108) Ichong vs. Hernandez (G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957)

2/20/2021 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 101
[No. L-7995. May 31, 1957]
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien

residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by
Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ,
Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City
Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
1156
1156 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ichong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER; NATURE AND

SCOPE.—Police power is far-reaching in scope, and it is almost
impossible to limit its sweep. It derives its existence from the very
existence of the State itself, and does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope. It is said to be co-extensive with self-
protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and
active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent
and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic
framework where the demands of society and of nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope
of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of
public interest and public welfare have become almost all-
embracing and have transcended human foresight.
2. ID.; GUARANTEES IN SECTION I, ARTICLE III OF THE

CONSTITUTION; UNIVERSALITY OF APPLICATION.—The
constitutional guarantees in Section I, Article III, of the
Constitution, which embody the essence of individual liberty and
freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are
admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality (Yiek Wo vs.
Hopkins, 30 L. ed., 220, 226).
3. ID.; LAW DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY;

TEST OR STANDARD.—The conflict between police power and
the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is
more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence, or
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000177bfb6e977712c694a003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/36
the indispensable means for the" attainment of legitimate

aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercises it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there
can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and
anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty or
property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the
equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is
reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if disctinction or classification
has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.
4. ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW CLAUSE; WHEN

NOT DEEMED INFRINGED BY LEGISLATION.—The equal
protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of inequality.
1157
VOL. 101, MAY 81, 1957 1157
It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in

the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to
operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825).
5. ID. ; ID. ; LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE DISTINCTION

AND CLASSIFICATION AMONG PERSONS; CITIZENSHIP
AS GROUND FOR CLASSIFICATION.—The power of the
legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons
is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause.
The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a
law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the
classification is without reasonable basis. Citizenship is a legal and
valid ground for classification.
6. ID.; ID.; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL TRADE;

CLASSIFICATION IN REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180 ACTUAL,
REAL AND REASONABLE.—The classification in the law of
retail traders into nationals and aliens is actual, real and reasonable.
All persons of one class are treated alike, and it cannot be said that
the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded. Hence, it
is the duty of this Court to declare that the legislature acted within
its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act
transcends the limits of equal protection established by the
Constitution.
7. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TEST OF REASONABLENESS.—The law in

question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired
legislative objective, i.e., to free the national economy from alien
control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it
affects private rights and privileges (II Am. Jur., pp. 1080-1081).
The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or
adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out
its purpose into effect. Judged by this test, the disputed legislation,
which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be
considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180 TOLERANT
AND REASONABLE.—A cursory study of the provisions of the
law
1158
immediately reveals how tolerant and reasonable the Legislature

has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and
privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue
therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the
right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or
privilege is denied only to persons upon conviction of certain
offenses.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTAINMENT OF LEGISLATIVE ASPIRATIONS

OF A PEOPLE NOT BEYOND THE LIMITS OF LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY.—If political independence is a legitimate aspiration
of a people, then economic independence is none of less legitimate.
Freedom and liberty are not real and positive, if the people are
subject to the economic control and domination of others,
especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and
eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and

domination is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature
may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks
to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due
process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can
never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY MANIFESTED IN

THE CONSTITUTION.—Nationalistic tendency is manifested in
various provisions of the Constitution. The nationalization of the
retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective
policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution, It
cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose
and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional.
11. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; EXERCISE OF

LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW.—The exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to
judicial review. The Court will not inquire into the motives of the
Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment.
The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an
enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in
favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views
inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the
legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.
12. ID.; TITLES OF BILLS; PROHIBITION AGAINST DUPLICITY;

PRESENCE OF DUPLICITY NOT SHOWN IN TlTLE OR
PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180.—What Section
21(1) of Article VI of the Constitution prohibits is duplicity, that is,
if its title completely fails to apprise the legislators or the public of
the nature.
1159
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1159
scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland,

Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297). A cursory consideration
of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence
of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not
readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and
objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either
prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been

included within the term "regulation".
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF GENERAL TERMS IN TITLE OF

BILL.—The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title
of a bill; the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the
law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 4803, p. 345). The
above rule was followed when the title of the Act in question
adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize"
or "prohibit".
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL

DIRECTIVE REGARDING SUBJECT OF A BILL.—One purpose
of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into
law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study
of the legislators or of the public. In case at bar it cannot be claimed
that the legislators have not been apprised of the nature of the law,
especially the nationalization and prohibition provisions. The
legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a
great many of the persons affected by the prohibition in the law
conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever
existed.
15. ID.; INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OBLIGATIONS NOT

VIOLATED BY REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180; TREATIES
SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION OR AMENDMENT BY
SUBSEQUENT LAW.—The law does not violate international
treaties and obligations. The United Nations Charter imposes no
strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed.,
pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing
more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China
of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other
1160
Ichong, etc. et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
country". But the nationals of China are not discriminated against

because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United
States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all
prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing
that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always
subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U.S. vs.
Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs.
Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Injunction and

Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ozaeta, Lichauco & Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar &
Associates for petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de
Castro for respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S.
Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and the issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity
and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-
reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due
process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses
an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the
disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly
springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse,
the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer.
Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress
attempts
1161
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1161

to translate national aspirations for economic independence and

national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival
and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free
the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so
that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed
economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances

justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not
citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens
of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens
actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed
to continue to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in
case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the
Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an
exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the
United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to
engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on
nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor
and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a
prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of
retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in
the retail business to present for registration with the proper
authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving,
among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets
1162

and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of juridical

entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now
engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for
a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based—Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a
judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin
the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act,

contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection
of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without
due process of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international
and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100%
Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5,
Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of
the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the
Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or
international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary
succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is
not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory
origin.
1163
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1163

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power.—

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the
police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is
attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due
process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to
the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it
would be well to bear in mind certain basic and f undamental, albeit
preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent
conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws. What is the .scope of police power, and
how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it?
What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the
function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly
and correctly understood that their application to the f acts of the
case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly
resolved.
It has been said that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that

it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need
to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive
with selfprotection and survival, and as such it is the most positive
and active of all governmental processes, the most essential,
insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations
have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and
scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the
fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-
embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated,
as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and
welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope
1164

of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain
or achieve public interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do
not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what
they do is to set f orth the limitations thereof. The most important of
these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.—

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found
in the following provisions of our Constitution:
"SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of

individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to
citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The equal protection clause.—

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to

privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
1165
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1165

d. The due process clause.—

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of
legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public
interest, a public purpose; is public welf are involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there
sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is
it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These
are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees
of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent
than real. Properly related; the power and the guarantees are
supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said,
the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations
of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the
State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there
is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason, The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare,
and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a
reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.—

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place
and role of the courts ? It must not be overlooked, in the first place,
that the legislature, which is the
1166

constitutional repository of police power and exercises the

prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of
circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or
reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise
of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the
public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts,
although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have
nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the
legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has
been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of
the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to
override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom
of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to

delve directly into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation
were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no
question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power..
But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens,
from engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex
because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as
society itself, which from time immemorial has always been open to
residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.—

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they
consume and consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course, is
unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in
communities producing more than what they consume and needing
an infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes
into existence.
1167
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1167

As villages develop into big communities and specialization in

production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under
modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs
have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions,
the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the
infinite variety of articles, goods and commodities needed for daily

life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers
perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which
all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the
communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer
in the life of the community. He ministers to the resident's daily
needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets
and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his
customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the
vinegar, the ,spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to
sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes
that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the
owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department
store or a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's traits.—

The alien retailer must have started plying his trade in this country in
the bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was
unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually he
invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and
big centers of population. He even pioneers in far away nooks where
the beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the daily
needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for
sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities
the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade,
industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.
1168

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off

without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and
customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he
forgets and forgives. The community takes no note of him, as he
appears to be harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.—

There is a general f eeling on the part of the public, which appears to
be true to f act, about the controlling and dominant position that the
alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other
essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the
residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population
he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control over
distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware,
textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other
goods and articles. And were it not for some national corporations
like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Accfa, his control
over principal foods and products would easily become full and
complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in
the retail trade. In one breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and
the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely
the result of racialism and pure and unabashed nationalism.
Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many
unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually
impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact
merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion
within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our
prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put
down the figures in black and white. Between the constitutional
convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and
control of the retail trade already
1169
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1169

Ichong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the
year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act
(1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-
increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade, as
witness the following tables;
Assets Gross Sales

Year and No.- Pesos Percent Pesos Percent
Retailer's Establishments Distribution Distribution
Nationality
1941:
Filipino 106,671 200, 323, 55.82 174, 181, 5174
138 924
Chinese 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239 44.21
Others 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05
1947:
Filipino 111,107 208, 658, 65.05 279, 583, 57.03
946 333
Chinese 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205, 701, 41.96
134
Others 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01
1948:
(Census)
Filipino 113,631 213, 342, 67.30 467, 161, 60.51
264 667
Chinese 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294, 894, 38.20
227
Others 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29
1949:
Filipino 113,659 213, 451, 60.89 462, 532, 53.47
602 901
Chinese 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392, 414, 45.36
875
Others 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17
1951:
Filipino 119,352 224, 053, 61.09 466, 058, 53.07
620 052
Chinese 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404, 481, 46.06
384
Others 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 .87
AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
Year and Item Assets Gross Sales
Retailer's (Pesos)
Nationality
(Pesos)
1941:
Filipino 1,878 1,633
Chinese 7,707 9,691
Others 24,415 8,281
1170

1947:
Chinese 7,707 14,934
Others ....24,749 13,919
1948: (Census)

Chinese 7,707 24,398
Others 24,916 23,686
1949:
Chinese 7,707 24,152
Others 24,807 20,737
1951:
Chinese 7,707 33,207
Others 24,824 22,033
(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and

Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of
Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of
Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships,

while the figures on Filipino establishments already include mere
market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small.
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assets
and of gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during
the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the
number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical
gap through their assets and gross sales which average between six
and seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers
in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more
capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much
more. The same official report, pointing out to the known
predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that
the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer
enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is
1171
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1171

thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in

matters of capital, credit, price and supply,
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional

Convention.—
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been

sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's target in the
enactment of the disputed nationalization law. If they did not exist as
a fact the sweeping remedy of nationalization would never have
been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the
existence of this alien dominance and control when they approved a
resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the
sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of the retail trade; * * *." (II Aruego, The Framing of
the Philippine Constitution, 662663, quoted on page 67 of
Petitioner.) That was twentytwo years ago; and the events since then
have not been either pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the
University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the
patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our
Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of
Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already
brought under their control the commercial and other economic
activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p,
114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the constitutional
convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection with
the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
"But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the
economic life of the country is not desirable and that if such a situation
should remain, political independence alone is no guarantee to national
stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest
from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of
recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under
such conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will,
has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle
for the
1172

economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the
crusade for political freedom. Thus * * * it (the Constitution) envisages an
organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the
possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by
alien interests in the economic field." (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th
ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in

other quarters. Filipino businessmen, manufacturers and producers
believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien control, and they
express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is
Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National
Convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution,

approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of
Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes,
and fears, alien predominance and control; so our newspapers,
which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien
stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be
a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the
sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade
does not seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing
feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national
interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and
thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such
complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of
prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be
made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or
articles they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of
dislocation of the national economy and of the complete
subservience of national retailers and of the consuming public are
not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers
1173
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1173

and consumers alike, can be placed completely at their mercy. This

is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be
prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does not
offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article
offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is
to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their
stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or
importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article
suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and
free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the
pernicious influences of alien domination. Grave abuses have
characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact
within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly
overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there
exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien
participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and
intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice
for our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the
market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating
artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable

proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the
inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so
that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn
Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding
practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws,
especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the
legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168),
authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price
control convictions; that they have secret combinations among
themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of
supply and demand;
1174

that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders

who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint
of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public
to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of
the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and
the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also
believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with
fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and
corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to
unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by
their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly
admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above
practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that
worse things may come in the future. The present dominance of the
alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore,
becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other
calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of
harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are
well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of
goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of
population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the
State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While
the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the
needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy
of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.

—
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and

circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial
hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the
legitimate desire and determina-
1175
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1175

tion of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the

nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been
saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is
clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself,
and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which
and by which the State insures its existence and security and the
supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a.Objections to alien participation in retail trade.—

The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the
equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of
alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien
and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the
country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for
personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit.
His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor
immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes
his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for
his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage
of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile,
the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his
beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that
the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers
and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found
necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he
never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and
wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the
gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would
help the
1176

country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest

in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would
indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important
function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution,
as already pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of
commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their
customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation
of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and
disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals,
show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These
differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the
national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing
violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground
for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for

distinction.—
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail
trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient
grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals
and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's
classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the
law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is
actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated
alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the
legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot
declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection
established by the Constitution.
1177
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1177

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions

and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the
equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of
a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without
reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited,
we can also refer to the case of Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the
application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as
contrary thereto:
"* * *. 1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does

not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws,
but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and
therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable
basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3.
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who
assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that
it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.'"
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.—

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid
ground for classification has already been affirmatively decided in
this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In
the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the
validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue,
because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels
engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the
Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to
aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the
equal pro-
1178

tection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The Legislature in

enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of
Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign
interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police
power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In
substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of
vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does
not violate the equal protection of the law and due process of law
clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision
we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson
in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:
" 'Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as,
for example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors,
etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of
an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping,
and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations.
Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of
its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American
shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on
this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the
license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her
enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as
contradistinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from
fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the
American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the
trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected.'"
The rule in general is as follows:
"Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a

classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class
falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree
of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes of American
citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and
aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of
police power." (2 Am. Jur. 468-469.)
1179
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1179

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a

statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided
that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his
intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid,
for the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit
the business of those who are supposed to have regard for the
welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court
cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs.
State, 99 N.E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain
persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors,
was found not to be the result of race hatred, or inhospitality, or a
deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that
an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with 'our institutions and
our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular
business to our entire social f abric", and was not, theref ore, invalid.
In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 71 L. ed. 1115
(1926), the U. S. Supreme Court had under consideration an
ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of

licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly
irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not
follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances
such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the
basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state that the
legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the
legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative
choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of
State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the
one at bar. In Asakura, vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington,
1922), the business of pawnbroking was considered as having
tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is
within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying
1180

aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in

Wright vs. May, L. R. A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in
Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that
aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge,
attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibition of issuance of
licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card
room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In
Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058
(Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers
was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's finding
that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way
affect the morals, the health, or even the convenience of the
community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed.
1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of
commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible to citizenship was
held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over
immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere
claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was
no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that
the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward persons of
Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the theory
that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural
resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257
(Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every
employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years
of age, was declared void because the court found that there was no
reason for the classification .and the tax was an arbitrary deduction
from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.—

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State
courts in the United States hold that the distinction between aliens
and citizens is not a valid
1181
VOL. 101, MAY 81, 1957 1181

ground for classification. But in these decisions the laws declared

invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious,
or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and
there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States
Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful
the keeping of books of account in any language other than English,
Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the
decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there
would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese
would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived
of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct.
The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that
no public benefit would be derived from the operation of the law and
on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something
indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 30 L. ed. 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring power on
officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to
persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the
power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the
discrimination which attended the administration and
implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere
racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a
law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was
declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and
just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was
proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so.
As we already have said, aliens do not naturally possess the
sympathetic consideration and regard for customers with whom they
come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the
nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit,
1182
Ichong etc.. et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land.
These limitations on the qualifications of aliens have been shown on
many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and
emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton
vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and
significance of the distinction between the alien and the national,
thus:
"* * *. It may be judicially known, however, that aliens coming into this
country are without the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and
usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes
of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow countrymen.
Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born,
whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of
governmental environment and control have been engendered and formed
under entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the same
inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed toward the
United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government
itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that
obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the
Legislature was without plausible reason for making the classification, and
therefore appropriate discrimination against aliens as it relates to the subject
of legislation. * * *."
VII The Due Process of Law Limitation
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by

legislature decisive.—
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the
police power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the
United States that:
"* * * And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands
only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that
the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject
sought to be attained. * * *."
* * * * * * *
"So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence
of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce
that policy by legislation adapted
1183
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1183

to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy,
or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed
are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and
are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. * * *." (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:

"* * *. Too much significance cannot be given to the word 'reasonable' in
considering the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the
test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the
legislature is to inquire whether the restrictions it imposes on rights secured
to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it
imposes any restrictions on such rights. * * *."
* * * * * * *
"* * *. A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its
operation upon the persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance
of a particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive." (11 Am. Jur. Sec.
302, pp. 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388, it was also held:
"* * *. To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and -not unduly oppressive upon individuals. * * *."
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR,

389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:
"In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the

exercise of the police power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is
not constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court is
whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in
connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and
capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health,
safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public."
1184

lchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
b. Petitioner's argument considered.—
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary

occupation, one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful
and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the
legislature to prohibit and penalize. This argument overlooks fact
and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e.,
that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner,
it has been so engaged by him, by the alien, in an honest creditable
and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens
and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and
welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and
indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien,
thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he
now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a
deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the
national security in times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by
petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances,
but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, taking into account the
illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens
have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer
is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring
about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy
from alien control and do minance. It is not necessarily unreasonable
because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-
1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or
adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out
its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation,
which is
1185
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1185

not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not

to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the
explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later was enacted
into law:
"This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent
persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold
upon our economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our
economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who
have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no
permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our
own destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the
mercy of other people.
"In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to
deprive persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of
livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who
are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze
all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it respects
existing rights.
"The approval of this bill is 'necessary for our national survival."
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then

economic independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom and
liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their
own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of
foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest
motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to
conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the
constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a
legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of
legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the

sphere of legislative action.—
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose
the constitutional restrictions of due
1186

process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from

economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police
power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the
legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would
promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and
liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they expressly made
their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief
that the legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative
power. Thus they declared in their Resolution:
" That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of retail trade; but it abstains from approving the amendment
introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this
matter because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to
promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the
privilege to engage in the retail trade.'" (II Aruego, The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the

Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in

various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a
principal objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation
and as corollary thereto the provision limiting to citizens of the
Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its
natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that
"no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a
continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a
primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law
imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the
provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and
unconstitutional ?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the
nationals as manifested in the approval
1187
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1187

of the radical measure is, therefore, fully justified. It would have

been recreant to its duties towards the country and its people would
it view the sorry plight of the nationals with complacency and refuse
or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of
public interest and national survival. As the repository of the
sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to
face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger
and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national
economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.—

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals
how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is
made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those
already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest
of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is
accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to
those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations
of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the
privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens
now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law
itself, its aims and purposes. Besides, the exercise of legislative
discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the
Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass
upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is
primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its
provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and
though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of
the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of
the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law
attacked as a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but
its unreasonableness, and we find
1188

he provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer

various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are:
that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of
aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase
because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for
the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there
may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from
foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the
supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative
prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law

is the claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it
conceals the real purpose of the bill, which is to nationalize the retail
business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The
constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section
21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title
completely fails to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature,
scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration
of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of
duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not
readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and
objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either
prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been

included within the term regulation.
1189
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1189

lchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
"Under the title of an act to 'regulate', the sale of intoxicating liquors, the
Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors." (Sweet vs. City of
Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
"Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of
every act of the Legislature shall be stated in the title, the title To regulate
the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an
act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit
of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the
subject of regulating the sale." (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted
in p. 42 of Answer.)
"The word 'regulate' is of broad import, and necessarily implies some
degree of restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with
the thing to be regulated. While word regulate' does not ordinarily convey
meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should not have such
meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing
the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression."
(State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it
has also been said that the title need not be an index to the entire
contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 4803,
p. 345.) The above rule was followed when the title of the Act in
question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of
"nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other
rules for the regulation of the retail trade, which may not be included
in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title
changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would
have been many provisions not f alling within the scope of the title
which would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term
"regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the
drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be
adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found
in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a
bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the
purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters
1190

which have not received the notice, action and study of the
legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed
that the legislators have not been apprised of the nature of the law,
especially the nationalization and prohibition provisions. The
legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a
great many of the persons affected by the prohibition in the law
conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed.
The objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the

supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and
of the Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly. We find no merit in the above contention. The
United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations
regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The
Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 2932), and the Declaration
of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the
United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can
be inferred from the fact that members of the United Nations
Organization, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners
from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws
against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be
violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is
equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms
as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are
not dis-
1191
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1191

criminated against because nationals of all other countries, except

those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited f rom engaging in the retail trade.
But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the
treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the
same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of
the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed
law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business
and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that
the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of
the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality
and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes
the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of
the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident
—as a matter of f act it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary—and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the
Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this
suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be
void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty
has actually been en-
1192

tered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed
or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical
effects of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on
the aliens. Thus it is stated that more time should have been given in
the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time
comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to
determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority
and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal
protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the
harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are
beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepción,

Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not

inquire into the wisdom of an Act passed by the Congress and duly
approved by the President of the Republic. But the rule does not
preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the Act
offends against a provision or provisions of the Constitution. I am
satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the due process of law
and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution does
not infringe upon them, insofar as it affects associations,
partnerships or corporations, the capital of which is not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and
have not been engaged in the retail business. I am, however, unable
to persuade myself that it does not violate said clauses insofar as the
Act applies to associations and partnerships referred to in the Act
and to aliens, who are and have
1193
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1193

heretofore been engaged in said business. When they did engage in

the retail business there was no prohibition on or against them to
engage in it. They assumed and believed in good faith they were
entitled to engage in the business. The Act allows aliens to continue
in business until their death or voluntary retirement f rom the
business or forfeiture of their license; and corporations, associations
or partnerships, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens
of the Philippines to continue in the business for a period of ten
years from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or
until the expiry of the term of the existence of the association or
partnership or corporation, whichever event comes first. The
prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, to engage in the retail business
for a period of more than ten years from the date of the approval of
the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence, whichever
event comes first, is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the
existence of such corporations is subject to whatever the Congress1
may impose reasonably upon them by subsequent legislation. But
the prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations and
partnerships, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of
the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the approval of the
Act, even bef ore the end of the term of their existence as agreed
upon by the associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the
retail business is transmitted by the death of an alien engaged in the

business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to a
deprivation of their property without due process of law. To my
mind, the ten-year period from the date of the approval of the Act or
until the expiration of the term of the existence of the association
and partnership, whichever event comes first, and the sixmonth
period granted to alien heirs of a deceased alien,
________________
1 Section 76, Act No. 1459.
1194

Ichong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc,, and Sarmiento
his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure

the defect of the law, because the effect of the prohibition is to
compel them to sell or dispose of their business. The price
obtainable at such forced sale of the business would be inadequate to
reimburse and compensate the associates or partners of the
association or partnership, and the alien heirs of a deceased alien,
engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it. The stock
of merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute
the business. The goodwill that the association, partnership and the
alien had built up during a long period of effort, patience and
perseverance forms part of such business. The constitutional
provisions that no person
1
shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law and2 that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws would have no meaning as applied to
associations or partnerships and alien heirs of an alien engaged in
the retail business if they were to be compelled to sell or dispose of
their business within ten years from the date of the approval of the
Act and before the end of the term of the existence of the
associations and partnerships as agreed upon by the associates and
partners and within six months after the death of their predecessorin-
interest.
The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, caref ul and
zealous in the safeguard of the ownership of private agricultural
lands which together with the lands of the public domain constitute
the priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not
deem 3it wise and prudent to deprive aliens and their heirs of such
lands,
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act,
insofar as it compels associations and partnerships referred to
therein to wind up their retail business within ten years from the date
of the approval of the Act
________________
1 Section 1(1), Article III, of the Constitution.

2 Ibid.
3 Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution.
1195
VOL. 101, MAY 81. 1957 1195

even before the expiry of the term of their existence as agreed upon
by the associates and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it
compels the alien heirs of a deceased alien engaged in the retail
business in his lifetime, his executor or administrator, to liquidate
the business, are invalid, for they violate the due process of law and
the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution.
Petition denied.
—————
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108) Ichong vs. Hernandez (G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957)

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2/20/2021 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 101

[No. L-7995. May 31, 1957]

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien

1156 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER; NATURE AND

2. ID.; GUARANTEES IN SECTION I, ARTICLE III OF THE

3. ID.; LAW DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY;

the indispensable means for the" attainment of legitimate

4. ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW CLAUSE; WHEN

VOL. 101, MAY 81, 1957 1157

Ichong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento

It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in

5. ID. ; ID. ; LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE DISTINCTION

6. ID.; ID.; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL TRADE;

7. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TEST OF REASONABLENESS.—The law in

1158 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ichong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento

immediately reveals how tolerant and reasonable the Legislature

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTAINMENT OF LEGISLATIVE ASPIRATIONS

eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY MANIFESTED IN

11. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; EXERCISE OF

12. ID.; TITLES OF BILLS; PROHIBITION AGAINST DUPLICITY;

VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1159

Ichong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento

scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland,

prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF GENERAL TERMS IN TITLE OF

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL

15. ID.; INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OBLIGATIONS NOT

1160 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ichong, etc. et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento

country". But the nationals of China are not discriminated against

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Injunction and

I. The case and the issue, in general

VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1161

to translate national aspirations for economic independence and

economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

1162 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of juridical

III. Grounds upon which petition is based—Answer thereto

provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act,

VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1163

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power.—

It has been said that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that

1164 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

b. Limitations on police power.—

"SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of

c. The equal protection clause.—

treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to

VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957 1165

d. The due process clause.—

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.—

1166 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

constitutional repository of police power and exercises the

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to