ASSIGNMENT NO:2

Name: Bareerah bint-e- Imran

Course: Foreign Policy of Pakistan-I
Semester: Autumn, 2023
Code: 8666
Level: B.Ed
 (Units 5-9 )

Q.1 What is meant by pluralist perspective in foreign policy? Why

had Pakistan adopted the pluralist perspective in its foreign policy
during 1960s?

ANSWER:

Pluralist perspective:

Pluralism is the theory that a multitude of groups, not the people as a whole,
govern the United States. These organizations, which include among others
unions, trade and professional associations, environmentalists, civil rights
activists, business and financial lobbies, and formal and informal coalitions of
like-minded citizens, influence the making and administration of laws and
policy. Since the participants in this process constitute only a tiny fraction of the
populace, the public acts mainly as bystanders.

Indeed, some pluralists believe that direct democracy is not only unworkable; it
is not even necessarily desirable. Besides the logistical problems of having
every citizen meet at one time to decide policies, political issues require
continuous and expert attention, which the average citizen does not have.
Robert Dahl, a noted pluralist, suggested in one of his early writings that in
societies like ours "politics is a sideshow in the great circus of life." Most
people, he explained, concentrate their time and energies on activities involving
work, family, health, friendship, recreation, and the like. Other pluralists go
further. They worry that the common person lacks the virtues--reason,
intelligence, patience--for self-government and that direct democracy leads to
anarchy and the loss of freedom.

Nor do pluralists think that representative democracy works as well in practice

as in theory. Voting is important, to be sure. But Americans vote for
representatives, not for specific policy alternatives. A candidate's election
cannot always be interpreted as an endorsement of a particular course of action.
Politicians frequently win office with only a "plurality" of the votes--that is,
they receive more votes than their opponents--but not with a majority of the
total eligible electorate. President Reagan, for example, received approximately
51 percent of the ballots cast in 1980, but his total constituted only about a
quarter of the votes of all potential voters, since only 55 percent of those
eligible to participate actually went to the polls. Furthermore, a first choice
among candidates is not necessarily the same as a first choice among policies.
The people who elected President Clinton, for example, did not all agree with
his positions on health care, taxes, national defense, Bosnia, and the
environment. Many of them, in fact, were probably voting against his opponent,
George Bush, rather than for Clinton himself.
If Americans do not decide major controversies themselves or indirectly
through elections, how are such matters resolved? Pluralists are convinced that
public policy emerges from competition among groups. Since relatively few
people participate actively in this process, power, it might seem, would be
concentrated in few hands. Before drawing any dire conclusions about the
possible undemocratic nature of this form of government, however, it is
necessary to look at political power as pluralists see it.

The pluralist perspective in foreign policy refers to a diplomatic approach that

recognizes and engages with multiple actors, interests, and influences in the
international arena. Instead of relying solely on one dominant power or
ideology, a country following a pluralist perspective seeks to diversify its
diplomatic relations and alliances. This approach allows for flexibility,
adaptability, and the pursuit of a balanced foreign policy that takes into account
the interests of various stakeholders.

Pluralist perspective in its foreign policy during 1960s:

In the context of Pakistan during the 1960s, several factors contributed to the
adoption of a pluralist perspective in its foreign policy:

1. Global Power Dynamics:

During the Cold War era, the world was polarized between the United States
and the Soviet Union, each leading its bloc of allies. Pakistan, under the
leadership of President Ayub Khan, sought to navigate between these
superpowers to maximize its benefits and minimize risks. This necessitated a
pluralistic approach that involved engaging with both sides.

2. Security Concerns:

The Indo-Pakistan rivalry and the Kashmir issue were significant security
concerns for Pakistan. By adopting a pluralist perspective, Pakistan aimed to
secure support and assistance from multiple countries to strengthen its position
in regional conflicts.

3. Economic Development:

Pakistan was focused on economic development during this period. Engaging

with various countries allowed Pakistan to attract foreign aid, investment, and
technological assistance. Diversifying economic partnerships was seen as
crucial for sustained development.

4. Islamic Solidarity:

Pakistan, being an Islamic state, also sought to build relations with other
Muslim-majority countries. This was in line with the idea of Islamic solidarity
and the desire to play a role in the affairs of the Muslim world.

5. Non-Alignment:

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) gained prominence during the 1960s, and
Pakistan, along with other nations, aimed to pursue a non-aligned foreign
policy. This involved not aligning exclusively with any major power bloc and
maintaining independence in international affairs.

6. Diplomatic Maneuverability:

By adopting a pluralist perspective, Pakistan aimed to maintain diplomatic

maneuverability. This flexibility allowed the country to adapt to changing
geopolitical situations and protect its interests effectively.

In summary, Pakistan's adoption of a pluralist perspective in its foreign policy

during the 1960s was a strategic response to the complex global environment of
the Cold War era. It allowed Pakistan to navigate geopolitical challenges,
pursue economic development, address security concerns, and assert its role in
both the Islamic and non-aligned movements.

Q.2 What was Simla agreement of 1972 and how had this
agreement provided an opportunity to develop normal relations
between India and Pakistan?

ANSWER:

Simla agreement of 1972:

The Simla Agreement of 1972 was a bilateral treaty signed between India and
Pakistan, following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. The war, which lasted for
about two weeks, resulted in the creation of Bangladesh (formerly East
Pakistan) as an independent nation. The Simla Agreement was signed on July 2,
1972, in Simla (now Shimla), India, by the then Prime Minister of India, Indira
Gandhi, and the President of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The agreement
aimed to establish peace, security, and good neighborly relations between the
two countries.

Agreement Between the Government of India and the Government of the

Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Bilateral Relations (Simla Agreement)

1. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that
the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto
marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious
relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that
both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the
pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples.

In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government
of Pakistan

i. That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall
govern the relations between the two countries;

ii. That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful
means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually
agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems
between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and
both shall prevent the organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts
detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations;

iii. That the pre-requisites for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable
peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co-
existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual
benefit;

iv. That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the
relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by
peaceful means;

v. That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity,
political independence and sovereign equality;

vi. That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations they will refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of each other.
2. Both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile
propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the
dissemination of such information as would promote the development of
friendly relations between them.

3. In order progressively to restore and normalise relations between the two

countries step by step, it would agree that :

i. Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land

including border posts, and air link including overflights;

ii. Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals
of the other country; iii. Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be
promoted. In this connection delegation from the two countries will meet from
time to time to work out the necessary details.

4. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the
Governments agree that :

i. Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the

international border;

ii. In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of
December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the
recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally,
irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further
undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this Line;

iii. The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this Agreement
and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.

5. This Agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries, in

accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into
force with effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are
exchanged.

6. Both Governments agree that the respective Heads will meet again at a
mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the
representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and
arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of
relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and
civilians internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption
of diplomatic relations.

Opportunity to develop new relations:

Key provisions of the Simla Agreement and how it provided an opportunity to

develop normal relations between India and Pakistan:

1. Recognition of the New Borders:

The agreement recognized the existing ceasefire line (renamed the Line of
Control) in the state of Jammu and Kashmir as the "de facto" border between
India and Pakistan. Both countries agreed to respect this line and refrain from
seeking to alter it by force.

2. Principle of Bilateralism:

The Simla Agreement emphasized the principle of settling bilateral issues

through peaceful means. It stated that the two countries would resolve their
differences through direct bilateral talks and negotiations, rather than involving
third parties or international mediation.

3. Return of Prisoners of War:

The agreement facilitated the release and repatriation of prisoners of war and
civilian internees held by both sides. This helped in normalizing the
humanitarian aspect of relations between India and Pakistan and reducing
tensions.

4. Post-War Normalization:

Both countries committed to taking steps to normalize and improve their

relations in the aftermath of the conflict. This included restoring economic and
diplomatic ties and promoting people-to-people contact.

5. Renunciation of Aggression:

The Simla Agreement included a commitment by both countries to renounce the

use of force and to settle their differences through peaceful means. This was a
crucial step towards promoting stability and reducing the likelihood of future
military conflicts.
6. Respect for Territorial Integrity:

The agreement affirmed the commitment of both countries to respect each

other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. This helped create a foundation for
building trust and confidence between the two nations.

7. Bilateral Mechanism for Dispute Resolution:

The establishment of the Joint Indo-Pakistani Judicial Committee, consisting of

legal experts from both countries, was outlined in the Simla Agreement. This
committee was intended to explore ways to resolve disputes, especially those
related to the repatriation of property and assets.

In summary, the Simla Agreement of 1972 provided an important opportunity

for India and Pakistan to move beyond the hostilities of the 1971 war and work
towards establishing normal and peaceful relations. By emphasizing
bilateralism, respecting existing borders, and committing to peaceful dispute
resolution, the agreement laid the groundwork for a more stable relationship
between the two South Asian neighbors. However, despite these intentions, the
broader context of Indo-Pakistani relations has remained complex and marked
by periodic tensions.

Q.3 How had the foreign policy of Zia’s regime succeeded in

offsetting the threats of the USSR during the Afghan war of 1980s?
Elaborate with cogent arguments.

ANSWER:

Foreign policy of Zia’s

During the Afghan War of the 1980s, the foreign policy of General Muhammad
Zia-ul-Haq's regime in Pakistan was characterized by a strategic alignment with
the United States and its allies to counter the Soviet Union's presence in
Afghanistan. Zia's foreign policy aimed at offsetting the threats posed by the
USSR through various means.

The Zia Regime:

When Zia assumed power in mid-1977, Pakistan was out of the limelight and
indeed was considered by some observers to be a political backwater. By the
time of Zia's death in 1988, it had, because of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979, become an important actor occupying a central position in
the world arena.

Although Zulifqar Ali Bhutto had tried to redirect Pakistan's regional orientation
toward West Asia and Zia continued this trend, the nation's geostrategic
interests dictated a concentration on South Asia. Pakistan's foreign policy was
very much centered on India. Less than two years after Zia's assumption of
power, Congress, led by Indira Gandhi, was voted out of office and replaced by
the Janata Party, whose foreign minister was Atal Behari Vajpayee of the Jana
Sangh, long seen as anti-Pakistan. Nonetheless, relations between Pakistan and
India may have reached their most cordial level during the almost three years
Janata was in power. Vajpayee visited Pakistan in February 1978. There were
exchanges on many issues, and agreements were signed on trade, cultural
exchanges, and communications--but not on such key issues as Kashmir and
nuclear development.

The nuclear issue was of critical importance to both Pakistan and India. In 1974
India successfully tested a nuclear "device." Bhutto reacted strongly to this test
and said Pakistan must develop its own "Islamic bomb." Zia thus inherited a
pledge that for domestic reasons he could not discard, and he continued the
development program. He asked India to agree to several steps to end this
potential nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. One of these measures was the
simultaneous signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. The second step was a joint agreement for inspection of all nuclear
sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pakistan also proposed a pact
between the two countries to allow for mutual inspection of sites. And, finally,
Pakistan proposed a South Asian nuclear-free zone. It appeared that Zia was
looking for a way to terminate the costly Pakistani program. But in order to sell
this idea in Pakistan, he required some concessions from India. Termination
would also get him out of difficulties the program was causing with the United
States, including the curtailment of aid in 1979. These proposals were still on
the table in the early 1990s, and were supplemented by then Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif's call for a roundtable discussion among Pakistan, India, the
United States, Russia, and China on nuclear weapons in South Asia.

Not all relations within South Asia were negative. President Ziaur Rahman of
Bangladesh proposed an organization for South Asian cooperation. Pakistan
was at first reluctant, fearing Indian domination, but eventually agreed to join
the group, along with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri
Lanka. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was
formally inaugurated at a summit meeting in Dhaka in 1985. There have been
some positive steps toward cooperation, and regular rotating summits are held,
although often with some delays.
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India (1984-89) came to Islamabad in 1988 to
attend a SAARC summit, the first visit of an Indian prime minister since 1960,
when Nehru visited to sign the Indus Waters Treaty. Zia stopped briefly in New
Delhi in December 1985 and in February 1987 visited again, having invited
himself to see a cricket match between the two countries. Zia's estimation was
that he and Rajiv could meet quite cordially but could not agree on substantive
issues.

Active and potential conflict continued to be a constant factor in Pakistan's

relations with India. The dispute over the precise demarcation of the Line of
Control in Kashmir at the Siachen Glacier heated up periodically and over time
caused substantial casualties on both sides because of numerous small
skirmishes and the extreme cold in the remote area. Also, in the 1986-87 winter
the Indian army conducted Operation Brass Tacks, maneuvers close to the
Pakistan border, and Pakistan mobilized its forces. However, the dangerous
situation was defused, and no hostilities took place. India accused Pakistan of
aiding Sikh insurgents in India's state of Punjab. Pakistan denied this
accusation, but some people thought that Operation Brass Tacks might have
been a means to strike at alleged bases in Pakistan's Punjab Province. Zia
skillfully handled the diplomacy during the period of tension.

Zia continued the process, begun by Bhutto, of opening Pakistan to the West
and drew on Pakistan's Islamic, trade, and military ties to the Middle East.
Military ties included stationing Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia and training
missions in several other countries. Remittances from Pakistanis employed as
migrant workers in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf area,
increased during the Zia years and became an important factor in Pakistan's
foreign-exchange holdings.

The United States under the administration of Jimmy Carter did not welcome
the displacement of Bhutto by Zia; representative government, human rights,
and nuclear nonproliferation were also of concern to Carter. The execution of
Bhutto only added to the United States displeasure with Zia and Pakistan. In
March 1979, Pakistan--and Iran--terminated their membership in CENTO.

A number of United States laws, amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of

1961, applied to Pakistan and its program of nuclear weapons development. The
1976 Symington Amendment stipulated that economic assistance be terminated
to any country that imported uranium enrichment technology. The Glenn
Amendment of 1977 similarly called for an end to aid to countries that imported
reprocessing technology--Pakistan had from France. United States economic
assistance, except for food aid, was terminated under the Symington
Amendment in April 1979. In 1985 the Solarz Amendment was added to
prohibit aid to countries that attempt to import nuclear commodities from the
United States. In the same year, the Pressler Amendment was passed; referring
specifically to Pakistan, it said that if that nation possessed a nuclear device, aid
would be suspended. Many of these amendments could be waived if the
president declared that it was in the national interests of the United States to
continue assistance.

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, causing a sudden

reversal of United States policy. Carter, who had described Pakistan as a
"frontline state" in the Cold War, offered US$400 million in military and
economic aid to Pakistan-- an amount that Zia spurned and contemptuously
termed "peanuts." When the Ronald Reagan administration took office in
January 1981, the level of assistance increased substantially. Presidential
waivers for several of the amendments were required. The initial package from
the United States was for US$3.2 billion over six years, equally divided
between economic and military assistance. A separate arrangement was made
for the purchase of forty F-16 fighter aircraft. In 1986 a follow-on program of
assistance over a further period of six years was announced at a total of more
than US$4 billion, of which 57 percent was economic aid and the rest military
aid.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, under its new leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, was
reassessing its role in Afghanistan. Indirect "proximity" negotiations in Geneva
under the auspices of the UN were going on between Afghanistan and Pakistan
with the United States and the Soviet Union as observers. In April 1988, a series
of agreements were signed among the United States, the Soviet Union, Pakistan,
and Afghanistan that called for the withdrawal of Soviet forces by mid-February
1989. The withdrawal was completed on time.

The event of the Zia period brought Pakistan to a leading position in world
affairs. However, Pakistan's new visibility was closely connected to the
supportive role it played for the anti- Soviet mujahidin in Afghanistan--and this
deceased when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. In the 1990s,
Pakistan faced some major domestic problems--mounting ethnic and sectarian
strife as well as widespread civil disorder. Pakistan will need to address these
problems as it strives to improve its international standing as a maturing
democratic nation and one aspiring to be the industrial and technological leader
of the Muslim world.

Cogent arguments:

Below are cogent arguments explaining how Zia's regime succeeded in

achieving this:
1. Strategic Alliance with the United States:

Zia-ul-Haq skillfully leveraged Pakistan's geostrategic location and entered into

a close alliance with the United States. The U.S., along with its NATO allies,
was committed to opposing Soviet expansionism. Pakistan became a key
conduit for military and financial assistance to the Afghan resistance
(Mujahideen) fighting against the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan.

2. Role as a Frontline State:

Pakistan, under Zia's leadership, positioned itself as a frontline state in the Cold
War conflict, actively participating in the U.S.-led efforts to counter Soviet
influence in the region. This alignment provided Pakistan with significant
military and economic assistance, as well as diplomatic support, which were
crucial in offsetting the Soviet threat.

3. Facilitation of Mujahideen Operations:

Zia's regime played a crucial role in facilitating the training, arming, and
logistical support for the Afghan Mujahideen, who were resisting the Soviet
forces. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a central role in coordinating
these efforts, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the
United States.

4. Islamic Ideological Framework:

Zia-ul-Haq sought to frame the Afghan resistance in Islamic and ideological

terms, which resonated with the sentiments of the Afghan people and garnered
support from Islamic nations. This approach helped in mobilizing not only
international assistance but also public support within Pakistan for the Afghan
Jihad.

5. Diversification of International Support:

Pakistan, under Zia's leadership, actively sought support from various countries,
including Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. This diversification of support
reduced Pakistan's dependence on any single ally and enhanced its capacity to
withstand potential Soviet countermeasures.
6. Refugee Management and International Appeal:

The influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan provided an opportunity for Zia's
regime to garner international sympathy for the Afghan cause. Managing this
refugee crisis effectively, Pakistan received substantial humanitarian aid from
the international community, further strengthening its position in the conflict.

7. Maintaining Internal Unity:

Zia-ul-Haq's government successfully maintained a degree of internal unity and

consensus in Pakistan regarding its involvement in the Afghan conflict. This
included the cooperation of various political, religious, and military factions,
which contributed to a more stable and focused foreign policy.

8. Nuclear Program as a Deterrent:

Zia's pursuit of a nuclear weapons program also played a role in deterring direct
Soviet intervention in Pakistan. The potential nuclear capability served as a
strategic deterrent and contributed to the overall security calculus in the region.

In conclusion, General Zia-ul-Haq's foreign policy during the Afghan War of

the 1980s succeeded in offsetting the threats posed by the USSR through a
combination of strategic alliances, diplomatic maneuvers, and effective support
for the Afghan resistance. Pakistan played a crucial role in contributing to the
eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, marking a significant
chapter in the Cold War dynamics in the region.

Q.4 What were the causes of shift in the US policy towards

Pakistan after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan? Explain with
solid reasons.

ANSWER:

US-Pakistan Relations Ebb After Afghanistan Withdrawal:

The last time U.S.-Pakistan relations turned cold was in the early 1990s, after
Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan and the U.S. no longer needed
Pakistan's support and regional intelligence. Following last year's U.S.
withdrawal from Afghanistan, after two decades of costly war that forced the
countries to work closely, Washington and Islamabad again appear to be
distancing from each other on major issues.
"Afghanistan has long been the lens through which Washington views its
relations with Islamabad," Michael Kugelman, an expert at the Wilson Center,
told VOA.

For Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of some 225 million people, having close
relations with a global power is vital in order for it to maintain balance with its
arch-enemy India, at least militarily, and ease domestic economic problems.
From the start of the war in Afghanistan to its 2021 conclusion, the U.S.
committed more than $32.5 billion in civilian and military aid to Pakistan,
according to the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan.
With U.S. military assistance suspended in 2018 and civilian aid reduced to
about $300 million for 2022, Pakistani authorities have turned to other countries
for help.
Late last month, as Russian troops started invading Ukraine, Pakistani Prime
Minister Imran Khan visited the Kremlin seeking closer ties and economic
assistance. Khan said Pakistan will continue to import wheat and gas from
Russia despite widespread international sanctions.

Causes of shift in U.S policy:

The shift in U.S. policy towards Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan in 1989 was influenced by a complex set of factors. The end of the
Cold War and the changing geopolitical landscape played a significant role in
reshaping the dynamics of international relations. Here are several reasons
explaining the causes of the shift in U.S. policy towards Pakistan during this
period:

1. End of the Cold War:

The primary driver of the shift in U.S. policy was the end of the Cold War. With
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the ideological and geopolitical
rationale for the U.S.-Pakistan alliance diminished. The focus of U.S. foreign
policy shifted away from the containment of communism, leading to a
reassessment of relationships in regions where Cold War dynamics were
prevalent.

2. Afghanistan's Internal Conflict:

After the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan plunged into a protracted civil war
characterized by infighting among various mujahideen factions. The absence of
a stable and unified government in Afghanistan created uncertainties and made
the U.S. reevaluate its engagement in the region.
3. Rise of the Taliban:

The power vacuum in Afghanistan led to the rise of the Taliban, a

fundamentalist group that eventually took control of Kabul in 1996. The U.S.
became increasingly concerned about the Taliban's support for terrorism, its
oppressive domestic policies, and the potential for Afghanistan to become a safe
haven for extremist groups.

4. Nuclear Proliferation Concerns:

Pakistan's nuclear program, which had been a source of tension between the
U.S. and Pakistan, became a more prominent concern after the Soviet
withdrawal. The U.S. was uneasy about the possibility of nuclear weapons
falling into the wrong hands, especially considering the internal instability in
Afghanistan.

5. Human Rights Issues:

The U.S. was critical of Pakistan's human rights record, particularly during the
rule of General Zia-ul-Haq and his successors. Issues such as restrictions on
political freedoms, mistreatment of ethnic and religious minorities, and the
curbing of democratic institutions led to a reassessment of the U.S.-Pakistan
relationship.

6. Global Terrorism Concerns:

The increasing association of the Taliban with Osama bin Laden and other
extremist groups raised alarm bells in the U.S. The 1998 U.S. embassy
bombings in East Africa and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole were linked to
Osama bin Laden, who found refuge in Afghanistan. The U.S. began to view
Afghanistan as a breeding ground for global terrorism.

7. Shift in U.S. Priorities:

The U.S. shifted its foreign policy priorities towards other regions, particularly
the Middle East. Issues such as the Gulf War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
and later the War on Terror after the 9/11 attacks, took precedence over the
situation in Afghanistan and U.S.-Pakistan relations.

8. Demands for Democratic Reforms:

The U.S. increasingly emphasized the importance of democratic governance in

Pakistan. The military coups and periods of martial law in Pakistan were viewed
with concern, and the U.S. urged Pakistan to transition to democratic
governance.

In summary, the shift in U.S. policy towards Pakistan after the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan was a result of the changing global geopolitical
landscape, the evolving situation in Afghanistan, concerns about nuclear
proliferation, human rights issues, and the emergence of new challenges such as
terrorism. These factors contributed to a reevaluation of the U.S.-Pakistan
relationship in the post-Cold War era.

Q.5 What is Sir Creek issue between India and Pakistan and what
are the possible solutions of this issue?

ANSWER:

Sir Creek:
Sir Creek is a 96-km strip of water disputed between India and Pakistan in the
Rann of Kutch marshlands. Originally named Ban Ganga, Sir Creek is named
after a British representative. The Creek opens up in the Arabian Sea and
roughly divides the Kutch region of Gujarat from the Sindh Province of
Pakistan.

Introduction:

Since their independence, relations between Pakistan and India have been
fraught with contentious issues. Most of these conflicts were related to the
demarcation of borders and the non-resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The
primary focus of plans and efforts to resolve these conflicts has been land-
based; for example, the future of Kashmir, the delimitation of the Line of
Control (LOC), and the Siachen Glacier issue. Less focus has been given to the
maritime issues between both countries, including Sir Creek and its effect on
the interstate maritime boundary delimitation; the arrest and repatriation of
fishermen by both sides; and non-cooperation between maritime forces at sea.
The resolution of maritime issues between Pakistan and India is essential
because on the one hand, it is a potential area of significant cooperation between
the two rivals, and on the other hand, the failure to resolve these issues can
further complicate relations between these two countries. Small, preliminary
steps by both sides toward the resolution of these maritime issues will build and
strengthen the cooperation, which could pave the way for the resolution of more
complex and substantive disputes in the future. In other words, peace in
Kashmir may be wrought at sea.

Since inception, Pakistan and India has numerous border disputes. One of them
is the maritime border dispute along Sir Creek. Perhaps the fundamental issue is
presented by Sir Creek, whose dispute prevents both countries from agreeing on
the demarcation of their mutual maritime border. Sir Creek forms one of the
enduring disputes between India and Pakistan. It involves conflicting claims to a
water strip some 60 miles in the Rann of Kutch, separating the Sindh province
of the southern part of Pakistan from the Indian province of Gujarat. Because
the Sir Creek dispute is not as politically charged as some of the other long-
standing points of disagreement between Pakistan and India, however, the
resolution of this issue might serve as a catalyst for a broader reconciliation
between the great South Asian powers.

There is a lot at stake in Sir Creek. According to Ansari and Vohra, “As
compared to the highly volatile issue of Kashmir, the delimitation of the
maritime boundary and the dispute involving the Sir Creek have not yet attained
a flash point status, although both issues have the potential to do so at a future
date.” Conversely, resolution of the Sir Creek issue may, then, facilitate a
resolution of the larger maritime boundary dispute—and perhaps foreshadows a
significant easing of tensions between South Asia’s two major powers. This
disagreement has sought a solution in bilateral, transnational, or international
law for at least a century now. Under the contemporary treaty scheme, including
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the dispute
has acquired a particular urgency. This chapter takes up the complex issues of
the Sir Creek dispute in light of international law and case studies to present
recommendations and viable options for both states’ governments toward a
possible solution that could bring peace and harmony to the region.

Background:
When the dispute surfaced, Sindh was part of Bombay presidency of undivided
India. After 1947, Sindh became part of Pakistan, while Kutch remained part of
India.” But the tension at Sir Creek well predates independence and partition.
Hindu rulers presided over the Kutch and surrounding areas before the
establishment of British rule in India. In 1760, Muslim rulers conquered Kutch
State, and the state remained under Muslim control until 1813. When the British
took over the Indo-Pak Subcontinent, Kutch State was put under the control of
the Sindh government. In 1843, Sindh was conquered by the British, and was
made a part of the Hindu dominated Bombay Presidency after 1853. As it was a
Muslim populated area, the decision was found very offensive by the Muslim.
However, after a powerful unrest, Sindh became a separate province in 1935. In
1947, Pakistan got independence from the British rulers, and Sindh, being a
Muslim populated area, became a province of Pakistan. The Rann of Kutch
remained an integral part of the Sindh government throughout the time of the
British rule in India.

Dispute:
The dispute lies in the interpretation of the maritime boundary line between
Pakistan and India. Before independence, the area was part of British India.
After independence in 1947, Sindh became a part of Pakistan while Gujarat
remained a part of India.
Pakistan lays claim to the entire creek as per paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Sind
Government Resolution of 1914 signed between the then Government of Sindh
and Rao Maharaj of Kutch.

The Green Line is the boundary as claimed by Pakistan, red line is boundary
claimed by India. Map not to scale.

The resolution, which demarcated the boundaries between the one territories,
included the creek as part of Sindh, thus setting the boundary as the eastern
flank of the creek. India sticks to its position that the boundary lies mid-channel
as depicted in another map drawn in 1925, and implemented by the installation
of mid-channel pillars back in 1924.
India supports its stance by citing the thalweg doctrine in international law. The
law states that river boundaries between two states may be, if the two states
agree, divided by the mid-channel. Though Pakistan does not dispute the 1925
map, it maintains that the doctrine is not applicable in this case as it most
commonly applies to non-tidal rivers, and Sir Creek is a tidal estuary. India
rejects the Pakistani stance by maintaining the fact that the creek is navigable
at high tide and that the thalweg principle is used for some international
boundaries in tidal waters, and that fishing trawlers use Sir Creek to go out to
sea. Another point of concern for Pakistan is that Sir Creek has changed its
course considerably over the years. If the boundary line is demarcated according
to the thalweg principle applied to the current channel, Pakistan and India
would both lose small amounts of wetlands territory that was historically part of
their provinces. More significantly, acceding to India's stance would result in
the shifting of the land/sea terminus point several kilometres to the detriment of
Pakistan, leading in turn to a loss of several thousand square kilometres of
its Exclusive Economic Zone under the United Nations Convention on Law of
the Sea.

Since 1969, there have been twelve rounds of talks between the two nations,
without a breakthrough. The twelfth round was completed in June 2012. Steps
to resolve the dispute include: allocation, delimitation, demarcation,
administration.

Since neither side has conceded ground, India has proposed that the maritime
boundary could be demarcated first, as per the provisions of Technical Aspects
of Law of Sea (TALOS). However, Pakistan has staunchly refused the proposal
on the grounds that the dispute should be resolved first. Pakistan has also
proposed that the two sides go in for international arbitration, which India has
flatly refused. India maintains that all bilateral disputes should be resolved
without the intervention of third parties.

Recommendations for a possible solution to the sir creek dispute:

The complexity and sensitivity of the Sir Creek dispute can be visualized from
the fact that both countries have fought a war in the same area and pursued
arbitration, but yet have not been able to solve the dispute. Ten bilateral rounds
of discussion have been held since 1989. The last discussion was suspended
after the tragic Mumbai attacks in 2008. India believes that Pakistan is
intentionally delaying the resolution process for some political reasons and may
desire arbitration at a later date. On the other hand, India does not wish to
involve itself with another arbitration tribunal and would prefer to resolve the
dispute without involvement of a third party. A need was felt to carry out a
survey of the area before further dialogue on the same issue. In this regard, a
joint land and hydrographic survey was conducted in 2007 before
commencement of the tenth round of discussion. The survey revealed changes
in the bathymetry, topography, and orientation of the creek. Both countries
exchanged their charts along with their respective claims during the tenth round.
At this point, they decided that their claims would be discussed in future rounds
of talks, but the tragic Mumbai attacks suspended further discussion on this
issue.

Of great interest to both countries, it is necessary to resolve the Sir Creek

dispute utilizing previous records so as to bring harmony and peace to the
region. By concurring, the step by step approach such as initially resolving this
milder and less controversial maritime issue will strengthen the trust and
cooperation which could lead both countries to resolve all outstanding bilateral
issues including the Kashmir and Siachen Glacier issues. In light of the
abovementioned case studies and norms of international law, some
recommendations are proposed here to obtain a possible solution to the Sir
Creek and maritime boundary disputes.

Recommendation 1

The existing record shows that the boundary of Sir Creek was first established
in 1914; therefore, first, it needs to be determined by how much Sir Creek has
been shifted due to accretion since 1914. For this purpose, Pakistan and India
should analyze British-Indian maps prepared by the Surveyor General since
1914, the maps formulating during the process of erecting pillars in 1924, and
those maps which were prepared in 1947 at the time of Independence.
Moreover, sophisticated charts prepared during a recent survey of Sir Creek in
2007 that were subsequently exchanged as well by both states can also mark the
exact location of Sir Creek as it presently exists.98
When this analysis phase is completed and the exact location of Sir Creek at the
time of Independence in 1947 will be established, the situation could be
substantiated by the recent decision made by the ICJ in 2005 in the case of
Benin and Niger’s maritime dispute. In this case the ICJ Chamber clearly
defined the Niger River boundary by applying the thalweg principle on the
status of the river that existed at the time of Independence in 1960. Therefore,
Pakistan and India should agree to ascertain the position of Sir Creek at the time
of 1947 and subsequently apply the same decision of the ICJ.

Recommendation 2

The 1982 United Nations Convention on International Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS) offers to extend the jurisdiction of maritime states over adjoining
seas. Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS describe the process of delimitation of the
EEZ and the Continental Shelf. Resolution of maritime dispute between
Suriname and Guyana is one of the empirical examples which could also be
modeled to resolve the Sir Creek boundary dispute.
Like Guyana and Suriname, Pakistan and India are also signatories to the
UNCLOS; therefore, a tribunal should be constituted to analyze Pakistan and
India’s claims over Sir Creek. The tribunal should first ascertain the status of
the existing western land terminus, which is apparently agreeable to both states
as it was undertaken in the Guyana and Suriname case, then find out if either
thalweg is applicable (India’s claim) or if it will support Pakistan’s claim over
Sir Creek. When the Sir Creek boundary dispute is resolved through this
process, it will delimit the EEZ and Continental Shelf of both countries and
through this way, both states’ maritime boundary will also be demarcated.

Recommendation 3

Before proposing recommendation three, it is necessary to understand

perceptions of Pakistan and India regarding demarcation of maritime boundary
which has been clearly marked by Agha in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Lines projected from Sir Creek show perceptions of Pakistan and

India’s maritime boundary. Line X shows India’s perception, whereas line Y

shows Pakistan’s perception.
The seaward approach in accordance with Technical Aspect on the Law of the
Sea (TALOS) is another approach to resolve the maritime boundary issue
between two adjacent states. This approach is also recommended by Vohra and
Ansari.
Figure 5. Equidistance Method of Maritime Boundary Delimitation.

To apply this method, two undisputed shore points are marked from the
mainland of Pakistan and India. Figure 5 illustrates this proposed solution. A
point of 200 nautical miles (the EEZ limit) is determined, equidistant from
already marked shore points on the respective mainland.
Following the same procedure, other points at 150, 100, 50, and 35 nautical
miles are to be marked on the chart from the same mainland points. Then a
point is to be marked on the mouth of Sir Creek equidistant from the positions
claimed by India (Point-1) and Pakistan (Point-K) as a solution without any bias
to future claims.104 The line joining these points would be marked on chart and
considered the maritime boundary between Pakistan and India.