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DIANA LOUISE TORIBIO April 16, 2020

{CORRUPTION, EXTRAVAGANCE, AND BRUTALITY HISTORY DOCUMENTARY}

1965-1986

Martial law under Ferdinand Marcos


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At 7:17 pm on September 23, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos announced on television that he had
placed the entirety of the Philippines under martial law. This marked the beginning of a 14-year period of
one-man rule that would effectively last until Marcos was exiled from the country on February 25, 1986.
Even though the formal document proclaiming martial law – Proclamation No. 1081, which was dated
September 21, 1972 – was formally lifted on January 17, 1981, Marcos retained essentially all of his
powers as dictator until he was ousted.

While the period of Philippine history in which Marcos was in power actually began seven years earlier,
when he was first inaugurated president of the Philippines in late 1965, this article deals specifically with
the period where he exercised dictatorial powers under martial law, and the period in which he continued
to wield those powers despite technically lifting the proclamation of martial law in 1981.

When he declared the martial law in 1972, Marcos claimed that he had done so in response to the
"communist threat" posed by the newly founded Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), and the
sectarian "rebellion" of the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM). Opposition figures of the time,
such as Lorenzo Tañada, Jose W. Diokno, and Jovito Salonga, accused Marcos of exaggerating these
threats, using them as a convenient excuse to consolidate power and extend his tenure beyond the two
presidential terms allowed by the 1935 Constitution.

After Marcos was ousted, government investigators discovered that the declaration of martial law had
also allowed the Marcoses to hide secret stashes of unexplained wealth that various courts later
determined to be "of criminal origin".

This 14-year period in Philippine history is remembered for the administration's record of human rights
abuses,[11][12] particularly targeting political opponents, student activists,[13] journalists, religious
workers, farmers, and others who fought against the Marcos dictatorship.[citation needed] Based on the
documentation of Amnesty International, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, and similar human
rights monitoring entities,[14] historians believe that the Marcos dictatorship was marked by 3,257 known
extrajudicial killings, 35,000 documented tortures, 77 'disappeared', and 70,000 incarcerations.[14][15]
[page needed][16]: 16 

Contents

1 Explanations for the declaration of martial law

1.1 Official justifications


1.2 Dissenting perspectives

1.2.1 Political mainstream

1.2.2 Economic interpretations

2 Planning and preparation for martial law

2.1 Controlling the armed forces and police

2.1.1 Defense secretary portfolio

2.1.2 Armed Forces of the Philippines reshuffle

2.1.3 Barangay Self Defense Units and Civilian Home Defense Forces

2.1.4 The "Oplan Sagittarius" expose

2.2 Ensuring political support from the United States government

3 The role of the Communist Party of the Philippines

3.1 The "Red Scare" in the Philippines and the Anti-Subversion Act

3.2 Marcos and anti-communist rhetoric

3.3 Confirmed incidents

3.4 Disputed incidents

3.5 Radicalization of moderate activists

4 Signing of Proclamation No. 1081

5 Announcement and implementation of martial law

5.1 First wave of arrests

5.2 Media lockdown

6 Impact of martial law on the 1971 Constitutional Convention

6.1 Arrested delegates, and Aquino and Diokno's detention

6.2 Rushed approval

7 Rise of the Moro National Liberation Front

8 Human rights abuses

8.1 Scale of abuses

8.2 International pressure, and knowledge of abuses by Marcos


9 Economy

9.1 Rise in poverty incidence

9.2 Rise in debt

10 Suppression of Journalism

11 Proclamation No. 2045

12 1986 People Power Revolution and exile of the Marcos family

13 See also

14 References

Explanations for the declaration of martial law

Numerous explanations have been put forward as reasons for Marcos to declare martial law in September
1972, some of which were presented by the Marcos administration as official justifications, and some of
which were dissenting perspectives put forward by either the mainstream political opposition or by
analysts studying the political economy of the decision.[17]

Official justifications

In his 1987 treatise, Dictatorship & Martial Law: Philippine Authoritarianism in 1972, University of the
Philippines public administration professor Alex Brillantes Jr. identifies three reasons expressed by the
Marcos administration, saying that martial law:[17]

was a response to various leftist and rightist plots against the Marcos administration;

was just the consequence of political decay after American-style democracy failed to take root in
Philippine society; and

was a reflection of Filipino society's history of authoritarianism and supposed need for iron-fisted
leadership.

The first two justifications were explicitly stated in Proclamation 1081, which cited two explicit
justifications: "to save the republic" (from various plots); and "to reform society" (after the failure of
American-style democracy).[17] The third rationalization arose from the administration's propaganda,
which portrayed Marcos as a hypermasculine or ultranationalist figure able to compel the obedience of
supposedly "spoiled" Filipinos.[17]

Dissenting perspectives

Political mainstream
Opposition to Marcos' declaration of martial law ran the whole gamut of Philippine society – ranging
from impoverished peasants whom the administration tried to chase out of their homes; to the Philippines'
political old-guard, whom Marcos had tried to displace from power; to academics and economists who
disagreed with the specifics of Marcos' martial law policies. All of these, regardless of their social
position or policy beliefs, subscribed to the interpretation that Marcos declared martial law:[17]

as a strategy to enable Ferdinand Marcos to stay in power past the two Presidential terms allowed him
under Philippine Constitution of 1935; and

as a technique for covering up the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his family, and his cronies.

Economic interpretations

In addition, some critics who ascribe an economic component to Marcos' motivations,[17] suggesting that
martial law:

was an acquiescence to the global market system, which required tight control of sociopolitical systems
so that the country's resources could be exploited efficiently;

was a product of the infighting among the families that formed the upper socioeconomic class of
Philippine society; and

was a connivance between the state powers and the upper-class families to keep the members of the
country's lower classes from becoming too powerful.

Planning and preparation for martial law

Martial Law monument in Mehan Garden

Although Marcos initially claimed that he had declared martial law in response to violent acts that took
place in 1971–72 – such as the Plaza Miranda bombing and the alleged assassination attempt on Defense
Secretary Enrile – the groundwork for its implementation had been laid down much earlier. Marcos aide-
turned whistleblower Primitivo Mijares noted that "The beginning infrastructure for martial law was
actually laid down as early as the first day of his assumption of the Philippine presidency on December
30, 1965."

Most notably, by the time Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, he had:

assured the loyalty of state institutions – especially the Armed Forces – to himself;[18][19]

appointed 8 out of 11 justices of the Philippines' Supreme Court;[20]


gained the support of the Nixon administration;[21] and

carefully crafted a public relations environment that ensured that the majority of Filipino citizens would at
least initially accept martial law.[22]

Controlling the armed forces and police

Defense secretary portfolio

Marcos began increasing his influence over the armed forces of the Philippines as soon as he became
president in 1965 by following President Ramon Magsaysay's precedent of concurrently hold the portfolio
of defense secretary in the first thirteen months of his presidency.[18] American defense analyst Donald
Berlin notes that this gave Marcos an opportunity for direct interaction with the AFP's leaders, and a hand
in the military's day-to-day operationalization.[23] Singaporean author and political science professor
Terence Lee notes that this had the effect of "develop[ing] a patronage system within the defense
establishment."[24] Professor Albert Celoza, in his 1997 book on the political economy of
authoritarianism in the Philippines, notes that: "It was alleged that a plan of action had existed as early as
1965...no one opposed the plan because no one was certain that the plan would be carried out."[20]: "32" 

Armed Forces of the Philippines reshuffle

Marcos soon carried out the "largest reshuffle in the history of the armed forces" when he forcibly retired
fourteen of the AFP's twenty-five flag officers, including the AFP Chief of Staff, the AFP Vice Chief of
Staff, the commanding general of the Philippine Army, the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, the
commanders of all four Constabulary Zones, and one third of all Provincial Commanders of the PC.[19]

One prominent early example of an officer forced to resign his commission was Navy Commodore
Ramon Alcaraz – a World War II hero who would eventually be dubbed the "father of the Philippine
Marines", and have a Philippine Navy ship named after him. Alcaraz was forced to resign from the Armed
Forces because his success in the Navy's anti-smuggling operations had come into conflict with Marcos
accommodations with alleged "smuggler-king" Lino Bocalan.[25]

In their place, Marcos appointed officers from his home region, the Ilocos, the most significant of whom
had familial connections to Marcos – ensuring their familial and regionalistic loyalties to him. The
practice was so pervasive that it quickly earned a moniker: "Ilocanization".[23][24] The most important of
these appointments included Juan Ponce Enrile as Secretary of Defense, and Fidel Ramos as Armed
Forces Vice Chief of Staff, who were both related to Marcos; and Fabian Ver, Marcos' townmate from
Sarrat, Ilocos Norte, as Armed Forces Chief of Staff.

In tandem with this "Ilocanization", generals loyal to Marcos were allowed to stay in their positions past
their supposed retirement age, or were rewarded with civilian government posts.[26] This led to a loss of
morale among the middle-ranks of the AFP, because it meant a significant slowdown in promotions and
caused many officers to retire with ranks much lower than they would otherwise have earned.[23][19]

As a result, Security Affairs Professor Douglas J. Macdonald noted that "near the end of the dictatorship,
the Military and the Intelligence organizations were badly polarized along generational lines, as they are
today."

Barangay Self Defense Units and Civilian Home Defense Forces

In June 1970, Marcos authorized the creation of civil militias called "Barangay Self Defense Units",
which would be renamed the Civilian Home Defense Forces in 1977 through Presidential Decree 1016.
[27] At its inception, the CHDF numbered 73,000 men, and it earned a reputation as the perpetrators of
the worst human rights violations during martial law.[28]

The "Oplan Sagittarius" expose

See also: Marcos Soliman

When Marcos was ready to declare martial law, copies of the plan for its implementation were distributed
to key officials within the Armed Forces. As a way of assuring that any whistleblowers would be easily
accounted for, the copies of the plan were distributed with codeword titles taken from the signs of the
Zodiac. The copy marked "Sagittarius" was given to General Marcos "Mark" Soliman who commanded
the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency. Thus, when Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino Jr. exposed
the existence of "Oplan Sagittarius" a week before martial law was declared, other generals were able to
deny that they had heard of any operation under the said code title, and it was easy for Marcos to pinpoint
Soliman as the whistleblower who gave the information to Aquino.[20]: "32" 

Not long after the declaration of martial law, the controlled press reported that Soliman had died of a heart
attack, but his family believed that Marcos had ordered that he be killed.[29] Marcos then dissolved the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) and put a powerful super-agency, the National
Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) in its place, with steadfast Marcos follower General Fabian
Ver in command.[29]: "306" 

Ensuring political support from the United States government

By 1971, Marcos had reached out to US Ambassador to the Philippines Henry Byroade, with the question
of whether the United States, then under the administration of President Richard Nixon, would support
him should he choose to proclaim Martial Law. Byroade brought the matter up with Nixon in a
conversation in January 1971. According to the US National Archives' copy of the Memorandum of
Conversation between Nixon and Byroade:[21]
The president declared that we would "absolutely" back Marcos up, and "to the hilt" so long as what he
was doing was to preserve the system against those who would destroy it in the name of liberty. The
President indicated that... we would not support anyone who was trying to set himself up as military
dictator, but we would do everything we can to back a man who was trying to make the system work and
to preserve order. Of course, we understood that Marcos would not be entirely motivated by national
interests, but this was something which we had come to expect from Asian leaders.[21]

Marcos informed the US Ambassador to the Philippines about his intent to declare Martial Law plan as
early as September 17, 1972, just a few days before Martial Law was announced on September 23, 1972.

The role of the Communist Party of the Philippines

Main article: Communism in the Philippines

Of the various threats cited in the Proclamation 1081 document as rationalizations for declaration of
Martial Law, the most extensively described was the threat supposedly posed by Communist insurgents –
specifically the newly formed Communist Party of the Philippines, a Maoist organization which had only
recently broken off from the Marxist–Leninist Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas.

The "Red Scare" in the Philippines and the Anti-Subversion Act

Main article: Red Scare

When Marcos became president in 1965, Philippine policy and politics functioned under a Post-World
War II geopolitical framework.[30] After gaining independence from the US after the war, the Philippines
had retained strong economic, political and military ties to the United States,[31] manifested in a Mutual
Defense Treaty (MDT), Military Assistance Agreement (MAA), a US Military Advisory Group
(JUSMAG), and the physical presence of several Military Bases where the US Military could conduct
"unhampered US military operations" for 99 years (later reduced to 50).[32]

Filipino presidents were very politically dependent on American support, and this did not change until the
end of the Cold War in 1989, and the termination of the 1947 US Military Bases Treaty, in 1992.[33][34]
[35]

With its close ties to the US, the Philippines was ideologically caught up in the anticommunist scare
perpetuated by the US during the Cold War.[36] The government was not yet strongly-established, and it
was "fearful of being swept away by [communism]'s rising tide",[37] so in 1957, it passed Republic Act
1700, known as the "Anti-Subversion Act of 1957", which made mere membership in any communist
party illegal. The Philippines would take three and a half decades to repeal it, through Republic Act 7636,
in 1992.[37]
RA 1700 was originally meant to counter the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed force,
the Hukbalahap (also called the "Huks"). The campaign against the PKP and the Huks was bloody, but it
had basically ended by 1954.[38] Throughout the 60s, the remnants of the PKP pursued "a course of
peaceful action" while working to rebuild their organisation,[38] but, this was later challenged by a youth-
based Maoist group within the organization created by University Professor Jose Maria Sison, who joined
the PKP in 1962.[39] Clashing with the PKP party leaders' view that armed struggle was an exercise in
futility, Sison and his group were expelled from the PKP in 1967, and on December 26, 1968 founded the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) along Maoist lines.[39] While the PKP sought to marginalize
this new group, it soon became the leading communist party in the Philippines.

Marcos and anti-communist rhetoric

When Marcos became president in 1965, the PKP was a weakened organization, and the Hukbalahap
reduced to "what amounted to banditry."[16] But Marcos immediately made noise about the supposed
"communist threat" – drawing on images of the bloody Huk encounters of the 1950s, and courting the
Johnson administration's political support in light of the U.S.' recent entry into the Vietnam war.[16][40]

Marcos continued using communism as bogeyman after 1968, as the PKP faded into obscurity and the
nascent CPP became more prominent. The Armed Forces of the Philippines did likewise in 1969, when
the CPP allied with Huk commander Bernabe Buscayno to create the nascent New People's Army.
Although the CPP-NPA was only a small force at the time, the AFP hyped up its formation,[41]: "43" 
partly because doing so was good for building up the AFP budget.[41]: "43" [16] As a result, notes security
specialist Richard J. Kessler, "the afp mythologized the group, investing it with a revolutionary aura that
ony attracted more supporters."

Even in the days immediately before Marcos' declaration of Martial Law on September 23, 1972, the
Philippine National Security Council did not consider the two communist movements to represent a
sizeable threat. At around that time, the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations received notice that
as of September 19, 1972, the Philippine Council had set their threat assessment at "between 'normal' and
'Internal Defense Condition 1'" on a scale where 3 was the highest Defense condition.[42][43] One of the
generals serving under General Fabian Ver of the National Intelligence and Security Authority later
recalled that "Even when Martial Law was declared, the communists were not a real threat. The military
could handle them."[16]

Confirmed incidents

Despite historical consensus that the Marcos administration willfully exaggerated the capabilities and
actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines, a few of the incidents cited by Marcos have been
confirmed as genuine activities of the CPP. These included: the December 1970 raid on the Philippine
Military Academy's armory by defecting army officer Victor Corpus; and the July 1972 MV Karagatan
incident in which a secret arms shipment from China, meant for Communist Party forces, sank just off
Digoyo Point in Palanan, Isabela.[44]

Disputed incidents

Numerous other incidents cited by Marcos as rationalizations for his declaration of Martial Law have
either been discredited or disputed, in light of Marcos' known tactic of undertaking false flag operations
as a propaganda technique.[45][46]

This includes: the August 1971 Plaza Miranda bombing; the 1972 Manila bombings from March to
September of that year; and the alleged September 1972 Ambush of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile.
[22]

Radicalization of moderate activists

The social unrest of 1969 to 1970, and the violent dispersal of the resulting "First Quarter Storm" protests
were among the early watershed events in which large numbers of Filipino students of the 1970s were
radicalized against the Marcos administration. Due to these dispersals, many students who had previously
held “moderate” positions (i.e., calling for legislative reforms) became convinced that they had no choice
but to call for more radical social change.[47][48]

Other watershed events that would later radicalize many otherwise "moderate" opposition members
include the February 1971 Diliman Commune; the August 1971 suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
in the wake of the Plaza Miranda bombing; the September 1972 declaration of Martial Law; the 1980
murder of Macli-ing Dulag;[49] and the August 1983 assassination of Ninoy Aquino.[50]

This radicalization led to a significant growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines under the
Marcos administration.[50] Writer and peace advocate Gus Miclat cites the example of Mindanao: "There
was not one NPA cadre in Mindanao in 1972. Yes, there were activists, there were some firebrands... but
there were no armed rebels then except for those that eventually formed the Moro National Liberation
Front. When Marcos fled in 1986, the NPA was virtually in all Mindanao provinces, enjoying even a tacit
alliance with the MNLF."[51]

Signing of Proclamation No. 1081

Main article: Proclamation No. 1081

Several conflicting accounts about exist regarding the exact date on which Marcos signed the physical
Proclamation No. 1081 document, which placed the entirety of the Philippines under martial law.[8][1]

Whichever the case, the document was formally dated September 21 because of his superstitions and
numerological beliefs concerning the number seven.[1] The Official Gazette of the republic of the
Philippines, in a retrospective article on Marcos' proclamation of martial law, comments on the
differences in the accounts:

"Whether they conflict or not, all accounts indicate that Marcos’ obsession with numerology (particularly
the number seven) necessitated that Proclamation No. 1081 be officially signed on a date that was
divisible by seven. Thus, September 21, 1972 became the official date that martial law was established
and the day that the Marcos dictatorship began. This also allowed Marcos to control history on his own
terms."[1]

Announcement and implementation of martial law

Jose W. Diokno at the MCCCL rally

September 22, 1972, marked a brief period in which Proclamation No. 1081 was formally in place, but
without the knowledge of the public. For most of the Philippines, therefore, martial law was thus properly
implemented when it was announced on the evening of September 23, 1972.[1]

The implementation of martial law began sometime before midnight on September 22, with the arrest of
the two main opposition leaders, Ninoy Aquino, who on September 21 held a Congress speech to
denounce impending martial law, and Jose W. Diokno, who held a rally with 50,000 people from the
Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL) at Plaza Miranda on the same day.[52] By
dawn of the following day, 1973, many of the 400 individuals listed on the Military's priority arrest list—
journalists, members of the political opposition, constitutional convention delegates, outspoken lawyers,
teachers, and students—had been detained.

Media outlets were shuttered, although those linked with Marcos crony Roberto Benedicto were allowed
to reopen within the day. Soon after, Congress was abolished, mass activities were prohibited, political
parties were outlawed, a curfew was put in place, and civil and political rights were suspended.

First wave of arrests

The first wave of arrests under Marcos' declaration of martial law began with the arrest of Senator
Benigno Aquino Jr. late in the evening of September 22, during a late meeting of the Joint Congressional
Committee on Tariff Reforms at the Manila Hilton Hotel. Aquino was one of Marcos' most prominent
critics, and had exposed the plan to proclaim martial law in a speech in the Philippine Senate the week
before.

Juan Ponce Enrile would later acknowledge that the first wave of arrests focused on political figures and
journalists "in the initial stages, we must emasculate all the leaders in order to control the situation."[53]

The arrest of others took place after midnight in the early morning hours of September 23. Martial law
forces were sent out to arrest 400 individuals on their priority target list. By 1:00 am, Senator Jose W.
Diokno had been arrested at his residence in Makati, as had poet-Senator Soc Rodrigo as of 2:00 am that
day. Vice President Fernando Lopez, who had resigned from his cabinet positions in the Marcos
administration after accusing Marcos of corruption and power-grabbing, was on the priority list but was
overseas at the time of the declaration. Sergio Osmeña Jr., who had run against Marcos in the contentious
election of 1969, was also abroad at the time and was not caught.[54] In their place, Lopez's nephew
Eugenio Lopez Sr. and Osmeña's son Sergio Osmeña III were arrested in what international media
described as an act of extortion designed to undermine their families' financial empires.[55]

By the dawn of September 23, 100 of the 400 individuals on the list were in detention centers, with
detainees including Senator Ramon Mitra, JRU history teacher Etta Rosales, University of the Philippines
College of Social Work professor Flora Lansang, human rights lawyer Haydee Yorac, Manila Times
publisher Chino Roces, and a plethora of journalists. Student leaders were arrested regardless of whether
their organizations were "radical" or "moderate".

Newspaper editors arrested that night included Amando Doronilla of the Daily Mirror, Luis Mauricio of
the Philippine Graphic, Teodoro Locsin Sr. of the Philippine Free Press, and Rolando Fadul of the
vernacular broadsheet Taliba. Also arrested were reporters Robert Ordoñez of the Philippine Herald,
Rosalinda Galang of the Manila Times; columnists Ernesto Granada of the Manila Chronicle and Maximo
Soliven of the Manila Times, and Luis Beltran and Ruben Cusipag of the Evening News.[56]

Philippines Free Press associate editor Napoleon Rama and ABS-CBN broadcaster Jose Mari Velez also
happened to be delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and were among the 11 outspoken
convention delegates to be arrested. The others included Heherson Alvarez, Alejandro Lichuaco, Voltaire
Garcia, and Teofisto Guingona Jr.

Media lockdown

Marcos reacted with fear of deposition and immediately finalized Proclamation No. 1081, which declared
nationwide martial law at 8:00 p.m. later that evening. One day before the proclamation, on September
22, 1972 at 8:00 p.m., Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile was told to exit his white Mercedes-Benz
sedan near Wack-Wack village.[57] Another vehicle carrying gunmen arrived and stopped near an
electrical post, right beside Enrile's vehicle. They then alighted from their vehicle and began to fire at the
large sedan of Enrile to give an impression of a terrorist ambush, setting the stage for Marcos's theatrical
television announcement.[58][59][60]

By the morning of September 23, 1972, martial law forces had successfully implemented a media
lockdown, with only outlets associated with Marcos crony Roberto Benedicto allowed to operate. In the
afternoon, Benedicto-owned television channel KBS-9 went back on air playing episodes of Hanna-
Barbera's Wacky Races cartoon series, which was interrupted at 3:00 PM, when Press Secretary Francisco
Tatad went on air to read Proclamation No. 1081, through which Marcos declared martial law.[61]
Ferdinand Marcos himself went on air at 7:17 that evening to formalize the announcement. On the
following Morning, September 24, the headline of Benedicto's Daily Express announced "FM Declares
Martial Law" – the only national newspaper to come out in the immediate aftermath of martial law.[5]
(The Mindanao Tribune, which had not received notification of the media lockdown, had been able to put
out an edition by the evening of September 23.)[62]

The declaration shut down 7 television stations, 16 national daily newspapers, 11 weekly magazines, 66
community newspapers, and 292 radio stations; as well as public utilities such as Meralco, PLDT, and the
three then-existing Philippine Airlines.[63]

Impact of martial law on the 1971 Constitutional Convention

Main article: Philippine Constitutional Convention of 1971

Marcos' September 1972 proclamation of martial law had major repercussions for the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. Marcos arrested the leadership of the "opposition bloc" of the convention, who wanted to
make sure that Marcos would not stay in power longer than the two terms allowed him under the 1935
constitution. Eventually, a group of Marcos-supporting delegates led by Gilberto Duavit came up with an
entirely new draft of the constitution, which they submitted to Malacañang for ratification only two
months after the proclamation of martial law.[64]

Arrested delegates, and Aquino and Diokno's detention

Diokno's Delta Room

Aquino's Alpha Room

The work of the convention was affected by the declaration of martial law in September 1972 by
President Ferdinand Marcos; the military units assigned to implement martial law were given a list of 400
individuals to arrest, consisting mostly of outspoken critics of Ferdinand Marcos' administration. This
included a number of members of the Constitutional Convention.[18]

Some of the individuals on the list, such as Raul Manglapus,[65] were not in the Philippines when martial
law was declared, while some, such as Raul Roco, were in the country but managed to evade arrest.

However, numerous members of the Constitutional Convention's opposition bloc were among those
arrested in the early hours of September 22, 1972.[18]: "157"  Convention members arrested included
Antonio Araneta, Jose Concepcion, Voltaire Garcia, Bren Guiao, Teofisto Guingona Jr., Alejandro
Lichuaco, Jose Nolledo, Philippines Free Press associate editor Napoleon Rama and ABS-CBN
broadcaster Jose Mari Velez.[66][67][64]

With nearly a dozen of its members in jail and some of its most prominent leaders overseas or in hiding,
the "progressive faction" of the convention that spoke against Marcos was no longer able to contribute to
the discussion.[18] Meanwhile, Diokno and Aquino, whom the dictatorship considered their foremost
opponents, were later handcuffed, blindfolded, and transferred via a chopper to solitary confinement at
Fort Magsaysay, located in the municipality of Laur, Nueva Ecija. Aquino and Diokno were transferred in
March 1973 for a period of 30 days after an article published in the Bangkok Post by Aquino further
revealed abuses under martial law. Marcos accused Diokno and Aquino for this article as it was printed
while both were in prison at Fort Bonifacio. Eventually both stayed under 30 days in the enclosed, and
air-sealed Alpha and Delta rooms, for Aquino and Diokno. Aquino spent his days counting through chalk
on the wall. While Diokno counted using the knots of ropes from his mosquito net as well as the back of a
soap packaging box and crossed out each day in the manner of a calendar.[68]

They both learned of each other's presence through singing. One of them would frequently sing the
national anthem Lupang Hinirang or "Chosen Land", to which the other would reply by singing Bayan Ko
or "My Country" to prove he was still alive.[69] Their visiting family members were often strip-searched
by soldiers. Diokno's wife Carmen would sneak in books in French and Spanish for him to read, and he
would converse to his wife in Spanish, their native tongue, for only them to comprehend. Diokno would
tell his family not to weep in front of the sadistic soldiers. Only his Aunt Paz Wilson, a woman in her 90s
and a mother figure since his mother's passing, would frequently cry during every visit. She continued to
visit despite also undergoing strip searches. The family would be in tears once they left the prison, where
the Aquino family would see them. This helped the Aquinos prepare themselves emotionally since they
never saw the Diokno family manifest much pain before. Nena Diokno, suspicious of Marcos, took most
of her husband's books at the library along M.H. del Pilar and brought them home before the military
burned down the library. Jose would thank her as he was very familiar with the library and memorized the
location of each shelf and book he read.[70] Both Aquino and Diokno could not keep glasses, or pipes,
and Diokno needed to request his rosary from time to time. After enduring 30 days they were transferred
back to Fort Bonifacio. Diokno was released on September 11, 1974, Marcos's birthday, while Aquino
would leave for the United States in 1980.[68]
Rushed approval

The convention moved quickly after Marcos had declared martial law. The opposition bloc had effectively
been decimated and the threat of imprisonment hung over any delegates who might voice opposition in
the convention. The regular rules of the convention were suspended and a 166-member group headed by
Marcos-supporting Delegate Gilberto Duavit came up with a new draft of the constitution. By November
29, 1972 – a little over two months after the declaration of martial law – the convention approved the
draft, which was presented to Marcos in Malacañang Palace on December 1, 1972.[64]

Rise of the Moro National Liberation Front

Main articles: Moro conflict and Moro National Liberation Front

Sparked by the 1968 Jabidah massacre exposes, tensions had been rising between the Marcos
administration and the Moro peoples of Mindanao. Soon after Jibin Arula told the story of the Massacre
story to the press, and Senate investigations suggested the involvement of the president,[71] Lanao del
Sur congressman Rashid Lucman called for Marcos' Impeachment.[72] When the bid failed, he eventually
founded the Bangsamoro Liberation Organization (BMLO), which initially called for Moro
Independence, although it eventually shifted its positions and called for regional autonomy.[72] Former
Cotabato governor Datu Udtog Matalam likewise formed of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM),
which also called for Moro Independence.[73] Neither group, however, drew enough followers to form a
viable opposition until Marcos declared Martial Law. The BMLO remained small, while the MIM was
dissolved when Matalam accepted a government post under Marcos.[74]

With the declaration of Martial Law, on October 21, 1972, political parties, including the BMLO and the
MIM, were dissolved.[75] So when former MIM member Nur Misuari formed an armed secessionist
group called the Moro National Liberation Front, he was quickly able to consolidate power.[75] The
MNLF became the single dominant voice calling for Moro Independence, and was able to raise a
significant armed force. The Philippines' decades-long Moro conflict had begun in earnest.[75]

Human rights abuses

Main article: Human rights abuses of the Marcos dictatorship

See also: List of torture methods used by the Marcos dictatorship

Scale of abuses

Marcos' 14 years as dictator is historically remembered for its record of human rights abuses,[11][12]
particularly targeting political opponents, student activists,[13] journalists, religious workers, farmers, and
others who fought against the Marcos dictatorship. Based on the documentation of Amnesty International,
Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, and similar human rights monitoring entities,[14] historians
believe that the Marcos dictatorship was marked by 3,257 known extrajudicial killings,[14] 35,000
documented tortures, 77 forced disappearances, and 70,000 incarcerations.[76][77]

Some 2,520 of the 3,257 murder victims were tortured and mutilated before their bodies were dumped in
various places for the public to discover – a tactic meant to sow fear among the public,[76][78] which
came to be known as "salvaging."[79] Some bodies were even cannibalized.[80]

International pressure, and knowledge of abuses by Marcos

The international community eventually got word of these human rights violations and applied pressure to
the Marcos administration to end them. In 1975, Marcos aide and chief propagandist Primitivo Mijares
defected from the Marcos administration and revealed in front of US lawmakers that torture was routinely
practiced within the Marcos regime.[81] Mijares' admission attracted international criticism, particularly
from Amnesty International and Washington. Amnesty International's first report about the Philippines in
December 1975 revealed the "systematic and severe torture" handled by the Fifth Constabulary Security
Unit (5CSU).[15][78] Amnesty International found convincing evidence of widespread torture among
prisoners, enabled by Marcos's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the absence of judicial
oversight.[82] Evidence reveals that not only was he aware of tortures and murders enacted by his
military and police force, but that he condoned and at times arranged for it.[16] This caused tensions
between the United States and the Philippines, pressuring Marcos to admit human rights violations during
his regime.[78]

Marcos initially denied knowledge of human rights violations.[16] In 1974, he proclaimed in a televised
address that "No one, but no one was tortured".[83] But he eventually confessed at the 1977 World Peace
through law Conference in Manila that "there have been, to our lasting regret, a number of violations of
the rights of detainees".[84]

Economy

Main article: Economic History of the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos

Philippine economic history from Marcos' declaration of Martial Law to his ouster through the 1986
People Power Revolution was a period of significant economic highs and lows.[85][86][87][18][88]

The September 1972 declaration of Martial Law coincided with an increased global demand for raw
materials, including coconut and sugar,[88][86] and the increase in global market prices for these
commodities. This “commodities boom” allowed GDP growth to peak at nearly 9 percent in the years
immediately after the declaration – in 1973 and 1976.[86] The Philippine's Gross Domestic Product
quadrupled from $8 billion in 1972 to $32.45 billion in 1980, for an inflation-adjusted average growth
rate of 6% per year.[89]
The commodities boom continued throughout most of the 70s, only slowing down towards the early
1980s when it left the Philippine economy vulnerable to the instability of the international capital market.
[86] As a result, the economy grew amidst the two severe global oil shocks following the 1973 oil crisis
and 1979 energy crisis – oil price was $3 / barrel in 1973 and $39.5 in 1979, or a growth of 1200% which
drove inflation.[citation needed]

The Heritage Foundation pointed that when the economy began to weaken in 1979, the government did
not adopt anti-recessionist policies and instead launched risky and costly industrial projects.[90] The
overall economy experienced a slower growth GDP per capita, lower wage conditions and higher
unemployment especially towards the end of Marcos' term after the 1983–1984 recession. The Philippine
peso devalued sharply from 3.9 to 20.53. The recession was triggered largely by political instability
following Ninoy's assassination,[91] high global interest rates,[92] severe global economic recession, and
significant increase in global oil price, the latter three of which affected all indebted countries in Latin
America, Europe, and Asia. The Philippines was among these countries and was not exempted from the
negative economic consequences.[93][94]

Despite the 1984–1985 recession, GDP on a per capita basis more than tripled from $175.9 in 1965 to
$565.8 in 1985 at the end of Marcos' term, though this averages less than 1.2% a year when adjusted for
inflation.[95][96][97]

The period is sometimes erroneously described as a golden age for the country's economy.[98][99]
However, by the period's end, the country was experiencing a debt crisis, extreme poverty, and severe
underemployment.[98][100] On the island of Negros, one-fifth of the children under six were seriously
malnourished.[101][102]

Rise in poverty incidence

Poverty incidence grew from 41% in the 1960s at the time Marcos took the presidency to 59% when he
was removed from power.[103][104][105][106][107][88][108]

Rise in debt

The Philippines had a cautious borrowing policy as late as the early 1970s, but the Marcos administration
borrowed a massive amount of foreign debt in the early 1980s amid high oil prices, high interest rates,
capital flight, and falling export prices of sugar and coconut.[103] The country's total external debt rose
from US$2.3 billion in 1970 to US$26.2 billion in 1985. Along with corruption and plunder of public
funds by Marcos and his cronies, this held the country under a debt-servicing crisis which is expected to
be fixed by only 2025.
Suppression of Journalism

Main article: Journalism during the Marcos dictatorship

The shutdown of media and the mass arrests of publishers and journalists on the eve of the 1972 Martial
Law declaration effectively silenced the Philippines culture of press freedom for several years. It also had
a chilling effect on news coverage all the way until Marcos was deposed and exiled in 1986, despite the
Marcos administration loosening press restrictions in light of international pressure, and despite the
technical lifting of Martial Law in 1980.[109]

The few publications who dared to criticize Marcos, such as the WE Forum and Ang Pahayagang Malaya,
came to collectively be referred to "the mosquito press," since they became a minor but persistent
irritation.[110]

Key turning points in the history of Philippine journalism during this time included:[109] the
establishment of We Forum in 1977 and of Ang Pahayagang Malaya in 1981; the landmark coverage
murder of Macli-ing Dulag, a leader of indigenous opposition to the Chico River Dam Project;[111] the
1982 expose of Ferdinand Marcos' fake military medals which led to the closure of WE forum and the
jailing of its prominent columnists;[109] and the 1984 murder of leading Mindanao journalist Alex
Orcullo in Davao City.[112]

Proclamation No. 2045

On January 17, 1981, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2045, which formally lifted the proclamation of
martial law, but retained many of his powers. The lifting was timed to coincide with Pope John Paul II's
visit to the Philippines and with the inauguration of new U.S. president and Marcos ally Ronald Reagan.
[113] Reacting to the announcement, former president Diosdado Macapagal, who at the time was the
leading member of the United Nationalist Democratic Organization, said that the lifting of martial law
after eight years was "in name only, but not in fact". Marcos reacted to criticism by telling the national
assembly, "The opposition members want only to save their individual skins against national interests."[9]

Amendment No. 6 to the new 1973 constitution allowed him to continue making laws, and the decrees
issued during martial law were carried forward after the lifting of Proclamation No. 1081. He also
retained the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for "crimes related to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, and also conspiracy to commit such crimes."[113]

Human rights abuses continued.[84]


1986 People Power Revolution and exile of the Marcos family

Main article: People Power Revolution

See also: Marcos dynasty

Increasing unrest springing from the economic collapse of the Philippines in the years after the
assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino in 1983 came to a head in February 1986, when the EDSA
People Power Revolution succeeded in unseating the Marcoses from Malacañang Palace.[114]

Fearful of a scenario in which Marcos' presence in the Philippines would lead to a civil war,[114] the
Reagan administration flew Marcos and a party of about 80 individuals[115] – the extended Marcos
family and a number of close associates[116] – from the Philippines to Hawaii despite Marcos' objections.
[114][117]

The exiles stayed at Hickam Air Force Base at the expense of the U.S. government. A month later, they
moved into a pair of residences in Makiki Heights, Honolulu, which were registered to Marcos cronies
Antonio Floirendo and Bienvenido and Gliceria Tantoco.[115]

Marcos would eventually die in exile in 1989.[40]

President Corazon Aquino eventually allowed the remaining members of the Marcos family to return to
the Philippines to face various charges.[118] News reports from the period record that Marcos supporters
organized crowd from Manila's slums to welcome the Marcoses on their return.[118]

First term (1965–1969)

Main article: First term of the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos

Marcos' first term began with his inauguration on December 30, 1965, and ended when he was
inaugurated for his second term on December 30, 1969.

By pursuing an aggressive program of infrastructure development funded by foreign loans, he remained


popular for most of his first term,[99] with his popularity flagging only after his debt-driven spending
during the campaign for his second term triggered an inflationary crisis in November and December
1969, before his second inauguration.[36][37] Among the major projects of the first term was the
construction of the Cultural Center of the Philippines complex, considered one of the earliest examples of
what would come to be known as the Marcoses' edifice complex.[100][101]
Soon after being elected, Marcos developed close relations with the officers of the Philippine Military,
[99] and began expanding the armed forces by allowing loyal generals to stay in their positions past their
retirement age, or giving them civilian government posts.[102] He also gained the support of the Johnson
administration in the US by allowing the limited Philippine involvement in the Vietnam war through the
Philippine Civic Action Group.[103]

Marcos' first term also saw the Philippine senate's expose of the Jabidah massacre in March 1968, where a
Muslim man named Jibin Arula testified that he had been the lone survivor of a group of Moro army
recruits which had been executed en-masse on Corregidor island on March 18, 1968.[104][105] The
allegations in the expose became a major flashpoint which ignited the Moro insurgency in the Philippines.
[105]

Presidential campaign

Main article: 1965 Philippine presidential election

Ferdinand Marcos is sworn into his first term on December 30, 1965.

Marcos ran a populist campaign emphasizing that he was a bemedalled war hero emerging from World
War II. In 1962, Marcos would claim to be the most decorated war hero of the Philippines by garnering
almost every medal and decoration that the Filipino and American governments could give to a soldier.
[106] Included in his claim of 27 war medals and decorations are that of the Distinguished Service Cross
and the Medal of Honor.[106][107] According to Primitivo Mijares, author of the book The Conjugal
Dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos, the opposition Liberal Party would later confirm
that many of his war medals were only acquired in 1962 to aid in his reelection campaign for the Senate,
not for his presidential campaign.[59] Marcos won the presidency in 1965.[108]

Inauguration

Ferdinand Marcos was inaugurated to his first term as the 10th president of the Philippines on December
30, 1965, after winning the Philippine presidential election of 1965 against the incumbent president,
Diosdado Macapagal. His inauguration marked the beginning of his two-decade long stay in power, even
though the 1935 Philippine Constitution had set a limit of only two four-year terms of office.

Expansion of the Philippine military

The leaders of some of the SEATO nations in front of the Congress Building in Manila, hosted by Marcos
on October 24, 1966
One of Marcos's earliest initiatives upon becoming president was to significantly expand the Philippine
military. In an unprecedented move, Marcos chose to concurrently serve as his own defense secretary,
allowing him to have a direct hand in running the military.[99] He also significantly increased the budget
of the armed forces, tapping them in civil projects such as the construction of schools. Generals loyal to
Marcos were allowed to stay in their positions past their retirement age, or were rewarded with civilian
government posts, leading Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. to accuse Marcos in 1968 of trying to establish
"a garrison state".[102]

Vietnam War

President Marcos (left) and his wife Imelda (center) meet with US President Lyndon B. Johnson (right) in
Manila in October 1966.

Under intense pressure from the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson,[103] Marcos reversed his pre-
presidency position of not sending Philippine forces to Vietnam War,[103][109] and consented to a
limited involvement,[110] asking Congress to approve sending a combat engineer unit. Despite
opposition to the new plan, the Marcos government gained Congressional approval and Philippine troops
were sent from the middle of 1966 as the Philippines Civic Action Group (PHILCAG). PHILCAG
reached a strength of some 1,600 troops in 1968 and between 1966 and 1970 over 10,000 Filipino soldiers
served in South Vietnam, mainly being involved in civilian infrastructure projects.[111][112]

Marcos with Japanese Emperor Hirohito in 1966

Loans for construction projects

See also: edifice complex

With an eye towards becoming the first president of the third republic to be reelected to a second term,
Marcos began taking up massive foreign loans to fund the "rice, roads, and schoolbuildings" he promised
in his reelection campaign. With tax revenues unable to fund his administration's 70% increase in
infrastructure spending from 1966 to 1970, Marcos began tapping foreign loans, creating a budget deficit
72% higher than the Philippine government's annual deficit from 1961 to 1965.[99]

This began a pattern of loan-funded spending which the Marcos administration would continue until the
Marcoses were deposed in 1986, resulting in economic instability still being felt today, and of debts that
experts say the Philippines will have to keep paying well into 2025.[99] The grandest infrastructure
projects of Marcos's first term, especially the Cultural Center of the Philippines complex, also marked the
beginning of what critics would call Marcos couple's Edifice complex, with grand public infrastructures
projects prioritized for public funding because of their propaganda value.[101][page needed]
Jabidah exposé and Muslim reactions

Main articles: Jabidah massacre and Moro conflict

In March 1968 a Muslim man named Jibin Arula was fished out of the waters of Manila Bay, having been
shot. He was brought to then-Cavite Governor Delfin N. Montano, to whom he recounted the story of the
Jabidah Massacre, saying that numerous Moro army recruits had been executed en-masse by members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on March 18, 1968.[104][better source needed] This became
the subject of a senate exposé by opposition Senator Benigno Aquino Jr.[113][114]

Although the lack of living witnesses other than Arula severely hampered the probes on the incident, it
became a major flashpoint that ignited the Moro insurgency in the Philippines.[105] Despite undergoing
numerous trials and hearings, none of the officers implicated in the massacre were ever convicted, leading
many Filipino Muslims to believe that the "Christian" government in Manila had little regard for them.
[115][116] This created a furor within the Muslim community in the Philippines, especially among the
educated youth,[117][page needed] and among Muslim intellectuals, who had no discernible interest in
politics prior to the incident.[105] Educated or not, the story of the Jabidah massacre led many Filipino
Muslims to believe that all opportunities for integration and accommodation with the Christians were lost
and further marginalised.[118]

This eventually led to the formation of the Mindanao Independence Movement in 1968, the Bangsamoro
Liberation Organization (BMLO) in 1969, and the consolidation of these various forces into the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) in October 1972.[119]

1969 presidential campaign

Main article: 1969 Ferdinand Marcos presidential campaign

Ferdinand Marcos's campaign for a second term formally began with his nomination as the presidential
candidate of the Nacionalista Party at its July 1969 general meeting. A meeting of the party's ruling junta
had met a week earlier to assure that the nomination would be unanimous.[120] Under the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines which was in force at the time, Marcos was supposed to be allowed a
maximum of two four-year terms as president.[99]

During the 1969 campaign, Marcos launched US$50 million worth in infrastructure projects in an effort
to curry favor with the electorate.[121] This rapid campaign spending was so massive that it would be
responsible for the balance of payments crisis of 1970, whose inflationary effect would cause social
unrest leading all the way up to the proclamation of martial law in 1972.[36][37] Marcos was reported to
have spent PHP100 for every PHP1 that Osmeña spent, using up PHP24 million in Cebu alone.[122]
With his popularity already beefed up by debt-funded spending, Marcos's popularity made it very likely
that he would win the election, but he decided, as National Artist for Literature Nick Joaquin reported in
the Philippines Free Press, to "leave nothing to chance."[120] Time and Newsweek would eventually call
the 1969 election the "dirtiest, most violent and most corrupt" in Philippine modern history, with the term
"Three Gs", meaning "guns, goons, and gold"[123][124] coined[125] to describe administration's election
tactics of vote-buying, terrorism and ballot snatching.[122]

1969 balance of payments crisis

During the campaign, Marcos spent $50 million worth in debt-funded infrastructure, triggering a Balance
of Payments crisis.[126] The Marcos administration ran to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for
help, and the IMF offered a debt restructuring deal. New policies, including a greater emphasis on exports
and the relaxation of controls of the peso, were put in place. The Peso was allowed to float to a lower
market value, resulting in drastic inflation, and social unrest.[127]

Second term (1969–1972)

Main article: Second term of the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos

See also: 1969 Philippine presidential election

Ferdinand Marcos takes the Oath of Office for a second term before Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion on
December 30, 1969.

Presidential elections were held on November 11, 1969, and Marcos was reelected for a second term. He
was the first and last Filipino president to win a second full term.[128][129][130][131] His running mate,
incumbent Vice President Fernando Lopez was also elected to a third full term as Vice President of the
Philippines.

Marcos' second term was characterized by social unrest, beginning with the 1969 Balance of Payments
Crisis, which was already underway during the second inauguration.[99] Opposition groups began to
form, with "moderate" groups calling for political reform and "radical" groups who espoused a more
radical-left ideology.[132][133][134]

Marcos responded to both groups with military force. The most notable of these was the series of protests
during the first three months of 1970 – a period that has since come to be known as the first quarter storm.
[135][136][134]
Another major event during Marcos' second term was the Philippine Constitutional Convention of 1971,
which was marred in May 1972 when a delegate exposed a bribery scheme in which delegates were paid
to vote in favor of the Marcoses – with First Lady Imelda Marcos herself implicated in the alleged payola
scheme.[99]: "133" [137]

On August 21, 1971, a political campaign rally of the opposition Liberal Party at Plaza Miranda in the
district of Quiapo, Manila. Marcos blamed the then-still-nascent Communist Party of the Philippines, and
issued Proclamation No. 889, through which he assumed emergency powers and suspended the writ of
habeas corpus.[138] Oppositionists were arrested after being accused of being "radicals". Marcos'
response further obscured the distinction between the moderates and radical opposition, which had
already been blurred since the First Quarter storm. This brought about a massive expansion of the
underground socialist resistance, when many moderate oppositionists saw no other choice to join the
radicals.[139][140][134] In 1972 a series of bombings in Metro Manila took place, ratcheting up the
tension. Marcos again blamed the communists, although the only suspects caught in connection to the
explosions were linked to the Philippine Constabulary.[141][142]

Marcos' second term effectively ended a little under two years and nine months later, when Marcos
announced on September 23, 1972, that he had placed the Philippines under martial law.[38]

Social unrest after the balance of payments crisis

While Marcos had won the November 1969 election by a landslide, and was inaugurated on December 30
of that year, Marcos's massive spending during the 1969 presidential campaign had taken its toll and
triggered growing public unrest.[127]

Marcos's spending during the campaign led to opposition figures such as Senator Lorenzo Tañada,
Senator Jovito Salonga, and Senator Jose W. Diokno to accuse Marcos of wanting to stay in power even
beyond the two term maximum set for the presidency by the 1935 constitution.[127]

Opposition groups quickly grew in the campuses, where students had the time and opportunity to be
aware of political and economic issues.[132][133]

"Moderate" and "radical" opposition

The media reports of the time classified the various civil society groups opposing Marcos into two
categories.[132][133] The "Moderates", which included church groups, civil libertarians, and nationalist
politicians, were those who wanted to create change through political reforms.[132] The "radicals",
including a number of labor and student groups, wanted broader, more systemic political reforms.[132]
[134]

The "moderate" opposition

See also: Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties

With the Constitutional Convention occupying their attention from 1971 to 1973, statesmen and
politicians opposed to the increasingly more-authoritarian administration of Ferdinand Marcos mostly
focused their efforts on political efforts from within the halls of power.[99]

Their concerns varied but usually included election reform, calls for a non-partisan constitutional
convention, and a call for Marcos not to exceed the two presidential terms allowed him by the 1935
Constitution.[99][134]

This notably included the National Union of Students in the Philippines,[134] the National Students
League (NSL),[134] and later the Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties or MCCCL, led by
Senator Jose W. Diokno.[133]

The MCCCL's rallies are particularly remembered for their diversity, attracting participants from both the
moderate and radical camps; and for their scale, with the biggest one attended by as many as 50,000
people.[133]

The "radical" opposition

See also: National Democracy Movement (Philippines)

The other broad category of opposition groups during this period were those who wanted broader, more
systemic political reforms, usually as part of the National Democracy movement. These groups were
branded "radicals" by the media,[132][134] although the Marcos administration extended that term to
"moderate" protest groups as well.[143]

Groups considered "radical" by the media of the time included:[134]

the Kabataang Makabayan (KM),

the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK),

the Student Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP),


the Movement for Democratic Philippines (MDP),

the Student Power Assembly of the Philippines (SPAP), and

the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino (MPKP).

Radicalization

Main article: Communist Party of the Philippines

When Marcos became president in 1965, Philippine policy and politics functioned under a Post-World
War II geopolitical framework.[144] As a result, the Philippines was ideologically caught up in the
anticommunist scare perpetuated by the US during the Cold War.[145] Marcos and the AFP thus
emphasized the "threat" represented by the formation of the Communist Party of the Philippines in 1969,
even if it was still a small organization.[136]: "43"  partly because doing so was good for building up the
AFP budget.[136]: "43" [127] As a result, notes Security Specialist Richard J. Kessler, this "mythologized
the group, investing it with a revolutionary aura that only attracted more supporters."

The social unrest of 1969 to 1970, and the violent dispersal of the resulting "First Quarter Storm" protests
were among the early watershed events in which large numbers of Filipino students of the 1970s were
radicalized against the Marcos administration. Due to these dispersals, many students who had previously
held "moderate" positions (i.e., calling for legislative reforms) became convinced that they had no choice
but to call for more radical social change.[139][140]

Other watershed events that would later radicalize many otherwise "moderate" opposition members
include the February 1971 Diliman Commune; the August 1971 suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
in the wake of the Plaza Miranda bombing; the September 1972 declaration of martial law; the 1980
murder of Macli-ing Dulag;[135] and the August 1983 assassination of Ninoy Aquino.[134]

By 1970, study sessions on Marxism–Leninism had become common in the campuses, and many student
activists were joining various organizations associated with the National Democracy Movement (ND),
such as the Student Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP) and the Kabataang
Makabayan (KM, lit. Patriotic Youth) which were founded by Jose Maria Sison;[146][147] the Samahang
Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK) which was founded as a separate organization from the SCAUP and
KM by a group of young writer-leaders;[148] and others.

The line between leftist activists and communists became increasingly blurred, as a significant number of
radicalized activists also joined the Communist Party of the Philippines. Radicalized activists from the
cities began to be more extensively deployed in rural areas were some became guerillas.[149][150]

First Quarter Storm


Main article: First Quarter Storm

By the time Marcos gave the first State of the Nation Address of his second term on January 26, 1970, the
unrest born from the 1969–1970 balance of payments crisis exploded into a series of demonstrations,
protests, and marches against the government. Student groups – some moderate and some radical – served
as the driving force of the protests, which lasted until the end of the university semester in March 1970,
and would come to be known as the "First Quarter Storm".[151][127]

During Marcos's January 26, 1970, State of the Nation Address, the moderate National Union of Students
of the Philippines organized a protested in front of Congress, and invited student groups both moderate
and radical to join them. Some of the students participating in the protest harangued Marcos as he and his
wife Imelda as they left the Congress building, throwing a coffin, a stuffed alligator, and stones at them.
[152]

The next major protest took place on January 30, in front of the presidential palace,[153] where activists
rammed the gate with a fire truck and once the gate broke and gave way, the activists charged into the
Palace grounds tossing rocks, pillboxes, Molotov cocktails. At least two activists were confirmed dead
and several were injured by the police.

Five more major protests took place in the Metro Manila area took place between then and March 17,
1970 – what some media accounts would later brand the "7 deadly protests of the First Quarter
Storm."[154] This included a February 12 rally at Plaza Miranda; a February 18 demonstration dubbed
the "People's Congress", also supposed to be at the Plaza Miranda but dispersed early, resulting in
protesters proceeding to the US Embassy where they set fire to the lobby;[140] a "Second People's
Congress" demonstration on February 26; a "People's March" from Welcome Rotonda to Plaza Lawton on
March 3; and the Second "People's March" at Plaza Moriones on March 17.[154]

The protests ranged from 50,000 to 100,000 in number per weekly mass action.[155][better source
needed] Students had declared a week-long boycott of classes and instead met to organize protest rallies.
[140]

Violent dispersals of various FQS protests were among the first watershed events in which large numbers
of Filipino students of the 1970s were radicalized against the Marcos administration. Due to these
dispersals, many students who had previously held "moderate" positions (i.e., calling for legislative
reforms) became convinced that they had no choice but to call for more radical social change.[139][better
source needed]

Constitutional Convention of 1971


Main article: Philippine Constitutional Convention of 1971

Expressing opposition to the Marcos's policies and citing rising discontent over wide inequalities in
society,[99] civil society groups and opposition leaders began campaigning in 1967 to initiate a
constitutional convention which would revise change the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines.[156] On
March 16 of that year, the Philippine Congress constituted itself into a Constituent Assembly and passed
Resolution No. 2, which called for a Constitutional Convention to change the 1935 Constitution.[157]

Marcos surprised his critics by endorsing the move, but historians later noted that the resulting
Constitutional Convention would lay the foundation for the legal justifications Marcos would use to
extend his term past the two four-year terms allowable under the 1935 Constitution.[99]

A special election was held on November 10, 1970, to elect the delegates of the convention.[99]: "130" 
Once the winners had been determined, the convention was convened on June 1, 1971, at the newly
completed Quezon City Hall.[158] A total of 320 delegates were elected to the convention, the most
prominent being former senators Raul Manglapus and Roseller T. Lim. Other delegates would become
influential political figures, including Hilario Davide, Jr., Marcelo Fernan, Sotero Laurel, Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Raul Roco, Edgardo Angara, Richard Gordon, Margarito Teves, and
Federico Dela Plana.[99][159]

By 1972 the convention had already been bogged down by politicking and delays, when its credibility
took a severe blow in May 1972 when a delegate exposed a bribery scheme in which delegates were paid
to vote in favor of the Marcoses – with First Lady Imelda Marcos herself implicated in the alleged payola
scheme.[99]: "133" [137]

The investigation on the scheme was effectively shelved when Marcos declared martial law in September
1972, and had 11 opposition delegates arrested. The remaining opposition delegates were forced to go
either into exile or hiding. Within two months, an entirely new draft of the constitution was created from
scratch by a special committee.[160] The 1973 constitutional plebiscite was called to ratify the new
constitution, but the validity of the ratification was brought to question because Marcos replaced the
method of voting through secret ballot with a system of viva voce voting by "citizen's assemblies".[161]: 
213  The ratification of the constitution was challenged in what came to be known as the Ratification
Cases.[162][163]

Early growth of the CPP New People's Army

On December 29, 1970, Philippine Military Academy instructor Lt Victor Corpuz led New People's Army
rebels in a raid on the PMA armory, capturing rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, a bazooka and
thousands of rounds of ammunition in 1970.[164] In 1972, China, which was then actively supporting and
arming communist insurgencies in Asia as part of Mao Zedong's People's War Doctrine, transported 1,200
M-14 and AK-47 rifles[165] for the NPA to speed up NPA's campaign to defeat the government.[166]
[167]

Rumored coup d'état and assassination plot

Rumors of coup d'état were also brewing. A report of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee said
that shortly after the 1969 Philippine presidential election, a group composed mostly of retired colonels
and generals organized a revolutionary junta with the aim of first discrediting President Marcos and then
killing him. The group was headed by Eleuterio Adevoso, an official of the opposition Liberal Party. A
document given to the committee by a Philippine Government official alleged that key figures in the plot
were Vice President Fernando Lopez and Sergio Osmena Jr., whom Marcos defeated in the 1969 election.
[168]

While a report obtained by The New York Times speculated that rumors of a coup could be used by
Marcos to justify martial law, as early as December 1969 in a message from the US Ambassador to the
US Assistant Secretary of State, the ambassador said that most of the talk about revolution and even
assassination has been coming from the defeated opposition, of which Adevoso is a leading activist. He
also said that the information he has on the assassination plans are 'hard' or well-sourced and he has to
make sure that it reaches President Marcos.[169][non-primary source needed][170][non-primary source
needed]

Plaza Miranda bombing

Main article: Plaza Miranda bombing

In interviews by The Washington Post, unnamed former Communist Party of the Philippines officials
alleged that "the Communist party leadership planned – and three operatives carried out – the Plaza
Miranda attack in an attempt to provoke government repression and push the country to the brink of
revolution. Communist Party Leader Jose Maria Sison had calculated that Marcos could be provoked into
cracking down on his opponents, thereby driving thousands of political activists into the underground, the
anonymous former officials said. Recruits were urgently needed, they said, to make use of a large influx
of weapons and financial aid that China had already agreed to provide."[171] José María Sison continues
to deny these claims,[172] and the CPP has never released any official confirmation of their culpability in
the incident. Marcos and his allies claimed that Benigno Aquino Jr. was part of the plot, which was denied
by CPP-NPA founding chair Jose Maria Sison.[173]

Richard Nixon with the Marcos family in 1969

Some historians claim Marcos was responsible for the Plaza Miranda bombing as he is known to have
used false flag operations as a pretext for martial law.[174][175] There were a series of deadly bombings
in 1971, and the CIA privately stated that Marcos was responsible for at least one of them.[citation
needed]US intelligence documents declassified in the 1990s contained further evidence implicating
Marcos, provided by a CIA mole within the Philippine army.[176]

Another false flag attack took place with the attempted assassination of Defense Minister Juan Ponce
Enrile in 1972. President Nixon approved Marcos's martial law initiative immediately afterwards.[176]

1971 suspension of the writ of habeas corpus

As a response to the Plaza Miranda bombing, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889, through which he
assumed emergency powers and suspended the writ of habeas corpus[177] – an act which would later be
seen as a prelude to the declaration of martial law more than a year later.[138]

Marcos's suspension of the writ became the event that forced many members of the moderate opposition,
such as Edgar Jopson, to join the ranks of the radicals. In the aftermath of the bombing, Marcos lumped
all of the opposition together and referred to them as communists, and many former moderates fled to the
mountain encampments of the radical opposition to avoid being arrested by Marcos's forces. Those who
became disenchanted with the excesses of the Marcos administration and wanted to join the opposition
after 1971 often joined the ranks of the radicals, simply because they represented the only group vocally
offering opposition to the Marcos government.[178][page needed]

1972 Manila bombings

Main article: 1972 Manila bombings

On the evening of September 23, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos announced that he had placed the
entirety of the Philippines under martial law.[38] This marked the beginning of a 14-year period of one-
man rule that would effectively last until Marcos was exiled from the country on February 25, 1986. Even
though the formal document proclaiming martial law – Proclamation No. 1081 – was formally lifted on
January 17, 1981, Marcos retained virtually all of his powers as dictator until he was ousted by the EDSA
Revolution.[179] Plaza Miranda was soon followed by a series of about twenty explosions that took place
in various locations in Metro Manila in the months immediately preceding Marcos' proclamation of
martial law.[180] The first of these bombings took place on March 15, 1972, and the last took place on
September 11, 1972,[180] – twelve days before martial law was announced on September 23 of that year.

The Marcos regime officially attributed the explosions to communist "urban guerillas",[180] and Marcos
included them in the list of "inciting events" that served as rationalizations for his declaration of martial
law.[141][additional citation(s) needed] Marcos's political opposition at the time questioned the
attribution of the explosions to the communists, noting that the only suspects caught in connection to the
explosions were linked to the Philippine Constabulary.[141][additional citation(s) needed]
The sites of the 1972 Manila bombings included the Palace Theater and Joe's Department Store on
Carriedo Street, both in Manila; the offices of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT),
Filipinas Orient Airways, and Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company (PhilamLife);
the Cubao branch of the Philippine Trust Company (now known as PhilTrust Bank); the Senate
Publication Division and the Philippine Sugar Institute in Quezon City, and the South Vietnamese
embassy.[180]

However, only one of these incidents – the one in the Carriedo shopping mall – went beyond damage to
property; one woman was killed and about 40 persons were injured.[141]

Martial law era (1972–1981)

Main article: Martial law under Ferdinand Marcos

See also: Proclamation No. 1081

September 24, 1972, issue of the Sunday edition of the Philippine Daily Express

Marcos's declaration of martial law became known to the public on September 23, 1972, when his press
secretary, Francisco Tatad, announced through the radio[181][38][39] that Proclamation № 1081, which
Marcos had supposedly signed two days earlier on September 21, had come into force and would extend
Marcos's rule beyond the constitutional two-term limit.[182] Ruling by decree, he almost dissolved press
freedom and other civil liberties to add propaganda machine, closed down Congress and media
establishments, and ordered the arrest of opposition leaders and militant activists, including senators
Benigno Aquino Jr., Jovito Salonga and Jose W. Diokno.[183][184] Marcos claimed that martial law was
the prelude to creating his Bagong Lipunan, a "New Society" based on new social and political values.
[citation needed]

The early years of martial law gained public approval,[185][186][187] as it was believed to have caused
crime rates to drop.[188]

Arrests

However, unlike Ninoy Aquino's Senate colleagues who were detained without charges, Ninoy, together
with communist NPA leaders Lt. Corpuz and Bernabe Buscayno, was charged with murder, illegal
possession of firearms and subversion.[189]
Bagong Lipunan (New Society)

Imperial Japanese Army soldier Hiroo Onoda offering his military sword to Marcos on the day of his
surrender on March 11, 1974

As one of his rationalizations for the declaration of martial law, Marcos said that there was a need to
"reform society"[141]: "66"  by placing it under the control of a "benevolent dictator" which could guide
the undisciplined populace through a period of chaos.[141]: "29" [190] He referred to this social
engineering exercise as the bagong lipunan or "new society"[191]: 13  and the Marcos administration
produced a range propaganda materials – including speeches, books, lectures, slogans, and numerous
propaganda songs – to promote it.[191]: 13 [192][193]

According to Marcos's book Notes on the New Society, it was a movement urging the poor and the
privileged to work as one for the common goals of society and to achieve the liberation of the Filipino
people through self-realization.[citation needed]

The Marcos regime instituted a youth organization, known as the Kabataang Barangay, which was led by
Marcos's eldest daughter Imee. Presidential Decree 684, enacted in April 1975, encouraging youths aged
15 to 18 to go to camps and do volunteer work.[194][195]

Filipinization of Chinese schools

To instill patriotism among Filipino citizens and prevent the growing number of Chinese schools from
propagating foreign ideologies, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 176,[196] preventing any
educational institution to be established exclusively for foreigners or offer any curriculum exclusively for
foreigners,[197] and restricted the teaching of the Chinese language to not more than 100 minutes a day.
[198]

1973 martial law referendum

Martial law was put on vote in July 1973 in the 1973 Philippine martial law referendum and was marred
with controversy[40][13] resulting to 90.77% voting yes and 9.23% voting no.

Rolex 12 and the military

Along with Marcos, members of his Rolex 12 circle like Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Chief of
Staff of the Philippine Constabulary Fidel Ramos, and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Fabian Ver were the chief administrators of martial law from 1972 to 1981, and the three
remained President Marcos's closest advisers until he was ousted in 1986. Other peripheral members of
the Rolex 12 included Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco Jr. and Lucio Tan.

Between 1972 and 1976, Marcos increased the size of the Philippine military from 65,000 to 270,000
personnel, in response to the fall of South Vietnam to the communists and the growing tide of
communism in South East Asia. Military officers were placed on the boards of a variety of media
corporations, public utilities, development projects, and other private corporations, most of whom were
highly educated and well-trained graduates of the Philippine Military Academy. At the same time, Marcos
made efforts to foster the growth of a domestic weapons-manufacturing industry and heavily increased
military spending.[199]

Many human rights abuses were attributed to the Philippine Constabulary which was then headed by
future president Fidel Ramos. The Civilian Home Defense Force, a precursor of Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU), was organized by President Marcos to battle with the communist and
Islamic insurgency problem, has particularly been accused of notoriously inflicting human right violations
on leftists, the NPA, Muslim insurgents, and rebels against the Marcos government.[200]

US foreign policy and martial law under Marcos

By 1977, the armed forces had quadrupled and over 60,000 Filipinos had been arrested for political
reasons. In 1981, Vice President George H. W. Bush praised Marcos for his "adherence to democratic
principles and to the democratic processes".[b] No American military or politician in the 1970s ever
publicly questioned the authority of Marcos to help fight communism in South East Asia.[citation needed]

From the declaration of martial law in 1972 until 1983, the US government provided $2.5 billion in
bilateral military and economic aid to the Marcos regime, and about $5.5 billion through multilateral
institutions such as the World Bank.[205]

In a 1979 US Senate report, it was stated that US officials were aware, as early as 1973, that Philippine
government agents were in the United States to harass Filipino dissidents. In June 1981, two anti-Marcos
labor activists were assassinated outside of a union hall in Seattle. On at least one occasion, CIA agents
blocked FBI investigations of Philippine agents.[206]

Withdrawal of Taiwan relations in favor of the People's Republic of China

Main articles: Philippines–Taiwan relations and China–Philippines relations

Prior to the Marcos administration, the Philippine government had maintained a close relationship with
the Kuomintang-ruled Republic of China (ROC) government which had fled to the island of Taiwan,
despite the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1949 Chinese Communist Revolution. Prior
administrations had seen the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a security threat, due to its financial
and military support of Communist rebels in the country.[207]

By 1969, however, Ferdinand Marcos started publicly asserting the need for the Philippines to establish a
diplomatic relationship with the People's Republic of China. In his 1969 State of the Nation Address, he
said:[208]

We, in Asia must strive toward a modus vivendi with Red China. I reiterate this need, which is becoming
more urgent each day. Before long, Communist China will have increased its striking power a thousand
fold with a sophisticated delivery system for its nuclear weapons. We must prepare for that day. We must
prepare to coexist peaceably with Communist China.

— Ferdinand Marcos, January 1969

In June 1975, President Marcos went to the PRC and signed a Joint Communiqué normalizing relations
between the Philippines and China. Among other things, the Communiqué recognizes that "there is but
one China and that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory…" In turn, Chinese Prime Minister
Zhou Enlai also pledged that China would not intervene in the internal affairs of the Philippines nor seek
to impose its policies in Asia, a move which isolated the local communist movement that China had
financially and militarily supported.[209][210]

The Washington Post, in an interview with former Philippine Communist Party Officials, revealed that,
"they (local communist party officials) wound up languishing in China for 10 years as unwilling "guests"
of the (Chinese) government, feuding bitterly among themselves and with the party leadership in the
Philippines".[171]

The government subsequently captured NPA leaders Bernabe Buscayno in 1976 and Jose Maria Sison in
1977.[210]

1978 Philippine parliamentary election

By 1977, reports of "gross human rights violations" had led to pressure from the international community,
including newly elected US President Jimmy Carter, put pressure on the Marcos Administration to release
Ninoy Aquino and to hold parliamentary elections to demonstrate that some "normalization" had begun
after the declaration of martial law.[211]: 168  Marcos did not release Aquino, but announced that the 1978
Philippine parliamentary election would be held in 1978.[211]: 168 

The elections were held on April 7, 1978, for the election of the 166 (of the 208) regional representatives
to the Interim Batasang Pambansa (the nation's first parliament). The elections were contested by several
parties including Ninoy Aquino's newly formed party, the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) and the regime's
party known as the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).

The Ninoy Aquino's LABAN party fielded 21 candidates for the Metro Manila area[212] including Ninoy
himself, activist Jerry Barican, labor leader Alex Boncayao,[213] Neptali Gonzales, Teofisto Guingona,
Jr., Ramon Mitra, Jr., Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., journalist Napoleon Rama, publisher Alejandro Roces, and
poet-playwright Francisco Rodrigo.

Irregularities noted during the election included "prestuffed ballot boxes, phony registration, "flying
voters", manipulated election returns, and vote buying,"[214] and LABAN's campaigning faced
restrictions,[214] including Marcos' refusal to let Aquino out of prison in order to campaign. All of the
party's candidates, including Aquino, lost the election.

Marcos's KBL party won 137 seats, while Pusyon Bisaya led by Hilario Davide Jr., who later became the
Minority Floor Leader, won 13 seats.

Prime Minister

In 1978, Ferdinand Marcos became Prime Minister of the Philippines, marking the return of the position
for the first time since the terms of Pedro Paterno and Jorge Vargas during the American occupation.
Based on Article 9 of the 1973 constitution, it had broad executive powers that would be typical of
modern prime ministers in other countries. The position was the official head of government, and the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. All of the previous powers of the President from the 1935
Constitution were transferred to the newly restored office of Prime Minister. The Prime Minister also
acted as head of the National Economic Development Authority. Upon his re-election to the Presidency in
1981, Marcos was succeeded as Prime Minister by an American-educated leader and Wharton graduate,
Cesar Virata, who was elected as an Assemblyman (Member of the Parliament) from Cavite in 1978. He
is the eponym of the Cesar Virata School of Business, the business school of the University of the
Philippines Diliman.

Proclamation No. 2045

After putting in force amendments to the constitution and legislative action,[215] President Marcos issued
Proclamation 2045, which lifted martial law, on January 17, 1981,[216] while retaining the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for rebellion and subversion-related crimes.[215] The lifting of
martial law was timed with the election of US President Ronald Reagan and the visit of Pope John Paul
II, to get support from Reagan and minimize criticism from the Pope.[215][217]
Third term (1981–1986)

Main article: 1981 Philippine presidential election and referendum

Ferdinand Marcos with US Secretary of State George Shultz, 1982

On June 16, 1981, six months after the lifting of martial law, the first presidential election in twelve years
was held. President Marcos ran while the major opposition parties, the United Nationalists Democratic
Organizations (UNIDO), a coalition of opposition parties and LABAN, boycotted the election. Marcos
won a massive victory over the other candidates.[218]

Armed conflict with the CPP–NPA

After the lifting of martial law, the pressure on the communist CPP–NPA alleviated. The group was able
to return to urban areas and form relationships with legal opposition organizations, and became
increasingly successful in attacks against the government throughout the country.[210] The violence
inflicted by the communists reached its peak in 1985 with 1,282 military and police deaths and 1,362
civilian deaths.[210]

1980s economic collapse

Because the Marcos administration's spending had relied so heavily on debt since Marcos' first term in the
60s, the Philippines was left vulnerable when the US economy went into recession in the third quarter of
1981, forcing the Reagan administration to increase interest rates.[219] The Philippine economy began
going into decline in 1981, continuing to do so by the time of the Benigno Aquino Jr. assassination in
1983. The economic and political instability combined to produce the worst recession in Philippine
history in 1984 and 1985, with the economy contracting by 7.3% for two successive years[219] and
poverty incidence at 49% or almost half the Philippine population.[220]

Aquino's assassination

Main article: Assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos in Washington in 1983

On August 21, 1983, opposition leader Benigno Aquino Jr. was assassinated on the tarmac at Manila
International Airport. He had returned to the Philippines after three years in exile in the United States,
where he had a heart bypass operation to save his life after Marcos allowed him to leave the Philippines to
seek medical care. Prior to his heart surgery, Ninoy, along with his two co-accused, NPA leaders Bernabe
Buscayno (Commander Dante) and Lt. Victor Corpuz, were sentenced to death by a military commission
on charges of murder, illegal possession of firearms and subversion.[189]
A few months before his assassination, Ninoy had decided to return to the Philippines after his research
fellowship from Harvard University had finished. The opposition blamed Marcos directly for the
assassination while others blamed the military and his wife, Imelda. Popular speculation pointed to three
suspects; the first was Marcos himself through his trusted military chief Fabian Ver; the second theory
pointed to his wife Imelda who had her own burning ambition now that her ailing husband seemed to be
getting weaker, and the third theory was that Danding Cojuangco planned the assassination because of his
own political ambitions.[221] The 1985 acquittals of Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver as well as other
high-ranking military officers charged with the crime were widely seen as a whitewash and a miscarriage
of justice.

On November 22, 2007, Pablo Martinez, one of the soldiers convicted in the assassination of Ninoy
Aquino, alleged that it was Marcos crony Danding Cojuangco who ordered the assassination of Ninoy
Aquino Jr. while Marcos was recuperating from his kidney transplant. Cojuangco is the cousin of
Aquino's wife Corazon Cojuangco Aquino. Martinez also alleged only he and Galman knew of the
assassination, and that Galman was the actual shooter, which is not corroborated by other evidence of the
case.[222]

After the February 1986 People Power revolution swept Aquino's widow to the presidency, the Supreme
Court ordered a retrial of Aquino's assassination.[223][224] The Sandiganbayan convicted 16 military
personnel for the murder, ruling that Constable 1st Class Rogelio Moreno, one of the military escorts
assigned to Aquino, "fired the fatal shot" that killed Aquino, not Galman.[225][223]

Impeachment attempt

In August 1985, 56 Assemblymen signed a resolution calling for the impeachment of President Marcos
for alleged diversion of US aid for personal use,[226] citing a July 1985 San Jose Mercury News exposé
of the Marcos's multimillion-dollar investment and property holdings in the United States.

The properties allegedly amassed by the First Family were the Crown Building, Lindenmere Estate, and a
number of residential apartments (in New Jersey and New York), a shopping center in New York,
mansions (in London, Rome and Honolulu), the Helen Knudsen Estate in Hawaii and three
condominiums in San Francisco, California.

The Assembly also included in the complaint the misuse and misapplication of funds "for the construction
of the Manila Film Center, where X-rated and pornographic films[citation needed] are exhibited, contrary
to public morals and Filipino customs and traditions." The impeachment attempt gained little real traction,
however, even in the light of this incendiary charge; the committee to which the impeachment resolution
was referred did not recommend it, and any momentum for removing Marcos under constitutional
processes soon died.[citation needed]

Physical decline

See also: People Power Revolution

During his third term, Marcos's health deteriorated rapidly due to kidney ailments, as a complication of a
chronic autoimmune disease lupus erythematosus. He had a kidney transplant in August 1983, and when
his body rejected the first kidney transplant, he had a second transplant in November 1984. Marcos's
regime was sensitive to publicity of his condition; a palace physician who alleged that during one of these
periods Marcos had undergone a kidney transplant was shortly afterwards found murdered. Police said he
was kidnapped and slain by communist rebels.[227] Many people questioned whether he still had
capacity to govern, due to his grave illness and the ballooning political unrest. With Marcos ailing, his
powerful wife, Imelda, emerged as the government's main public figure. Marcos dismissed speculations
of his ailing health as he used to be an avid golfer and fitness buff who liked showing off his physique.

By 1984, US President Ronald Reagan started distancing himself from the Marcos regime that he and
previous American presidents had strongly supported even after Marcos declared martial law. The United
States, which had provided hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, was crucial in buttressing Marcos's rule
over the years, although during the Carter administration the relationship with the US had soured
somewhat when President Jimmy Carter targeted the Philippines in his human rights campaign.

Economic performance

Main article: Economy of the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos

Economy of the Philippines under

President Ferdinand Marcos

1966–1971

Population

1967 {\displaystyle \approx }\approx 33.71 million

Gross Domestic Product (1985 constant prices)

1966 Increase ₱285,886 million

1971 Increase ₱361,791 million

Growth rate, 1966–71 average 4.75%

Per capita income (1985 constant prices)


1967 Increase ₱8,932

1971 Increase ₱9,546

Total exports

1966 Increase ₱70,254 million

1971 Decrease ₱63,626 million

Exchange rates

USD1 = ₱6.44

₱1 = USD0.16

Sources:[230]

Economy of the Philippines under

President Ferdinand Marcos

1972–1985

Population

1985 {\displaystyle \approx }\approx 54.3 million

Gross Domestic Product (1985 constant prices)

1972 Increase ₱ 381,497 million

1985 Increase ₱571,883 million

Growth rate, 1972–85 average 3.43%

Per capita income (1985 constant prices)

1972 Increase ₱9,802

1985 Increase ₱10,524

Exchange rates

USD1 = ₱20

₱1 = USD0.05

Sources:[230][231]

The 21-year period of Philippine economic history during Ferdinand Marcos's regime—from his election
in 1965 until he was ousted by the People Power Revolution in 1986—was a period of significant
economic highs and lows.[232][219][99]
Philippine Annual Gross Domestic Product grew from $5.27 billion in 1964 to $37.14 billion in 1982, a
year prior to the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. The GDP went down to $30.7 billion in 1985, after two
years of economic recession brought about by political instability following Ninoy's assassination.[233] A
considerable amount of this money went to the Marcos family and friends in the form of behest loans.
[citation needed]

Poverty and inequality

Susan Quimpo recounts that times were hard financially during the Marcos regime, so much so that
citizens had to line up for rice rations due to rice shortage, and that the government told citizens to
consume corn instead.[234]

In The Making of the Philippines, Frank Senauth (p. 103) says:[235]

Marcos himself diverted large sums of government money to his party's campaign funds. Between 1972
and 1980, the average monthly income of wage workers had fallen by 20%. By 1981, the wealthiest 10%
of the population was receiving twice as much income as the bottom 60%.[236]

Debt

To help finance a number of economic development projects, the Marcos government borrowed large
amounts of money from international lenders.[237][238] The external debt of the Philippines rose more
than 70-fold from $360 million in 1962 to $26.2 billion in 1985,[239] making the Philippines one of the
most indebted countries in Asia.[237]

The country's total external debt rose from US$2.3 billion in 1970 to US$26.2 billion in 1985 during
Marcos's term. Marcos's critics charged that policies have become debt-driven with rampant corruption
and plunder of public funds by Marcos and his cronies. This held the country under a debt-servicing crisis
which is expected to be fixed by only 2025. Critics have pointed out an elusive state of the country's
development as the period is marred by a sharp devaluing of the Philippine Peso from 3.9 to 20.53. The
overall economy experienced a slower growth GDP per capita, lower wage conditions and higher
unemployment especially towards the end of Marcos's term after the 1983–1984 recession. Some of
Marcos's critics claimed that poverty incidence grew from 41% in the 1960s at the time Marcos took the
Presidency to 59% when he was removed from power,[240][241][242]

Reliance on US trade
As a former colony of the United States, the Philippines was heavily reliant on the American economy to
purchase agricultural goods such as sugar,[243] tobacco, coconut, bananas, and pineapple[244][page
needed][245]

Economy during martial law (1973–1980)

See also: Economy of the Philippines

According to World Bank Data, the Philippine's Annual Gross Domestic Product quadrupled from $8
billion in 1972 to $32.45 billion in 1980, for an inflation-adjusted average growth rate of 6% per year,
while debt stood at US$17.2 billion by the end of 1980.[233][240] Indeed, according to the US-based
Heritage Foundation, the Philippines enjoyed its best economic development since 1945 between 1972
and 1979.[246] The economy grew amidsts two severe global oil shocks following the 1973 oil crisis and
1979 energy crisis – oil price was $3 / barrel in 1973 and $39.5 in 1979, or a growth of 1200%. By the
end of 1979, debt was still manageable, with debt to Debt-GNP ratio about the same as South Korea,
according to the US National Bureau of Economic Research.[240]

Foreign capital was invited to invest in certain industrial projects. They were offered incentives, including
tax exemption privileges and the privilege of bringing out their profits in foreign currencies. One of the
most important economic programs in the 1980s was the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (Movement
for Livelihood and Progress). This program was started in September 1981. It aimed to promote the
economic development of the barangays by encouraging its residents to engage in their own livelihood
projects. The government's efforts resulted in the increase of the nation's economic growth rate to an
average of six percent or seven percent from 1970 to 1980.[247]

Economy after martial law (1981–1985)

Marcos at the North–South Summit on International Cooperation and Development in Cancun alongside
other world leaders including I. Gandhi, F. Mitterrand, R. Reagan, M. Thatcher, K. Waldheim, Zhao
Ziyang; October 23, 1981

The Philippine economy, heavily reliant on exports to the United States, suffered a great decline after the
Aquino assassination in August 1983.

In an attempt to launch a national economic recovery program and despite his growing isolation from
American businesses, Marcos negotiated with foreign creditors including the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for a
restructuring of the country's foreign debts – to give the Philippines more time to pay the loans. Marcos
ordered a cut in government expenditures and used a portion of the savings to finance the Sariling Sikap
(Self-Reliance), a livelihood program he established in 1984.
However, the economy continued to shrink despite the government's recovery efforts due to a number of
reasons. Most of the so-called government development programs failed to materialize. Government
funds were often siphoned off by Marcos or his cronies. American investors were discouraged by the
Filipino economic elite who were against the corruption that by now had become endemic in the Marcos
regime.[248][page needed] The failure of the recovery program was further augmented by civil unrest,
rampant graft and corruption within the government, and Marcos's lack of credibility.[citation needed]
The unemployment rate increased from 6.25% in 1972 to 11.058% in 1985.[249][better source needed]

Main article: CIBI Information, Inc.

In 1981, Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of Instructions No. 1107 mandating the Central Bank of the
Philippines to analyze the probability of establishing and funding the operation of a credit bureau in the
Philippines due to the disturbing increase of failures on corporate borrowers.[250] In adherence to the
order, Central Bank of the Philippines organized the Credit Information Exchange System under the
department of Loans and Credit. It was created to engage in collating, developing and analyzing credit
information on individuals, institutions, business entities and other business concerns. It aims to develop
and undertake the continuing exchange of credit data within its members and subscribers and to provide
an impartial source of credit information for debtors, creditors and the public. On April 14, 1982, Credit
Information Bureau, Inc. was incorporated as a non-stock, non-profit corporation. CIBI was created
pursuant to LOI No. 1107 dated February 16, 1981, and was further strengthened by PD No. 1941 which
recognizes and supports CIBI as a suitable credit bureau to promote the development and maintenance of
rational and efficient credit processes in the financial system and in the economy as a whole. In 1997,
Credit Information Bureau, Inc. was incorporated and transformed into a private entity and became CIBI
Information, Inc. CIBI is a provider of information and intelligence for business, credit and individuals.
[251] The company also supplies compliance reports before accrediting suppliers, industry partners and
even hiring professionals.

MARTIAL LAW (Declaration of Martial Law)

President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed Proclamation No. 1081 on September 21, 1972, placing the
Philippines under Martial Law. Some sources say that Marcos signed the proclamation on September 17
or on September 22—but, in either case, the document itself was dated September 21.

Throughout the Martial Law period, Marcos built up the cult of September 21, proclaiming it as National
Thanksgiving Day by virtue of Proclamation No. 1180 s. 1973 to memorialize the date as the foundation
day of his New Society. The propaganda effort was so successful that up to the present, many Filipinos—
particularly those who did not live through the events of September 23, 1972—labor under the
misapprehension that martial law was proclaimed on September 21, 1972. It was not.

The culmination of a long period of preparation

The facts are clear. A week before the actual declaration of Martial Law, a number of people had already
received information that Marcos had drawn up a plan to completely take over the government and gain
absolute rule. Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr., during a September 13, 1972 privilege speech, exposed
what was known as “Oplan Sagittarius.” The Senator said he had received a top-secret military plan given
by Marcos himself to place Metro Manila and outlying areas under the control of the Philippine
Constabulary as a prelude to Martial Law. eMarcos was going to use a series of bombings in Metro
Manila, including the 1971 Plaza Miranda bombing, as a justification for his takeover and subsequent
authoritarian rule.

In his own diary, Marcos wrote on September 14, 1972 that he informed the military that he would
proceed with proclaiming Martial Law. Even the U.S. Embassy in Manila knew as early as September 17,
1972 about Marcos’ plan.

This was indeed the culmination of a long period of preparation: As early as May 17, 1969, Marcos hinted
the declaration of Martial Law, when he addressed the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Association.

In his memoir, then Justice Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile recalled that on a late afternoon in December
1969, Marcos instructed him to study the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief under the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution. Marcos made this instruction as he “[foresaw] an escalation of
violence and disorder in the country and [wanted] to know the extent of his powers as commander-in-
chief.” The President also stressed that “the study must be done discreetly and confidentially.”

At about the same time, Marcos also instructed Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor and Jose Almonte
to study how Martial Law was implemented in different parts of the world. Marcos also wanted to know
the consequences of declaring Martial Law. The result of their study stated that, “while Martial Law may
accelerate development, in the end the Philippines would become a political archipelago, with
debilitating, factionalized politics.” Almonte recalled that their findings led to the conclusion that “the
nation would be destroyed because, apart from the divisiveness it would cause, Martial Law would offer
Marcos absolute power which would corrupt absolutely.”

By the end of January 1970, Enrile, with the help of Efren Plana and Minerva Gonzaga Reyes, submitted
the only copy of the confidential report on the legal nature and extent of Martial Law to Marcos. A week
later, Marcos summoned Enrile and instructed him to prepare the documents to implement Martial Law in
the Philippines.

In his January 1971 diary entries, Marcos discussed how he met with business leaders, intellectuals from
the University of the Philippines, and the military to lay the groundwork that extreme measures would be
needed in the future. On May 8, 1972, Marcos confided in his diary that he had instructed the military to
update its plans, including the list of personalities to be arrested, and had met with Enrile to finalize the
legal paperwork required.

On August 1, 1972, Marcos met with Enrile and a few of his most trusted military commanders to discuss
tentative dates for the declaration of Martial Law—to fall within the next two months. All of the dates
they considered either ended in seven or were divisible by seven, as Marcos considered seven his lucky
number.

http://www.gov.ph/featured/
declaration-of-martial-law/
The Sunday edition of the Philippines Daily Express on September 24, 1972, the only newspaper
published after the announcement of martial law on September 21, the evening prior.

Snap election and exile after the EDSA Revolution (1986)


EDSA REVOLUTION (People Power Revolution)
President Ferdinand E. Marcos was elected president in 1965, defeating incumbent President Diosdado
Macapagal by a margin of 52 to 43 percent. During this time, Marcos was very active in the initiation of
public works projects and the intensification of tax collections. Marcos and his government claimed that
they "built more roads than all his predecessors combined and more schools than any previous
administration". Amidst charges from the opposition party of vote-buying and a fraudulent election,
President Marcos was reelected in the 1969 Philippine presidential election, this time defeating Sergio
Osmeña, Jr. by 61 to 39 percent.

President Marcos's second term for the presidency was marred by allegations by the opposition Liberal
Party of widespread graft and corruption. According to leftists who rioted during the First Quarter Storm,
the increasing disparity of wealth between the very wealthy and the very poor that made up the majority
of the Philippines' population led to a rise in crime and civil unrest around the country. In March 1969, the
New People's Army (NPA) was formed as the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
initiating the still-ongoing CPP–NPA–NDF rebellion. Marcos quickly denounced the movement, hoping
to gain monetary and political support from anti-Communist administrators in the United States.

In 1972 the Moro National Liberation Front, a militant Muslim separatist group, formed in the southern
island of Mindanao.

Marcos soon used the rise of militant and civil unrest as justification for declaring martial law.

Despite warnings from the military and First Lady Imelda Marcos, Ninoy Aquino was determined to
return home. Asked what he thought of the death threats, Aquino responded, "The Filipino is worth dying
for."Ninoy's passport expired and the renewal was denied. Ninoy, acquired a plan to acquire a passport
with the help of Rashid Lucman. The passport carried the alias Marcial Bonifacio (Marcial for martial law
and Bonifacio for Fort Bonifacio where he was imprisoned).

On August 21, 1983, after three years, Aquino was murdered by the military, as he disembarked from a
plane at the Manila International Airport (later renamed in Aquino's honor). His assassination shocked and
outraged most Filipinos, who had lost confidence in the Marcoses. The event led to more suspicions about
the government, triggering non-cooperation among Filipinos that eventually led to outright civil
disobedience. It also shook the Marcos Administration, which was by then deteriorating due in part to
Marcos's blatant illness (turned out to be the fatal lupus erythematosus).

The assassination of Aquino caused the economy to deteriorate, and the government plunged further into
debt. By the end of 1983, the economy contracted by 6.8%. Because the Marcos administration's spending
had relied so heavily on debt since the Marcos family's first term in the 60s, the Philippines was left
vulnerable when the US economy went into recession in the third quarter of 1981, forcing the Reagan
administration to increase interest rates. The Philippine economy began going into decline in 1981,
continuing to do so by the time of the Benigno Aquino Jr. assassination in 1983. The economic and
political instability combined to produce the worst recession in Philippine history in 1984 and 1985, with
the economy contracting by 7.3% for two successive years.n 1984, Marcos appointed a commission, first
led by Chief Justice Enrique Fernando and later Corazon Agrava, to launch an investigation into Aquino's
assassination. Despite the commission's conclusions, Cardinal Jaime Sin, the Archbishop of Manila,
declined an offer to join the commission and rejected the government's views on the assassination.

This began a period of coalitions, first led by the nationalist liberal democrats under Jose W. Diokno
called Kilusan sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan or KAAKBAY, an umbrella organization
founded in 1983, which headed the first grand liberal coalition called JAJA, or the Justice for Aquino,
Justice for All movement. JAJA consisted of organizations such as the social democrat-based August
Twenty One Movement (ATOM) led by Butz Aquino, KAAKBAY, MABINI, the Makati-based Alliance
of Makati Associations or AMA, and others. Parliamentarians of the streets, as it was called applied
pressure politics, and soon other coalitions were formed, culminating in the first call for elections for the
opposition in the Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino or KOMPIL. KOMPIL was organized by Aquino's
ATOM from the JAJA coalition, as a means to unite the businessmen, communists, and other groups.
Most of the KOMPIL members were led by the AMA leaders. Meanwhile Diokno, Lorenzo M. Tañada of
MABINI, Butz and Corazon Aquino, and a few others were elected the overall presiding leaders in a
search to find the opposition candidate. The main issue was whether to accept the CAMEL or Call for
Meaningful Elections or, as Diokno and the more liberal JAJA members preferred, to boycott the event
which might be another fixed election. JAJA was later replaced by the Coalition of Organizations for the
Restoration of Democracy (CORD) in the middle of 1984, which retained most of JAJA’s features and
membership. A year later CORD was replaced by Bagong Alyansang Makabayan or BAYAN, which was
to be a platform for Diokno should he run for president, and was led by Tañada and student leader Lean
Alejandro of the University of the Philippines. However the socialists/national democrats took control of
the coalition so Diokno, Ambrosio Padilla, and the liberal democrats as well as Butz Aquino, ATOM, and
the social democrats left BAYAN to the present communist-based coalition that it has become in the 21st
century.Before the division of the center-left and national democratic/Marxist left, the coalitions tended to
pursue Diokno's philosophy of pressure politics or mass actions to influence and sway the Marcos
dictatorship

Eventually the top leaders decided to convene to select a candidate in case of contingencies or any sudden
announcements of changes. It was then on November 3, 1985, after pressure from the US government,
that Marcos suddenly announced a snap presidential election would take place the following year, one
year ahead of the regular presidential election schedule, to legitimize his control over the country. The
snap election was legalized with the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 (National Law No. 883) by the
Marcos-controlled unicameral congress called the Regular Batasang Pambansa.

To select a leader, the convenor's group of opposition leaders formed underlying principles. These
principles, mainly proposed and edited by Diokno, discussed matters that involved anti-foreign
domination in the economy, especially American intervention and military bases. After the principles
were agreed upon by the opposition leaders, as Lorenzo M. Tañada quipped, it became almost automatic
and completely expeditious in agreeing unanimously on one candidate to face Marcos. For the initial step
in nominating a candidate, the selection process started out with a pooled list among the opposition
leaders themselves. The list of candidates for president were mostly including former senators: Jose W.
Diokno, Butz Aquino, Jovito Salonga, Eva Estrada-Kalaw, Salvador "Doy" Laurel, Ambrosio Padilla,
Aquilino Pimentel, Raul Manglapus, and Ramon Mitra, as well as a future senator in Teofisto Guingona
Jr., and a technocrat who once served as Marcos's executive secretary named Rafael Salas.

After the vetting of nominees, as men such as Sen. Diokno vehemently opposed to run for president,the
remaining potential candidates who openly wished to earn the opposition's nomination were Salonga,
Laurel, and Estrada-Kalaw. United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) members Estrada-
Kalaw and Laurel were the only two not to sign the declaration of unity or the underlying principles.
Eventually Estrada-Kalaw withdrew after being overwhelmed by the multiple candidates in the selection
process and campaigned to become the vice-presidential candidate. Between 64 year old Salonga, who
with 64 year old Estrada-Kalaw represented the two largest Liberal Party factions, and Laurel, who was
son of former president Jose P. Laurel, it was decided by men such as Chino Roces that both candidates
might lack the popularity needed to win. Because Salonga had spent much time in exile in the United
States while Laurel, the founder and main head of UNIDO, was deemed "too lightweight".

UNIDO and the other coalitions decided to agree to choose Aquino's wife Cory Aquino instead of both
and began the Cory Aquino for President Movement or CAPM, led by Roces, et al. Only Laurel, a friend
of Ninoy Aquino, did not agree with this choice and wanted to run against Aquino and Marcos. UNIDO
overwhelmed Laurel's vote and encouraged him to become Cory Aquino's vice-president instead. Once
Cory Aquino became the main candidate, Laurel eventually ran as Cory Aquino's running mate for vice-
president under the United Opposition (UNIDO) party. Marcos ran for re-election, with Arturo Tolentino
as his running mate under the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) party. Thus within a matter of only a few
weeks the candidates were fixed and the campaign period was set for the 1986 snap election.

The election was held on February 7, 1986. The official election canvasser, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), declared that Marcos was the winner. The final tally of the COMELEC had Marcos
winning with 10,807,197 votes against Aquino's 9,291,761 votes. On the other hand, based on returns of
70% of the precincts of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), an accredited poll
watcher, had Aquino winning with 7,835,070 votes against Marcos's 7,053,068 votes.

This electoral exercise was marred by widespread reports of violence and tampering of election results,
culminating in the walkout of 30 COMELEC computer technicians to protest the deliberate manipulation
of the official election results to favor Ferdinand Marcos. The walkout was considered one of the early
"sparks" of the People Power Revolution. The walkout also served as an affirmation to allegations of
vote-buying, fraud, and tampering of election results by the KBL.

Prior dialogues to stop the revolution had not succeeded with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which
was led by General Fabian Ver. AFP was ready to mount an airstrike on the day but Marcos ordered them
to halt.
The actual dialogue on TV between Marcos and then AFP Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver went as
follows:

Fabian Ver: The Ambush there is aiming to mount there in the top. Very quickly, you must immediately
leave to conquer them, immediately, Mr. President.

Ferdinand Marcos: Just wait, come here.

Ver: Please, Your Honor, so we can immediately strike them. We have to immobilize the helicopters that
they've got. We have two fighter planes flying now to strike at any time, sir.

Marcos: My order is not to attack. No, no, no! Hold on. My order is not to attack.

Ver: They are massing civilians near our troops and we cannot keep on withdrawing. You asked me to
withdraw yesterday–

Marcos (interrupting): Uh yes, but ah... My order is to disperse without shooting them.

Ver: We cannot withdraw all the time...

Marcos: No! No! No! Hold on! You disperse the crowd without shooting them.

Because of reports of alleged fraud, the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) through
Cardinal Ricardo Vidal issued a statement condemning the elections.The United States Senate also passed
a resolution stating the same condemnation. US president Ronald Reagan issued a statement calling the
fraud reports as "disturbing" but he said that there was fraud "on both sides" of the Philippine election. In
response to the protests, COMELEC claimed that Marcos with 53 percent won over Aquino. However,
NAMFREL countered that the latter won over Marcos with 52 percent of votes.

On February 15, Marcos was proclaimed by COMELEC and Batasang Pambansa as the winner amidst
the controversy. All 50 opposition members of the Parliament walked out in protest. The Filipino people
repudiated the results, asserting that Aquino was the real victor. Both "winners" took their oath of office
in two different places, with Aquino gaining greater mass support. Aquino also called for coordinated
strikes and mass boycott of the media and businesses owned by Marcos's cronies. As a result, the crony
banks, corporations, and media were hit hard, and their shares in the stock mThe People Power
Revolution has inspired a call for a change of government through peaceful protests rather than
bloodshed. Many similar revolutions have followed since then, taking the Philippine example of
nonviolent regime change, such as that in East Germany and many other former Soviet Bloc countries,
most of which had direct relation to the end of the Cold War in 1989.[76]

The EDSA Revolution Anniversary is a special public holiday in the Philippines. Since 2002, the holiday
has been declared a special non-working holiday.

Rampant corruption during the term of President Joseph Estrada led to the similar 2001 EDSA Revolution
leading to his resignation from the presidency.

In 1986 a few months after February a music video starring various artists was released called, "Handog
ng Pilipino Sa Mundo". It was written by Apo Hiking Society singer Jim Paredes and performed by
numerous artists, and showed martial law heroes Jose W. Diokno, Lorenzo M. Tañada, Rene Saguisag,
Butz Aquino, Joe Burgos, and Pres. Aquino with Vice-President Doy Laurel during their campaign.

In 2003,the Radio Broadcast of the Philippine People Power Revolution was inscribed in the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Memory of the World Register,
which is the official documentary heritage list of the United Nations (UN)'s educational and scientific
body.

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