Aswath Lecture Notes 1
Aswath Lecture Notes 1
Aswath Lecture Notes 1
Damodaran 0
CORPORATE FINANCE
B40.2302
LECTURE NOTES: PACKET 1
Aswath Damodaran
Aswath Damodaran 1
The hurdle rate The return How much How you choose
should reflect the The optimal The right kind
should reflect the cash you can to return cash to
riskiness of the mix of debt of debt
magnitude and return the owners will
investment and and equity matches the
the timing of the depends upon depend on
the mix of debt maximizes firm tenor of your
cashflows as well current & whether they
and equity used value assets
as all side effects. potential prefer dividends
to fund it. investment or buybacks
opportunities
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The Objective in Decision Making
3
Expected Value that will be Growth Assets Equity Residual Claim on cash flows
created by future investments Significant Role in management
Perpetual Lives
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Maximizing Stock Prices is too narrow an
objective: A preliminary response
4
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The Classical Objective Function
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STOCKHOLDERS
FINANCIAL MARKETS
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What can go wrong?
7
STOCKHOLDERS
FINANCIAL MARKETS
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I. Stockholder Interests vs. Management
Interests
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And institutional investors go along with incumbent
managers
10
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Board of Directors as a disciplinary mechanism
11
Directors are paid well: In 2010, the median board member at a Fortune
500 company was paid $212,512, with 54% coming in stock and the
remaining 46% in cash. If a board member was a non-executive chair, he
or she received about $150,000 more in compensation.
Spend more time on their directorial duties than they used to: A board
member worked, on average, about 227.5 hours a year (and that is being
generous), or 4.4 hours a week, according to the National Associate of
Corporate Directors. Of this, about 24 hours a year are for board
meetings. Those numbers are up from what they were a decade ago.
Even those hours are not very productive: While the time spent on being
a director has gone up, a significant portion of that time was spent on
making sure that they are legally protected (regulations & lawsuits).
And they have many loyalties: Many directors serve on three or more
boards, and some are full time chief executives of other companies.
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The CEO often hand-picks directors..
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Directors lack the expertise (and the willingness)
to ask the necessary tough questions..
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The Calpers Tests for Independent Boards
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Application Test: Whos on board?
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So, what next? When the cat is idle, the mice
will play ....
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Overpaying on takeovers
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A case study in value destruction:
Eastman Kodak & Sterling Drugs
5,000
4,500
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
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Kodak Says Drug Unit Is Not for Sale but
22
An article in the NY Times in August of 1993 suggested that Kodak was eager to
shed its drug unit.
In response, Eastman Kodak officials say they have no plans to sell Kodaks Sterling Winthrop
drug unit.
Louis Mattis, Chairman of Sterling Winthrop, dismissed the rumors as massive speculation,
which flies in the face of the stated intent of Kodak that it is committed to be in the health
business.
A few months laterTaking a stride out of the drug business, Eastman Kodak said
that the Sanofi Group, a French pharmaceutical company, agreed to buy the
prescription drug business of Sterling Winthrop for $1.68 billion.
Shares of Eastman Kodak rose 75 cents yesterday, closing at $47.50 on the New York Stock
Exchange.
Samuel D. Isaly an analyst , said the announcement was very good for Sanofi and very good
for Kodak.
When the divestitures are complete, Kodak will be entirely focused on imaging, said George
M. C. Fisher, the company's chief executive.
The rest of the Sterling Winthrop was sold to Smithkline for $2.9 billion.
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The connection to corporate governance: HP buys
Autonomy and explains the premium
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A year later HP admits a mistakeand explains it
24
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Application Test: Who owns/runs your firm?
25
Employees Lenders
Inside stockholders
% of stock held
Voting and non-voting shares
Control structure
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Case 1: Splintering of Stockholders
Disneys top stockholders in 2003
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Case 2: Voting versus Non-voting Shares &
Golden Shares: Vale
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Case 4: Legal rights and Corporate
Structures: Baidu
The Board: The company has six directors, one of whom is Robin Li,
who is the founder/CEO of Baidu. Mr. Li also owns a majority stake
of Class B shares, which have ten times the voting rights of Class A
shares, granting him effective control of the company.
The structure: Baidu is a Chinese company, but it is incorporated in
the Cayman Islands, its primary stock listing is on the NASDAQ and
the listed company is structured as a shell company, to get around
Chinese government restrictions of foreign investors holding shares
in Chinese corporations.
The legal system: Baidus operating counterpart in China is
structured as a Variable Interest Entity (VIE), and it is unclear how
much legal power the shareholders in the shell company have to
enforce changes at the VIE.
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Things change.. Disneys top stockholders in 2009
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II. Stockholders' objectives vs. Bondholders'
objectives
31
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Examples of the conflict..
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An Extreme Example: Unprotected Lenders?
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III. Firms and Financial Markets
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Managers control the release of information to
the general public
35
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%
-2.00%
-4.00%
-6.00%
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
% Chg(EPS) % Chg(DPS)
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Some critiques of market efficiency..
37
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Are markets short sighted and too focused
on the near term? What do you think?
38
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Are markets short term? Some evidence that
they are not..
39
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If markets are so short term, why do they react to big
investments (that potentially lower short term earnings) so
positively?
40
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But what about market crises?
41
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IV. Firms and Society
42
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Social Costs and Benefits are difficult to quantify
because ..
43
Assume that you work for Disney and that you have an opportunity
to open a store in an inner-city neighborhood. The store is
expected to lose about a million dollars a year, but it will create
much-needed employment in the area, and may help revitalize it.
Would you open the store?
Yes
No
If yes, would you tell your stockholders and let them vote on the
issue?
Yes
No
If no, how would you respond to a stockholder query on why you
were not living up to your social responsibilities?
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So this is what can go wrong...
45
STOCKHOLDERS
Managers put
Have little control their interests
over managers above stockholders
FINANCIAL MARKETS
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Traditional corporate financial theory breaks
down when ...
46
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When traditional corporate financial theory
breaks down, the solution is:
47
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I. An Alternative Corporate Governance System
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II. Choose a Different Objective Function
49
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III. Maximize Stock Price, subject to ..
50
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The Stockholder Backlash
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The Hostile Acquisition Threat
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In response, boards are becoming more
independent
53
Boards have become smaller over time. The median size of a board
of directors has decreased from 16 to 20 in the 1970s to between 9
and 11 in 1998. The smaller boards are less unwieldy and more
effective than the larger boards.
There are fewer insiders on the board. In contrast to the 6 or more
insiders that many boards had in the 1970s, only two directors in
most boards in 1998 were insiders.
Directors are increasingly compensated with stock and options in
the company, instead of cash. In 1973, only 4% of directors
received compensation in the form of stock or options, whereas
78% did so in 1998.
More directors are identified and selected by a nominating
committee rather than being chosen by the CEO of the firm. In
1998, 75% of boards had nominating committees; the comparable
statistic in 1973 was 2%.
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Disney: Eisners rise & fall from grace
In his early years at Disney, Michael Eisner brought about long-delayed changes in
the company and put it on the path to being an entertainment giant that it is
today. His success allowed him to consolidate power and the boards that he
created were increasingly captive ones (see the 1997 board).
In 1996, Eisner spearheaded the push to buy ABC and the board rubberstamped
his decision, as they had with other major decisions. In the years following, the
company ran into problems both on its ABC acquisition and on its other
operations and stockholders started to get restive, especially as the stock price
halved between 1998 and 2002.
In 2003, Roy Disney and Stanley Gold resigned from the Disney board, arguing
against Eisners autocratic style.
In early 2004, Comcast made a hostile bid for Disney and later in the year, 43% of
Disney shareholders withheld their votes for Eisners reelection to the board of
directors. Following that vote, the board of directors at Disney voted unanimously
to elect George Mitchell as the Chair of the board, replacing Eisner, who vowed to
stay on as CEO.
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Eisners concession: Disneys Board in 2003
55
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Changes in corporate governance at Disney
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1. Required at least two executive sessions of the board, without the CEO
or other members of management present, each year.
2. Created the position of non-management presiding director, and
appointed Senator George Mitchell to lead those executive sessions and
assist in setting the work agenda of the board.
3. Adopted a new and more rigorous definition of director independence.
4. Required that a substantial majority of the board be comprised of
directors meeting the new independence standards.
5. Provided for a reduction in committee size and the rotation of
committee and chairmanship assignments among independent
directors.
6. Added new provisions for management succession planning and
evaluations of both management and board performance
7. Provided for enhanced continuing education and training for board
members.
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Eisners exit and a new age dawns? Disneys board
in 2008
57
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But as a CEOs tenure lengthens, does
corporate governance suffer?
1. While the board size has stayed compact (at twelve members),
there has been only one change since 2008, with Sheryl
Sandberg, COO of Facebook, replacing the deceased Steve Jobs.
2. The board voted reinstate Iger as chair of the board in 2011,
reversing a decision made to separate the CEO and Chair
positions after the Eisner years.
3. In 2011, Iger announced his intent to step down as CEO in 2015
but Disneys board convinced Iger to stay on as CEO for an extra
year, for the the good of the company.
4. There were signs of restiveness among Disneys stockholders,
especially those interested in corporate governance. Activist
investors (CalSTRS) starting making noise and Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS), which gauges corporate governance at
companies, raised red flags about compensation and board
monitoring at Disney.
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Igers non-exit and the Domino effect
59
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What about legislation?
60
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Is there a payoff to better corporate
governance?
61
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The Bondholders Defense Against Stockholder
Excesses
62
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The Financial Market Response
63
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The Counter Reaction
65
STOCKHOLDERS
FINANCIAL MARKETS
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So what do you think?
66
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The Modified Objective Function
67
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The notion of a benchmark
70
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What is Risk?
71
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The Capital Asset Pricing Model
73
Expected Return
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How risky is Disney? A look at the past
75
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
-5.00%
-10.00%
-15.00%
-20.00%
-25.00%
Oct-08
Dec-08
Feb-09
Apr-09
Jun-09
Aug-09
Oct-09
Dec-09
Feb-10
Apr-10
Jun-10
Aug-10
Oct-10
Dec-10
Feb-11
Apr-11
Jun-11
Aug-11
Oct-11
Dec-11
Feb-12
Apr-12
Jun-12
Aug-12
Oct-12
Dec-12
Feb-13
Apr-13
Jun-13
Aug-13
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Do you live in a mean-variance world?
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The Importance of Diversification: Risk Types
77
Competition
may be stronger
or weaker than Exchange rate
anticipated and Political
risk
Projects may
do better or Interest rate,
worse than Entire Sector Inflation &
may be affected news about
expected by action economy
Firm-specific Market
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Why diversification reduces/eliminates
firm specific risk
78
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The Role of the Marginal Investor
79
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Identifying the Marginal Investor in your firm
80
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Gauging the marginal investor: Disney in
2013
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Extending the assessment of the investor
base
In all five of the publicly traded companies that we
are looking at, institutions are big holders of the
companys stock.
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The Limiting Case: The Market Portfolio
83
The big assumptions & the follow up: Assuming diversification costs
nothing (in terms of transactions costs), and that all assets can be
traded, the limit of diversification is to hold a portfolio of every
single asset in the economy (in proportion to market value). This
portfolio is called the market portfolio.
The consequence: Individual investors will adjust for risk, by
adjusting their allocations to this market portfolio and a riskless
asset (such as a T-Bill):
Preferred risk level Allocation decision
No risk 100% in T-Bills
Some risk 50% in T-Bills; 50% in Market Portfolio;
A little more risk 25% in T-Bills; 75% in Market Portfolio
Even more risk 100% in Market Portfolio
A risk hog.. Borrow money; Invest in market portfolio
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The Risk of an Individual Asset
84
The essence: The risk of any asset is the risk that it adds to
the market portfolio Statistically, this risk can be measured by
how much an asset moves with the market (called the
covariance)
The measure: Beta is a standardized measure of this
covariance, obtained by dividing the covariance of any asset
with the market by the variance of the market. It is a measure
of the non-diversifiable risk for any asset can be measured by
the covariance of its returns with returns on a market index,
which is defined to be the asset's beta.
The result: The required return on an investment will be a
linear function of its beta:
Expected Return = Riskfree Rate+ Beta * (Expected Return on the
Market Portfolio - Riskfree Rate)
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Limitations of the CAPM
85
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Alternatives to the CAPM
86
Step 1: Defining Risk
The risk in an investment can be measured by the variance in actual returns around an
expected return
Riskless Investment Low Risk Investment High Risk Investment
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Why the CAPM persists
87
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Application Test: Who is the marginal investor in
your firm?
88
An insider
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The Riskfree Rate and Time Horizon
91
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Riskfree Rate in Practice
92
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What is the Euro riskfree rate? An exercise
in November 2013
Rate on 10-year Euro Government Bonds: November 2013
9.00% 8.30%
8.00%
7.00% 6.42%
5.90%
6.00%
5.00%
3.90% 3.95%
4.00% 3.30%
3.00% 2.35%
2.10% 2.15%
1.75%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
Germany Austria France Belgium Ireland Italy Spain Portugal Slovenia Greece
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When the government is default free: Risk
free rates in November 2013
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What if there is no default-free entity?
Risk free rates in November 2013
Adjust the local currency government borrowing rate for default risk to
get a riskless local currency rate.
In November 2013, the Indian government rupee bond rate was 8.82%. the local
currency rating from Moodys was Baa3 and the default spread for a Baa3 rated
country bond was 2.25%.
Riskfree rate in Rupees = 8.82% - 2.25% = 6.57%
In November 2013, the Chinese Renmimbi government bond rate was 4.30% and
the local currency rating was Aa3, with a default spread of 0.8%.
Riskfree rate in Chinese Renmimbi = 4.30% - 0.8% = 3.5%
Do the analysis in an alternate currency, where getting the riskfree rate is
easier. With Vale in 2013, we could chose to do the analysis in US dollars
(rather than estimate a riskfree rate in R$). The riskfree rate is then the
US treasury bond rate.
Do your analysis in real terms, in which case the riskfree rate has to be a
real riskfree rate. The inflation-indexed treasury rate is a measure of a real
riskfree rate.
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Three paths to estimating sovereign
default spreads
97
Figure 4.2: Risk free rates in Currencies where Governments not Aaa
rated
16.00%
14.00%
12.00%
10.00%
8.00%
Default Spread
6.00%
Risk free rate
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%
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99
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
Japanese Yen
Czech Koruna
Croatian Kuna
Bulgarian Lev
Swiss Franc
Euro
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Danish Krone
Taiwanese $
Pakistani Rupee
Swedish Krona
Hungarian Forint
British Pound
Thai Baht
Vietnamese Dong
Romanian Leu
Israeli Shekel
HK $
Australian $
Default Spread based on rating Malyasian Ringgit
NZ $
Chilean Peso
Risk free Rates in January 2017
Iceland Krona
Indian Rupee
Colombian Peso
Peruvian Sol
Indonesian Rupiah
Russian Ruble
Mexican Peso
South African Rand
Venezuelan Bolivar
Brazilian Reai
Turkish Lira
Kenyan Shilling
Nigerian Naira
99
Measurement of the risk premium
100
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What is your risk premium?
Assume that stocks are the only risky assets and that you are
offered two investment options:
a riskless investment (say a Government Security), on which you can
make 3%
a mutual fund of all stocks, on which the returns are uncertain
How much of an expected return would you demand to shift
your money from the riskless asset to the mutual fund?
a. Less than 3%
b. Between 3% - 5%
c. Between 5% - 7%
d. Between 7% -9%
e. Between 9%- 11%
f. More than 11%
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Risk Aversion and Risk Premiums
102
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Risk Premiums do change..
103
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Estimating Risk Premiums in Practice
104
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The Survey Approach
105
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The Historical Premium Approach
106
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ERP: A Historical Snapshot
107
What about historical premiums for other
markets?
108
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One solution: Bond default spreads as CRP
November 2013
In November 2013, the historical risk premium for the US was 4.20%
(geometric average, stocks over T.Bonds, 1928-2012)
Arithmetic Average Geometric Average
Stocks - T. Bills Stocks - T. Bonds Stocks - T. Bills Stocks - T. Bonds
1928-2012 7.65% 5.88% 5.74% 4.20%
2.20% 2.33%
Using the default spread on the sovereign bond or based upon the
sovereign rating and adding that spread to the mature market premium
(4.20% for the US) gives you a total ERP for a country.
Country Rating Default Spread (Country Risk Premium) US ERP Total ERP for country
India Baa3 2.25% 4.20% 6.45%
China Aa3 0.80% 4.20% 5.00%
Brazil Baa2 2.00% 4.20% 6.20%
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Beyond the default spread? Equities are
riskier than bonds
While default risk spreads and equity risk premiums are highly correlated,
one would expect equity spreads to be higher than debt spreads. One
approach to scaling up the premium is to look at the relative volatility of
equities to bonds and to scale up the default spread to reflect this:
Equals
Aswath Damodaran Implied Equity Risk Premium (1/1/14) = 8.04% - 2.55% = 5.49%
111
The bottom line on Equity Risk Premiums
in November 2013
Mature Markets: In November 2013, the number that we chose to use as the
equity risk premium for all mature markets was 5.5%. This was set equal to the
implied premium at that point in time and it was much higher than the historical
risk premium of 4.20% prevailing then (1928-2012 period).
Arithmetic Average Geometric Average
Stocks - T. Bills Stocks - T. Bonds Stocks - T. Bills Stocks - T. Bonds
1928-2012 7.65% 5.88% 5.74% 4.20%
2.20% 2.33%
1962-2012 5.93% 3.91% 4.60% 2.93%
2.38% 2.66%
2002-2012 7.06% 3.08% 5.38% 1.71%
5.82% 8.11%
For emerging markets, we will use the melded default spread approach (where
default spreads are scaled up to reflect additional equity risk) to come up with the
additional risk premium that we will add to the mature market premium. Thus,
markets in countries with lower sovereign ratings will have higher risk premiums
that 5.5%.
! $
Emerging Market ERP = 5.5% + Country Default Spread*## Equity
&& !
" Country Bond %
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A Composite way of estimating ERP for
countries
Step 1: Estimate an equity risk premium for a mature market. If your
preference is for a forward looking, updated number, you can
estimate an implied equity risk premium for the US (assuming that
you buy into the contention that it is a mature market)
My estimate: In November 2013, my estimate for the implied premium in
the US was 5.5%. That will also be my estimate for a mature market ERP.
Step 2: Come up with a generic and measurable definition of a mature
market.
My estimate: Any AAA rated country is mature.
Step 3: Estimate the additional risk premium that you will charge for
markets that are not mature. You have two choices:
The default spread for the country, estimated based either on sovereign
ratings or the CDS market.
A scaled up default spread, where you adjust the default spread upwards
for the additional risk in equity markets.
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Andorra 7.45% 1.95% Liechtenstein 5.50% 0.00%Albania 12.25% 6.75%
ERP : Nov 2013 Austria 5.50% 0.00% Luxembourg 5.50% 0.00%Armenia 10.23% 4.73% Bangladesh 10.90% 5.40%
Belgium 6.70% 1.20% Malta 7.45% 1.95%Azerbaijan 8.88% 3.38% Cambodia 13.75% 8.25%
Cyprus 22.00% 16.50% Netherlands 5.50% 0.00%Belarus 15.63% 10.13% China 6.94% 1.44%
Denmark 5.50% 0.00% Norway 5.50% 0.00%Bosnia 15.63% 10.13% Fiji 12.25% 6.75%
Finland 5.50% 0.00% Portugal 10.90% 5.40%Bulgaria 8.50% 3.00%
Hong Kong 5.95% 0.45%
France 5.95% 0.45% Spain 8.88% 3.38%Croatia 9.63% 4.13%
India 9.10% 3.60%
Germany 5.50% 0.00% Sweden 5.50% 0.00%Czech Republic 6.93% 1.43%
Indonesia 8.88% 3.38%
Estonia 6.93% 1.43%
Greece 15.63% 10.13% Switzerland 5.50% 0.00% Japan 6.70% 1.20%
Georgia 10.90% 5.40%
Iceland 8.88% 3.38% Turkey 8.88% 3.38%Hungary 9.63% 4.13% Korea 6.70% 1.20%
Ireland 9.63% 4.13% United Kingdom 5.95% 0.45%Kazakhstan 8.50% 3.00% Macao 6.70% 1.20%
Italy 8.50% 3.00% Western Europe 6.72% 1.22%Latvia 8.50% 3.00% Malaysia 7.45% 1.95%
Canada 5.50% 0.00% Lithuania 8.05% 2.55% Mauritius 8.05% 2.55%
United States of America 5.50% 0.00% Country TRP CRP Macedonia 10.90% 5.40% Mongolia 12.25% 6.75%
North America 5.50% 0.00% Angola 10.90% 5.40% Moldova 15.63% 10.13% Pakistan 17.50% 12.00%
Argentina 15.63% 10.13% Benin 13.75% 8.25% Montenegro 10.90% 5.40% Papua NG 12.25% 6.75%
Belize 19.75% 14.25% Botswana 7.15% 1.65% Poland 7.15% 1.65% Philippines 9.63% 4.13%
Bolivia 10.90% 5.40% Burkina Faso 13.75% 8.25% Romania 8.88% 3.38%
Singapore 5.50% 0.00%
Brazil 8.50% 3.00% Cameroon 13.75% 8.25% Russia 8.05% 2.55%
Sri Lanka 12.25% 6.75%
Cape Verde 12.25% 6.75% Serbia 10.90% 5.40%
Chile 6.70% 1.20% Taiwan 6.70% 1.20%
Egypt 17.50% 12.00% Slovakia 7.15% 1.65%
Colombia 8.88% 3.38% Thailand 8.05% 2.55%
Slovenia 9.63% 4.13%
Costa Rica 8.88% 3.38% Gabon 10.90% 5.40% Vietnam 13.75% 8.25%
Ukraine 15.63% 10.13%
Ecuador 17.50% 12.00% Ghana 12.25% 6.75% Asia 7.27% 1.77%
E. Europe & Russia 8.60% 3.10%
El Salvador 10.90% 5.40% Kenya 12.25% 6.75%
Guatemala 9.63% 4.13% Morocco 9.63% 4.13% Bahrain 8.05% 2.55%
Mozambique 12.25% 6.75% Israel 6.93% 1.43% Australia 5.50% 0.00%
Honduras 13.75% 8.25%
Namibia 8.88% 3.38% Jordan 12.25% 6.75% Cook Islands 12.25% 6.75%
Mexico 8.05% 2.55%
Nigeria 10.90% 5.40% Kuwait 6.40% 0.90% New Zealand 5.50% 0.00%
Nicaragua 15.63% 10.13%
Rwanda 13.75% 8.25% Lebanon 12.25% 6.75% Australia & NZ 5.50% 0.00%
Panama 8.50% 3.00%
Paraguay 10.90% 5.40% Senegal 12.25% 6.75% Oman 6.93% 1.43%
Peru 8.50% 3.00% South Africa 8.05% 2.55% Qatar 6.40% 0.90%
Suriname 10.90% 5.40% Tunisia 10.23% 4.73% Saudi Arabia 6.70% 1.20%
UruguayAswath Damodaran
8.88% 3.38% Uganda 12.25% 6.75% United Arab Emirates 6.40% 0.90% Black #: Total ERP
Venezuela 12.25% 6.75% Zambia 12.25% 6.75% Middle East 6.88% 1.38% Red #: Country risk premium
Latin America 9.44% 3.94% Africa 11.22% 5.82% AVG: GDP weighted average
Estimating ERP for Disney: November 2013
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ERP for Companies: November 2013
Company Region/ Country Weight ERP
Bookscape United States 100% 5.50%
US & Canada 4.90% 5.50%
Brazil 16.90% 8.50%
Rest of Latin
1.70% 10.09%
America
China 37.00% 6.94%
Vale
Japan 10.30% 6.70%
In November 2013, Rest of Asia 8.50% 8.61%
the mature market Europe 17.20% 6.72%
Rest of World 3.50% 10.06%
premium used was Company 100.00% 7.38%
5.5% India 23.90% 9.10%
China 23.60% 6.94%
UK 11.90% 5.95%
Tata Motors United States 10.00% 5.50%
Mainland Europe 11.70% 6.85%
Rest of World 18.90% 6.98%
Company 100.00% 7.19%
Baidu China 100% 6.94%
Germany 35.93% 5.50%
North America 24.72% 5.50%
Rest of Europe 28.67% 7.02%
Deutsche Bank
Asia-Pacific 10.68% 7.27%
South America 0.00% 9.44%
Company 100.00% 6.12%
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The Anatomy of a Crisis: Implied ERP from
September 12, 2008 to January 1, 2009
117
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An Implied ERP
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119
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
Implied Premiums in the US: 1960-2016
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
Implied Premium for US Equity Market: 1960-2016
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
Aswath Damodaran
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
7.00%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
Implied Premium
ERP : Jan 2017
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Estimating Beta
122
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Estimating Performance
123
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Setting up for the Estimation
124
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Choosing the Parameters: Disney
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Disneys Historical Beta
!
Return on Disney = .0071 + 1.2517 Return on Market R = 0.73386
(0.10)
Analyzing Disneys Performance
Intercept = 0.712%
This is an intercept based on monthly returns. Thus, it has to be
compared to a monthly riskfree rate.
Between 2008 and 2013
n Average Annualized T.Bill rate = 0.50%
n Monthly Riskfree Rate = 0.5%/12 = 0.042%
n Riskfree Rate (1-Beta) = 0.042% (1-1.252) = -.0105%
The Comparison is then between
Intercept versus Riskfree Rate (1 - Beta)
0.712% versus 0.0105%
Jensens Alpha = 0.712% - (-0.0105)% = 0.723%
Disney did 0.723% better than expected, per month, between
October 2008 and September 2013
Annualized, Disneys annual excess return = (1.00723)12 -1= 9.02%
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127
More on Jensens Alpha
128
If you did this analysis on every stock listed on an exchange, what would the
average Jensens alpha be across all stocks?
a. Depend upon whether the market went up or down during the period
b. Should be zero
c. Should be greater than zero, because stocks tend to go up more often than down.
Disney has a positive Jensens alpha of 9.02% a year between 2008 and 2013.
This can be viewed as a sign that management in the firm did a good job,
managing the firm during the period.
a. True
b. False
Disney has had a positive Jensens alpha between 2008 and 2013. If you were an
investor in early 2014, looking at the stock, you would view this as a sign that the
stock will be a:
a. Good investment for the future
b. Bad investment for the future
c. No information about the future
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128
Estimating Disneys Beta
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129
The Dirty Secret of Standard Error
1600
1400
1200
1000
Number of Firms
800
600
400
200
0
<.10 .10 - .20 .20 - .30 .30 - .40 .40 -.50 .50 - .75 > .75
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130
Breaking down Disneys Risk
R Squared = 73%
This implies that
73% of the risk at Disney comes from market sources
27%, therefore, comes from firm-specific sources
The firm-specific risk is diversifiable and will not be
rewarded.
The R-squared for companies, globally, has increased
significantly since 2008. Why might this be happening?
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131
The Relevance of R Squared
132
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133
Estimating Expected Returns for Disney in
November 2013
Inputs to the expected return calculation
Disneys Beta = 1.25
Riskfree Rate = 2.75% (U.S. ten-year T.Bond rate in
November 2013)
Risk Premium = 5.76% (Based on Disneys operating
exposure)
Expected Return = Riskfree Rate + Beta (Risk Premium)
= 2.75% + 1.25 (5.76%) = 9.95%
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134
Use to a Potential Investor in Disney
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135
How managers use this expected return
Managers at Disney
need to make at least 9.95% as a return for their equity
investors to break even.
this is the hurdle rate for projects, when the investment is
analyzed from an equity standpoint
In other words, Disneys cost of equity is 9.95%.
What is the cost of not delivering this cost of equity?
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136
Application Test: Analyzing the Risk Regression
137
Using your Bloomberg risk and return print out, answer the
following questions:
How well or badly did your stock do, relative to the market, during the
period of the regression?
Intercept - (Riskfree Rate/n) (1- Beta) = Jensens Alpha
n where n is the number of return periods in a year (12 if monthly; 52
if weekly)
What proportion of the risk in your stock is attributable to the market?
What proportion is firm-specific?
What is the historical estimate of beta for your stock? What is the
range on this estimate with 67% probability? With 95% probability?
Based upon this beta, what is your estimate of the required return on
this stock?
Riskless Rate + Beta * Risk Premium
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137
A Quick Test
138
You are advising a very risky software firm on the right cost of
equity to use in project analysis. You estimate a beta of 3.0
for the firm and come up with a cost of equity of 20%. The
CFO of the firm is concerned about the high cost of equity
and wants to know whether there is anything he can do to
lower his beta.
How do you bring your beta down?
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138
Regression Diagnostics for Tata Motors
Beta = 1.83
67% range
1.67-1.99
Jensens a
= 2.28% - 4%/12 (1-1.83) = 2.56% Expected Return (in Rupees)
Annualized = (1+.0256)12-1= 35.42% = Riskfree Rate+ Beta*Risk premium
Average monthly riskfree rate (2008-13) = 4% = 6.57%+ 1.83 (7.19%) = 19.73%
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139
A better beta? Vale
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140
Deutsche Bank and Baidu: Index Effects on
Risk Parameters
For Deutsche Bank, a widely held European stock,
we tried both the DAX (German index) and the FTSE
European index.
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141
Beta: Exploring Fundamentals
142
Beta
between 1 Microsoft: 1.25
and 2
GE: 1.15
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142
Determinant 1: Product Type
143
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143
A Simple Test
144
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144
Determinant 2: Operating Leverage Effects
145
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145
Measures of Operating Leverage
146
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146
Disneys Operating Leverage: 1987- 2013
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148
Effects of leverage on betas: Disney
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149
Disney : Beta and Financial Leverage
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150
Betas are weighted Averages
151
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151
The Disney/Cap Cities Merger (1996): Pre-
Merger
152
+
Capital Cities: The Target
Debt = $ 615 million
Equity Beta Market value of equity = $18, 500 million
0.95 Debt + Equity = Firm value = $18,500 +
$615 = $19,115 million
D/E Ratio = 615/18500 = 0.03
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Disney Cap Cities Beta Estimation: Step 1
153
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153
Disney Cap Cities Beta Estimation: Step 2
154
If Disney had used all equity to buy Cap Cities equity, while assuming Cap
Cities debt, the consolidated numbers would have looked as follows:
Debt = $ 3,186+ $615 = $ 3,801 million
Equity = $ 31,100 + $18,500 = $ 49,600 m (Disney issues $18.5 billion in equity)
D/E Ratio = 3,801/49600 = 7.66%
New Beta = 1.026 (1 + 0.64 (.0766)) = 1.08
Since Disney borrowed $ 10 billion to buy Cap Cities/ABC, funded the rest
with new equity and assumed Cap Cities debt:
The market value of Cap Cities equity is $18.5 billion. If $ 10 billion comes from
debt, the balance ($8.5 billion) has to come from new equity.
Debt = $ 3,186 + $615 million + $ 10,000 = $ 13,801 million
Equity = $ 31,100 + $8,500 = $39,600 million
D/E Ratio = 13,801/39600 = 34.82%
New Beta = 1.026 (1 + 0.64 (.3482)) = 1.25
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154
Firm Betas versus divisional Betas
155
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155
Bottom-up versus Top-down Beta
156
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156
Disneys businesses: The financial
breakdown (from 2013 annual report)
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157
Unlevered Betas for businesses Unlevered Beta
(1 - Cash/ Firm Value)
Median
Company Cash/ Business
Sample Median Median Median Unlevered Firm Unlevered
Business Comparable firms size Beta D/E Tax rate Beta Value Beta
US firms in
broadcasting
Media Networks business 26 1.43 71.09% 40.00% 1.0024 2.80% 1.0313
Global firms in
amusement park
Parks & Resorts business 20 0.87 46.76% 35.67% 0.6677 4.95% 0.7024
Studio
Entertainment US movie firms 10 1.24 27.06% 40.00% 1.0668 2.96% 1.0993
Global firms in
Consumer toys/games
Products production & retail 44 0.74 29.53% 25.00% 0.6034 10.64% 0.6752
Global computer
Interactive gaming firms 33 1.03 3.26% 34.55% 1.0085 17.25% 1.2187
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158
A closer look at the process
Studio Entertainment Betas
Enterprise Value (EV) = Market Cap + Debt - Cash
Firm value = Market Cap + Total Debt Gross D/E = Total Debt/ Market
Cap
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159
Backing into a pure play beta: Studio
Entertainment
160
Disney has $3.93 billion in cash, invested in close to riskless assets (with a beta of zero).
You can compute an unlevered beta for Disney as a company (inclusive of cash):
Aswath Damodaran
161
The levered beta: Disney and its divisions
To estimate the debt ratios for division, we allocate Disneys total debt
($15,961 million) to its divisions based on identifiable assets.
We use the allocated debt to compute D/E ratios and levered betas.
Business Unlevered beta Value of business D/E ratio Levered beta Cost of Equity
Media Networks 1.0313 $66,580 10.03% 1.0975 9.07%
Parks & Resorts 0.7024 $45,683 11.41% 0.7537 7.09%
Studio Entertainment 1.0993 $18,234 20.71% 1.2448 9.92%
Consumer Products 0.6752 $2,952 117.11% 1.1805 9.55%
Interactive 1.2187 $1,684 41.07% 1.5385 11.61%
Disney Operations 0.9239 $135,132 13.10% 1.0012 8.52%
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Discussion Issue
163
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163
Estimating Bottom Up Betas & Costs of
Equity: Vale
Sample' Unlevered'beta' Peer'Group' Value'of' Proportion'of'
Business' Sample' size' of'business' Revenues' EV/Sales' Business' Vale'
Global'firms'in'metals'&'
Metals'&' mining,'Market'cap>$1'
Mining' billion' 48' 0.86' $9,013' 1.97' $17,739' 16.65%'
Global'specialty'
Fertilizers' chemical'firms' 693' 0.99' $3,777' 1.52' $5,741' 5.39%'
Global'transportation'
Logistics' firms' 223' 0.75' $1,644' 1.14' $1,874' 1.76%'
Vale'
Operations' '' '' 0.8440' $47,151' '' $106,543' 100.00%'
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164
Vale: Cost of Equity Calculation in
nominal $R
To convert a discount rate in one currency to another, all you need are
expected inflation rates in the two currencies.
(1+ Inflation Rate Brazil )
(1+ $ Cost of Equity) 1
(1+ Inflation Rate US )
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165
Bottom up betas & Costs of Equity: Tata
Motors & Baidu
Tata Motors: We estimated an unlevered beta of 0.8601
across 76 publicly traded automotive companies (globally)
and estimated a levered beta based on Tata Motors D/E ratio
of 41.41% and a marginal tax rate of 32.45% for India:
Levered Beta for Tata Motors = 0.8601 (1 + (1-.3245) (.4141)) = 1.1007
Cost of equity for Tata Motors (Rs) = 6.57% + 1.1007 (7.19%) = 14.49%
Baidu: To estimate its beta, we looked at 42 global companies
that derive all or most of their revenues from online
advertising and estimated an unlevered beta of 1.30 for the
business. Incorporating Baidus current market debt to equity
ratio of 5.23% and the marginal tax rate for China of 25%, we
estimate Baidus current levered beta to be 1.3560.
Levered Beta for Baidu = 1.30 (1 + (1-.25) (.0523)) = 1.356
Cost of Equity for Baidu (Renmimbi) = 3.50% + 1.356 (6.94%) = 12.91%
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166
Bottom up Betas and Costs of Equity:
Deutsche Bank
We break Deutsche Bank down into two businesses commercial and
investment banking.
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167
Estimating Betas for Non-Traded Assets
168
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Using comparable firms to estimate beta
for Bookscape
Unlevered beta for book company = 0.8130/ (1+ (1-.4) (.2141)) = 0.7205
Aswath Damodaran Unlevered beta for book business = 0.7205/(1-.05) = 0.7584 169
Estimating Bookscape Levered Beta and
Cost of Equity
Because the debt/equity ratios used in computing
levered betas are market debt equity ratios, and the only
debt equity ratio we can compute for Bookscape is a
book value debt equity ratio, we have assumed that
Bookscape is close to the book industry median market
debt to equity ratio of 21.41 percent.
Using a marginal tax rate of 40 percent for Bookscape,
we get a levered beta of 0.8558.
Levered beta for Bookscape = 0.7584[1 + (1 0.40) (0.2141)] = 0.8558
Using a riskfree rate of 2.75% (US treasury bond rate)
and an equity risk premium of 5.5%:
Cost of Equity = 2.75%+ 0.8558 (5.5%) = 7.46%
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170
Is Beta an Adequate Measure of Risk for a
Private Firm?
Beta measures the risk added on to a diversified
portfolio. The owners of most private firms are not
diversified. Therefore, using beta to arrive at a cost
of equity for a private firm will
a. Under estimate the cost of equity for the private firm
b. Over estimate the cost of equity for the private firm
c. Could under or over estimate the cost of equity for the
private firm
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Total Risk versus Market Risk
Adjust the beta to reflect total risk rather than market risk.
This adjustment is a relatively simple one, since the R squared
of the regression measures the proportion of the risk that is
market risk.
Total Beta = Market Beta / Correlation of the sector with the market
In the Bookscape example, where the market beta is 0.8558
and the median R-squared of the comparable publicly traded
firms is 26.00%; the correlation with the market is 50.99%.
Market Beta 0.8558
= = 1.6783
R squared .5099
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172
Application Test: Estimating a Bottom-up Beta
173
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173
From Cost of Equity to Cost of Capital
174
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174
What is debt?
175
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Estimating the Cost of Debt
176
If the firm has bonds outstanding, and the bonds are traded,
the yield to maturity on a long-term, straight (no special
features) bond can be used as the interest rate.
If the firm is rated, use the rating and a typical default spread
on bonds with that rating to estimate the cost of debt.
If the firm is not rated,
and it has recently borrowed long term from a bank, use the interest
rate on the borrowing or
estimate a synthetic rating for the company, and use the synthetic
rating to arrive at a default spread and a cost of debt
The cost of debt has to be estimated in the same currency as
the cost of equity and the cash flows in the valuation.
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176
The easy route: Outsourcing the
measurement of default risk
For those firms that have bond ratings from global
ratings agencies, I used those ratings:
Company S&P Rating Risk-Free Rate Default Spread Cost of Debt
Disney A 2.75% (US $) 1.00% 3.75%
Deutsche Bank A 1.75% (Euros) 1.00% 2.75%
Vale A- 2.75% (US $) 1.30% 4.05%
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177
A more general route: Estimating Synthetic
Ratings
The rating for a firm can be estimated using the
financial characteristics of the firm. In its simplest
form, we can use just the interest coverage ratio:
Interest Coverage Ratio = EBIT / Interest Expenses
For the non-financial service companies, we obtain
the following:
Company Operating income Interest Expense Interest coverage ratio
Disney $10.023 $444 22.57
Vale $15,667 $1,342 11.67
Tata Motors Rs 166,605 Rs 36,972 4.51
Baidu CY 11,193 CY 472 23.72
Bookscape $2,536 $492 5.16
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Interest Coverage Ratios, Ratings and
Default Spreads- November 2013
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Estimating Cost of Debt
For Bookscape, we will use the synthetic rating (A-) to estimate the cost of
debt:
Default Spread based upon A- rating = 1.30%
Pre-tax cost of debt = Riskfree Rate + Default Spread = 2.75% + 1.30% = 4.05%
After-tax cost of debt = Pre-tax cost of debt (1- tax rate) = 4.05% (1-.40) = 2.43%
For the three publicly traded firms that are rated in our sample, we will
use the actual bond ratings to estimate the costs of debt.
Company S&P Rating Risk-Free Rate Default Spread Cost of Debt Tax Rate After-Tax Cost of Debt
Disney A 2.75% (US $) 1.00% 3.75% 36.1% 2.40%
Deutsche Bank A 1.75% (Euros) 1.00% 2.75% 29.48% 1.94%
Vale A- 2.75% (US $) 1.30% 4.05% 34% 2.67%
For Tata Motors, we have a rating of AA- from CRISIL, an Indian bond-
rating firm, that measures only company risk. Using that rating:
Cost of debtTMT = Risk free rateRupees + Default spreadIndia + Default spreadTMT
= 6.57% + 2.25% + 0.70% = 9.62%
After-tax cost of debt = 9.62% (1-.3245) = 6.50%
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Default Spreads January 2017
20.00%
15.00%
Axis Title
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
Aaa/AA Baa2/BB
Aa2/AA A1/A+ A2/A A3/A- Ba1/BB+ Ba2/BB B1/B+ B2/B B3/B- Caa/CCC Ca2/CC C2/C D2/D
A B
Spread: 2017 0.60% 0.80% 1.00% 1.10% 1.25% 1.60% 2.50% 3.00% 3.75% 4.50% 5.50% 6.50% 8.00% 10.50% 14.00%
Spread: 2016 0.75% 1.00% 1.10% 1.25% 1.75% 2.25% 3.25% 4.25% 5.50% 6.50% 7.50% 9.00% 12.00% 16.00% 20.00%
Spread: 2015 0.40% 0.70% 0.90% 1.00% 1.20% 1.75% 2.75% 3.25% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00%
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Application Test: Estimating a Cost of Debt
183
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Costs of Hybrids
184
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Weights for Cost of Capital Calculation
185
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Disney: From book value to market value
for interest bearing debt
In Disneys 2013 financial statements, the debt due over time was footnoted.
Weight
Time due Amount due Weight
*Maturity
0.5 $1,452 11.96% 0.06 The debt in this table does
2 $1,300 10.71% 0.21
not add up to the book value
3 $1,500 12.36% 0.37
of debt, because Disney
4 $2,650 21.83% 0.87
6 $500 4.12% 0.25
does not break down the
8 $1,362 11.22% 0.9 maturity of all of its debt.
9 $1,400 11.53% 1.04
19 $500 4.12% 0.78
26 $25 0.21% 0.05
28 $950 7.83% 2.19
29 $500 4.12% 1.19
$12,139 7.92
Disneys total debt due, in book value terms, on the balance sheet is $14,288
million and the total interest expense for the year was $349 million. Using 3.75%
as the pre-tax cost of debt: " 1 %
$ (1 (1.0375) '
Estimated MV of Disney Debt = 349 $ '+
7.92
14, 288
= $13, 028 million
7.92
$ .0375 ' (1.0375)
$# '&
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186
Operating Leases at Disney
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Application Test: Estimating Market Value
188
Estimate the
Market value of equity at your firm and Book Value of
equity
Market value of debt and book value of debt (If you cannot
find the average maturity of your debt, use 3 years):
Remember to capitalize the value of operating leases and
add them on to both the book value and the market value
of debt.
Estimate the
Weights for equity and debt based upon market value
Weights for equity and debt based upon book value
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188
Current Cost of Capital: Disney
Equity
Cost of Equity = Riskfree rate + Beta * Risk Premium
= 2.75% + 1.0013 (5.76%) = 8.52%
Market Value of Equity = $121,878 million
Equity/(Debt+Equity ) = 88.42%
Debt
After-tax Cost of debt =(Riskfree rate + Default Spread) (1-t)
= (2.75%+1%) (1-.361) = 2.40%
Market Value of Debt = $13,028+ $2933 = $ 15,961 million
Debt/(Debt +Equity) = 11.58%
Cost of Capital = 8.52%(.8842)+ 2.40%(.1158) = 7.81%
Aswath Damodaran
121,878/ (121,878+15,961)
189
Divisional Costs of Capital: Disney and Vale
Disney
Cost!of! Cost!of! Marginal!tax! After6tax!cost!of! Debt! Cost!of!
!! equity! debt! rate! debt! ratio! capital!
Media!Networks! 9.07%! 3.75%! 36.10%! 2.40%! 9.12%! 8.46%!
Parks!&!Resorts! 7.09%! 3.75%! 36.10%! 2.40%! 10.24%! 6.61%!
Studio!
Entertainment! 9.92%! 3.75%! 36.10%! 2.40%! 17.16%! 8.63%!
Consumer!Products! 9.55%! 3.75%! 36.10%! 2.40%! 53.94%! 5.69%!
Interactive! 11.65%! 3.75%! 36.10%! 2.40%! 29.11%! 8.96%!
Disney!Operations! 8.52%! 3.75%! 36.10%! 2.40%! 11.58%! 7.81%!
Vale
Cost of After-tax cost of Debt Cost of capital (in Cost of capital (in
Business equity debt ratio US$) $R)
Metals &
Mining 11.35% 2.67% 35.48% 8.27% 15.70%
Iron Ore 11.13% 2.67% 35.48% 8.13% 15.55%
Fertilizers 12.70% 2.67% 35.48% 9.14% 16.63%
Logistics 10.29% 2.67% 35.48% 7.59% 14.97%
Vale Operations 11.23% 2.67% 35.48% 8.20% 15.62%
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Costs of Capital: Tata Motors, Baidu and
Bookscape
To estimate the costs of capital for Tata Motors in Indian
rupees:
Cost of capital= 14.49% (1-.2928) + 6.50% (.2928) = 12.15%
For Baidu, we follow the same path to estimate a cost of
equity in Chinese RMB:
Cost of capital = 12.91% (1-.0523) + 3.45% (.0523) = 12.42%
For Bookscape, the cost of capital is different depending on
whether you look at market or total beta:
Cost of After-tax cost of
equity Pre-tax Cost of debt debt D/(D+E) Cost of capital
Market Beta 7.46% 4.05% 2.43% 17.63% 6.57%
Total Beta 11.98% 4.05% 2.43% 17.63% 10.30%
Aswath Damodaran
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Application Test: Estimating Cost of Capital
192
Based upon the costs of equity and debt that you have
estimated, and the weights for each, estimate the cost of
capital for your firm.
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Back to First Principles
194
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Measures of return: earnings versus cash flows
197
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Measuring Returns Right: The Basic Principles
198
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Setting the table: What is an
investment/project?
199
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Here are four examples
200
Rio Disney: We will consider whether Disney should invest in its first
theme parks in South America. These parks, while similar to those that
Disney has in other parts of the world, will require us to consider the
effects of country risk and currency issues in project analysis.
New iron ore mine for Vale: This is an iron ore mine that Vale is
considering in Western Labrador, Canada.
An Online Store for Bookscape: Bookscape is evaluating whether it should
create an online store to sell books. While it is an extension of their basis
business, it will require different investments (and potentially expose
them to different types of risk).
Acquisition of Harman by Tata Motors: A cross-border bid by Tata for
Harman International, a publicly traded US firm that manufactures high-
end audio equipment, with the intent of upgrading the audio upgrades on
Tata Motors automobiles. This investment will allow us to examine
currency and risk issues in such a transaction.
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200
Earnings versus Cash Flows: A Disney Theme
Park
201
Disney has already spent $0.5 Billion researching the proposal and
getting the necessary licenses for the park; none of this investment
can be recovered if the park is not built. This expenditure has been
capitalized and will be depreciated straight line over ten years to a
salvage value of zero.
Disney will face substantial construction costs, if it chooses to build
the theme parks.
The cost of constructing Magic Kingdom will be $3 billion, with $ 2 billion
to be spent right now, and $1 Billion to be spent one year from now.
The cost of constructing Epcot II will be $ 1.5 billion, with $ 1 billion to be
spent at the end of the second year and $0.5 billion at the end of the third
year.
These investments will be depreciated based upon a depreciation
schedule in the tax code, where depreciation will be different each year.
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Key Revenue Assumptions
203
Revenue estimates for the parks and resort properties (in millions)
Year Magic Kingdom Epcot II Resort Properties Total
1 $0 $0 $0 $0
2 $1,000 $0 $250 $1,250
3 $1,400 $0 $350 $1.750
4 $1,700 $300 $500 $2.500
5 $2,000 $500 $625 $3.125
6 $2,200 $550 $688 $3,438
7 $2,420 $605 $756 $3,781
8 $2,662 $666 $832 $4,159
9 $2,928 $732 $915 $4,575
10 $2,987 $747 $933 $4,667
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Key Expense Assumptions
204
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Other Assumptions
206
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Laying the groundwork:
Book Capital, Working Capital and Depreciation
207
12.5% of book
value at end of
prior year
($3,000)
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Step 1: Estimate Accounting Earnings on Project
208
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And the Accounting View of Return
209
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Should there be a risk premium for foreign
projects?
The exchange rate risk should be diversifiable risk (and hence
should not command a premium) if
the company has projects is a large number of countries (or)
the investors in the company are globally diversified.
For Disney, this risk should not affect the cost of capital used.
Consequently, we would not adjust the cost of capital for Disneys
investments in other mature markets (Germany, UK, France)
The same diversification argument can also be applied against
some political risk, which would mean that it too should not affect
the discount rate. However, there are aspects of political risk
especially in emerging markets that will be difficult to diversify and
may affect the cash flows, by reducing the expected life or cash
flows on the project.
For Disney, this is the risk that we are incorporating into the cost of
capital when it invests in Brazil (or any other emerging market)
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Estimating a hurdle rate for Rio Disney
We did estimate a cost of capital of 6.61% for the Disney theme park
business, using a bottom-up levered beta of 0.7537 for the business.
This cost of equity may not adequately reflect the additional risk
associated with the theme park being in an emerging market.
The only concern we would have with using this cost of equity for this
project is that it may not adequately reflect the additional risk associated
with the theme park being in an emerging market (Brazil). We first
computed the Brazil country risk premium (by multiplying the default
spread for Brazil by the relative equity market volatility) and then re-
estimated the cost of equity:
Country risk premium for Brazil = 5.5%+ 3% = 8.5%
Cost of Equity in US$= 2.75% + 0.7537 (8.5%) = 9.16%
Using this estimate of the cost of equity, Disneys theme park debt ratio
of 10.24% and its after-tax cost of debt of 2.40% (see chapter 4), we can
estimate the cost of capital for the project:
Cost of Capital in US$ = 9.16% (0.8976) + 2.40% (0.1024) = 8.46%
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Would lead us to conclude that...
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A Tangent: From New to Existing
Investments: ROC for the entire firm
Assets Liabilities
Existing Investments Fixed Claim on cash flows
Generate cashflows today Assets in Place Debt Little or No role in management
How good are the Includes long lived (fixed) and Fixed Maturity
short-lived(working Tax Deductible
existing investments capital) assets
of the firm?
Expected Value that will be Growth Assets Equity Residual Claim on cash flows
created by future investments Significant Role in management
Perpetual Lives
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The return on capital is an accounting number,
though, and that should scare you.
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Return Spreads Globally.
217
217
6 Application Test: Assessing Investment
Quality
For the most recent period for which you have data,
compute the after-tax return on capital earned by your
firm, where after-tax return on capital is computed to be
After-tax ROC = EBIT (1-tax rate)/ (BV of debt + BV of
Equity-Cash)previous year
For the most recent period for which you have data,
compute the return spread earned by your firm:
Return Spread = After-tax ROC - Cost of Capital
For the most recent period, compute the EVA earned by
your firm
EVA = Return Spread * ((BV of debt + BV of Equity-
Cash)previous year
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218
The cash flow view of this project..
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
After-tax Operating Income -$32 -$96 -$54 $68 $202 $249 $299 $352 $410 $421
+ Depreciation & Amortization $0 $50 $425 $469 $444 $372 $367 $364 $364 $366 $368
- Capital Expenditures $2,500 $1,000 $1,188 $752 $276 $258 $285 $314 $330 $347 $350
- Change in non-cash Work Capital $0 $63 $25 $38 $31 $16 $17 $19 $21 $5
Cashflow to firm ($2,500) ($982) ($921) ($361) $198 $285 $314 $332 $367 $407 $434
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The Depreciation Tax Benefit
220
While depreciation reduces taxable income and taxes, it does not reduce
the cash flows.
The benefit of depreciation is therefore the tax benefit. In general, the tax
benefit from depreciation can be written as:
Tax Benefit = Depreciation * Tax Rate
Disney Theme Park: Depreciation tax savings (Tax rate = 36.1%)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Depreciation $50 $425 $469 $444 $372 $367 $364 $364 $366 $368
Tax Bendfits from Depreciation $18 $153 $169 $160 $134 $132 $132 $132 $132 $133
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Depreciation Methods
221
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The Capital Expenditures Effect
222
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The Working Capital Effect
224
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224
The incremental cash flows on the project
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A more direct way of getting to
incremental cash flows
226
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Revenues $0 $1,250 $1,750 $2,500 $3,125 $3,438 $3,781 $4,159 $4,575 $4,667
Direct Expenses $0 $788 $1,103 $1,575 $1,969 $2,166 $2,382 $2,620 $2,882 $2,940
Incremental Depreciation $0 $375 $419 $394 $322 $317 $314 $314 $316 $318
Incremental G&A $0 $63 $88 $125 $156 $172 $189 $208 $229 $233
Incremental Operating Income $0 $25 $141 $406 $678 $783 $896 $1,017 $1,148 $1,175
- Taxes $0 $9 $51 $147 $245 $283 $323 $367 $415 $424
Incremental after-tax Operating income $0 $16 $90 $260 $433 $500 $572 $650 $734 $751
+ Incremental Depreciation $0 $375 $419 $394 $322 $317 $314 $314 $316 $318
- Capital Expenditures $2,000 $1,000 $1,188 $752 $276 $258 $285 $314 $330 $347 $350
- Change in non-cash Working Capital $0 $63 $25 $38 $31 $16 $17 $19 $21 $5
Cashflow to firm ($2,000) ($1,000) ($859) ($267) $340 $466 $516 $555 $615 $681 $715
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Sunk Costs
227
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Test Marketing and R&D: The Quandary of Sunk
Costs
228
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Allocated Costs
229
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To Time-Weighted Cash Flows
231
2. Annuity ! 1 $
# 1 -
(1+r)n & " (1 + r) n - 1 %
A$
A# & # r
'
&
# r &
#" &%
!
3. Growing Annuity (1+g)n $
#1 - n &
(1+r)
A(1+g) # &
# r-g &
#" &%
4. Perpetuity A/r
5. Growing Perpetuity Expected Cashflow next year/(r-g)
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Discounted cash flow measures of return
233
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Closure on Cash Flows
In a project with a finite and short life, you would need to compute
a salvage value, which is the expected proceeds from selling all of
the investment in the project at the end of the project life. It is
usually set equal to book value of fixed assets and working capital
In a project with an infinite or very long life, we compute cash flows
for a reasonable period, and then compute a terminal value for this
project, which is the present value of all cash flows that occur after
the estimation period ends..
Assuming the project lasts forever, and that cash flows after year
10 grow 2% (the inflation rate) forever, the present value at the end
of year 10 of cash flows after that can be written as:
Terminal Value in year 10= CF in year 11/(Cost of Capital - Growth Rate)
=715 (1.02) /(.0846-.02) = $ 11,275 million
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234
Which yields a NPV of..
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The IRR of this project
$5,000.00
$4,000.00
$3,000.00
$2,000.00
Internal Rate of Return=12.60%
NPV
$1,000.00
$0.00
8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20% 21% 22% 23% 24% 25% 26% 27% 28% 29% 30%
-$1,000.00
-$2,000.00
-$3,000.00
Discount Rate
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The IRR suggests..
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Does the currency matter?
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The Consistency Rule for Cash Flows
240
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240
Disney Theme Park: Project Analysis in $R
241
Based on our expected cash flows and the estimated cost of capital, the
proposed theme park looks like a very good investment for Disney. Which
of the following may affect your assessment of value?
Revenues may be over estimated (crowds may be smaller and spend less)
Actual costs may be higher than estimated costs
Tax rates may go up
Interest rates may rise
Risk premiums and default spreads may increase
All of the above
How would you respond to this uncertainty?
Will wait for the uncertainty to be resolved
Will not take the investment
Ask someone else (consultant, boss, colleague) to make the decision
Ignore it.
Other
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243
One simplistic solution: See how quickly
you can get your money back
If your biggest fear is losing the billions that you invested in the project,
one simple measure that you can compute is the number of years it will
take you to get your money back.
Year Cash Flow Cumulated CF PV of Cash Flow Cumulated DCF
0 -$2,000 -$2,000 -$2,000 -$2,000
1 -$1,000 -$3,000 -$922 -$2,922
2 -$859 -$3,859 -$730 -$3,652
3 -$267 -$4,126 -$210 -$3,862
4 $340 -$3,786 $246 -$3,616
5 $466 -$3,320 $311 -$3,305
6 $516 -$2,803 $317 -$2,988
7 $555 -$2,248 $314 -$2,674
8 $615 -$1,633 $321 -$2,353
9 $681 -$952 $328 -$2,025
Payback = 10.3 years
10 $715 -$237 $317 -$1,708
11 $729 $491 $298 -$1,409
12 $743 $1,235 $280 -$1,129
13 $758 $1,993 $264 -$865
14 $773 $2,766 $248 -$617 Discounted Payback
15 $789 $3,555 $233 -$384 = 16.8 years
16 $805 $4,360 $219 -$165
Aswath Damodaran 17 $821 $5,181 $206 $41 244
A slightly more sophisticated approach:
Sensitivity Analysis & What-if Questions
The NPV, IRR and accounting returns for an investment will change
as we change the values that we use for different variables.
One way of analyzing uncertainty is to check to see how sensitive
the decision measure (NPV, IRR..) is to changes in key assumptions.
While this has become easier and easier to do over time, there are
caveats that we would offer.
Caveat 1: When analyzing the effects of changing a variable, we
often hold all else constant. In the real world, variables move
together.
Caveat 2: The objective in sensitivity analysis is that we make
better decisions, not churn out more tables and numbers.
Corollary 1: Less is more. Not everything is worth varying
Corollary 2: A picture is worth a thousand numbers (and tables).
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And here is a really good picture
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The final step up: Incorporate probabilistic
estimates.. Rather than expected values..
Actual Revenues as % of Forecasted Revenues (Base case = 100%)
!
Operating Expenses at Parks as % of
Revenues (Base Case = 60%)
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247
The resulting simulation
Average = $3.40 billion
Median = $3.28 billion
!
NPV ranges from -$1 billion to +$8.5 billion. NPV is negative 12% of the
time.
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You are the decision maker
249
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Equity Analysis: The Parallels
250
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A Vale Iron Ore Mine in Canada Investment
Operating Assumptions
251
1. The mine will require an initial investment of $1.25 billion and is expected to have a production
capacity of 8 million tons of iron ore, once established. The initial investment of $1.25 billion will
be depreciated over ten years, using double declining balance depreciation, down to a salvage
value of $250 million at the end of ten years.
2. The mine will start production midway through the next year, producing 4 million tons of iron
ore for year 1, with production increasing to 6 million tons in year 2 and leveling off at 8 million
tons thereafter (until year 10). The price, in US dollars per ton of iron ore is currently $100 and is
expected to keep pace with inflation for the life of the plant.
3. The variable cost of production, including labor, material and operating expenses, is expected to
be $45/ton of iron ore produced and there is a fixed cost of $125 million in year 1. Both costs,
which will grow at the inflation rate of 2% thereafter. The costs will be in Canadian dollars, but
the expected values are converted into US dollars, assuming that the current parity between the
currencies (1 Canadian $ = 1 US dollar) will continue, since interest and inflation rates are similar
in the two currencies.
4. The working capital requirements are estimated to be 20% of total revenues, and the
investments have to be made at the beginning of each year. At the end of the tenth year, it is
anticipated that the entire working capital will be salvaged.
5. Vales corporate tax rate of 34% will apply to this project as well.
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Financing Assumptions
252
Vale plans to borrow $0.5 billion at its current cost of debt of 4.05% (based
upon its rating of A-), using a ten-year term loan (where the loan will be paid
off in equal annual increments). The breakdown of the payments each year
into interest and principal are provided below:
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The Hurdle Rate
253
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Net Income: Vale Iron Ore Mine
254
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Production (millions of tons) 4.00 6.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
* Price per ton 102 104.04 106.12 108.24 110.41 112.62 114.87 117.17 119.51 121.9
= Revenues (millions US$) $408.00 $624.24 $848.97 $865.95 $883.26 $900.93 $918.95 $937.33 $956.07 $975.20
- Variable Costs $180.00 $275.40 $374.54 $382.03 $389.68 $397.47 $405.42 $413.53 $421.80 $430.23
- Fixed Costs $125.00 $127.50 $130.05 $132.65 $135.30 $138.01 $140.77 $143.59 $146.46 $149.39
- Depreciation $200.00 $160.00 $128.00 $102.40 $81.92 $65.54 $65.54 $65.54 $65.54 $65.54
EBIT -$97.00 $61.34 $216.37 $248.86 $276.37 $299.91 $307.22 $314.68 $322.28 $330.04
- Interest Expenses $20.25 $18.57 $16.82 $14.99 $13.10 $11.13 $9.07 $6.94 $4.72 $2.41
Taxable Income -$117.25 $42.77 $199.56 $233.87 $263.27 $288.79 $298.15 $307.74 $317.57 $327.63
- Taxes ($39.87) $14.54 $67.85 $79.51 $89.51 $98.19 $101.37 $104.63 $107.97 $111.40
= Net Income (millions US$) -$77.39 $28.23 $131.71 $154.35 $173.76 $190.60 $196.78 $203.11 $209.59 $216.24
Book Value and Depreciation
Beg. Book Value $1,250.00 $1,050.00 $890.00 $762.00 $659.60 $577.68 $512.14 $446.61 $381.07 $315.54
- Depreciation $200.00 $160.00 $128.00 $102.40 $81.92 $65.54 $65.54 $65.54 $65.54 $65.54
+ Capital Exp. $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
End Book Value $1,050.00 $890.00 $762.00 $659.60 $577.68 $512.14 $446.61 $381.07 $315.54 $250.00
- Debt Outstanding $458.45 $415.22 $370.24 $323.43 $274.73 $224.06 $171.34 $116.48 $59.39 $0.00
End Book Value of Equity $591.55 $474.78 $391.76 $336.17 $302.95 $288.08 $275.27 $264.60 $256.14 $250.00
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A ROE Analysis
255
BV of
Beg. BV: Capital Ending BV: Average
Year Net Income Depreciation Working Debt BV: Equity ROE
Assets Expense Assets BV: Equity
Capital
0 $0.00 $0.00 $1,250.00 $1,250.00 $81.60 $500.00 $831.60
1 ($77.39) $1,250.00 $200.00 $0.00 $1,050.00 $124.85 $458.45 $716.40 $774.00 -10.00%
2 $28.23 $1,050.00 $160.00 $0.00 $890.00 $169.79 $415.22 $644.57 $680.49 4.15%
3 $131.71 $890.00 $128.00 $0.00 $762.00 $173.19 $370.24 $564.95 $604.76 21.78%
4 $154.35 $762.00 $102.40 $0.00 $659.60 $176.65 $323.43 $512.82 $538.89 28.64%
5 $173.76 $659.60 $81.92 $0.00 $577.68 $180.19 $274.73 $483.13 $497.98 34.89%
6 $190.60 $577.68 $65.54 $0.00 $512.14 $183.79 $224.06 $471.87 $477.50 39.92%
7 $196.78 $512.14 $65.54 $0.00 $446.61 $187.47 $171.34 $462.74 $467.31 42.11%
8 $203.11 $446.61 $65.54 $0.00 $381.07 $191.21 $116.48 $455.81 $459.27 44.22%
9 $209.59 $381.07 $65.54 $0.00 $315.54 $195.04 $59.39 $451.18 $453.50 46.22%
10 $216.24 $315.54 $65.54 $0.00 $250.00 $0.00 $0.00 $250.00 $350.59 61.68%
Average ROE over the ten-year period = 31.36%
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255
From Project ROE to Firm ROE
256
As with the earlier analysis, where we used return on capital and cost of
capital to measure the overall quality of projects at firms, we can
compute return on equity and cost of equity to pass judgment on
whether firms are creating value to its equity investors.
Specifically, we can compute the return on equity (net income as a
percentage of book equity) and compare to the cost of equity. The return
spread is then:
Equity Return Spread = Return on Equity Cost of equity
This measure is particularly useful for financial service firms, where
capital, return on capital and cost of capital are difficult measures to nail
down.
For non-financial service firms, it provides a secondary (albeit a more
volatile measure of performance). While it usually provides the same
general result that the excess return computed from return on capital,
there can be cases where the two measures diverge.
Aswath Damodaran
256
An Incremental CF Analysis
257
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Net Income ($77.39) $28.23 $131.71 $154.35 $173.76 $190.60 $196.78 $203.11 $209.59 $216.24
+ Depreciation & Amortization $200.00 $160.00 $128.00 $102.40 $81.92 $65.54 $65.54 $65.54 $65.54 $65.54
- Capital Expenditures $750.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
- Change in Working Capital $81.60 $43.25 $44.95 $3.40 $3.46 $3.53 $3.60 $3.68 $3.75 $3.82 ($195.04)
- Principal Repayments $41.55 $43.23 $44.98 $46.80 $48.70 $50.67 $52.72 $54.86 $57.08 $59.39
+ Salvage Value of mine $250.00
Cashflow to Equity ($831.60) $37.82 $100.05 $211.33 $206.48 $203.44 $201.86 $205.91 $210.04 $214.22 $667.42
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An Equity NPV
Discounted at US$ cost of
equity of 11.13% for Vales
iron ore business
258
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258
An Equity IRR
259
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259
Real versus Nominal Analysis
260
No
Explain
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260
Dealing with Macro Uncertainty: The Effect of
Iron Ore Price
261
Like the Disney Theme Park, the Vale Iron Ore Mines actual value will be
buffeted as the variables change. The biggest source of variability is an
external factor the price of iron ore.
Vale Paper Plant: Effect of Changing Iron Ore Prices
$1,500 40.00%
30.00%
$1,000
20.00%
$500
10.00%
NPV
N
$0 0.00%
$50 $60 $70 $80 $90 $100 $110 $120 $130
-10.00%
-$500
-20.00%
-$1,000
-30.00%
$600
20.00%
$500
15.00%
$300
NPV
10.00% IRR
$200
$100
5.00%
$0
-$100 0.00%
Canadian $ versus US $
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Should you hedge?
263
The value of this mine is very much a function iron ore prices. There are futures,
forward and option markets iron ore that Vale can use to hedge against price
movements. Should it?
Yes
No
Explain.
The value of the mine is also a function of exchange rates. There are forward,
futures and options markets on currency. Should Vale hedge against exchange rate
risk?
Yes
No
Explain.
On the last question, would your answer have been different if the mine were in
Brazil.
Yes
No
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263
Value Trade Off
What is the cost to the firm of hedging this risk? Cash flow benefits
- Tax benefits
- Better project choices
Negligible High
Hedge this risk. The Indifferent to Can marginal investors Do not hedge this risk.
benefits to the firm will hedging risk hedge this risk cheaper The benefits are small
exceed the costs than the firm can? relative to costs
Pricing Trade
Earnings Multiple Earnings
- Effect on multiple X - Level
Yes No
- Volatility
Will the benefits persist if investors hedge Hedge this risk. The
the risk instead of the firm? benefits to the firm will
exceed the costs
Yes No
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265
Tata Motors and Harman International
266
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266
Estimating the Cost of Capital for the
Acquisition (no synergy)
267
4. Debt ratio & cost of debt: Tata Motors plans to assume the existing debt of Harman
International and to preserve Harmans existing debt ratio. Harman currently has a debt
(including lease commitments) to capital ratio of 7.39% (translating into a debt to equity
ratio of 7.98%) and faces a pre-tax cost of debt of 4.75% (based on its BBB- rating).
Levered Beta = 1.17 (1+ (1-.40) (.0798)) = 1.226
Cost of Equity= 2.75% + 1.226 (6.13%) = 10.26%
Cost of Capital = 10.26% (1-.0739) + 4.75% (1-.40) (.0739) = 9.67%
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267
Estimating Cashflows- First Steps
268
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269
Value of Harman International: Before Synergy
270
Earlier, we estimated the cost of capital of 9.67% as the right discount rate to apply in
valuing Harman International and the cash flow to the firm of $166.85 million for 2014 (next
year), assuming a 2.75% growth rate in revenues, operating income, depreciation, capital
expenditures and total non-cash working capital. We also assumed that these cash flows
would continue to grow 2.75% a year in perpetuity.
Adding the cash balance of the firm ($515 million) and subtracting out the existing debt
($313 million, including the debt value of leases) yields the value of equity in the firm:
Value of Equity = Value of Operating Assets + Cash Debt
= $2,476 + $ 515 - $313 million = $2,678 million
The market value of equity in Harman in November 2013 was $5,428 million.
To the extent that Tata Motors pays the market price, it will have to generate benefits from
synergy that exceed $2750 million.
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Case 1: IRR versus NPV
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Projects NPV Profile
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What do we do now?
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Case 2: NPV versus IRR
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Project A
Investment $ 1,000,000
NPV = $467,937
IRR= 33.66%
Project B
Investment $ 10,000,000
NPV = $1,358,664
IRR=20.88%
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Which one would you pick?
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Assume that you can pick only one of these two projects.
Your choice will clearly vary depending upon whether
you look at NPV or IRR. You have enough money
currently on hand to take either. Which one would you
pick?
a. Project A. It gives me the bigger bang for the buck and more
margin for error.
b. Project B. It creates more dollar value in my business.
If you pick A, what would your biggest concern be?
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Capital Rationing, Uncertainty and Choosing a
Rule
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The sources of capital rationing
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An Alternative to IRR with Capital Rationing
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Case 3: NPV versus IRR
283
Project A
Investment $ 10,000,000
NPV = $1,191,712
IRR=21.41%
Project B
Investment $ 10,000,000
NPV = $1,358,664
IRR=20.88%
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Why the difference?
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NPV, IRR and the Reinvestment Rate
Assumption
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Solution to Reinvestment Rate Problem
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Why NPV and IRR may differ.. Even if projects
have the same lives
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Comparing projects with different lives..
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Project A
-$1000
NPV of Project A = $ 442
IRR of Project A = 28.7%
Project B
$350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350
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Why NPVs cannot be compared.. When projects
have different lives.
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Solution 1: Project Replication
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Project A: Replicated
$400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400
Project B
$350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350
-$1500
NPV of Project B= $ 478
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Solution 2: Equivalent Annuities
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What would you choose as your investment
tool?
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What firms actually use ..
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II. Side Costs and Benefits
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A. Opportunity Cost
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Case 1: Foregone Sale?
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Case 2: Incremental Cost?
An Online Retailing Venture for Bookscape
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Cost of capital for investment
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Incremental Cash flows on Investment
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0 1 2 3 4
Revenues $1,500,000 $1,800,000 $1,980,000 $2,178,000
Operating Expenses
Labor $150,000 $165,000 $181,500 $199,650
Materials $900,000 $1,080,000 $1,188,000 $1,306,800
Depreciation $250,000 $250,000 $250,000 $250,000
Office Costs
After-Tax Additional Storage Expenditure per Year = $1,000 (1 0.40) = $600
PV of expenditures = $600 (PV of annuity, 18.12%,4 yrs) = $1,610
NPV with Opportunity Costs = $76,375 $34,352 $1,610= $ 40,413
Opportunity costs aggregated into cash flows
Year Cashflows Opportunity costs Cashflow with opportunity costs Present Value
0 ($1,150,000) ($1,150,000) ($1,150,000)
1 $340,000 $12,600 $327,400 $277,170
2 $415,000 $13,200 $401,800 $287,968
3 $446,500 $13,830 $432,670 $262,517
4 $720,730 $14,492 $706,238 $362,759
Adjusted NPV $40,413
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Case 3: Excess Capacity
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In the Vale example, assume that the firm will use its
existing distribution system to service the
production out of the new iron ore mine. The mine
manager argues that there is no cost associated with
using this system, since it has been paid for already
and cannot be sold or leased to a competitor (and
thus has no competing current use). Do you agree?
a. Yes
b. No
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A Framework for Assessing The Cost of Using
Excess Capacity
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Product and Project Cannibalization: A Real
Cost?
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B. Project Synergies
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A project may provide benefits for other projects within the firm.
Consider, for instance, a typical Disney animated movie. Assume
that it costs $ 50 million to produce and promote. This movie, in
addition to theatrical revenues, also produces revenues from
the sale of merchandise (stuffed toys, plastic figures, clothes ..)
increased attendance at the theme parks
stage shows (see Beauty and the Beast and the Lion King)
television series based upon the movie
In investment analysis, however, these synergies are either left
unquantified and used to justify overriding the results of
investment analysis, i.e,, used as justification for investing in
negative NPV projects.
If synergies exist and they often do, these benefits have to be
valued and shown in the initial project analysis.
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Case 1: Adding a Caf to a bookstore: Bookscape
306
Assume that you are considering adding a caf to the bookstore. Assume
also that based upon the expected revenues and expenses, the caf
standing alone is expected to have a net present value of -$87,571.
The cafe will increase revenues at the book store by $500,000 in year 1,
growing at 10% a year for the following 4 years. In addition, assume that
the pre-tax operating margin on these sales is 10%.
1 2 3 4 5
Increased Revenues $500,000 $550,000 $605,000 $665,500 $732,050
Operating Margin 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Operating Income $50,000 $55,000 $60,500 $66,550 $73,205
Operating Income after Taxes $30,000 $33,000 $36,300 $39,930 $43,923
PV of Additional Cash Flows $27,199 $27,126 $27,053 $26,981 $26,908
PV of Synergy Benefits $135,268
The net present value of the added benefits is $135,268. Added to the
NPV of the standalone Caf of -$87,571 yields a net present value of
$47,697.
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Case 2: Synergy in a merger..
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Estimating the cost of capital to use in valuing
synergy..
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Estimating the value of synergy and what Tata can
pay for Harman
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III. Project Options
310
Initial Investment in
Project NPV is positive in this section
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Insights for Investment Analyses
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The Option to Expand/Take Other Projects
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Taking a project today may allow a firm to consider and take other
valuable projects in the future. Thus, even though a project may have a
negative NPV, it may be a project worth taking if the option it provides the
firm (to take other projects in the future) has a more-than-compensating
value.
PV of Cash Flows
from Expansion
Additional Investment
to Expand
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The Option to Abandon
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A firm may sometimes have the option to abandon a project, if the cash
flows do not measure up to expectations.
If abandoning the project allows the firm to save itself from further
losses, this option can make a project more valuable.
PV of Cash Flows
from Project
Cost of Abandonment
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IV. Assessing Existing or Past investments
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Analyzing an Existing Investment
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In a post-mortem, you look at the actual cash You can also reassess your expected cash
flows, relative to forecasts. flows, based upon what you have learned,
and decide whether you should expand,
continue or divest (abandon) an investment
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a. Post Mortem Analysis
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The actual cash flows from an investment can be greater than or less than
originally forecast for a number of reasons but all these reasons can be
categorized into two groups:
Chance: The nature of risk is that actual outcomes can be different from
expectations. Even when forecasts are based upon the best of information, they
will invariably be wrong in hindsight because of unexpected shifts in both macro
(inflation, interest rates, economic growth) and micro (competitors, company)
variables.
Bias: If the original forecasts were biased, the actual numbers will be different from
expectations. The evidence on capital budgeting is that managers tend to be over-
optimistic about cash flows and the bias is worse with over-confident managers.
While it is impossible to tell on an individual project whether chance or
bias is to blame, there is a way to tell across projects and across time. If
chance is the culprit, there should be symmetry in the errors actuals
should be about as likely to beat forecasts as they are to come under
forecasts. If bias is the reason, the errors will tend to be in one direction.
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b. What should we do next?
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t =n
NFn ........ Liquidate the project
t =0 (1 + r)
n
<0
t =n
NFn
n
< Salvage Value ........ Terminate the project
t =0 (1 + r)
t =n
NFn ........ Divest the project
t =0 (1 + r)
n
< Divestiture Value
t =n
NFn
n
> 0 > Divestiture Value ........ Continue the project
t =0 (1 + r)
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DCA: Evaluating the alternatives
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First Principles
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