128) People vs. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 (1956) )

2/20/2021 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 099
[Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs.

AMADO V. HERNANDEZ. ET AL., defendants and appellants.
1. CMMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ELEMENTS OF: PENALTY.—

According to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, one of the
means by which rebellion may be committed is by "engaging in
war against the forces of the government" and "committing serious
violence" in the prosecution of said war". These expressions imply
everything that war connotes, namely: resort to arms, requisition of
property and services, collection of taxes and contributions,
restraint of liberty, damages to property, physical injuries and loss
of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in
its wake. Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and
"committing serious violence", said act of resorting _to arms, with
the resulting impairment or destruction of life and property—when,
as alleged in the information, performed "as a necessary means to
commit rebellion, in connection therewith and in futherance
thereof" and "so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the * * *
purpose" of the rebellion—constitutes neither two or more offenses,
nor a complex crime, but one crime—that of rebellion. plain and
simple, punishable with one single penalty, namely, that prescribed
in said Article 135.
2. ID.; ID.; COMMON CRIMES PERPETRATED IN

FURTHERANCE OF A POLITICAL OFFENSE, NOT SUBJECT
TO EXTRADITION.—National as well as international, laws and
jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common
crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as "common" offenses and assumes the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and, consequently, could not be punished, under
Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines, separately f
rom the principal oifense, or complexed with the^ same, to justify
the imposition of a graver penalty.
3. ID.; ID.; COMPLEX CRIMES; ARTICLE 48 APPLIES ONLY

WHEN Two CRIMES ARE COMMITTED.—The language of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes the commission
of two or more crimes, and hence, does not apply when the culprit
is guilty of only one crime.
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000177bfd0cc806fbba762003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/62
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; "PRO REO" PRINCIPLE; LESS CRIMINAL

PERVERSITY IN COMPLEX CRIMES.—If one act constitutes
two or more offenses,
516
516 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hemandez, et al.
there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that

prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing
that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in
its maximum period, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code could
have had no other purpose than to prescribe a. penalty lower than
the aggregate of the penalties for each oifense, if imposed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is
readily discernible. When two or more crimes/ are the result of a
single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he
commits said crimes through separate and distinct acts. Instead of
sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he
must suffer the maximuin of the penalty f or the more serious one,
on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the
separate penalties for each offense.
5. ID.; ID.; CBIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; WHEN ACCUSED

ENTITLED TO BAIL.—Individual freedom is too basic, too
transcendental and vital in a republican state, to be denied mere
general principles and abstract considerations of public policy.
Considering that the information filed against defendant is simply
rebellion, the penalty for which cannot exceed twelve years of
prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; that defendant was sentenced
by the lower court, not to the extreme penalty, but to life
imprisonment; and that the decision appealed from and the
opposition to the petition for bail do not reveal satisfectorily any
concrete, positive act of the defendant showing, sufficiently, that
his provisional release, during the pendency of the appeal, would
jeopardize the security of the State, said defendant may be allowed
bail.
MOTION for bail pending appeal of the judgment of the Court of

First Instance of Manila. Montesa, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jose P. Laurel, Claudio Techankee, Enrique Fernando, Vicente A.
Rafael, Manuel Q. Chan and Juan T. David for appellant A. V.
Hernandez.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla for appellee.
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This refers to the petition for bail filed by defendantappellant

Amado Hernandez on June 26, 1954, and renewed
517
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 517

People vs. Hernandez, et al.
on December 22, 1955. A similar petition, filed on December'28,

1953, had been denied by a resolution of this court dated February 2,
1954. Although not stated in said resolution, the same was due
mainly to these circumstances: The prosecution maintains that
Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion
complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital
punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court
sentenced him merely to life imprisonment. Upon the other hand, the
defense contends, among other things, that rebellion can not be
complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. Inasmuch as the issue
thus raised had not been previously settled squarely, and this court
was then unable, as yet, to reach a definite conclusion thereon, it
was deemed best not to disturb, for the time being, the course of
action taken by the lower court, which denied bail to the movant.
After mature deliberation, our considered opinion on said issue is as
follows:
The first two paragraphs of the amended information in this case
read:
"The tmdersigned accuses (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias

Soliman alias Amado alias AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo
Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G. Capadocia, (3) Mariano
P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo
Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr.
alia-s Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias
Arong, (7) Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy,
(9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William, (10)
Jacobo Espino, (11) Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian
Lumanog alias Manue, of the crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies committed as follows:
"That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said
date and contimiously thereafter tmtil the present time, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had chosen as the nerve
center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating, and cooperating

with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in
criminal cases Nos. 14071,
518

14082, 14270, 14315, and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(decided May 11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and
identities are still unknown, the said accused and their co-conspirators,
being then officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated with the
Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) formerly known as the Committee
on Labor. Organization (CLO), an active agency, organ, and instrumentality
of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), with central offices in
Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other
'mass organizations' in different places in the Philippines, and as such
agency, organ, and instrumentality, fully cooperates in, and synchronizes its
activities with the rebellious activities of the 'Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan,
(H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby assure, facilitate, and
effect the complete and permanent success of the armed rebellion against
the Repubflic of the Philippines, as the herein defendants and their co-
conspirators have in fact synchronized the activities of the CLO with the
rebellious activities of the HMB and other agencies, organs and
instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines and have
otherwise master-minded or promoted the cooperative efforts between the
CLO and HMB and other agencies, organs, and instrumentalitifcs of the
P.K.P. in the prosecution of the rebellion against the Republic of the
Philippines, and being theri also high ranking officers and/or members of, or
otherwise affiliated with, the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.),
which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the
Government of the Philippines through acts therefor committed and planned
to be further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of
which party the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HMB), otherwise or
formerly known as the 'Hukbalahaps' (Huks), is the armed force, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote,
maintain, cause, direct and/or command the *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng
Bayan' (HMB) or the 'Hukbalahaps' (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms
against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such
armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the
Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in
fact the said 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' or 'Hukbalahaps' have risen
publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making
armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and
army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to
commit the crime af rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance
thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting,
plnnder^ a^son, and plan-
519
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 519

ned destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos,
disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the
aforesaid purpose, as follows, to wit:"
Then follows a description of the murders, arsons and robberies
allegedly perperated by the accused "as a necessary means to commit the
crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof."
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:
"When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an oifense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period."
It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same

presupposes the commission of two (2) or more crimes, and, hence,
does not apply when the culprit is guilty of only one crime.
Article 134 of said code reads:
"The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and

taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine
Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces,
or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives."
Pursuant to Article 135 of the same code "any person, merely

participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period."
The penalty is increased to priswn mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000 for "any person who promotes, maintains or heads a
rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or
employment, takes part therein":
1. "engaging in war against the forces of the government",

2. "destroying property", or
3. "committing serious violence",
520

4. "exacting contributions or"

5. "diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which
they have been appropriated".
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of

acts constitute only one offiense, and no more, and are, altogether,
subject to only one penalty—prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000. Thus for instance, a public officer who assists the rebels by
turning over to them, for use in financing the uprising, the public
funds entrusted to his custody, could neither be prosecuted for
malversation of such funds, apart from rebellion, nor accused and
convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with malversation of
public funds. The reason is that such malversation is inherent in the
crime of rebeliion committed by him. In fact, he would not be guilty
of rebellion had he not so misappropriated said funds. In the
imposition, upon said public officer, of the penalty for rebellion it
wvuld even be improper to consider the aggravating circumstance of
advantage taken by the offender of his public position, this being an
essential element of the crime he had perpetrated. Now, then, if the
office held by said offender and the nature of the f unds malversed
by him cannot aggravate the penalty for his offense, it is clear that
neither may it worsen the very crime committed by the culprit by
giving rise, either to an independent crime, or to a complex crime.
Needless to say, a mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a
public officer, should not be placed at a more disadvantageous
position than the promoters, maintainers or leaders of the movement,
or the public officers who join the same, insofar as the application of
Article 48 is concerned.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the
words of said Article 135, is by "engaging in war against the forces
of the government" and "committing serious violence" in the
prosecution of said "war". These expressions imply everything that
war connotes, namely;
521
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 521

resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collec
tion of taxes and contributions, restraint of Hberty, damage to

property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness
and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake—except that, very
often, it is worse than war in the international sense, f or it involves
internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a bitterness and
passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a contest between strangers.

Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and "committing
serious violence", said resort to arms, with the resulting impairment
or destruction of life and property, constitutes not two or more
offense, but only one crime—that of rebellion plain and simple.
Thus, f or instance, it has been held that "the crime of treason may
be committed 'by executing either a single or similar intentional
overt acts, diff erent or similar but distinct, and for that reason, it
may be considered one single continuous offense. (Guinto vs. Veluz,
77 Phil., 801, 44 Off. Gaz., 909.)" (People vs. Pacheco, 93 Phil.,
521.)
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we
repeat, one single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no
occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor
the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, this court has never
in the past, convicted any person of the "complex crime of rebellion
with murder". What is more, it appears that in every one of the cases
of rebellion published in the Philippine Reports, the defendants were
convicted of simple rebellion, although they had killed several
persons, sometimes peace officers (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 PhiL, 472;
U. S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil., 509, U. S. vs. Ayala, 6 Phil., 151; League
vs. People, 73 PhiL, 155).
Following a parallel line are our decisions in the more recent
cases of treason, resulting from eollaboration with the Japanese
during the war in the Pacific. In fact, said cases went further than the
aforementioned cases of rebellion, in that the theory of the
prosecution to the
522

effect that the accused in said treason cases were guilty of the
complex crime of treason with murder and other crimes was
expressly and repeatedty rejected therein. Thus, commenting on the
decision of the People's Court flnding the accused in People w.
Prieto (80 Phil., 138, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329) "guilty of * * * the crime
of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries" and
sentencing him to death, and on the contention of the Solicitor
General that Prieto had coimnitted the "complex crime of treason
with homicide", this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Tuason,
said:
"The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts

and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate
from treason. Under the Philippine treason law and under the United States
constitution defming treason, after which the former was patterned, there
must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort.
One without the other does not make treason.
"In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature part&kes, of a deed or
physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.)
This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is
charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime
and can not b.e the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for
possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a
robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a
prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass
are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant
be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another
offense where, as in this case, it is averfed as a constitutive ingredient of
treason. * * * Where imirder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of
treason * * * they can not be regarded separately under their general
denomination." (Italics supplied.)
Accordingly, we convicted the accused of simple treason and

sentenced him to Hfe imprisonment.
523
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 523

In People vs. Labra, 81 Phil., 377, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159,
we used the following language:
"The lower eourt found appellant guilty not only of treason, but of nrnrder,
for the killing of Tomas Abella, and, following the provisions of Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code sentenced him to death, the maximum penalty
provided by article 114.
"The lower court erred in finding appellant guilty of the murder of
Tomas Abella. The arrest and killing of Tomas Abella for being a guerilla, is
alleged in count 3 of the information, as one of the elements of the crime of
treason for which appellant is prosecuted. Such element constitute a part of
the legal basis upon which appellant stands convicted of the crime of
treason. The killing of Tomas Abella cannot be considered as legal ground
for convicfing appellant of any crime other than treason. The essential
elements of a given crime cannot be disintegrated in different parts, each
one stand as a separate grotmd to convict the accused of a different crime or
criminal offense. The elements constituting a given crime are integral and
inseparable parts of a whole. In the contemplation of the law, they cannot be
used for double or multiple purposes. Tliey can only be used for the sole
purpose of showing the commission of the crime of which they form part.
The factual complexity of the crime of treason does not endow it with the
functional ability of worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction.
Otherwise, the accused will have to face as many prosecution^ and
convictions as there are elements in the crime of treason, in open violation
of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy," (Italics supplied.)
The same conclusion was reached in People vs. Alibotod 82 Phil.,

164, 46 Off. Gaz., 1005, despite the direct partidpation of the def
endant therein in the maltreatment and killing of several persons.
In People vs. Vilo 82 Phil., 524, 46 Off. Gaz., 2517, we held:
"The People's Court, however, erred in classifying the crime as treason with
murder. The killing of Amado Satorre and one Segundo is charged as an
element of treason, and it therefore becomes identified with the latter crime,
and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment or used in combination
with treason to mcrease the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides." (People vs. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz. 3329. See also People vs.
Labra, 1^886, 46 Oif. Gaz., [Supp. to No. 1], 159.) (Italics supplied.)
524

To the same effect was our decision in People vs. Roble 83 Phil., 1,
46 Off. Gaz., 4207. We stated therein:
"The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complev crime
of treason with murders, with the result that the penalty provided for the
most serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing
the case from the standpoint of modifying circumstances, the court believed
that the same result obtained. It opined that the killings were murders
qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident
premeditation, superior strength, cruelty, and an armed band.
"We think this is error. The tortures and murders set forth fn the
information are merged in and formed part of the treason. They were in this
case the overt acts which, besides^ traitorous intention supplied a vital
ingredient in the crime." (Italics supplied.)
The accused in People vs. Delgado 83 PhiL, 9, 46 Off. Gaz., 4213,

had been convicted by the People's Court of "the crime of treason
complexed with the criine of murder" and sentenced to the extreme
penalty. In our decision, penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, we
expressed ourselves as follows:
The appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen. His adherence to the
Japanese forces of occupation and giving them aid and comfort by acting as
their spy, undercover man, investigator, and even killer when necessary to
cow and compel the inhabitants to surrender their firearms and disclose
information about the guerrillas has been fully established. His manner of
investigation and maltreatment of some of his victims like Tereso Sanchez
and Patricio Suico, was so cruel, brutal and inhuman that it is almost
unbelievable that a Filipino can commit and practice such atrocities
especially on his own countrymen. But, evidently, war, confusion and
opportunism can and do produce characters and monster unknown during
peace and normal times.
"The People's Court found the appellant guilty of treason complexed
with murder. The Solicitor General, however, maintains that the offense
committed is simple treason, citing the doctrine laid down by this court in
the case of People vs. Prieto, (L—399, 45 Oif. Gaz., 3329) but accompanied
by the aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 21, of the
Revised Penal Code, and not compensated by any mitigating circumstance,
and he recommends the imposition of the penalty of death. We agree with
the Solicitor General that on the basis of the ruling of this court
525
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 525

in the case of People vs. Prieto, supra, the appellant may be convicted only
of treason, and that the killing and infliction of physical injuries committed
by him may not be separated from the crime of treason but should be
regarded as acts performed in the commission of treason, although, as stated
in said case, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were
carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance." (Italics supplied.)
and reduced the penalty from death to life imprisonment and a fine
of F20,000.
Identical were the pertinent features of the case of People vs.
Adlawan, 83 Phil., 194, 46 Off. Gaz., 4299, in which, through Mr.
Justice Reyes (A), we declared:
"* * * we find merit in the contention that appellant should have not been
convicted of the so-called 'Complex crime of treason with murder, robbery,
and rape.' The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the information are
therein alleged not as specific offenses but as mere elements of \the crime of
treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and
identified with the general charged, they can not be used in combination
with the treason to increase the penalty under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto, L-399, January 29, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz.,
3329.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of treason only" (Italics
supplied.)
In People vs. Suralta, 85 Phil., 714, 47 Off. Gaz., 4595, the language
used was:
"* * * But the People's Court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the
complex crime of treason with murder, because murder was an ingredient of
the crime of treason, as we have heretofore held in several cases. (Italics
supplied.)
This was reiterated in People vs. Navea, 87 PhiL, 1, 47 Off. Gaz.,

Supp. No. 12, p. 252:
"The Solicitor General recommends that the appellant be sentenced for the
complex crime of treason with murder. We have already ruled, however, that
where, as in the present case, the killing is charged as an element of treason,
it 'becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be thz subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the
penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides" (Italics supplied.)
526

The question at bar was, also, taken up in the case of Crisologo vs.
People and Villalobos (94 PhiL, 477), decided on February 26,1954.
The facts and the rule therein laid down are set forth in our
unanimous decision in said case, from which we quote:
"The petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAPFE during the last
world war and at the time of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant
colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was on March 12, 1946,
accused of treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in an
information filed in the People's Court. But before the accused could be
brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13, 1947,
indicted for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as
the Articles of War, before a military court created by authority of the Army
Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three charges, two of which, the
first and third, were those of treason consisting in giving information and
aid to the enemy leading to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and
other persons with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the
USAFFE to surrender and cooperate with the enemy, while the second was
that of having certain civilians killed in time of war. Found innocent of the
first and third charges but guilty of the second, he was on May, 8, 1947,
sentenced by the military court to life imprisonment.
"With. the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311
abolishing the People's Court, the criminal case in that court against the
petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions of said Act, transferred to the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and there the charges of treason were
amplified. Arraigned in that tourt upon the amended information, petitioner
presented a motion to quash, challenging the jurisdiction of the court and
pleading double jeopardy because of his previous sentence in the military
court. But the court denied the motion and, after petitioner had pleaded not
guilty, proceeded to trial, whereupon, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition was filed in this court to have the trial judge desist from
proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case.
"It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court
different from that charged in the civil court and that even granting that the
offense was identical the military court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the same because the People's Court had previously acquired
jurisdiction over the case with th.e
527
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 527

result that the conviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first
point, it is urged that the amended information filed in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from those charged in
the military court. But we note that while certain overt acts specified in the
amended information in the Zamboanga court were not specified in the
indictment in the court martial, they all are embraced in the general charge
of treason, which is a continuous offense and one who commits it is not
criminally liable for as many crimes as there are overt acts, because all overt
act 'he has done or might Jiave done for that purpose constitute but a single
offense.' (Guinto vs. Veluz, 44 Off. Gaz., 909; People vs. Pacheco, L-4750,
promulgated July 31, 1953.) In other words, since the offense charged in the
amended information in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is
treason, the fact that the said information contains an enumeration of
additional overt acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment before the
military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do not in
themselves constitute a new and distinct offense from that of treasont and
this court has repeatedly held that a person cannot be found guilty of treason
and at the same time also guilty of overt acts specified in the information for
treason even if those overt acts,, considered separately, are punishable by
law, for the simple reason that those overt acts are not separate offenses
distinct from that of treason but constitute ingredients thereof." (Italics
suplied.)
Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion of this court, on

the question whether said crime may be complexed with murder,
when the former was committed through the latter, and it is so
alleged in the information, had positively and clearly crystalized
itself in the negative as early as January 29, 1948.
We have not overlooked the decision in People vs. Labra (L-
1240, decided on May 12, 1949), the dispositive paft of which partly
reads:
"Wherefore, the verdict of guilty must be affirmed. Articles 48, 114 and 248
of the Revised Penal Code are applicable to the offense of treason with
murder. However for lack of sufficient votes to impose the extreme penalty,
the appellant will be sentenced to life imprisonment. * * *."
Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code

and "the offense of treason with murder," it should be noted that we
affirmed therein the action of the
528

People's Court, which, according to the opening statement of our

decision, convicted Labra of "treason aggravated with murder".
Besides, the applicability of said articles was not disciissed in said
decision. It is obvious, from a mere perusal thereof, thaj; this court
had no intention of passing upon such question. Otherwise, it would
have explained why it did not follow the rule laid down in the
previous cases of Prieto, Labra (August 10, 1948), Alibotod, Vilo,
Roble, Delgado and Adlawan (supra), in which the issue was
explidtly examined and decided in the negative. Our continued
adherence to this view in the subsequent cases of Suralta, Navea,
Pacheco and Crisologo, without even a passing reference to the
second Labra case, shows that we did not consider the same as
reflecting the opinion of the court on said question. At any rate,
insofar as it suggests otherwise, the position taken in the second
Labra case must be deemed reversed by our decisions in said cases
of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo.
It is true that treason and rebellion are distinct and different from
each other. This does not detract, however, from the rule that the
ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are
absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. Besides there is more reason to apply said rule in the crime of
rebellion than in that of treason, for the law punishing rebellion
(Article 135, Revised Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of
engaging in war and committing serious violence among its essential
elements—thus clearly indicating that everything done in the
proseeution of said war, as a means necessary therefor, is embraced
therein—unlike the provision on treason (Article 114, Revised Penal
Code) which is less explicit thereon.
It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in authority
or an agent of a person in authority may
529
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 529

People vs. Hernandez, et aL
be committed with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil, 162),

homicide (People vs. Lojo, 52 Phil., 390) and murder (U. S. vs.
Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171; U. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385), and
rape may be perpetrated with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya, 34
Phil., 690), then rebellion may, similarly, be complexed with murder,
arson, or robbery. The conclusion does not follow, for engaging in
war, serious violence, physical injuries and destruction of life and
property are inherent in rebellion, but not in assault upon persons in
authority or agents of persons in authority or in rape. The word
"rebellion" evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted
authorities, but, also, civil war, on a bigger or lesser scale, with all
the evils that go with it, whereas, neither rape nor assault upon
persons in authority connotes 1
necessarily, or even generally, either
physical injuries, or murder.
In support of the theory that a rebel who kills in furtherance of
the insurrection is guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with
murder, our attention has been called to Article 244 of the old Penal
Code of the Philippines, reading:
"Los delitos particulares cometidos en tma rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo

de ellas, seran castigados respectivamente segun las disposiciones de este
Codigo.
"Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores seran penados como tales los
jefes principales de la rebelion o sedicion."
and to the foHowing observations of Cuello Calon (Derecho Penal,

Vol. II, p. 110), in relation thereto:
"Se establece aqui que el en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas,
comete otros delitos (v.g., roba, mata o lesiona), sera responsable de estos
ademas de los delitos de rebelion o sedicion. La dificultad consiste en estds
casos en separar los accidentes de la rebelion o s^dicion de los delitos
independientes de estas, y como las leyes no contienen en este punto
precepto alguno aplicable, su solucion ha quedado encomendada a los
tribunales. La
_______________
1 ln the Andaya case the victim was a girl twelve years of age.
530

jurisprudencia que estos han sentado considera como accidentes de la

rebelion o sedicion—cuya criminalidad queda embedida en la de estos
delitos, y, por tanto, no son punibles especialmente—los hechos de escasa
gravedad (v.g., atentados, desacatos, lesiones menos graves); por el

contrario, las inf racciofces graves, como el asesinato o las lesiones graves,
se consideran como delitos independientes de la rebelion o de la sedicion."
It should be noted, however, that said Article 244 of the old Penal
Code of the Philippines has not been included in our Revised Penal
Code. If the applicability of Article 48 to rebellion was determined
by the existence of said Article 244, then the elimination of the latter
would be indicative of the contrary.
Besides, the crime of rebellion, referred to by Cuello Calon, was
that punished in the Spanish Penal Code, Article 243 of which
provides:
"Son reos de rebelion los que se alzaren publicamente y ei? abierta

hostilidad contra el Gobierno para cualquiera de los objetos siguientes:
1. "Destronar al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del Reino, o

privarles de su libertad personal u obligarles a ejecutar un acto
contrario a su voluntad.
2. "Impedir la celebracion de las elecciones para Diputados a Cortes o
Senadores en todo el Keino, o la reunion legitima de las mismas.
3. "Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion de alguno de los
Cuerpos Colegisladores o arrancarles alguna resolucion.
4. "Ejecutar cuailquiera de los delitos previstos en el articulo 165.
5. "Sustraer el Reino o parte de el o algun cuerpo de trop'i de tierra o
de mar, o cualquiera otra clase de fuerza armada, de la obediencia
del Supremo Gobierno.
6. "Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros de la Corona de sus
facultades constitucionales, o impedirles o coartarles su libre
ejercicio. (Articulo 167, Codigo Penal de 1850.—Veanse las demas
concordancias del articulo 181.)"
Thus, the Spanish Penal Code did not specifically declare that
rebellion includes the act of engaging in war against the forces of the
Government and of using serious violence for the purposes stated in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal
531
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 531

Code. In view of this express statutory inclusion of the acts of war

and serious violence among the ingredients of rebellion in the
Philippines, it is clear that the distinction made by Cuello Calon
between grave and less grave offenses committed in the course of an
insurrection cannot be accepted in this jurisdiction. Again, if both
classes of offenses are part and parcel of a rebellion, or means
necessary therefor, neither law nor logic justifies the exclusion of the
one and the inclusion of the other. In fact, Cuello Calon admits that
"the difficulty lies in separating the accidents of rebellion or sedition
from the offenses independent therefrom." Ergo, offenses that are
not independent therefrom, but. constituting an integral part thereof
—committed, precisely, to carry out the uprising to its successful
conclusion—are beyond the purview of Article 244. Indeed, the
above quoted statement of CueUo Calon—to the effect that grave f
elonies committed in the course of an insurrection are independent
therefrom—was based upon a decision of t;he Supreme Court of
Spain of February 5, 1872, which we find reported in the Codigo
Penal de Filipinas, by Jose Perez Rubio, as follows:
"El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia en sentencia de 5 de Febrero de 1872,

tiene declarado: Que segun los articulos 184 del Codigo Penal de 1830, y
259 del reformado (1870), los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion
o sedicion o con motivo de ellas se castigan respectivamente segun las
disposiciones de los mismos Codigos; y con arreglo al decreto de amnistia
de 9 de Agosto de 1876 estan solo comprendidos en aquella gracia las
personas sentenciadas, procesadas 6 sujetas a responsabilidad por delitos
politicos de cualquiera especie cometidos desde el 29 de Septiembre de
1868; Que el asesinato del Gobernador Civil de Burgos na fu6 resultado de
movimiento alguno politico, sino de un mero tumulto que imprimio el
fanatismo, y cuya unica aparente tendencia era impedir que aquel
funcionario inventariase ciertos objetos artisticos que se decian existentes en
la Catedral: Que esto lo demuestran las salvajes voces de muerte proferidas
por los asesinos contra la persona del Gobernador; sin que al ejecutar en 6l
mismo recinto del templo los horrorosos hechos que aparecen en la causa,
alzasen bandera politica alguna ni dieran otro grito que el, en aquel
momento sacrilego e impio, de 'Viva la religion:' Que la apreciar la Sala
sentenciadora los hechos refe-
532

rentes al {jobernador Civil de delito de asesinato, penarlo con arreglo al

Codigo y declarar inaplicable el citado Decreto de Amnistia, no ha cometido
el error de derecho senalado en los casos 1.° 3.° del articulo 4.° de la ley
sobre establecimiento de la cajsacion criminal, ni infringido los articulos
250 y 259 del Codigo Penal de 1870." (Page 239; Italics supplied.) (See,
also, "El Codigo Penal", by Hidalgo Garcia, Vol. I, p. 623.)'
It is apparent that said case is not in point. There was no issue

therein on whether murder may be complexed with rebellion or
sedition. The question for determination was whether the killers of
the victim were guilty of the common crime of murder, or should
have been convicted only of rebellion or sedition. The court adopted
the first alternative, not because of the gravity of the acts performed
by the accused, but because they had no political motivation.
Moreover, the footnote to said quotation from Cuello Calon reads:
"Los atentados desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad u otros delitos contra el

orden publico cometidos en la sedicion o con motivo de ella, no son delitos
distintos de la sedicion, 3 octubre 1903, 19 noviembre 1906; la resistencia o
acometimiento a la fuerza publica por los sediciosos es accidente de la
rebelion, 23 mayo 1890.
"El asesinato de un gobernador cometido en el curso de un tumulto debe
penarse como un delito comun de asesinato, 5 febrero 1872. Sin embargo, la
jurisprudencia, tratandose de ciertos delitos, es vacilante; asi, v. g., el
acometimiento al teniente de alcalde se ha declarado en un fallo
independiente de la perturbacion tumultuaria promovida para impedir al
alcalde el cumplimiento de sus providencias, 16 marzo 1885, mientras que
un hecho analogo se ha considerado en otra sentencia ya citada como
accidente de la rebelion, 3 Octubre 1903. El acometimiento de los
sediciosos a la fuerza piiblica es accidente de la sedicion y no uno de los
delitos particulares a que se refiere este articulo, 23 de mayo 1890. Entre
estos delitos a que alude el precepto se hallan las lesiones que puedan causar
los sediciosos, 19 noviembre 1906." (Footnote 21, II Cuelo Calon, Derecho
Penal, pp. 110-111.) (Italics supplied.)
Thus in a decision, dated May 2, 1934, the Supreme Court of Spain

held:
"Considerando que la nota deferencial entre los delitos de rebelion y

sedicion, de una parte, y el de atentado, esta constituida por
533
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 533

la circunstancia de alzamiento publico que caracteriza a los primeros, los

cuales, por su indole generica, absorben a los de atentado y demas
infracciones que durante su comision y con su motivo se cometan, y
afirmandose como hecho en la sentencia recurrida que el procesado Mariano
Esteban Martinez realizo, en union de otros, el atendado que se le imputa sin
alzarse publicamente, cae por su base el recurso fundado en supuesto
distinto." (Jurisprudencia Criminal, Tomo 130, p. 551.) (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect are, likewise, the following:
"La provocacion y el ataque a la Guardia Civil por paisanos alzados

tumultuariamente para impejdir al Delegado de un Gobernador civil el
cumplimiento de sus providencias, no pueden estimarse constitutivos de un
delito distinto del de sedicion, ni ser, por tanto, perseguidos y penados
separadamente.
"La resistencia o el acometimiento de los sublevados a la fuerza publica

constituye, en su caso, una circuns.tancia o accidente de la sedicion y no es
delito de los que el Codigo Penal en este articulo (formerly Article 244, now
Article 227) supone que pueden cometerse en ella o con su motivo, los
cuales denomina delitos particulares, y manda que se penen conf orme a las
disposiciones del propio Codigo. (S. 23-5-890; G. 23-6-890; t. 44; pagina
671)" (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, p. 2411.) (Italics supplied.)
"La Audiencia condeno como autores de atentado a dos de los
amotinados que agredieron al alcalde, e interpuesto recurso de casacion
contra la sentencia, el Tribunal Supremo la casa. y anula, teniendo en
cuenta lo dispuesto en el articulo 250 (numero 3.°) del Codigo Penal;
'Considerando que el acto llevado a cabo por el grupo constituye una
verdadera sedicion, sin que sea licito el dividir este hecho y calificarlo de
atentado respecto a las personas que agredieron a dicho alcalde, porque el
acometimiento fue un accidente de la sedicion, de la cual' eran todos
responsables, ya se efectuara por los agrupados en conjunto o por uno solo,
por ser comun el objeto que se proponian y no individual; y al calificar y
penar este hecho la Audencia de Gerona, de atentado * * *, ha incurrido en
error de derecho e infringido los articulos 250 y siguientes del Codigo
Penal, por no haberlos aplicado, y el 263, numero 2.°, en relacion con el
264, numeros 1.° y 3.°, por su aplicacion * * *" (Sent, 3 octubre 1903.—
Gac. 12 Diciembre) (Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola, Tomo xxviii, p. 250).
These cases are in accord with the text of said Article 244, which
refers, not to all offenses committed in the
534

course of a rebellion or on the occasion thereof, but only to "delitos

particulares" or common crimes. Now, what are "delitos
particulares" as the phrase is used in said article 244? We quote from
Viada:
"Las disposicion defl primer parrafo de este artfculo no puede ser mas justa;
con arreglo a ella, los delitos particulares o coizmnes cometidos en una
rebelion or sedicion no deberan reputarse como accidentes inherentes a
estas, sino como delitos especiales, a dicha rebelion y sedicion ajenos, los
que deberan ser respectivamente castigados con las penas que en este
C6digo se las senalan. Pero, que delitos deberan considerarse como
comunes, y cuales como constitutivos de la propia rebelion o sedicion? En
cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece esta cuestion dificultad alguna, pues todo
hecho que no este comprendido en uno y otro de los objetos especificados
en los seis numeros del articulo 243 sera extraiio a la rebelion, y si se hallare
definido en algun otro articulo del C6digo, con arreglo a este debera ser
castigado como delito particular. Pero tratandose de la sedicion,
comprendiendose como objetos de la misma, en los numeros 3.°, 4.° y 5.°

del articulo 250, hechos que constituyen otros tantos ataques a las personas
o a la propiedad, cuales se consideran como accidentes inherentes a la
propria sedicion, y cuales deberari reputarse como delitos particulares o
comunes? En cuanto a los casos de los numeros 4.° y 5. , estimanos que el
objeto politico y social que se requiera para la realizacion de los actos en
aquellos comprendidos es el que debe servirnos de norma y guia, para
distinguir lo inherente a la sedicion de lo que es ajeno o extrano a ella.
Cuando no exista ese objeto politico y social, el acto de odio o venganza
ejercido contra los particulares o cualquiera clase del Estado, y el atentado
contra las propiedades de los ciudadanos o corporaciones mentados en el
numero 5.° del articulo 250, no seran constitutivos del delito de sedicion,
sino que deberan ser apreciados y castigados como delitos comunes, segun
las disposiciones respectivas de este Codigo—y por lo que toca a los actos
de odio o venganza ejercidos en la persona o bienes de alguna Autoridad o
sus agentes, estimamos que deberan
2
reputarse como delitos convunes todos
aquellos hechos innecesarios para la consecucion del fin particular que se
propusieran los sediciosos—y como esenciales, constitutivos de la propia
sedicion todos aquellos actos de odio o venganza que sean medio
racionalmente necesario para el logro del objeto especial a que se
encaminaran los esfuerzos de los sublevados. Asi, en el caso de la Cuestion
1
________________
2 The information in the case at bar alleges that the acts therein set f orth were comnaitted
"as a necessary means to commit tlie crime of rebellion."
535
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 535

expuesta en el comentario del articulo 258, es evidente que el fin que se

propusieron los sediciosos fue no pagar el impuesto a cuya cobranza iba a
pyoceder el comisionado; pero para lograr este objeto, como lo lograron, fue
preciso hacer salir del pueblo al ejecutor, y a este efecto, lo amenazaron, lo
persiguieron y llegaron hasta lesionarle. Esas amenazas y lesiones no
pudieron apreciarse, ni las aprecio tampoco la Sala sentenciadora, como
delito comun, sino como accidente inherente a la misma sedicion, por
cuanto fueron im medio racionalmente necesario para la consecucion del fin
determinado que se propusieron los culpables.
"Pero cuando tal necesidad desaparece, cuando se hiere por herir, cuando
se mata por matar, el hecho ya, no puede ser considerado como un accidente
propio de la sedicion, sino como tm delito especial, al que debe aplicarse la
pena al mismo correspondiente." (III Viada, pp. 311-312.) (Italks supplied.)
Cuello Calon is even more illuminating. He says:
"La doctrina cientifica considera los delitos llamados politicos como

infracciones de un caracter especial distintas de los denominados delitos
comunes. De esta apreciacion ha nacido la division de los delitos, desde el
punto de vista de su naturaleza intrinse'ca, en delitos politicos y delitos
comunes o de derecho comun.
"Se reputan delitos comunes aquellos que lesionan bienes juridicos
individuales (v. gr., los delitos contra la vida, contra la honestidad, contra la
propiedad, etc.).
"La nocion del delito poflitico no parece tan cl^ra. Desde luego revisten
este caracter los que atentan contra el orden politico del Estado, contra su
orden extenjo (independencia de la nacion, integridad del territorio, etc.) o
contra el interno (delitos contra el Jefe del Estado, contra la forma de
Gobierno, etc.)- Pero tambien pueden ser considerados como politicos
todos los delitos, cualesquiera, que sean incluso los de derecho comtin,
cuando fueron cometidos por moviles politicos. Deben, por tanto, estimarse
como infracciones de esta clase, no solo las que objetivamente tengan tal
caracter por el interes politico que lesionan, sino tambien las que,
apreciadas subjetivamente, maiiifiestan una motivacion de caracter politico.
"Asi podria formulares esta definicion: es delito politico el cometido
contra el orden politico del Estado, asi como todo delito de cualquiera otra
clase determinado por moviles poKttcos." (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal,
Tomo I, pp. 247-249.)
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the

political order, as well as such common crimes as may
536

be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is

the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippines Islands
or any part thereof." then said offense becomes stripped of its
"common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the
crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of tlie
latter.
Conformably with the foregoing, the case of murder against the
defendant in U. S. vs. Lardizabal (1 Phil., 729)—an insurgent who
killed a prisoner of war because he was too weak to march with the
retreating rebel forces, and could not be left behind without
endangering the safety of the latter—was dismissed upon the ground
that the execution of said prisoner of wwr formed part of, and, was
included in, the crime of sedition, which, in turn, was covered by an
amnesty, to the benefits of which said defendant was entitled.
True, in U. S. vs. Alfont (1 Phil., 115), the commander of an

unorganized group of insurgents was, pursuant to Article 244 of our
old Penal Code, convicted of homicide for having shot and killed a
woman who was driving a vehicle. But the complex crime of
rebellion with homicide was not considered in that case. Apart from
this, the accused failed to established the relation between her deaih
and the insurrection. What is more, it was neither proved nor alleged
that he had been prompted by political reasons. In other words, his
offense was independent from the rebellion. The latter was merely
the occasion for the commission of the former.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned decisions of this court
and the Supreme Court of Spain in cases of treason, rebellion and
sedition, are in line with the trend in other countries, as well as in the
field of international relations. Referring to the question as to what
offenses are
537
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 537

political in nature, it was said in In re Ezeta (62 Fed. Rep., 972):
"What constitutes an offense of a political character has not yet been

determined by judicial authority. Sir James Stephens, in his work, History of
the Criminal Law of England (Volume 2, p. 71), thinks that it should be
'interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for
extraditidn crimes if those crimes were incidental to and formed a part of
political disturbances.' Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the house of commons, in
1866, while discussing an amendment to the act of 'extradition, on which the
treaty between England and France was founded, gave this defmition: Any
offense committed in the course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or
political commotion.' Hansard's Debates Vol. 184, p. 2115. In the Castioni
Case, supra, decided in 1891, the question was discussed by the most
eminent counsel at the English bar, and considered by distinguished judges,
without a definition being framed that would draw a fixed and certain line
between a municipal or common crime and one of political character. 'I do
not think/ said Denman, J., 'it is necessary or desirable that we should
attempt to put into language, in the shape of an exhaustive definition,
exactly the whole state of things, or every state of things, which might bring
a particular case within the description of an offense of a political character/
In that case, Castioni was charged with the murder of one Rossi, by shooting
him with a revolver, in the town of Bellinzona, in the canton of Ticino, in
Switzerland. The deceased, Rossi, was a member of the state council of the
canton of Ticino. Castioni was a citizen of the same canton. For some time
previous to the nrurder, much dissatisfaction had been felt and expressed by
a large number of inhabitants of Ticino at the mode in which the political
party then in power were conducting the government of the canton. A
request was presented to the government for a revision of the constitution of

the canton and, the government having declined to take a popular vote on
that question, a number of the citizens of Bellinzona, among whom was
Castioni, seized the arsenal of the town, from which they took rifles and
ammunition, disarmed the gendarmes, arrested and bound or handcuffed
several persons connected with the government, and forced them to march
in front of the armed crowd to the municipal palace. Admission to the
palace was demanded in the name of the people, and was refused by Rossi
and another member of the government, who were in the palace. The crowd
then broke open the outer gate of the palace, and rushed in, pushing before
them the government officials whom they had arrested and bound. Castioni,
who was armed with a revolver, was among the first to enter. A second door,
which
538

was locked, was broken open, and at this time, or immediately after, Rossi,
who was in the passage, was shot through the body with a revolver, and died
very soon afterwards. Some other shots were fired, but no one else was
injured. Castioni fled to England. His extradition was requested by the
federal council of Switzerland. He was arrested and taken before a police
magistrate, as provided by the statute, who held him for extradition.
Application was made by the accused to the high court of justice of England
for a writ of habeas corpus. He was represented by Sir Charles Russell, now
lord chief justice. The attorney general, Sir Richard Webster, appeared for
the crown, and the solicitor general, Sir Edward Clarke, and Robert
Woodfal, for the federal council of Switzerland. This array of distinguished
counsel, and the high character of the court, commends the case as one of
the highest authority. It appeared from an admission by one of the parties
engaged in the disturbances 'that the death of Rossi was a misfortune, and
not necessary for the rising.' The opinions of the judges as to the political
character of the crime charged against Castioni, upon the facts stated, is
exceedingly interesting, but I need only refer to the following passages.
Judge Denman says:
"The question really is whether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man
was acting as one of a number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a
political character with a political object, and as part of thc political
movement and risiug in which he was taking part.'
"Judge Hawkins, in commenting upon the character of political offenses,
said:
'I cannot help thinking that everybody knows there are many acts of a
political character done without reason, done against all reason; but at the
same time one cannot look too hardly, and weigh in golden scales the acts of
men hot in their political excitement. We know that in heat, and in heated
blood, men often do things which are against and contrary to reason; but
none the less an act of this description may be done for the purpose of
furthering and in fwrtherance of a political rising, even though it is an act
which may be deplored and lamented, as even cruel and against all reason,
by those who can calmly reflect upon it after the battle is over.'
"Sir James Stephens, whose definition as an author has already been
cited, was one of the judges, and joined in the views taken as to the political
character of the crime charged against Castioni. The prisoner was
discharged. Applying, by analogy, the action of the English court in that
case to the four cases now before me, under consideration, the conclusion.
follows that the crimes charged here, associated as they are wlth the actual
conflict of armed forces, are of a political character.
539
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 539

"The draft of a treaty on International Penal Law, adopted by the congress of

Montevidecr in 1888, and recommended by the International American
Conference to the governments of the Latin-American natiojis in 1890,
contains the following provisions (Article 23):
"Political offenses, offenses subversive of the internal and external safety
of a state or common offenses connected ivith these, shall not warrant
extradition. The detettnination of the character of the offense is incumbent
upon the nations upon which the demand for extradition is made; and its
decision shall be made under and according to the provisions of the law
which shall prove to be most favorable to the accused:'
"I am not aware that any part of this Code has been made the basis of
treaty stipulations between any of the American nations, but the article cited
may be at least accepted as expressing the wisdom of leading jurists and
diplomats. The article is important with respect to two of its features: (1)
provides that a fugitive shall not be extradited for an offense connected with
a political offense, or with an offense subversive of the internal or external
safety of the state; and (2) the decision as to the character of the offense
shall be made under and according to the provisions of the law which shall
prove most favorable to the accused. The first provision is sanctioned by
Calvo, who, speaking of the exemption from extradition of persons charged
with political offenses, says:
'The exemption even extends to acts connected with political crimes or
offenses, and it is enough, as says Mr. Fuastin Helio; that a common crime
be connected with a political act, that it be the outcome of or be in the
outcome of or be in the execution of such, to be covered by the privilege
which protects the latter' Calvo, Droit Int. (3me ed.) p. 413, section 1262.
"The second provision of the article is founded on the broad principles of
humanity found everywhere in the criminal law, distinguishing its
administration with respect to even the worst features of our civilization
from the cruelties of barbarism. When this article was under discussion in
the international American conference in Washington, Mr. Silva, of
Colombia, submitted some observations upon the difficulty of drawing a

line between an offense of a political character and a coromon crime, and
incidentally ref erred to the crime of robbery, in terms worthy of some
consideration here. He said:
"In, the revolutions, as we conduct them in our countries, the common
offenses are necessarily mixed up with the political in
540

many cases. A colleague General Caamano (of Ecuador) knows how we

carry on wars. A revolutionist needs horses for moving-, beef to feed his
troops, etc.; and since he does not go into the public markets to purchase
these horses and that beef, nor the arms and saddfles to mount and equip his
forces, lie takes them from the first pasture or shop he find at hand. This is
called robbery everywhere, and is a common offense in time of peace, but in
time of war it is a circumstance closely allied to the manner of waging it.'
International American Conference, Vol. 2, p. 615." (Italics supplied.)
We quote the following from footnote (23) on pages 249-250, Vol. I,

of Cuello Calon's aforesaid work on "Derecho Penal."
"En algunos €6digo y leyes de fecha proxima ya se halla una defhucion de

estos delitos. El Codigo penal ruso, en el articulo 58, define como 'delitos
contra revolucionarios' los hechos encaminados a derrocar o debilitar el
poder de los Consejos de trabajadores y campesinos y de los gobiernos de la
Union de Republicas socialistas sovieticas, a destruir o debilitar la seguridad
exterior de la Union de Republicas Sovieticas y las conquistas economicas,
politicas y nacionales fundamentales de la revolucion proletaria.' El Codigo
Penal italiano de 1930 considera en su articulo 8.° como delito politico 'todo
delito que ofenda un interes politico del Estado o un derecho politico del
ciudadano.' Tambien se reputa politico el delito comun determinado, en todo
o en parte por motivos politicos. En la ley alemana de extradicion de 25
diciembre 1929 se definen asi: 'Son delitos politicos los atentados punibles
directamente ejecutados contra la existencia o la seguridad del Estado,
contra el jefe o contra un miembro del gobierno del Estado como tal, contra
ima corporacion constitucional, contra los derechos politicos las buenas
relaciones con el extranjero.' parrafo 3.°, 2.
"La 6a. Conferencia para la Unificacion del Derecho penal (Copenhague,
31 agosto—3 septiembre 1935) adopto la siguiente nocion del delito
politico:
"1. Por delitos politicos se entienden los dirigidos contra la

organizaeion y funcionamiento del Estado o contra los derechoa
que de esta organizacion y funcionamiento provienen para el
culpable.
"2. Tambien se consideran como delitos politicos los delitos de derecho

comun que constituyen hechos conexos con la ejecucion de los
delitos previstos en seccion 1.°: como los hechos dirigidos a
541
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 541

favorecer la ejecucion de un delito politico o a perniitir al autor de

este delito sustraerse a la aplicacion de la ley penal.
"3. No s6 consideraran delitos politicos aquellos a los que ?u autor sea
inducido por un motivo egoista y vil
"4. No se consideraran delitos los que creen un peligro para la
comimidad o un estado de terror." (Italics supplied.)
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence

overwhelmingly f avor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in f urtherance of a political offense, are divested of their
character as "common" offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of wkich they are mere ingredients,
and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a
graver penalty.
There is one other reason—and a fundamental one at that—why
Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If
murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely:
(1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and
prisidn mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of
prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder, reclmion temporal in
its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48, said pznalty would have to be meted out
to him, even in tke absence of a single aggravating circumstance.
Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of
the prosecution, wouW be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for tfoe purpose
of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him t® a penalty more
severe than that which would be proper
542
if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the

word of Rodriguez Navarro:
"La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace

referencia esjte articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente
en el principio
3
pro reo." (II Doctrina Pejial del Tribunal Supremo de Espana,
p. 2168. )
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71

(later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article
48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
"Las disposiciones. del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que

un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea
medio necesario para cometer el otro.
"En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas
grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represente la suma de las que
pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
"Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los
delitos por separado." (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrino Penal del Tribunal
Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163.)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in
said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penajty for the
graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not
exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged
w6re dealt with separately. The absenee of said limitation in our
Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of
said Article 48. Indeed, if oiie act constitutes two or more offenses,
there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing
that the penalty for the graver off ense be, in such case, imposed in
its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose
than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the
________________
3 Sve, also the comentarios el C6digo Penal, by A. Quintano Ripolles (Vol. I, pp.
396-397) and Derecho Penal, by Federico Puig Pena (Vol. I, p. 289).
543
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 543

penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this
benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or
more crimes are the result of a single act, the oflfender is deemed
,less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and
distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently
from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the
more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the
sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.
Did the framers of Article 48 have a different purpose in dealing
therein with an offense which is a means necessary for the
commission of another? To begin with, the culprit can not, then, be
considered as displaying a greater degree of malice than when the
two off enses are independent of each other. On the contrary, since
one offense is a necessary means for the commission of the other,
ilie evil intent is one, which, at least, quantitatively, is lesser than
when the two offenses are ufirelated to each other, because, in such
event, he is twice guilty of having harbored criminal designs and of
carrying the same into execution. Furthermore, it must be presumed
that the object of Article 48, in its entirvty, is only one. We cannot
assume that the purpose of the lawmaker, at the beginning of the
single sentence of which said article consists, was to favor the
accused, and that, before the sentence ended, the former had a
change of heart and turned about face against the latter. If the
second part of Article 48 had been meant to be unfavorable to the
accused—and, hence, the exact opposite of the first part—each
would have been placed in separate provisions, instead of in one
single article. If the first part sought to impose, upon the culprit, a
penalty less grave than that which he would deserve if the two or
more offenses resulting from his single act were punished separately,
then this, also, must be the purpose of the second part, in dealiiig
with an offense which is a necessary means f or the commission of
another.
544

People vs. Hernandez, et al
The accuracy of this conclusion is borne out by the fact that, since
1850, when the counterpart of our Article 48 was inserted in the
Penal Code of Spain, or for over a century, it does not appear to
have been applied by the Supreme Court thereof to crimes of murder
committed in furtherance of an insurrection.
Tncidentally, we cannot accept the explanation that crimes
committed as a means necessary for the success of a rebellion had to
be prosecuted separately under the provisions of Article 259 of the
Penal Code of Spain, which is the counterpart of Article 244 of our
old Penal Code. To begin with, these articles are part of a
substantive law. They do not govern the manner or method of
prosecution of the culprits. Then again, said precepts ordain that
common crimes committed during a rebellion or sedition, or on the

occasion thereof, "shall be respectively punished according to the
provisions of this Code." Among such provisions was Article 90
(later Article 71, then Article 75) of the Spanish Penal Code, and
Article 89 of our old Penal Code, of which Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines is a substantial reproduction. Hence,
had the Supreme Court of Spain or the Philippines believed that
murders committed as a means necessary to attain the aims of an
uprising were "common" crimes, the same would have been
complexed with the rebellion or sedition, as the case may be.
The cases of People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 64) and Peopte vs.
Cabrera (43 Phil., 82) have not escaped our attention. Those cases
involved members of the constabulary who rose publicly, for the
purpose of performing acts of hate and vengeance upon the police
force of Manila, and in an encounter with the latter, killed some
members thereof. Charged with and convicted of sedition in the first
case, they were accused of murder in the second case. They pleaded
double jeopardy in the second case, upon the ground that the facts
alleged in the information were those set forth in the charge in the
first case, in which they had
545
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 545

been convicted. This plea was rejected upon the ground that the
organic law prohibited double jeopardy for the same offense, and
that the offense of sedition is distinct and different f rom that of
murder, although both were the result of the same act.
The question whether one offense was inherent in, or identified
with, the other was not discussed or even considered in said cases.
Besides, the lower court applied, in the murder case Article 89 of the
old Penal Code—which is the counterpart of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code—but this Court refused to do so. Again, simply
because one act may constitute two or more offenses, it does not
follow necessarily that a person may be prosecuted for one after
conviction for the other, without violating the injunction against
double jeopardy. For instance, if a man fires a shotgun at another,
who suffers thereby several injuries, one of which produced his
death, may he, after conviction for murder or homicide, based upon
said fatal injury, be accused or convicted, in a separate case, for the
non-fatal injuries sustained by the victim? Or may the former be
convicted of the complex crime of murder or homicide with serious
and/or less serious physical injuries? The mere formulation of these
questions suffices to show that the limitation of the rule on double
jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense does not
constitute a license for the separate prosecution of two offenses
resulting from the same act, if one offense is an essential element of

the other. At any rate, as regards this phase of the issue, which was
not touched in the Cabrera cases, the rule therein laid down must
necessarily be considered modified by our decision in the cases of
People vs. Labra (46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159) and Crisologo
vs. People and Villalobos (supra,), insofar as inconsistent therewith.
The main argument in support of the theory seeking to complex
rebellion with murder and other offenses is that "war"—within the
purview of the laws on rebellion and sedition—may be "waged" or
"levied" without killing.
546

This premise does not warrant, however, the conclusion—drawn

therefrom—that any killing done in furtherance of a rebellion or
sedition is independent therefrom, and may be complexed therewith,
upon the ground that destruction of human life is not indispensable
to the waging or levying of war. A person may kill anothsr without
inflicting physical injuries upon the latter, such, for instance, as by
poisoining, drowning, suffocation or shock. Yet it is admitted that he
who f atally stabs another cannot be convieted of homicide with
physical injuries. So too, it is undeniable that treason may be
committed without torturing or murdering anybody. Yet, it is well-
settled that a citizen who gives aid and comfort to the enemy by
taking direct part in the maltreatment and assassination of his
(citizen's) countrymen, in furtherance of the wishes of said enemy, is
guilty of plain treason, not complexed with murder or physical
injuries, the later being—as charged and proven—mere ingredients
of the former. Now then, if homicide may be an ingredient of
treason, why can it not be an ingredient of rebellion? The proponents
of the idea of rebellion complexed with homicide, etc., have not
even tried to answer this question. Neither have they assailed the
wisdom of our aforementioned decisions in treason cases.
The Court is conscious of the keen interest displayed, and the
considerable efforts exerted, by the Executive Department in the
apprehension and prosecution of those believed to be guilty of
crimes against public order, of the lives lost, and the time and money
spent in connection therewith, as well as of the possible implicatlons
or repercussions in the security of the State. The careful
consideration given to said policy of a coordinate and coequal
branch of the Government is reflected in the time consumed, the
extensive and intensive research work undertaken, and the many
meetings held by the members of the court for the purpose of
elucidating on the question under discussion and of settling the
same.
547
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 547

The role of the judicial department under the Constitution is,

however, clear—to settle justiceable controversies by the application
of the law. And the latter must be enf orced as it is—with all its
flaws and def ects, not affecting its validity—not as the judges
would have it. In other words, the courts must apply the policy of
the State as set forth m its laws, regardless of the wisdom thereof.
It is evident to us that the policy of our statutes on rebellion is to
consider all acts committed in furtherance thereof—as specified in
Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code—as constituting
only one crime, punishable with one single penalty—namely, that
prescribed in said Article 135. It is interesting to note, in this
connection, that the penalties provided in our old Penal Code
(Articles 230 to 232) were much stiffer, namely:
1. Life imprisonment to death—for the promoters, maintainers

and leaders ol the rebellion, and, also, for subordinate
officers who held positions of authority, either civil or
ecclesiastical, if the pufpose of the movement was to
proclaim the independence of any portion of the Philippine
territory;
2. Reclusion temporal in its maximum period—for said
promoters, maintainers and leaders of the insurrection, and
for its subordinate officers, if the purpose of the rebellion
was any of those enumerated in Article 229, except that
mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
3. Rechtswn temporal: (a) for subordinate officers other than
those already adverted to; and (&) for mere participants in
the rebellion f alling under the first paragraph of No. 2 of
Article 174; and
4. Prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal
in its minimum period—for participants not falling under
No. 3.
After the cession of the Philippines to the United States, the rigors of
the old Penal Code were tempered. Its aforementioned provisions
were superseded by section 3 of Act No. 292, which reduced the
penalty to imprisonment f or not
548

more than ten (10) years and a fine not exceeding $10,000, or
F20,000, for "every person who incites, sets on foot, assists or
engages in any rebellion or insurrection * * * or who gives aid and
comfort to any one so engaging in such rebellion or insurrection."
Such liberal attitude was adhered to by the authors of the Revised
Penal Code. The penalties therein are substantially identical to those
prescribed in Act 292. Although the Revised Penal Code increased
slightly the penalty of imprisonment for the promoters, maintainers
and leaders of the uprising, as well as for public officers joining the
same, to a maximum not exceeding twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, it reduced the penalty of imprisonment for mere participants
to not more than eight (8) years of prision mayor, and eliminated the
fine.
This benign mood of the Revised Penal Code becomes more
significant when we bear in mind it was approved on December 8,
1930 and became effective on January 1, 1932. At that time the
communists in the Philippines had already given ample proof of
their widespread activities and of their designs and potentialities.
Prior thereto, they had been under surveillance by the agents of the
law, who gathered evidence of their subversive movements,
culminating in the prosecution of Evangelista, Manahan (57 Phil.,
354; 57 Phil., 372), Capadocia (57 Phil., 364), Feleo (57 PhiL, 451),
Nabong (57 Phil., 455), and others. In fact, the first information
against the first two alleged that they committed the crime of
inciting to sedition "on and during the month of November, 1930,
and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto."
As if this were not enough, the very Constitution adopted in
1935, incorporated a formal and solemn declaration (Article II,
section 5) committing the Commonwealth, and, then the Republic of
the Philippines, to the "promotion of social justice". Soon later,
Commonwealth Act No. 103, creating the Court of Industrial
Relations, was passed.
549
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 549

Then followed a number of other statutes implementing said

constitutional mandate. It is not necessary to go into the details of
said legislative enactments. Suffice it to say that the same are
predicated upon a recognition of the f act that a good many of the
problems confronting the State are due to social and economic evils,
and that, unless the latter are removed or, least minimized, the
former will keep on harrassing the community and affecting the
wellbeing of its members.
Thus, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the

begining of the century, has been one of decided leniency, in
comparison with the laws enforce during the Spanish regime. Such
policy has not suffered the slightest alteration. Although the
Government has, for the past five or six years, adopted a more
vigorous course of action in the apprehension of violators of said
law and in their pwsecution, the established policy of the State, as
regards the punishment of the culprits has remained unchanged since
1932. It is not for us to consider the merits and demerits of such
policy. This falls within the province of the policy-making branch of
the government—the Congress of the Philippines. However, the
following quotation from Cuello Calon indicates the schools of
thought on this subject and the reason that may have influenced our
lawmakers in making their choice:
"Durante muchos siglos, hasta tiempos relativamente cercanos, se reputaban

los hechos que hoy llamaxnos delitos politicos como mas graves y
peligrosos que los crimenes comunes. Se consideraba que mientras estos
solo causan un dafio individual, aquellos producen profundas perturbaciones
en fla vida collectiva llegando a poner en peligro la mis/ma vida del Estado.
En consonancia con estas ideas fueron reprimidos con extraordinaria
severidad y designados con la denominacion romana de delitos de lesa
majestad se catalogaron en las leyes penales como los crimenes mas
temibles.
"Pero desde hace poco mds de un siglo se ha realizado en este punto una
transf ormacion profunda merced a la cual la delincuencia politica dejo de
apreciarse con los severos criterios de antano quedando sometida a un
regimen penal, por regla general suave y benevolo.
550

"El origen de este cambio se remonta, segun opinion muy difundida, a la

revolucion que tuvo lugar en Francia en el ano 1830. El gobierno de Luis
Felipe establecio una honda separacion entre los delitos comunes y los
politicos, siendo estos sometidos a una penalidad mas suave y sus autores
exceptuados de la extradicion. Irradiando a otros paises tuvieron estas tan
gran difusion que en casi todos los de regimen liberal-individualista se ha
llegado a crear un tratamiento desprovisto de severidad para la represion de
estos hechos. No solo las penas con que se conminaron perdieron gran parte
de su antigua dureza, sino que en algunos paises se creo un regimen penal
mas suave para estos delicuentes, en otros se abolio para ellos la pena de
muerte. Tan profundo contraste eiitre el antiguo y el actual tratamiento de la
criminalidad politica en la mayoria de los paises solo puede ser explicado
por las ideas nacidas y difundidas bajo los regimenes politicos liberales
acerca de estos delitos y delincuentes. Por una parte se ha afirmado que la
criminalidad de estos heqhos no contiene la misma inmoralidad que la

delincuencia comuri, que es tan solo relativa, que depende del tiempo, del
lugar, de las circumstandias, de las instituciones del pais. Otros invocan la
elevacion de los moviles y sentimientos determinantes de estos hechos, el
amor a la patria, la adhesion ferviente a determinadas ideas o principios, el
espiritu de sacrificio por el triunfo de tm ideal.
"Contra su trato benevolo, del que no pocas veces se han beneficiado
peligrosos malhechores, se ha iniciado hace algun tiempo una fuerte
reaccion (vease Cap. XV, 3.°, b), que llego a alcanzar considerable
severidad en las legislaciones de tipo .autoritario, y que tambien ha hallado
eco, en forma mas suave, en las de otros paises de constitucion democratica
en los que, especialmente en los ultimos aiios, la frecuencia de agitaciones
politicas y sociales ha originado la publicacion de numerosas leyes
encaminadas a la proteccion penal del Estado." (Cuello Calon, Derecho
Penal, Tomo 1, pp. 250-252.)
Such evils as may result from the failure of the policy of the law
punishing the offense to dovetail with the policy of the law
enforcing agencies in the apprehension and prosecution of the
off'enders are matters which may be brought to the attention of the
departments concerned. The judicial branch can not amend the
former in order to suit the latter. The Court cannot indulge in judicial
legislation without violating the principle of separation of powers,
and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system. In
short, we cannot accept the theory of the prosecution without
causing much bigger harm than
551
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 551

Peopte vs. Hernandez, et al.
that which would allegedly result f rom the adoption of the opposite
view.
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients
of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as
means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of
rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended
information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the
maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed
twelve (12) years of prisidn mayor and a fine of F20,000; and that,
in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may may
be allowed bail.
It is urged that, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court should

deny the motion under consideration, because the security of the
State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction appealed
from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Amado V. Hernandez is
strong. However, as held in a resolution of this court, dated January
29, 1953, in the case of Montano vs. Ocampo (G. R. L-6352):
"* * * to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it
must also appear that in case of conviction the defendant's criminal liability
would probably call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive
showing before this Court has been made."
In fact, in the case at bar, defendant Amado V. Hernandez was

sentenced by the lower court, not to the extreme penalty, but to life
imprisonment. Furthermore, individual f reedom is too basic, too
transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be denied
upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public
safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major
preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied
________________
4 In the language of the information.
552

with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of

section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution
devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14),
(15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to^ the protection
of several aspects of freedom. Thus,, in line with the letter and spirit
of the fundamental law, we said in the aforementioned case of
Montano vs. Ocampo:
"Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise

absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the
courts has been toward a fair and liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise,
of the evidence in the determination of the degree of proof and presumption
of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right."
* * *
"In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other
important factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose of confining
accused in jail before conviction, it has been obseryed, is to assure his
presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital
cases, it is only on the theory that the prOof being strong, the defendant
would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.
Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied
in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution.
"The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the defendant's
official and social standing and his other personal circumstances, seems
remote if not nil."
This view applies f ully to Amado V. Hernandez, with the

particularity that there is an additional circumstance in his favor—he
has been detained since January 1951, or for more than five (5)
years, and it may still take some time to dispose of the case, for the
same has not been, and is not in a position to be, included, as yet, in
our calendar, inasmuch as the briefs for some appellants—other than
Hernandez—as well as the brief for the Government, are pending
submission. It should be noted, also, that the decision appealed from
the opposition to the motion in question do not reveal satisfactorily
and concrete, positive
553
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 553

act of the accused showing, sufficiently, that his provincial release,

during the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the security of
the State.
Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of defendant-
appellant Amado V. Hernandez is hereby granted and, upon the
filing of a bond, with sufficient sureties, in the sum of P30,000, and
its approval by the court, let said defendant-appellant be
provisionally released. Is is so ordered.
Parás, C. J., Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo and Reyes. J. B. L., JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, J., concurs in the result.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
Amado V. Hernandez and others were charged in the Court of First

Instance of Manila with the crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies. The body of the information charged that he
and his co-defendants conspired and that "as a necessary means to
commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof," "have then and there committed acts of murder,
pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private
and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and
fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose,"
and recited the different crimes committed by the defendants. After
trial Amado V. Hernandez was found guilty and sentenced to suffer

life imprisonment from which judgment and sentence he appealed.
The appeal is pending in this Court.
Upon the ground that there is no complex crime of rebellion with
murder, the penalty provided for to be imposed upon persons found
guilty of rebellion
1
being prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000 only, the majority grants the petition for bail filed by the
appellant.
_______________
1 Article 135, Revised Penal Code.
554

Section 1, paragraph 16, Article III, of the Constitution provides:
All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except

those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.
Excessive bail shall not be required. (Italics supplied.)
The pertinent sections of Rule 110 provide:
SEC. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First
Instance.—After judgment by a justice of the peace and before conviction
by the Court of First Instance, the defendant shafll be admitted to bail as of
right.
SEC. 4. Noncapital offenses after conviction by the Court of First
Instance.—After convictioh by the Court of First Instance defendant may,
upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the court.
SEC. 5. Capital offenses defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in
this rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be
punished by death.
SEC. 6. Capital offenses not bailable.—No person in custody for the
commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of
his guilt is strong.
SEC. 7. Capital offenses—burden of proof.—On the hearing of an
applieation for admission to bail made by any person who is in custody for
the eommission of a capital offense, the burd'en of showing that evidence of
guilt is strong is on the prosecution.
SEC. 13. Bail on appeal.—Bail upon appeal must conform in all respects
as provided for in other cases of bail.
According to this Rule, a defendant in a criminal case after a

judgment of conviction by the Justice of the Peace Court and before
conviction by the Court of First Instance is entitled to bail. After

conviction by the Court of First Instance he, upon application, may
still be bailed in non-capital offenses but at the discretion of the
court. When the information charges a capital offense the defendant
is not entitled to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course
this means before conviQtion. After conviction for a capital offense,
the defendant has absolutely no right to bail, because even before
conviction a defendant charged with capital offense is not entitled to
bail if the evidence of guilt is strong. So that
555
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 555

should a defendant charged with a capital offense apply for bail

before conviction, the prosecution must establish and show that the
evidence of the defendant's guilt is strong if the applieation for bail
be objected to. After conviction of a defendant charged with a
capital offense there is no stronger evidence of his guilt than the
judgment rendered by the trial court. The judgment is entitled to full
faith and credit. Until after the evidence shall have been reviewed
and the reviewing court shall have found that the trial court
committed error in convicting the defendant of the crime charged,
the judgment and sentence of the trial court in such criminal case
must be taken at its face value and be given full faith and credit by
this Court.
Without a review of the evidence presented in the case, the
majority has taken up and discussed the question whether, under and
pursuant to the provisions of article 135 of the Revised Penal Code,
the complex crime of rebellion with murder may arise or exist or be
committed and has reached the conclusion that murder as an incident
to rebellion is integrated, imbibed, incorporated, or absorbed in, or
part and parcel of, the last mentioned crime. For that reason it is of
the opinion that, as the information filed against Amado V.
Hernandez does not charge a capital offense, he may be admitted to
bail at the discretion of the Court.
Even if the majority opinion that the crime charged in the inf
ormation is rebellion only—a non-capital offense—be correct, still
the granting of bail after conviction is discretionary, and I see no
plausible reason for the reversal of this Court's previous stand,
because the security of the State is at stake.
For these reasons I dissent.
MONTEMAYOR, J., dissenting:
Unable to agree to the resolution of the majority, I am constrained to

dissent therefrom, not so much from
556

the part thereof granting the motion for bail, as where it holds not
only that there can be no complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, robbery, arson, etc., but that these crimes when committed
during and on the oceasion of a rebellion, are absorbed by the latter.
The new doctrine now being laid down besides being, to my mind,
quite radical and in open and clear contravention of public policy, is
fundamental and of far-reaching consequences, and I feel it myMuty
not only to voice my dissent but also to state the reasons in support
thereof.
The resolution cites and quotes Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code to support its theory that the five acts enumerated therein
particularly those of engaging in war against the forces of the
government, destroying property and committing serious violence,
cover all the murders, robberies, arsons, etc., committed on the
occasion of or during a rebellion; and it procefeds to assert that the
expressions used in said article, such as engaging in war against the
forces of the government and committing serious violence imply
everything that war connotes such as physical injuries and loss of
life. In this connection, it is of profit and even necessary to refer to
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code defining and describing how
the crime of rebellion is committed.
"ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection—How committed.—The crime of

rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government for the purpose of iremoving from the allegiance to
said Government or its laws, the territory of the Pihlippine Islands or any
part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any
of their powers or prerogatives."
According to the above article, rebellion is committed by rising

publicly and taking arms against the government for the purpose or
purposes enumerated in said article. In other words, the commission
of rebellion is complete and consummated if a group of persons for
the
557
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 557

purposes enumerated in the article, rise publiely, take up arms and

assemble. It is not necessary for its consummation that anybody be
injured or killed, be it a, government soldier or civilian, or that
innocent persons be forcibly deprived of their properties by means
of robbery or that their stores and houses be looted and then burned
to the ground. Stated differently, murders, robberies, arsons, etc., are
not necessary or indispensable in the commission of rebellion and,
consequently, are not ingredients or elements of the latter.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code providing for "Penalty for
complex crimes" reads thus:
"ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.—When a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committmg: the other, the penalty for the inost serious crlme shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maxinram periocL" (As amended
by Act No. 4000.)
For better understanding, I deem it advisable to ascertain and

explain the meaning of the phrase "necessary means" used in Article
48. "Necessary means" as interpreted by criminologists, jurists and
legal commentators, does not rnean indispensable means, because if
it did, then the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another
would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an
ingredient thereof. That would be true in the offense of trespass to
dwelling to commit robbery in an inhabited house, or the infliction
of physical injuries to commit homicide or murder. The phrase
"necessary means" used in Article 48, merely signifies that for
instanse, a crime such as simple estafa can be and ordinarily is
committed in the manner defined and described in the Penal Code;
but, if the "estafador" resorts to or employs falsification, merely to
facilitate and insure his committing the estafa, then he is guilty of
the complex crime of estafa thru falsification. So, if one desiring to
rape a certain woman, instead of waiting for an opportunity where
she could be alone or helpless, in
558

the fields or some isolated place, abducts her by force and takes her
to a forest to ravish her; or he enters her home through a window at
night and rapes her in her room, then he is guilty of the complex
crime of abduction with rape or rape with tresspass to dwelling. The
reason is that the commission of abduction of tresspass to dwelling
are not indispensable means or ingredients of the crime of rape.
They are but means selected by the culprit to facilitate and carry out
perhaps more quickly his evil designs on his victim. Says the
eminent Spanish commentator, Groizard, on this point:
"Una cosa anologa acontece respecto de los delitos conexionados con una
relacion de medio a fin. Tanibien en ellos la unidad dc acto moral, que da
vida al delito, hace logica la imposicion de una sola pena. Preciso es, sin
embargo, distinguir el caso en que el delito medio sea medio necesario de
realizar el delito fin, del caso en que sea puramente medio, pero no medio
indispensable. En aquel, el delito medio no es, en realidad, sino una
condicion precisa, una circumstancia sine qua non, un elemento integral de
la accion punible concebida como fin. Sin pasar por uno, seria imposible
llegar al otro. La voluntad, libre e inteligente, tiene entonces por unico
objeto llegar al delito fin. Si al recorrer su camino ha de pasar,
indispensablemente, por la comision de otro hecho punible, no dos, sino un
delito habra que castigar, toda vez que uno fue el mal libremente querido, no
siendolo el otro por si, sino en tanto que era necesario para obtener la
realizacion del mal proposito concebido."
* * *
"Asi, hay que reconocer que es plausible que, cuando un delito es medio
de realizar otro, se imponga al culpable la pena correspondiente al mayor en
su grado maximo; pero que no los es si resulta que ha sido medio necesario.
Por lo contrario, para que sea justo el aumento de pena, con arreglo a la
doctrina general acerca del delito y las circunstancia agravantes, es preciso
que existan y no se aprovechen otros procedimientos, otros recursos, mas o
menos faciles para consumar el delito. Entonces la responsibilidad se hace
mayor eligiendo un medio que sea un delito en si. El que puede, haciendo
uso de su libertad y de su inteligencia, escoger entre varios procedimientos
para llegar a un fin, y se decide por uno que por si solo constituye delito, de
este delito no necessario para la realizacion del proyectado como fin, debe
responder tambien."
* * *
559
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 559

"Ejemplo: el allanamiento de domicilio como medio de llegar al delito de

violaci6n. No es condicion necesaria, para que la violacion pueda realizarse,
el entrar en la morada ajena contra la voluntad de su dueiio. Sin esa
circunstancia, el delito puede existir. Ahora bien; si el criminal acepta como
medio de llegar a la violacion el allanamiento de domicilio, este delito y el
de violacion deben ser castigados observandose en la aplicacion del castigo
una unidad de penalidad que guarde cierta analogia con la unidad de
pensamiento que llevo en ctilpable a la realizacion de ambos delitos. Para
estos y analogos casos, la razon aprueba la imposicion de la mas grave de
las penas en su grado maximo." (Groizard, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Tomo

II, pp. 495-496.)
Applying the above observations to the crime of rebellion as

definied in Article 134, the same may be committed by merely rising
publicly and taking arms against the government, such as was done
on several occassions as alleged in the information for rebellion in
the present case where a group of Hukbalahaps, entered towns,
overpowered the guards at the Presidencia confiscated fireams and
the contents of the municipal treasurer's safe, exacted eontributions
in the form of money, foodstuffs and clothing from the residents and
maintained virtual control of the town for a few hours. That is
simple but consummated rebellion. Murder, robbery, arson, etc., are
not necessary or indispensable to consummate the crime of
rebellion.
But in other cases, this group or other groups of dissidents in
order to facilitate achieving their objective to overthrow the
government, according to the findings of the trial courts in several
cases of rebellion, resorted to looting and robberies to raise funds to
finance their movement, sometimes killing civilians who refused to
contribute or to be recruited to augment the forces of the rebels or
who were suspected of giving information to the government forces
of the movements of the dissidents. Sometimes, homes of town and
barrio residents are set on fire and burned to the ground in reprisal or
in order to strike terror into the hearts of the inhabi-
560

tants, so that they would be more amenable to the rule and the
demands of the rebels. At other times, civilians were kidnapped for
purposes of ransom, and some hostages killed when the ransom was
not paid or was not forthcoming. In the raid on Camp Macabulos in
Tarlac, besides shooting down soldiers and officers, buildings were
set on fire, including the hospital, as a result of which, patients
including a Red Cross nurse were killed. In another case, a
passenger bus containing about forty civilian passengers in Sta.
Cruz, Zambales, was held up by these armed dissidents; the
passengers were robbed of their money and jewelry and fourteen of
them were shot to death. The party of Mrs. Aurora Quezon while on
its way to the town of Baler, was ambushed in Bongabong, Nueva
Ecija by the dissidents and several members of the party, including
herself, her daughter, her son-in-law, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon
City, and others were killed, and their persons despoiled of jewelries
and belongings. It is clear that all these acts of murder, vandalism,
banditry and pillage cannot be regarded as ingredients and
indispensable elements of the crime of rebellion. The aforecited acts

and cases, the enumeration of which is far from complete, are not
based on mere suspicion or hearsay. They are alleged as facts in the
numerous counts contained in complaints or informations for
rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc. in
several separate cases in the Courts of First Instance, some still
pending trial but quite a number already decided and now pending
appeal before us. There must be much truth to these charges and
counts because in the case against Huk Supremo Luis Taruc,
William Pomeroy et al., (criminal case No. 19166 C.F.I., Manila)
Pomeroy pleaded guilty to all the thirty counts against him; so did
Taruc after seven counts had been eliminated from the thirty
contained in the information. Among the twenty three counts
remaining to which Taruc pleaded guilty were the holding
561
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 561

up of forty civilians in a passenger bus in Sta. Cruz, Zambales, and

the night raid on Camp Macabulos where hospital patients and a Red
Cross nurse were killed.
Since the above mentioned crimes of multiple murder, robbery,
kidnapping, ete., are not ingredients of rebellion nor indispensable to
its commission but only means selected and employed by the
offenders to commit rebellion and achieve their goal, a complex
crime is committed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Going back to the theory of the majority in the resolution that the
phrase engaging in war and committing serious violence used in
Article 134, covers the crimes of murder, robbery, arson, etc.,
committed during a rebellion, I emphatically disagree. Engaging in
war and levying war, against the government, are general terms
employed in the United States statutes to define rebellion and
treason. They are used interchangeably and have the same meaning
in our law on rebellion and treason, (Articles 114, 134, 135, Revised
Penal Code) which are based on Act 292 of American origin. They
do not necessarily mean actual killing of government troops, much
less of innocent civilians.
"Levying War.—The assembling of a body of men for the purpose of

effecting by force a treasonable object; and all who perform any part,
however, minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are
leagued in the general conspiracy, are considered as engaged in levying war,
within the meaning of the constitution." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. 2,
p. 1938.)
This Tribunal defines "levying war" in the case of U. S. vs.

Lagnason, 3 PhiL, 478-9, thus:
"Whatever differences there may have been among the early judges as to
whether an armed resistance to the enforcement of a public law (see Act No.
292, section 5, 1) constituted a levying of war or not, and was or was not
treason, yet they were all unanimous in holding that acts of violence
committed by an armed body of men with the purpose of overthrowing the
Govern-
562

ment was "levying war against the United States," and was therefore
treason, whether it was done by ten men or ten thousand. (See United States
vs. Hanway, 2 WalL, jr., 139; 26 Fed. Cases, 105.)
* * *
"As the act of engaging in a rebellion is levying war, and therefore

treason, the same act seems to be punished by both sections and in different
ways." (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil., 48-9.)
Just as a citizen can commit treason by adhering to the enemy and

committing treasonable overt acts such as pointing out and helping
arrest guerrillas, accompanying enemy soldiers on patrol and giving
valuable information to the enemy, without himself killing anyone of
his countrymen, this although Article 114 uses the phrase levying
war to define treason, so, although Article 135 uses the phrase
"engaging in war", a group of individuals may also commit rebellion
by merely rising publicly and taking arms against the government
without firing a single shot or inflicting a single woimd.
But the majority says that serious violence mentioned in Article
134 may include murder. To me, this view is untenable. From
serious violence to the capital offense of murder, certainly, is a far
cry. Besides, serious violence can also be on things. In my opinion,
the different acts mentioned in Article 135, among them, destroying
property, committing serious violence, exacting contributions or
diverting public funds, instead of giving license and unlimited leave
to rebels and dissidents to engage in mass murder, looting and
wholesale destruction of property, on the contrary, serve to limit and
restrict the violations of law that may be included in and absorbed
by rebellion. Article 135 mentions those acts which generally
accompany a public armed uprising. When rebels raid a town or
barrio, manhandling of civilians who obstruct their movements or
fail to carry out their orders such as to lend their carabaos and carts
for transportation
563
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 563

purposes, or to contribute food, clothes, medicines, money etc., may

be expected. The rebels may employ force to disarm the policeman
guarding the Presidencia and if he offers resistance beat him up or,
once inside, break down the door of the treasurer's office, blow up
his safe and carry away the money contents thereof. All these acts
involve violence, even serious violence on persons and things,
including diversion of public funds. But knowing that these law
violations, relatively not serious, are generally unavoidable in public
armed uprisings involving hastily assembled persons and groups
with little discipline' the law tolerates them, considering them as part
of the rebellion. But when rebels rob innocent civilians, kidnap them
for purposes of ransom, even kill them merely because they fail to
pay the ransom, and civilian houses are put to the torch, endangering
the lives of the inmates; when civilians are killed for refusing to
contribute, or on mere suspicion of their giving information to the
government, I cannot believe that these brutal act are condoned by
the law and are to be included in the crime of rebellipn.
The majority leans heavily on our decisions in several treason
cases wherein we refused or failed to convict of the complex crime
of treason with multiple murder. To me, those cases are neither
controlling nor applicable for several reasons. Almost invariably,
indictment in those treason cases alleged the killings committed by
the indictees as ingrediente and elements of treason. They are
mentioned as the overt acts to establish and prove treason. Naturally,
the court held that being ingred'ients of the crime of treason they
cannot be considered as distinct and separate offenses for the
purpose of applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Another
reason is that, treason being a capital offense, this court did not see
any immediate necessity for considering and applying the theory of
complex crime because the result would in many cases be practically
the same. In other words, treason might yet be said to absorb the
crime of homicide, even
564

of murder, because as regards the penalty, they are of the same

category. Still another reason, not an unimportant one is that at that
time, opinion among the members of this Tribunal on the question of
complex crime of treason with homicide, sedition with murder and
rebellion with murder, arson, robbery, etc., had not yet crystalized,
one way or the other. So, we preferred to avoid ruling on the issue,
specially since by considering the commission of murder, robbery,
etc., in treason as aggravating the crime, we would achieve the same
result as regards the penalty to be imposed.
But in the case of People vs. Perfecto Labra, G. R. No. 1240,
May 12, 1949, this court through Mr. Justice Bengzon, accepted the
view of the Solicitor General that under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, Labra was guilty of the complex crime of treason with
murder, as shown by the dispositive part of otir decision in that case,
which is quoted below:
"Wherefore, the verdict of guilt must be affirmed. Artiele 48, 114 and 248 of
the Revfsed Penal Code are applicable to the offense of treason with murder.
However, for lack of sufficient votes to impose the extreme penalty, the
appellant will be sentenced to life imprisonment."
The only reason why the death penalty was not imposed in said case
was because of lack of sufficient votes but evidently, the Justices
were agreed as to the application of Article 48 of the Penal Code
regarding complex crimes.
Then In the treason case of People vs. Barrameda, 85 PhiL, 789,
47 Off. Gaz., 5082, on the strength of our deeision in the case of
Labra, the Solicitor General recommended that Barrameda be also
convicted of the eomplex crime of treason with multiple murder and
sentenced to death. This Tribunal accepted the Solicitor GeneraPs
recommendation and imposed the death penalty in the following
language:
"We entertain not the least doubt as to the guilt of the appellant. His very
counsel de oficio who made an analysis of the testimonies of the witnesses
for the prosecution and painstakingly stated them in detail in his brief,
agrees that his client is guilty
565
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 195 565

although he prays that the sentence of life imprisonment be affirmed. The

Solicitor General, however, recommends that the penalty of death be
imposed upon the appellant. Considering that the treason committed by the
appellant was accompanied not only by the apprehension of Americans (U.
S. citizens) and their delivery to the Japanese forces which evidently later
executed them, but also by killing with his own hands not only one but
several Filipinos, his own countrymen, and that in addition to this, he took
part in the mass killing and slaughter of many other Filipinos, we are
constrained to agree to said recommendation. However, unpleasant, even
painful is the compliance with our duty, we hereby impose upon the
appellant Teodoro Barrameda the penalty of death which will be carried out
on a day to be fixed by the trial court within thirty (30) days after the return
of the record of the case to said court."
With the two aforecited cases, it may not be said that the Supreme
Court has always held that there can be no complex crime of treason
with murder.
The theory of the majority is that the crime of rebellion with the
maximum penalty of twelve years and fine, absorbs the other crimes
of murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., as long as the latter are
committed in the course and in furtherance of the former. The idea
of one crime absorbing a more serious one with a more severe
penalty does not readily appeal to the reasonable and logical mind
which can only eomprehend a thing absorbing another smaller or
less than itself in volume, in importance, in value or in category.
That is why Judge Montesa in the three cases, People vs. Hernandez,
People vs. Espiritu, and People vs. Medina, criminal cases Nos.
15481, 15479 and 1411 respectively, of the Court of First Instance,
Manila, in his decision convicting the accused therein, in disposing
of the theory of absorption, urged upon him by counsel for the
defense to the effect that the crime of rebellion absorbs the crime of
murder, robbery, arson, etc., made the following observations:
"The theory of absorption tenaciously adhered to by the defense to the effect

that rebellion absorbs all these more serious offenses is preposterous to ,say
the least, considering that it is both physically
566

and metaphysically imposible for a smaller unit or entity to absorb a bigger

one." (Montesa, J., People vs. Hernandez G. R. No. 15481, p. 78.)
We need not go into an academic discussion of this question because

as a matter of law, my opinion, criminal jurisprudence, expounding
the criminal law namely the Penal Code and the Penal Code of
Spain, on which it is based, expressly and clearly declare that the
common crimes of murder, robbery, arson, etc., committed in the
course or by reason of rebellion, are separate crimes, not to be
merged in or absorbed by rebellion and should be prosecuted
separately. Article 259 of the Penal Code of Spain, of 1870 on which
our Penal Code promulgated in 1887, was based, provides as follow:
"Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebellion o sedicion 6 con motivo

de ellas, seran castigados respectivamente, segun las disposiciones de este
Codigo.
"Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores, seran penados como tales

los jefes principales de la rebelion 6 sedicion." (Groizard, El Codigo Penal
de 1870, Tomo III, Articulo 259, p. 649.)
In commenting on Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code, Viada

says:
" 'La disposicion del primer parrafo de este articulo no puede ser mas justa;
con arreglo a ella, los delitos particulares o comunes cometidos en una
rebellion o sedicion no deberan reputarse como accidentes inherentes a
estas, sino como delitos especiales a dicha rebellion y sedicion ajenos, los
que deberan ser respectivamente castigados con las penas que en este
Codigo se les senalan. Pero que delitos deberan considerarse como
comunes, y cuafles como constitutivos de la propia rebelion o sedicion? En
cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece este cuesti6n dificultad alguna, pues todo
hecho que no este comprendido en uno u otro de los objetos especificados
en los seis niimeros del Articulo 243 sera extrano a la rebelion, y si se
hallere definido en algun otro articulo del Codigo, con arreglo a este debera
ser castigado como delito particular.'" (Viada, Codigo Penal, Tomo II, 198-
199.)
Pefia, another commentator, referring to Article 259 of the Spanish

Penal Code, has the following to say:
"La disposicion de este articulo es sobradamente justa, pero cuando se

entendera que el hecho es independiente de la insurgencia?
567
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 567

Tratandose de la rebelion no hay problema, pues toclos los fines que se

indkan en el Articulo 214 se distinguen facilmente de un asesinato, un robo,
una violacion, etc. El problema puede surgir con la sedicion, en cuyos tres
ultimos ntimeros, dice un autor, se tipifican conductas que muy bien pueden
ser subsimidas en otros lugares del Codigo. El T.S. parece que sigue est,e
principio general: las infracciones graves se considerdn como delitos
independientes, en cambio los heehos de menor gravedad puedan ser
considerados como accidentes de la rebelion. En este sentido, el T. S. ha
declarado que son accidentes de la rebelion, los desacatos y lesiones a la
autoridad y otros delitos contra el orden piiblico, asi como la resistencia o
acometiendo a la fuerza publica (23 Mayo 1890). El abuso de superioridad
tambien es inherente el alzamiento tumultuario (19 noviembre 1906.)" (Pena
Deredes Penal, Tomo II pp. 89-90.)
Another commentator, A. Quintano Ripolles, says of Article 259 of

the Spanish Penal Code, counterpart of Article 244 of our old Penal
Code:
"La concurrencia de delitos consignada en este articulo no piiede ser mds

justa, bien que la dificultad persista siempre para determinar cuales han de
ser los particulares accidentales y cuales los integrantes de la propia
subversion. Una doctrina demasiado simplista, que ha sido a menudo
seguida por la Jurisprudencia, es la de estimar que, absorbiendo el delito
mds grave al que lo es menos, todo el que por debajo del de rebelion o
sedicion sera anulado por este. Para los de la misma naturaleza, la cosa es
incuestionable, pero no para los que la tengan diversa, entendiendo por la
estrana e iraprecisa expresion de (particulares) a las infracciones comunes o
no politicas." (A. Quintano Eipolles, Comentarios al Codigo Penal Vol. II,
pp. 101-102; cursivas con nuestras.)
Another distinguished legal commentator gives his view on the same

Article 259:
"Se establece aqui que en una rebelion 6 sedicion, o con motivo de ellas,
comente otros delitos (v. g., roba, mata o lesiona), seBd responsable de estos
ademas de los delitos de rebelion o sedicion. La dificultad consiste en estos
casos en separar los accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion de los delitos
independientes de estas, y como las leyes no contienen en este punto
precepto alguno aplicable, su solucion ha quedado encomendada a los
tribunales. La jurisprudencia que estos han sentado considera como
accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion—cuya criminalidad queda embebida en
la de estos delitos, y, por tanto, no son punibles especialmente—los hechos
de escasa gravedad (v:g., atentados, desacatos, lesiones menos
568

graves); por e'l contrario, las infracciones graves, como el asesinato o las
lesiones graves, se eonsideran como delitos independientes de la rebelion o
de la sedieion," (Cfmello Gakm, Vol. .2 Dereeho Penal p. 110.)
Finally, 'Groizard, another eminent commentator of the Penal code

of Spain, in commenting on the same Article 259 of the Spanish
Penal Code of 1870, says the following:
"No necesita ninguno el parrafo primero de este articulo. Aunque no se

hubiera escrito en el Codigo, harian los Tribunales lo que dice. Seria
necesario para que asi no sucediera el que fuera la rebelion un motivo de
exencion de responsabilidad criminal para las demas clases de delitos."
(Groizard Tomo 3, 650.)
It will be seen that Spanish jurists and legal commentators are, with
reference to Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870,
unanimous in the opinion that this provision of the Criminal Law is
just and fair because one should not take advantage of his
committing the crime of rebellion by committing other more serious
crime such as murder, robbery, arson, etc., with impunity. The above
much commented Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code has its
counterpart in Article 244 of our old Penal Code in practically the
same wording and phraseology:
"ART. 24. All other crimes committed in the course of a rebellion of

seditious movement, or on occasion thereof, shall be punished in accordance
with the rules of this Code.
"If the perpetrators of such crimes can not be discovered, the principal
leaders of the rebellion or sedition shall be punished therefore as prineipals."
In this jurisdiction, we have faithfully observed and applied this

penal provision. In the cases of U. S. vs. Cabrera, et al., 43 PhiL,
page 64 and page 82 for sedition and multiple murder respectively,
wherein members of the Philippine constabulary attacked and killed
several policemen in the City of Manila, this Court convicted said
soldiers, first, of sedition and later, of multiple murder, clear proof
that the murders committed in the course of and by reason of the
sedition were not included in and, absorbed by sedition, this despite
the fact that our law
569
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 569

on sedition then, section 5 of Act No. 292 uses the Words—rise

publicly and tinnHltuousIy, in order to attain by f orce or outside of
legal methods any of the following objects are guilty of seditioiu IB
the imdtiple murder ease, the sergeants and corporals of the
constabulary, who took part in the killing of the city policemen, were
sentenced to death. This court in that case said:
"It is merely stating the obvicms to say that sedition is not the same offense
as murder. Sedition is a ctime against public order; murder is a crime against
persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the State, the
authority of the government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a
crime directed against the lives of individuals. (U. S. vs. Abad (1902) 1 Phil.
437.) Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the state; murder at common law is where a person of sound
min(J and discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the
sovereign, with malice aforethought, express or implied.
"The oflfenses eharged in the two informations for sedition and murder
are perfectly distinct in point of law, howevery nearly they may be
connected in point of faet. Not alone are the offieiises "eo nomine" different,
but the allegations in the body of the informations are different. The gist of
the infornaation for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the
constabulary in order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the
object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons of the police
force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several placea in the city of
Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case is that the
constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight
persons aad gravely wcmnded three others. The crimes of murder and'
serious physical inj.uries were not necessarily included in the
infoipnsDation for sedition; and the defendants could not have been
convictedi of these crimes under the first information." (Phil. Vol. 43, pages
99-100.)
There is an insinuation made in the majority resolution, that the

American Law on sedition and rebellion, the origin of our present
law on the subject, is more benign and- liberal than its counterpart in
the Spanish Penal Code, defining and penalizing sedition and
rebellion, and that under American jurisprudence, rebellion and
sedition include crimes like murder, robbery, arson, etc., committed
570

in the course thereof. But it will be noticed that of the nine Justices
who signed the decision in the case of People vs. Cabrera for
multiple murder, five, including Mr. Justice Malcolm, who penned
the decision, were Americans, supposed to be steeped in American
Law and the common law, and yet they all held that sedition where
force is expected to be used, did not include murder. It is evident
that the insinuation made in the majority resolution is not exactly
borne out by the Cabrera case.
The majority asks why in the past, especially up to 1932, when
our Revised Penal Code was promulgated no one had ever been
prosecuted, much less convicted of rebellion or sedition complexed
with murder, robbery, etc., if it is true that there is such a complex
crime of rebellion with murder. For that matter, one may even ask
why the constabulary soldiers in the Cabrera case were not charged
with the complex crime of sedition with murder. The reason and the
answer are obvious. Until 1932, the year of the promulgation of our
Revised Penal Code, our old Penal Code included Article 244, the
counter-part of Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code, to the effect
that common crimes like murder, robbery, arson, committed on the
occasion or by reason of a rebellion or seditibn, are to be prosecuted
separately. That was why insurgents who committed rebellion or
insurrection with homicide or murder during the first days of the
American regime in the Philippines, could not be charged with the
complex crime of rebellion with murder; and that explains why
Cabrera and his co-accused could not be charged with the complex
crime of sedition with multiple murder, but were prosecuted
separately for multiple murder.
The majority also asks why the insurgents in the year 1901 and
1902 were charged only with rebellion but never with murder
despite the fact that there was proof that they also had committed
murder in the course of the rebellion or insurrection. The reason to
my mind was that, shortly thereafter, came the proclamation of
amnesty
571
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 571

issued by President McKinley of the United States, which amnesty

covered not only the crime of rebellion but also other violatioiis of
the law committed in the course of the rebellion.
Then came our Revised Penal Code promulgated in 1932. It is a
revision of our old Penal Code of 1887. One of the purposes of the
revision was simplification, and elimination of unnecessary
provisions. In proof of this, while our Penal Code of 1887 contained
611 articles, our Revised Penal Code contains only 367 articles.
Among the articles of the old Penal Code not included in the
Revised Penal Code, is Article 244. Does the omission or
elimination of Article 244 mean that now, common crimes like
murder, robbery, arson, etc., committed in the course of a rebellion
or sedition are absorbed by rebellion or sedition? Hardly. It cannot
be that the committee on revision and our legislators abandoned the
idea and the theory contained in said Article 244, because as I have
already explained, all the Spanish commentators and jurists
commenting on this particular provision of the Spanish Penal Code
are agreed that it is a just and reasonable provision, so that sedition
and rebellion may not be utilized as a cloak of immunity in the
commission of other serious crimes, To me, the reason for the
omission is that it was really unnecessary. As Groizard said in his
commentary already reproduced, even if that provision were not
embodied in the penal code, the court would still apply said
provision:
"No necesita ninguno el parrafo primero de este articulo. Aunque no se

hubiera escrito en el Codigo, harian los Tribunales lo que dice. Seria
necesario para que asi no sucediera el que fuera la rebelion un motivo de
exencion de responsabilidad criminal para las demas clases de delitos."
(Groizard Tomo 3, p. 650.)
The members of the committee on revision of our old Penal Code

who must have been familiar with the opinion and comments of
eminent Spanish jurists, particularly the above comment of Groizard
undoubtedly, deemed the provision of Article 244 superfluous and
unnecessary, and so
572

omitted it in the revision. However, this omission of Article 244 of

our Penal Code in the new, has an important effect. No longer shall
we be obliged to prosecute murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc.,
committed in the course of and by reason of a sedition or a rebellion,
separately. The prosecution is now free to combine these common
crimes with the crimes of sedition or rebellion and charge a complex
crime. And that is what has been done in the prosecution of the
numerous cases of rebellion.
This idea, this theory of complex crime of rebellion with mutiple
murder, etc., is not such a strange, extravagant or fantastic
proposition or idea. We are not the 'ohly ones holding this view. Out
of seven separate cases, all involving the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder and etc., decided in the Court of First Instance,
not long ago, cases No. 14070—People vs. Lava; No. 15841—
People vs. Hernandez; No. 2878—People vs. Capadocia; No. 10400
—People vs. Salvador No. 2704—People vs. Nava; No. 19166—
People vs. Pomeroy and the same case 19166—People vs. Taruc,
only one judge, Hon. Gregorio Narvasa, of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, held that there is no complex crime of rebellion
with murder, and his holding was based mainly if not entirely on the
decisions of this Tribunal in the treason cases which as I have
already explained, are not controlling or applicable. In the other
cases, five judges of Courts of First Instance, Judges Ocampo,
Castelo, Barcelona, Gatmaitan, and Montesa, held that there is such
a complex crime of rebellion with murder and actually convicted the
accused of said complex crime. Again, in the case of People vs.
Umali, et al., criminal case No. 11087 of the Court of Pirst Instance
of Quezon Province, Judge Gustavo Victoriano, convicted the
accused of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, etc.
Recently, in several criminal cases pending in Pangasinan, involving
the complex crimes of rebellion with multiple murder, etc., Judge
Morfe of the Court of First Instance of that province acting upon
573
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 573

motions to quash the informations on the ground that there was no

such complex crime of rebellion with murder and consequently, the
informations were not in accordance with law, for charging more
than one offense, in a well reasoned and considered order, denied the
same and held that there is a complex crime of rebellion with

murder. Of course, these opinions of judges of the lower courts are
not binding on this tribunal but surely, they are persuasive ard can
not be ignored. At least, they show that there are others, learned in
the law, who subscribe to the theory of complex crime of rebellion
with murder, arson, etc.
Our decision in the case of People vs. Umali, (96 Phil., 185),
promulgated on November 29, 1954, is another proof that murders
committed in the course of sedition or rebellion are not absorbed by
the latter. In said case, this court in a unanimous decision found the
defendants therein guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson,
frustrated murder and physical injuries and sentenced them
accordingly. The question may again be asked, if there is such a
complex crime of sedition with murder, arson, etc., why were Umali
and his co-accused not convicted of this complex crime? The answer
is found in a portion of our decision in that ca&e which we quote:
"The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense or offenses

committed. Appellants were charged with and convicted of the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and
robbery. Is there such a complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
etc? While the Solicitor General in his brief claims that appellants are guilty
of said complex crime and in support of his stand 'asks for leave to
incorporate by reference' his previous alrguments in opposing Umali's
petition for bail, counsel for appellants considered it unnecessary to discuss
the existence or non-existence of such complex crime, saying that the nature
of the crime committed 'is of no moment to herein appellants because they
had absolutely no part in it whatsoever'. For the present, and with respect to
this particular case, we deem it unnecessary to decide this important and
controversial question, deferring its consideration and determination to
another case or occasion more opportune, when it is more directly and
squarely raised and both
574

parties given an opportunity to discuss and argue the question more

adequately and exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for the moment
that there is no such complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., and that
consequently appellants could not have been legally charged with it, much
less convicted of said complex crime, and the information should therefore,
be regarded as having charged more than one offense, contrary to Rule 106,
section 12 and Rule 113, section 2(e), of the Rules of Court, but that
appellants having interposed no objection thereto, they were properly tried
for and lawfully convicted if guilty of the several and separate crimes
charged therein, we have decided and we rule that the appellants may
properly be convicted of said several and separate crimes, as hereinafter

specified. We feel particularly supported and justified in this stand that we
take, by the result of the case, namely, that the prison sentence we impose
does not exceed, except perhaps in actual duration, that meted out by the
court below, which is life imprisonment."
The majority resolution invokes and applies the principle of the so

called pro reo in connection with Article 48 of our Revised Penal
Code on complex crimes, to the effect that said article should not be
applied when the resulting penalty exceeds the sum total of the
several crimes committed constituting the complex crime.
According to the majority, the theory of pro reo is that the principle
of complex crime was adopted for the benefit of the accused and not
to his prejudice; so, it is to be applied when the maximum of the
penalty for the more serious crime is less in severity or duration of
imprisonment than the sum total of the several crimes committed,
but not otherwise. This is a novel theory in this jurisdiction. To my
knowledge it has never been advanced before. All along and during
all these years, the courts of this country not excluding this august
tribunal had been applying the provisions of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, and its source, Article 89 of our Penal Code of
1887, regardless of whether or not the resulting penalty was
prejudicial to the accused. As a matter of fact, in most cases the
resulting penalty imposed by this tribunal in complex crimes was
much more severe and of longer duration (imprison-
575
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 575

ment) than the sum total of the two or more crimes committed. In
the numerous cases decided by this court involving the complex
crime of estafa through falsification, the maximum of the penalty for
the more serious crime of falsification was imposed although it
exceeded the total of the penalties for estafa and for falsification. In
cases of rape with physical injuries the maximum of the penalty for
the crime of rape was imposed although it exceeded in duration and
severity the total of the penalty for rape and that for the relatively
light penalty for physical injuries. In the case of People vs. Parulan
(88 Phil., 615), involving the complex crime of kidnapping with
murder, this tribunal applied the provision of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code and would have sentenced the accused to death,
were it not for one dissenting vote based not on the applicability of
Article 48, but on the question of jurisdiction. Said this court:
"La pena que debe imponerse al acusado Parulan es la del delito mas grave
de secuestro en su grado maximo, o sea, pena capital. Pero el Magistrado Sr.
Tuason, consecuente con su opinion disidente en Parulan contra Rodas,

supra, no puede confirmar la pena capital impuesta por el Juzgado de
Primera Instancia de Manila que segun el no tenia jurisdiccion sobre la
presente causa. En vista de este voto disidente, el presidente del tribunal Sr.
Paras y tres magistrados aunque creen que el acusado Parulan, por las
pruebas presentadas, merece pena capital, con todo no pueden votar por la
confirmacion porque el delito se cometio antes de la aprobacion de la Ley
de la Eepublica No. 296, que solo exige ocho votos para la imposicion de la
pena capital. Automaticamente, por ministerio de la ley debe imponerse a
Parulan la pena inmediatamente inferior a la de muerte, que es la de
reclusion perpetua con las accesorias." (88 Phil., p. 624.)
*
Then in the case of People vs. Guillen 47 Off. Gaz., 3433,
involving the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted
murder committed by the accused with a single act of hurling a hand
grenade at President Roxas, this tribunal in a per curiam decision,
ignoring the aggravating circumstances that attended the
commission of 4he crime, applied the maximum of the penalty for
the more serious
_______________
* 85 Phil,, 307.
576

crime of murder in accordance with Article 48 of the Revised Penal

Code and sentenced the accused to death. Other instances and cases
may be cited ad libitum to show that in this jurisdiction and in this
tribunal, the principle of pro reo was never entertained, much less
accepted.
Origin of pro reo principle
Up to the year 1908, the Spanish Penal Code had the following
provisions for complex crimes:
"Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que

un solo hecho constituya dos o mas deflitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea
grave, aplicandola en su grado maximo."
The above provisions were copied in our Penal Code of 1887 under
Article 89 which reads thus:
"The provisions of the next preceding article are not applicable to cases in
which a single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when one offense is a
necessary means for committing the other.
"In these cases, only the penalty of the more serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum degree."
On January 3, 1908, the Spanish Penal Code was amended,

particularly paragraph 2 of Article 90 thereof so as to add to said
paragraph the following clause:
"Hasta el limite que represente la suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse,
penando separadamente ambos delitos."
so that since January 1908, Article 90 of the Spanish Penal Code

reads:
"Las aisposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que

un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea
grave, aplicandola en su grado maximo hasta el limite que represente la
suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente ambos
delitos."
The amendment is the provision for the so called pro reo rule. But
we never accepted much less followed said innovation in the
Philippines. We did not amend Article 89
577
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 577

of our old Penal Code particularly paragraph 2 thereof so as to add

the clause:
"Hasta el limite que represente la suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse,
penando separadamente ambos delitos."
inserted by the amending Spanish Law of January 3, 1908 to the

second paragraph of Article 90 of the Spanish Pen&3 Code.
Furthermore, when we draf ted and promulgated our Revised Penal
Code in 1932 (Article No. 3815) we ignored and did not accept the
amendment to the Spanish Penal Code that favored one accused of a
complex crime as regards the penalty, so that now our law on the
subject is contained in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which
as amended by Act No. 4000, reads as follows:
"AnT. 48. Penalty for complex erimes.—When a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (As amended by
Act No. 4000.)
The majority resolution makes a more or less extensive dissertation

and citation of authorities on the law of extradition, intended to
show that common crimes such as murder, etc., committed on the
occasion of or in the course of the commission of political crimes
like sedition and rebellion, are not subject to extradition. We believe
that these citations and these arguments are neither relevant nor
applicable. All we can say is that a murder committed in the course
of a rebellion or sedition may be considered a political crime in
contemplation of the extradition law and that a persoii accused of
said murder is not subject to extradition. But a crime may be
considered political from the standpoint of the extradition law and
yet may be regarded by the country where committed as a common
crime separate and distinct from the rebellion or sedition in the
course of which it was committed, and, consequently, subject to
prosecution. Moreover, the fact that a murder committed in the
course of a sedition or rebellion is excluded from the scope of the
extradition agreement between
578

nations, is proof and argument that were it not for its exclusion, the
member nations of the extradition agreement, where murders are
committed in the course of a rebellion or sedition may and would
extradite the offenders, on the theory that said murders are separate
from and are not absorbed by the rebellion or sedition; otherwise,
there would be no need for excluding such crimes of murder, arson,
etc., committed during a rebellion or sedition, from the scope of the
extradition law. And among such nations which consider these
common crimes of murder, etc., as separate from rebellion or
sedition during which they were committed, are Spain, as shown by
Article 259 of its Penal Code, and the Philippines as illustrated in
the cases of U.S. vs. Cabrera and People vs. Umali, supra. Groizard
lists down several countries that consider common crimes
committed during a rebellion or sedition as subject to prosecution:
"Codigo del Canton de Zuxich.
S. 75. Si con motivo de la sedicion o como consecuencia fueren cottietidos otros

delitos, estos seran castigados conforme a las disposiciones penales para los mismos
fijadas.
"Codigo de Peru.
ART. 145. Los reos de rebelion, sedicion motin 6 asonada son responsables de los
delitos especiales que cometen, observandose lo dispuesto en el Articulo 45.
AKT. 146. Si no pudiese averiguarse quien de los sublevados cometio el delito
especial, se hara responsable a los autores del tumulto.
"Codigo de Chile.
ART. 131. Los delitos particulares cometidos en un sublevacion 6 con motivo de

ella, seran castigados respectivamente con las penas designadas para ellos, no
obstante le dispuesto en el articulo 129.—Si no pueden descubrirse los autores, seran
considerados y penados como complices de tales delitos los jefes principales 6
subalternos de ttos sublevados que hallandose en la posibilidad de impedirlos no lo
hubieren hecho.
"Codigo del Paraguay.
ART. 380. Los delitos particulares cometidos en la sedicion 6 con motivo de ella,
seran castigados con la pena que les corresponda por las leyes respectivas.
579
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 579

"Codigo de la Republica Argentina.
ART. 231. Los que cometen delitos comunes con motivo de la rebelion motin 6
asonada 6 con ocasion de ella, seran castigados con la pena que corresponde a esos
delitos.
"Codigo de Honduras.
ART. 224. (Como el xraestro.)
(Groizard, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Vol. 3, Artfculo 259, p. 650.)
In justice to the defendants-appellants in the present case, I wish to

explain and make clear that in mentioning and describing the serious
crimes of murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., alleged to have
been committed in the course of the rebellion or by reason thereof, I
am not referring particularly to the charge or charges and counts
alleged against them. Their case is now pending appeal in this
tribunal and their guilt or innocence of said charges or counts will be
decided in due time. And so, I am not imputing or attributing to
them the serious violations of law I haVe mentioned in this opinion.
Rather, I am making general reference to the informations filed in
other cases, especially in the informations against Luis Taruc and
William Pomeroy which case is not only decided but also is closed.
In conclusion, I hold that under the law and under general
principles rebellion punished with a maximum penalty of twelve
(12) years and fme cannot possibly absorb a much more serious
crimes like murder or kidnapping which are capital offenses and

carry the maximum penalty of death. It is hard for the mind to grasp
the idea that a person committing one lone murder may be headed
for the electric chair; but if perpetrates several murders,
kidnappings, arsons, and robberies and during their perpetration,
was still committing another crime, that of trying to ovorthrow his
own government by force, then all he gets is twelve years and fine.
Since, the serious crimes like multiple murder, robbery, arson,
kidnapping, etc., committed during the rebellion are not ingredients
of, nor are they indispensable to the commission of rebellion, and
were but means freely selected by the rebels to facilitate
580

their commission of rebellion or to achieve and specd up their

realization of their object, which was to overthrow the government
and implant their own system said to be of communistic ideology,
then under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the complex crime
of rebellion with murder, etc., was committed.
Judging by the numerous acts of atrocity contained in the several
informations filed against the rebels in different cases, not only
government soldiers and officers, but innocent civilians by the
hundreds were murdered. Stores and homes were looted; not only
public buildings, like presidencias and government hospitals, but
also private buildings and homes were burned to the ground. And as
a result of these acts of terrorism, entire barrios were abandoned and
landowners, especially owners of landed estates, evacuated to the
provincial capitals or to the cities for personal security. And it seems
that these acts of banditry and pillage still continue though on a
smaller scale.
Settled public policy or the policy of the Government as regards
rebellion and the crimes against persons and property committed by
the rebels is clear. With their taxes, the citizens are maintaining a
large army to put down the rebellion. Substantial rewards ranging
from P500 to FIOO',000 are offered for the apprehension of the
rebels, specially the leaders. A rebel leader with a P100,000 price on
his head, after a campaign of several years by the army, and after the
loss of lives of many soldiers and civilian guides, is finally captured.
The government pays down the P100,000 to those responsible for
the capture and charges him with the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, kidnapping, etc.,—a capital offense. Pending
trial, he asks to be released on bail and under the doctrine being laid
down by us, he is set at liberty, free to go back to the hills to resume
his dissident activities where he left off, by merely posting a bond
corresponding to a maximum imprisonment of twelve years

(P12,000)
581
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 581

and a fine the amount of which is left to the discretion of the trial
court. If he jumps his bail and assuming that the full amount of the
bond is confiscated, still, the Government which paid P100,000 for
his capture is the loser. It will have to wage another campaign to
recapture him and perhaps offer another reward for his
apprehension. This would illustrate the wide divergence between the
policy of the Government and the present ruling of the Court. That is
not as it should be. The three departments of the Government, the
Executive, the Legi&lative and the Judicial pepartment, though
independent of each other, should f unction as a team, harmoniously,
and in cooperation, all f or the public welfare. They cannot work at
cross purposes. All three should be guided by the settled public
policy of the state and this applies to the courts. In the case of Rubi
vs. provincial board of Mindoro, 39 PhiL, pp. 718-19, this court
speaking about the relation between interpretation of the law by the
courts and public policy, said:
"As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in
case of doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid, is
the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the
Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gamble vs.
Vanderbilt University (200 Southwegtern Reporter 510) the Chief of Justice
of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
'We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio
decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in the
last analysis, determined on the theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid
of analogies furnished by such prior cases. Jn balancing conflicting
solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will
best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or
principle.'
"Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous,
said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some
chances. (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911] 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the
many grave questions which this case presents, the court must take "a
chance," it should be, with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the
effectuation of the general
582

governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no
narrow and bigotted sense, but with that broad conception which will make
the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments
of the Government."
Now, by the majority resolution, this Court would spread the mantle
of immunity over all these serious crimes against persons and
property on the theory that they are all covered by, included in, and
absorbed by the crime of rebellion. Under this protective mantle
extended by us, instead of curbing and discouraging the commission
of these common serious crimes in accordance with public policy,
the commission of said crimes would be encouraged. No longer
would evil-minded men, outlaws, bandits, Jhesitate to kill and rob
and kidnap, because by pretending to be rebels or to be engaged in
rebellion, their acts of atrocity would be covered by rebellion, for
which they would get, at most, twelve (12) years and fine. No longer
would the spectre of the death penalty and the electric chair hang
sword of Damocles-like over the heads of would be kidnappers,
murderers and arsonists because by merely claiming to have
committed another additional crime, rebellion, under the doctrine
laid down by the majority resolution, capital punishment for all
capital crimes they have committed or may commit, is automatically
reduced to twelve (12) years and fine. It is evident that the effect of
the interpretation by this Court of the law on complex crimes, in
relation to rebellion and the common serious crimes committed
during and in the course thereof, runs counter to the settled public
policy on the subject.
Sad, indeed, is the role being played by this Tribunal in laying
down a doctrine of such far reaching consequences and in my
opinion of such baneful not to say disastrous effects on peace and
order and personal security, diametrically and utterly opposed to
settled public policy, when af ter all, we have now the opportunity
and the choice of accepting and adopting another view, another
interpretation of the law on complex crimes, to me more reasonable,
583
VOL. 99, JULY 20, 1956 583

People vs. Arinso
more logical and certainly, more in accordance with public policy,

and more in keeping with peace and order, personal security and the
public welfare.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
Endencia, JJ., concurs.
LABRADOR, J., dissenting:
I fully agree with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor

in so far as he holds that the complex crime of rebellion with murder
exists under our law. I also concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice
Padilla in so far as ,he holds that the petition f or bail should be
denied because of the danger that the release of the
petitionerappellant may cause to the security of the State. As the
appellant has been convicted by the Court of First Instance, he may
be admitted to bail in the sound discretion of the court. In the
interest of security the discretion should not be exercised in favor of
the granting of bail.
Petition granted.
_____________
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128) People vs. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 (1956) )

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2/20/2021 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 099

[Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs.

1. CMMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ELEMENTS OF: PENALTY.—

2. ID.; ID.; COMMON CRIMES PERPETRATED IN

3. ID.; ID.; COMPLEX CRIMES; ARTICLE 48 APPLIES ONLY

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; "PRO REO" PRINCIPLE; LESS CRIMINAL

516 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Hemandez, et al.

there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that

5. ID.; ID.; CBIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; WHEN ACCUSED

MOTION for bail pending appeal of the judgment of the Court of

This refers to the petition for bail filed by defendantappellant

VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 517

on December 22, 1955. A similar petition, filed on December'28,

"The tmdersigned accuses (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias

Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating, and cooperating

518 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 519

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:

It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same

"The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and

Pursuant to Article 135 of the same code "any person, merely

1. "engaging in war against the forces of the government",

520 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Hernandez, et al.

4. "exacting contributions or"

Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of

VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 521

resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collec

tion of taxes and contributions, restraint of Hberty, damage to

passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a contest between strangers.

522 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

"The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts

Accordingly, we convicted the accused of simple treason and

VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 523

The same conclusion was reached in People vs. Alibotod 82 Phil.,

524 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

The accused in People vs. Delgado 83 PhiL, 9, 46 Off. Gaz., 4213,

VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 525

This was reiterated in People vs. Navea, 87 PhiL, 1, 47 Off. Gaz.,

526 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 527

Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion of this court, on

Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code

528 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People's Court, which, according to the opening statement of our

VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 529

be committed with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil, 162),

"Los delitos particulares cometidos en tma rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo

and to the foHowing observations of Cuello Calon (Derecho Penal,

530 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

jurisprudencia que estos han sentado considera como accidentes de la

gravedad (v.g., atentados, desacatos, lesiones menos graves); por el

"Son reos de rebelion los que se alzaren publicamente y ei? abierta

1. "Destronar al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del Reino, o

VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 531

Code. In view of this express statutory inclusion of the acts of war

"El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia en sentencia de 5 de Febrero de 1872,