SCUD ALERT!

The History, Development, and Military Significance

of Ballistic Missiles on Tactical Operations

A Monograph
by

Major Bryon E. Greenwald

Air Defense Artillery

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 94-95

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

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 SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Mayor Brvon E. Greenwald

Title of Monograph: SCUD ALERT!: The Historv. Develo~ment.

. .
and Mzlltarv Sicmificance of alli is tic

Missiles on Tactical merations

Approved by:

Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

Director, School of

Advanced Military

Studies

& J&L Director, Graduate

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Program

Accepted this 17th day of December 1994

 ABSTRACT

SCUD ALERT!: THE HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND MILITARY

SIGNIFICANCE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES ON TACTICAL OPERATIONS by

Major Bryon E. Greenwald, USA, 69 pages.

While the Persian Gulf War confirmed the political and

strategic utility of using ballistic missiles as a terror

weapon, the effect of ballistic missiles on tactical

operations has received much less attention. Despite

growing evidence of technological advances in guidance and

warhead systems that warrant concern, much of the current

literature ignores the operational and tactical impact of

ballistic missiles on the battlefield. Even the US Army's

most forward looking document, US Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI O p e r a t i o n s (1

August 1994), disregards the impact of these weapons on

tactical operations. Thus, this monograph breaks new ground

and demonstrates why military leaders and planners should

pay more attention to the emerging tactical threat from

ballistic missiles, unconventional warheads, and weapons of

mass destruction.

This monograph argues that changes in the nation's

military strategy, the continued global proliferation of

ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and the

pace of technological improvements to those systems mandate

that commanders and planners understand the military

significance of ballistic missiles to their tactical battle

space. This monograph traces the early history and recent

development of ballistic missiles and analyzes nine factors

related to their battlefield effectiveness. Included in

this analysis is a discussion of chemical, biological,

nuclear, fuel-air explosive, and submunition warheads and

their effect on tactical operations. The monograph

concludes with an examination of the impact of ballistic

missiles on tactical forces during force projection

operations.

Table of Contents Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Critical Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The History. Development and Current Status

of Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ballistic and Cruise Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Early Ballistic Missile History . . . . . . . . . . .
Recent Ballistic Missile Development . . . . . .
Current Ballistic Missile Tactics . . . . . . . . .
Third World Motivations: Ballistic
Missiles vs . Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Third World Missile Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Effect of Ballistic Missiles on Tactical

Battle Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deployment and Early Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Build up and Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Decisive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Redeployment and Post-Conflict. . . . . . . . . . . .

iii

 INTRODUCTION

The Persian Gulf War confirmed the utility of using

tactical ballistic missiles as a political terror weapon.

Iraq's launching of Scud missiles against Tel Aviv on 18

January 1991 threatened to draw Israel into the war and

forced the United States to respond by rushing Patriot Air

Defense systems to the region to protect key Israeli

population centers. While the political and strategic

significance of the 88 tactical ballistic missiles7 Iraq

launched at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the war appears

obvious, the tactical effect of these missiles on the

battlefield is less apparentas

Despite growing evidence of technological advances in

guidance and warhead systems that warrant concern, much of

the current literature ignores the operational and tactical

impact of ballistic missiles on the battlefield. Even the

US Army's most forward looking document, US Army Training

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI

Operations : A Concept f o r t h e Evolution of F u l l -Dimensional
Operations f o r t h e S t r a t e g i c Army of the E a r l y Twenty-First
Century, (1 August 19941, does not address the impact of
these weapons on tactical operations. Emphasizing the

strategic and political impact of weapons of mass

destruction, the pamphlet contends that

the security challenge having the most

serious ramifications for US interests will come

from the proliferation of WMD [weapons of mass

destruction]. The strategic-political effects of

WMD overshadow their military utility. WMD and

theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) allow an

adversary to extend its operational and strategic

reach.

While the extreme physical devastation and psychological

dislocation resulting from the use of ballistic missiles and

weapons of mass destruction will have far reaching political

and strategic effects, their impact on tactical military

operations will also be significant. Thus, this monograph

breaks new ground and demonstrates why military leaders and

planners should pay more attention to the emerging tactical

threat from ballistic missiles, unconventional warheads, and

weapons sf mass destruction.

Changes in the nation's military strategy, the

continued global proliferation of ballistic missiles and

weapons of mass destruction, and the pace of technological

improvements to these systems mandate that commanders and

planners understand the military significance of ballistic

missiles on the tactical battlefield. With the end of the

Cold War, the nation's shift from a strategy of forward

presence to an increased reliance on force pro-jection

operations means that the armed forces will deploy to

unstable areas of the world where host nation defense forces

may be limited and force protection will be an immediate

priority. Within that environment, the proliferation of

tactical ballistic missiles among Third World nations

combined with the predilection of some leaders to use them

against US forces--Libya in 1986 and Iraq in 1991--provides

both the means and precedent for a TBM attack on US forces

in the future.

While current missile accuracy may limit the

effectiveness of a conventionally armed tactical ballistic

missile as a point weapon, the addition of a chemical,

biological, or nuclear warhead makes the TBM militarily

significant regardless of circular error probable (CEP).1°

The improvements in missile accuracy and range that have

occurred over the last twenty years will continue, making

both conventionally and unconventionally armed missiles an

ever increasing threat to tactical forces. Finally,

attempts at counter-proliferation may slow, but will not

stop the emergence of these evolving weapon systems in the

arsenals of developing countries. Several developing

nations, including some that are hostile to the United

States, possess indigenous missile and warhead programs that

render them relatively impervious to American or

international arms control and counter-proliferation

efforts. As the following chart demonstrates, some missile

producing nations, irrespective of their relationship with

the United States, also have export agreements or

development partnerships with nations that are either

hostile to the United States or embroiled in regional

disputes that may involve US forces at some point in the

future ,I1

TRANSFERS OF MISSILES AND RELATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

from Industrialized Countries to Developing Countries, 1960-1994

LEGEND

Missile transfers Technical assistance

Potential missile transfers

Sourcea include: Janne E . Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the

Third World, (Washington: D C : The Brookings Institution, 1991), 18; Martin

Navias, Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World, (London: Brassey's,

19901, 29-31. For additional references see note12

This monograph highlights the history and development

of the ballistic missile, surveys the current TBM threat

environment, and examines the potential primary and

secondary effects ballistic missiles have on the tactical

commanderlsbattle space during four phases of force

projection operations--deploymentand early entry, build up

and expansion, decisive operations, and redeployment and

post-conflict. To validate the potential TBM threat to

tactical units, the threat survey outlines the range,

accuracy, and warhead capabilities of contemporary missiles

as well as lists the nations most likely to possess them.

This monograph employs three criteria to evaluate the

primary and secondary effects that a ballistic missile

attack may have on the tactical aspects of force projection

operations. The criteria are: the potential for increased

casualties, the diversion of resources from the main effort

in response to a TBM attack or threat of attack, and the

degree of disruption (de-synchronization)an attack creates

in the commanderssbattle plan.

CRITICAL CONCEPTS

The discussion of ballistic missile development and

current threat environment set the conditions for an

informed examination of the effect of these weapons on

tactical military operations. Therefore, it is important to

define the three concepts--primary effect, secondary effect,

and tactical battle space--that form the boundaries of this

monograph.

Primary effects are those that occur directly from a

missile attack or from the threat of such an attack. In the

Persian Gulf War, tactical commanders planned for Scud

attacks on their units as they entered the theater, trained

in assembly areas, passed through the breach, conducted

decisive combat operations, and even as they signed the

Armistice at Safwan Air Field. Although the Iraqis did not

use their Scuds to attack maneuver forces, the threat of an

attack, particularly in view of Iraq's known use of chemical

weapons and perceived nuclear potential, compelled tactical

commanders to prepare appropriately for their use. A

successful attack on the ports, the assembly areas, or the

breach may have disrupted Allied actions and greatly

increased casualties.

While primary effects demonstrate the first tier,

direct impact of ballistic missiles on tactical forces,

secondary effects are those tactical effects that devolve

indirectly from a friendly response to the political and

strategic use or threatened use of ballistic missiles by

enemy forces. For example, in the Persian Gulf War, the

political impact of Scud attacks on Israel forced General

Schwarzkopf to divert 40% of his daily air sorties from

attacking Iraqi formations and lines of communication to

hunting Scud launchers in the Western Iraqi Desert. His

actions represented a major diversion of combat power,

extended the air effort by more than a week, and prevented

the Army Central Command (ARCENT) from meeting its targeting

goals prior to starting the ground war.13 Moreover, the

same attacks required the United States to use a portion of

its limited airlift assets to bring Patriot units into

Israel and other sites in the theater. In future force

projection operations, the 94 C-5A Galaxy and 19 C-141

Starlifter sorties needed to fly a six-battery Patriot

battalion into a theater of operations will consume precious

amounts of strategic lift and detract from the commander's

ability to rapidly build up combat forces or a logistical

base.l 4
While most sources acknowledge the political,

strategic, and even operational impact of ballistic

missiles, the focus of this monograph is on the effect of

these weapons on the tactical commander's battle space.

Battle space, as defined by the US Army's keystone

warfighting doctrine, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, is a

physical, three-dimensional volume that extends to the

maximum capabilities of the commander to acquire and engage

the enemy. In examining the impact of ballistic missiles on

the tactical commander's battle space, the type, quantity,

and capability of the assets at the tactical commander's

disposal delimit the area concerned. At the tactical level

of war, "corps and divisions fight . . .battles and

engagements." Thus, for the purpose of analysis, this

monograph places the upper limit of tactical battle space at

the area defined by the capabilities of the assets organic

to an army corps; the Power limit extends down to the area

associated with a maneuver company.f5

THE HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND CURRENT STATUS

OF BALLISTIC MISSILES

In light of the recent use of ballistic missiles in the

Middle East, a mythology has arisen concerning TBMs. Some

of the erroneous perceptions include the beliefs: that all

missiles are alike; that the Persian Gulf War was the first

time ballistic missiles had been used in combat; that they

are extremely inaccurate and only good for terrorizing urban

populations; and that they are militarily insignificant

weapons.16 An indepth analysis of the history, development,

and use of ballistic missiles dispels these misconceptions

and highlights their potential impact on the tactical

commander's battle space.

Ballistic and Cruise Missiles

Largely due to the intense publicity the use of the

"ScudM missile received during the Persian Gulf War, it has

become incorrectly the nom de guerre for the several models

of surface-to-surface missiles present in the world today.

In reality, there are two types of surface-to-surface

missiles--ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. A

ballistic missile is an unmanned, rocket-powered weapon. It

receives power from its engines and guidance from the

guidance system only in the ascent. In the descent, it

follows a ballistic (unpowered and unguided) trajectory.

The majority of ballistic missiles are exo-atmospheric.

Conversely, a cruise missile is an unmanned aircraft

that uses an air-breathing engine similar to those used in

airplanes to propel it. Most modern versions employ

inertial guidance systems as well as terrain comparison

programs that link television or infrared images of the

terrain to computer-generated images of the planned attack

route to achieve pinpoint accuracy. Like an aircraft, the

cruise missile is endo-atmospheric. Unlike most aircraft,

however, the cruise missile provides an extremely small

radar cross section and is therefore more difficult for air

defense systems to detect and engage.17

Early Ballistic Missile History

Although the use of rockets and missiles in war extends

back to Tamerlane's Battle of Delhi in 1399, the slow pace

of technical advancement resulted in only sporadic

employment of these weapons in the ensuing centuries. A

brief flurry of interest reemerged around 1800 with the

adaptation of an Indian rocket by Sir William Congreve for

use by the British Army. In 1806, after setting the town of

Boulogne, France afire with his rockets, Congreve proclaimed

that, l1the rocket is, in truth, an arm by which the whole

system of military tactics is destined to be changed." Yet

despite Congrevelsprophetic comment, the useful development

of rockets and missiles as weapons of war had to wait until

the twentieth century.18

Modern surface-to-surfacemissiles first saw wartime

service with the firing of V-1 and V-2 weapons against

London, Paris, Antwerp, Liege, and Brussels during the

latter stages of World War 11. The V-1 "flying bomb" was a

small cruise missile powered by a pulse jet that "buzzed" as

it flew. It traveled at speeds up to four hundred miles per

hour at altitudes between 3,000 and 5,000 feet and carried a

ton of explosive. Early models ranged out to 250

kilometers. Later in 1945, the Germans boosted the range to

400 kilometers by replacing certain portions of the airframe

with plywood and reducing the size of the warhead. In a

final effort to increase the range of the missile, the

Germans slung the V-1 under a Heinkel-111 airplane, creating

the first air-launched cruise missile. The combined range

of the aircraft and missile extended to nearly 1300

kilometers. Its rudimentary guidance system kept the V-1

accurate to within 10 kilometers for every 160 kilometers of

flight. Although quite inaccurate by modern standards, the

V-1 was accurate enough to strike large urban areas such as

Greater London.lg

The V-2 was a single-stage, liquid-fueled ballistic

missile equipped with an inertial guidance system. It

weighed almost thirteen tons, carried a one ton warhead, and

had a range of 350 kilometers. Powered by nearly nine tons

of alcohol and liquid oxygen and controlled by gyroscopes or

radio signals that moved large graphite vanes located behind

the jet, the missile rose vertically for six miles before

automatic controls turned it to forty-five degrees for its

final climb. Once it attained a speed sufficient to reach

its .intended range, the engine shut off and the missile flew

in a "gigantic parabolan to the target. At its apex, the

missile climbed to a height of fifty miles. Its peak speed

was four thousand miles per hour; it made the flight from

Germany or the Netherlands to London in three or four

minutes - 2 0
In the last year of the war, the Germans successfully

launched 19,395 V-1 cruise missiles and 2,952 V-2 ballistic

missiles at cities in England and on the Continent. While

Hitlerls Vergeltung or retaliation^ campaign had little or

no strategic effect on the Allied war effort, it did inflict

immense physical damage, killing over 13,000 civilians and

soldiers, and seriously wounding at least another 25,000.

More importantly, the V-weapons had an immense psychological

impact on the populace. Of these missiles, Winston

Churchill wrote

[they] imposed upon the people of London a

burden perhaps even heavier than the air-raids of

1940 and 1941. Suspense and strain were more

prolonged. Dawn brought no relief, and cloud no

comfort . . . .The blind impersonal nature of the

missile made the individual on the ground feel

helpless. There was little that he could do, no

human enemy that he could see shot down.21

Interestingly, although both missiles carried the same size

warhead, the V-2 caused nearly twice as many casualties as

the V-1. The slower speed of the V-1 permitted Allied

planes and antiaircraft artillery to intercept it

occasionally, while its engine noise served to warn people

to take cover. Conversely, the V-2's supersonic speed

guaranteed the penetration Allied air space, while its lack

of engine noise made the missile's impact a surprise,

preventing any manner of early warning or protective

action.2 2
General Sir Frederick Pile, Commander of the Anti-

Aircraft Command and Britain's leader in the defense against

the V-1 and V-2 missiles during World War 11, was quite

sanguine about the prospects of what he called "robot

warfarell. He believed that 'Ithe bomber which today [ I 9 4 9 1

necessitates a group of highly trained personnel will in its

turn become a robot machine of the rocket-propelled type.f123

While Pile appears to have overstated his case a bit, the

continued improvements in ballistic and cruise missiles

since World War I1 may still prove him correct. His

associate, Mr. Duncan Sandys, British Minister of Parliament

and chairman of Churchillls crossbow^ Committee on air

defense, may have been more on target.

In his post-war report to the British Cabinet Sandys

commented,

"that the advent of the long-range, radio-

controlled, jet-propelled projectile has opened up

vast new possibilities in the conduct of military

operations. Ira [the] future, the possession of

superiority in long-distance rocket artillery may

well count for as much as superiority in naval or

air power. " 2 4

Over the last fifty years, what Duncan Sandys hinted at

in 1945 has indeed occurred. Ballistic missiles have

retained their characteristic ability to penetrate enemy air

space, while advances in technology have led to improvements

in accuracy and lethality. By the mid-1990s, ballistic

missiles have developed to the point where, in some

situations, their military utility rivals that of combat

aircraft .

Recent Ballistic Missile Development

Despite losing the World War 11, the Germans continued

to influence missile development into the early stages of

the Cold War. After the war, both the United States and the

Soviet Union used captured V-weapons (and German scientists)

in the early phases of their missile programs. Of the two

superpowers, the Soviet Union, through its export of

missiles to developing nations, did more to propagate the

German ballistic missile legacy.25

Of the several potential Soviet missile systems

available for export, the SS-1C or Scud-B missile (NATO

designation) has become the sine qua non of developing

ballistic missile programs. It is not without reason that

the Scud missile has entered the lexicon of military

planners and defense analysts as a synonym for tactical

ballistic missile. The Soviet Scud-B is the most widely

proliferated surface-to-surface missile in the world today.

As of early 1993, there were twenty-two countries with Scud-

B missiles in their arsenals.26

Drawing heavily on the original V-2 design, the Soviet

Union developed and mass produced the Scud-B in the 1960s

for deployment with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. In

response to requests from the then client states of Syria,

Libya, and Egypt, the Soviets developed a special export

version (designated R-17E), the first of which reached Egypt

in 1973 and was used in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The

export version had a throw weight of one metric ton (1,000

kg or 2,200 lb), a range of approximately 300 kilometers,

and came with the same eight wheeled, high mobility

Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) used by the Soviets. Its

circular error probable (CEP) ranged between 400-1,000

meters 2 7
Soviet Scud missile exports flourished from the 1970s

through the early 1990s. In addition to Egypt, the

following countries received Scud missiles from the Soviet

Union: Iraq (1974 and again in the m i d - 1 9 8 0 ~ )Syria

~
(1974),

Libya (1976), and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

(1979). The greatest transfer and indeed the largest

employment of ballistic missiles since World War I1 took

place in the late 1980s when the Soviets shipped

approximately 2,000 Scud missiles to Afghanistan for use by

the Afghan government against the guerrilla forces.28

From this nucleus of primary Scud importers, secondary

and tertiary groups of Scud users have emerged. North

Korea, for example, acquired Scud-B missiles and

Transporter-Erector-Launchers from Egypt in 1981. In 1987,

North Korea sent modified Scud-B missiles to Iran for use in

the Iran-Iraq "War of the Citiesn. The North Koreans have

since licensed modified Scud-B manufacturing lines in Egypt,

Syria, Iraq, Iran, and possibly Cuba. These modified

missiles have a slightly longer range--about 320 kilometers

with a 2,200 pound warhead. Various sources estimate the

accuracy of the modified missile at about 400-1,000 meters,

the same as the basic S C U ~ - B . ~ ~

In addition to building and exporting a modified

version of the Scud-B, North Korea also initiated

development of three extended-range variants of the missile.

This effort took two different paths. The simpler of the

two approaches merely made further modifications to the

already modified Scud-B. By reducing the size of the Scud-B

warhead, the North Koreans increased the range on their Scud

Mod C missile to 500 kilometers. They may have also added

an improved inertial guidance system to enhance the CEP. In

1990, for potentially as much as $500 million, Iran

purchased Scud Mod C missiles and North Korean assistance in

converting an Iranian missile maintenance facility to

produce indigenous Mod C missiles. North Korea followed up

this missile transfer with the sale of Mod C missiles to

Syria--about sixty missiles and 12 TELs began arriving in

April 1991.3 0
The more difficult of the two approaches North Korea

took to increase the range of the modified Scud-B missile

involved a complete redesign of the missile system based on

"Scudu technology. The estimated range of the Scud Mod D or

Nodong 1 missile is between 1,000-1,300kilometers, a

distance that includes all of the Korean peninsula, Kyoto

and Osaka in Japan, Beijing and Shanghai, and parts of

Russia. The North Koreans had trouble with the accuracy of

the Nodong 1 missile and may limit deployment until the

Nodong 2 or Scud Mod E missile is available. Reports

estimate that the Nodong 2 will have a range between 1,500

and 2,000 kilometers. Unlike the Nodong 1 and its

predecessors, the Nodong 2 is either a multi-stage or

clustered missile. North Korea's inexperience with these

types of missiles may delay fielding of the Nodong 2.31

China has followed the example set by the Soviet Union

and North Korea in missile development and export sales.

The Chinese have greatly expanded their ballistic missile

production since their initial foray in the 1960s. Like the

North Koreans, the Chinese have pursued two lines of missile

production. The CSSIDongfeng line of strategic nuclear

missiles, designed for use by the People's Liberation Army,

expanded from the CSS-1 deployed in 1967 to include the CSS-

2, CSS-3, and CSS-4 (known in China as the DF-3, DF-4, and

DF-5). The CSS-2 (DF-3) has a range of 3,000 kilometers and

a CEP of 1,000 meters. The Chinese sold a conventional

version with a range of 2,700 kilometers to Saudi Arabia in

1987. The CSS-3 (DF-4) and CSS-4 (DF-5) missiles are two-

stage, liquid-fueled missiles with ranges of 7,000

kilometers and 10,000 kilometer^.^^

In 1984, the Chinese began a second line of missile

production aimed primarily at the Third World export market.

The "MI1 family of missiles are solid-fueled, tactical

ballistic missiles. The M-9 is a single-stage missile with

computer-aided inertial guidance and terminal control. It

carries a 500 kilogram payload, has a range of 600

kilometers, and a CEP of 300 meters. The Chinese have sold

the M-9 to Syria and Libya. The M-11 is a two-stage system

with the same guidance and payload characteristics as the M-

9. It has a range of 300 kilometers. Reports indicated

that Pakistan had purchased the M-11 in 1991, but as of

October 1994 had not yet received operational missiles from

China. Part of this purchase may have included Chinese

technical assistance to help Pakistan with its own short-

range H a t f I (80 km) and medium-range H a t f I1 (300 km)

ballistic missile programs.33

Of all the missile importers and exporters discussed so

far, Iraq has been the most profligate builder, developer,

and user of Scud missiles and their derivatives. In the

early-1980s, Iraq initiated a missile development program

that started with the building of rocket artillery to gain

experience and graduated to the modification of imported

Scud missiles before the Allied bombing in early 1991 and

subsequent United Nations sanctions and inspections combined

to shut it down. In 1982, Iraq fired its first Scud-B

missile at Iran. The 300 kilometer range of the missile,

however, proved inadequate to strike the Iranian capital,

Teheran, located 500 kilometers away from the Iraqi border.

TO overcome this shortfall, the Iraqis modified their Scud-B

mfssiles by lengthening the fuel tanks and lightening the

warhead. This resulted in two longer range missiles, the A1

Hussein, with a range of 650 kilometers and the A1 Abbas,

with a range of 950 kilometers. Although they increased the

range of their missiles, the Iraqis did nothing to improve

their accuracy. This only exaggerated the error already

present in the generic Scud-B guidance system (CEP 450

meters). The resultant doubling and trebling of range

created a similar effect with respect to circular error

probable. The A1 Hussein had a 1,000 meter CEP and the A1

Abbas fell out at around 1,500 meters.34

Over the course of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88),the two

sides fired over 478 Scud-type missiles at each other. Iran

fired about 117 North Korean Scud-B missiles at Iraq, while

the Iraqis launched a mixture of approximately 361 Scud-B,

Al-Hussein, and Al-Abbas missiles. During the Persian Gulf

war, Iraq used its Al-Hussein missiles primarily against

targets in Israel and its longer range Al-Abbas missiles

against Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.35

 Current Ballistic Missile Tactics

Ballistic missiles have been employed in war with

increasing frequency. By themselves, however, ballistic

missiles are useless. Only when employed as part of a

system that includes both targeting and launching mechanisms

do ballistic missiles attain any significance. As both

Adolph Hitler and Saddam Hussein demonstrated with their

selective use of missiles against cities, accurate targeting

is not always a prerequisite for successful ballistic

missile employment. A launching mechanism, however, is

crucial. Without a launcher, ballistic missiles are like

bullets without a rifle--they simply cannot get into the

air.

 Prior to the Persian Gulf War, intelligence analysts

used the number of Transporter-Erector-Launchers a nation

imported from the Soviet Union as one indicator of that

nation's capability to employ its ballistic missile force.

As events during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

highlighted, however, some nations have ceased relying on

imports and begun building an indigenous fleet of launchers.

Iraq developed a number of its own Transporter-Erector-

Launchers and Mobile-Erector-Launchers (MELs) as well as

separate transport vehicles for its Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas

missiles. The first TEL was the Al-Waleed TEL, a Saab-

Scania tractor-trailer with an erector-launcher assembly

similar to the one used on the Soviet supplied Scud-B TEL.

Less sophisticated, the MEL consisted of a truck with a

simple hydraulically elevated launch rail. Additionally,

the Iraqis used fixed launch sites constructed from formed

concrete ramps and steel rails and located primarily in the

H2/H3 Airfield complexes. They also developed a missile

transport vehicle based on a civilian tractor-trailer.37

In a TEL supported launch, the Iraqis sent the vehicle

to the missile transfer area at the appropriate time to

receive the missile from a transport vehicle. From there it

proceeded to the pre-surveyed launch site where the missile

was fueled and launched. The transport vehicle and all

other vehicles returned to "fortifiedv areas as soon as

their tasks were complete. In a MEL supported launch, the

MEL and the transport vehicle met at the launch site at the

appointed time. Crews transferred the missile from the

transport vehicle to the MEL, fueled and launched the

missile. As in the TEL supported launch, all support crew

and vehicles left the launch site as soon as they had

accomplished their specific tasks. These tactics worked

well during the Persian Gulf War. Although restricted by

Allied air operations to moving only at night, Iraqi missile

crews succeeded in launching their missiles and, for the

most part, escaped unscathed.38

 Third World Motivations: Ballistic Missiles vs. Aircraft

The rapid proliferation of ballistic missiles among

developing countries over the last decade has spawned a

debate about their actual ability to affect the conduct of

tactical operations. The issue centers on whether ballistic

missiles or combat aircraft represent a more efficient means

for developing nations to exercise military power. At first

glance, aircraft appear more advantageous. They are

reusable, more versatile, and capable of achieving better

accuracy than their single-shot ballistic brethren.

Ballistic missiles, however, confer prestige and enhance

deterrence, two benefits that combat aircraft do not

necessarily provide. Moreover, in certain situations,

ballistic missiles add more to a nation's warfighting

capability than combat aircraft do.39

There is by no means unanimity of opinion on this

issue. Several analysts hold that ballistic missiles do not

carry enough payload nor are they accurate enough to make

them cost-effective unless armed with nuclear warheads.

This belief dominated superpower thinking about nuclear

weapons and ballistic missiles for years, but with advances

in technology and the deployment of the US Army's extremely

lethal Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) this attitude may

change. Others see current utility as limited, but allow

that the rapid proliferation of improved positioning and

guidance systems and enhanced warhead technologies will add

to the usefulness of ballistic missiles on the battlefield.

This opinion supports the contention that ATACMS may

represent a new stage in ballistic missile development

similar to the one presaged by the early Scud missile.

Finally, a small minority view holds that ballistic missiles

are applicable to today's battlefield.40

Although a debate rages over the military utility of

ballistic missiles, most analysts agree that any measure of

military effectiveness must involve five characteristics:

range, payload, accuracy, rate of fire, and speed of

delivery. Reliance on these characteristics, however,

sanitizes the argument and excludes four other important

features that complicate analysis even further: pre-launch

survivability, warhead type, cost, and relative ability to

employ either missiles or aircraft in actual combat. A

careful examination of all nine factors demonstrates that

while ballistic missiles do not fly as far as combat

aircraft nor carry as much ordnance, their improving

accuracy and warhead yield as well as lower cost and greater

pre-launch survivability make them a more efficient means of

attacking an adversary than combat aircraft. Most

importantly, their speed enables ballistic missiles to

penetrate enemy air space and deliver ordnance in combat, a

task that most Third World air forces have found extremely

difficult to accomplish, especially when fighting the United

States. Under these circumstances, ballistic missiles are

not only a more efficient and effective means for Third

World nations to attack deploying US tactical forces, they

are often the only means available. This conclusion is not

lost on the leaders of developing countries. More than

anything else, it drives their procurement of ballistic

missiles and constitutes a continuing threat for United

States forces during force projection operations.

Range, Payload, and Pre-Launch Survivability

The preponderance of ballistic missiles available to

developing countries have relatively short ranges and

limited payloads. Their ranges extend from approximately

300-1000 kilometers, while their payloads measure between

1,100-2,200pounds. Some missiles, including the Israeli

Jericho II(1,500 kilometers/l650 pounds), the Saudi

Arabian/Chinese DF-3A (2,700 kilometers/4,400 pounds), and

the Indian Agni (2,500 kilometers/1,400-2,000pounds),

possess longer ranges and greater payloads. These missiles,

however, are still no match for most combat aircraft,

especially when air refueling is available to extend an

aircraft s combat radius.41

Although the majority of ballistic missiles fly much

farther and carry far more ordnance than ~ h i r dWorld

artillery (45 kilometers/220 pounds or less), they pale in

comparison with combat aircraft. The average operational

payload of an F-16C fighter with a combat radius of almost

1,400 kilometers is 4,000 pounds or roughly the equivalent

of two Scud-B missiles (300 kilometers/approx. 2,200 pound

payload) or ten A1 Hussein missiles (650 kilometers/approx.

400 pound payload). The SU-24 can fly 950 kilometers and

carry 6,600 pounds of weapons or the equivalent of three

Scud-B or sixteen A1 Hussein missiles.42

Despite their moderate ranges and payloads, ballistic

missiles retain some advantages over combat aircraft. In

some geo-strategic situations, range does not matter.

During the Iran-Iraq War, "almost every militarily

significant target in Iraq [was] within 300 kilometers [or

Scud missile range] of Likewise, during the

Persian Gulf War, Iraq used its longer range A1 Hussein

missiles (650 kilometer) to hit targets in Israel. In the

Far East, the South Korean capital of Seoul lies within 45

kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), while the major

port city of Pusan, at the southern tip of the Korean

peninsula, is only 380 kilometers away from North Korea.

Both areas are well within the range of North Korean

ballistic missiles.44

Moreover, the need for combat aircraft to take off and

land from fixed, known facilities limits their pre-launch

survivability. Only when conducting a preemptive strike or

during an opening attack on enemy territory do aircraft

obtain a pre-launch survivability similar to ballistic

missiles. For the rest of the conflict, aircraft and the

bases from which they fly are at much greater risk than are

mobile missile launchers. Conversely, even moderately

ranged (300-1,000kilometers) ballistic missiles possess

greater operational flexibility and survivability. The

range and mobility of ballistic missiles expand their launch

area and increase the difficulty an adversary will have in

finding and suppressing them. During the Persian Gulf War,

the United States and its allies experienced great

difficulty in locating and destroying mobile Iraqi missile

launchers. A Congressional report on intelligence

achievements during the war concluded that the United States

failed to destroy a single mobile launcher. Moreover, the

G u l f War Air P o w e r S u r v e y commissioned by the United States

Air Force concluded that "there is no indisputable proof

that Scud mobile launchers . . .were destroyed by fixed-wing

aircraft . . . . the level of effort put into the hunt for the
launchers. . .does not appear to have been very effective..,."
Even with Coalition aircraft flying Scud patrols over Iraq

and in some cases visually identifying the launch flume, the

mobile Scud launchers escaped the area before the aircraft

could attack them.45

Accuracy, Rate of F i r e , and Warhead Type

Under the correct conditions, combat aircraft are

extremely accurate and capable of dropping unguided,

conventional high-explosive bombs within 5 to 15 meters of

the target. When equipped with precision-guided munitions,

the accuracy of combat aircraft improves to within a few

feet of the target. In combat against a similarly equipped

enemy armed with modern air defense fighters, surface-to-air

missiles, and antiaircraft artillery, however, pilots may

have difficulty finding and staying on target long enough to

deliver their ordnance accurately. Even in Operation Desert

Storm, where Coalition forces had unchallenged command of

the air, aircraft accuracy against Iraqi ground forces was

initially quite poor. It improved only after pilots

decreased their attack and release altitudes and switched to

dropping laser-guided bombs.46 Considering that American

and some European aircraft and air forces are undoubtedly

the most sophisticated and best trained forces in the world,

it is unlikely that for the foreseeable future any Third

World country will develop or acquire combat aircraft,

precision munitions, and pilots capable of achieving similar

pinpoint accuracy either on a target range or in combat.

Thus, when comparing aircraft and missiles, one must not

blindly accept claims of superior accuracy, but should view

them in the context of what is possible during actual combat

operations.

Despite the questionable accuracy of Third World

aircraft in actual combat, ballistic missiles armed with

high explosive conventional warheads are still not as

accurate as even degraded combat aircraft. Missile

accuracy, however, depends a great deal on the character of

the intended target. Most foreign ballistic missiles

deployed in the early 1990s use guidance systems developed

in the 1960s and 1970s. These missiles are ideal for large

soft area targets such as cities, multi-strip air fields,

port complexes, and expansive logistics or command and

control sites. Used individually, their high explosive

warheads have limited utility against separate point targets

that require greater accuracy. Still the destructiveness of

a conventional Scud-type missile with a 450 meter CEP bears

mention. The missile's supersonic speed imparts

considerable energy upon impact. The missiles fired during

the Iran-Iraq War typically dug craters at least 10 meters

across and several meters deep. Even when fired separately

their cumulative damage, as experienced for instance by

Israel during the Persian Gulf War, is worth note. Over a

43 day period, the nineteen Iraqi missile attacks on Tel

Aviv damaged over 4,000 buildings including about 3,900

apartments and homes, 330 public buildings, 20 schools, and

over 50 b u s i n e ~ s e s . When
~ ~
fired in salvos--Iraq managed to

launch six in one three minute period during the second week

of Operation Desert Storm--the high rate of fire intensifies

the attack and adds to its overall cumulative effect.48

 Unfortunately, developing nations will not remain

satisfied with 20-30 year old missile technology. Just as

they are seeking improved aircraft and surface weapons,

Third World countries will endeavor through either

indigenous production or foreign purchase to upgrade their

missile arsenals.49 One of the factors motivating these

nations to improve the accuracy of their missiles is that

the developed nations have demonstrated that it is indeed

possible to build both better guidance systems and enhanced

conventional and unconventional warheads. In the 1980s, the

Soviet Union made great strides in improving the accuracy of

their missiles. For example, they replaced the Scud-B (CEP

450 meters) with the SS-23 (CEP 320 meters) and the SS-12

Scaleboard (CEP 650 meters) with a new SS-12M version (CEP

300 meters). There are even reports of a new Scud-D missile

with a CEP of 50 meters.50

Dramatic advancements in ballistic missile technology

should not surprise the leaders of the developed nations.

After all, the United States more than doubled the range and

reduced the CEP of its medium range ballistic missile

tenfold when it replaced the Pershing 1A (CEP 400 meters)

with the Pershing I1 (40 meters) .51 Additionally, the pace

of missile development in Third World countries is

progressing at a faster rate than it did in the United

States and the Soviet Union. Although developing countries

on the whole began development of ballistic missiles about

20-25 years after the United States and the Soviet Union,

they have benefited from the scientific ground work laid

down by scientists in those nations. As a result, the

progress over time made by Third World indigenous

development programs has more than tripled that of the US

and Soviet union.52

Given the availability of advanced guidance technology,

missile accuracy will improve significantly over the next

decade. While extremely sophisticated guidance technologies

like thrust vector nozzles, cryogenic gyroscopes, and

antiradiation terminal homing mechanisms remain difficult

for developing countries to obtain, Third World countries

can purchase low cost alternatives, including GPS/GLONASS

receivers and television and infrared comparators, that will

enhance the accuracy of their missiles dramatically. With

improved accuracy, ballistic missiles will rival combat

aircraft in their ability to attack point targets. This

will make them an even more attractive option for Third

World leaders to use against deploying United States

forces - 5 3
Another way to enhance the military effectiveness of a

ballistic missile is to improve its warhead yield. This is

possible through the use of improved conventional

submunitions or fuel-air explosives as well as

unconventional chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads.

Given the lethality of these warheads, concern over accuracy

declines, making even 1970s vintage missiles a potent threat

to US tactical forces.

Submunitions warheads have been part of superpower

arsenals for some time. The Soviets led the way with

development of submunitions warheads for their second and

third generation missiles, including a Scud runway

penetration warhead with forty 12-kilogram submunitions and

an anti-personnel warhead with one hundred 5-kilogram

submunitions. The United States Army Tactical Missile

System (ATACMS) holds up to 1,000 small submunitions and the

Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) carries 677 bomblets

weighing about one-half pound each. Submunitions are

currently available in the Third World either through the

sale of former Soviet hardware or through indigenous

development and sale of products such as the Egyptian Sakr-

80 and the Brazilian Astros I1 rocket system, both of which

have optional submunition warheads.54

There are two classes of submunitions, "lightw and

"heavy", with the dividing line between the two somewhere

around 10 kilograms (22 pounds). Assuming a 300 meter CEP,

a warhead with 30 I1heavyl1(40 pound) submunitions would

disperse one submunition every 110 meters (360 feet). The

same warhead packing 1,000 "lightl1 (1.1 pound) bomblets

would land one bomblet every 19 meters (62 feet). Place

this dispersion in the context of a force projection

operation with United States Air Force aircraft unloading

soldiers and materiel at a forward air base. The wingspan

of a C-141 Starlifter is 49 meters (161 feet), that of a C-

5A Galaxy is 68 meters (223 feet). As the following diagram

demonstrates, "heavyu submunitions would theoretically leave

these aircraft unharmed, while the dispersion of "lightI1

submunitions guarantees that some aircraft would be hit.55

I Effect of Submunitions on Aircraft

"Heavym Submuni tion X - - - - - - - - - -x-

(I10 meter dispersion)

C-5A Galaxy W - - - - - - -w
(68 meter)

C-141 Starlifter W - - - - -w
(49 meter)

"Lightn Submunition X--X--X--X- -x

(19 meter)

x = submunition w = aircraft
impact wingtip

- = 10 meter interval

Using the notional air base outlined in figure 1 as a

further example, the effects of several types of warheads

including both classes of submunitions becomes apparent.56

In the center of the runway, using a missile with a 300

meter CEP, the effect of a conventional high explosive

warhead with a burst radius of 60 meters is minimal. While

high explosive warheads will severely damage vehicles,

aircraft, and buildings, the limited accuracy of a 300 meter

CEP missile requires that several missiles impact before the

probability of achieving significant damage occurs. One

study conducted by the RAND Corporation concluded that an

attacker would need to fire at least twelve ballistic

missiles with unitary warheads to attain a fifty percent

probability of cratering a runway. Remembering that Iraq

managed to salvo six missiles in rapid succession only once

during the Persian Gulf War, it seems the odds of achieving

the rate of fire necessary to have just an even chance at

impairing military operations are small. If the odds are

against success with a 300 meter CEP missile, then a glance

at the 900 meter CEP circle confirms the view that

conventional high explosive ballistic missiles like the

Iraqi A1 Hussein (1000 meter CEP) are too inaccurate to

affect military operations and are better employed as

"terrorw weapons.57

In contrast to the limited effect of conventional high

explosive warheads, "heavy" submunitions would impact on

several vulnerable areas of the air base, but leave only two

of thirty submunitions on the runway. If the aimpoint was

the center of the 400 foot wide parking apron, the total

would increase to five submunitions. The impact of two

rounds would crater the runway, temporarily impeding

operations while the runway repair crew patched the holes.

On the apron, given the density of aircraft and the

likelihood of both primary and secondary explosions of

ammunition and fuel, the level of damage would be much

higher.58

Compared to "heavyn submunitions, "lightn submunitions

have an even greater destructive potential. Again with the

aimpoint at the center of the runway in figure 1, a

ballistic missile with a 300 meter CEP armed with lllight"

submunitions would place 65 of the 1,000 bomblets on the

runway. These 1.1 pound bomblets are too small to damage

the runway, but could damage aircraft on the runway or

nearby taxiways and subsequently impair flight operations.

If the same missile aimed for the middle of the apron, 160

 Figure 1

Effects of various ballistic missile warheads

on a United States air base

(Note: by definition only 50 percent of arriving

warheads would impact inside the CEP circle.)

bomblets would impact, inflicting substantial damage on the

aircraft parked there and disrupting flight operations for a

much longer time. In force projection operations, often

only a limited number of fighter and transport aircraft are

available for use by tactical forces. The loss of these

aircraft either through destruction or the disruption of

flight operations may reduce the ground commander's tactical

combat power and prevent him from executing his tactical

plan.5 9
In addition to submunitions, developing countries are

seeking to buy or build chemical warheads for their

ballistic missiles. These warheads are not only more lethal

than submunitions, they are also more available throughout

the Third World. Former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney

testified to Congress in 1991 that by the year 2000, thirty

countries will have chemical weapons. Several of these

nations, including Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya,

North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, and Taiwan, are also

developing their own ballistic missiles.60

The actual lethality of chemical warheads is subject to

several factors including the type of agent employed, the

weather, terrain, and the degree of protection. Indeed, due

to difficulties with the size of particle dispersion and the

possibility that the heat of reentry may destroy the

chemicals, ballistic missiles may not be the most efficient

way to dispense chemical weapons. For some countries,

however, they may be the only way to attack deploying

forces . 61
Issues concerning their efficiency notwithstanding,

chemically-armed ballistic missiles can seriously impair

friendly tactical operations. Two published studies, one

conducted in 1985 by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the

other done in 1988 by the International Institute for

Strategic Studies, concluded that a single Scud-B chemical

warhead filled with thickened Sarin nerve agent would create

an elliptical pattern almost four kilometers long and 450

meters wide. Within that pattern, the chemical would have

lethal effects out to about 300 meters and cause death and

illness as far as two kilometers downwind from the initial

area of effect. The DIA study concluded that "all

unprotected personnel in the area will be casualties.u62

Figure P depicts such an attack on a United States air

base. In this scenario, the chemical would cover most of

the runway and portions of the apron and taxiway. While the

lethality of the attack would decrease the farther away an

individual was from the initial area of effect, operational

flights from a contaminated runway are extremely hazardous.

Most probably, commanders would divert aircraft to another

airfield, accepting the inherent reduction in responsiveness

and disruption of operations in order to fly from an

uncontaminated air strip. This diversion of resources,

either fighter aircraft or equipment moved by transports,

could potentially deprive the tactical commander of the

assets needed to defeat the enemy and would, at a minimum,

complicate his planning immensely.

Instead of merely disrupting operations, an attacker

intent on creating as many casualties as possible would need

a minimum of four missiles to ensure coverage of the area

with a potentially lethal dose to all unprotected troops.

Figure 2 shows the effect of such an attack on deplaning

troops. Unprotected soldiers caught within the first

ellipse would die within one minute. In future deployment

operations, commanders facing the possibility of a

chemically-armed missile attack will need to decide whether

to fly their soldiers into theater wearing hot, bulky,

restrictive chemical protective clothing or risk suffering

the potential consequences.63

 CW warhead with thickened SOMAN

1500 m burst height
0.72 system reliability

Figure 2

Chemical attack on deplaning troops

If chemical warheads represent an increase in lethality

over high explosives and submunitions, biological and

nuclear warheads are even more deadly. One analyst noted

that in

. . .very rough terms, a relatively small (20-

kiloton) nuclear warhead is 10,000 times as

destructive as a 1-ton conventional explosive, 10-

100 times as deadly as a nerve-agent warhead, but

no more deadly than an anthrax warhead used

against an unprotected population. Used against a

well protected population, nuclear weapons are 100

to 1,000 times more deadly than chemical weapons

and about 10 times as deadly as an anthrax

warhead.6 4

The tremendous potential lethality of nuclear and

biological weapons has motivated several developing

countries to either acquire them from external sources or

produce them internally. While for years there were only

five established nuclear powers--China, France, Great

Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union--the break-

up of the former Soviet Union has led to a division of

nuclear assets among the new Commonwealth of Independent

States.65 Beyond this initial circle of nuclear states

there are some, such as Israel, India, and South Africa, who

are believed to possess nuclear weapons already and others

who are actively seeking them. This latter group includes

Japan, North Korea, Taiwan, South Korea, Pakistan, Brazil,

Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. To put this

into perspective, only Japan is known not to possess

ballistic missiles.66

Similarly, by the year 2000 as many as ten developing

countries will be able to deploy biological weapons. Of

those nations, eight--Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya,

North Korea, Syria, and Taiwan--have ballistic missile

programs.67 To illustrate the magnitude of casualties

possible from the impact of a biological warhead, consider a

missile armed with 30 kilograms of anthrax spores, a

biological pathogen particularly suited for dispersal from

missiles and one that Iraq is known to have manufactured at

its Salman Pak biological warfare facility. As one analyst

noted, depending on the weather conditions and given some

assumptions about release, lethal doses to unprotected

adults would cover an area of 6 to 80 square kilometers,

killing nearly all those affected within a few days.

Moreover, anthrax is not contagious and therefore is

suitable, like some chemical weapons, for discrete use. In

contrast to even the most persistent chemical agents, some

of which might pose a continuing hazard for a few weeks,

anthrax spores can survive for decades in the While

an adversary would not want to use biological warheads on an

area he would some day want to occupy, they are ideal for

denying territory--an airfield, a port, or an oil refinery--

for a significant period of time. The effect of biological

warheads on tactical operations is twofold. First, scores

of soldiers would die or need evacuation for treatment,

thereby depleting the commander's tactical combat power.

Second, the denial of a port of entry into a contingency

theater could prevent soldiers from deploying rapidly enough

to stop an attacking enemy. Diversion to a secondary port

of embarkation would delay operations and carry the

potential for increased casualties.

While biological and nuclear warheads represent the

epitome of destructive yield, fuel-air explosives are

running a close second. Used by the United States in

Vietnam and apparently by the Russians in Afghanistan, there

is evidence that some Third World countries are developing

fuel-air explosives for their ballistic missiles. The basic

principle is that the warhead would burst spreading a fuel-

air mixture evenly across a wide area. Once dispersed, a

detonator ignites the mixture to achieve an explosive effect

much like the ignition in a cylinder of a car engine. The

benefit of a fuel-air explosion, unlike that of a

conventional warhead, is that the blast is spread evenly

across a wide area. The peak over-pressure created by a 500

kilogram (1,100 pound) fuel-air explosion reaches 12.8

pounds force per square inch (psig) at a distance out to 130

meters from the outer boundary of the aerosol cloud. At 190

meters, the overpressure is 6 psig. By contrast, in a

nuclear explosion, most authorities rate a "severe blastn at

5.2 psig and "moderate blastu at 2.7 psig. Atmospheric

tests confirm that an overpressure of 6 psig is enough to

destroy steel frame hangars and severely damage fuel storage

tanks, while 5 psig will damage and overturn vehicles.

Given these effects, it seems reasonable to conclude that a

similar explosion would crush US Army command and control

shelters, collapse soft-skinned vehicles such as fuel

tankers, and cause large casualties among exposed soldiers.

In essence, the blast effects of fuel-air explosives match

those of a small nuclear bomb.69

Cost, Speed, and Ability to -ploy i n Combat

Advocates of airpower place a great deal of emphasis on

the cost-effectiveness of aircraft over ballistic missiles,

particularly with respect to unit cost per deliverable ton

of ordnance by each system. This argument is overblown and

based on a flawed assessment of the degree of penetration

and the Mreusabilityvor multi-sortie capacity of combat

aircraft. When recalculated using an adversary's predicted

ability to employ his aircraft in combat, the cost of

aircraft far exceeds that of ballistic missiles, making TBMs

a more cost-effective and realistic way for Third World

leaders to attack deploying US forces.

Various estimates place the total cost of a single

strike aircraft, including pilot training and several years

of operations and support, at approximately $40 million

dollars. These estimates treat aircraft infrastructure

costs--airbases, repair facilities, and training and

salaries for highly skilled maintenance personnel--as "sunkv

and do not include them in their calculations. Based on a

95 percent probability of penetrating enemy air space, a

lifetime total of 2 0 combat sorties, and a payload of 2 . 8 5

tons per sortie, one estimate concluded the cost per

deliverable ton of ordnance by aircraft was $700,000.70

The same analysis placed the cost of a ballistic

missile at $1 million. It properly noted that ballistic

missiles provide a nation with a "potent system at much

lower investment and infrastructure costs and with less need

for highly-trained personnel . . . . "71 Given a penetration

probability of 100 percent and a payload of .80 tons, the

estimate figured that it cost $ 1 . 2 5 million per ton of

deliverable ordnance. The study concluded that aircraft

were more cost-effective than missiles. The author did,

however, caveat his conclusions by stating that because

nuclear warheads only required one sortie to generate

immense destruction, missiles were a more cost-effective way

to deliver them.72

Due to their accuracy, aircraft are probably better

platforms for delivering conventional ordnance, but as

discussed above, the accuracy of missiles is improving and

the types of warheads are expanding. If nothing else, these

factors should drive a re-examination of the calculations.

More importantly, when one includes the actual number of

combat aircraft needed to defeat ever improving Third World

air defense systems and penetrate enemy airspace, the

estimated cost per deliverable ton for combat aircraft rises

dramatically.

The United States bombing raid on Libya in 1986 is an

excellent case study. In Operation El Dorado Canyon, in

order to penetrate Libyan airspace safely Navy A-7 and F/A-

18 aircraft fired antiradiation missiles at air defense

batteries, Navy EA-6 aircraft jammed Libyan air defense

radars, F-14 and more F/A-18 fighters flew combat air

patrol, and Navy E-2 aircraft provided command and control

and early warning. All of these planes as well as the EF-

111 aircraft that accompanied the F-111 bombers from England

flew only to ensure penetration of Libyan airspace, they had

nothing directly to do with bombing Libya.73 One source

indicates that more than 70 aircraft participated in the US

Navy's portion of the attack. Of those 70, only 14 were

bombers targeting locations in Libya; the rest were there to

facilitate penetration or protect the two aircraft carriers

used in the attack. Of the 14 A-6E Navy bombers involved,

12 actually dropped bombs.7 4

Using a 5:l ratio as a rough comparison of

participating aircraft to bombers, the cost per ton of

ordnance delivered by aircraft rose from $700,000 to $11.36

million or nine times the cost of missiles.75 While

inexact, this example illustrates how the continued

improvement of Third World air defense systems will increase

the cost of conducting military operations with aircraft to

a level where ballistic missiles will one day become cost-

effective. If nations improve the accuracy of their

missiles and obtain non-conventional warheads, that day may

arrive even sooner than expected.

This example pitted the aircraft of the United States

Air Force and Navy against the Libyan air defense system.

Most analyses of cost-effectiveness follow this trend and

cite historic cases of US aircraft in World War 11, Korea,

Vietnam, and Operation Desert Storm. They conclude that the

highest aircraft attrition rate ever achieved over the

course of any of these conflicts was 2 percent. This

methodology is inappropriate for any analysis of the impact

of ballistic missiles on US force projection operations.

Using the attrition rate of US aircraft in a cost-benefit

analysis of aircraft and missiles inverts the factors and

skews the results. A more appropriate scenario examines the

cost-effectiveness of Third World aircraft attacking an area

defended by US Air Force and Navy aircraft and US Army air

defense artillery. While no such studies have been

conducted, several analysts have postulated about the

percentage of aircraft attrition necessary to make ballistic

missiles more cost-effective than aircraft. The figures run

anywhere from 9 percent to 50 percent depending on the type

and range of the missile.76

In the Persian Gulf War, the most recent conflict

between a Third World air force and US armed forces, no

enemy aircraft overflew United States or Coalition forces.

The US and her allies had air supremacy then and are likely

to continue to have it in any conflict in the foreseeable

future. This would seem to drive the virtual attrition rate

of Third World aircraft facing a US led deployment to well

above 50 percent. In other words, the likelihood that an

adversary would test his air force against that of the

United States is small. Moreover, if he were to do so, the

probable attrition rate of his aircraft would easily exceed

50 percent. Thus, in planning an attack on US forces, a

Third World adversary would probably find it more cost-

effective to launch ballistic missiles instead of combat

aircraft. While this may seem extreme, it was essentially

Iraq's strategy during the Persian Gulf War. The Iraqis

understood that the speed of their missiles gave them a

chance at penetrating Coalition air space, something their

air force could never do. At the very least, given the

continued asymmetry between US and Third World air forces,

it is reasonable to expect a potential adversary to employ a

mixture of missiles and aircraft--maybe more missiles than

aircraft--against deploying US forces. This expectation,

combined with the likelihood that any future foe will have

improved the accuracy and yield of his ballistic missiles,

poses an ever increasing threat to deploying tactical

forces .
Third World Missile Status

The ballistic missile threat to US tactical forces is

real and quantifiable. Table 1 outlines this threat by

nation and type of missile. All references to range,

payload, and CEP are approximate and based on unclassified

inf~rmation.~ While
~
this threat information is as

comprehensive as possible, limited access to a number of

countries on the list prevents a complete and exact indexing

of ballistic missile capabilities. Moreover, for reasons of

deterrence, most nations may prefer to leave others guessing

as to the actual extent of their capabilities. Nonetheless,

this index highlights several trends in the emerging missile

threat to US forces.

The most obvious trend is the spread of Scud and Scud-

derivative missiles throughout the Third World. This is

attributable to the proliferation begun by the Soviet Union

and carried on since its collapse by nations such as Iraq

and North Korea. Of particular note is the emergence of

Chinese missiles in several developing countries. This

indicates how effective the Chinese have become in marketing

their more modern " M I 1 series missiles and may demonstrate

the viable limits of Scud-derivative proliferation.

Another notable characteristic concerns the range of

most missiles. The majority of ballistic missiles have

ranges under 1,000 kilometers. When equipped with improved

guidance systems and warheads, these missiles will possess

the range, accuracy, and lethality to pose a militarily

significant threat to tactical units. Similarly, the

majority of missile payloads can carry over 1,100 pounds.

This is the minimum weight believed necessary to transport a

nuclear warhead and may serve as an indicator of the

direction some missile programs may follow in the future.

Finally, a variety of warheads ranging from conventional

high explosives and submunitions to unconventional chemical

and nuclear munitions are already available to several

developing countries. This proliferation of warhead

technology underscores the potential threat to US forces

employed in future force projection operations from

ballistic missiles of ever increasing range, accuracy, and

lethality.

 THIRD WORLD BALLISTIC MISSILE INDEX

NATION MISSILE RANGE PAYLOAD CEP WARHEAD

(pounds) (meters)
AFGHANISTAN Scud B 2200 400-1000 conv/cherr
ALGERIA Frog-7 960 400 conventional
ARGENTINA Alacan 1100
BRAZIL MB/EE-150 1100
MB/EE-600
MB/EE-1000
SS-300
CHINA 8610 (M-7)
M-9 conventional
M-11 conventional
CSS-2/DF-3 conv/nuclear
CSS-3/DF-4 nuclear
CSS-4/DF-5 nuclear
EGYPT Scud B conv/chem
Scud C conv/chem
Sakr-80 conv/submun
Vector
INDIA Privthi
Agn i
IRAN Ognab conventional
Nazeat
Scud B conv/chern
Scud Mod C conv/chem
FROG-7/Laith conventional
Scud B conv/chern
A1 Hussein conv/chem
A1 Abbas conv/chem
LIBYA Frog 7 conventional
Scud B conv/chem
A1 Fatah
Y- 9 conventional
NORTH KOREA Scud Mod B conv/chem
Scud Mod C conv/chem
Nodong 1 conv/chem
Nodong 2 conv/chem
PAKISTAN Hatf I/IA
Haft I1
Haft I11
Y-11 conventional
SAUDI ARABIA 2SS-2/DF-3 conventional
SYRIA Frog 7 conventional
Scud B conv/chem
Scud Mod C conv/chem
Y-9 conventional
3s-21 conv/chem
YEMEN Frog 7 conventional
Scud B conventional
3s- 21 conventional

Table 1

 THE EFFECT OF BALLISTIC MISSILES

ON TACTICAL BATTLE SPACE

Since their employment in World War 11, ballistic

missiles have improved in range, accuracy, and warhead

capacity to the point where they now pose a significant

threat to tactical units. Although some examination of the

impact of ballistic missiles on deployed forces occurred

coincident to the discussion of their history and

development, the following analysis specifically highlights

the primary and secondary effects of ballistic missiles on

the tactical commander's battle space during the deployment

and early entry, build up and expansion, decisive

operations, and redeployment and post-conflict phases of

force projection operations. While anticipating continued

ballistic missile development and the increased availability

of advanced conventional and unconventional warheads, this

analysis employs potential North Korean and Persian Gulf

conflict scenarios as a backdrop for discussion. It

superimposes events from the past on concerns of the present

and technical developments from the immediate future to

produce a vision of how a potential enemy might employ

tactical ballistic missiles against US forces. With respect

to the emerging threat from ballistic missiles and weapons

of mass destruction, "Third World1'does not mean third rate.

In the context of force projection operations, a ballistic

missile attack can have a militarily significant effect on

tactical forces and in some cases, seriously damage their

chances for success on tomorrow's battlefield.78

Deployment and Early Entry

United States forces are most vulnerable during the

deployment and early entry phase of force projection

operations. An enemy may be unwilling or unable to employ

ground or air forces against deploying units, but can attack

ports of debarkation with ballistic missiles from secure

locations hundreds of kilometers away from the entry area.

During this phase, an enemy will attempt to prevent or delay

US forces from entering the theater by using his ballistic

missiles to attack ports, air fields, and logistics bases.79

The primary effect of such an attack would be to close

the air field or port at least temporarily while surviving

personnel treated casualties and removed debris. If the

enemy employed submunitions in his attack, there is the

likelihood of increased damage to arriving aircraft

resulting in additional casualties and debris. In the case

of a chemical attack on an air field, the number of

casualties would increase, while the damage to facilities

would decrease. Moreover, the presence of a chemical agent

will limit flight operations and slow the inprocessing of

newly arriving combat forces. In a scenario where the

commander needed to transition forces rapidly from arrival

in theater to combat operations, such an attack risks

disrupting the flow of troops, upsetting the commander's

tempo of operations, and potentially invalidating his plan.

If the attack occurred on a tactical air field, the damage

to aircraft would reduce the available sorties and disrupt

the tempo of air operations. The loss of tactical aircraft

would impact on the ability of the commander to attack enemy

ground troops, interdict their supply lines, hunt for

ballistic missile launchers, and protect his air space.

Likewise, a chemical attack on port facilities in the

rear area would cause a large number of casualties,

particularly among unprotected civilians. Consider the

impact an Iraqi chemical attack on the port of Jubayl might

have on the psyche of the civilian stevedore work force

during a future Persian Gulf War. Even if most survive the

initial attack, it is doubtful that many would return to

work the next day. During the Persian Gulf War, Scud

attacks on Jubayl and Dammam caused four civilian ship

captains to pull back out to sea, delaying the unloading of

combat elements of the much needed VII Corps. Similar

delays during future deployments could mean the difference

between victory or defeat in a rapidly progressing

operation.

In addition to their political and strategic impact,

the use or threat of use of ballistic missiles on the air

fields, ports, or population centers of an allied nation

supporting US forces would have serious secondary tactical

effects. The most obvious example involves the Iraqi

attacks on Israeli population centers during the Persian

Gulf War. These attacks risked bringing Israel into the war

and destroying the Allied Coalitionlspolitical and military

structure. This would have changed the correlation of

forces, possibly requiring a revising of the operations

plan, and left US forces vulnerable to attack from formerly

allied nations like Syria. Concern over similar attacks

into Turkey and the resultant potential for lost basing

rights drove military planners to send Patriot batteries to

Turkey to intercept any incoming Iraqi Scud missiles.81

The loss, through either missile attack or

intimidation, of an intermediate staging base or the forward

portion of a communications zone located in an allied nation

would degrade significantly the commander's ability to bring

forces and supplies into theater and execute his war plan.

One nation particularly vital to US military deployments in

Asia is Japan. An attacking North Korean force, however,

could range the coast of Japan with Scud Mod C missiles from

positions just south of Seoul, South Korea. Even worse,

using the Nodong 1 missile (1,000-1,300kilometer range),

the North Koreans can reach Osaka and Tokyo from locations

outside their capital of P1yongyang. While it is unlikely

that the Japanese would prevent US forces from staging out

of Japan, improvements in North Korea's missile program and

the potential for such an attack compelled the Japanese to

purchase the Patriot missile system from the United States.

Concern over assured access to bases in Japan obliged the US

to agree to sell the Patriot missile system--a system based

highly advanced computer and aerospace technology--toJapan,

a competitor in the global computer and aerospace industry

Moreover, in the event of war, the political pressure to

destroy mobile launchers and alleviate the threat of missile

attacks on Japan will force a diversion of aircraft and

intelligence assets in a situation reminiscent of the

Persian Gulf War. Compared to the relatively flat sands of

Iraq, however, the mountainous terrain in Korea will make it

even more difficult to find the launchers. This difficulty

will cause an even greater diversion of air assets away from

attacking ground formations than occurred during the "Great

Scud Huntf1in the Persian Gulf War. Given the remote nature

of the Korean theater of operations and the expected

rapidity of a North Korean attack, any diversion of assets

away from stopping a North Korean offensive could prolong

the conflict, lead to increased casualties, and limit the

ability of tactical commanders to achieve victory on the

battlefield.82

Build up and Expansion

During the build up and expansion phase of force

projection operations, an enemy will continue to attempt to

disrupt the deployment of forces into the theater with

missile attacks on ports, air fields, logistics bases and

tactical assembly areas. To deter, or if necessary defeat,

such an attack by North Korea, General Gary Luck, the

commander of United States forces in South Korea, asked that

a Patriot battalion deploy to Korea in the spring of 1994.

Concerned with protecting the vital assets he needed for the

initial fight as well as maintaining the flow of

reinforcements and supplies into Korea in the event of a

North Korean attack, General Luck positioned the arriving

Patriot batteries at key air fields and ports on the

peninsulaea3 At the tactical level the primary effects of

such an attack would be the likely desynchronization of the

commander's operation due to a lack of combat troops and

equipment necessary to accomplish key parts of his plan as

well as an increase in casualties.

 A ballistic missile attack on large logistics sites and

tactical assembly areas would have a similar effect. During

Operation Desert Storm, the commander of the Patriot-Hawk

air defense task force assigned to protect VII Corps

expressed the importance of preventing such an

attack. As part of his Commander's Intent, Lieutenant

Colonel Lawrence Dodgen wrote

. . .the
enemy's greatest threat is his ability
to upset the timing of the operation or to

contaminate/damage critical elements of the Corps

by missile . . .attack. While in TAA [tactical

assembly area] Juno, Patriot is to protect the

force from attack with logistics, llAB [llth

Aviation Brigade], and command and control as the

priorities. Early positioning of HIMAD [high to

medium air defense] forces allows for rapid

logistics build up . . . . 84

Lieutenant General Paul Funk, commander of the US

Army's I11 Corps, confirmed this danger with respect to his

unit's potential deployment to South Korea to thwart a

future North Korean attack. He commented that given the

restricted nature of the terrain in Korea, a ballistic

missile attack had more potential lethality than one might

face in Saudi Arabia. He emphasized that the lack of room

in Korea to disperse his maneuver forces and logistics sites

left them at risk.85 Depending on the type of warhead

employed, a successful missile attack in this situation

could cause heavy casualties, destroy or contaminate

countless supplies, and render scores of soft-skinned

vehicles inoperable.

During this phase, a missile attack on political,

strategic, or operational targets poses significant

secondary effects for tactical forces. The loss of an

intermediate staging base for soldiers and supplies would

limit the commander's ability to execute his tactical plan.

Furthermore, as in the Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel, the

diversion of air assets to find and suppress the mobile

launchers could delay the onset of offensive operations.

The attacks on Israel caused the diversion of not only

combat aircraft, but also the Joint Surveillance Target

Attack Radar System (JSTARS) from its coverage of the

ongoing ground battle at Khafji to hunt for Scuds in Western

Iraq. In an attempt to allay Israeli concerns, political

leaders in Washington, DC directed General Schwarzkopf to

move one of only two JSTARS aircraft in Saudi Arabia. The

issue is not whether the decision was correct, but that the

launching of Scuds at Israel had important tactical side

effects, including blinding the ground commanders as to what

was occurring during the first ground battle of the Persian

Gulf ~ar.86

Just as an attack on a logistical base or assembly area

in VII Corps or I11 Corps would create problems for the

corps commander, so too would an attack on a theater level

facility. A successful missile attack on King Khalid

Military City and Log Base Bravo during the Persian Gulf War

would have amounted to piercing what Lieutenant General John

J. Yeosock, the Third Army Commander, considered his

operational center of gravity. Consequently, the 11th Air

Defense Artillery Brigade positioned Patriot batteries there

to protect those vital Third Army assets. The tactical

effects of a successful attack would have rippled throughout

the command, severely interrupting the movement of forces

and supplies west in preparation for the ground attack, and

disrupting both the XVIII Corps and the VII Corps plans.87

Decisive Operations

The objective of the commander during combat operations

is to achieve a quick, decisive victory with minimal

casualties. A successful ballistic missile attack during

this phase can prevent the commander from achieving his

goal. During decisive operations, when combat forces are

moving and fighting, the enemy will use his ballistic

missiles to interdict the friendly movement of troops and

supplies and attack friendly forces as they congregate to

pass through choke points on the battlefield.

During the Persian Gulf War, an ideal time for the

Iraqis to attack friendly maneuver forces with ballistic

missile attacks would been have as VII Corps breached Iraqi

front line positions on 24 February 1991. In a post-war

conversation, General Frederick Franks Jr., the VII Corps

commander during Operation Desert Storm, expressed

particular concern about chemically-armed ballistic missiles

landing on his soldiers "in the breach," especially if Iraqi

minefields slowed their p e n e t r a t i ~ n . ~To

~ counter

this

threat, VII Corps ordered two Patriot batteries from the

Corps Patriot battalion to the breach site to provide

defense against ballistic missiles.89

For soldiers hit with such an attack, the effects would

have been devastating. One participant asked about the

likely effect of a chemical attack on breaching forces

commented that the soldiers in Abrams tanks and Bradley

infantry fighting vehicles might have survived thanks to the

over pressurization of the chemical protection system

installed on those vehicles, but that soldiers in other

vehicles would have been contaminated. This assumes that

the tank and infantry squads riding with their hatches open

had been warned in time to close their hatches and activate

their overpressure systems before entering the contaminated

area.9 0
Moreover, in at least one battalion, staff officers and

headquarters personnel following the combat forces through

the area stopped and dismounted their vehicles to survey the

situation. As they gathered together, a senior non-

commissioned officer commented that they were all vulnerable

to an attack by indirect fire. If that fire had been from

ballistic missiles armed with fuel-air explosives, the

battalion staff would have been killed and all of the light-

skinned vehicles--command and control shelters, supply

vehicles, and fuel tankers--destroyed. Such an attack would

have decapitated the battalion, removing most of the unit's

planning personnel. Additionally, the loss of vehicles,

particularly fuel vehicles, would have forced that battalion

to run out of fuel. While the 1st Infantry Division had

spare combat vehicles to replace destroyed tanks and

infantry fighting vehicles, it did not have any additional

fuel tankers. Thus, while there may have been enough bulk

fuel within the 1st Division and VII Corps, the inability to

distribute that fuel to front line units risked disrupting

the Division and Corps battle plans.91

In certain situations, the political or strategic use

of ballistic missiles by the enemy may also have the

secondary tactical effect of inhibiting the movement of

reinforcements and supplies to critical points on the

battlefield. Consider the case of a war in Korea, where

political considerations will force the Combined Forces

Command (CFC) to defend the approaches to Seoul. To do so,

the CFC may need to move forces and supplies in and around

Seoul. A North Korean missile attack on Seoul, regardless

of whether it carried chemical munitions, would affect the

populace psychologically to the point where the ensuing mass

exodus of refugees would clog the vital road networks needed

by the military forces. This phenonenon was evident in

Teheran during the Iran-Iraq War and in Tel Aviv throughout

Operation Desert Storm. Seoul is the fourth most populous

city in the world with a projected population of almost 2 2

million people by the year 2000. It has a population

density of 49,101 people per square mile or five times that

of Tel Aviv. If North Korea lived up to the pledge one of

its diplomats made in April 1994, to turn Seoul "into a sea

of fire," the consequent exodus could easily overcome

efforts by Korean authorities to control it. Furthermore,

if the North Koreans used chemical munitions on Seoul, the

immense congestion in the city portends massive casualties,

potentially drawing US and South Korean medical and

logistical personnel and supplies away from the front to

provide disaster relief.92

Redeployment and Post-Conflict

Although most significant combat activities will have

ceased as US forces transition into the reconstitution and

post-conflict phase of force projection operations, an enemy

may still launch a "last ditch" missile attack against US

forces. In this event, an enemy would target large

facilities and collections of soldiers such as ports, air

fields, and assembly areas. The impact of a ballistic

missile attack during this phase would have a debilitating

psychological as well as physical effect on tactical forces.

While the congestion of departing forces suggests the

potential for higher casualties, the shock of such an attack

might far outweigh the physical effects of the bombardment.

A successful ballistic missile attack on a victorious army

may call into question the concept of victory, undermine the

political rationale for initially deploying forces, and put

future deployments at risk. An attack with weapons of mass

destruction could damage or contaminate port and air field

facilities, delaying or preventing the redeployment of US

forces. Given that the national military strategy envisions

fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional

contingencies, the inability to redeploy forces from one

theater to another rapidly could jeopardize the chances for

tactical, operational, and strategic success in the second

major regional contingency.

 CONCLUSION

Ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction

represent a credible tactical threat to US forces engaged in

force projection operations. The proliferation of improved

missile guidance, propulsion, and warhead technologies among

Third World nations will only serve to increase the

lethality of this threat to US forces in the future. As

nations improve the quality and quantity of their missile

arsenals, missiles will assume ever increasing utility over

combat aircraft. In a conflict with the United States, the

power of the US Air Force and Navy to ground any enemy air

force will reinforce this belief, tempting an adversary to

use his ballistic missile arsenal to best advantage.

Moreover, after a slow, but continuous expansion of the use

of ballistic missiles in combat, the precedent for an attack

on US forces has been set. The Libyan attacks in 1986

represented a meager, but determined attempt to strike back

at the United States for its air raids earlier that year.

The attacks by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, however,

opened the door for similar large scale attacks in the

future. The expected advancements in missile and warhead

technology will permit foes to strike at US forces from

longer distances with greater accuracy and lethality. If

successful, these attacks will have a militarily significant

effect on the conduct of the deployment and early entry,

build up and expansion, decisive operations, and

redeployment and post-conflict phases of force projection

operations.

Tactical commanders from battalion to corps must

understand and appreciate the devastating effect of attacks

by ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction on

their battle space. These attacks could delay or prevent

the entry of forces into the theater of operations, slow the

movement of soldiers and equipment from ports and air

fields, disrupt the timing and synchronization of decisive

operations, necessitate the diversion of essential

resources, and cause innumerable casualties. A successful

ballistic missile attack could invalidate the concept of

"decisive victory with minimal casualtiesn and undermine the

potential for success in future force projection operations.

Therefore, commanders must incorporate the threat from

ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction into

their tactical plans or suffer the attendant consequences.

 ENDNOTES

l~eorge Bush, N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y S t r a t e g y o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s ,

March 1990 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), 9.

'~eorge Bush, N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y S t r a t e g y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
January 1993, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 1.

'~illiam J. Clinton, A N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y S t r a t e g y o f Engagement

and E n l a r g e m e n t , July 1994, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1994), i.

7~uringthe Persian Gulf War, Iraq launched 88 Scud-B/Al-Hussein

missiles at Saudi Arabia(43), Israe1(42), Bahrain(3). See Thomas A.

Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, G u l f War A i r Power S u r v e y Summary R e p o r t ,

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 84. Additionally,

during the first three days of the ground operation (21-23 February

1991), the Iraqis fired a combination of 91 Brazilian-made Astros I1 and

FROG-7 rockets at Allied forces in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. See Joseph

S. Bermudez, Jr. "Iraqi Missile Operations During Desert Storm," J a n e ' s

S o v i e t I n t e l l i g e n c e R e v i e w , 3 , no. 3 . (March 1991): 131-135; Bermudez,
"Iraqi Missile Operations During Desert Storm--Update,"J a n e ' s S o v i e t
I n t e l l i g e n c e R e v i e w , 3, no. 5 . (May 1991) : 225.

8~allisticmissile attack and defense is a relatively new field of

study. It was an outgrowth of the study of nuclear theory, emerging in

the mid-1980s with a focus on NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As the US and

Soviet Union began eliminating entire classes of nuclear weapons,

defense analysts started to study the effects of short range,

conventional ballistic missiles on the battlefield. With the end of the

Cold War and evidence of missile proliferation in the Third World, study

has turned to ballistic missile production and use by developing

countries.

The use of ballistic missiles in both the Iran-Iraq War and the

more recent Persian Gulf War reinforced this trend. Currently, this

field of study is dominated by defense analysts and think tank employees

who focus primarily at the political and strategic level of war. As an

adjunct to the field of ballistic missile study, there has emerged a

parallel concern over the use of weapons of mass destruction. The two

issues are normally addressed together in the same publications. Some

of the major works are: Janne Nolan, T r a p p i n g s o f Power: B a l l i s t i c

Missiles i n t h e T h i r d W o r l d , (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1991); Martin Navias, B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e P r o l i f e r a t i o n i n the T h i r d
W o r l d , (London: Brassey's, 1990) and Going B a l l i s t i c : The B u i l d - u p o f
M i s s i l e s i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t , (London: Brassey's, 1993); and W. Seth
Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response, (New

York: Praeger Publishers, 1990).

Due to the focus on political and strategic issues surrounding

ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, solutions tend

toward arms control agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty and the Treaty of Tlateloco as well as export control agreements

such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and away from active

defenses against attack. As recent events involving North Korea's

nuclear arsenal demonstrate, however, arms control agreements can be

surreptitiously ignored or openly abrogated. Moreover, as the

proliferation of missile and warhead technology shows, the actual

enforcement of restraints on technology transfer is a complicated and

challenging matter.

9~~~~~~ Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the

Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic A m y of the

Early Twenty-First Century, (1 August 1994), 2-7.

locircular error probable or circle of equal probability(CEP) is

the distance from the intended target in which 50% of the missiles will

probably land.

llln the last ten years, several nations have established missile

partnerships. Iraq, Egypt, and Argentina joined together to develop the

Condor I1 ballistic missile. Iran received North Korean help to modify

Soviet Scud missiles. Taiwan, South Africa, and China supposedly

received aid from Israel. In turn, China sold DF-3A missiles to 'Saudi

Arabia and offered to develop missile prototypes for Middle Eastern

nations willing to underwrite the cost. Brazil and China formed a joint

venture to develop space-launch vehicles. One spinoff from this

relationship is the development of a ballistic missile with export

potential. Also, Libya has approached Brazil, Pakistan, and others in

an effort to buy missiles and missile technology (Nolan, 18). For a

incisive analysis of Third World defense investment, ballistic missile

production, and technology transfer see Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of

Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, particularly chapters 2,

3, and 5.

1 2 ~ o eBermudez, Jr. "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant: North Korea's

Ballistic Missile Program," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, 20-21;

Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. "Iraqi Missile Operations During Desert Storm,"

Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, 3, no. 3. (March 1991) : 131-135;

Richard A. Bitzinger, "Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third

World," International Security, vol 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992) : 84-111; John
Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs:

Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security, vol 17, no. 2

(Fall 1992) : 5-41; Barbara Starr, "USA Links Chinese Ties to Missile
Exports," Jane's Defence Weekly, (15 October 1994): 6.

1 3 " ~ h Great
e
Scud Hunt" also required the use of scarce

intelligence assets and the creation of a special 877-man Joint Special

Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to find mobile Scud launchers. See Robert

H. Scales, C e r t a i n V i c t o r y : The US A m y i n t h e G u l f War, (Fort

Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Press, 1994), 184-187.

1 4 ~ h edata on airlift sorties assumes a six-battery Patriot

battalion, eight launchers per battery, and a battalion headquarters.

Data was provided by the Directorate of Combat Developments, US Army Air

Defense Artillery School and Center, Fort Bliss, Texas. Adjusting these

figures to their C-141 equivalent (multiply the number of C-5As by a

factor of 2.5), the cost in air lift becomes apparent. To move the

Patriot battalion in question would require approximately 254 C-141

equivalent sorties or 31% of what it took to move the entire 82d

Airborne Division (832 C-141 sorties) to Saudi Arabia for Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. For airlift data on the 82d Airborne

Division, see Scales, C e r t a i n V i c t o r y , 50-51.

15us Army, Field Manual 100-5, O p e r a t i o n s (hereafter cited as FM

100-5), (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 6-2, 6-12. See

also TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, 3-8. With advances in technology,

information age information reporting, and compressions in time-space

relationships, defining battle space by levels of command, size of

units, types of units, or types of equipment may become obsolete or at

best confusing. In certain circumstances, events may be defined as

either strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or

contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical

objectives. Commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of

constant, immediate communications and advanced, long range weaponry,

any single event may cut across the three levels of war. See Joint

Publication 3-0, D o c t r i n e f o r J o i n t O p e r a t i o n s , (Washington, DC: The

Joint Staff, 1993) 11-1.

16~uringthe Persian Gulf War, the author participated in a radio

talk show on military affairs and discussed ballistic missile and anti-

missile (Patriot) operations. The conclusions about misperceptions are

drawn from that experience as well as discussions with some senior

military officers in the ensuing three years.

17w. Seth Carus, B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s i n t h e T h i r d World: T h r e a t and

Response, 2; Robert Shuey and others, M i s s i l e P r o l i f e r a t i o n : S u r v e y o f
Emerging M i s s i l e Forces, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Office,
1988), In.

lacited in Bernard and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbow t o H-Bomb, 1st

Midland ed., (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 44 and

127.

I 9 ~ h eair-launched V-1 was less accurate than the ground-launched

version. Instead of launching from a known location on the ground, it

relied on the location of the aircraft for its initial positioning. Due

to the heavy losses inflicted on the Luftwaffe by Allied bombers and

fighters, most air-launches occurred at night over the North Sea with

pilots counting on their instruments (and their nerves). to get them to

the right spot in the air. Headquarters, United States Forces European

Theater, Report o f t h e General Board, S t u d y # 3 8 , 38-40 cited in R.J.

Backus, "The Defense of Antwerp Against the V-1 Missile," (M.A. thesis,

Command and General Staff College, 1971), 10; M. C. Helfers, The

Employment of V-Weapons by the Gennans in World War 11, Off ice of the

Chief of Military History, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army,

1954) , 37; Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), 39; See also Kenneth P.

Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile, (Washington, DC:

Government Printing Office, 1985).

The British employed a three-tiered strategy--passivedefense,

active defense, and attack operations--in their fairly successful

defense of London from the V-1. They used air raid alerts and deep air

raid shelters to safeguard the people: antiaircraft artillery, fighter

aircraft, and barrage balloons to stop the incoming missiles; and

bombers to strike the V-1 launch sites, storage areas, and factories.

Of the more than 7,500 missiles fired at London, only about 2,400 got

through the defenses. Total civilian casualties were 6,184 killed and

17,981 seriously wounded. There is no record for the number of wounded

that did not require hospitalization. At least 75,000 homes were

destroyed. For more on the British battle against the V-1, see Winston

Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 38-49; General Sir Frederick Pile, Ack-

Ack: Britain ssDefence Against Air Attack During the Second World War,

(London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1949), 311-368; and R.J. Backus, "The
Defense of Antwerp Against the V-1 Missile," 12-21.

20~hurchill,Triumph and Tragedy, 49-52; Pile, Ack-Ack, 386-388.

System Planning Corporation, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An

Emerging Threat, (Arlington, VA: System Planning Corporation, 1992), 5.

21~hurchill,Triumph and Tragedy, 39.

22~he V-1

campaign began on June 13, 1944 and occured in three

phases. From June 13 - September 5, 1944, the Germans launched missiles

from northern France. From September 15, 1944 - January 15, 1945, they
used the Heinkel 111 to air launch V-1s at London. V-1 attacks resumed

on March 3, 1945 and continued until 29 March, when the British

antiaircraft artillery downed the last missile. During the V-1

campaign, the Germans successfully launched 7,558 missiles at London,

8,696 at Antwerp, and 3,141 at Liege. The V-2 campaign began on

September 8, 1944 and continued until the Allies liberated the launching

area near The Hague in April 1945. During the V-2 campaign, the Germans

launched 1,190 missiles at London, 1,610 at Antwerp, 151 at Brussels,

and one at Paris. British casualties totaled 6,184 killed and 17,981

seriously wounded from V-1 attacks and 2,724 killed and 6,467 seriously

wounded from V-2 attacks. The V-2 attacks on Belgium totaled 4152

killed. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 48-55; Backus, "The Defense of

Antwerp Against the V-1 Missile," 12-14.

2 3 ~ i l e Ack-Ack,
,
392.

2 4 ~ i rDuncan Sandys quoted in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 55.

In one aspect, however, Sir General Pile was correct. He wrote that in

the future air defense will have no "human element." "The target,

whether bombers or rocket plane, will be picked up automatically; the

defence rockets will be fired at them at the most suitable moment--also

automatically--and controlled automatically." Today, due to the immense

speed with which tactical ballistic missiles approach a target, air

defense officers manually enter targeting parameters into the Patriot

missile system computer and then turn the system on automatic. The

Patriot system radar tracks the incoming missile, while the computer

selects the optimum engagement time, fires the Patriot missile, and

directs the missile toward the TBM. After the initial programming, the

defense is without a "human element." See Pile, A c k - A c k , 392. Some

American scientists shared Pile's view. Among them was Dr. Hugh L.

Dryden, a scientist evaluating the state of American science and

technology after the war. Dryden believed that the state of missile

development in 1945 mirrored that of aircraft at the end of World War I.

Of this latent potential, he wrote, "The brief experience in the

tactical use of guided missiles in this war indicates that another war

will probably be opened by the descent in large numbers of missiles

launched from distances perhaps on the order of 1,000 to 3,000 miles on

an unsuspecting and unprepared country." In light of the performance of

US cruise and Iraqi ballistic missiles in the Persian Gulf War, he may

not have been far off. Hugh L. Dryden, P r e s e n t S t a t e o f t h e Guided

M i s s i l e A r t , "Toward New Horizons," vol. VI-1, (A Report Prepared for
the Scientific Advisory Group, Army Air Forces,.1945), 1 cited in Gary

R. Akin, "Evolution and Development of Cruise Missiles: Technology for

War," A i r Power H i s t o r y vol 38, no. 2 (Summer 1991), 44.

2 5 ~ h i scomment requires at least one caveat. Specifically, the

Germans were not shy about lending their expertise after the war. With

German help, Egypt became the first developing nation to begin its own

missile program. With extensive assistance from German engineers, the

Egyptians deployed a family of liquid-propellant missiles as early as

1963. They never fired the missiles and when the Germans were forced

from Egypt, the program collapsed. System Planning Corporation,

B a l l i s t i c Missile P r o l i f e r a t i o n : An Emerging T h r e a t , 5-6.

2 6 ~ h efollowing nations possess Scud-B missiles: Afghanistan,

Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Egypt, Georgia,

Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Libya, Poland, Romania,

Russia, Slovakia, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen. Duncan Lennox,

"Missile Race Continues," J a n e ' s D e f e n c e W e e k l y , 23 January 1993, 20.

2 7 ~ h eSoviets first supplied FROG rockets in the 1960s and 1970s,

sending FROG 7s to Egypt (1968), Iraq and North Korea (1969), Syria

(1973), Algeria (1975), Libya (1978), The Peoples1 Democratic Republic

of Yemen [PDRYI (1979), and Kuwait (late 1970s). Scud exports began in

the 1960s and continue into the 1990s. See Martin Navias, Going
B a l l i s t i c : The B u i l d - u p o f Missiles i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t , 63-64.
The Scud-B CEP varies according to source consulted. For example,

Duncan Lenox, "Iraq's Scud Progrmme-the Tip of the Iceberg," J a n e ' s

D e f e n c e W e e k l y , 12 March 1991, 303, lists it at 450 meters, while Janne
E. Nolan, T r a p p i n g s o f Power, 67-68 carries it at 980 yds. Martin
Navias, Going B a l l i s t i c , 13 lists the Scud-B at 400-500 meters CEP.
This monograph assumes a CEP of 450 meters.

 28~artinNavias, Going Ballistic, 63-64, 140-142 contends that

goverment forces fired somewhere between 1,228 and 1,554 (possibly even

all 2,000) Scuds at the Mujahideen.

2 9 ~ o eBermudez, Jr. "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant: North Korea's

Ballistic Missile Program," 22; System Planning Corporation, Ballistic

Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 16; Joe Bermudez, Jr.,

"Syria's Acquisition of North Korean 'Scuds',"Jane's Intelligence

Review, vol 3, no. 6 (June 1991): 249-251.

300ne indication of the status of the North Korean economy and the

importance of Iranian financing is the report that Iranian forces

received their new missiles even before North Korea fielded them in its

own army. Joe Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant: North

Korea's Ballistic Missile Program," 22; Syria reportedly paid for the

missiles it received from North Korea with part of the $2 billion it

received from Saudi Arabia for its participation in the Persian Gulf

War. Joe Bermudez, Jr., "Syria's Acquisition of North Korean 'Scuds',"

Jane's Intelligence Review, 249-251. Iran also may have received North

Korean assistance in manufacturing a chemical warhead for their new

missile. See Martin Navias, Going Ballistic, 80-81. Navias also reports

that in October 1991 the United States warned Israel not to attack a

North Korean cargo ship, the Mopu, which they believed was carrying the

Scud Mod C missiles. The US feared that an Israeli attack might have

damaging implications for the upcoming Madrid summit.

31An indicator as to the extent of continued Russian (and

ultimately German) influence over ballistic missile development, Russia

recently prevented a number of missile designers from travelling to

North Korea. These designers were from the Makeyev design bureau

responsible for "Scud" design and, according to Joe Bermudez, Jr., have

addressed North Korea's multi-staging or clustering problems. Joe

Bermudez, Jr. "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant: North Korea's Ballistic

Missile Program," 22.

32~ystemPlanning Corporation, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An

Emerging Threat, 14; After an early interest in tactical range

ballistic missiles, the Chinese turned to strategic range weapons in an

effort to deter the superpowers, the United States before the 1970s and

the Soviets after the late 1960s. Only in the mid-1980s when they

became aware of the export potential of TBMs did the Chinese turn to

making and marketing short range ballistic missiles. Interestingly, in

reflection of their interests over time, the Chinese designed the

Dongfeng series of missiles to strike specific strategic targets, the

DF-2 (Japan), DF-3 (Philippines), DF-4 (Guam), and DF-5 (the continental

United States). This designation determined the range of the missile.

Conversely, with their eye on the Third World export market, the Chinese

named the "Mu family of missiles to correspond to the English word

"missile". Perhaps the best description of the Chinese missile program

is John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs:

Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security, vol 17, no. 2

(Fall 1992): 5-41. See also Barbara Starr, "USA Links Chinese Ties to

Missile Exports," Jane's Defence Weekly, (15 October 1994) : 6 ; and Yan
Kong and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Bureaucracy," J a n e ' s
I n t e l l i g e n c e R e v i e w , vol 5, no. 1 (1 January 1993) : 36-41.

33~he M-9
and M-11 missiles, when used by the PLA, are known as

the DF-15 and DF-11. In addition to the M-9 and M-11, there have been

reports of other "M" series missiles--the M-7, M-8, M-12, or M-18--under

production, including one supposedly with a range of 1,000 kilometers.

System Planning Corporation, B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e P r o l i f e r a t i o n : An

Emerging T h r e a t , 15; John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, I1China1sBallistic
Missile Programs," 10-11.

With respect to tactical ballistic missiles and weapons of mass

destruction, China's arms exports go beyond merely selling surface-to-

surface missiles. In 1989, they sold Iraq and Pakistan magnets used in

high-speed centrifuges to make weapons-grade uranium. In 1990, the

Chinese sold lithium hydride to Iraq and Libya. The chemical has

potential uses in the manufacture of nerve agents, missile fuel, and

nuclear weapons. In 1991, they provided Algeria and Iran with advice on

how to match nuclear weapons with air and missile delivery systems.

Moreover, they are reportedly aiding these nations in developing nuclear

weapons programs, including building a plutonium reactor in Algeria.

For the extent of Chinese arms sales, see Richard A. Bitzinger, "Arms to

Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World," I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , vol

17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 84-111.

34~artinNavias, ( G o i n g B a l l i s t i c , 101-105; Duncan Lennox, "Iraq's

'Scud' Programme--The Tip of the Iceberg," J a n e ' s D e f e n c e W e e k l y , (2
March 1991), 301-303.

35~uncanLennox, "Iraq's 'Scud1 Programme," 301; Joe S-Bermudez,

Jr. "Iraqi Missile Operations During Desert Storm," 132.

3 6 ~ V-2
~ r figures,

see Churchill, Triumph and T r a g e d y , 39; For
Persian Gulf War figures, see Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, G u l f
War A i r Power S t u d y Summary R e p o r t , 84; For other figures, see Martin
Navias, Going B a l l i s t i c , 128-172.

37~ermudez,"Iraqi Missile Operations During Desert Storm," 131-

135.

3 8 ~ h eIraqis used standard operating procedures developed during

the Iran-Iraq War for ballistic missile operations. Prior to missile

transfer to the TEL or MEL, the procedures are believed to progress in

the following order: The launch order is given, presumably from Saddam

Hussein directly, containing the launch time, position, and target.

Crews at the appropriate missile storage facility prepare the missiles,

mating the warhead, calibrating the guidance system, and conducting last

minute checks. Concurrently, commanders alert the missile transport

vehicles as to the number of missiles to move and the location of the

missile transfer area or launch area. Ibid., 131-135.

Keaney and Cohen in the G u l f War A i r Power S t u d y Summary R e p o r t ,

84-90, conclude that Coalition air power failed to destroy a single

mobile Scud launcher. Scales, C e r t a i n V i c t o r y , 184-187, implies, but

does not confirm, that a Special Forces called F-15E strike destroyed at

least one mobile launcher.

39~hilethe issues of prestige and deterrence are outside the

scope of this monograph, they nonetheless form part of the motivation

for developing nations to acquire ballistic missiles. As a symbol of a

nation's military might and technical prowess, ballistic missiles

enhance national prestige and stature among other developing nations.

In a certain sense, the possession of ballistic missiles replicates the

political prestige associated with the possession of battleships earlier

in the twentieth century. In that regard, the concept of actual

military utility may in fact give way to the perception of the same.

Moreover, actual usefulness may yield to the need of some developing

countries to demonstrate an industrial strength and wherewithal equal to

that of developed nations. Brazil and South Africa are two examples of

nations where the possession of ballistic missiles holds only limited

military utility yet provides a symbol of strength and technical

capability. Additionally, the ability to manufacture missiles and other

military hardware magnifies the symbolic value attributed to possession.

Indigenous manufacturing not only showcases a nation's technical

sophistication, but it also highlights that country's military self-

sufficiency and apparent independence from foreign political influence.

For a further explanation of these and other benefits of ballistic

missile ownership and indigenous production see, Andrew W. Hull,

"Motivations for Producing Ballistic Missiles and Satellite Launch

Vehicles," Jane's Intelligence Review, vol 5, no. 2 (February 1993): 86-

89; John R . Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike
Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness," International Security, vol

17, no. 2, (Fall 1992) : 77; Martin Navias, Going Ballistic, 10; Bruce
E. Arlinghaus, "Social versus Military Development: Positive and

Normative Dimensions," in James Everett Katz, Arms Production in

Developing Countries, (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1984), 39-

50; and Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson edited, Arms Production in the

Third World, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (London:

Taylor and Francis, 1986).

While prestige may motivate some nations to acquire ballistic

missiles, their popularity among developing nations stems as much from

their deterrent value as any other factor. The deterrent value of

ballistic missiles, especially when armed with unconventional warheads,

far exceeds that of combat aircraft. All the Middle East nations that

possess missiles do so in part due to their deterrent value. Iraqi

dictator, Saddam Hussein, explicitly referred to the deterrent value of

ballistic missiles when he commented that peace was possible only when

both the Arabs and Israelis each had "one missile, so neither can use

it." For more on the deterrent value of ballistic missiles see, Martin

Navias, Going Ballistic, 48.

40~ordesmanand Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War: Volume 11: The

Iran-Iraq War, 503; John R. Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and

Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness," 43; and

Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What

is the Threat? What Should be Done?" International Security, vol 16, no.

1, (Summer 1991), 5-42, all believe that aircraft are more cost-

effective that ballistic missiles. Thomas L. McNaugher, "Ballistic

Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War,"

I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , vol 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990) goes even further

claiming that "...it might be useful to encourage states to buy missiles

rather than bombers, since doing so would be a relative waste of money,

leaving fewer resources available for war" (33). Martin Navias, Going
B a l l i s t i c , 7-18, presents a more balanced opinion. Janne E. Nolan,
T r a p p i n g s o f Power, 63-97, concludes that by traditional measures of
utility--accuracy, payload, and quantity available--ballisticmissiles

have limited military significance, but with the continued proliferation

of advanced technology, especially global positioning data and improved

guidance systems, that may change. W. Seth Carus, B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s i n

t h e T h i r d W o r l d : T h r e a t and R e s p o n s e , 27-39, believes that ballistic
missiles have capabilities that make them potentially useful as

conventional weapons.

The current version of ATACMS ranges to 150 kilometers and carries

up to 1,000 anti-personnel, anti-materiel mines. One planned

improvement to the ATACMS will double the range to 300 kilometers, but

reduce the payload. Another planned version will employ Brilliant Anti-

Tank Munitions (BAT) to kill armored vehicles at extended ranges. At a

test conducted at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico in December

1994, the US Army fired an ATACMS 428 kilometers. The ATACMS has an

unclassified CEP of approximately 15 meters.

4 1 ~ .Seth Carus, B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s i n t h e T h i r d W o r l d : T h r e a t and

R e s p o n s e , 31-32; Janne E. Nolan, T r a p p i n g s of Power, 65, makes a very
cogent point about the ability of inflight refueling to extend the range

of combat aircraft. This is especially true when one remembers

Operation El Dorado Canyon, the 1986 raid on Libya, where US F-111

combat aircraft took off from England, flew around France and Spain,

bombed Libya and returned without landing. The F-111 aircraft refueled

four times in the air between takeoff and landing in England.

4 2 ~ h einitial idea for comparing the payloads of aircraft and

missiles came from work done by Navias, Carus, and Nolan. The combat

radii and payloads of aircraft, however, vary not only by country and by

source, but also are interpreted differently by the various authors when

comparing aircraft and missiles. The combat radii and payloads used in

this monograph came from Mark Lambert, ed., J a n e ' s A l l the W o r l d ' s
A i r c r a f t , 1993-1994, (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group, Inc,
1993), F-16C (page 512), SU-24 (310). The payload of an A1 Hussein

missile is also up for debate. W. Seth Carus and Janne Nolan contend it

is about 190 kilograms (418 pounds), while Martin Navias places it at

500 kilograms (1,100 pounds). This monograph uses the Carus/Nolan

estimate of about 400 pounds.

4 3 ~ . Seth Carus, B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s i n the T h i r d W o r l d : T h r e a t and

R e s p o n s e , 32 .

4 4 ~ o h nR. Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike

Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness," 62.

 4 5 ~ o h nR. Harvey in "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced

Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness," contends that

aircraft and missiles have the same pre-launch survivability. "For

simplicity assume that the pre-launch survivability of both aircraft and

missiles is 1.0" (p. 65). For states sharing a common border, he is

probably correct that the warning time for missiles and aircraft is

about equal. During the Persian Gulf War, the Israelis had

approximately 5 minutes warning time of incoming Al-Hussein missiles

launched from the H3 air base in Iraq. A modern combat aircraft flying

at Mach 2.0 could cover the same distance in about the same time.

During a preemptive air strike against a neighboring state, Harvey's

assumption of pre-launch survivability appears correct.

Unless the first strike prevents all retaliatory action by the

defender, however, the pre-launch survivability of missiles and aircraft

is not equal. As the US and Coalition forces discovered during the

Persian Gulf War, finding and destroying mobile missile launchers is

much more difficult than striking fixed launching facilities or

airfields. For a specific assessment of the United States inability to

find and destroy mobile launchers during the Persian Gulf War, see the

section entitled "The Great Scud Chase," Congress, House, Committee on

Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, R e p o r t on

I n t e l l i g e n c e S u c c e s s e s and F a i l u r e s i n O p e r a t i o n s D e s e r t S h i e l d / S t o m ,
103d Cong., 1st Sess., August 16, 1993, Committee Print 5, p. 11-12.

This section of the report concludes that there was no "hard evidencer1

that Allied forces destroyed even a single mobile missile launcher

despite the continuous use of combat air patrols consisting of JSTARS

and F-15E strike aircraft. The United States Air Force came to the same

conclusion in its Gulf War Air Power Survey. See Thomas A. Keaney and

Eliot A. Cohen, G u l f War A i r Power S u r v e y Summary R e p o r t , 83-90.

Obviously, even for the world's most sophisticated military equipped

with superior intelligence gathering and strike capabilities, this task

was far from "simple". Summarizing the problems posed by ballistic

missiles, General Charles A. Horner, the CENTCOM Air Component Commander

during the Persian Gulf War, wrote in a recent article, "...I grossly

underestimated [the Scud's] impact as a political terror weapon and the

resources we would have to expend to counter it. The capability of that

antiquated weapon to hamstring modern warfare shocked me. Proliferation

of fielded and emerging ballistic missiles with vastly improved

capabilities will only exacerbate the problem for future warfighting

commanders." General Charles A. Horner, "Space Systems Pivotal to Modern

Warfare," Defense 9 4 , no. 4 . : 20-29.

4 6 ~ was ~ ~the h case

in Vietnam during Operation Rolling Thunder

when, to cite an extreme example, the US Air Force and Navy flew 350

sorties against the Thanh Hoa bridge in North Vietnam from 1965-68 and

failed to cause any major structural damage. Accuracy improved, when

during Linebacker I (May-October 1972), the Air Force flew F-4s with

laser-guided bombs against the same target and destroyed it without

suffering any aircraft losses. Even with laser-guided bombs, it still

required 26 F-4 sorties to destroy the bridge. Glenn Griffith and

others, "The Tale of Two Bridges," The T a l e o f Two B r i d g e s and t h e

B a t t l e f o r the S k i e s o v e r N o r t h V i e t n a m , ed. by A.J.C. Lavalle,
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976) cited in Thomas A.

Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, G u l f War A i r Power S u r v e y Summary R e p o r t ,

243. See Keaney and Cohen, pages 102-106, for an explanation of early

aircraft difficulties in targeting accuracy during the Persian Gulf War.

47~nformationon the V-2 tests and size of craters from W. Seth

Carus, B a l l i s t i c Missiles i n the T h i r d W o r l d : T h r e a t and R e s p o n s e , 35.

Information on the damage to Tel Aviv during the Persian Gulf War from

Martin Navias, Going B a l l i s t i c , 154.

48~homasA. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, G u l f War A i r Power S u r v e y

Summary R e p o r t , 88 .

49~oncernover technology transfer by developed countries formed

the basis for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Formalized
in 1987 between Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United

Kingdom, and the United States, the agreement asks signatories to

restrict voluntarily the export of missile-related exports and dual-use

technology applicable to missile programs. The MTCR applies controls to

technologies that would contribute to the capability of unmanned

delivery of a payload of at least 1,100 pounds (the minimum size

scientists believe necessary for a nuclear warhead) across a distance of

at least 300 kilometers. Membership has grown from the initial seven

nations to eighteen, adding Spain, Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, the

Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Norway, New Zealand, and Finland.

Portugal and Israel may join soon. While the MTCR is an encouraging

step toward counter-proliferation, it will not stop some nations--Libya,

North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan, or China--from pursuing ways

to improve the accuracy and yield of their missiles or from selling

those improvements to others. Access by rogue nations to more accurate

and lethal missiles will increase the potential danger to US tactical

forces deployed in future force projection operations.For more on MTCR

see, Janne E. Nolan, T r a p p i n g s o f Power.

sosystem Planning Corporation, B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e P r o l i f e r a t i o n : An

Emerging T h r e a t , 67, makes reference to a new model Soviet/Russia Scud
(possibly the Scud D) with a 50 meter CEP. Although they are not

signatories to the MTCR, the Soviets in 1990 appeared to have scaled

back their missile exports and denied a Syrian request for SS-23

missiles. The new Russian regime or maverick elements within its

underfunded military, however, may be willing to do anything for cash to

include selling highly accurate ballistic missiles or advanced guidance

components. W. Seth Carus, B a l l i s t i c Missiles i n the T h i r d W o r l d :

T h r e a t and R e s p o n s e , 15 and 34. Carus also makes mention of the Agni
missile under development in India with a CEP of 50 meters.

51~nternationalInstitute for Security Studies, The M i l i t a r y

B a l a n c e , 1988-1989, (London: International Institute for Security
Studies, 1988), 210.

52~singthe comparative data provided in System Planning

Corporation, B a l l i s t i c Missile P r o l i f e r a t i o n : An Emerging T h r e a t , 67-68,

and calculating the slope of development, the author arrived at the

following conclusions about the pace of ballistic missile development.

The US achieved an increase in effective range of 50 meters per year

during the first phase of its ballistic missile development. The Soviet

Union, after a slow period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s where it

achieved only a 25 meter per year increase, caught up with the US and

maintained a parallel development of 50 meters per year. France and

Great Britain together achieved an increase of only 18.5 meters per year

from the early 1970s to the early 1990s. Finally, after a slower first

phase of growth from 1987 to 1990 where they achieved 100 meters per

year, developing countries have progressed rapidly attaining between

160-200 meters per year of effective range on the ballistic missiles.

While these figures depict the pace of development with respect to

effective range of relatively short range missiles, they should also

serve as an indicator of what developing countries are capable of with

respect to improving accuracy and enhancing warhead effects.

5 3 ~ o ran excellent explanation of this issue, see System Planning

Corporation, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 61.

In addition to developing more modern guidance mechanisms, missile

owners may improve accuracy by using commercially available satellite

data to enhance missile targeting. Satellite navigation data will

reduce the uncertainty of both mobile missile launcher and target

positioning, a long time problem for all surface-to-surface artillery

calculations. Furthermore, commercial imagery from, for example French

SPOT satellites, could provide added target location and battle damage

assessment. John E. 0'pray, "Regional Power Ballistic Missiles : An

Emerging Threat to Deployed US Forces?," (Thesis, Air War College, Air

University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1990), 8.

54~ystemPlanning Corporation, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An

Emerging Threat, 67; John E. OIPray, "Regional Power Ballistic Missiles:

An Emerging Threat to Deployed US Forces?," 85; David Rubenson and Anna

Slomovic, The Impact of Missile Proliferation on US Power Projection

Capabilities, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1990), 13. Iraq used the Astros

I1 during the Iran-Iraq War and Brazil has sold the Astros I1 to Libya.

5 5 ~ o h nE. O1Pray, "Regional Power Ballistic Missiles: An Emerging

Threat to Deployed US Forces?," 83-86.

5 6 ~ h efollowing discussion concerning the effects of submunitions

and chemical warheads on a notional airbase summarizes an argument made

by John OIPray in Chapter 5 of "Regional Power Ballistic Missiles: An

Emerging Threat to Deployed US Forces?.' O'Pray used Maxwell Air Force

Base, Alabama as his model. It is a standard, unhardened airbase

similar to those that US forces might deploy to in 'response to regional

contingencies.

57~avidRubenson and Anna Slomovic, The Impact of Missile

Proliferation on US Power Projection Capabilities, 17.

''~ohn E. OIPray, "Regional Power Ballistic Missiles: An Emerging

Threat to Deployed US Forces?," 84, cites an example from Vietnam where

a single explosion at Bien Hoa destroyed 14 aircraft and damaged 30

more. It also caused several fires and secondary explosions in fuel and

ammunition storage facilities.

='~ohn E. OIPray, "Regional Power Ballistic Missiles: An Emerging

Threat to Deployed US Forces?," 86-87.

60~ecretaryCheney cited in Martin Navias, Going Ballistic, 14.

List of nations with ballistic missile and chemical programs from W.

Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response,

7 and System Planning Corporation, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An

Emerging Threat, 72-74. Of particular note, former Director of the

Central Intelligence Agency, William Webster, stated that Libya's Rabta

chemical plant may be "...the single largest chemical-warfare-agent

production plant in the Third World," but that Iraq has several

production sites with a total capacity that exceeds Libya's. William

Webster cited in John E. OIPray, "Regional Power Ballistic Missiles: An

Emerging Threat to Deployed US Forces?,I175.

61~artinNavias, Going Ballistic, 15-16, outlines some of the

difficulties in using chemical warheads on ballistic missiles.

62~oviet
Chemical Weapons Thrust, Report No. DST-1629F-051-85,

(Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1985) 8, cited in John E.

OIPray, "Regional Power Ballistic Missiles: An Emerging Threat to

Deployed US Forces?," 78; International Institute for Strategic Studies,

The Military Balance, (London: International Institute for Strategic

Studies, 1988), 248; Robert D. Orton and Robert C. Neumann, "The Impact

of Weapons of Mass Destruction on Battlefield Operations," Military

Review, vol 73, no. 12. (December 1993): 64-72, offers soldier's

perspective of the impact of WMD on battlefield operations.

63~igure2 was taken from David Rubenson and Anna Slomovic, The

Impact of Missile Proliferation on US Power Projection Capabilities, 23.

The measure of thickened Soman should be in milligrams per cubic

milliliter of air (mg/m3) and not mg/m2 as depicted. The inner elipse

would contain 500 mg/m3, the second elipse 100 mg/m3, and the third

elipse 10 mg/m3. The lethality of chemical agents is normally stated in

terms of LCt50, which is the product of the concentration of the agent

in air in milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m3), multiplied by the length

of exposure in minutes that would result in death to fifty percent of

the unprotected people exposed. For example, the LCt50 of Soman is 100

mg min/m3, meaning that exposure to a concentration of 10 mg/m3 for 10

minutes or 100 mg/m3 for 1 minute would be fatal to half those exposed.

An incapacitating dose of Soman is 75 mg min/m3. A median lethal dose

to soldiers in chemical protective garments is 10,000 mg min/m3. Thus,

in this scenario, troops wearing MOPP 4 and caught in the first elipse

would begin to die within 20 minutes of exposure. At a time when US

Army doctrine is based on "decisive victory with minimum casualties" a

chemical attack on deploying soldiers could result in instant political

and strategic defeat. The chemical dosage data outlined above came

directly from Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass

Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should be Done?," 17-18.

 64~teveFetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass

Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should be Done?," 27. This

assumes a missile with a 1 ton (2,200 pound) payload aimed at a large

city with an average population density of 30 per hectare or 13 persons

per acre of land.

6 5 ~ h etop-secret United States operation to remove nearly 1,100

pounds of weapons-grade uranium from Kazakhstan in 1994 dramatizes the

potential for theft or sale of nuclear materials from these nations.

Project Sapphire removed 1,400 stainless steel containers of weapons-

grade uranium from a remote site in Kazakhstan. The nearly half-ton of

material was enough to make two or three dozen nuclear bombs. Secretary

of State Warren Christopher stated that there was enough material in the

cache "to start a substantial nuclear weapons arsenal if it had fallen

into the hands of a rogue state." The operation had the full cooperation

of the government of Kazakhstan. "Under Cover of Darkness, Nuclear

Cache is Taken Away," Kansas C i t y S t a r , 24 November 1994, A-10.

6 6 ~ o rreasons of deterrence, fear of sanctions, and protection of

sovereignty, many nations do not disclose their nuclear status. As a

result, the list of states already possessing nuclear weapons and those

who are actively seeking them is open to interpretation and varies by

source. This list was taken from System Planning Corporation, B a l l i s t i c

M i s s i l e P r o l i f e r a t i o n : An Emerging T h r e a t , 71.

67~.
Carus, B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s i n the T h i r d W o r l d : T h r e a t and
Seth
R e s p o n s e , 7.

68~teveFetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass

Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should be Done?," 24-26. One

example cited by Fetter as to the effect of anthrax bombs was the

testing of such bombs by the US, Britain and Canada on Guinard Island

during World War 11. The island was declared safe again in 1988 after

burning the heather and treating the ground with formaldehyde.

69~hrisBellamy, The F u t u r e o f Land W a r f a r e , (New York: St.

Martin's Press, 1987), 186-187; Data on overpressure effects obtained

from John E. O'Pray, "Regional Power Ballistic Missiles: An Emerging

Threat to Deployed US Forces?," 89.

7 0 ~ o h nR. Harvey in "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced

Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectivene~s,~ 49-66.

72~nformationdrawn from Ibid, 49-66. For Harvey's comments on the

utility of ballistic missiles for nuclear delivery see, pages 43, 67,

and 74.

73~escriptionof aircraft used in the raid and their roles

obtained from James A. Winnefield and Dana J. Johnson, J o i n t A i r

O p e r a t i o n s : P u r s u i t o f U n i t y i n Command and C o n t r o l , 1 9 4 2 - 1 9 9 1 ,
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 87.

 7 4 ~ h enumber of US Navy aircraft participating in the attack (70)

and the number tasked to drop bombs (14) obtained from, Memorandum, W.

Seth Carus to Janne E. Nolan, cited in Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of

Power, 70. W. Hay Parks, "Crossing the Line," US Naval Institute

Proceedings vol 112, (November 1986), 51, indicates that two A-6E

aircraft aborted, but does not give a reason. Additionally, 24 F-111s

and 5 EF-111s departed England. Six F-111s and 1 EF-111 were spares and

dropped off after the first air-refueling. Eleven F-111s dropped bombs;

one crashed into the Mediterranean Sea. Additional support aircraft

included 28 KC-10/KC-135 tankers, six A-7s and six F/A-18s firing Shrike

and HARM missiles at Libyan air defense radars, at least two E-2C

command and control aircraft, and an undisclosed number of F-14s and

F/A-18s flying MIG Combat Air Patrol over the two US aircraft carriers,

the America and the Coral Sea. For more on US Air Force participation,

see Robert E. Venkus, Raid on Qaddafi, (New York: St. Martin's Press,

1992) .

75~arveyuses series of complex calculations to arrive at his

conclusions. This monograph does not seek to replicate his

calculations. Instead, it uses the basic mathematics provided by Harvey

in Table 3, Nominal Parameters for Missile-Aircraft Cost Comparison,

located on page 66 of his article. The following is a summary of how

this author arrived at the cost per deliverable ton using a ratio of 5

participating aircraft to every one actual bombing aircraft. Assume

Pre-Launch Survivability (PLS) is still 1.0. Divide the Defense

Penetration Probability (PP) used by Harvey for aircraft (-95)by 5 to

get .19 probability of penetration. The formula for determining the

average number of sorties before an aircraft is lost is

( N ~ ) = ~ / ( ~ - P L S * P PSubstituting
).
numbers, Ns=l/(l-1.0*.19) or

Ns=1/(.81)=1.2345679 sorties before the aircraft is lost. Take Ns along

with the Tons Delivered Per Sortie (Tav) given by Harvey as 2.85 tons,

and use them in the following equation for Cost Per Delivered Ton (CPT):

C P T = C O S ~ / ( N ~ * T ~ ~Using
) .
actual numbers, CPT=$40 million/(1.23*2.85

tons). This translates into: CPT=$40 million/3.52 tons or CPT=$11.36

million per ton of delivered ordnance. For more information see, John

R. Harvey "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft:

Comparing Military Effectiveness," International Security, vol 17, no.

2, (Fall 1992) : 66. An even simpler calculation would be to multiply

the $700,000 cost per deliverable ton by a factor of 5 for a total of

$3.5 million per deliverable ton or nearly three times more costly than

missiles.

76~arveyand Fetter both use historical evidence of US losses to

bolster their argument, although Harvey also discusses the 1973 Yom

Kippur War and the 1982 Falklands War. Harvey uses a crossover point of

9 percent in his argument. Fetter (page 9) calculates 35 percent for a

single-stage missile and 25 percent for a two-stage missile. Uzi Rubin,

"Iraq and the Ballistic Missile Scare," Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, October 1990 cited in Martin Navias, Going Ballistic, 12,

argues for 50 percent.

 77~artinNavias, Going Ballistic, 33 ; Martin Navias, Ballistic

Missile Proliferation in the Third World, 29-31; System Planning

Corporation, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 55;

Duncan Lennox, Missile Race Continues," Jane's Defence Weekly, (23

January 1993): 18-21; and "World Missiles," Defense and Foreign Affairs

Strategic Policy, (March 1991) : 23.

78~rimarytactical effects are those that occur directly from a

missile attack or threat of such an attack. Secondary effects are those

tactical effects that devolve indirectly from a friendly response to the

political and strategic use of ballistic missiles by enemy forces.

7 9 ~ o ~ iC.s
Wagner, Jr., "Theater Missile Defense," A m y vol. 44,

no. 11, (November 1994) : 26; US Army Air Defense Artillery School,
"Draft Concept for Integrated Air Defense Artillery Operations," (Fort

Bliss, TX: Combat Developments Directorate, 13 June 19941, 23.

'O~ichael W. Ellis and Jeffrey Record, "Theater Ballistic Missile

Defense and US Contingency Operations," Parameters vol. 22, no. 1,

(Spring 1992): 20; Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the

Persian Gulf War, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 256-257.

8 2 ~ h eissue of a North Korean missile attack and the potential for

the ballistic missile intimidation of Japan were discussed by the author

and LTC Keith McNamara, Assistant Director of Combat Developments, US

Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas during a meeting at

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in August 1994.

83~onversationwith LTC Keith McNamara, Ibid. The Patriot

battalion was the 2-7 ADA stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas. That

battalion is part of an all Patriot Air Defense Brigade charged with

providing tactical ballistic missile protection to echelon above corps

(EAC) units. One of the Patriot batteries that deployed to Korea

positioned outside of Osan Air Base. The other locations were not

disclosed to the author.

84~~l f
Collection, SSG AAR 3-042, SG Historian Group VII

War
Corps. (S/Unclass) Part 3, Chronology and Documentation, Volume 4,

Documentation: Tab B, VII (US) Corps Operations Order (OPORD) 1990-2

(Operation Desert Sabre), Annex M (Air Defense), (U) (hereafter cited as

GWC Operation Desert Saber): 3. The task force designation was TF 8-43

ADA. It consisted of a four-battery Patriot battalion and two Hawk

batteries.

85~ieutenantGeneral Funk made these comments in response to a

question the author asked him during a briefing at the School of

Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas on 13 October 1994.

'%J.s. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee

on Oversight and Investigations, Report on Intelligence Successes and

Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Stom, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.,

August 16, 1993, Committee Print 5 , p. 11.

8 7 ~ na meeting with Colonel Joseph Garrett, Commander of the 11th

Air Defense Artillery Brigade, and Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Gault, Deputy

Commander, prior to the movement of XVIII Corps west, Lieutenant General

Yeosock called King Khalid Military City and Logistics Base Bravo his

operational center of gravity. Colonel Gault related these comments to

the author during a meeting at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas on 13 August

1994.

880n 6 October, 1994 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the author

questioned General Franks on how the threat of a ballistic missile

attack complicated his planning during Operation Desert Storm. He

commented that he was particularly concerned with chemical rounds

landing on his forces while they were breaching Iraqi positions and

potentially caught up in a minefield. He also mentioned that he felt

tactical ballistic missiles were particularly dangerous during early

entry operations. He concluded by stating that the Army must always

possess its own means of self-defense against ballistic missiles.

8 9 (Operation
~ ~ ~
Desert Saber), A-7.

'O~ajor Michael Alexander made these observations to the author on

16 November, 1994 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Major Alexander was a

Headquarters Company commander in the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Divisi.on

during Operation Desert Storm.

91~hisparagraph is based on comments by Major Alexander to the

author on 16 November, 1994.

9 2 ~ a t aon the population size and density of Seoul obtained from

The World Almanac, (New York: Pharos Books, 1992), 881. Incidentally,

Pusan, while having a smaller total population (5 million) has almost

twice the population density (92,735) as Seoul. An attack on Pusan

during any phase of the war risks closing its main arteries for the

duration of the conflict. The comment by a North Korean diplomat is

attributed to Park Young Su. It was made at Panmunjom in March 1994.

Quoted in ADA (Air Defense Artillery), (July-August 1994), 1.

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