405) Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC ( (176 SCRA 1 (1989) )

2/21/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 176
*
G.R. No. 86564. August 1, 1989.
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZA-
BAL, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Special Civil Actions; Quo Warranto; Docket Fees;

Election Law; The petition for quo warranto was filed on time, the filing fee
having been filed within the ten-day period prescribed by law; whatever
delay in the payment thereof was not imputable to the private respondent.—
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the
petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents
that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency
of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation
proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we
reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the
payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. x x
x In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and
whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the private respon-
dent’s fault or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, we required the
timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the
filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, however,
this Court, taking into account the special
____________
* EN BANC.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Election
circumstances of that case, declared: This Court reiterates the rule that the
trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000177c3b79545bf1ec7c7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/22
prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the payment of the said
fee within a reasonable time. In the event of noncompliance therewith, the
case shall be dismissed.
Same; Appeals; Remand of the case to the lower court for further
reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before it.—This matter should
normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is the
timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his
citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity
for an early resolution of that more important question clearly and urgently
affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it now in this same
action. x x x While it is in the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the
wrong court and thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more
correct procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case to the
proper court which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
Considering, however, the length of time that this case has been pending, we
apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and
follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
(135 SCRA 37) which states: “x x x it is a cherished rule of procedure for
this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.
No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court
only to have its decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court
and from there to this Court.” (p. 43) x x x A marked characteristic of our
judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand x x x the
Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.’ (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21
SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez,
34 Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court
act, and act with finality.” x x x Remand of the case to the lower court for
further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a
position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many
occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the
ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when
public interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial
court had already received all the evidence of the parties.
VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 3
Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; Constitutional Law; Citizenship; The

doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.—There is
also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the
doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does
not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases.
Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only when the
petitioner filed his reply to the private respondent’s comment. Besides, one
of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in
this case.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Commonwealth Act No. 63; Modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be lost.—The petitioner now claims that
his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and
did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument
cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates
the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are:
(1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the
petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article
IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, “Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The annulment of petitioner’s Australian
citizenship as a result of the finding that his marriage to an Australian
national was bigamous, did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship.—Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage
to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian
citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his
adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and
freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced
the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has
been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation; It
does not appear that petitioner has reacquired his Philippine citizenship by
any of these methods.—Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does
the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of
these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as
to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither

has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that: x x x
(2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may
reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the
Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No.
270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration. (Italics supplied.) That is why the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien
certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his
present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
Election Law; The qualifications for an elective office are continuing
requirements, once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office
itself is deemed forfeited.—The probability that many of those who voted
for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only
strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title
to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and
voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all
in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified
from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve
as such.
Same; The candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes
cannot occupy the office that was vacated as a result of the disqualification
of the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.—Finally, there
is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes
in the election, he
VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 5
was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. The latest ruling
of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, decided in
1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected
after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and
considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the
second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight
members of the Court then, with three dissenting and another two reserving
their vote. One was on official leave. Re-examining that decision, the Court
finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of
Geronimo v. Ramos, which represents the more logical and democratic rule.
That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio
vs. Paredes, was supported by ten members of the Court, without any
dissent, although one reserved his vote, another took no part, and two others
were on leave. There the Court held: “x x x it would be extremely repugnant
to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency,
the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they
do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are
filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms
of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal
votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.) The fact that
the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a
dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the
winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a
statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the
matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was
alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Civil Procedure; Appeals; No decision on the petitioner’s citizenship

has been rendered and no decision can, as yet, be elevated to the Supreme
Court for review.—What was raised to the Court was only the
issue of the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to inquire into the citizenship of the

petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have limited ourselves to sustaining the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the case for further
proceedings and the rendition of a decision. Under Section 7, Article IX-A
of the Constitution, a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. No decision on the petitioner’s
citizenship has been rendered and no decision can, as yet, be elevated to us

for review. I, therefore, reiterate my statement in Frivaldo that my
concurrence is limited only to cases involving citizenship and disloyalty but
not to any of the many other grounds for disqualification cited in my
concurring opinion.
PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Elections.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on

Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as a
qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation
that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether
or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry
into this matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto
against him was not filed on time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged
tardiness not of the petition itself but of the payment of the filing
fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable requirement.
The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings to
mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was
lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed filed beyond the
reglementary period, there is no question that this petition must be
granted and the challenge abated.
The petitioner’s position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-
elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo
warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26, 1988,
but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally
VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 7

paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his

proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without
the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid.
This was done beyond the reglementary period provided for under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto.—Any voter contesting the election of
a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on
the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten
days after the proclamation of the result of the election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required
under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC
providing that—
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the
payment of a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00)
and the legal research fee as required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the

payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filing of
the petition itself. He cites many rulings of 1the Court to this effect,
specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals.
For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was
paid out of time. In fact, he says, it was filed ahead of time. His
point is that when he filed his “Petition for Quo Warranto with
Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining
Order or Injunction” on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it
as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No.
88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was
only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his
petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case
No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He
immediately paid the
_____________
1 149 SCRA 562.

filing fee on that date.

The private respondent argues further that during the period
when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation
controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto
proceeding was deemed 2
suspended under Section 248 of the
Omnibus Election Code. At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner, became
effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after publication
of the said 3Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule
44 thereof. These rules could not retroact to January 26, 1988, when
he filed his petition with the COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus
Election Code did not require it, the payment of filing fees was still
necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of
the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and
February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private respondent
counters that the latter resolution was intended for the local elections
held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local
elections, which were supposed to be governed by the first-
mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on
March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its
publication as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on January
5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:
____________
2 Sec. 248. Effect of filing petition to annul or suspend the proclamation.—The

filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of
any candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election
protest or quo warranto proceedings.
3 Rule 44, Sec. 4. COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Effectivity.___ These Rules shall
be published in the Official Gazette and shall take effect on the seventh day following
its publication. Actually, the Rules became effective seven days after the official
release of the Official Gazette dated June 27, 1988 on November 8, 1988.
VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 9

Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission.—The

rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on
the seventh day after their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least
(2) daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that
the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the
respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as
extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the
COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require
the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on
the assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees in
quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record
that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996,
this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its
publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle
and the Philipine Daily Inquirer, or after the4 petition was filed.
The petitioner forgets Tañada v. Tuvera when he argues that the
resolutions became effective “immediately upon approval” simply
because it was so provided therein. We held in that case that
publication was still necessary under the due process clause despite
such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and
whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the private
respondent’s fault or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case,
we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition
for the timeliness of the 5filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, however, this Court, taking into account
the special circumstances of that case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a
case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court
may allow the payment of the said fee within a
____________
4 146 SCRA 446.

5 G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989.
10

reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall

be dismissed.
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the

COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees.—If the fees above prescribed are
not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are
paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. (Italics supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the
petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the
filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize
his alleged lack of citizenship as “a futile technicality.” It is
regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a
qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is worse is
that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the
reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally
raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto
proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the subject
of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early
resolution of that more important question clearly and urgently
affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it now in this
same action.
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would
appear that our sole function in this proceeding should be to resolve the
single issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
motion for new trial of the GSIS in question should indeed be deemed pro
forma. But going over the extended pleadings of both parties, the Court is
immediately impressed that substantial justice may not be timely achieved,
if we should decide this case upon such a technical ground alone. We have
carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the parties, very ably and
comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually
11
VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 11

competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve the interests of

justice by broadening the scope of our inquiry, for as the record before us
stands, we see that there is enough basis for us to end the basic controversy
between the parties here and now, dispensing, however, with procedural
steps which would 6
not anyway affect substantially the merits of their
respective claims.
x x x
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and
thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure
was for the respondent court to forward the case to the proper court which
was the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the
length of time that this case has been pending, we apply the rule in the case
of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle
enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37)
which states:
“x x x it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the
entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds
of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the
trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court
and from there to this Court.” (p. 43)
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et

al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988), we stated that:
“x x x But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts dictate
the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner’s favor. There is therefore no point in
referring the case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions
involved will not change, nor should the ultimate judgment. Considerable time has
already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that the controversy is
finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108
Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v.
Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia
v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil.
____________
6 Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 616. See also Ortigas v. Ruiz, 148 SCRA 326; First
Asian Transport and Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople, 142 SCRA 542; Quisumbing v. Court of
Appeals, 122 SCRA 703; Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, 112 SCRA 629; Francisco v. City of Davao,
12 SCRA 628.
12

162). ‘Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time,
effort and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in
the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked
characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand x x
x the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.’ (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21
SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil.
74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court act, and act with
7
finality.”
x x x
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is
not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on
the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest
and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the
merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings,
such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of
the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case 8
or
where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties.
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present
case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is
holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says: In adopting private
respondent’s comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as
“its own” private respondent’s repeated assertion that petitioner is no
longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not respondent COMELEC
effectively disqualified itself, by reason of prejudgment, from
resolving the petition 9for quo warranto filed by private respondent
still pending before it?
This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule
directly on the merits of this case.
Going over the record, we find that there are two administra-
_____________
7 Tejones v. Gironella, 159 SCRA 100.

8 Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. CA, 157 SCRA 357.
9 Rollo, p. 159.
13
VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 13

tive decisions on the question of the petitioner’s citizenship. The

first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 10
1982, and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines.
The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation on September 13, 1988,
11
and held that the petitioner was
not a citizen of the Philippines.
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chairman
Vicente Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate, Savellano and
Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan concurring
in the dismissal of the petition “without prejudice to the issue of the
respondent’s citizenship being raised anew in a proper case.”
Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner
Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have
been made with the Australian Embassy for official verification of
the petitioner’s alleged naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman
Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
It is important to observe that in the proceeding before the
COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had
been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture,
which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact
that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian
passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to
this country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the
official statement of the Australian Government dated August 12,
1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was
still an Australian citizen as of that12 date by reason of his
naturalization in 1976. That statement is reproduced in full as
follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by

virtue of a certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the
____________
10 Ibid., pp. 182A-195.

11 Id., pp. 94-107.
12 Id. Emphasis supplied.
14

Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and

recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby
provide the following statement in response to the Subpoena Testificandum
dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for disqualification against
RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify
that the statement is true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December

1934, was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. As
the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not required to meet
normal requirements for the grant of citizenship and was granted
Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian
citizenship must take an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation
of allegiance. The wording of the oath of affirmation is: “I . . . .,
renouncing all other allegiance . . . .” etc. This need not necessarily
have any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on
the citizenship laws of his former country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in
Sydney on 27 June 1980 on the ground that the marriage had been
bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in
respect of Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which
relates to the giving of false or misleading information of a material
nature in respect of an application for Australian citizenship. If
such a prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of
Australian citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of
Australian citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian

citizenship under Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a
formal and voluntary act other than marriage, then he would
automatically lose his Australian citizenship under Section 17 of
the Act.
15
VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 15

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND

AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12TH
DAY OF APRIL 1984.
DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed)
GRAHAM C. WEST
Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed

to the private respondent
13
by the Department of Foreign Affairs
reading as follows:
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to
inform you that inquiry made with the Australian Government
through the Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra has elicited
the following information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian

citizenship on 28 July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian
citizenship had to either swear an oath of allegiance or
make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a
renunciation of “all other allegiance.”
Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs:
(SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR.
Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every

naturalized Australian reading as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will
be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors accord-
____________
16

ing to law, and that I will faithfully 14observe the laws of Australia and
fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen.
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and
declare that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors
according to law, and that I will faithfully15 observe the Laws of Australia and
fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen.
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above

evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian Passport
No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the Philippines in
1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he
was an alien and registered 16
as such under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-323985. He later asked for the change of his
status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen17 and
was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. He
also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a
number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and even
sought to avoid the jurisdiction
18
of the barangay court on the ground
that he was a foreigner.
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all
these acts as “mistakes” that did not divest the petitioner of his
_____________

16 Id.
17 Id.
18 (i) Statement dated 25 November 1976 that he is an “Australian,” made before
Det. Abaya.
(ii) Statement affirming that he is an Australian citizen in the affidavit-complaint
executed on 1 July 1988 and in the complaint filed on 13 January 1982 with the City
Court of Baguio: “x x x being an Australian citizen the subject of this complaint is
one of which the Barangay Court cannot take cognizance of.”
17
VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 17

citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members joined in

this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner
is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences
of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel when he
performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC
at that time and stresses Labo’s political affiliation with the party in
power then, but we need not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be
reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be
dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to19questions of citizenship,
as the Court has ruled in several cases. Moreover, it does not
appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer, 20
having been invoked only when the
petitioner filed his reply to the private respondent’s comment.
Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of
parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to an Australian
national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine
citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he
automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He
became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such
through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because
he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made
the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all
other allegiance, he swore “to be faithful and bear true allegiance to
Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia . . .” and to
fulfill his duties “as an Australian citizen.”
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia
made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his
Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand
against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which
_____________
19 Soria v. Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee v. Commissioner of

Immigration, 42 SCRA 561; Sia Reyes v. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478.
20 Rollo, pp. 159-160.
18

enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country,

all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth
mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the
present Constitution, “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his
marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance
alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His
divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That
is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must
consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine
citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of
a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that
he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record,
nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any
judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring
Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has
complied with PD No. 725, providing that:
x x x (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship

may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with
the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction
No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration. (Italics supplied.)
19
VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 19

That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation

rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of
registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his present
claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local
elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he
was not even a qualified
21
voter under the Constitution itself because
of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for
mayor of Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local Government

Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications.—(1) An elective local official must be a citizen of

the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a
qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or
province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one
year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read
and write English, Pilipino, or any other local language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a “futile

technicality” that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of
Baguio City who elected him by a “resonant and thunderous
majority.” To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead
over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the
people of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed
the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner
owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a
stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only
citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner
may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens
the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications
are continuing requirements; once any of
_____________
21 Art. V, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution.
20

them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed

forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements
were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first
place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from
running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to
serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the
petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he
was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the 22

Court on this issue is Santos v.
Commission on Elections, decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes
for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and
considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect,
the second placer won by default. That23
decision was supported
24
by
eight members of the Court then, 25
with three dissenting
26
and
another two reserving their vote. One was on official leave.
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it
should 27be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v.
Ramos, which represents the more logical and democratic rule.
That case, which reiterated
28
the doctrine first announced in 1912 in29
Topacio vs. Paredes, was supported by ten members of the Court,
without any dissent, although one
____________
22 137 SCRA 740.

23 Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.
24 Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.
25 Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.
26 Fernando, C.J.
27 136 SCRA 435.
28 23 Phil. 238.
29 Gutierrez, Jr., J., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring.
21
VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 21

30 31
reserved
32
his vote, another took no part, and two others were on
leave. There the Court held:
“x x x it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the

constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office,
and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no
one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless
he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
(20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The
votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy
on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate
was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride
in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more
than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him.
Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious
advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him material
and other attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be
sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit33 and
transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. But
having
____________
30 Makasiar, J.
31 Aquino, J.
32 Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.
33 Except in times of war, under CA No. 63.
22

done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arm once
his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned
by it as an undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be
easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after
the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the
country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total
and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may
not be accomplished by election to public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared
NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED
from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to
VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of
Baguio City once this decision becomes final and executory. The
temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras,

Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., see concurring statement.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
As in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (G. R. No.

87193, June 23, 1989) and inspite of what would otherwise be
insuperable procedural obstacles, I am constrained to concur in the
Court’s decision so forcefully and felicitously written by Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz. I do so because I cannot see how the Court can
countenance a citizen of a foreign country or one who has renounced
Filipino citizenship sitting as the mayor of one of the most important
cities in the Philippines.
What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction to inquire into the citizenship of the
petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have limited ourselves to sustaining
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the
23
VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 23

case for further proceedings and the rendition of a decision. Under

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, a decision, order, or
ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof. No decision on the petitioner’s citizenship has been
rendered and no decision can, as yet, be elevated to us for review. I,
therefore, reiterate my statement in Frivaldo that my concurrence is
limited only to cases involving citizenship and disloyalty but not to
any of the many other grounds for disqualification cited in my
concurring opinion.
Our decision to disqualify the petitioner is particularly distressing
to me because I am impressed by the singular achievements in the
beautification of Baguio City, in the peace and order situation, and in
the resurgence of civic pride so visible to anyone who ha gone up to
Baguio since Mr. Labo assumed the mayorship. However, I see no
other way this case can be resolved except by adopting a pragmatic
approach. It is beyond dispute that a non citizen cannot be the mayor
of Baguio City. i join the rest of the Court.
Petitioner disqualified from continuing to serve as Mayor of
Baguio City.
Notes.—Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is

frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in
a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to secure, not
override, substantial justice and thereby defeat their very aims. (A-
One Feeds Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590.)
In meritorious cases, a liberal, not literal interpretation of the
rules become imperative and technicalities should not be resorted to
in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules which is proper
and fast determination of a litigation. (A-One Feeds Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 100 SCRA 590.)
——o0o——
24
© Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

405) Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC ( (176 SCRA 1 (1989) )

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

405) Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC ( (176 SCRA 1 (1989) )

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

405) Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC ( (176 SCRA 1 (1989) )

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

2/21/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 176

RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

Civil Procedure; Special Civil Actions; Quo Warranto; Docket Fees;

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Election

VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 3

Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Election

Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; Constitutional Law; Citizenship; The

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Election

to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither

VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 5

Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Election

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Civil Procedure; Appeals; No decision on the petitioner’s citizenship

6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Election

issue of the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to inquire into the citizenship of the

citizenship has been rendered and no decision can, as yet, be elevated to us

PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Elections.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on

VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 7

paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his

and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the

1 149 SCRA 562.

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

filing fee on that date.

2 Sec. 248. Effect of filing petition to annul or suspend the proclamation.—The

VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 9

Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission.—The

4 146 SCRA 446.

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall

The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the

The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:

VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 11

competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve the interests of

Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

7 Tejones v. Gironella, 159 SCRA 100.

VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 13

tive decisions on the question of the petitioner’s citizenship. The

I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by

10 Ibid., pp. 182A-195.

12 Id. Emphasis supplied.

14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and

A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December

(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian

VOL. 176, AUGUST 1, 1989 15

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND

This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed

1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian

Very truly yours,

The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every

13 Id. Emphasis supplied.

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares: