Hindu Predictive Astrology of B V Raman
Hindu Predictive Astrology of B V Raman
Hindu Predictive Astrology of B V Raman
Aswath Damodaran
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The two faces of discounted cash flow valuation
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where the asset has an n-year life, E(CFt) is the expected cash flow in period t
and r is a discount rate that reflects the risk of the cash flows.
Alternatively, we can replace the expected cash flows with the
guaranteed cash flows we would have accepted as an alternative
(certainty equivalents) and discount these at the riskfree rate:
where CE(CFt) is the certainty equivalent of E(CFt) and rf is the riskfree rate.
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Risk Adjusted Value: Two Basic Propositions
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The value of an asset is the risk-adjusted present value of the cash flows:
1. The “IT” proposition: If IT does not affect the expected cash flows or the riskiness
of the cash flows, IT cannot affect value.
2. The “DUH” proposition: For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have
to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
3. The “DON’T FREAK OUT” proposition: Assets that generate cash flows early in
their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter
may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.
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DCF Choices: Equity Valuation versus Firm
Valuation
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Assets Liabilities
Existing Investments Fixed Claim on cash flows
Generate cashflows today Assets in Place Debt Little or No role in management
Includes long lived (fixed) and Fixed Maturity
short-lived(working Tax Deductible
capital) assets
Expected Value that will be Growth Assets Equity Residual Claim on cash flows
created by future investments Significant Role in management
Perpetual Lives
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Equity Valuation
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Firm Valuation
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Present value is value of the entire firm, and reflects the value of
all claims on the firm.
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Firm Value and Equity Value
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Cash Flows and Discount Rates
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Equity versus Firm Valuation
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First Principle of Valuation
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The Effects of Mismatching Cash Flows and
Discount Rates
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Generic DCF Valuation Model
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Same ingredients, different approaches…
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Moving on up: The “potential dividends” or FCFE
model
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To valuing the entire business: The FCFF model
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DISCOUNT RATES
The D in the DCF..
Estimating Inputs: Discount Rates
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Risk in the DCF Model
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Not all risk is created equal…
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Risk and Cost of Equity: The role of the marginal
investor
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Not all risk counts: While the notion that the cost of equity should
be higher for riskier investments and lower for safer investments is
intuitive, what risk should be built into the cost of equity is the
question.
Risk through whose eyes? While risk is usually defined in terms of
the variance of actual returns around an expected return, risk and
return models in finance assume that the risk that should be
rewarded (and thus built into the discount rate) in valuation should
be the risk perceived by the marginal investor in the investment
The diversification effect: Most risk and return models in finance
also assume that the marginal investor is well diversified, and that
the only risk that he or she perceives in an investment is risk that
cannot be diversified away (i.e, market or non-diversifiable risk). In
effect, it is primarily economic, macro, continuous risk that should
be incorporated into the cost of equity.
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The Cost of Equity: Competing “ Market Risk” Models
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Classic Risk & Return: Cost of Equity
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The Risk Free Rate: Laying the Foundations
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Test 1: A riskfree rate in US dollars!
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Test 2: A Riskfree Rate in Euros
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9.00%
8.00%
7.00%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
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Test 3: A Riskfree Rate in Indian Rupees
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Sovereign Default Spread: Three paths to
the same destination…
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Local Currency Government Bond Rates – January
2017
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Currency Govt Bond Rate 12/31/16 Currency Govt Bond Rate 12/31/16
Australian $ 2.76% Malyasian Ringgit 4.24%
Brazilian Reai 11.37% Mexican Peso 7.63%
British Pound 1.35% Nigerian Naira 15.97%
Bulgarian Lev 2.04% Norwegian Krone 1.61%
Canadian $ 1.70% NZ $ 3.25%
Chilean Peso 4.12% Pakistani Rupee 8.03%
Chinese Yuan 3.25% Peruvian Sol 6.43%
Colombian Peso 6.76% Phillipine Peso 4.75%
Croatian Kuna 3.13% Polish Zloty 3.67%
Czech Koruna 0.49% Romanian Leu 3.44%
Danish Krone 0.42% Russian Ruble 8.38%
Euro 0.29% Singapore $ 2.45%
HK $ 1.69% South African Rand 8.80%
Hungarian Forint 3.41% Swedish Krona 0.62%
Iceland Krona 5.06% Swiss Franc -0.19%
Indian Rupee 6.40% Taiwanese $ 1.17%
Indonesian Rupiah 7.60% Thai Baht 2.70%
Israeli Shekel 2.06% Turkish Lira 11.00%
Japanese Yen 0.06% US $ 2.45%
Kenyan Shilling 14.02% Venezuelan Bolivar 20.43%
Korean Won 2.08% Vietnamese Dong 6.10%
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Approach 1: Default spread from Government
Bonds
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Approach 2: CDS Spreads – January 2017
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Approach 3: Typical Default Spreads: January
2017
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Test 4: A Real Riskfree Rate
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No default free entity: Choices with riskfree rates….
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Risk free Rate: Don’t have or trust the
government bond rate?
1. Build up approach: The risk free rate in any currency can be
written as the sum of two variables:
Risk free rate = Expected Inflation in currency + Expected real interest rate
The expected real interest rate can be computed in one of two ways: from
the US TIPs rate or set equal to real growth in the economy. Thus, if the
expected inflation rate in a country is expected to be 15% and the TIPs rate
is 1%, the risk free rate is 16%.
2. US $ rate & Differential Inflation: Alternatively, you can scale up
the US $ risk free rate by the differential inflation between the US
$ and the currency in question:
Risk free rateCurrency=
Thus, if the US $ risk free rate is 2.00%, the inflation rate in the foreign
currency is 15% and the inflation rate in US $ is 1.5%, the foreign currency risk
free rate is as follows:
Risk free rate =
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One more test on riskfree rates…
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-5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
0.00%
5.00%
1954
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1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Inflation rate
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
2007
2008
2009
Some perspective on risk free rates
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
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Negative Interest Rates?
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The ubiquitous historical risk premium
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Default spread for country: In this approach, the country equity risk
premium is set equal to the default spread for the country,
estimated in one of three ways:
The default spread on a dollar denominated bond issued by the country.
(In January 2017, that spread was 3.64% for the Brazilian $ bond)
The sovereign CDS spread for the country. In January 2017, the ten year
CDS spread for Brazil, adjusted for the US CDS, was 3.21%.
The default spread based on the local currency rating for the country.
Brazil’s sovereign local currency rating is Ba2 and the default spread for a
Ba2 rated sovereign was about 3.47% in January 2017.
Add the default spread to a “mature” market premium: This default
spread is added on to the mature market premium to arrive at the
total equity risk premium for Brazil, assuming a mature market
premium of 5.69%.
Country Risk Premium for Brazil = 3.47%
Total ERP for Brazil = 5.69% + 3.47% = 9.16%
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An equity volatility based approach to
estimating the country total ERP
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A melded approach to estimating the additional
country risk premium
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A Template for Estimating the ERP
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ERP : Jan 2017
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Approaches 1 & 2: Estimating country risk
premium exposure
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Extending to a multinational: Regional breakdown
Coca Cola’s revenue breakdown and ERP in 2012
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A Production-based ERP: Royal Dutch Shell
in 2015
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Approach 3: Estimate a lambda for country risk
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A Revenue-based Lambda
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A Price/Return based Lambda
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80
20
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Return on Embratel
Return on Embraer
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0
20
0
-20
-20
-40 -40
-60
-60 -80
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20
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Estimating a US Dollar Cost of Equity for
Embraer - September 2004
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Assume that the beta for Embraer is 1.07, and that the US $ riskfree rate
used is 4%. Also assume that the risk premium for the US is 5% and the
country risk premium for Brazil is 7.89%. Finally, assume that Embraer
gets 3% of its revenues in Brazil & the rest in the US.
There are five estimates of $ cost of equity for Embraer:
Approach 1: Constant exposure to CRP, Location CRP
E(Return) = 4% + 1.07 (5%) + 7.89% = 17.24%
Approach 2: Constant exposure to CRP, Operation CRP
E(Return) = 4% + 1.07 (5%) + (0.03*7.89% +0.97*0%)= 9.59%
Approach 3: Beta exposure to CRP, Location CRP
E(Return) = 4% + 1.07 (5% + 7.89%)= 17.79%
Approach 4: Beta exposure to CRP, Operation CRP
E(Return) = 4% + 1.07 (5% +( 0.03*7.89%+0.97*0%)) = 9.60%
Approach 5: Lambda exposure to CRP
E(Return) = 4% + 1.07 (5%) + 0.27(7.89%) = 11.48%
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Valuing Emerging Market Companies with
significant exposure in developed markets
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Implied Equity Premiums
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Implied Equity Premiums: January 2008
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We can use the information in stock prices to back out how risk averse the market is and how much of a risk
premium it is demanding.
After year 5, we will assume that
Between 2001 and 2007 Analysts expect earnings to grow 5% a year for the next 5 years. We earnings on the index will grow at
dividends and stock will assume that dividends & buybacks will keep pace.. 4.02%, the same rate as the entire
buybacks averaged 4.02% Last year’s cashflow (59.03) growing at 5% a year economy (= riskfree rate).
of the index each year.
61.98 65.08 68.33 71.75 75.34
January 1, 2008
S&P 500 is at 1468.36
4.02% of 1468.36 = 59.03
If you pay the current level of the index, you can expect to make a return of 8.39% on stocks (which is obtained by
solving for r in the following equation)
61.98 65.08 68.33 71.75 75.34 75.35(1.0402)
1468.36 = + + + + +
(1+ r) (1+ r) 2 (1+ r) 3 (1+ r) 4 (1+ r) 5 (r - .0402)(1+ r) 5
Implied Equity risk premium = Expected return on stocks - Treasury bond rate = 8.39% - 4.02% = 4.37%
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A year that made a difference.. The implied
premium in January 2009
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Year Market value of index Dividends Buybacks Cash to equity Dividend yield Buyback yield Total yield
2001 1148.09 15.74 14.34 30.08 1.37% 1.25% 2.62%
2002 879.82 15.96 13.87 29.83 1.81% 1.58% 3.39%
2003 1111.91 17.88 13.70 31.58 1.61% 1.23% 2.84%
2004 1211.92 19.01 21.59 40.60 1.57% 1.78% 3.35%
2005 1248.29 22.34 38.82 61.17 1.79% 3.11% 4.90%
2006 1418.30 25.04 48.12 73.16 1.77% 3.39% 5.16%
2007 1468.36 28.14 67.22 95.36 1.92% 4.58% 6.49%
2008 903.25 28.47 40.25 68.72 3.15% 4.61% 7.77%
Normalized 903.25 28.47 24.11 52.584 3.15% 2.67% 5.82%
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The Anatomy of a Crisis: Implied ERP from
September 12, 2008 to January 1, 2009
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An Updated Equity Risk Premium: January
2017
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A Buyback Adjusted Version of the US ERP
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Implied Premium versus Risk Free Rate
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Why implied premiums matter?
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Which equity risk premium should you use?
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If you assume this Premium to use
Premiums revert back to historical norms Historical risk premium
and your time period yields these norms
Market is correct in the aggregate or that Current implied equity risk premium
your valuation should be market neutral
Marker makes mistakes even in the Average implied equity risk premium over
aggregate but is correct over time time.
Predictor Correlation with implied Correlation with actual Correlation with actual return
premium next year return- next 5 years – next 10 years
Current implied premium 0.750 0.475 0.541
Average implied premium: Last 5 0.703 0.541 0.747
years
Historical Premium -0.476 -0.442 -0.469
Default Spread based premium 0.035 0.234 0.225
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An ERP for the Sensex
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Changing Country Risk: Brazil CRP & Total
ERP from 2000 to 2015
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The evolution of Emerging Market Risk
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80 Discount Rates: III
Relative Risk Measures
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The CAPM Beta: The Most Used (and
Misused) Risk Measure
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Unreliable, when it looks bad..
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Or when it looks good..
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One slice of history..
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And subject to game playing
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Measuring Relative Risk: You don’t like betas or
modern portfolio theory? No problem.
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Don’t like the diversified investor focus,
but okay with price-based measures
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Don’t like the price-based approach..
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Determinants of Betas & Relative Risk
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In a perfect world… we would estimate the beta of a
firm by doing the following
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Adjusting for operating leverage…
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Bottom-up Betas
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Why bottom-up betas?
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Estimating Bottom Up Betas & Costs of
Equity: Vale
Sample Unlevered beta Peer Group Value of Proportion of
Business Sample size of business Revenues EV/Sales Business Vale
Iron Ore Global firms in iron ore 78 0.83 $32,717 2.48 $81,188 76.20%
Global specialty
Fertilizers chemical firms 693 0.99 $3,777 1.52 $5,741 5.39%
Global transportation
Logistics firms 223 0.75 $1,644 1.14 $1,874 1.76%
Vale
Operations 0.8440 $47,151 $106,543 100.00%
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Embraer’s Bottom-up Beta
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Gross Debt versus Net Debt Approaches
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Analysts in Europe and Latin America often take the difference between
debt and cash (net debt) when computing debt ratios and arrive at very
different values.
For Embraer, using the gross debt ratio
Gross D/E Ratio for Embraer = 1953/11,042 = 18.95%
Levered Beta using Gross Debt ratio = 1.07
Using the net debt ratio, we get
Net Debt Ratio for Embraer = (Debt - Cash)/ Market value of Equity
= (1953-2320)/ 11,042 = -3.32%
Levered Beta using Net Debt Ratio = 0.95 (1 + (1-.34) (-.0332)) = 0.93
The cost of Equity using net debt levered beta for Embraer will be much
lower than with the gross debt approach. The cost of capital for Embraer
will even out since the debt ratio used in the cost of capital equation will
now be a net debt ratio rather than a gross debt ratio.
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The Cost of Equity: A Recap
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99 Discount Rates: IV
Mopping up
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Estimating the Cost of Debt
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Interest Coverage Ratios, Ratings and Default
Spreads: 2003 & 2004
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If Interest Coverage Ratio is Estimated Bond Rating Default Spread(2003) Default Spread(2004)
> 8.50 (>12.50) AAA 0.75% 0.35%
6.50 - 8.50 (9.5-12.5) AA 1.00% 0.50%
5.50 - 6.50 (7.5-9.5) A+ 1.50% 0.70%
4.25 - 5.50 (6-7.5) A 1.80% 0.85%
3.00 - 4.25 (4.5-6) A– 2.00% 1.00%
2.50 - 3.00 (4-4.5) BBB 2.25% 1.50%
2.25- 2.50 (3.5-4) BB+ 2.75% 2.00%
2.00 - 2.25 ((3-3.5) BB 3.50% 2.50%
1.75 - 2.00 (2.5-3) B+ 4.75% 3.25%
1.50 - 1.75 (2-2.5) B 6.50% 4.00%
1.25 - 1.50 (1.5-2) B– 8.00% 6.00%
0.80 - 1.25 (1.25-1.5) CCC 10.00% 8.00%
0.65 - 0.80 (0.8-1.25) CC 11.50% 10.00%
0.20 - 0.65 (0.5-0.8) C 12.70% 12.00%
< 0.20 (<0.5) D 15.00% 20.00%
The first number under interest coverage ratios is for larger market cap companies and the second in
brackets is for smaller market cap companies. For Embraer , I used the interest coverage ratio table for
smaller/riskier firms (the numbers in brackets) which yields a lower rating for the same interest coverage
ratio.
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Cost of Debt computations
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Companies in countries with low bond ratings and high default risk
might bear the burden of country default risk, especially if they are
smaller or have all of their revenues within the country.
Larger companies that derive a significant portion of their revenues
in global markets may be less exposed to country default risk. In
other words, they may be able to borrow at a rate lower than the
government.
The synthetic rating for Embraer is A-. Using the 2004 default
spread of 1.00%, we estimate a cost of debt of 9.29% (using a
riskfree rate of 4.29% and adding in two thirds of the country
default spread of 6.01%):
Cost of debt
= Riskfree rate + 2/3(Brazil country default spread) + Company default spread
=4.29% + 4.00%+ 1.00% = 9.29%
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Synthetic Ratings: Some Caveats
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Weights for the Cost of Capital Computation
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Estimating Cost of Capital: Embraer in 2004
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Equity
Cost of Equity = 4.29% + 1.07 (4%) + 0.27 (7.89%) = 10.70%
Market Value of Equity =11,042 million BR ($ 3,781 million)
Debt
Cost of debt = 4.29% + 4.00% +1.00%= 9.29%
Market Value of Debt = 2,083 million BR ($713 million)
Cost of Capital
Cost of Capital = 10.70 % (.84) + 9.29% (1- .34) (0.16)) = 9.97%
The book value of equity at Embraer is 3,350 million BR.
The book value of debt at Embraer is 1,953 million BR; Interest
expense is 222 mil BR; Average maturity of debt = 4 years
Estimated market value of debt = 222 million (PV of annuity, 4 years,
9.29%) + $1,953 million/1.09294 = 2,083 million BR
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If you had to do it….Converting a Dollar Cost of
Capital to a Nominal Real Cost of Capital
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Dealing with Hybrids and Preferred Stock
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Assume that the firm that you are analyzing has $125 million
in face value of convertible debt with a stated interest rate of
4%, a 10 year maturity and a market value of $140 million. If
the firm has a bond rating of A and the interest rate on A-
rated straight bond is 8%, you can break down the value of
the convertible bond into straight debt and equity portions.
Straight debt = (4% of $125 million) (PV of annuity, 10 years, 8%) + 125
million/1.0810 = $91.45 million
Equity portion = $140 million - $91.45 million = $48.55 million
The debt portion ($91.45 million) gets added to debt and the
option portion ($48.55 million) gets added to the market
capitalization to get to the debt and equity weights in the cost
of capital.
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Recapping the Cost of Capital
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Measuring Cash Flows
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Measuring Cash Flow to the Firm: Three
pathways to the same end game
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118 Cash Flows I
Accounting Earnings, Flawed but Important
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From Reported to Actual Earnings
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I. Update Earnings
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II. Correcting Accounting Earnings
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The Magnitude of Operating Leases
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Dealing with Operating Lease Expenses
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Operating Leases at The Gap in 2003
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The Gap has conventional debt of about $ 1.97 billion on its balance sheet and its
pre-tax cost of debt is about 6%. Its operating lease payments in the 2003 were
$978 million and its commitments for the future are below:
Year Commitment (millions) Present Value (at 6%)
1 $899.00 $848.11
2 $846.00 $752.94
3 $738.00 $619.64
4 $598.00 $473.67
5 $477.00 $356.44
6&7 $982.50 each year $1,346.04
Debt Value of leases = $4,396.85 (Also value of leased asset)
Debt outstanding at The Gap = $1,970 m + $4,397 m = $6,367 m
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The Collateral Effects of Treating Operating
Leases as Debt
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The Magnitude of R&D Expenses
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R&D Expenses: Operating or Capital Expenses
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Capitalizing R&D Expenses: SAP
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The Effect of Capitalizing R&D at SAP
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IV. Accounting Malfeasance….
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V. Dealing with Negative or Abnormally Low
Earnings
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133 Cash Flows II
Taxes and Reinvestment
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What tax rate?
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The tax rate that you should use in computing the after-
tax operating income should be
a. The effective tax rate in the financial statements (taxes
paid/Taxable income)
b. The tax rate based upon taxes paid and EBIT (taxes paid/EBIT)
c. The marginal tax rate for the country in which the company
operates
d. The weighted average marginal tax rate across the countries in
which the company operates
e. None of the above
f. Any of the above, as long as you compute your after-tax cost of
debt using the same tax rate
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The Right Tax Rate to Use
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A Tax Rate for a Money Losing Firm
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Net Capital Expenditures
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Cisco’s Acquisitions: 1999
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Cisco’s Net Capital Expenditures in 1999
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Working Capital: General Propositions
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Volatile Working Capital?
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144 Cash Flows III
From the firm to equity
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Dividends and Cash Flows to Equity
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Measuring Potential Dividends
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Estimating Cash Flows: FCFE
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Estimating FCFE when Leverage is Stable
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Net Income
- (1- DR) (Capital Expenditures - Depreciation)
- (1- DR) Working Capital Needs
= Free Cash flow to Equity
DR = Debt/Capital Ratio
For this firm,
Proceeds from new debt issues = Principal Repayments +
(Capital Expenditures - Depreciation + Working Capital Needs)
In computing FCFE, the book value debt to capital ratio
should be used when looking back in time but can be
replaced with the market value debt to capital ratio,
looking forward.
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Estimating FCFE: Disney
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FCFE and Leverage: Is this a free lunch?
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FCFE and Leverage: The Other Shoe Drops
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Leverage, FCFE and Value
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ESTIMATING GROWTH
Growth can be good, bad or neutral…
The Value of Growth
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Ways of Estimating Growth in Earnings
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156 Growth I
Historical Growth
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Historical Growth
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Motorola: Arithmetic versus Geometric Growth
Rates
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A Test
159
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Dealing with Negative Earnings
160
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The Effect of Size on Growth: Callaway Golf
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Extrapolation and its Dangers
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163 Growth II
Analyst Estimates
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Analyst Forecasts of Growth
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How good are analysts at forecasting growth?
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Are some analysts more equal than others?
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The Five Deadly Sins of an Analyst
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Propositions about Analyst Growth Rates
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169 Growth III
It’s all in the fundamentals
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Fundamental Growth Rates
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Growth Rate Derivations
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Estimating Fundamental Growth from new
investments: Three variations
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I. Expected Long Term Growth in EPS
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Regulatory Effects on Expected EPS growth
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One way to pump up ROE: Use more debt
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Decomposing ROE: Brahma in 1998
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II. Expected Growth in Net Income from non-
cash assets
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Estimating expected growth in net income from
non-cash assets: Coca Cola in 2010
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III. Expected Growth in EBIT And Fundamentals:
Stable ROC and Reinvestment Rate
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Cisco’s Fundamentals
Reinvestment Rate = 106.81%
Return on Capital =34.07%
Expected Growth in EBIT =(1.0681)(.3407) = 36.39%
Motorola’s Fundamentals
Reinvestment Rate = 52.99%
Return on Capital = 12.18%
Expected Growth in EBIT = (.5299)(.1218) = 6.45%
Cisco’s expected growth rate is clearly much higher than Motorola’s sustainable
growth rate. As a potential investor in Cisco, what would worry you the most
about this forecast?
a. That Cisco’s return on capital may be overstated (why?)
b. That Cisco’s reinvestment comes mostly from acquisitions (why?)
c. That Cisco is getting bigger as a firm (why?)
d. That Cisco is viewed as a star (why?)
e. All of the above
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The Magical Number: ROIC (or any
accounting return) and its limits
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IV. Operating Income Growth when Return on
Capital is Changing
184
Note that I am assuming that the new investments start making 17.22%
immediately, while allowing for existing assets to improve returns
gradually
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The Value of Growth
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187 Growth IV
Top Down Growth
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Estimating Growth when Operating Income is
Negative or Margins are changing
188
All of the fundamental growth equations assume that the firm has a
return on equity or return on capital it can sustain in the long term.
When operating income is negative or margins are expected to change
over time, we use a three step process to estimate growth:
Estimate growth rates in revenues over time
Determine the total market (given your business model) and estimate the
market share that you think your company will earn.
Decrease the growth rate as the firm becomes larger
Keep track of absolute revenues to make sure that the growth is feasible
Estimate expected operating margins each year
Set a target margin that the firm will move towards
Adjust the current margin towards the target margin
Estimate the capital that needs to be invested to generate revenue growth and
expected margins
Estimate a sales to capital ratio that you will use to generate reinvestment needs
each year.
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Tesla in July 2015: Growth and Profitability
189
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Tesla: Reinvestment and Profitability
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Expected Growth Rate
ROCt+1*Reinvestment Rate
ROC *
Reinvestment Rate + (ROCt+1-ROCt)/ROCt
1. Revenue Growth
2. Operating Margins
Earnings per share Net Income 3. Reinvestment Needs
CLOSURE IN VALUATION
The Big Enchilada
Getting Closure in Valuation
193
A publicly traded firm potentially has an infinite life. The value is therefore
the present value of cash flows forever.
t=¥ CF
Value = å t
t
t=1 (1+r)
Since we cannot estimate cash flows forever, we estimate cash flows for a
“growth period” and then estimate a terminal value, to capture the value
at the end of the period:
t=N CF
Value = å t + Terminal Value
t (1+r) N
t=1 (1+r)
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Ways of Estimating Terminal Value
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1. Obey the growth cap
195
When a firm’s cash flows grow at a “constant” rate forever, the present
value of those cash flows can be written as:
Value = Expected Cash Flow Next Period / (r - g)
where,
r = Discount rate (Cost of Equity or Cost of Capital)
g = Expected growth rate
The stable growth rate cannot exceed the growth rate of the economy but
it can be set lower.
• If you assume that the economy is composed of high growth and stable growth firms,
the growth rate of the latter will probably be lower than the growth rate of the
economy.
• The stable growth rate can be negative. The terminal value will be lower and you are
assuming that your firm will disappear over time.
• If you use nominal cashflows and discount rates, the growth rate should be nominal in
the currency in which the valuation is denominated.
One simple proxy for the nominal growth rate of the economy is the
riskfree rate.
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Risk free Rates and Nominal GDP Growth
Risk free Rate = Expected Inflation + Nominal GDP Growth = Expected Inflation
Expected Real Interest Rate + Expected Real Growth
The real interest rate is what borrowers The real growth rate in the economy
agree to return to lenders in real measures the expected growth in the
goods/services. production of goods and services.
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2. Don’t wait too long…
198
Assume that you are valuing a young, high growth firm with
great potential, just after its initial public offering. How long
would you set your high growth period?
a. < 5 years
b. 5 years
c. 10 years
d. >10 years
While analysts routinely assume very long high growth
periods (with substantial excess returns during the periods),
the evidence suggests that they are much too optimistic.
Most growth firms have difficulty sustaining their growth for
long periods, especially while earning excess returns.
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And tie to competitive advantages
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3. Don’t forget that growth has to be earned..
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The Big Assumption
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Excess Returns to Zero?
202
There are some (McKinsey, for instance) who argue that the return on
capital should always be equal to cost of capital in stable growth.
But excess returns seem to persist for very long time periods.
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And don’t fall for sleight of hand…
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4. Be internally consistent
204
Risk and costs of equity and capital: Stable growth firms tend
to
Have betas closer to one
Have debt ratios closer to industry averages (or mature company
averages)
Country risk premiums (especially in emerging markets should evolve
over time)
The excess returns at stable growth firms should approach (or
become) zero. ROC -> Cost of capital and ROE -> Cost of
equity
The reinvestment needs and dividend payout ratios should
reflect the lower growth and excess returns:
Stable period payout ratio = 1 - g/ ROE
Stable period reinvestment rate = g/ ROC
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Which cash flow should I discount?
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Given cash flows to equity, should I discount
dividends or FCFE?
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What discount rate should I use?
209
If your firm is
large and growing at a rate close to or less than growth rate of the economy, or
constrained by regulation from growing at rate faster than the economy
has the characteristics of a stable firm (average risk & reinvestment rates)
Use a Stable Growth Model
If your firm
is large & growing at a moderate rate (≤ Overall growth rate + 10%) or
has a single product & barriers to entry with a finite life (e.g. patents)
Use a 2-Stage Growth Model
If your firm
is small and growing at a very high rate (> Overall growth rate + 10%) or
has significant barriers to entry into the business
has firm characteristics that are very different from the norm
Use a 3-Stage or n-stage Model
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The Building Blocks of Valuation
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1. The Value of Cash
214
The simplest and most direct way of dealing with cash and
marketable securities is to keep it out of the valuation - the
cash flows should be before interest income from cash and
securities, and the discount rate should not be contaminated
by the inclusion of cash. (Use betas of the operating assets
alone to estimate the cost of equity).
Once the operating assets have been valued, you should add
back the value of cash and marketable securities.
In many equity valuations, the interest income from cash is
included in the cashflows. The discount rate has to be
adjusted then for the presence of cash. (The beta used will be
weighted down by the cash holdings). Unless cash remains a
fixed percentage of overall value over time, these valuations
will tend to break down.
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An Exercise in Cash Valuation
215
Trades in US US Argentina
In which of these companies is cash most likely to be
a) A Neutral Asset (worth $100 million)
b) A Wasting Asset (worth less than $100 million)
c) A Potential Value Creator (worth >$100 million)
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Should you ever discount cash for its low
returns?
216
There are some analysts who argue that companies with a lot of
cash on their balance sheets should be penalized by having the
excess cash discounted to reflect the fact that it earns a low return.
Excess cash is usually defined as holding cash that is greater than what the
firm needs for operations.
A low return is defined as a return lower than what the firm earns on its
non-cash investments.
This is the wrong reason for discounting cash. If the cash is invested
in riskless securities, it should earn a low rate of return. As long as
the return is high enough, given the riskless nature of the
investment, cash does not destroy value.
There is a right reason, though, that may apply to some
companies… Managers can do stupid things with cash (overpriced
acquisitions, pie-in-the-sky projects….) and you have to discount for
this possibility.
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Cash: Discount or Premium?
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A Detour: Closed End Mutual Funds
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2. Dealing with Holdings in Other firms
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An Exercise in Valuing Cross Holdings
221
Now assume that you are told that Company A owns 10% of
Company B and that the holdings are accounted for as passive
holdings. If the market cap of company B is $ 500 million, how
much is the equity in Company A worth?
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If you really want to value cross holdings right….
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Valuing Yahoo as the sum of its intrinsic
pieces
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If you have to settle for an approximation, try this…
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Yahoo: A pricing game?
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3. Other Assets that have not been counted
yet..
227
Assets that you should not be counting (or adding on to DCF values)
If an asset is contributing to your cashflows, you cannot count the market value of
the asset in your value. Thus, you should not be counting the real estate on which
your offices stand, the PP&E representing your factories and other productive
assets, any values attached to brand names or customer lists and definitely no non-
assets (such as goodwill).
Assets that you can count (or add on to your DCF valuation)
Overfunded pension plans: If you have a defined benefit plan and your assets
exceed your expected liabilities, you could consider the over funding with two
caveats:
Collective bargaining agreements may prevent you from laying claim to these
excess assets.
There are tax consequences. Often, withdrawals from pension plans get taxed at
much higher rates.
Unutilized assets: If you have assets or property that are not being utilized to
generate cash flows (vacant land, for example), you have not valued them yet. You
can assess a market value for these assets and add them on to the value of the
firm.
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An Uncounted Asset?
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4. A Discount for Complexity:
An Experiment
229
Company A Company B
Operating Income $ 1 billion $ 1 billion
Tax rate 40% 40%
ROIC 10% 10%
Expected Growth 5% 5%
Cost of capital 8% 8%
Business Mix Single Multiple
Holdings Simple Complex
Accounting Transparent Opaque
Which firm would you value more highly?
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Measuring Complexity: Volume of Data in
Financial Statements
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Measuring Complexity: A Complexity Score
231
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Dealing with Complexity
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5. Be circumspect about defining debt for cost of
capital purposes…
233
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Book Value or Market Value
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But you should consider other potential
liabilities when getting to equity value
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6. Equity to Employees: Effect on Value
236
The Easier Problem: Restricted Stock Grants
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The Bigger Challenge: Employee Options
238
XYZ company has $ 100 million in free cashflows to the firm, growing 3% a
year in perpetuity and a cost of capital of 8%. It has 100 million shares
outstanding and $ 1 billion in debt. Its value can be written as follows:
Value of firm = 100 / (.08-.03) = 2000
Debt = 1000
= Equity = 1000
Value per share = 1000/100 = $10
XYZ decides to give 10 million options at the money (with a strike price of
$10) to its CEO. What effect will this have on the value of equity per
share?
a. None. The options are not in-the-money.
b. Decrease by 10%, since the number of shares could increase by 10 million
c. Decrease by less than 10%. The options will bring in cash into the firm but they
have time value.
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I. The Diluted Share Count Approach
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The treasury stock approach adds the proceeds from the exercise of
options to the value of the equity before dividing by the diluted number
of shares outstanding.
In the example cited, this would imply the following:
Value of firm = 100 / (.08-.03) = 2000
Debt = 1000
= Equity = 1000
Number of diluted shares = 110
Proceeds from option exercise = 10 * 10 = 100
Value per share = (1000+ 100)/110 = $ 10
The treasury stock approach fails to consider the time premium on the
options. The treasury stock approach also has problems with out-of-the-
money options. If considered, they can increase the value of equity per
share. If ignored, they are treated as non-existent.
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III. Option Value Drag
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Valuing Equity Options issued by firms… The Dilution
Problem
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Value of Equity to Value of Equity per share
245
Using the value per call of $5.42, we can now estimate the
value of equity per share after the option grant:
Value of firm = 100 / (.08-.03) = 2000
Debt = 1000
= Equity = 1000
Value of options granted = $ 54.2
= Value of Equity in stock = $945.8
/ Number of shares outstanding / 100
= Value per share = $ 9.46
Note that this approach yields a higher value than the
diluted share count approach (which ignores exercise
proceeds) and a lower value than the treasury stock
approach (which ignores the time premium on the options)
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To tax adjust or not to tax adjust…
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Option grants in the future…
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NARRATIVE AND NUMBERS:
VALUATION AS A BRIDGE
Tell me a story..
Valuation as a bridge
Illusions/Delusions
Illusions/Delusions
1. Creativity cannot be quantifie d
1. Precision: Data is precise
2. If the story is good, the
2. Objectivity: Data has no bias
investment will be.
3. Control: Data can control reality
3. Experience is the best teacher
250
Step 1: Survey the landscape
251
Step 2: Create a narrative for the future
253
The Uber Narrative
254
Step 3: Check the narrative against history,
economic first principles & common sense
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The Impossible, The Implausible and the
Improbable
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Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable
257
The Impossible: The Runaway Story
The Story The Checks (?)
+ +
+ Money
The Implausible: The Big Market Delusion
The Improbable: Willy Wonkitis
Step 4: Connect your narrative to key
drivers of value
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Step 4: Value the company (Uber)
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Step 5: Keep the feedback loop
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Valuing Bill Gurley’s Uber narrative
264
Different narratives, Different Numbers
265
Step 6: Be ready to modify narrative as
events unfold
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The equity risk premiums that I have used in the valuations that follow
reflect my thinking (and how it has evolved) on the issue.
Pre-1998 valuations: In the valuations prior to 1998, I use a risk premium of 5.5%
for mature markets (close to both the historical and the implied premiums then)
Between 1998 and Sept 2008: In the valuations between 1998 and September
2008, I used a risk premium of 4% for mature markets, reflecting my belief that risk
premiums in mature markets do not change much and revert back to historical
norms (at least for implied premiums).
Valuations done in 2009: After the 2008 crisis and the jump in equity risk premiums
to 6.43% in January 2008, I have used a higher equity risk premium (5-6%) for the
next 5 years and will assume a reversion back to historical norms (4%) only after
year 5.
After 2009: In 2010, I reverted back to a mature market premium of 4.5%,
reflecting the drop in equity risk premiums during 2009. In 2011, I used 5%,
reflecting again the change in implied premium over the year. In 2012 and 2013,
stayed with 6%, reverted to 5% in 2014 and will be using 5.75% in 2015.
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The Valuation Set up
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270 Training Wheels On?
Stocks that look like Bonds, Things Change and
Market Valuations
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A break even growth rate to get to market price…
272
$70.00
$60.00
$40.00
$30.00
$20.00
$10.00
$0.00
4.10% 3.10% 2.10% 1.10% 0.10% -0.90% -1.90% -2.90% -3.90%
Expected Growth rate
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From DCF value to target price and returns…
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277
278 Aswath Damodaran
279 The Dark Side of Valuation
Anyone can value a company that is stable,
makes money and has an established
business model!
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The fundamental determinants of value…
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The Dark Side of Valuation…
281
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Difficult to value companies…
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I. The challenge with young companies…
283
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Upping the ante.. Young companies in young
businesses…
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Lesson 1: Don’t sweat the small stuff
287
Lesson 3: Scaling up is hard to do & failure
is common
Lower revenue growth
rates, as revenues
scale up.
Keep track of dollar
revenues, as you go
through time,
measuring against
market size.
Lesson 4: Don’t forget to pay for growth…
289
Lesson 5: The dilution is taken care off..
290
Lesson 6: If you are worried about failure,
incorporate into value
291
Lesson 7: There are always scenarios
where the market price can be justified…
292
Lesson 8: You will be wrong 100% of the
tim and it really is not your fault…
No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and
how well structured your model is, your estimate of
value will change both as new information comes out
about the company, the business and the economy.
As information comes out, you will have to adjust and
adapt your model to reflect the information. Rather than
be defensive about the resulting changes in value,
recognize that this is the essence of risk.
A test: If your valuations are unbiased, you should find
yourself increasing estimated values as often as you are
decreasing values. In other words, there should be equal
doses of good and bad news affecting valuations (at least
over time).
293
And the market is often “more wrong”….
$90.00
$80.00
$70.00
$60.00
$50.00
$30.00
$20.00
$10.00
$0.00
2000 2001 2002 2003
Time of analysis
294
Assessing my 2000 forecasts, in 2014
295
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Amazon: My “Field of Dreams” Valuation – October 2014
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The perils of valuing mature companies…
300
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301 Aswath Damodaran
Lesson 1: Cost cutting and increased efficiency are easier
accomplished on paper than in practice… and require
commitment
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Lesson 2: Increasing growth is not always a value
creating option.. And it may destroy value at times..
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Lesson 3: Financial leverage is a double-edged
sword..
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III. Dealing with decline and distress…
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a. Dealing with Decline
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b. Dealing with the “downside” of Distress
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Adjusting the value of LVS for distress..
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IV. Emerging Market Companies
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Lesson 1: Country risk has to be incorporated… but
with a scalpel, not a bludgeon
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Lesson 3: The “corporate governance” drag
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Lesson 4: Watch out for cross holdings…
319
80.00% 36.62%
47.45%
47.06%
60.41%
47.62% 50.94%
20.00%
0.00%
Tata Chemicals Tata Steel Tata Motors TCS
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Lesson 5: Truncation risk can come in many forms…
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V. Valuing Financial Service Companies
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Lesson 1: Financial service companies are opaque…
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327 Aswath Damodaran
Lesson 2: For financial service companies, book value
matters…
328
The book value of assets and equity is mostly irrelevant when valuing
non-financial service companies. After all, the book value of equity is a
historical figure and can be nonsensical. (The book value of equity can be
negative and is so for more than a 1000 publicly traded US companies)
With financial service firms, book value of equity is relevant for two
reasons:
Since financial service firms mark to market, the book value is more likely to reflect
what the firms own right now (rather than a historical value)
The regulatory capital ratios are based on book equity. Thus, a bank with negative
or even low book equity will be shut down by the regulators.
From a valuation perspective, it therefore makes sense to pay heed to
book value. In fact, you can argue that reinvestment for a bank is the
amount that it needs to add to book equity to sustain its growth
ambitions and safety requirements:
FCFE = Net Income – Reinvestment in regulatory capital (book equity)
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FCFE for a bank…
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VI. Valuing Companies with “intangible” assets
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Lesson 1: Accounting rules are cluttered with
inconsistencies…
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Lesson 2: And fixing those inconsistencies can
alter your view of a company and affect its value
335
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VII. Valuing cyclical and commodity companies
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Lesson 1: With “macro” companies, it is easy to get
lost in “macro” assumptions…
337
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Lesson 2: Use probabilistic tools to assess value as a
function of macro variables…
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Test 1: Are you pricing or valuing?
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Test 2: Are you pricing or valuing?
345
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The drivers of value
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The determinants of price
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Three views of “the gap”
348
The “pricers” dilemma..
349
The valuer’s dilemma and ways of dealing with it…
350
Strategies for managing the risk in the “closing” of
the gap
The “karmic” approach: In this one, you buy (sell short) under
(over) valued companies and sit back and wait for the gap to
close. You are implicitly assuming that given time, the market
will see the error of its ways and fix that error.
The catalyst approach: For the gap to close, the price has to
converge on value. For that convergence to occur, there
usually has to be a catalyst.
If you are an activist investor, you may be the catalyst yourself. In fact,
your act of buying the stock may be a sufficient signal for the market to
reassess the price.
If you are not, you have to look for other catalysts. Here are some to
watch for: a new CEO or management team, a “blockbuster” new
product or an acquisition bid where the firm is targeted.
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An example: Apple – Price versus Value
(my estimates) from 2011 to 2015
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A closing thought…
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