilise food prices and eliminate value-
added taxes on grains.34

Taxation
The tax revenue is collected from a narrow tax base.35 The Ethiopian Government relies on
international trade taxes, and over the past decade these taxes have contributed 40% of its
tax revenue.36
The Proclamation (No. 983/2016) provided a common administrative set of rules
for all taxes except customs duties, abrogating the previously dispersed rules around
administration.37
In Ethiopia, employment income and business income of individuals are subject to tax at
progressive rates ranging from 10% to 35%.38 Corporations are taxed at a flat rate of 30%,
which is slightly less than Sudan, Zambia, and Congo at 35%, but higher than Egypt at 22.5%
and Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast at 25%.39

| 69
 Recommendations
• The Government should consider simplifying the regulatory instruments on fertilizer import,
distribution, trade, and marketing, to ensure more effective coordination between the
different regulatory authorities.
• The Government should review and refine the IBT electricity structure, to incentivise the
economically and efficient use of electricity and remove the disproportionate benefit going
to wealthier households.

ENVIRONMENT FOR BUSINESS CREATION

(ETHIOPIA RANK: 144TH)
In an entrepreneurial society, ideas are constantly being created, developed, and tested. The
process of turning ideas into success must be as easy and accessible as possible. Society can
benefit by providing a supportive environment that appreciates and values the contribution that
entrepreneurs make towards achieving prosperity.
Ethiopia ranks 144th for Environment for Business Creation. The new Government has placed
strong importance on improving the business climate, to increase the productivity and
competitiveness of Ethiopia’s private sector as part of its plan to achieve middle-income
status by 2025.40 Compliance costs with licensing requirements are still high in Ethiopia,
with more than 95% of the costs for businesses resulting from cumbersome documentation
and other time-consuming procedures.41 There is a significant gap in the skillset of the newly
joined workforce relative to the structure of labour demand.

License and procedural constraints

A significant constraint on the business community is the large number of business licenses
and procedural steps that are necessary to start and grow a business.42 Starting a business
in Ethiopia requires 11 procedures taking 32 days, on average, with costs amounting to 45%
of average income per capita. This compares to the sub-Saharan African average of seven
procedures and 22 days, costing 36% of average income per capita.43
Ethiopia’s new Investment Law established the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC),
along with regional state investment authorities as ‘one-stop-shops’, to ensure better
coordination of agencies that support investors.44 In practice, however, investors still need
to communicate with multiple authorities and institutions, which leads to high transaction
costs.45

70 |
Figure 12: Cost of starting a business

Weaker Stronger
120
Percentage of income per capita

100

80

60

40

20

0
e

ia

wi

ia

co

na

ca

da
nd

iu
ni

bi

ny

an
qu

bw

ib
op

fri
ala

oc

wa

an
rit
m
za

ru

am
Ke

Gh
bi

ba

hA
hi

or

Rw
Za

au
n

Bu
M

ts
m

Ta
Et
m

Bo
M
a

ut
Zi
oz

So
M

Source: World Bank Doing Business Index 2019 .

Economic Hubs
In 2015, the Government introduced a National Development Spatial Plan, which seeks to
promote a more “polycentric system of cities” within a system of urban clusters and reduce
overreliance on Addis Ababa as the main economic hub.46
Other policies have led to the creation of growth corridors and “clusters”, such as industrial parks
and export processing zones, where the Government is prioritising export-oriented manufacturing
to increase the manufacturing contribution to GDP.47
The Small and Medium Manufacturing Industry Cluster Development Corporation (SMMIDC)
has been tasked with furthering the industrial parks agenda, where SMEs can cluster, with the
instruction to prioritise high-tech manufacturing industry by the provision of land.48

Limited skilled labour

As the economy shifts from agriculture49 to having larger industrial and service-related
sectors, it places new demands and expectations on the labour force. The lack of required
skills in the labour market is a constraint on business generation and growth.50 Although
more than two million young people join the workforce each year, businesses face challenges
in finding employees with the right skills.51
Ethiopia has given priority to improving education — primary school enrolment has reached
94% in the country.52 The Government has been pursuing a rapid expansion of the university
system over the last 20 years. The number of private education institutions has increased
from 3 to 49,53 with some experts identifying closer to 100 such institutions.54 However, this
increase in education has not resulted in workers with high skills that match labour market
needs.55

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 In 2002, the Government introduced the Training and Vocational Education Training (TVET)
strategy, which was complemented by a non-formal TVET strategy to provide short-term
technical training.56 However, the strategy is led by different government agencies with
little coordination, leading to duplication and fragmentation of efforts.57 Lack of financing
is also a problem, with expenditure on TVET halving between 2009-10 and 2016-17.58 While
expenditure on the expansion and construction of new TVET institutes increased, TVET
students account for only around 1% of all students enrolled in training and education,59
and access to TVET is lacking in the administrative regions and rural areas. Finally, negative
societal attitudes towards TVET result in students not choosing it as a preferred option.
Experts interviewed as part of this study report a problem of practical skilling in on-the-job
training programmes.

Recommendations
Further streamlining of the processes and procedures for business creation is necessary, as is
ensuring that good businesses can access credit.
• The Government should streamline the procedures that businesses need to undertake to
start operations, including reducing the number of licenses required.
• The Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) should improve coordination with regional
bodies and other agencies, so they become fully integrated as a ‘one-stop-shop’.60
• The Government should improve coordination between the various TVET authorities, to
ensure better efficacy of the skills programme.
• The Government should integrate TVET programmes with on-the-ground training, to make
those leaving education more equipped and desirable for the labour market, including
investing in school-to-work transition programmes.

BURDEN OF REGULATION (ETHIOPIA RANK: 124TH)

A large administrative burden results in companies focussing resources on complying with these
regulations, rather than innovating and creating. In particular, the process of complying with
tax regulations should be uncomplicated and quick. While the possibility of taxation having a
detrimental effect on business is well understood, so too is the method of tax collection and the
complexity of taxes being levied. Our measure captures how much effort and time are required
to comply with such regulations.
The burden of regulation in Ethiopia has significantly increased over the past decade,
particularly with respect to the time taken for businesses to comply with regulations. As
a result, the country has fallen 72 places in the rankings, to 124th globally. While several
reforms have been introduced to reduce regulatory burdens and ease business operations,
limited progress has been achieved.

Regulatory environment
In a survey conducted for SMEs in the West Arzi Zone in Ethiopia, 77% of respondents said
that the time and cost of complying with extensive regulation created heavy burdens for
their enterprises and obstacles to business performance.61 The percentage of time businesses

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 in Ethiopia spend complying with various government regulations has increased from 4%
to 12%, and is considerably higher than in Morocco, Djibouti, Burundi, Sudan, and Tanzania
(5%).
In addition, there are concerns in relation to the inconsistent and discretionary application
of policies and rules in favour of state-owned enterprises.62 Investors report having to spend
considerable amounts of time building relationships with government officials to progress
their projects. This poor enabling business and regulatory environment is seen as limiting
the Ethiopian private sector, contributing to poor capacity for market discovery, product
innovation and process innovation in the country.63

Tax system
Taxpayers in Ethiopia report that the process of complying with taxation is even more
burdensome than the amount of tax itself. 64 Tax regulations see the most frequent
changes.65
Although the average number of tax payments made per year in Ethiopia has remained
the same at 29, above Zambia and Rwanda, the average amount of time spent dealing
with making tax payments has increased, from 198 hours per year in 2010 to 300 hours
per year in 2020.66 According to the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD),
the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ECRA) (now the Ministry of Revenue) lacks
sufficiently skilled staff in areas of tax administration to undertake all tasks effectively,
including the e-filing system, leading to a knock-on effect on how well officials can
communicate the tax system to taxpayers, increasing the cost and time of compliance.67

Figure 13: Number of tax payments

Weaker Stronger
70

60

50
Number per year

40

30
Global Median
20

10

0
a

wi

na

ia

ia

da

ca

co
nd

iu
ni

ny

an

bi
bw

qu

ib
op

fri
ala

oc
wa

an

rit
m
za

ru
am
Ke

Gh
bi
ba

hA
hi

or
Rw
Za

au
n

Bu
M

ts
m
Ta

Et
m

M
Bo

M
a

ut
Zi

oz

So
M

Source: World Bank Doing Business Index 2019.

ERCA launched its online tax filing system in 2012. In the fiscal year for 2016-2017, only 5%
of clients used the online tax submission platform.68 This was because of the poor capacity
in Ethiopia’s communications infrastructure, and poor internet connectivity meant that the
e-filing system either could not be accessed or only operated slowly. As a result, taxpayers
were compelled to file taxes manually, leading to long queues at tax offices.69 Secondly,
the usage of the e-filing system is not governed by any legal or regulatory framework, so

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 users are not encouraged or cannot be compelled to use it. Coupled with concerns over
data security, this has resulted in a low adoption rate.70 Pilots for e-payments of taxes
through the system have been tested for 11 companies, but are still not operational.71 The
e-payments have been tested with the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and Ethio telecom, but
despite the Ministry of Revenue announcing in 2019 that e-payments systems would soon be
implemented nationwide,72 the Revenue authority are still working towards including receipt
collection in the digital system.73

Recommendations
• The Government should reduce the regulatory burden on businesses and ensure consistency
in their application, especially in relation to favourable treatment of state-owned
enterprises.74
• The Ministry of Revenue should upskill tax officials on the e-system, so they can
communicate more effectively about the system with taxpayers.
• The Ministry of Revenue should prioritise effective rollout and uptake of e-payment for taxes
nationwide, to reduce compliance times.

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Credit (iStock.com)
LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY (ETHIOPIA RANK: 153RD)
Labour Market Flexibility helps to facilitate the availability of jobs and the protection of workers.
Without a well-functioning labour market, jobs are likely to be scarce, and available jobs
may well be not attractive, with little redress available for those who find themselves in a bad
employment situation. Our measure captures how dynamic and flexible the workplace is for
both employer and employee.
Labour Market Flexibility has significantly weakened in Ethiopia over the past decade,
indicated by employers reporting a deterioration in the flexibility of both wage determination
and worker contracts, and in labour-employer relations. Interviews with Ethiopian labour
market experts as part of this study highlighted several prominent cases of abuse of labour
rights, which have not been challenged by Government.75 Although there have been some
recent reforms to modernise labour practices in Ethiopia, these reforms are yet to have a
signficant impact. As a result, Ethiopia dropped from 71st in the global rankings to 153rd.

Labour market regulations

Ethiopia has ratified all eight core International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions.76 In
2019, it adopted the Labour Proclamation (1156/201952) that governs employment relations
in the private sector, replacing the previous law that has been in place for the last 16 years
(see box for changes). The new code intends to be employer-friendly, reflecting a shift in
business environment.77 The code improves certain protections and rights for employees.78

The new Employer Action Code took effect on September 5, 2019. Notable changes include:
Minimum wage: The code provides for the establishment of a Wage Board, which is empowered
to set and revise the minimum wage of employees and will be comprised of the Government,
employees, trade unions and other stakeholders.
Leave: Employees are entitled to 16 days of paid annual leave after one year of service, up from
14 previously, and an additional day per two additional years (no limit). Employer-paid maternity
leave increased to 120 calendar days, up from 90 days. New fathers are now entitled to three
calendar days of employer-paid paternity leave.
Overtime: The statutory workday remains eight hours a day (48 hours per week). Overtime
limitations have been simplified to four hours a day and 12 hours a week. Compensation
increased to 150% of normal pay for overtime between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., and to 175%
between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
Other matters: The maximum probationary period increased from 45 calendar days to 60
working days. In the event of a reduction in workforce, disabled staff are now subject to the same
staff selection criteria as other employees.

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 Redundancy

Ethiopia has a high worker turnover rate, at 42% according to a study by the International
Growth Centre.79 High turnover in the labour market incurs considerable disruption
for employers and considerable cost in relation to redundancy payments. Ethiopia has
significantly reduced these types of costs to businesses over the past decade, reducing
redundancy costs from 40 weeks of salary to 19 weeks, comparable to Morocco and
Botswana.

Labour Conditions in Industrial Parks

Ethiopian wages have recently received renewed attention in the wake of a report from the NYU
Stern Center, reporting that garment workers in Ethiopia’s industrial parks are the lowest paid in
the world.80 Low wages can be partly attributed to Ethiopia being able to establish itself as a low-
cost manufacturing hub to attract foreign investment, and global companies such as H&M, Gap
and Tommy Hilfiger are manufacturing clothes in Ethiopia.81 However, this has come at a cost: a
high turnover of workers (with an overall attrition rate of 100% in 2017-18), and low productivity,
with factories replacing their workers every 12 months and running at 15% efficiency.82
Industrial park workers also lack sufficient training (sometimes as little as two weeks), which
keeps costs low but creates problems as many workers coming from rural areas are not
familiar with working in an industrial environment.83 These issues are compounded by a lack of
coordination between urban and regional councils around employment regulations and training.

Minimum wage

The minimum wage for public sector workers is low.84 There is currently no minimum wage
for the private sector, resulting in low wages for certain workers. Wages are traditionally set
by the employer, negotiated by a collective agreement, or fixed by the employee’s contract.
Labour legislation does recognise collective bargaining at the industry level, a common
feature of many African countries.
The ILO estimates that only 16% of workers in Ethiopia are waged and salaried, one of the
lowest percentages in Africa, and over half of these are in the public sector, including state-
owned enterprises.85 The percentage of Ethiopia’s labour force operating in the independent
(or informal) sector is officially reported to have fallen from 51% in 1999 to 23% in 2013,86
although experts attribute this drop to a statistical redefinition of the sector, which does not
concur with the ILO estimate.87

76 |
Figure 14: Waged and salaried workers

Stronger Weaker
90
80
70 Global Median
Percentage of workforce

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ca

na

ia

co

wi

da

ia

i
nd
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ny

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za

ru
am

Ke

Gh

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hA

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Rw

Za
au

Bu
M
ts

m
Ta

Et
m
N

M
Bo
M

a
ut

Zi

oz
So

M
Source: ILO.

Unionisation

The right of workers to join trade unions is recognised by the Ethiopian Constitution, with
more than 500,000 organised under the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU).88
Ethiopia experiences a low unionisation rate. At the minimum wage incident occurring at
Ethiopia’s Hawassa industrial park (see box), employees were prevented from unionising.89
Clear cases of abuse occur, such as the sacking of 65 workers in 2015 at the Sheraton Hotel
in Addis Ababa during negotiations renewing the collective agreement.90 There has not been
a large strike since 1993. However, according to Freedom House, this can be attributed to the
CETU refraining from challenging the Government openly.

Recommendation
• Employment councils should work with foreign manufacturers and brands to provide
skills training for garment workers to ensure high productivity, low turnover and overall
development of the supply chain. (see Tanger-Med Zone in Morocco91)

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 Endnotes
1 Roku Fukui, “In Ethiopia, digital development just took a major leap forward,” World Bank Blogs, June 2019.
2 “Ethiopia to complete privatisation of its telecom sector next year,” Bloomberg, July 2021.
3 “Ethiopia: The Market,” Import-Export Solutions, October 2020.
4 “2020 Investment Climate Reports: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
5 Gebremedhine Birega, “Preliminary country paper of Ethiopia on competition regime: capacity building on com-
petition policy in select countries of Eastern and Southern Africa,” AHa Ethiopian Consumer Protection Associa-
tion, September 2004.
6 Zenobia Ismail, “Privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises in Ethiopia since 1991,” K4D Helpdesk Report, Birming-
ham UK: University of Birmingham, June 26, 2018, p. 11.
7 “A review of competition policy in Ethiopia,” UNCTAD, March 2018, p. viii.
8 Ibid..
9 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
10 Ibid.
11 “Why Ethiopia needs to open its telecom market,” World Bank Blogs, February 11, 2021.
12 “Competition Directive: Draft for Stakeholder Consultation,” Ethiopian Communications Agency, August 2020,
p. 6.
13 “Ethiopia Toward the Competitive Frontier Strategies for Improving Ethiopia’s Investment Climate,” The World
Bank Group, June 2009, p. 12.
14 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
15 Baynesagn Asfaw Ambaw and Jan Telgen, “PBC as a Solution for Public Procurement Problems: Some Ethiopian
Evidence,” European Journal of Business and Management, Vol. 9, No. 34, 2017, p. 103.
16 “Privatisation in Ethiopia,” Simmons and Simmons, April 7, 2016.
17 “2020 Investment Climate Reports: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
18 Birhanu Firkade, “SoE revenue falls short of target,” The Reporter Ethiopia, October 3, 2020.
19 Ethiopia 2030: The Pathway to Prosperity Ten Years Perspective Development Plan (2021 – 2030),” The Planning
and Development Commission, May 2021, p. 12.
20 “Learning from Leaders Nordic and International Best Practice with Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform,” Nordic Council of
Ministers, 2016, p. 35.
21 “Ethiopia – Regional Cities,” ARUP, 2016, p. 46.
22 Ibid.
23 “Magnitude and Distribution of Electricity and Water Subsidies for Households in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,” The
World Bank Group, September 2019, p. 31.
24 Zewdie Habte Shikur, “Agricultural policies, agricultural production and rural households’ welfare in Ethiopia,”
Economic Structures, Volume 9, No. 50, August 2020, p. 4.
25 Shahidur Rashid, Nigussie Tefera, Nicholas Minot, and Gezahengn Ayele, “Fertilizer in Ethiopia An Assessment of
Policies, Value Chain, and Profitability,” IFPRI, Discussion Paper 01304, December 2013, p. 2.
26 “Agribusiness Indicators: Ethiopia,” The World Bank Group, April 2012, p. 24.
27 Johanes Agbahey, “Fertilizer supply chain in Ethiopia: structure, performance and policy analysis,” Afrika Focus,
Volume 28, No. 1, 2015, p. 82.
28 “Agribusiness Indicators: Ethiopia,” The World Bank Group, April 2012, p. 52.
29 “Ethiopia - NPK fertilizers - import quantity,” Knoema, 2020.
30 “Agribusiness Indicators: Ethiopia,” The World Bank Group, April 2012, p. 24.
31 Urgessa Tilahun Bekab, “Review of Challenges and Prospects of Agricultural Production and Productivity in Ethio-
pia,” Journal of Natural Sciences Research, Vol. 4, No. 18, May 2014, p. 70.
32 “A Review of National Fertilizer Regulatory Authorities in Ethiopia,” The African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partner-
ship, July 2017, p. 16.
33 Getachew Abebe Woldie and Khalid Siddig, “Do subsidies matter in food price stabilization? Evidences from Ethio-
pia in a computable general equilibrium framework,” Justus Liebig University of Giessen, MPRA Paper No. 29117,
March 2011, p. 3.
34 “Ethiopia ends fuel subsidy, increases pump prices,” Reuters, October 4, 2008.
35 “Performance and Prospects of Tax Collection in Ethiopia,” UNDP, August 2016.
36 “Information Technology and Fiscal Capacity in a Developing Country: Evidence from Ethiopia,” Centre for Tax and
Development, January 2015, p. 8.

78 |
37 “Doing business in Ethiopia: overview,” Tadesse Kiros Law Office, June 2020.
38 “Ethiopia Fiscal Guide 2019,” KPMG, March 2020, p. 4.
39 “List of Countries by Corporate Tax Rate: Africa,” Trading Economics, December 2020.
40 “Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) (2015/16-2019/20) Volume I: Main Text,” Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, National Planning Commission, May 2016, p. ix.
41 “The Cost of Business Registration and Licensing in Ethiopia and Options for Reform,” The World Bank Group,
March 2016, p. 4.
42 “Country Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in Ethiopia,” The International Finance Corporation, 2019,
p. 23.
43 “Doing Business 2020 – Ethiopia,” The World Bank Group, 2020.
44 “Ethiopia’s New Investment Framework – The Regulation,” Clifford Chance, January 2021, p. 6.
45 Ibid.
46 “Enhancing Economic Development and Job Creation in Addis Ababa: The Role of the City Administration,”
The World Bank Group, May 2018, p. 14.
47 “Developing Ethiopia: First-mover Investment Opportunities,” Deloitte, 2016, p. 6.
48 Ibid.
49 Agriculture still accounted for 66% of employment in 2018 down from 79% in 2008. “Nexus skills-jobs
assessment Ethiopia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, February 2020, p. 7.
50 Hamed M. S. Ahmed and Yimer Ayalew Ahmed, “Constraints of youth entrepreneurs in Ethiopia,” Journal of Global
Entrepreneurship Research, May 2021.
51 “Generation Unlimited launches in Ethiopia,” Generation Unlimited, April 2021.
52 “School enrolment, primary (% net) – Ethiopia,” UNESCO Institute for Statistics, February 2020.
53 “2020 Investment Climate Statements: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
54 Expert interview.
55 “Nexus skills-jobs assessment Ethiopia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, February 2020, p. 7.
56 “Stage of skills: Ethiopia,” International Labour Organisation, 2018, p. 23.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ministry of Education, Federal Republic of Ethiopia, 2017.
60 Consider Senegal, which established a Business Creation Support Office that reduced the time required to register
a business from two months, dealing with six different government agencies, to 48 hours.
61 Ofgaha Alemu Dire and Wegene Bekele Bekelcha, “Perception towards Regulatory Burden on Small and Medium
Enterprises Performance: A Case Study in Shashemene Town, West Arsi Zone, Ethiopia,” Business and Economic
Research, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2020, p. 309.
62 “Creating Markets for Ethiopia: Country Private Sector Diagnostic,” International Finance Corporation, 2019, p. 21.
63 Zuzana Brixiova and Mthuli Ncube, “Entrepreneurship and the Business Environment in Africa: An Application to
Ethiopia,” Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), IZA Discussion Papers, No. 7553, August 2013, p. 5.
64 “Tax Compliance Cost Burden and Tax Perceptions Survey in Ethiopia,” The World Bank Group, May 2015, p. x.
65 “Creating Markets for Ethiopia: Country Private Sector Diagnostic,” International Finance Corporation, 2019, p. 21.
66 “Ease of Doing Business Report 2020 – Ethiopia, Paying Taxes,” World Bank Doing Business, 2020.
67 “Perceptions of Value Added Tax Filing and Invoicing Compliance in Ethiopia: The Case of Three Federal Branch
Offices in Addis Ababa,” International Centre for Tax and Development, African Tax Administration Paper 11, June
2019, p. 13.
68 Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority (ERCA), 2017.
69 Ronald Waiswa, Sebsbie Fekade and Asnakech Lake, “Practices, Challenges and Prospects for Public Sector Taxa-
tion in Ethiopia,” International Centre for Tax and Development, African Tax Administration Paper 10, June 2019.
70 “Abera Mechal, “Factors affecting the adoption of electronic tax filing in Ethiopia: perception of taxpayers’,” Addis
Ababa University, June 2018, p. 62.
71 “Ethiopia Introduces Electronic Tax Payment System,” Ministry of Revenues, Ethiopia.
72 “Ethiopia introduced electronic tax payment system,” New Business Ethiopia, February 26, 2019.
73 “Digitalising the tax payment system,” BDO Global, January 2021.
74 “Study on Business Environment Problems of Ethiopia: The Case of Addis Ababa,” All Answers Ltd., December
2019.
75 Expert interview.

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 76 “2020 Investment Climate Statement: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
77 “Ethiopia: New labor code to attract foreign investment,” Willis Towers Watson, February 2020.
78 Ibid.
79 “Worker turnover and job flows in the formal private sector of Ethiopia,” International Growth Centre, February
2020.
80 Paul M. Barrett and Dorotheé Baumann-Pauly, “Made in Ethiopia: Challenges in the garment industry’s new fron-
tier,” NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, May 2019, p. 1.
81 Elizabeth Cline, “Will Ethiopia Flourish or Suffer Under Fast Fashion?” Sourcing Journal, October 2014.
82 James Purtill, “$26 a month: Ethiopians are being paid world’s lowest wages to make your Calvin Kleins,” ABC,
May 2019.
83 Marjorie van Elven, “Ethiopian garment workers paid the lowest wages in the apparel industry,” The Fashion
United, May 2019.
84 2020 Investment Climate Statement: Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of State, 2020.
85 “Stage of skills: Ethiopia,” International Labour Organisation, 2018, p. 26.
86 Chalachew Getahun Desta, “The Urban Informal Economy in Ethiopia: Theory and Empirical Evidence,” Eastern
Africa Social Science Research Review, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, January 2018, p. 45.
87 Consultation with experts.
88 “Freedom in the World: Ethiopia 2020,” Freedom House, 2020.
89 Ibid.
90 “Shame on Sheraton!,” The International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and
Allied Workers’ Associations (IUF), February 2015.
91 “Special Economic Zones: Accelerator for Industrialisation in Africa,” Africa Free Zones Organisation, Event Sum-
mary Report, November 2019, p. 29.

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Credit (iStock.com)
82 |
Credit (iStock.com)
GOVERNANCE (ETHIOPIA RANK: 125TH)
The importance of good governance to long-term economic growth cannot be overstated.1 A
politically stable, capable, and trustworthy state is one of the central components of economic
development. Even when controlling for extraneous factors such as culture, there is evidence
that economic institutions are one of the key determinants of differences in prosperity across
countries.2 Governance underpins economic activity; unless and until good governance is
established, attracting investment and enterprise is difficult. Investment and prosperity
require the rule of law, which itself is dependent upon trust in effective and accountable state
institutions.3,4 Good governance is most robust when it has been established over time and is a
codification of cultural expectations and behaviours.5
A prosperous Ethiopia is one where power is shared between different stakeholders for the
public good, there are meaningful checks and balances on how power can be exercised in
the political, institutional, and economic spheres, and the military is separate from party
politics. A competent and independent judiciary would guarantee that everyone, including
the state, is subject to the rule of law, without political interference in judicial processes. This
environment would also help ensure the Government delivers public services with integrity
and competence.
The legacy of authoritarian rule by successive governments in Ethiopia has undermined
strong governance. Its global ranking for Governance is 125th. Historically, the ruling party
governed with few constraints and limited accountability, which maximised its control of
political power, resulting in Ethiopia ranking 133rd for Executive Constraints and 131st for
Political Accountability. While the Constitution provided for an independent judiciary, it has
historically been subject to political control, and it has been subordinate to the Government
and the ruling party. Ethiopia’s ranking for the Rule of Law is 79th. The level of corruption in
Ethiopia, both in the political system and across government, is high. Ethiopia has a ranking
of 105th for Government Integrity. The traditional political system in Ethiopia requires control
of the civil service by the ruling party, as a result of which the civil service is highly politicised.
The civil service is also poorly remunerated and has a relatively low social status, which
weakens motivation. The global ranking for Government Effectiveness is 109th. The conflict
in Tigray and tensions in other regions further risk weakening the governance environment in
the country.

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 Elements of Governance
Executive Constraints – the level of checks and balances, and separation of powers – especially with
respect to the executive. For effective executive constraints to be in place, a government must not
only have checks and balances and separation of powers, but also be free from military involvement,
and effective sanctions must be in place for misconduct within office.
Political Accountability – the degree to which the public can hold public institutions accountable,
capturing the degree of political pluralism and other mechanisms of accountability.
Rule of Law – the fairness, independence, and effectiveness of the judiciary (in applying both civil
and criminal law), along with the degree to which every citizen is subject to the law.
Government Integrity – the integrity of a government, encompassing both the absence of
corruption and the degree to which government fosters citizen participation and engagement
through open information and transparent practices.
Government Effectiveness – a combination of the quality of public service provision, the quality of
the bureaucracy, and the competence of officials.
Regulatory Quality – all aspects of the running of the regulatory state – whether it is burdensome
and impedes private sector development, and whether it is smoothly and efficiently run.

EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS (ETHIOPIA RANK: 133RD)

A well-functioning government relies on clearly defined, separated powers and an appropriate
level of external checks and balances on the executive, from bodies such as the judiciary, media,
and civil society. Appropriate action also needs to be taken when officials violate their power.
This measure accounts for the extent of institutionalised constraints on the decision-making
powers of the executive, such as through the separation of powers into different bodies, and the
degree to which there are checks and balances in practice.
Ethiopia ranks 133rd globally for Executive Constraints, showing a ranking improvement over
the past decade. In Ethiopia, narrow-based groups have enjoyed a quasi-monopoly of power
and have exercised it with few constraints imposed by the legislature or the judiciary (see
box). The “Parliament and the judiciary are not independent institutions that can use their
constitutional authority to hold the executive accountable.”6
The exercise of authoritarian power and the resistance to transfer of this power has been
driven by the nature of the political system. Given Ethiopia’s political and ethnic polarisation,
a key objective of the winning side in political conflicts has been to maintain power. This
has resulted in a political settlement of ‘winner-takes-all’ with a legacy of authoritarian
government, where the dangers of losing power have been too high to contemplate. The
political system has been of a one-group/one-dominant party system that controls all key
institutions within Ethiopian society, including the state, the military, the judiciary, and key
sectors of the economy.
The protection of the security forces and the large financial support of the international
community allowed the EPRDF/TPLF to create something bigger than an authoritarian one-
party state. A 2019 assessment stated “Ethiopia is more than a party-state. [It] is a party-
business-non-government-organization-military-mass organization state, where the lines
among all of these different facets of the EPRDF overlap and are blurred by design.”7

84 |
 In 2018, recently appointed Prime Minister Abiy committed to the democratic opening
of Ethiopia, including free and fair elections. Whether the Prime Minister and the new
Prosperity Party can successfully change a political system that has existed for so long in a
polarised country is still an open question.

The Constitution
The 1995 Constitution provided for a nominal separation of powers, including a legislative
function, free election of representatives, protection of civil and political liberties and human
rights, and a federal structure based on ethnically-based regional states (common culture,
common customs, common intelligible language, etc.). However, the Constitution allowed
the ‘claw back’ of many of these executive constraints. The Constitution gives the House of
the Federation a key role in interpreting the Constitution (Article 62(1)).

Figure 15: Executive powers are effectively limited by the judiciary and legislature

Stronger Weaker
1.8
1.6
1.4
Expert survey (0-3)

1.2
Global Median
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
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ia

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Source: World Justice Project (Rule of Law Index) 2020.

Military
In Ethiopia, the historic transition of power between groups has generally taken place in the
context of violence and armed conflicts. The authority of government has been established
by winning these conflicts, with the victors’ ideology being imposed on the population,
i.e., the Communist ideology of the Derg or the ‘revolutionary democracy’ ideology of the
EPRDF/TPLF. These ideologies were authoritarian and required centralised power, without the
presence of executive constraint.
The security forces have been intertwined with the EPRDF/TPLF party and protected
its political dominance for 27 years. The military has played a key role in determining
government authority. Top-level commanders were top leaders in the party and controlled
the economy through state-owned enterprises and through the operation of the Metals and
Engineering Corporation, initially a Derg defence conglomerate.
In a context where government authority was linked to the control of the military, Prime
Minister Abiy consolidated his authority by the removal of TPLF loyalists from the Ethiopian
security forces. He responded with force to the actions of the TPLF-led regional government
in Tigray in November 2020.

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 Political History
The Derg was the military junta that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1987, having overthrown the
Government of the Ethiopian Empire and Emperor Haile Selassie. From 1987-1991, Ethiopia was a
Communist People’s Democratic Republic.
The long period of armed conflict between 1974 and 1991 ultimately resulted in The Tigray
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) winning power in 1991.
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was formed by the union of the
TPLF and the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) in early 1989 (these were later
joined by other parties), with the TPLF leading the coalition.
In December 2019, the new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, established the Prosperity Party as a
successor of the EPRDF by bringing together ethnic-based parties, minus the TPLF, into a multi-
ethnic party.

The legislature

As the legislature has always been under the control of the ruling party, this has allowed the
executive to govern unconstrained by any substantive checks and balances. The legislature
also has the power to constrain the autonomy of the courts.8
Since 1995, the EPRDF/TPLF engineered large parliamentary majorities with minimal
opposition representation, except in 2005. In the view of the ruling party, there was little
need of political opposition, as the ‘revolutionary democracy’ ideology required everyone to
work to deliver the developmental state. The domination of parliament by the ruling party
resulted in parliament rubber stamping its decisions.9 It is not yet clear the extent to which
this dynamic will change following the June 2021 elections.

The judiciary
The judiciary is subordinate to the ruling party; according to Bertelsmann, “The judiciary has
also failed to check that the executive is acting within the framework of the law.”10
The “Ethiopian legal system prohibits the judiciary from reviewing sensitive matters
related to the Constitution, this task is assigned to political bodies such as the House of
the Federation.”11 This limits the capacity of the judiciary to provide a constraint on the
executive. In addition, the judiciary is subject to political interference and corruption. Judges
are appointed by the government, and a 2017 review stated, “judicial impartiality particularly
in political cases is almost non-existent.”12

Ethnic federalism
Federalism is another way in which the powers of the executive can be constrained. However,
in Ethiopia, the implementation of federalism with a strong ethnic component contributed
initially to the capacity of the ruling party to control the entire country for almost 30 years,
as it was able to co-opt the regions.
This federal system was able to provide ethnic, linguistic, and cultural self-expression
with a strong focus on ethnicity. However, financial resources and political power were
concentrated at the federal level. In this context, some academics argued that for the EPRDF,
this central power was strong, in fact “the actual power and interference of the federal

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government in regional and local affairs has become stronger than under any previous
regime.”13 It has been argued that political cadres of the EPRDF had more power than
Regional Presidents, and the interests of regional states were subordinated to the interests of
the elites in the centre, particularly from the coalition political parties of the EPRDF.14
However, recently, federalism based on ethnicity appears to be creating more tensions.
Ethnic and regional demands have been growing and regional protests contributed to the
TPLF losing its grip on power in 2018. Today, The TPLF is no longer part of the ruling party,
now the Prosperity Party, and the Prosperity Party is no longer a coalition of political parties
with a strong ethnic basis.

Recommendations
Consider the separation of the military and the ruling party.
• The military should leave party politics and the running of the state.
• The military should continue to have full autonomy on security issues, including promotions
in the military.
• A substantial security budget settlement should be guaranteed, with a potential dividend
from economic growth.

POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (ETHIOPIA RANK: 131ST)

Political Accountability supports democracy and promotes prosperity. It provides a means
to monitor government conduct and prevent both the concentration of power and collusion
between the state and big businesses. Our measure of Political Accountability captures the
degree to which the public can hold public institutions to account, which covers a range of
mechanisms of accountability, such as periodic elections and the degree of political pluralism.
Ethiopia ranks 131st in Political Accountability. In Ethiopia, elites have historically gained
power by dynastic tradition or by violent confrontation rather than by a peaceful and
democratic transfer of power. The EPRDF/TPLF implemented “revolutionary democracy”,
whereby it used its political cadres to train and guide the population to implement its
developmental programmes. This ideology requires keeping political power by all means. The
EPRDF/TPLF successfully implemented this ideology for 27 years.15
Under this framework, the issue of political accountability does not arise. It is assumed
that the Government does what the people need without requiring formal mechanisms of
accountability. The Government used political and developmental structures to ensure that
its policies are implemented with little dissent, even at local (Kebele) level.
Prime Minister Abiy has rejected the “revolutionary democracy” view of political
accountability and has committed to respect traditional political accountability mechanisms,
including free, transparent, inclusive, and fair elections. However, given the polarisation in
the country, only time will tell if these commitments can be fully met.

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 Elections

The elections conducted by the EPRDF/TPLF were not carried out by an independent
electoral authority and did not generally provide an equal space for the opposition. Hence,
they could not generally be classified as free and fair elections. This is understandable given
the political system because the ruling party could not have contemplated an outcome that
could have ended its political dominance and endanger the position of their main ethnic
political base in Tigray. Freedom House has ranked Ethiopia as ‘Not Free’ since 2011, noting
that the 2015 elections “were not held in accordance to democratic standards.”16
The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) is charged with conducting “in an impartial
manner, free and fair elections in Federal and State constituencies.”17 In practice, however,
it has been controlled by the ruling party and has not had the autonomy or the power to
ensure fair and free elections.
The Prosperity Party (successor of the EPRDF) has committed to respect traditional political
accountability mechanisms, including elections. The June 2021 elections were run with an
independent electoral board. However, the context of the elections was difficult, and the
elections were boycotted by the main opposition parties in Oromia, who complained of
harassment. The elections were run in six of the 10 regions (not in Tigray and in other areas
of Amhara and the Somali region) and the president of the electoral board noted that in two
of the regions electoral observers were not allowed.18

Electoral Politics in Ethiopia

A split in the TPLF, in relation to the war in Eritrea in 2001, resulted in a more competitive election
in 2005. Although the opposition performed well, winning in Addis Ababa, the EPRDF maintained
power. Subsequently, it introduced repressive laws to ensure that the success of the opposition
would not be repeated.
In recent years, however, the EPRDF/TPLF control over society has weakened. The protests of
Oromia youth over employment and land rights and the collective memory of oppression that
started in 2015 resulted in the marginalisation of the TPLF and contributed to the resignation of
Prime Minister Hailemariam in 2018.
In April 2018, the EPRDF selected Abiy Ahmed from the Oromo Democratic Party to be Prime
Minister, ending 27 years of political dominance of the TPLF and the Tigrayan military. The new
Prime Minister stated that he repudiated human rights abuses, corruption, and authoritarianism
of the TPLF and offered democratic openings. He also facilitated the ending of the decade-long
conflict with Eritrea, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
In December 2019, three ethnic EPRDF parties, but not the TPLF, merged to form the Prosperity
Party.
Following the postponement of national elections in 2020, Tigray requested the conduct of
regional elections, which was rejected by the centre. The centre proceeded with the elections,
which was one of the catalysts for the ensuing conflict in Tigray between the TPLF and the
Ethiopian National Defence Forces and the Eritrean army.

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Ethnicity

Ethnicity has become a dominant and unpredictable political factor within Ethiopia. The
federal system is based on ethnicity and provides a constitutional right to secede from the
Ethiopian federation and from any regional state. “A political system of ethno-linguistic
federation hardens tribal identities”19 and can foster radical ethno-national movements.
Ethnic tensions are intense in many areas of the country. While ethnic federalism initially
facilitated the political control of the country by the ruling party, it eventually contributed to
the undoing of that control.
Ethnic federalism has contributed to the resurgence of sub-national and ethnic identities
focussed on the fight for resources allocated by the centre.20 Ethnic groups stake claims to
the territories of other groups. Land expropriations have also contributed to ethnic protests.

Ethnic Conflicts
A total of 2,060,000 people remained internally displaced by armed conflict and violence, as of
the end of 2020. The main drivers of displacement were political violence, disputes over land and
resources, inter-communal violence and armed conflict. In 2018, almost 2.9 million new conflict
displacements were recorded, the largest figure ever for the country and the highest number
globally for that year.
The number of new displacements fell significantly, to just over a million in 2019, as a result of a
government plan to return internally displaced people to their places of origin.
IDMO reported 539,000 new displacements in Tigray, in addition to reports of human rights
violations and abuses, including sexual violence, and food insecurity.21 Violence also forced people
from their homes in the Afar, Amhara, Beninshangul Gumuz and Southern Nations, Nationalities
and People’s (SNNP) regions, pushing the number of new displacements to nearly 1.7 million in
the country as a whole, a 61% increase on the figure for 2019.22

Ethnic polarisation and division in the country is high. In the context of a collective memory
of violence and coercion, narratives of dispossession have been powerful in reinforcing ethnic
divisions, particularly between the Oromo and Amhara peoples. “The two main nations —
Oromo and Amhara — are being pushed in the direction of strident ethno-nationalism.”23
“Collective memory of violence that certain groups suffered in this process has remained
fresh in a number of cases, owing to the continued perception or experience of central
political control and targeted use of coercion.”24 Groups in Oromia saw a continuity between
Imperial Ethiopia, the Derg military regime and the EPRDF/TPLF in this regard.
In this polarised context, the challenge for the Prosperity Party is to avoid retaining the
authoritarian political methods and repression structures the EPRDF used to remain in
power.

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 A View of Federalism, Ethnic Homogeneity, and The City of Hawassa25
The city of Hawassa was promoted by the EPRDF/TPLF as demonstrating the success of ethnic
federalism, as Hawassa became a diverse and dynamic city. However, the majority of people in
Hawassa, particularly the young, do not define themselves in ethnic terms, and they come from
different areas in the country. Hawassa is the capital of Sidama (which voted in November 2019
to become a new regional state), but it has never been a city with a majority of ethnic Sidama.
However, as part of Sidama, there is a political incentive to provide institutions (universities),
infrastructure (roads that link to Sidama) and services (in the Sidamo language) that favour ethnic
Sidamas and to make the city more ethnically homogeneous. Similarly, the recruitment of the
60,000 employees of the Hawassa industrial park (the largest in Africa) excludes people from
neighbouring Oromia. Hawassa has also become more ethnically homogeneous by the expansion
of its urban boundaries. This ethnic homogeneity is partly a consequence of ethnic federalism and
moves Hawassa away from the dynamic, ethnically diverse Hawassa of the past.

Press and civil society

The role of civil society as a mechanism of political accountability has been very limited
in Ethiopia. The opposition parties, civil society organisations, and the media have been
controlled through legislation such as the Anti-Corruption Law (2001), the Media Law
(2008), the Charities and Proclamation Law (2009), and the Anti-Terrorism Law (2009),
which negate much of the civil liberties protection included in the Constitution. While there
has been relaxation of the regulations of civil society organisations, particularly charities,
under the new Government, the instruments of control of media and civil society have been
retained.
Social control was implemented successfully by the EPRDF/TPLF at all levels, including at the
Kebele (local) level. Clientelism is used to co-opt opposition and ensure votes for the ruling
party, relying both on the distribution of services and, when needed, police intimidation. The
massive recruitment for the ruling party after the elections of 2005 ensured that control at
local level has been effective. The mechanisms of social control also include the ‘gimgema’,
public evaluations of party members. The system of social control and repressive legislation
has been generally effective in delivering large majorities for the ruling party for 27 years,
apart from 2005. In addition, the security forces have been ready to protect the political
dominance of the ruling party when needed.

Recommendations
• The Government should work with other parties and civil society organisations to broker
a dialogue between the nation’s elite to determine by consensus a political settlement for
Ethiopia that supports peace.
• The Government should explore political settlement that provides greater autonomy for
regions, for example a federation like the one in Switzerland. The federal level should provide
examples of the value of its functions to the regions.
• The Government should consider constitutional changes to ensure the protection of civil and
political liberties for all citizens, freedom of the press, equal treatment under the law and
progress towards inclusive and free and fair elections.
• The Government and the regions should consider eliminating their social control
mechanisms at Kebele level.

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RULE OF LAW (ETHIOPIA RANK: 79TH)
An independent, impartial, and effective judiciary is a cornerstone of democracy, as it ensures
that the law, both civil and criminal, is being fairly and appropriately applied. An independent
judiciary ensures that every citizen is protected from the powers of the state. There also needs to
be a level playing field for both state agents and firms so that firms can thrive. Our measure of
the Rule of Law captures these elements, along with the accountability of the public to the law.
Ethiopia ranks 79th in the world for the Rule of Law, with some improvement in the last 10
years.
The Constitution establishes an independent judiciary, with the Supreme Federal judicial
authority vested in the Federal Supreme Court.26 Judicial powers, at federal and state level,
are vested in the courts, which adjudicate constitutional issues. However, the Ethiopian
Constitution takes significant judicial powers from the judiciary because it vests certain
powers, such as interpreting the Constitution and determining Constitutional disputes, in the
House of the Federation.27 This limits the powers of the judiciary.28
The judiciary has historically been part of the system to enforce the power of the
authoritarian regime, with no separation from the Government. The Judiciary does not
constrain the executive or protect citizens from the state. On the contrary, the Government
uses the judiciary, ‘rule by law,’ to enforce its control of citizens.29
A recent UK review noted that the “courts and law enforcement were politicised and
did not always act in connection with the constitution, but on ethnic lines.”30 Freedom
House summarises its judgment on the rule of law in Ethiopia as “The judiciary is officially
independent, but in practice it is subject to political interference, and judgments rarely
deviate from government policy… Due process rights are generally not respected.”31
The appointment of the lawyer and civil society leader Meaza Ashenafi as president of
the Supreme Court in November 2018 was seen as a positive step, although no major
improvements in the judiciary have taken place yet.
The politicisation of the judiciary has also played a central part in weakening political and
social stability in Ethiopia and undermining human rights. It has not been able to protect
opposition politicians or political parties, and there have been few prosecutions for human
rights abuses. Freedom House notes that the “security forces frequently commit human
rights violations including torture and extra-judicial killings with impunity.”32
The independence of the judiciary has also affected conflicts about the allocation of
land rights for foreign investors. “In conjunction with the authoritarian tendencies of the
government and the absence of the rule of law, the constitutionally guaranteed right to
private property can easily be abused and violated.”33
Corruption is commonplace, at both federal and regional levels. “Corruption among judges
is widespread, and judges not loyal to the government run the risk of being replaced by a
‘more suitable’ candidate.”34 The prosecution of corruption cases is also seen as extremely
politicised, at least since the Anti-Corruption Law of 2001, and facilitated by the judiciary.

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 Recommendations
• The Government should consider amending the Constitution so the court system has the
final say on constitutional issues,35 to ensure protection of civil and political rights. This will
need to ensure fair ethnic representation for all groups in the judiciary.
• The Government should consider creating an independent judiciary body to supervise the
judiciary, as part of a political settlement between different parts of Ethiopian society.36
• The independent judiciary body should develop transparent mechanisms to ensure the
independent appointment of impartial judges, based on professional qualifications and
integrity.
• The Government should establish clear procedures to protect the independence of the
judiciary, including length of the term of office, security of tenure during that term,
remuneration and pension.
• The Government should ensure the integrity of the judiciary with clear processes for
disqualification and removal from office and broader institutional conditions.

GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY (ETHIOPIA RANK: 105TH)

Corruption has a negative economic impact and reduces public trust and the legitimacy of the
state. It contributes to inequality, discourages private sector development, and, by affecting
government finances, it limits the ability of governments to invest in productivity-enhancing
projects. Transparency supports public accountability and helps build trust in the Government,
which in turn supports social stability and economic growth. Our measure considers corruption
within each branch of government and public office, and it measures transparency, capturing
the degree to which government fosters citizens’ participation and engagement through open
information and transparent practices.
Ethiopia ranks 105th in the world in terms of Government Integrity, with recent improvement
from a low in 2016. Transparency International have noted that “corruption poses a serious
and multifaceted problem to the overall wellbeing of the population and its economy.”37 The
level of corruption in Ethiopia is partly explained by the fact that for decades the ruling party
has governed without checks and balances and without direct accountability to citizens,
civil society, and the free press. Given the ruling party has been focussed on consolidating its
power, this has meant diverting resources to the party or to party members.

Evidence of corruption
Determining the extent of corruption is particularly difficult in countries such as Ethiopia.38
However, given that the EPRDF/TPLF controlled much of the economy in Ethiopia, and given
the limited checks and balances in the system, the potential for corruption in Ethiopia has
always been large.
Transparency International highlight two distinct forms of corruption in Ethiopia:
bureaucratic and political. In a 2018 report, it observed that bureaucratic corruption “seems
to exist in every office. Officials from the traffic police, court, customs and trade licences
office, land acquisition department, licensing, and tax collection, as well as government
procurement, have faced allegations of bribery…”39

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Political corruption “meant that members of the ruling party have enjoyed privileges with
regard to access to credit, land lease contracts and jobs.”40 Political corruption has also
contributed to the monopolisation of the country’s economy.41 “Corruption and nepotism
meant that members of the ruling party have enjoyed unfair privileges regarding access to
credit, land lease contracts and jobs. Rules governing markets and investment have been
unreliable and subject to arbitrary and significant state intervention.”42
In 2012, the World Bank diagnostic report on corruption concluded that it was particularly
extensive in the acquisition of land on lease, non-payment of tax, and government
procurement.43 More recently, in November 2018, significant corruption was identified in
the Metals and Engineering Corporation (METEC), a military enterprise. Its former Director-
General was accused of a host of failures, mismanagement, and crimes, including making
irregular procurements over six years, worth $1.3 billion, without competitive tenders.44 In
addition, between 2004 and 2013, Ethiopia lost $26 billion to illicit financial outflows, and is
among the top 10 African countries by cumulative illicit financial flows (IFFs) related to trade
mispricing.45

Corruption linked to the control of the state

Opportunities for corruption have been extended by the large role of the state as it followed
a ‘developmental state’ model. Managing large state-owned enterprises and endowment
companies, allocating land and mining resources, developing large infrastructure investments
funded by debt, intervening in and controlling financial markets and foreign exchange and
devising restrictive and complex rules and regulations have all provided opportunities for
corruption.
Bureaucratic corruption is also the result of control of the state by the ruling party. For
example, higher-ranking civil servants have generally not been appointed by merit but
because of loyalty to the party or ethnic factors, weakening civil service leadership (see
next section). Furthermore, as civil servants have been poorly paid, corruption is a way to
bolster remuneration. The hierarchical culture in the Ethiopian civil service linked to the
authoritarian nature of the Government results in a system where the corrupt behaviour of
state officials is not questioned by junior civil servants or by the public.46
The weakening of the independent press, opposition politicians and civil society through
repressive legislation has left these institutions with limited capacity to fight corruption.

Weak government institutions to fight corruption

The Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of Ethiopia (FEACC) was established in
2001 and revised legislation was issued in 2005. Since 2016, the Attorney General has taken
over the investigation and prosecution powers of the FEACC. Other institutions in the anti-
corruption system include the Federal Auditor General, the Office of the Federal Attorney
General and the Financial Intelligence Centre (anti-money laundering).
Although Ethical Liaison Units are present in government offices and public enterprises,
a study of their role in countering corruption found that taking disciplinary measures and
putting criminal sanctions on corrupt entities was beyond their capacity. Lack of human and
material resources, the absence of anti-corruption commitment from leadership, and a lack
of trust and confidence in people were major challenges in combatting corruption.47

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 There is limited trust in the integrity of anti-corruption institutions, including the FEACC,
which “as an institution of truth-seeking and justice has been seriously compromised by
the perception that high-ranking officials prosecuted were victims of a political witch hunt
by the regime. Scrutiny and accountability have never reached the higher echelons of
Ethiopian officialdom.”48 Given the strong politicisation of the courts, the suspicion that
anti-corruption charges are politically selective persist. Ethiopia also lacks a comprehensive
system of protection for whistle-blowers.

Anti-corruption prosecutions
In the main, many prosecutions for corruption in Ethiopia have been seen as politically
motivated. There have been prosecutions against ‘corrupt’ political opponents, e.g., the Anti-
Corruption Law (Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, 2001) was used the day
after its implementation to prosecute TPLF members who lost an internal party struggle.
Public dissatisfaction has also led to prosecutions. In 2017, dozens of government officials,
including the state minister for finance, were arrested on suspicion of corruption. Officials
from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation, the capital’s housing development
agency, the state-run Ethiopian Sugar Corporation and the Ethiopian Roads Authority were
also arrested, on charges including embezzlement and the siphoning of billions of Birrs…”49
The office of the federal Attorney General has recently said that work is underway to recover
over $400 million of stolen public funds, embezzled by government officials and affiliate
investors and diverted to foreign countries.50 The Attorney General ordered the arrest of 70
senior officials, including the former deputy chief of the National Intelligence and Security
Service and a federal police commissioner, with several senior officials, mainly from the TPLF,
being charged with corruption. The prosecution of TPLF loyalists took place when the TPLF
was no longer in power.
International reports offer a note of caution, stating that “In the past, officeholders loyal to
the government who break the law and engage in corruption have not been systematically or
adequately prosecuted.”51 They add that “even though the new government pledged to fight
corruption, so far, the executive maintains control over the judiciary and the legislature.”52

Transparency and access to information

The right to information exists in the Constitution, but it is limited administratively.
Information on Government plans and activities is often limited, even though the
Constitution includes a clause on transparency and accountability. When the COVID-19
pandemic arrived in Ethiopia, the Government imposed a three-month internet shutdown
in Oromia, restricting internet access for millions of people.53 At the end of June 2020,
Ethiopian authorities imposed another nationwide internet shutdown following the murder
of Oromo singer and activist Hachalu Hundessa. According to Freedom House, “the
Government has justified the internet shutdowns, which sometimes occurred in the context
of political and ethnic violence, by citing the need to maintain security and public order.”54
The Ethiopian Government’s control over the country’s telecommunications infrastructure,
Ethio telecom, enables it to restrict information flows and access to internet and mobile
phone services.55

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Recommendations
Improving the integrity of government in Ethiopia is intertwined with improving political
accountability, establishing a competent and honest judiciary, and making the civil service
focussed on the needs of its citizens (a citizen-centred state) and responsive to public demands.
• The Government should strengthen anti-corruption measures. It should implement zero-
tolerance for corruption, whereby Government works for the benefit of all Ethiopians, not
for party or private gains. Each Minister should ensure that their departments have a clear
strategy to be corruption-free within a short time.
• The Government should ensure that independent courts fully investigate corruption in
Government and prosecute speedily with support from internal audits, the auditor general
and the anti-corruption commission (included in the social contract). They should formalise
clear procedural guidance on the Government’s anti-corruption policies and introduce a
whistle-blower law.
• The Government should strengthen the independence and capacity of enforcement agencies
fully to investigate cases of corruption in government, e.g. internal audits, auditor general
and FEACC.
• The Government should consider stopping the use of internet shutdowns as a way of
controlling Ethiopians and restricting access to information.

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Credit (Shutterstock.com)
 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS
(ETHIOPIA RANK: 109TH)
Government effectiveness includes, but extends beyond, the efficient use of resources and
spending through effective government policy design and implementation to consider the
ability of a government to enact its intended strategies. Our measure includes the quality of
government officials and their independence from government pressures.
Ethiopia ranks 109th globally on Government Effectiveness. Ethiopia made the most progress
in government effectiveness in the early 2000s.56 However, while several civil service
reform programmes have been implemented since then, limited progress in government
effectiveness has been achieved.
The main constraint to Government effectiveness is the fact that the state and civil service
have traditionally been subordinated to and intertwined with the Government or the ruling
party. This has not allowed space for introducing merit-based recruitment in the civil service.
The Ethiopian state has historically had low capacity, even though the ‘developmental state’
requires high capacities. EPRDF/TPLF did not provide the financial resources, incentives,
merit-based recruitment or autonomy to make this high state capacity possible.
The civil service has been poorly remunerated; and surveys of the civil service show that it is
often demotivated and lacks capability, with promotion based on party affiliation rather than
merit.

Figure 16: Government quality and credibility

Stronger Weaker
1.0

0.5

0.0
Index (-2.5-+2.5)

Global Median
-0.5

-1.0

-1.5

-2.0
s

da

ia

co

na

ia

wi

i
nd
iu

ric

an

ny

bi

ni

qu

bw
ib

op

ala
oc
an

a
rit

za

ru
am
sw

Ke
Gh
Af

bi

ba
hi
or
Rw

Za
au

Bu
M

m
t
h

Ta
Et

m
N

M
Bo
M

a
ut

Zi
oz
So

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators 2018.

96 |
Development state

The EPRDF/TPLF approach since 2001 had been to follow the ‘developmental state’ models
of East Asia, such as China (see box). This ‘developmental state’ approach of government,
controlling key aspects of the economy with large infrastructure investments, requires high
state capacity. However, the Government did not devote the necessary financial resources or
ensure sufficient autonomy to establish the highly competent and effective civil service that
the developmental state needed. Although a Ministry of Capacity Development was created
in 2001 to build a strong and capable state, nothing substantial was achieved.57 The priority
was to strengthen the ruling party rather than to strengthen the capacity of the state, with
senior appointments made based on loyalty and ethnicity rather than competence.58
This relatively weak state capacity has not been capable of effectively implementing the
actions required by the ‘developmental state’ model.

China’s Successful ‘Developmental State’ vs Ethiopia’s ‘Imperfect Implementation’

China has a history of being a unified country and a merit-based autonomous state for more
than 2200 years. As Francis Fukuyama notes in relation to Ethiopia and Rwanda trying to follow
the ‘developmental state’ model, they “have embarked in a process of ‘party development’ in
the name of national development…the imperfect implementation of the China model and
the lack of bureaucratic accountability, turnover, and capacity in these countries has created
vulnerabilities within the regimes that could catalyse domestic resistance.”59
China has been able to create a state that is dominated by the Communist party with
effectiveness, because it developed a robust bureaucratic system to support the merit-based
promotion of party members and strengthen party institutions. The system in China includes
term limits, age limits, transparency and accountability. These party processes are absent in
Ethiopia. This is critical because both in China and Ethiopia party members control the state. In
Ethiopia, appointments above director level are political.
In this context, as Fukuyama notes, while both Ethiopia and Rwanda “reference the importance
of a strong state, state policies generally bolstered the capacities of their parties. State power and
capacity in both these countries are entirely dependent upon their respective ruling party, both
of which have embarked on endeavours to incorporate all its citizens into their parties and to
permeate the economic and social spheres through their political positions.”60

Successful delivery of Government programmes has also been challenging due to the
nature of the EPRDF, as a coalition of regional political, and mainly ethnic, parties. This has
contributed to a fragmentation in policymaking and implementation, with different agencies
and ministries often unable to work together to achieve common goals, even at federal level.
The regional dimension adds an additional level of complexity to institutional coordination.
BTI reports that the politicisation of the civil service may be continuing under the new
Government, as it refers to appointments of inexperienced people in the cabinet and points
out that the “dismissals and new appointments of employees of the central government are
clearly motivated by political considerations in favour of Oromo.”61

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 Civil service competence

Political arrangements in Ethiopia have been traditionally based on the ruling party
controlling the state and security forces. However, unlike China, Ethiopia has not established
a merit-based autonomous state to ensure successful delivery. The Derg regime that started
in 1974 replaced many career civil servants with political appointees.62 Similarly, the EPRDF/
TPLF regime started in 1991 by removing civil servants associated with the previous regime,
to support “revolutionary democracy,” — the subordination of citizens and society to the
party.63
High civil service employment growth was needed to support the decentralisation process
and service delivery. As a result, the number of civil service personnel grew 7% a year for
several years, requiring more than 150,000 additional recruits.64 While this growth was
supported by an expansion in post-secondary education, the quality of this education has
deteriorated, affecting the quality of civil service recruits.
A significant proportion of staff whose qualifications have been tested in service through
competency assessments have failed to exhibit sufficient basic knowledge. Survey evidence
indicates that the quality of the civil service has declined in recent years, and inadequate
skills prevail. This is corroborated by capacity assessments and key informant interviews.
State capacity at regional and local levels is generally weaker than at federal level, as fewer
resources are available.65
The absence of a competent, merit-based approach in the Ethiopian senior civil service
directly affects the quality of the leadership, particularly given that political appointments
start in Ethiopia at a lower level than in other countries.
Appointments to important positions of power are often based on loyalty to the ruling
party, “creating cronyism and patronage throughout the system”66 and resulting in
mismanagement and inefficiency, wasting considerable human and natural resources. Just
over one in two promotions (56%) in Ethiopia are based on merit, considerably lower than in
Ghana and Indonesia, at 87% and 89% respectively.67
A 2019 World Bank report on the civil service commented on the lack of merit-based
promotion, reporting that “the practice of selecting decision-making staff as political
appointees from the director level upwards, may play a role in this regard” and “when
incentives are not fully aligned, managers may be oriented more towards their political
roles and opportunities rather than viewing performance as a key criterion for further
promotion.”68 This leads to a focus on political careers rather than on good civil service
management. In addition, civil servant surveys indicate that political connections are one of
the most important reasons for promotion and that factors that affect the treatment of civil
servants include political and ethnic connections.69
Other reviews of the civil service confirm these findings:
“…actual practices have juxtaposed the ‘merit and patronage approaches…’ Often, the
former is practised in hiring individuals for lower positions. The higher the position, the
greater the possibility for individuals to be recruited at best on a ‘quasi-merit’ basis and
at worst on a pure patronage basis…The influence of politicians on their selection is quite
high… Such results speak to how politicized the Ethiopian civil service is.”70
A further barrier to government effectiveness is the poor use of IT. The lack of technical
knowledge at federal level has been corroborated in discussions with Public Wing members.71

98 |
 Remuneration and satisfaction

Public and private sector wages in Ethiopia are among the lowest paid globally.72 Civil servant
surveys show that 70-80% of civil servants are dissatisfied with their salaries. Low salaries
act as a constraint to attracting qualified staff to the civil service. Private sector pay has
now surpassed public wages. While the Ethiopian wage bill is relatively low at 5% of GDP,
available fiscal resources are also low. In addition, operational budget (including information
technology) and maintenance have also been low, even more so at the Woreda and Kebele
levels.
Low salaries are compounded with the low social status of the civil service in Ethiopia, which
contrasts with the high prestige of civil servants in successful ‘developmental state’ countries
in East Asia and China. The World Bank study shows that only 8% of federal civil servants see
their work as prestigious.73

Figure 17: Job satisfaction : Civil servants

100
90
80
70
Percentage

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ria

sia

an

ia

na
l
Al

op
t

a
ige

ne

kis

Gh
hi
do
N

Pa

Et
In

As a result of these factors, civil servants in Ethiopia, particularly at the federal level, are
more demotivated than in other countries where similar surveys have been carried out.

| 99
 30 Years of Civil Service Reforms
The reform of the civil service can be categorised into the following three phases, most of which
did little to improve the civil service.74
(1) 1991-1996: a retrenchment policy that helped to purge staff thought to be associated with
the Derg, although increasing civil servants from 216,000 to almost 290,000.
(2) 1996-2003: The Comprehensive Civil Service Reform Programme, aiming to implement new
public management reform tools to improve performance.
(3) 2003 - 2018: The Public Sector Capacity Building Support Programme, which introduced
management by objectives, a balanced scorecard, and the civil service Change Army. This
programme is backed by gimgema that is used as a means of ‘political administrative evaluation.’
Civil servants more than quadrupled during this phase.
After 2003, the EPRDF/TPLF carried out many top-down reform programmes with limited
participation of civil servants. However, given that the political control of the state was not part
of the reforms, the likelihood of success was limited. Other core issues such as salaries, low status
and poor resources were not addressed.
Change Army reforms: Most of the reform initiatives, which were centrally planned and rolled
out to the rest of the country, were not successful. The most successful was the Change Army
approach adopted in 2014, a political initiative that was consistent with the high politicisation of
the state. This initiative brings together the Party Wing, the State Wing, and the Public Wing and
“assumes civil servants to behave as a stand-by military army who is ready to win a battle.” The
Change Army “mechanism tended to evaluate civil servants using subjective measures, such as
whether they had an ‘appropriate attitude’ at work.”75
The Change Army tool was piloted by mobilising communities in rural areas. It was then adopted
in the civil service as a way of bringing together the party (the Party Wing), the civil service (the
State Wing) and citizens (the Public Wing). The State Wing is led by the ‘model civil servants’,
whom other civil servants are meant to follow. The ‘model civil servants’ also have the role of
evaluating other civil servants. The Change Army facilitates the contacts between the Public Wing
and the State Wing.
“In the military, heroes are always honoured. Similarly, after accomplishing some grand objectives
there is a need to celebrate success to honour successful public servants (Civil Heroes).”76 The
Change Army focus is on attitudes rather than on constructive problem solving, and therefore it is
seen as highly political.

Service delivery and economic growth

Ethiopia’s economic growth and its delivery of basic services have been strong in the last
20 years, despite the low capacity of the state. The EPRDF/TPLF relied on the use of state-
owned enterprises and endowment companies and the financial support of the international
community (particularly for infrastructure investments) to achieve these strong results.
World Bank civil service surveys show that the civil service performed best at monitoring and
targeting, and worse on autonomy given to the staff, flexibility on ways of working and staff
involvement in decisions. Use of management information systems is weak.77

100 |
Recommendations
A pre-requisite for meaningful improvement in government effectiveness will be to create a state
separate from any political party and focussing on making the Government and the civil service
centred on citizen’s needs and responsive to their demands.
Professionalise civil service leadership.
• The Government should establish a merit-based process for appointing the most senior
officials. Appointments should be based on proven integrity, focus on the public good
and public service and professional experience and competence, not because of political
affiliations.
• All high-level appointments should be carefully vetted. A strengthened Public Service
Commission should monitor these appointments, proposing a temporary salary structure
and recording experiences in different departments to identify and disseminate best practice.
Departments should also establish a merit-based process for appointing civil servants.
• Departments should seek to attract the best talent by offering competitive salaries, decision-
making autonomy, world class training and development opportunities, within and across
departments.
Empower and delegate responsibility.
• Ministers and senior officials and their teams should be given greater autonomy and
accountability for achieving the Government’s key priorities.
• Each Minister should be given the opportunity to appoint on a merit-basis 10-20 officials to
support their departmental or agency delivery.
• Ministers should be responsible for regular reporting of their progress to the Cabinet and the
public.
Provide citizen-centred services.
• Ministers and senior officials should give priority to understanding the key needs of citizens,
particularly the most vulnerable, and to identifying ways to make the provision of services to
vulnerable people more relevant, easier, accessible and corruption-free.
• The Government should implement effective Citizen’s Charters and effective complaint
mechanisms and rely on the use of surveys of public users to evaluate civil service
performance.
• Leaders should be responsible for embedding and fostering a new civil service ethos that
demonstrates a commitment to service, empathy, and transparency, to bring public services
closer to all Ethiopians.
Digitise Government services.
• The Government should consider adopting the digitisation approaches taken in Estonia and
India.

| 101
 Endnotes
1 Douglass C. North. Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1990.
2 Acemoglu , Daron, and James Robinson. “The role of institutions in growth and development.” Leadership and
Growth 135 (2010).
3 Guillermo A. O’Donnell. “Why the rule of law matters.” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 (2004): 32-46.
4 Stephan Haggard and Lydia Tiede. “The rule of law and economic growth: Where are we?” World Development
39, no. 5 (2011): 673-685.
5 Richard V. Adkisson and Randy McFerrin. “Culture and good governance: A brief empirical exercise.” Journal of
Economic Issues 48, no. 2 (2014): 441-450.
6 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
7 Terrence Lyons, “The Puzzle of Ethiopian Politics,” July 2019.
8 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Henok Gabisa, “The politics of the Ethiopian Justice Sector Reform Programme,” Africa Law, May 2015.
12 Aaron Testafaye, “State and Economic Development in Africa, The Case of Ethiopia,” July 2017.
13 Jon Abbink, “Ethnic-based federalism and ethnicity in Ethiopia: reassessing the experiment after 20 years,” Journal
of Eastern African Studies, Volume 5, No. 4, November 2011.
14 Webcast: Alemayehu Weldemariam, Dr Yohannes Gedamu, Dr Daniel Mains, “A Changing Ethiopia: What is the
Legacy of Ethnic Federalism,” United States Institute of Peace, July 2019.
15 Lovise Aalen, “The Revolutionary Democracy of Ethiopia: A Wartime Ideology Both Shaping and Shaped by Peace-
time Policy Needs,” Government and Opposition, Volume 55, No. 4, 2020; Jon Abbink, “Ethnic-based federalism
and ethnicity in Ethiopia: reassessing the experiment after 20 years,” Journal of Eastern African Studies, Volume 5,
No. 4, 2011.
16 “Freedom in the World: Ethiopia 2020,” Freedom House, 2020.
17 “Responsibility of national EMB,” The Electoral Knowledge Network, June 2021.
18 Ayenat Mersie, “Ethiopians vote as opposition alleges some irregularities,” Reuters, June 2021.
19 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
20 Legesse Mengie, “Ethnic Federalism and Conflict in Ethiopia: What Lessons Can Other Jurisdictions Draw?” African
Journal of International and Comparative Law, Volume 23, 2015.
21 “Ethiopia: Tigray Region Humanitarian Update - Situation Report No. 1,” ReliefWeb, November 2020.
22 “Tigray crisis: Why Sudan is a ‘second home’ to Ethiopian refugees,” BBC News, March 2020.
23 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
24 Erwin van Veen, “Perpetuating Power. Ethiopia’s Political Settlement and the organization of Security,” Clingendael
Institute, 2016.
25 Webcast: Alemayehu Weldemariam, Dr. Yohannes Gedamu, Dr. Daniel Mains, “A Changing Ethiopia: What is the
Legacy of Ethnic Federalism,” United States Institute of Peace, July 2019.
26 The 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia, Article 8, Article 78.
27 Justine Limpitlaw, “Media Law Handbook for Eastern Africa,” Volume 1, p. 228.
28 Ibid.
29 Girmachew Alemu Aneme, “Introduction to the Ethiopian Legal System and Legal Research,” February 2020;
Assefa Fiseha, “Separation of powers and its implications for the judiciary in Ethiopia,” Journal of Eastern African
Studies, Volume 5, No. 4, 2011; Abebe, A. “Rule by law in Ethiopia: Rendering constitutional limits on government
power nonsensical,” University of Cambridge Centre of Governance and Human Rights, CGHR Working Paper 1,
2011.
30 “Country Policy and Information Note Ethiopia: Actors of protection,” Home Office UK, September 2020.
31 “Freedom in the World: Ethiopia 2020,” Freedom House, 2020.
32 Ibid.
33 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
34 Ibid.
35 Muluken Berhanu, “Independence of the Judiciary in Parliamentary Democracy: The Ethiopian Experience,” St.
Mary’s University, Ethiopia, p. 75.
36 Ibid.
37 Kaunaim Rahman, “Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption in Ethiopia,” Transparency International, October

102 |
 2018.
38 “Freedom in the World: Ethiopia 2020,” Freedom House, 2020.
39 Kaunaim Rahman, “Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption in Ethiopia,” Transparency International, October
2018.
40 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
41 Gudeta Kebede, “Political corruption: political and economic state capture in Ethiopia,” European Scientific Jour-
nal, ESJ, Volume 9, No. 35, 2013.
42 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
43 Janelle Plummer, “Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia Perceptions, Realities, and the Way Forward for Key Sectors,”
The World Bank Group, May 2012.
44 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
45 Kaunaim Rahman, “Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption in Ethiopia,” Transparency International, October
2018.
46 Daniel Rogger, “Who Serves the Poor? Surveying Civil Servants in the Developing World,” The World Bank Group,
May 2017, p. 14.
47 Minhaj Alam and Daniel Handino Onsamo, “Assessing the Effectiveness of Ethics Liaison Units in Combatting Cor-
ruption: The Case of Hadiya Zone, SNNPRS, Ethiopia,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol.
7, No. 1, January 2017.
48 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
49 Kaunaim Rahman, “Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption in Ethiopia,” Transparency International, October
2018.
50 “Ethiopia to Recover Over 130 Billion Birr Stolen Public Funds: Official,” Ezega News, December 2019.
51 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
52 Ibid.
53 “Freedom in the World: Ethiopia 2020,” Freedom House, 2020.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Elsa Araya, “Moving Further on Civil Service Reforms in Ethiopia: Findings and Implications from a Civil Service
Survey and Qualitative Analysis,” The World Bank Group, January 2019.
57 “Ethiopia- Public Sector Capacity Building Program Support Project,” The World Bank Group, 2004.
58 Francis Fukuyama and Hilary Matfess, “The March Is Not Linear: Big Party Politics and the Decline of Democracy
Worldwide,” Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
In book: “Beyond Convergence: World Without Order,” Edited by Hilary Matfess and Michael Miklaucic, 2016.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
62 Adare Assefa Mitiku and Annie Hondeghem, “The Ethiopian Civil Service System in Perspective: Implications for
Leadership Roles,” From the book: “Public Administration in Ethiopia: Case Studies and Lessons for Sustainable
Development,” Bacha Kebede Debela, et. al., Leuven University Press, 2020.
63 Ibid.
64 Elsa Araya, “Moving Further on Civil Service Reforms in Ethiopia: Findings and Implications from a Civil Service
Survey and Qualitative Analysis,” The World Bank Group, May 2019, p. 9.
65 Ibid.
66 “BTI 2020 Country Report – Ethiopia,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.
67 lsa Araya, “Moving Further on Civil Service Reforms in Ethiopia: Findings and Implications from a Civil Service
Survey and Qualitative Analysis,” the World Bank Group, 2019.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Information confirmed by a survey that the authors conducted. Adare Assefa Mitiku and Annie Hondeghem, “The
Ethiopian Civil Service System in Perspective: Implications for Leadership Roles,” From the book: “Public Adminis-
tration in Ethiopia: Case Studies and Lessons for Sustainable Development,” Bacha Kebede Debela, et. al., Leuven
University Press, 2020.
71 Elsa Araya, “Moving Further on Civil Service Reforms in Ethiopia: Findings and Implications from a Civil Service
Survey and Qualitative Analysis,” the World Bank Group, 2019.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.

| 103
 74 Adare Assefa Mitiku and Annie Hondeghem, “The Ethiopian Civil Service System in Perspective: Implications for
Leadership Roles,” From the book: “Public Administration in Ethiopia: Case Studies and Lessons for Sustainable
Development,” Bacha Kebede Debela, et. al., Leuven University Press, 2020.
75 Elsa Araya, “Moving Further on Civil Service Reforms in Ethiopia: Findings and Implications from a Civil Service
Survey and Qualitative Analysis,” the World Bank Group, 2019; Ermias Tasew Eyasu and Mulualem Tarekegn
Ferede, “Challenges of Change Army Implementation: the case of Benishangul Gumuz Regional State,” Interna-
tional Journal of Research in Social Sciences, Vol. 9, Issue 6, June 2019.
76 Gebre Miruts and Nigussie Daba, “Change Army: The New Face of Modernizing Civil Service in Ethiopia: The Case
of Addis Ababa,” July 2015.
77 Elsa Araya, “Moving Further on Civil Service Reforms in Ethiopia: Findings and Implications from a Civil Service
Survey and Qualitative Analysis,” the World Bank Group, 2019.

104 |
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Credit (iStock.com)
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Credit (Shutterstock.com)
CONCLUSIONS
Ethiopia is an important country in Africa, a country with a long, rich and proud history, with the
second largest population in the continent and situated in the politically strategic Horn of Africa.
For 27 years, the EPRDF/TPLF, with the support of international donors (including the US, UK, EU,
and the World Bank), was able to govern in a strongly authoritarian tradition, based on a narrow
ethnic group and with a largely state-led and controlled economy while achieving high rates
of economic growth (‘Ethiopian miracle’). This was possible through large debt-financed public
investments in infrastructure. Importantly, the country attracted some notable foreign investments,
particularly from global brands in manufacturing and from China.
However, the political and economic limits of the EPRDF/TPLF ‘developmental state’ model
(with weak state capacity) were reached in 2018, and a new leadership took control of the ruling
party. The administration of Prime Minister Abiy faces strong challenges politically (with ethnic
polarisation in the country and the armed conflict in Tigray), economically (the economic crisis
brought on by debt-financed public investments that were not accompanied by an open economy
and by weak productivity) and socially (the social impact of COVID-19 and internal conflicts).
History suggests that the traditional response for the Government would be to try to resolve these
political conflicts by military means, and to look for the continuation of the ‘winner-takes-all’
and authoritarian political model, searching yet again for the support of international donors. If
successful, the Government would then pursue a cautious and gradual opening of the economy.
Our analysis suggests that this traditional path also includes substantial risks. We believe that
a negotiated reconciliation process that looks to break with the authoritarian ‘winner-takes-all’
tradition is worth considering. A more democratic political settlement, which may also involve the
regions and the centre working together for common interests and objectives and more autonomy
in the control of financial resources by the regions, will reduce the imperative of politically
controlling the civil service, and will open the doors for the creation of a ‘merit-based’ civil service
that focusses on the needs of the citizen (‘citizen-centred’) and a truly competent and independent
judiciary.
The ability to govern competently is key to the ambitions of Ethiopia to achieve prosperity. High-
quality leaders should not only be responsible for delivering on key priorities but should also ensure
that in their day-to-day interactions they embed and foster a new civil service ethos, one that
demonstrates a commitment to service and empathy and zero-tolerance for corruption, embraces
transparency and brings public services closer to all Ethiopians, for example, through digitalisation.
These changes can be reinforced by encouraging citizens to demand high standards from the
Government, supported by initiatives such as Citizen Charters and user feedback.
The challenge of securing impetus on reform should not be underestimated. For nearly all
dimensions of reform, including those that would benefit most of the population, there are powerful
interest groups. For example – as in other countries – market liberalisation is opposed by incumbent
enterprises that run the existing systems; liberalisation of foreign investment is resisted by dominant
domestic firms; changes to public administration are viewed with suspicion by Government workers;
and governance reform is opposed by those in positions of power.
Nevertheless, a purposeful reconciliation process would support a road to prosperity which includes
providing an enabling environment for the private sector (domestic and foreign) while using state
resources to provide tools to improve the productivity of the most vulnerable (small farmers and
the so-called ‘informal’ or independent sector); opening Ethiopia to the best technologies (including
digital innovations for small farmers to provide extension services, support for climate resilience
agriculture, mobile payments, banking, micro-lending, index-based micro-insurance, climate
information, ‘uberisation’ of tractors, etc.), ideas and people in the world (including the resources
from the diaspora).

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APPENDIX
Credit (Shutterstock.com)
Ethiopia: GIEO Score 36.0 (146th)

Pillar
Economic Openness over time Rank - Global (1 to 167) Score
Performance 2020 2010 10-year trend 2020
37
146th Market Access and
36 144th 155 24.3 29.0
145th
Infrastructure
140th 141st
35 142nd
144th
Investment
GIEO Score

145th
34 146th
146th
151 35.4 35.5
147th Environment
33

32 Enterprise Conditions 140 41.2 42.1

31
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Index Year Governance 125 36.0 37.4

Breakdown of performance 2010

Score
10-year trend 2020
Rank - Global (1 to 167)
2020
10-year rank change

Economic Openness 34. 2 36. 0 146 2

Market Access and Infrastructure 2 4. 3 2 9.0 15 5 2

Communications 20.4 35.6 151 11

Resources 15.7 17.0 153 2

Transport 30.1 32.8 127 3

Border Administration 33.4 41.0 109 22

Open Market Scale 10.4 14.6 129 11

Import Tariff Barriers 33.9 32.5 159 8

Market Distortions 30.9 27.1 158 3

Investment Environment 35.4 35.5 15 1 9

Property Rights 39.3 34.7 156 23

Investor Protection 34.2 30.5 143 12

Contract Enforcement 39.2 47.1 89 25

Financing Ecosystem 32.0 40.0 143 11

Restrictions on International Investment 25.2 15.8 163 1

Enterprise Conditions 41. 2 42 . 1 140 10

Domestic Market Contestability 30.7 32.9 139 2

Environment for Business Creation 33.4 49.8 144 10

Burden of Regulation 53.0 46.6 124 72

Labour Market Flexibility 49.7 33.3 153 82

Price Distortions 54.6 47.5 102 45

Governance 3 6. 0 37.4 12 5 5

Executive Constraints 27.6 30.1 133 9

Political Accountability 35.8 39.0 131 7

Rule of Law 41.1 45.4 79 18

Government Integrity 41.6 38.2 105 9

Government Effectiveness 38.2 40.0 109 9

Regulatory Quality 28.9 30.8 133 4

110 |
Ethiopia: Market Access and Infrastructure (155th): Element and indicator scores
Italics: Indicator contains imputed values
Value Global Rank Value Global Rank
Source Unit Weight Source Unit Weight
2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020

Communications (151st) 25% 20.4 35.6 140 151 Resources (153 r d) 20% 15.7 17.0 151 153

kilobits per kilowatts per

International internet bandwidth ITU
second per capita
1.0 25.5 32.2 150 160 Installed electric capacity UNESD
capita
1.5 0.0 0.0 148 143

index, index,
2G, 3G and 4G network coverage GSMA
0-100
2.0 35.8 60.0 133 146 Ease of establishing an electricity connection WB-DB
0-100
1.0 57.3 60.1 106 118

number /100 index,

Fixed broadband subscriptions ITU
population
1.0 0.0 0.1 160 156 Reliability of electricity supply WB-DB
0-7
1.0 0.0 0.0 142 149

USD per
Internet usage ITU percentage 1.0 0.5 18.6 164 139 Gross fixed water assets IBNET population 1.0 0.0 0.0 138 138
served

litres per capita

Water production IBNET
per day
0.5 35.2 35.2 158 158

expert survey,
Reliability of water supply WEF
1-7
1.0 3.6 3.8 120 120

Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank
2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020

Transport (127th) 25% 30.1 32.8 130 127 Border Administr ation (109 th ) 5% 33.4 41.0 131 109

index, survey,
Logistics performance WB-LPI
1-5
1.5 2.4 2.3 121 143 Efficiency of customs clearance process WB-LPI
1-5
1.5 2.1 2.6 123 79

index, Time to comply with border regulations and

Airport connectivity WEF 2.0 11,234.9 42,696.8 106 90 WB-DB hours 1.0 116.5 98.3 138 136
0-100 procedures

expert survey, Cost to comply with border regulations and

Efficiency of seaport services WEF 2.0 2.8 2.8 140 139 WB-DB USD (current) 0.5 304.1 304.1 101 104
1-7 procedures
index,
Liner shipping connectivity UNCTAD rebased to 100 in 0.5 * 24.5 24.5 59 82
2004

expert survey,
Quality of roads WEF
1-7
1.0 3.3 3.0 93 128

km per 100 sq
Road density FAO
km of land area
0.5 4.0 4.0 152 152

km per sq km of
Rail density UIC
land area
0.5 0.0 0.0 162 164

Source Unit Unit Value Global Rank Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank
2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020

Open Market Scale (129th) 5% 10.4 14.6 140 129 I mpor t Tar if f Barr ier s (159 th ) 5% 33.9 32.5 151 159
Domestic and international market access for percentage of
WTO 1.5 1.0 1.1 121 130 Share of imports free from tariff duties WEF percentage 1.5 13.4 12.0 148 154
goods global GDP

Domestic and international market access for percentage of

WTO 2.0 0.1 0.2 127 122 Average applied tariff rate WEF percentage 2.0 12.7 13.0 150 151
services global GDP

Trade-weighted average tariff faced in index,

WEF percentage 0.5 3.5 2.4 31 11 Complexity of tariffs WEF 0.3 6.5 6.5 44 42
destination markets 1-7

index,
Margin of preference in destination markets WEF
1-100
0.5 22.7 25.6 128 127

Source Unit Unit Value Global Rank Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank
2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020

Market Distortions (158th) 1 5% 30.9 27.1 155 158 #N/A #N/A ## ##

expert survey,
Extent of liberalisation of foreign trade BTI
1-10
1.0 4.0 4.0 150 145

expert survey,
Prevalence of non-tariff barriers WEF
1-7
1.0 3.9 3.6 135 155

Non-tariff measures UNCTAD number 0.3 498.0 498.0 79 79

| 111
Ethiopia: Investment Environment (151st): Element and indicator scores
Italics: Indicator contains imputed values
Value Global Rank Value Global Rank
Source Unit Weight Source Unit Weight
2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020

Property Rights (156th) 30 % 39.3 34.7 133 156 Inves t or P rot ect i on ( 143rd) 20% 34.2 30.5 131 143

expert survey, index,

Protection of property rights WEF
1-7
1.0 4.3 3.3 84 154 Strength of insolvency framework WB-DB
0-16
1.0 5.0 5.0 122 135

expert survey,
Lawful process for expropriation WJP
0-1
1.0 0.49 0.43 103 131 Insolvency recovery rate WB-DB percentage 1.5 32.2 27.3 75 109

expert survey, expert survey,

Intellectual property protection WEF
1-7
2.0 3.3 3.1 102 152 Auditing and reporting standards WEF
1-7
2.0 3.8 3.5 119 136

index, index,
Quality of land administration WB-DB
0-30
1.0 4.0 5.5 156 148 Extent of shareholder governance WB-DB
0-10
1.0 4.0 4.0 110 117

index, index,
Procedures to register property WB-DB
0-100
1.0 49.6 50.9 132 133 Conflict of interest regulation WB-DB
0-10
0.5 1.7 1.7 161 162

Regulation of property possession and expert survey,

BTI
1-10
1.0 4.0 3.0 130 142
exchange

Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank
2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020

Contract Enforcement (89th) 20% 39.2 47.1 114 89 Fi nanci ng E cos y s t em ( 143rd) 20% 32.0 40.0 154 143

index,
Quality of judicial administration WB-DB
0-18
1.5 5.5 7.0 122 109 Access to finance WB-ES percentage 1.0 44.2 20.3 138 84

expert survey,
Time to resolve commercial cases WB-DB days 1.0 206.7 176.7 103 75 Financing of SMEs WEF
1-7
1.0 3.7 3.3 94 136

expert survey,
Legal costs WB-DB percentage 0.5 5.1 5.1 17 13 Venture capital availability WEF
1-7
1.0 2.2 3.2 138 50

expert survey, expert survey,

Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms WJP
0-1
1.0 0.53 0.59 144 122 Quality of banking system and capital markets BTI
1-10
1.0 4.0 4.0 140 143

branches
Commercial bank branches IMF-FAS /100,000 adult 1.0 1.2 2.9 160 148
population

expert survey,
Soundness of banks WEF
1-7
1.0 4.2 3.7 137 145

index,
Depth of credit information WB-DB
0-8
0.5 0.0 0.0 112 141

Source Unit Unit Value Global Rank Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank
2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020
Restrictions on International
10 % 25.2 15.8 164 163 #N/A #N/A ## ##
Investment (163rd)
expert survey,
Business impact of rules on FDI WEF
1-7
2.0 4.6 3.6 121 150

Capital controls FI percentage 1.0 15.4 0.0 109 154

Freedom to own foreign currency bank index,

FI
0-10
1.0 0.0 0.0 137 141
accounts

index,
Restrictions on financial transactions Chinn-Ito
0-1
1.0 0.2 0.2 109 106

expert survey,
Prevalence of foreign ownership of companies WEF
1-7
1.0 3.7 3.7 153 143

index,
Freedom of foreigners to visit FI
0-10
1.0 0.2 0.2 138 160

Source Unit Unit Value Global Rank Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank
2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020

#N/A #N/A ## ## #N/A #N/A ## ##

112 |
Ethiopia: Enterprise Conditions (140th): Element and indicator scores
Italics: Indicator contains imputed values
Value Global Rank Value Global Rank
Source Unit Weight Source Unit Weight
2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020

Domestic Market E n vi r on m en t f or B u s i n es s
30 % 30.7 32.9 141 139 25% 33.4 49.8 154 144
Contestability (139th) C r eat i on ( 144t h )
expert survey, expert survey,
Market-based competition BTI
1-10
1.0 4.0 4.0 120 111 Private companies are protected and permitted BTI
1-10
1.0 5.0 4.0 124 139

expert survey, index,

Anti-monopoly policy BTI
1-10
1.0 3.0 4.0 141 121 Ease of starting a business WB-DB
0-100
1.0 30.4 71.7 161 147

expert survey, expert survey,

Extent of market dominance WEF
1-7
1.0 3.3 3.1 119 142 State of cluster development WEF
1-7
1.0 3.0 3.3 117 130

Labour skill a business constraint WB-ES percentage 0.5 23.0 3.4 95 6

expert survey,
Availability of skilled workers WEF
1-7
0.5 3.7 3.6 128 140

Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank
2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020
Lab ou r Mar k et Fl exi b i l i t y
Burden of Regulation (124th) 25% 53.0 46.6 52 124 10 % 49.7 33.3 71 153
( 15 3rd)
expert survey, expert survey,
Burden of government regulation WEF
1-7
1.0 3.8 3.8 32 42 Cooperation in labour-employer relations WEF
1-7
1.0 3.9 3.4 143 163

expert survey,
Time spent complying with regulations WB-ES percentage 1.0 3.8 11.9 31 125 Flexibility of hiring practices WEF
1-7
0.5 3.7 3.5 86 129

Number of tax payments WB-DB number per year 1.0 29.0 29.0 76 104 Redundancy costs WEF weeks 0.5 40.0 19.2 106 100

index,
Time spent filing taxes WB-DB hours per year 1.0 198.0 300.0 55 129 Flexibility of employment contracts WB-DB
0-1
1.0 0.7 0.7 9 9

index, expert survey,

Burden of obtaining a building permit WB-DB
0-100
1.0 64.5 55.1 67 135 Flexibility of wage determination WEF
1-7
1.0 5.1 3.2 84 162

index,
Building quality control index WB-DB
0-15
0.5 7.0 11.0 134 75

Source Unit Unit Value Global Rank Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank
2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020

Price Distortions (102nd) 10 % 54.6 47.5 57 102 #N/A #N/A ## ##

expert survey,
Distortive effect of taxes and subsidies WEF
1-7
1.0 3.91 3.42 52 111

percentage of
Energy subsidies IMF
GDP
1.0 3.6 3.2 82 84

Source Unit Unit Value Global Rank Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank
2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020

#N/A #N/A ## ## #N/A #N/A ## ##

| 113
Ethiopia: Governance (125th): Element and indicator scores
Italics: Indicator contains imputed values
Value Global Rank Value Global Rank
Source Unit Weight Source Unit Weight
2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020

Executive Constraints (133rd) 15 % 27.6 30.1 142 133 P ol i t i cal A ccount ab i l i t y ( 131s t ) 15 % 35.8 39.0 138 131
Executive powers are effectively limited by the expert survey, Consensus on democracy and a market expert survey,
WJP
0-3
2.0 1.12 1.23 131 117 BTI
1-10
1.0 4.0 4.0 138 129
judiciary and legislature economy as a goal

Government powers are subject to expert survey, coding,

WJP
0-3
1.0 1.09 1.11 140 131 Political participation and rights FH
1-7
0.5 5.0 6.0 105 124
independent and non-governmental checks

expert survey, expert survey,

Transition of power is subject to the law WJP
0-1
1.0 0.26 0.32 162 150 Democracy level CSP
-10-10
1.0 -3.0 1.0 130 121

index, expert survey,

Military involvement in rule of law and politics FI
0-10
0.5 1.7 1.7 150 155 Complaint mechanisms WJP
0-1
1.0 0.40 0.40 136 144

Government officials are sanctioned for expert survey,

WJP
0-1
1.0 0.44 0.42 88 85
misconduct

Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank
2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020

Rule of Law (79th) 15 % 41.1 45.4 97 79 G overnment Int egri t y ( 10 5t h) 20% 41.6 38.2 96 105

expert survey, expert survey,

Judicial independence WEF
1-7
1.0 3.2 3.7 107 79 Use of public office for private gain WJP
0-4
2.0 1.31 1.32 95 89

expert survey, expert survey,

Civil justice WJP
0-6
3.0 1.98 2.33 154 132 Diversion of public funds WEF
1-7
0.5 3.4 3.9 74 54

index, expert survey,

Integrity of the legal system FI
0-10
2.0 7.5 7.5 43 37 Right to information WJP
0-1
0.5 0.45 0.37 102 124

expert survey, expert survey,

Efficiency of dispute settlement WEF
1-7
0.5 3.7 3.5 59 88 Publicised laws and government data WJP
0-1
1.0 0.4 0.2 91 127

expert survey,
Transparency of government policy WEF
1-7
0.5 3.8 3.8 99 87

index,
Budget transparency IBP
0-100
0.5 34.8 34.8 105 116

Source Unit Unit Value Global Rank Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank
2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020
Government Effectiveness
20% 38.2 40.0 118 109 Regul at ory Qual i t y ( 133rd) 15 % 28.9 30.8 137 133
(109th)
index, index,
Government quality and credibility WGI
-2.5 - +2.5
2.0 -0.4 -0.6 92 113 Regulatory quality WGI
-2.5 - +2.5
1.0 -0.9 -1.0 132 140

expert survey, expert survey,

Prioritisation BTI
1-10
1.0 5.0 5.0 86 85 Enforcement of regulations WJP
0-1
1.0 0.36 0.35 142 148

expert survey, Efficiency of legal framework in challenging expert survey,

Efficiency of government spending WEF
1-7
0.5 3.7 3.6 48 49 WEF
1-7
1.0 3.1 3.4 93 62
regulations

expert survey, expert survey,

Efficient use of assets BTI
1-10
1.0 4.0 4.0 100 99 Delay in administrative proceedings WJP
0-1
1.0 0.34 0.38 139 126

expert survey,
Implementation BTI
1-10
1.0 4.0 5.0 115 82

expert survey,
Policy learning BTI
1-10
1.0 4.0 5.0 117 81

expert survey,
Policy coordination BTI
1-10
1.0 4.0 4.0 129 119

Source Unit Unit Value Global Rank Source Unit Weight Value Global Rank
2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020

#N/A #N/A ## ## #N/A #N/A ## ##

114 |
 | 115
Credit (Shutterstock.com)
List of data sources and acronyms

Code Organisation

Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation

BTI
Index
CII Chinn-Ito Index

CSP Center for Systemic Peace

FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation

FH Freedom House

FI Fraser Institute

GSMA Groupe Spéciale Mobile Association

International Benchmarking Network
IBNWS
for Water and Sanitation Utilities
IBP International Budget Partnership

IMF International Monetary Fund

International Telecommunications
ITU
Union
UNCTAD United Nations Trade Data
United Nations Energy Statistics
UNESD
Database
WBDB World Bank Doing Business Index

WBDI World Bank Development Indicators

WBES World Bank Enterprise Surveys

World Bank Logistics Performance
WBLPI
Index
WEF World Economic Forum

WGI Worldwide Governance Indicators

WJP World Justice Project

WTO World Trade Organisation

You can find the Global Index of Economic Openness report and
methodology at https://li.com/research/open-economies/global-
index-of-economic-openness/downloads/
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September 2021