Case 2:22-cv-01075-DMG-JC Document 45 Filed 07/25/22 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #:351

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-1075-DMG (JCx) Date July 25, 2022

Title Rockmond Dunbar v. The Walt Disney Company, et al. Page 1 of 6

Present: The Honorable DOLLY M. GEE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

KANE TIEN NOT REPORTED

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s) Attorneys Present for Defendant(s)

None Present None Present

Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS—ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

[38]

On May 6, 2022, Plaintiff Rockmond Dunbar filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
against Defendants American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. and Twentieth Century Fox
Television. [Doc. # 29.] Defendants now move to dismiss three of Dunbar’s 13 claims, for: (1)
disparate impact on the basis of religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; and
(3) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. [Doc. # 38 (“MTD”).] The
motion is fully briefed. [Doc. ## 42, 44.] For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS
the MTD, with leave to amend.

I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Dunbar is a member of the Church of Universal Wisdom and an actor, writer, and
producer. FAC at ¶¶ 1–3. Founded in 1974, Universal Wisdom followers believe, among other
things, that it is a sacrilege to ingest medication, chemicals, or other foreign matters that “defy
natural law.” Id. at ¶ 26. Dunbar has been a follower of Universal Wisdom since 2014. Id. at ¶
24.

In September 2021, when Dunbar was working for Defendants on the TV show “9-1-1,”
Defendants formally announced a policy that required certain employees to be fully vaccinated
against COVID-19 by October 18, 2021. Id. at ¶ 41. On October 4, 2021, Dunbar’s agents
submitted request forms on his behalf for an exemption to the vaccine requirement, citing both
medical and religious reasons. Id. at ¶ 54. Based on his adherence to Universal Wisdom,
Dunbar has religious beliefs that conflict with receiving vaccines. Id. at ¶ 47. Dunbar also has
an unspecified medical disability because of which his doctors advised he should not from
receive a COVID-19 vaccine. Id. at ¶ 48. On October 4, 2021, Defendants notified Dunbar’s
agents that the medical exemption letter submitted by Dunbar’s physician was insufficient to

CV-90 CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk KT

Case 2:22-cv-01075-DMG-JC Document 45 Filed 07/25/22 Page 2 of 6 Page ID #:352

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-1075-DMG (JCx) Date July 25, 2022

Title Rockmond Dunbar v. The Walt Disney Company, et al. Page 2 of 6

receive a medical exemption. Id. at ¶ 55. In the same correspondence, Defendants expressed
incredulity that Dunbar was also requesting a religious belief accommodation. Id. Defendants
ultimately rejected Dunbar’s requests and terminated his employment on the basis of his non-
compliance with the vaccination requirement on November 10, 2021. Id. at ¶¶ 66, 82.

On November 8, 2021, Dunbar and his wife secured $1 million in investment funds for a
movie project independent of Defendants (“the Project”). Id. at ¶ 118. Information about the
Project was listed on a website called “Breakdown Services,” which is a site for TV series and
films that are currently casting. Id. Casting for the Project began on December 8. Id. at ¶ 121.

On November 16, the website Deadline published an article titled “Rockmond Dunbar
Exits ‘9-1-1’ Over Covid Vaccine Mandate After Pursuing Medical & Religious Exemptions.”
Id. at ¶ 87. Dunbar alleges that Defendants or their agents leaked information to Deadline about
his medical and religious exemption requests. Id. at ¶ 89. After the article’s release, “A and B
list” actors who had previously expressed interest in the Project backed out because of the
negative media associated with Dunbar. Id. at ¶¶ 122, 124. As a result, Dunbar and his wife
were forced to offer the lead roles to “B, C, and D list” actors, and investors retracted $500,000
in funding from the Project’s budget because of the changes in casting. Id. at ¶¶ 125.

II.
LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may seek dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A court may grant such a
dismissal only where the plaintiff fails to present a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege
sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs.,
Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.
2001)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must articulate “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). Although a pleading need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must contain
“more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Id. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint,
courts must accept all factual allegations as true. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Legal
conclusions, in contrast, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id.

CV-90 CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk KT

Case 2:22-cv-01075-DMG-JC Document 45 Filed 07/25/22 Page 3 of 6 Page ID #:353

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-1075-DMG (JCx) Date July 25, 2022

Title Rockmond Dunbar v. The Walt Disney Company, et al. Page 3 of 6

Should a court dismiss certain claims, “[l]eave to amend should be granted unless the
district court ‘determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other
facts.’” Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lopez v.
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

III.
DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Dunbar’s disparate impact claim for religious discrimination
under Title VII on the ground that the FAC does not state facts sufficient to show that a protected
religious group suffered a disparate impact. MTD at 7–8.1 Defendants also move to dismiss
Dunbar’s intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage claims
(“IPEA claims”) on the grounds that Defendants did not have knowledge of Dunbar’s
prospective film project, and that even if they had such knowledge, their alleged interference was
not the “but for” cause of Dunbar’s economic loss. Id. at 9–14.

A. Disparate Impact

To state a claim for disparate impact discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must
allege (1) a significant disparity with respect to employment for the protected group, (2) the
existence of a specific employment practice or set of practices, and (3) a causal relationship
between the identified practice and the disparity. Freyd v. University of Oregon, 990 F.3d 1211,
1224 (9th Cir. 2021). Dunbar fails to plead the first element, that a disparate impact on a
protected group actually exists, because he only alleges that he himself was terminated. He
points to no other Universal Wisdom followers who have been adversely affected by
Defendants’ vaccination policy. Although a plaintiff need not provide comprehensive statistical
evidence at the pleading stage, he still must allege specific facts from which a reasonable
inference can be drawn that an employment practice broadly impacts a certain group in an
adverse manner—not merely a single person. See Liu v. Uber Techs. Inc., 551 F. Supp. 3d 988,
991 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“Ultimately, all that Liu has alleged so far is that he himself was
terminated, and the Court cannot draw an inference of disparity from a single data point.”);
Arnold v. Sessions, No. 4:18-CV-00553-KAW, 2018 WL 6728008, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21,
2018) (“Plaintiff fails to allege any facts establishing women, or even another woman . . . were
subject to ‘a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact’ as a result of the [policy].”).

1
All page references herein are to page numbers inserted by the CM/ECF system.

CV-90 CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk KT

Case 2:22-cv-01075-DMG-JC Document 45 Filed 07/25/22 Page 4 of 6 Page ID #:354

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-1075-DMG (JCx) Date July 25, 2022

Title Rockmond Dunbar v. The Walt Disney Company, et al. Page 4 of 6

In his Opposition, Dunbar requests that the Court take judicial notice of two other
lawsuits against Defendants alleging religious discrimination in their vaccination policy, in order
to show that he is not the only person who has been impacted. [Doc. # 43 (“RJN”).] While the
Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, including lawsuits filed, it cannot take
judicial notice of the truth of facts recited therein. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690
(9th Cir. 2001). Dunbar essentially requests the Court to do just that, to incorporate the
allegations in these other pleadings into his own. Therefore, his RJN is DENIED.

Even if the Court were to consider the allegations in these other complaints, however,
they do not help Dunbar’s case. Neither plaintiff alleges he is a member of the Church of
Universal Wisdom. Dunbar argues that his disparate impact claim encompasses all those who
share a religious belief against vaccinations. Opp. at 17–18. But courts generally treat disparate
impact claims as those affecting particular groups or faiths, including articulable sub-groups, but
not all those who share a single common belief. As one court aptly put it:

If a plaintiff could narrowly define its class based on its particular religious belief,
rather than the broader religious faith or group to which it belongs, then disparate-
impact claims would have a nearly limitless reach. This is because any policy
impacting a plaintiff's specific religious belief would generally impact 100% of
the members of a class defined by that belief, which would virtually always
amount to a disproportionate impact as compared to those falling outside the
class. For example, a Jewish man impacted by a policy affecting a belief rooted
in his idiosyncratic, personalized interpretation of Judaism could claim disparate
impact even though no other Jewish people hold that belief.

Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1306 (M.D. Ala.
2019), aff'd, 6 F.4th 1247 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); see also Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc.,
181 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1186 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (articulating similar dilemma).

Although the Court recognizes that Dunbar is at an information disadvantage because of

the confidential nature of the vaccine accommodations process, he must still plead facts that
allow the Court to infer there are other members of his protected group who are also impacted by
Defendant’s policy. See Liu, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 991. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ MTD as to Dunbar’s disparate impact religious discrimination claim. Because it is
unclear whether additional allegations could cure this deficiency, the Court GRANTS Dunbar
leave to amend.

CV-90 CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk KT

Case 2:22-cv-01075-DMG-JC Document 45 Filed 07/25/22 Page 5 of 6 Page ID #:355

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-1075-DMG (JCx) Date July 25, 2022

Title Rockmond Dunbar v. The Walt Disney Company, et al. Page 5 of 6

B. Inference with Prospective Economic Advantage (“IPEA”)

Plaintiff’s 12th and 13th causes of action are for intentional IPEA and negligent IPEA,
respectively. The elements of the claim for intentional IPEA are: “(1) an economic relationship
between the plaintiff and another, containing a probable future economic benefit or advantage to
plaintiff, (2) defendant's knowledge of the existence of the relationship, (3) defendant's
intentional conduct designed to interfere with or disrupt the relationship, (4) actual disruption,
and (5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of defendant's acts.” Marin Tug & Barge, Inc. v.
Westport Petroleum, Inc., 271 F.3d 825, 831 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Della Penna v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 376, 380 n.1 (1995)). Further, the plaintiff must plead that
the “defendant's interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference
itself.” Della Penna, 11 Cal. 4th at 393. A claim for negligent IPEA has the same elements
except that, instead of an intentional act, element three requires that the defendant had
knowledge that the relationship would be disrupted if the defendant failed to act with reasonable
care, and that the defendant failed to act with reasonable care. Redfearn v. Trader Joe's Co., 20
Cal. App. 5th 989, 1005 (2018).

Dunbar’s IPEA claims are based upon his loss of investments in the Project due to
negative publicity surrounding his termination by Defendants for failure to get vaccinated.
Defendants argue that the FAC fails to establish that they had knowledge of the Project before
having allegedly interfered with it. The FAC currently claims that Defendants had knowledge of
the Project because it was featured on the “Breakdown Services” website. FAC at ¶ 120. The
speculation that because information about the Project was publicly available online, that
Defendants actually saw this information, does not allow the Court to draw a reasonable
inference of knowledge. See Go Daddy Operating Co., LLC v. Ghaznavi, No. 17-CV-06545-
PJH, 2018 WL 1091257, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2018) (allegation of knowledge through
public database was insufficient). Although “general knowledge that [Dunbar] had economic
relationships” is sufficient, without necessarily identifying the specific parties to the relationship,
Dunbar still must plead specific facts allowing a reasonable inference that Defendants had such
“general knowledge.” Monex Deposit Co. v. Gilliam, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1162 (C.D. Cal.
2010). Other than the reference to the “Breakdown Services” website, the FAC does so only in
conclusory fashion.2

2
In a declaration attached to his Opposition, Dunbar attests that creatives, executive producers, and writers
of “9-1-1” had copies of Project’s script and that one of the actors on “9-1-1” was even considering playing a lead
role in the Project. See Dunbar Decl. at ¶¶ 4–8 [Doc. # 42-1]. The Court cannot consider this evidence on a motion
to dismiss, though it does allow Dunbar to amend his pleading. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir.
2005) (“[C]ourts, when ruling on a motion to dismiss, must disregard facts that are not alleged on the face of the
complaint or contained in documents attached to the complaint” or incorporated by reference therein.)

CV-90 CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk KT

Case 2:22-cv-01075-DMG-JC Document 45 Filed 07/25/22 Page 6 of 6 Page ID #:356

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-1075-DMG (JCx) Date July 25, 2022

Title Rockmond Dunbar v. The Walt Disney Company, et al. Page 6 of 6

The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s MTD as to the IPEA claims, with leave to
amend.3

IV.
CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ MTD, with leave to amend.
Dunbar shall file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), or file a notice of intent not to amend,
by August 15, 2022. Defendants shall file their response within 21 days of the filing of the
SAC. The July 29, 2022 hearing on the MTD is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

3
Defendants also argue that the FAC fails to establish that the publicity around Dunbar’s failure to get
vaccinated was the but-for cause of the Project’s losses, because the Deadline article was published on November 16
and casting for the actors who eventually withdrew did not begin until December 8. On this point, the Court
disagrees. It is reasonable to infer that, though the information first became public earlier, word did not reach these
actors until after they had already expressed an interest in working with Dunbar.

CV-90 CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk KT