India Review

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/find20

India and the soft power rubric: the relevance of

migrants, students, visitors and movies

Irene S. Wu

To cite this article: Irene S. Wu (2021) India and the soft power rubric: the relevance of migrants,
students, visitors and movies, India Review, 20:4, 373-401, DOI: 10.1080/14736489.2021.1958581

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INDIA REVIEW
2021, VOL. 20, NO. 4, 373–401
https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2021.1958581

India and the soft power rubric: the relevance of migrants,

students, visitors and movies
Irene S. Wu
Communications, Culture, and Technology Program, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA

ABSTRACT
Much has been written about India’s soft power – how much it
has, its sources and origins, and its deficits and applications. This
article aims to place India’s soft power in context of other
nations like China and the US, by applying the Soft Power
Rubric, a model that harnesses quantitative data on ordinary
human interactions – like foreign visitors appearing in local
street markets – to understand the relationships among coun­
tries. In this examination of India’s soft power, the focus is on the
activity of ordinary people, not necessarily actions by the gov­
ernment. The Soft Power Rubric centers around understanding
in which foreign countries are people attracted to India and,
vice versa, which foreign countries attract Indians to go abroad.
The sum of this activity paints a picture of cultural affinity and
social interaction unlike any other analysis of soft power.

Years ago, traveling on a high Asian plateau, I bought a yak jacket from a street
market merchant. I still wear it today. We bargained, we settled a price, I paid,
she made too much change, I returned the difference. Surprised, she asked me
where I was from. Befuddled at outing myself as a foreigner, America,
I replied.
In economics, the purchase connects directly to the calculation of the
country’s Gross Domestic Product. The sum of all yak jacket prices is added
to sums across other sectors and published as a yearly total. How about in
international relations and politics? She left an impression of her country, and
I of mine. Can that be entered into a calculus of soft power resources?
Much has been written about India’s soft power – how much it has, its
sources and origins, and its deficits and applications. This article aims to place
India’s soft power in context of other nations like China and the US, by
applying the Soft Power Rubric, a model that harnesses quantitative data on
ordinary human interactions – like foreign visitors appearing in local street
markets – to understand the relationships among countries.
Soft power contrasts with hard power, which is defined here as both
economic and military power. Military power is directly controlled by govern­
ment. Governments mostly have the monopoly on military force, each in its

CONTACT Irene S. Wu [email protected]

© 2021 Taylor & Francis
374 I. S. WU

Short-term Watch a Visit a Long-term

attraction movie country Study Abroad Emigrate Attraction

Figure 1. Measuring a country’s cultural influence.

own jurisdiction. States make decisions at the heart of military power, such as
spending on weapons and hiring of soldiers. Economic power is deeply
influenced by government. Government decisions shape market structures;
fiscal and monetary policy influence the direction and volume of growth.
However, much about economic activity is outside the direct control of
government. Central banks can lower interest rates and economies fail to
grow. Entrepreneurs can launch highly profitable innovations in market
areas previously ignored by policy planners. Soft power is even more so
beyond the direct leverage of government officials. Which government ever
successfully selected a movie to become popular abroad? More examples exist
instead of movies governments tried to promote to foreigners, only to find
little traction.
In this examination of India’s soft power, the focus is on the activity of
ordinary people, not necessarily actions by the government. In this regard, this
article follows the path laid out in India Review’s 2009 special issue on foreign
policy ideas, interests and values edited by Devesh Kapur. That issue discussed
India’s foreign policy influence as shaped by foreigners’ perceptions of the
country, its ability to lead by example especially as the world’s largest and
multicultural democracy, and the impact of its diaspora, its media, ideology
and culture.1 Similarly, the Soft Power Rubric centers around understanding
in which foreign countries are people attracted to India and, vice versa, which
foreign countries attract Indians to go abroad. The sum of this activity paints
a picture of cultural affinity and social interaction unlike any other analysis of
soft power.

Literature review
The international relations literature on soft power includes case studies,
quantitative studies, policy reports including indices, and theory. The seminal
case study on soft power is Nye’s work on the US. Nye’s early formulations of
soft power in 1990 responded to American public sentiment that US power
was in decline, especially compared to Japan’s rising economic power. His
essential argument was that although US economic power might be in decline,
it would remain a great power due to its soft power influence.2 Beyond the US
case, there are several significant volumes on India. Tharoor writes, “Mahatma
Gandhi won us our independence through the use of soft power – because
nonviolence and satyagraha were indeed classic uses of soft power before the
 INDIA REVIEW 375

term was even coined. Pandit Nehru was also a skilled exponent of soft power:
he developed a role for India in the world based entirely on its civilizational
history and its moral standing, making India the voice of the oppressed and
the marginalized against the big power hegemons of the day.”3 Nair wrote
recently, the debates today surrounding secularism’s role in India’s identity
have implications for its soft power abroad.4 Kugiel’s book India’s soft power
also emphasizes India’s moral authority. Kugiel identifies India’s cultural
diversity – racial, religious, ethnic, and linguistic – as a major source of soft
power. He also emphasizes its democratic political values, diaspora, and
economic potential as attractive to foreigners.5 Chadda’s Why India matters
focuses on India’s civilization, democracy and diaspora as its main soft power
resources. She highlights the success of Indian diaspora, especially in market
economies abroad, as an important way for India to project soft power.6
Kumar and Biswas’s edited volume Modi’s cultural diplomacy and soft power
covers this government’s heightened interest in cultural and diasporic con­
nections with other countries along with special essays on movies, religion,
diaspora, and cuisine.7 Finally, Schaefer and Karan’s edited volume Bollywood
and globalization provides a historical and social analysis of the Indian movie
industry’s growing global influence, including the effects of political change in
India on the type of movies exported abroad.8
Quantitative studies show soft power’s causal effect on foreign policy. For
example, Goldsmith and Horiuchi demonstrate that foreign public opinion
had an important impact on countries’ willingness to send troops to Iraq with
the US in 2003.9 Rose and Spiegel show that more popular countries have
more international trade.10 In international education, Spilembergo’s and
Atkinson’s show if foreign students are educated in democratic countries,
once they return, their home country becomes more democratic.11
There are several soft power indices. The Soft Power 30 Index identifies
annually the leading countries with quantitative data on culture, digital,
education, engagement, enterprise, and government. In recent years, India
does not appear among the global top 30; but, in the 2018 report, which
included an Asia Index, India ranks eighth.12 India also appears in the cultural
influence section of the Lowy Asia Power Index, ranked third in 2018 and
fourth in 2019.13 These indices’ simplicity keeps soft power on the radar of
policymaking and business elites, although the confidentiality of their algo­
rithms reduces their academic rigor.
Soft power theory centers on defining political power and what subset
might be “soft.” Nye’s argues that military might and natural endowments,
such as population, geography, and access to raw materials, are not the only or
even primary sources of power. Instead, appealing domestic assets, such as
technology, education, and economic growth, are as important; an innovative
view in 1990, but widely accepted today.14 Nye views soft power as cooperative
and non-coercive, leading him to argue that “sharp power,” such as Chinese
376 I. S. WU

and Russian disinformation campaigns, are hard not soft power tactics.15
Beyond Nye, Bakalov’s literature review identifies three points of consensus:
(1) soft and hard power differ by degree rather than of kind, (2) soft power
changes over the long term, while hard power can change quickly, and (3) civil
society holds soft power as much as government.16 Still problematic are
differentiating the effects of social structures and specific actors on soft
power. Also, to alleviate confusion surrounding when conditions create soft
power and when soft power leads to outcomes, Bakalov suggests focusing on
sequences of interaction between people as links in a process of influence. The
Soft Power Rubric also prioritizes social interaction. Further, by re-defining
soft power and offering an empirical tool to make cross-country and historical
comparisons, the Soft Power Rubric retains the communicative clarity of
indices with a method rigorously grounded in conceptual debates.

How ordinary people and their worldviews link with a country’s soft
power
The Soft Power Rubric considers the experiences people have that inform their
long-term view of foreign countries. The Rubric’s elements each quantify some
type of interaction with foreigners. There are several lines of social science
research that suggest observing people-to-people interactions are likely to shed
light on country-to-country politics.
Look to the audience: Dallas and meta-power in a networked world. In
political communication, research is just as focused on how people receive
and understand a message as how people send a message. Ang studies
Dutch viewers’ reaction to the hugely popular US soap opera Dallas in the
1980’s, a flagship example of the American cultural imperialism that
concerned European governments. Ang’s methodological insight is that
to understand the impact of a television show it is important to ask the
viewers.17 In the study of soft power, to understand the extent of
a country’s potential soft power, it is as important to study the countries
it influences and their reactions, as it is to examine the intent behind its
public diplomacy program.
The volume and intensity of social interactions reflects the degree of cultural
integration. Deutsch, in Nationalism and Communications, demonstrates
that communities’ levels of integration can be observed in traffic across
their communications facilities.18 Merritt examines the volume of postal
mail in the US. In the mid-eighteenth century, there were more pieces of
mail between the various colonies in the US and the United Kingdom than
there were mail among the colonies. However, by the early nineteenth
century, the volume among the US states grew to be greater than the mail
between the US and the United Kingdom. The change reflects the greater
integration of the states with each other. In addition, Merritt discusses how
 INDIA REVIEW 377

better roads eased travel, the movement of ideas, and grew the market for
news among the colonies.19 Regardless of the content of the mail or the
newspapers, the change in volume and direction of communications is
evidence that certain communities are more connected to each other than
before. If soft power relationships occur where foreigners think of us as “we”
rather than “they,” Deutsch and Merritt’s work suggests that the first place to
look is who interacts with us the most.
Creating culture, building trust, and accumulating social capital
through interaction. Culture, Fine reminds us, is not an outside force
that is a catch all for everything else unexplained by other means. People
create and perform culture as they interact with each other. His term,
“tiny publics,” builds on Alexis de Tocqueville’s notion of “minute
associations,” small groups of people – like a book club or a team of
video gamers- that work together, hold common values, share a past,
and look forward to a future. He argues that big social forces get started
in small-scale places.20 To understand how cultural forces came to be,
we must start tiny and work our way up to big. To understand global
dynamics of influence and attraction among countries, we must start
with individuals interacting with others on the other side of national
borders.
Research on trust and social capital focuses on the ties that bind people
together and improve cooperation in society. Ostrom’s work emphasizes
that people create trust through a series of reciprocal actions. She inves­
tigated how people with a common resource to share – like water or
land – govern themselves successfully for the group’s overall benefit.
Ostrom’s conception of “trust” is not simply an act of faith, but
a choice based on experience and self-interest.21 Putnam and Goss’s
work on social capital characterizes several types of bonds among people
that can lead to cooperation: formal and informal; thick and thin; inward
and outward; and bonding and bridging. Inward focuses on helping
members of the group; outward on achieving a public good. Bridging
social capital is among people who are different; bonding among people
who are similar.22 Putnam’s work focuses on the kinds of bonds that hold
society together; Ostrom focuses on how these bonds are built. In my own
work Forging trust communities, I apply these concepts into the Internet
era. The more recent technologies of telephones, televisions, mobile
phones, and Internet, each in their turn create the potential for new
communities. This potential is converted into actual communities when
the people included interact, reciprocate, and build trust. Soft power
relationships among countries reflect their willingness to work together
based on trust accrued through positive, reciprocal interactions in the
past, not only between states, but also among ordinary people. Soft
power relationships are the social capital among nations.
378 I. S. WU

Redefining soft power

Suppose soft power is present when foreigners think of us as we, not they. That
is the ultimate form of foreigners accepting our point of view. A country does
not so much have soft power over another country, but rather countries have
soft power relationships with each other. Getting to we and with suggests these
societies are integrated, in whole or in part.
The Soft Power Rubric brings together a group of time series data that
tracks changes in the interactions that people have with foreigners. Three
series are direct people-to-people interactions, emigration, study abroad, and
traveling abroad; the fourth is a mediated interaction, watching foreign
movies. Emigration reflects a person’s ultimate integration in a foreign society,
permanently moving family and home to another country. Study abroad
reflects a person’s serious interest and commitment to understanding another
society by spending substantial financial resources and formative time in
a foreign country. Visiting a foreign country reflects a short-term interest in
a foreign society. Watching a movie expresses a curiosity about another
country.
Figure 1 shows these indicators range from short-term attraction – such as
buying a ticket to see a movie from another country, to long-term attraction –
emigrating to a foreign country. What matters is not how many movies
a country produces, but rather how many foreigners choose to watch them.
To explore the practical application of this new view of soft power,
I composed a dataset on migration, study abroad, and travel for over 200
countries from 1960 to 2017. For each of these three series, international
institutions have collected data for many countries for many years already.
I also built a dataset on foreign movie audiences for about 50 countries from
1970 forward. Data for this is available, but less comprehensive than the other
three series. Taken together, these four indicators provide a nuanced picture of
the personal interaction of people across nations and opens the possibility of
comparing soft power of countries across time.
The Soft Power Rubric measures soft power resources, the potential for
a country to have a soft power relationship with another. GDP, a measure of
economic power resources, sums the financial value of goods and services
produced by an economy. For military power, the number of military bases,
aircraft carrier, or personnel are measures of military power resources (Global
Firepower). More resources likely mean more success, but there is no guar­
antee. A bigger GDP does not guarantee the upper hand in a trade negotiation.
More military bases do not ensure victory in war. However, more resources
make success more likely, and the depletion of resources heightens the risk of
failure. Similarly, the Rubric reveals the volume and intensity of people-to-
people interactions that form the basis of many individuals’ views of foreign
countries and the foundation of a country’s soft power resources. More soft
 INDIA REVIEW 379

power resources no more predict greater political cooperation than more

military resources predict victory in war. However, it is reasonable to expect
the presence of major soft power resources itself alters behavior.
This Soft Power Rubric provides empirical markers that can ground quali­
tative studies of individual countries. The next section applies the Soft Power
Rubric in depth to India.23 The first application uses the Soft Power Rubric to
illustrate changes in India’s soft power from 1960 to the present – both in
attracting foreigners and reaching out to foreign countries; to provide context,
India’s data is also compared to China’s. The second application uses the Soft
Power Rubric data to illustrate an alternative explanation to why India is
included in G20, but excluded from the G7 – possibly soft power is as powerful
an explanation as economic power.

Exploring India with the soft power rubric

The quantitative data of the Soft Power Rubric are indicators that suggest
which lines of qualitative inquiry might prove fruitful. From movies to migra­
tion, scholars of India’s soft power highlight its strengths and weaknesses; the
quantitative data can place India in global context and also unearth changes
over time. Throughout this analysis India is compared with other countries.
Indian government reports and other research on soft power often highlight
China24, which also has an active soft power strategy; therefore, China is
included in several instances. Further, India aspires to join groups like the
G7, membership which is determined as much by a country’s soft power as its
economic power; therefore, India is compared to G7 members like France and
Italy.

Foreign audiences for Indian movies

Indian movies are the most popular image of the country in many regions of
the world. In the 1970’s, in several countries ranging from Indonesia to
Nigeria, Indian movies had a virtual monopoly since few were locally made.
In the Soviet Union, they were very popular, until American movies were
allowed.25 With greater economic liberalization in the early 1990s, Indian
movies took a more popular turn, shifting from the mainly classical styles to
more Western-style, hybridized productions.26 While there is substantial
qualitative work on the popularity of Indian films, quantitative data on the
number of foreigners who watch Indian movies is difficult to come by and,
therefore, is an opportunity for further research.
There is an important further question – does watching movies from
a country improve that country’s image in the audience’s mind? In
a recent study, over two hundred Croatian students screened five Indian
movies, followed by discussion. When surveyed afterward, most said their
380 I. S. WU

view of India had changed little, with the exception of Pinjar, a historical
movie about a family during the Partition.27 A second study from the 1990’s
of Koreans who had immigrated to the US asks whether movies and mass
media influenced their view before immigrating and whether life in the US
matched the mass media image. Immigrants with less education were more
dependent on mass media for their image of the US, especially the sense that
it was a country of luxury. Immigrants with more education were likely to
have a range of sources of information on the US, including personal
contacts, and also had a firmer sense that Americans were more frugal
than Koreans.28 Finally, an ongoing research project finds that people in
Central Asia have a negative view of American movies and cultural products
as purveyors of decadent culture.29 On the one hand we know that movie
fans are hugely knowledgeable about their favorites abroad. On the other
hand, serious studies suggest movies provide at best a partial understanding
of the foreign country. Movies are one source of soft power, but alone they
are not effective and they are not likely the main source of a country’s soft
power.
India’s movie industry is often held as an example of its soft power, but no
studies have been able to empirically link its movies to influence in foreign
policy. The trend is that more countries are producing and co-producing
movies that reach a global audience. It is reasonable to expect that there will
be more diversity of movies in the global market, as has happened in other
media markets like television and radio. Straubhaar, an expert on Brazil’s
media industry, argued in the 1990’s that the US was not as dominant in the
world media market as it once was, and that this was part of a predictable cycle
of technology and structural change. If the US was an early entrant into an
industry, like the movies, then it has a first mover advantage, especially when
the costs of production and distribution are high. However, as production and
distribution costs decline, other countries’ producers will grow.30 The
UNESCO data shows that while US-produced movies continue to sell tickets,
the number of co-productions among investors from different countries is also
rising. Given that India is already among the small number of countries with
movies appearing regularly in the UNESCO Top Ten lists, the prospects for
growing prominence are good.

Foreign visitors, students, and immigrants in India

For the other three elements of the Soft Power Rubric, there is excellent data
on India. There has been a steady increase in foreign visitors and students to
India in recent years, reflecting India’s pull on people in other parts of the
world. Tourists come to see the sites and business people to explore opportu­
nities. Foreigners enrolling in an Indian university shows an even greater
 INDIA REVIEW 381

commitment to learn about the country. It also reflects the students’ con­
fidence that India offers opportunities for intellectual and technical learning
that are better than at home.
Many scholars have explored the impact the host country has on foreign
students and the implications for when they return home. Carol Atkinson’s
work on US military academies shows how officer exchanges influence foreign
military culture, including a greater likelihood of transitioning to democracy.31
Alice Kaplan follows the influence that a year in Paris had on future US First
Lady Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy, writer Susan Sontag, and philosopher Angela
Davis.32 The exposure there three women had to French intellectual, cultural,
and artistic life transformed American culture for a generation.
Similarly, travel reflects the foreigner’s interest in the country – whether
visiting members of their extended family, exploring business opportunities,
or simply site-seeing. The tourism literature demonstrates travel is not just an
industry, but also a way for the host country to develop and convey a narrative
about their own community to outsiders. In the US, Humboldt Park, Chicago,
is a Puerto Rican neighborhood that uses its local heritage and its contribution
to American culture to attract tourists, both for the benefit of local and outside
travel businesses.33 In the Netherlands, part of the success of Volendam,
a Catholic village in a Protestant nation, is its appeal as among the most
picturesque fishing villages in the country.34 On the one hand, tourism is an
industry like any other. On the other hand, it can be an opportunity for
a community and a country to shape its own narrative for visitors.
To put India’s soft power influence into context, it helps to compare India
with China’s pull on foreign visitors and foreign students. As the bars in
Figure 2 show, while in the 1980 and 1990 there were more foreign students
in India (blue) than in China (orange), around 2000 China overtook India.
Similarly, in foreign visitors, represented by lines in Figure 2, India (blue) and
China (orange) were at comparable levels in 1990s, but foreign visitors to
China have grown faster than to India. Hosting foreign visitors is a short term
and hosting foreign students is a long term opportunity to build soft power
with people from other nations. Even though India’s numbers have grown
rapidly, China began to overtake in 2000, also reflecting a shift in soft power
influence.
Where India far exceeds China is as host for foreign immigrants, and
through these immigrants India has deeper soft power relationships with
their home countries that China lacks. Figure 3 shows the number of foreign­
ers who live in both countries from 1990 to 2019.
In 2019, India is home to over 5 million immigrants; China just over
1 million. Historically, there were two large waves of refugees that came to
India, first after Partition in 1947 and the second from Bangladesh after the
1971 war. The decline in total immigrants in India since 1990 is due to these
now elderly refugees passing away.36 China hosts more immigrants than it
382 I. S. WU

3,00,000 Foreign visitors to 60.0

Foreign visitors (millions)

China

2,50,000 50.0
Foreign students

2,00,000 40.0

1,50,000 30.0
Foreign
1,00,000 visitors 20.0
to India
Foreign students to
50,000 China 10.0
Foreign students to
India
- -
1980x 1990x 2000 2010 2018

Foreign students to India Foreign students to China

Foreign visitors to India Foreign visitors to China

Figure 2. Foreign students in India and China, 1980–2018. Source: UN World Tourism Organization
and UNESCO Institute of Statistics Note: Reporting years vary.35

Figure 3. Immigrant stock, 1990–2019. Source: UN Population Division

 INDIA REVIEW 383

Figure 4. Top ten countries sending immigrants to India, 2019. Source: UN Population Division

did before, more than doubling between 1990 and 2015. However, the
government’s concerns about foreigners is reflected in its immigration
policy.37 Especially compared to India, China’s restrictive approach is
a missed opportunity in terms of extending its soft power influence.38
When emigrants move to India that is evidence that foreigners are attracted to
the country, an indicator that there is a soft power relationship between the two
countries. When immigrants come for a better life, they hold India in high
esteem. When refugees arrive to escape troubles at home, at minimum India is
a safer haven than before. Figure 4 is a network diagram showing which
countries sent immigrants to India as of 2019.
Of all the immigrants in India in 2019, 3 million were from in Bangladesh,
1 million from Pakistan, and over half million from Nepal. These are the
countries where India’s soft power influence is likely to be the greatest.

Indian students abroad

Another important aspect of the Soft Power Rubric is how many Indian
students go abroad, serving as unofficial cultural ambassadors. For a few
years, these students are part of these foreign communities, building friend­
ships and relationships which leave a lasting impression of India.39 Figure 5
shows the remarkable movement of Indian students to study at foreign uni­
versities for a degree.
384 I. S. WU

3,50,399

1,93,508

51,981
32,972
8,755 16,486 15,538

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2018

Figure 5. Indian students abroad. Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics

By 2010, with annual figures approaching 200,000 students abroad

a year, India is second only to China with the largest movement of
young people to foreign universities. Kapur in his book on the Indian
diaspora argues that the government was able to undertake reforms that
re-balanced privilege from the elites to non-elites in part because dissa­
tisfied elites always had the option of emigrating. In particular, as educa­
tion policy made it easier for non-elites to gain seats at university, elite
families sent their children abroad to foreign campuses. While this drains
talent away, it increases India’s profile abroad. India’s diaspora has deep
network power, a consequence of personal relationships and professional
ties.40
Figures 6 and 7 show the top country destination of Indian students
enrolled in foreign universities. In 1960, about one-third of the students
went to the US; in 2017, 42% to the US and 15% to Australia.
In 1960, around 6000 Indian students went to the US, around 1600 to the UK,
and just over 1000 to Germany. In 2018, about 136,000 Indian students went to
the US; 73,000 to Australia; 35,000 to Canada; 20,000 to UK, 16,000 to Germany,
and 12,000 New Zealand. These figures also reflect the rise of English-speaking
countries besides the US and UK that seek more foreign students – Canada,
New Zealand, and Australia, especially.

Indian emigrants abroad

India has the largest emigrant community outside its borders of any other
country- over 17 million people abroad. If counted as a country itself, this
emigrant community would be the 65th largest among the over 200 countries
in the world, as shown in Table 1.
 INDIA REVIEW 385

Figure 6. Indian students Abroad 1960. Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics

Figure 7. Indian students Abroad 2018. Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics

Table 1. India’s emigrant community compared to other countries’

total population44.
World rank Country 2019 Total population
63 Kazakhstan 18,513,930
64 Zambia 17,861,030
65 Indian emigrant community 17,510,931
66 Ecuador 17,373,662
67 Netherlands 17,332,850
 386
I. S. WU

Table 2. Top 5 countries with larges emigrant communities abroad45,46.

1990 2000 2010 2019
Total World 153,011,473 Total World 173,588,441 Total World 220,781,909 Total World 271,642,105
Russia 12,662,893 Russia 10,721,414 India 13,229,275 India 17,510,931
Afghanistan 6,823,350 Mexico 9,562,929 Mexico 12,414,825 Mexico 11,796,178
India 6,623,177 India 7,932,405 Russia 10,130,259 China 10,732,281
Ukraine 5,545,760 China 5,885,006 China 8,733,242 Russia 10,491,715
Bangladesh 5,451,831 Ukraine 5,596,883 Bangladesh 6,750,115 Syria 8,225,49
 INDIA REVIEW 387

Table 3. Brief history of G-group meetings.

Stage Leader level Finance Minister level
Building to 1973: After the collapse of the Bretton Woods
G8 foreign exchange regime and the onset of
a global oil crisis, a group met as the “Library”
group, and included the US, UK, France and
Germany. Japan joined later in 1973, Italy in
1975, Canada in 1976, making it the G7. The
European Community in 1977; Russia joined in
1997, now it was the G8.
G20 1999: The 1998 financial crisis triggered in
created Southeast Asia led to the creation of the first
G20 finance ministerial-level meeting –
a lower level meeting compared to the leaders
meetings
G8+ O5 2005: G8 added the Outreach 5 (O5), Mexico,
China, India, Brazil, and South Africa.
G20 2008: After the global financial crisis of 2007, the
elevated G20 was elevated from finance minister to
leader level in 2008.
G8 2014: Russia cast out of G8 after its invasion of
becomes Crimea. Back to G7.
G7

Figure 8. Top ten host countries of Indian emigrants abroad, 2019. Source: UN Population Division

Countries that host immigrants report their citizenship or country of

origin.41 Therefore, these figures do not capture those diaspora who retain
with strong cultural ties to India but were born outside India and/or have
non-Indian citizenship. If they are considered, the Indian diaspora com­
munity abroad is even larger than the 17 million. Diaspora communities
are inevitably linked to the ancestral country’s soft power. The Indian
diaspora is a particularly important one and the Indian government
publishes data regularly on how many and where they live.42
388 I. S. WU

Comparable data for the diaspora of other countries is not easily available,
therefore, for the purposes of this article, I compare only immigration
data. However, this would be a fruitful avenue for further research.
Kapur explains some of the historic, political drivers behind this migration.
When India introduced universal franchise soon after Independence, the
political hegemony of upper castes evaporated. Later in the 1950’s, the upper
castes of South India were squeezed out of government jobs and universities,
they migrated to other parts of India and into central government jobs. In the
late 1960’s, they exited from public to private sector, and then out of the
country. In 1990, the government increased affirmative action. Migration was
an effective outlet for elites who found their status ebbing, within ten years the
political controversy over affirmative action faded.43
Since 1990 India has been among the top five countries with the largest
emigrant communities abroad, as shown in Table 2.
India’s emigrant community was the third largest in the world in 1990 and
2000; and first largest in 2010 and 2019. The Figure 8 network diagram shows
the top ten host countries for Indians living abroad as of 2019. Again, as with
Figure 3, these figures represent a snapshot of the total size of the Indian
emigrant community living there in a given year, not the number of new
Indian immigrants who crossed the border that year.
In 2019, there were 3.4 million in the United Arab Emirates, 2.7 million in
the US, 2.4 million in Saudi Arabia, 1.6 m in Pakistan; and over 1 million each
in Kuwait and Oman.
Using the lens of the Soft Power Rubric, India outranks most other coun­
tries in terms of the number of students and emigrants abroad. These are the
major sources of India’s soft power relationships with other countries. While
typically a country’s ability to attract foreigners, through inward visitors,
students, and migrants, would be the measure of its soft power influence,
India is a special case. For most countries, their best chance of interacting with
foreigners is when foreigners visit. For India, however, its community abroad
is as large as many countries and represents the main opportunity for foreign­
ers to enjoy social interactions with Indian and Indian culture. Beyond the Soft
Power Rubric, there are innumerable areas for transnational social interaction
ranging from music to cuisine, and fashion to literature. While for the moment
they lend themselves less to quantitative Table 3 cross-national comparisons,
there is ample room for further work.

Soft Power success, the G20

India’s membership in the leading global leadership group the G20 is an
example of its soft power. Perhaps it is overlooked in the India soft power
literature because bigger diplomatic prizes – such as a seat on the UN Security
 INDIA REVIEW 389

Council – still elude it. Nevertheless, a closer inspection of how G20 countries
were selected shows that being included is less a matter of economic size and
more a matter of political importance, underpinned by soft power.
India aspires to be part of not just the G20, perhaps, but also of the leading
G8 (with Russia’s expulsion, now G7). Consequently, for India, getting into
the G20 may seem like second best. Parthasarthi Shome in one of two volumes
on the G20 development agenda says:

“In the new multi-polar world, India enjoys considerable attention reflective of its
integration with the global economy through the current and capital accounts of its
balance of payments. However, its growing economic advances are not fully reflected in
the prevailing global governance arrangements, beginning with the above-mentioned G8
+O5 outreach programme, which did not represent India’s interests adequately.”47

Shome refers to an effort that began in 2005 for the G8 to include “Outreach 5”
countries, India among them. A vignette captures the reality. At the 2005
meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, while in principle the O5 were welcome
guests, in reality G8 leaders held a summit lunch to discuss outreach, while
O5 leaders were kept waiting outside the room.48 Around this time India and
others also sought to reform the United Nations and gain a seat on the Security
Council, reforms which today have yet to take place. These frustrations for
India may loom larger than the successes – getting into the G20.
G-groups are responses to financial crises. Table 3 identifies the stages of
G-group meetings at the leadership and finance minister level.49 The smaller
G7 and G8 leader meetings are more prestigious. The larger G20 began as
a lower-level meeting, a gathering of finance ministers in the wake of the 1998
financial crisis. In 2005, concerned it was losing relevance, the G8 created an
Outreach program to include Mexico, China, India, Brazil and South Africa
(O5) However, G8 countries continued to set the agenda with O5 in secondary
roles. Not until the global financial crisis of 2007 was the broad G20 group
elevated from finance-minister to leader level.
In 1998, the formal decisions on creating the ministerial-level G20 were
made by US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and Canadian Finance
Minister Paul Martin.50 A more informal accounting of events suggests that
they were selected by US Treasury official Timothy Geithner and his German
Finance Ministry counterpart Caio Koch-Weser.51 The incumbent members
of the G8 were all included, and the group expanded to encompass system­
atically significant countries that subscribed to a liberal economic agenda with
a domestic standard of good governance.52 However, this definition is more
honored in the breach, as Tristen Naylor argues.

“Despite original club members no longer being undisputedly larger economies than
others, they remain in the top-tier group. G7 members have not maintained the relative
economic power that they enjoyed in 1975. Within only five years both China and Brazil
had displaced Italy to make it ranked eighth in 1980. By the time the G20 was established
 390
I. S. WU

Table 4. Top countries by GDP 199856.

Rank Country 1998 GDP (current US$)
1 United States 9,062,818,202,000
2 Japan 4,032,509,760,873
3 Germany 2,238,990,774,703
4 United Kingdom 1,650,172,242,464
5 France 1,503,108,739,159
6 Italy 1,270,052,525,928
7 China 1,029,043,097,554
8 Brazil 863,723,411,633
9 Canada 631,813,279,407
10 Spain 619,214,834,614
11 Mexico 526,502,129,378
12 Netherlands 438,008,220,395
13 India 421,351,477,505
14 Australia 398,899,138,574
15 Korea, Rep. 383,330,931,042
16 Argentina 298,948,250,000
17 Switzerland 295,045,151,745
18 Turkey 275,967,393,985
19 Russian Federation 270,955,486,862
20 Sweden 270,809,066,781
21 Belgium 258,528,339,631
22 Austria 218,259,904,402
(Continued)
Table 4. (Continued).
Rank Country 1998 GDP (current US$)
23 Denmark 176,991,934,993
24 Poland 174,685,791,564
25 Hong Kong SAR, China 168,886,163,222
26 Norway 154,163,364,303
27 Saudi Arabia 146,775,498,093
28 Greece 144,428,172,489
29 South Africa 137,774,755,609
30 Finland 134,038,718,291
31 Portugal 123,946,327,916
32 Israel 115,932,846,767
33 Thailand 113,675,561,057
34 Iran, Islamic Rep. 110,276,913,363
35 Colombia 98,443,739,941
36 Indonesia 95,445,547,873
INDIA REVIEW
391
392 I. S. WU

at the ministerial level in 1999, India had achieved the rank of being the seventh largest
economy. Despite club members’ declining rank, their status was unaffected. This was
particularly so for Italy and Canada. Indeed, Canada has never ranked as a top-seven
economy and Italy has not been worthy of the distinction since 1980. They were able to
maintain their spots because of precedence. As a result, having gained inclusion they
could not lose it.”53

Jose Antonio Campo and Joseph Stiglitz also raise concern that the G20 mem­
bership is limited. Countries with large population and GDP like Nigeria have
been excluded; the Arab members fall short in meeting the criteria; the
Europeans are overrepresented; and least-developed countries are
unrepresented.54 In short, there is widespread agreement in the scholarly litera­
ture that inclusion in the G20 has less to do with the size of a country’s economy
and the democratic and good governance values of its political system than with
customary diplomatic influence, a version of soft power.
At the time of G20’s formation 1998, India was the 13th largest economy.55
In Table 4, the italicized countries were not included despite their large
economies. In particular, several of the smaller European economies in the
top 20 rank were excluded. Countries like South Africa and Indonesia were
included in an effort to be more representative.
Table 4Spain, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden were excluded even
though at the time they were among the top 20 largest economies. They had
insufficient soft power to get themselves included. In addition, there are 13
excluded economies larger than Indonesia, which was included.

3,00,00,000 4,00,000

3,50,000
Migrants and visitors

2,50,00,000
3,00,000
Students

2,00,00,000
2,50,000

1,50,00,000 2,00,000

1,50,000
1,00,00,000
1,00,000
50,00,000
50,000

0 0
1960x 1970x 1980x 1990x 2000 2010 2018/2019

Foreign immigrants in India Foreign visitors to India Foreign students in India

Indian emigrants abroad Indian visitors abroad Indian students abroad

Figure 9. More Indians abroad than foreigners in India: Migrants, visitors, students, 1960–2018/19.58
 INDIA REVIEW 393

The language used by various country scholars in Hoffmeister’s collected

volume on perceptions of the G20 reflects their knowledge of how precarious
their membership is. Turkey is aware it might have been excluded, following
a pattern that it is often isolated in the international community, say Huseyin
Bagci and Ilan Turan. Indonesia is grateful to be included, especially as
a representative of Southeast Asia and ASEAN in particular, writes Zamroni
Salim. South Africa, is willing to be a responsible stake holder, but also notes that
the job of representing all of Africa in its diversity is an onerous responsibility,
writes Laurence Bourelle. All these scholars note that membership in G20 is
affirmation of a country’s political importance – not just its economic signifi­
cance – an opportunity to take part in setting the rules of global governance
rather than simply being subjected to them.57
Economic size alone does not determine membership in the G20 or G7.
Therefore, India’s successful membership in G20 reflects the soft power it
exercises, in addition to its growing economic influence. A summary of India’s
Soft Power Rubric data show that in the period leading up to the late 1990’s
when the G20 was formed, India became more outward facing. Figure 9 below
shows an increase in nearly every metric of Indians’ social interactions with
foreigners. Foreign visitors and Indian visitors going abroad rise sharply from
1960 forward. Indian emigrants and Indian students abroad grow tremen­
dously from 1980 forward. From 2010 the number of foreign students
attracted to India also rises. The only indicator that declines is the number
of foreign immigrants in India; explained earlier as the advancing age of
immigrants who arrived during Partition.
Figure 9 shows that the period 1980 to 2000 marks the start of more
Indians going abroad and foreigners coming into the country. For
people across the globe, at a personal level, global awareness of India

250
200
150
100
50
0
Foreign immigrants Foreign students 2018 Foreign visitors 2018 GDP 2019 (US$)
2019 (E+05) (E+03) (E+06) (E+012)

France Italy India

Figure 10. India’s soft power rubric data compared with France and Italy.59
394 I. S. WU

grew significantly, and this would be one factor influencing India’s

inclusion in the G20 at the finance minister level in 1998 and again at
the leader level in 2008.
Should India seek membership in a re-fashioned G7, another set of data lays
out the challenges ahead. Figure 10 compares India’s Soft Power Rubric data to
France and Italy, both G7 members. Whereas in terms of GDP size, in 2019,
India is already at level comparable to France and Italy, in the other arenas of
hosting foreign immigrants, foreign students, and foreign visitors, it is evident
how much more foreigners are attracted to French and Italian culture and
society than to India’s.
In 2019, India’s GDP is larger than both Italy and France. However, in terms
of hosting foreign immigrants, India is 1 million behind Italy and 3 million
people behind France. In terms of hosting foreign students, Italy hosts double
and France five times more students than India. In terms of attracting foreign
visitors, France and Italy each host over four times more than India. The Soft
Power Rubric data is one way to capture the intangible attraction that foreign­
ers have for a particular country and is a useful tool for measuring a country’s
cultural influence.

Conclusion
The Soft Power Rubric data builds a picture of a country’s relationships with
the rest of the world by examining data on its people-to-people interactions
with foreigners – from what foreign movies are watched, and from where do
foreign visitors, students, and immigrants come. Seen through the prism of the
Soft Power Rubric, India has exceptional soft power resources. Ordinarily, soft
power is understood as foreigners’ interest in a country, which would make
foreign visitors, students, and immigrants coming into India as the natural
place to look for influence. For example, the best chance for a foreigner to meet
at Dane is in Denmark, a chance encounter outside of Denmark is less likely.
In the case of India, however, its large population abroad is an outstanding soft
power asset. The most likely opportunity today for foreigners to interact with
Indians is to meet an Indian who is abroad – as an immigrant, student, or
visitor.
When compared to China, in the 1980’s, Indians had more social interac­
tions with foreigners – whether as visitors, students, or immigrants – than
China, but by 2000 China had opened up more to the outside world than
India. When compared to G7 nations, India’s economy is already of similar
size. However, countries like France and Italy have deeper people-to-people
relationships with a wider array of countries.
What would increase India’s soft power in the future? On the movie front,
India is certainly one in a very small set of countries that has a successful
export industry, which is a major achievement. However, compared to the US
 INDIA REVIEW 395

industry’s level of foreign policy impact, India’s is still a distance away. Keep in
mind the studies that show foreigners have the most accurate impression of
a country when they have multiple and different social interactions with
people from that country. When foreigners both watch Indian movies and
have opportunities to meet Indian people, that is the most potent formula for
growing soft power relationships.
In other arenas, initiatives that would bring more foreigners to India – as
visitors, students as immigrants – would also help build its soft power relation­
ships with other countries. These, of course, are classically domestic policies,
and not usually undertaken as foreign policy initiatives. However, should
domestic political conditions align to make India easier for foreigners to
access, there should be a foreign policy payoff, a soft power bonus.

Notes
1 Devesh Kapur, “Introduction: Future Issues in India’s Foreign Policy: Ideas,
Interests and Values,” India Review: Future Issues in India’s Foreign Policy: Ideas,
Interests and Values 8, no. 3 (2009): 200–208, https://doi.org/10.1080/
14736480903116743.
2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Changing Nature of World Power,” Political Science Quarterly
105, no. 2 (1990): 177–92.
3 Shashi Tharoor, The Elephant, the Tiger, and the Cell Phone: Reflections on India, the
Emerging 21st Century Power (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2007).
4 Neeti Nair, “For the First Time, India Is Seeing Secularism Go from a Top-down Decree
to a Street Slogan,” The Print, January 3, 2020, https://theprint.in/opinion/india-seeing-
secularism-go-from-top-down-decree-to-street-slogan/343834/ (accessed August 23,
2021).
5 Patryk Kugiel, India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy (London, England:
Routledge, 2017).
6 Maya Chadda, Why India Matters (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 2014).
7 Satish Kumar, Bibhuti Bhusan Biswas, and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, eds., Modi’s
Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power: Issues and Challenges (New Delhi: Ansh Book
International, 2016).
8 David J. Schaefer and Kavita Karan, eds., Bollywood and Globalization: The Global Power
of Popular Hindi Cinema, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series 63 (New York:
Routledge, 2012).
9 Benjamin E. Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi, “In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign
Public Opinion Matter for US Foreign Policy?” World Politics 64, no. 3 (2012): 555–85.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887112000123.
10 Andrew K. Rose, “Like Me, Buy Me: The Effect of Soft Power on Exports,” Economics
and Politics 28, no. 2 (2016): 216–32.
11 Carol L. Atkinson, Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy through Military Educational
Exchanges (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). Antonio Spilimbergo, “Democracy
and foregin education,” American Economic Review 99, no. 1 (2009): 528–543.
12 Jonathan McClory, “Soft Power 30,” https://softpower30.com/ (accessed March 2, 2021).
13 Lowy Institute, “Countries – Lowy Institute Asia Power Index,” https://power.lowyinsti
tute.org/countries/ (accessed March 2, 2021).
 396
I. S. WU

Source 1960x 1970x 1980x 1990x

Foreign students UNESCO 1978 1986
Foreign visitors UN World Tourism Organization 1961
Foreign UN Demographic Yearbook and UN Population no data 1971 1981
immigrants Division

Indian visitors abroad UN World Tourism Organization 1961 1979–1980 1989–

1990
Indian students abroad UNESCO 1961– 1980–1981 1988–
1962 1991
Indian emigrants UN Demographic Yearbook and UN Population 1955– 1970–1973 only a few countries 1980–1986 only a few countries
abroad Division 1961 reporting reporting
 Source 1960x 1970x 1980x 1990x
Foreign students UNESCO 1978 1986
Foreign visitors UN World Tourism Organization 1961
Foreign UN Demographic Yearbook and UN Population no 1971 1981
immigrants Division data
Indian visitors abroad UN World Tourism Organization 1961 1979–1980 1989–
1990
Indian students abroad UNESCO 1961– 1980–1981 1988–
1962 1991
Indian emigrants UN Demographic Yearbook and UN Population 1955– 1970–1973 only a few countries 1980–1986 only a few countries
abroad Division 1961 reporting reporting
INDIA REVIEW
397
398 I. S. WU

14 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York:
Basic Books, 1990).
15 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power: The Right and Wrong Ways
to Respond to Authoritarian Influence,” Foreign Affairs, 2018.
16 Ivan Bakalov, “Whither Soft Power? Divisions, Milestones and Prospects of a Research
Programme in the Making,” Journal of Political Power 12, no. 1 (2019): 129–51.
17 Ien Ang, Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination (London:
Methuen, 1985).
18 Karl W. Deustch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the
Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge: MIT, 1966).
19 Richard Merritt, “Nation Building in America: The Colonial Years,” In Nation Building
in Comparative Contexts, edited by Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (New
Brunswick, NJ: AldineTransaction, 1966).
20 Gary Fine, Tiny Publics A Theory of Group Action and Culture (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 2012).
21 Elinor Ostrom, “Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and
Reputation,” in Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental
Work, edited by Elinor Ostrom and James Walker (New York: Russell Sage, 2003).
22 Robert Putnam and Kristin Goss, “Introduction,” in Democracies in Flux: The
Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002).
23 Irene S. Wu, Soft Power Amidst Great Power Competition (Wilson Center for
International Scholars, 2018), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/soft-power-amidst-
great-power-competition (accessed August 23, 2021).
24 A. K. Singh, S. Tiwari, India, and Center for Joint Warfare Studies, eds. Proceedings of
Seminar on Leveraging India’s Soft Power as a Strategic Resource (New Delhi: Vij Books
India, 2010).
25 Anjali Gera Roy, ed. The Magic of Bollywood: At Home and Abroad (New Delhi,
Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012).
26 David J. Schaefer, and Kavita Karan, eds., Bollywood and Globalization: The Global
Power of Popular Hindi Cinema. Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series 63
(New York: Routledge, 2012).
27 Viktorija Car, Lidija Kos-Stanisic, and Zrinka Viduka, “The Limits of Soft-Power
Diplomacy: Consumption and Representation of Bollywood Movies among Croatian
Students of Media, Communications and Political Science,” Teorija in Praksa 53, no. 5
(2016): 1213–35.
28 Paul Messaris, and Jisuk Woo, “Image vs. Reality in Korean-Americans’ Responses to
Mass-mediated Depictions of the United States,” Critical Studies in Mass
Communication 8, no. 1.
29 Eric McGlinchey and Marlene Laruelle, “Explaining Great Power Status in Central Asia:
Unfamilarity and Discontent,” Minerva Research Initiative, https://minerva.defense.gov/
Owl-In-the-Olive-Tree/Owl_View/Article/2001688/explaining-great-power-status-in-
central-asia-unfamilarity-and-discontent/ (accessed March 2, 2021).
30 Joseph D. Straubhaar, “Beyond Media Imperialism,” Critical Studies in Mass
Communication 8, no. Journal Article (1991): 39–59.
31 Carol L. Atkinson, Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy through Military Educational
Exchanges (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).
32 Alice Yeager Kaplan, Dreaming in French: The Paris Years of Jacqueline Bouvier
Kennedy, Susan Sontag, and Angela Davis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2012).
 INDIA REVIEW 399

33 Carla Almeida Santos and Christine Buzinde, “Politics of Identity and Space,”
Journal of Travel Research 45, no. 3 (2007): 322–32, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0047287506295949.
34 Johan van Rekom and Frank Go, “Being Discovered,” Annals of Tourism Research 33,
no. 3 (2006): 767–84, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2006.03.002.
35 Reporting years vary: 1980x = 1981(China) and 1978(India); 1990x = 1989(China) and
1986(India).
36 Times of India, “Despite Drop, India No. 9 in Number of Immigrants,” https://time
sofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Despite-drop-India-No-9-in-number-of-immigrants/arti
cleshow/12105590.cms (accessed August 23, 2021).
37 Huifeng He and Josh Ye, “While Trump Curbs Immigration, China’s Giving out More
Green Cards. But Can It Attract More Foreigners?” South China Morning Post,
February 17, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/
2071793/while-trump-curbs-immigration-chinas-giving-out-more (accessed
August 23, 2021).
38 As Figure 3 indicates, the definition of migrant varies from country to country. In the
case of China, migrant refers only to those living in China who are foreign citizens. In
India, migrant refers to those living in India who are foreign born or are refugees. In
both cases, these data are stock, not flow. They capture the total number of immigrants
living in a country, not the number that crossed the border that year.
39 Irene S. Wu, “Applying the Soft Power Rubric: How Study Abroad Reveals International
Cultural Relations,” in Cultural Values in Political Economy, edited by J. P. Singh.
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020).
40 Devesh Kapur, Diaspora, Development, and Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400835089.
41 Indian emigrant data is from the United Nations Population Division, https://www.un.
org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp.
Population data is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators https://data.
worldbank.org/ (accessed January 26, 2021).
42 When using the UN data on Indians abroad, the definition of the host country applies.
For example, for Indian immigrants in the US, the US migrant definition will apply;
whereas for Indian immigrants in Germany, the Germany migrant definition will apply.
In the UN data the three major categories used by most countries to count migrants are
foreign born and/or foreign citizens; further, some countries include refugees.
43 India, Government of, “Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Report of the High Level
Committee on Indian Diaspora,’ MEA, OIA Publications,” https://mea.gov.in/oia-
publications.htm (accessed August 23, 2021).
44 Kapur, Diaspora, Development, and Democracy.
45 In South Asia, the Partition is an example of borders shifting, making “immigrants” of
some people who had not moved. Sometimes, immigration data reveals moving borders,
not moving people. While the UN data released in 2017 lists Russia in 1990, the Soviet
Union did not officially dissolve until 1991. The UN data in Table 2 reflect the political
boundaries after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The number of Russians abroad
declined. In Central Asia, in 1990 there were 4.6 million, but 2015, there were
3.6 million; in Eastern Europe, in 1990 there were 6.2 million Russians, but in 2015
there were 1.1 million.
46 United Nations Population Division, “Total International Migration Stock,” https://
www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.
asp (accessed August 23, 2021).
400 I. S. WU

47 Parthasarathi Shome, ed. The G20 Development Agenda: An Indian Perspective (Delhi,
India: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
48 Tristen Naylor, Social Closure and International Society: Status Groups from the Family
of Civilized Nations to the G20. (London: Routledge, 2019). Robert Hunter Wade, “From
Global Imbalances to Global Reorganisations,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 33
(2009):539–562, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/41205/.
49 Colin I. Bradford and Johannes F. Linn, “A History of G20 Summits: The Evolving
Dynamic of Global Leadership,” Journal of Globalization and Development 2, no. 2
(2012): 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1515/1948-1837.1239.
50 Tristen Naylor, Social Closure and International Society: Status Groups from the Family
of Civilized Nations to the G20.
51 Wade, “From Global Imbalances to Global Reorganisations.”
52 Naylor, Social Closure and International Society: Status Groups from the Family of
Civilized Nations to the G20.
53 Naylor, Social Closure and International Society: Status Groups from the Family of
Civilized Nations to the G20.
54 José Antonio Ocampo and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “From the G-20 to a Global Economic
Coordination Council,” Journal of Globalization and Development 2, no. 2 (2012): 1–16.
55 India’s rank as 13th largest economy in 1998 is based on GDP (current US$) as reported
by the World Bank, downloaded in November 2019, which reflects, among other things,
data as routinely revised by governments to provide the most accurate economic data
possible.
56 World Bank, “World Development Indicators DataBank,” https://databank.worldbank.
org/source/world-development-indicators (accessed August 23, 2021).
57 Wilhelm Hofmeister, ed., G20: Perceptions and Perspectives for Global Governance
(Konrade Adenauer Stiftung Singapore, 2011).
58 When data for specific years are missing, I pulled data for nearby years.

Source
1960x
1970x
1980x
1990x
Foreign students
UNESCO
1978
1986
Foreign visitors
UN World Tourism Organization
1961
Foreign immigrants
UN Demographic Yearbook and UN Population Division
no data
1971
1981
Indian visitors abroad
UN World Tourism Organization
1961
1979–1980
1989–1990
 INDIA REVIEW 401

Indian students abroad

UNESCO
1961–1962
1980–1981
1988–1991
Indian emigrants abroad
UN Demographic Yearbook and UN Population Division
1955–1961
1970–1973 only a few countries reporting
1980–1986 only a few countries reporting
59 In Figure 10, each data series is followed by scientific notation in order for all four
series to fit on a single y-axis. For example, India hosts 5.2 million or 52 × 105 noted
as E + 05 immigrants and 42 thousand or 42 × 103 noted as E + 03 foreign students.

Acknowledgments
The author thanks the Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington, Dc, for
funding this research, especially Shihoko Goto, Michael Kugelman, Blair Ruble, Robert
Litvack and Abraham Denmark. Neeti Nair, Devesh Kapur, Kiran Duwadi, Jeffrey Taliaferro
and two anonymous reviewers provided insightful comments Thanks also to the Kluge Center
at the Library of Congress for essential research services and Keio University for early support.
This work reflects the views of the author only, and not those of the US Federal
Communications Commission, its members, or staff.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding
The author undertook this research while a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars.

ORCID
Irene S. Wu http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7086-0813