407) Macalintal vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003)

2/21/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 405
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections
*
G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official
capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Election Law; Constitutional Law; Parties in Interest; Taxpayers have

the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.—R.A. No. 9189, entitled, “An
Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified
Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes,” appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which
provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of
the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to
carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right
to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute. The Court has held that they may assail the validity
of a law appropriating public funds because expenditure of public funds by
an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
Same; Same; Statutes; Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.—The Constitution is the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined
and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of constitutionality of a law must be
overcome convincingly.—Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be
constitutional. In Peralta vs. COMELEC, the Court said: . . . An act of the
legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution
rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of
the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department
of the government itself. Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law
must be overcome convincingly: . . . To declare a law unconstitutional, the
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000177c3b8a9cf8bd377c3003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/185
repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal,

for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no
infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a law there
_______________
* EN BANC.
615
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 615
must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or

prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.”
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A constitutional provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself
alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.—
It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution should
be construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon, the Court held that a
constitutional provision should function to the full extent of its substance
and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions
of that great document. Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character
unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest. The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily
from the language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court
may consider the intent of its framers through their debates in the
constitutional convention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Absentee Voting; Members to the
Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all
Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin.—
It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional
Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino
citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The
Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting
age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and
consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The execution of the affidavit itself is
not the enabling or enfranchising act; The affidavit is not only proof of the
intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume
residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit
expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.—
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not
the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is
not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go

back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it
serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his
domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the
affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes
“provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to
qualified to vote in a political exercise.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5(d) does not only require an
affidavit or a promise to “resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her
registration,” the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not
applied
616
for citizenship in another country.—It must be emphasized that Section 5(d)

does not only require an affidavit or a promise to “resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from
approval of his/her registration,” the Filipinos abroad must also declare that
they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must
return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return “shall be cause for
the removal” of their names “from the National Registry of Absentee Voters
and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5(d) itself provides for a
deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands
to lose his right of suffrage.—Congress itself was conscious of said
probability and in fact, it has addressed the expected problem. Section 5(d)
itself provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return
as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under Section 9, should a
registered overseas absentee voter fail to vote for two consecutive national
elections, his name may be ordered removed from the National Registry of
Overseas Absentee Voters.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Court does not find Section 5(d) of
R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.—In fine, considering the
underlying intent of the Constitution, the Court does not find Section 5(d) of
R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.
Same; The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must
remain in the hands of Congress.—Congress could not have allowed the
COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly
stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the
votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners
for the said positions.” The provisions of the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the
proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for
the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
Same; By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and
revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went
beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.—By vesting itself with the
powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate
of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left
with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a
provision of law unconstitutional.
617
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 617

BELLOSILLO, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Domicile; Intention to acquire a domicile without actual

residence in the locality does not result in the acquisition of domicile, nor
does the fact of physical presence without intention.—In this jurisdiction, it
is well settled that “domicile” and “residence” as used in election laws are
synonymous terms which import not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place coupled with conduct
indicative of that intention. Domicile is a question of intention and
circumstances. There are three (3) rules that must be observed in the
consideration of circumstances: first, that a man must have a residence or
domicile somewhere; second, domicile is not easily lost, once established it
is retained until a new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one
residence or domicile at a time. The principal elements of domicile, i.e.,
physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a
domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of
domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire
a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in the
acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without
intention.
PUNO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Domicile; Residence connotes the actual relationship of

an individual to a specific place; To be a resident, physical presence of a
person in a given area, community or country is required; Elements to
determine the domicile of a person.—In its ordinary conception, residence

connotes the actual relationship of an individual to a specific place. To be a
resident, physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country is required. Even before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution,
jurisprudence has equated the first residence requirement (one year
residence in the Philippines) with domicile or legal residence. Domicile in
turn has been defined as an individual’s permanent home or “the place to
which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent.” The domicile of a person is determined by the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed
place; and (2) animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently. The mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or
change of domicile.
Same; Same; To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and acts which correspond with purpose.—In Romualdez-Marcos
v. COMELEC, we ruled that domicile of origin is not easily lost. To suc-
618
cessfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual

removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
acts which correspond with purpose. This change of domicile is effected by a
Filipino who becomes an “immigrant” or a “permanent resident” of a
foreign country.
Same; Same; The affidavit merely proves the intent to return but not the
other requisites for reacquiring the domicile of origin.—With due respect, I
submit that the affidavit merely proves the intent to return but not the other
requisites for reacquiring the domicile of origin. Intent, which is not
coupled with actual physical transfer, is not sufficient either to abandon the
former domicile or to establish a new domicile. Thus, the view that domicile
could be established as soon as the old is abandoned even though the person
has not yet arrived at the new domicile, has not been accepted.
Same; Same; The burden of establishing a change in domicile is upon
the party who asserts it.—To stress, the burden of establishing a change in
domicile is upon the party who asserts it. A person’s declarations as to what
he considers his home, residence, or domicile are generally admissible “as
evidence of his attitude of mind.” However, whatever the context, “their
accuracy is suspect because of their self-serving nature, particularly when

they are made to achieve some legal objective.”
Same; Same; The burden rests on an “immigrant” or a “permanent
resident” to prove that he has abandoned his domicile in the foreign country
and reestablished his domicile in the Philippines; A self-serving affidavit
will not suffice, especially when what is at stake is a very important
privilege as the right of suffrage; Until such promise is fulfilled, he
continues to be a domiciliary of another country; Until then, he does not
possess the necessary requisites and therefore, cannot be considered a
qualified voter.—In the case at bar, the burden rests on an “immigrant” or a
“permanent resident” to prove that he has abandoned his domicile in the
foreign country and reestablished his domicile in the Philippines. A self-
serving affidavit will not suffice, especially when what is at stake is a very
important privilege as the right of suffrage. I respectfully submit that what
makes the intent expressed in the affidavit effective and operative is the
fulfillment of the promise to return to the Philippines. Physical presence is
not a mere test of intent but the “principal confirming evidence of the
intention of the person.” Until such promise is fulfilled, he continues to be a
domiciliary of another country. Until then, he does not possess the necessary
requisites and therefore, cannot be considered a qualified voter.
Same; Same; Section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 empowering the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates should be construed as
limited to the positions of Senators and party-list representatives.—On its
619
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 619
face, section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to section
4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It gives the impression that
Congress abdicated to COMELEC its constitutional duty to canvass and
proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President. I agree
with the majority that the impugned provision should be given a reasonable
interpretation that would save it from a constitutional infirmity. To be sure,
Congress could have not allowed the COMELEC to exercise a power
exclusively bestowed upon it by the Constitution. Thus, section 18.5 of Rep.
Act No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates should be construed as limited to the positions of Senators and
party-list representatives.
Same; Same; Sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 granting
Congress the power to review, revise, amend and approve the implementing
rules and regulations of the COMELEC are unconstitutional.—Under the
1987 Constitution, the power to promulgate rules and regulations has been
directly granted by the Constitution and no longer by Congress.
Undoubtedly, the power was granted to COMELEC to strengthen its

independence, hence, its exercise is beyond invasion by Congress. Under
any lens, sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 constitute undue
restrictions on the constitutional power of the COMELEC to promulgate
rules and regulations for such rules are made subject to the prior review and
approval of Congress. The impugned provisions can result in the denial of
this constitutionally conferred power because Congress can veto the rules
and regulations the COMELEC has promulgated. Thus, I respectfully
submit that sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 granting Congress the
power to review, revise, amend and approve the implementing rules and
regulations of the COMELEC, otherwise known as subordinate legislations
in other countries, are unconstitutional.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Election Law; Domicile; The power given to COMELEC by Section

18.5 of R.A. 9189 should be understood to be limited only to the
proclamation of winning candidates for the positions of senators and party-
list representatives; The election returns for the positions of president and
vice-president should then be certified by the Board of Canvassers to
Congress and not to COMELEC as provided for in Section 18.4 of the Act.
—Section 4 of the Act allows all qualified Filipinos abroad to vote for
President, Vice-President, Senators and party-list representatives. In relation
to this, Section 18.5 empowers the Commission on Election to order the
proclamation of winning candidates. Since it is Congress which has been
granted by the Constitution the authority and duty to canvass the votes and
proclaim the winning candidates for president and vice-president, I echo the
sentiment of my colleagues that the power given to COMELEC by Section
18.5 of R.A. 9189 should be understood to be limited only to the
proclamation of
620
winning candidates for the positions of senators and party-list

representatives. The election returns for the positions of president and vice-
president should then be certified by the Board of Canvassers to Congress
and not to COMELEC as provided for in Section 18.4 of the Act.
PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion:
Election Law; Domicile; Physical presence in the country is no longer

indispensable to arm Filipinos abroad with sufficient information to enable
them to vote intelligently.—In sum, I respectfully submit that physical
presence in the country is no longer indispensable to arm Filipinos abroad

with sufficient information to enable them to vote intelligently. The advent
of the Information Age and the globalization of knowledge have empowered
them to know enough about the Philippines to enable them to choose our
national officials prudently and, in the process, to have a significant voice in
the governance of the country they love and cherish.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Domicile; R.A. 9189 grants the right of suffrage to a

category of voters who do not possess the constitutional requirement of
residence.—I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion because
R.A. 9189 grants the right of suffrage to a category of voters who do not
possess the constitutional requirement of residence. These are men and
women who are still Filipino citizens but who have voluntarily and
unambiguously chosen actual, physical, and permanent residence in a
foreign country. In other words, the questioned law allows non-residents to
vote.
Same; Same; It is plain to see that Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 in its
current form is unconstitutional.—Juxtaposing these definitions found in
our jurisprudence with the evident intent of the framers of our Constitution,
it is plain to see that Section 5 (d) of R.A. 9189, in its current form is
unconstitutional. It seeks to grant the benefits of absentee voting to those for
whom it was never intended: Filipinos who are permanent residents,
necessarily including immigrants, of countries other than their own.
Same; Same; A mere promise to return home within three years from
voting is no proof of intent to return to a permanent residence.—“Absentee”
has to be qualified. It refers only to those people residing abroad whose
intent to return home and forsake the foreign country is clear. It cannot refer
to immigrants. A mere promise to return home within three years from
voting is no proof of intent to return to a permanent residence. The sanction
for its enforcement is so feeble that the promise will be an empty one. As
earlier stated, an immigrant gives up many things, including the right or
opportunity of voting in the Philippines, when he moves with his
621
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 621
family abroad. A sanction of future disenfranchisement would not bother

him in the least bit.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Concurring and Dissenting

Opinion:
Election Law; Domicile; R.A. No. 9189, which expands the meaning as
to include those otherwise not covered (such as Filipino immigrants or
permanent residents of foreign countries), through the mere imposition of
certain requirements, “risks a declaration of unconstitutionality.”—The
intention of the Framers to limit the phrase “qualified Filipinos abroad” to
Filipinos temporarily residing abroad is clear and unmistakable. Therefore,
a law, such as R.A. No. 9189, which expands the meaning as to include
those otherwise not covered (such as Filipino immigrants or permanent
residents of foreign countries), through the mere imposition of certain
requirements, “risks a declaration of unconstitutionality.”
Same; Same; Mere declaration that he intends to resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines does not have the effect of
conferring upon the immigrant the necessary qualification of “residency”
here.—Mere declaration that he intends to resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines does not have the effect of
conferring upon the immigrant the necessary qualification of “residency”
here. To reiterate, residence for voting is not wholly a question of intention,
it is a question of fact and intention. A voter’s statements, declarations, or
testimony with respect to his intention is not controlling, but must be taken
in connection with his acts and conduct. Hence, the right to vote in a certain
place or precinct requires the occurrence of two things, the act of residing
coupled with the intention to do so.
Same; Same; Where the Constitution fixes the qualifications of voters,
these qualifications cannot be increased, diminished, or changed by
legislative enactment, unless the power to do so is expressly granted or
necessarily implied.—In fine, let it be stressed that where the Constitution
fixes the qualifications of voters, these qualifications cannot be increased,
diminished, or changed by legislative enactment, unless the power to do so
is expressly granted, or necessarily implied. The inclusion of the residency
requirement in the Constitution is not without reason. It constitutes an
invaluable protection against fraud and further affords some surety that the
elector has in fact become a member of the community and that, as such, he
has a common interest in all matters pertaining to its government, and is
therefore more likely to exercise his right intelligently. The specification in
the Constitution is an implied prohibition against interference. It is not
competent for Congress to diminish or alter such qualification.
622
Same; Same; Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional for it

diminishes the “residency requirement” of the Constitution by including
within the phrase “qualified Filipinos abroad” immigrants and permanent
residents of foreign countries.—Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is
unconstitutional for it diminishes the “residency requirement” of the

Constitution by including within the phrase “qualified Filipinos abroad”
immigrants and permanent residents of foreign countries. It defies the clear
intent of the Constitution to limit the application of the absentee voting law
to Filipinos who are “temporarily abroad.” Thus, as statutes which purport
to modify constitutionally fixed qualifications are void, so must Section 5(d)
of R.A. No. 9189 suffer the same fate.
CARPIO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Domicile; Section 5(d) of RA No. 9189, which prescribes

the reacquisition of residence by a Filipino through the execution of an
affidavit stating he is resuming residence in the Philippines, is similarly well
within the power of Congress to enact and is thus constitutional.—Thus, RA
No. 8171 allows a former natural-born Filipino who became a foreigner to
reacquire Philippine citizenship by filing a simplified administrative petition
and taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines. Section 5(d) of RA No.
9189, which prescribes the reacquisition of residence by a Filipino through
the execution of an affidavit stating he is resuming residence in the
Philippines, is similarly well within the power of Congress to enact and is
thus constitutional.
CARPIO-MORALES, J., Separate Opinion:
Election Law; Domicile; The affidavit executed in accordance with

Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 by a Filipino immigrant or permanent resident of
another country expressing his intent to resume physical permanent
residence in the Philippines is an eloquent proof of his intention not to
abandon his domicile of origin in the Philippines.—It is my view that the
affidavit executed in accordance with Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 by a
Filipino immigrant or permanent resident of another country expressing his
intent to resume physical permanent residence in the Philippines is an
eloquent proof of his intention not to abandon his domicile of origin in the
Philippines. It is a statement under oath of what a Filipino seeks to do for
the future of his membership in a political community. Why should this
affidavit be discredited on the mere speculation that the immigrant might
not fulfill his undertaking to return to the Philippines for good? If Filipinos
who are temporarily residing in foreign countries are accorded full faith and
credit as to their domiciliary ties no matter how indefinite their absence
from the Philippines, what more in the case of Filipino immigrants who
have formally declared their intent to settle in their homeland?
623
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 623

CALLEJO, SR., J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; While intention is an important factor to be

considered in determining whether or not a residence has been acquired,
intention alone is insufficient to establish a residence for voting purposes.—
The majority view, I humbly submit, is non-sequitur for it is well-
entrenched that while intention is an important factor to be considered in
determining whether or not a residence has been acquired, intention alone is
insufficient to establish a residence for voting purposes. Hence, a mere
intention to remove, not consummated, can neither forfeit the party’s old
domicile nor enable him to acquire a new one. And the fact that a person
intends to remove at a future time does not of itself defeat his residence
before he actually does remove.
Same; Same; The undertaking required of an immigrant/permanent
resident under the aforesaid section x x x is ipso facto an admission that
he/she is not an actual resident of the Philippines and does not possess the
residency requirement on the date of the election but merely promises to
possess the same within three (3) years from registration.—I am in complete
accord with the petitioner’s position that Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189
virtually enfranchises a voter who, on the date of the election, does not
possess the residency requirement as ordained under Section 1, Article V of
the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, the undertaking required of an
immigrant/permanent resident under the aforesaid section, “that he/she shall
resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than
three (3) years from the approval of his/her registration,” is ipso facto an
admission that he/she is not an actual resident of the Philippines and does
not, therefore, possess the residency requirement on the date of the election
but merely promises to possess the same within three (3) years from
registration. Consequently, Section 5(d), which in effect attempts to permit
non-residents to exercise the right of suffrage, in direct contravention of the
constitutional prescription in Section 1, Article V, must be stricken from
Rep. Act No. 9189 as an invalid and unconstitutional provision.
AZCUNA, J., Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Domicile; The abandonment of present domicile of

choice, by the execution of the affidavit, operates to revive the domicile of
origin to replace it, because of the principle that no person can be without a
domicile at any time.—Petitioner contends that Filipinos who establish
permanent residence abroad have thereby abandoned their Philippine
domicile of origin and replaced it with a domicile of choice in a foreign
country. This may indeed be true, but with the execution of the affidavit
provided for under Section 5 (d) aforementioned, the affiant expressly states
an abandonment of said domicile of choice. The legal effect of this
624
expression is to revive the domicile of origin. For unlike a domicile of

choice, which requires both intention and physical presence to be
established or maintained, the domicile of origin can be revived by an
intention properly expressed. Thus, the abandonment of the present domicile
of choice, by the execution of the affidavit, operates to revive the domicile
of origin to replace it, because of the principle that no person can be without
a domicile at any time.
Same; Same; Through the execution of the affidavit, the affiant does the
operative act that makes said affiant once more a Philippine domiciliary.—
Through the execution of the affidavit, the affiant does the operative act that
makes said affiant once more a Philippine domiciliary. The requirement of
resuming actual physical presence within three (3) years is only a test of
such intention, but is not needed to effect the change or reversion of
domicile. If the affiant does not resume the residence physically within said
period, then the intent expressed in the affidavit is defective and the law will
deem it inoperative, thereby allowing removal of affiant’s name from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Pete Quirino-Quadra and Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the COMELEC.
Henry S. Rojas and Alberto Agra for movant-intervenors.
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Wigberto E. Tañada and Merlin M.
Magallona for intervenors.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by

Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a
declaration that certain provisions of Republic
1
Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in
the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds
_______________
1 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved the law on 13 February 2003. It

was published in the 16 February 2003 of Today and Daily Tribune.
625
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 625

are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the
instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the present
petition.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, “An Act Providing for A System of
Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines
Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,”
appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a
supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year
of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to
carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have
the right to restrain officials from wasting 2public funds through the
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. The Court has held that3
they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds
because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of executing an 4 unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds.
The challenged provision of law involves a public right that
affects a great number of citizens. The Court has adopted the policy
of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the petitioner has
seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental
significance to the Filipino people. This has been explicitly
pronounced in Kapatiran 5
ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan, where the Court held:
Objections to taxpayers’ suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or

interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the
importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court’s
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given
to them, the Court has brushed aside6
technicalities of procedure and has
taken cognizance of these petitions.
_______________
2 PHILCONSA vs. Mathay, 124 Phil. 890; 18 SCRA 300, 306 (1966).
3 Id., citing PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, 122 Phil. 894; 155 SCRA 479 (1965).
4 Sanidad vs. COMELEC, L-44640, 12 October 1976, 73 SCRA 333, 358-359
citing Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960).
5 G.R. No. 81311, 30 June 1988, 163 SCRA 371, 378.
6 Id., p. 378 cited in Tatad vs. The Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346
Phil. 321, 359; 281 SCRA 330 (1997).
626

Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the
constitutional right of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos
is involved.
The question of propriety of the instant petition which may
appear to be visited by the vice of prematurity as there are no
ongoing proceedings in any tribunal, board or before a government
official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions as
required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dims in light of the
importance of the 7constitutional issues raised by the petitioner. In
Tañada vs. Angara, the Court held:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it

contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that
the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.” Once a “controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide.”
In another case of paramount impact to the Filipino people, it has

been expressed that it is illogical to await the adverse consequences
of the law in order8 to consider the controversy actual and ripe for
judicial resolution. In yet another case, the Court said that:
. . . despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when
it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only
criterion will be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the
light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and
political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions.
Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of
the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate “to make the
hammer fall heavily,” where the acts of these de-
_______________
7 338 Phil. 546, 574; 272 SCRA 18 (1997).

8 Separate Opinion of Kapunan, J. in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000, 347 SCRA 128, 256.
627
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 627

partments, or of9 any official, betray the people’s will as expressed in the
Constitution . . .
The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court
is further buttressed by the fact that it is now more than fifteen years
since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution requiring Congress to
provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
Thus, strong reasons10of public policy demand that the Court resolves
the instant petition and determine whether Congress has acted
within the limits of the Constitution
11
or if it had gravely abused the
discretion entrusted to it.
The petitioner raises three principal questions:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the

registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries by their mere act of executing
an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1
of Article V of the Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national
offices and party list representatives including the President
and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the
winning candidates for President and the Vice-President
shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections shall promulgate without
violating the independence of the COMELEC under
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
The Court will resolve the questions in seriatim.

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines?
Section 5(d) provides:
_______________
9 Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889,
4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 51, 58-59.
10 See: Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 27833, 18 April 1969, 27 SCRA 835.
11 Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110 (1994) and Basco vs. Phil.
Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52 (1991).
628

Sec. 5. Disqualifications.—The following shall be disqualified from voting

under this Act:
... ... ...
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in
the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit
prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall
three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the
immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it

violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires
that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding an election. 12Petitioner cites the ruling
of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In
that case, the Court held that a “green card” holder immigrant to the
United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and
residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by
a voter to13 perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political
exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent
the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by
providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the
aforesaid
14
residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to
vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to
anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the
qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
Respondent
15
COMELEC refrained from commenting on this
issue.
_______________
12 G.R. No. 88831, 8 November 1990, 191 SCRA 229.

13 Petition, p. 7.
14 Id., p. 9.
15 Per Comment and Memorandum filed by Arty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV,
Law Department, COMELEC.
629
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 629

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court, the Solicitor

General filed his comment for all public respondents. He
contraposes that the constitutional challenge to Section 5(d) must
fail because of the absence of clear and unmistakable showing that
said provision of law is repugnant to the Constitution. He stresses:
All laws are presumed to be constitutional; by the doctrine of
separation of powers, a department of government owes a becoming
respect for the acts of the other two departments; all laws are
presumed to have adhered to constitutional limitations; the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law.
In addition, the Solicitor General points out that Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution is a verbatim reproduction of those
provided for in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions. Thus, 16
he cites
Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives wherein
the Court held that the term “residence” has been understood to be
synonymous with “domicile” under both Constitutions. He further
argues that a person can have only one “domicile” but he can have
two residences,
17
one permanent (the domicile) and the other
temporary; and that the definition and meaning given to the term
residence likewise applies18
to absentee voters. Invoking Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC 19
which reiterates the Court’s ruling in
Faypon vs. Quirino, the Solicitor General maintains that Filipinos
who are immigrants or permanent residents20 abroad may have in fact
never abandoned their Philippine domicile.
Taking issue with the petitioner’s contention that “green card”
holders are considered to have abandoned their Philippine domicile,
the Solicitor General suggests that the Court
21
may have to discard its
ruling in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals in so far as it relates to
immigrants and permanent residents in foreign countries who have
executed and submitted their affidavits conformably with Section
5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. He maintains that through the execution of
the requisite affidavits, the Congress of the Philippines with the
concurrence of the President of the Republic had in
_______________
16 199 SCRA 692, 713 (1991).

17 Comment, p. 9 citing Joaquin G. Bernas, Today, 5 February 2003.
18 318 Phil. 329; 248 SCRA 300 (1995).
19 96 Phil. 294 (1954).
20 Comment, pp. 11-12.
21 Caasi Case, supra.
630

fact given these immigrants and permanent residents the opportunity,

pursuant to Section 2, Article V of the Constitution, to manifest that
they had in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile; that
indubitably, they would have formally and categorically expressed
the requisite intentions, i.e., “animus manendi”and “animus
revertendi”; that Filipino immigrants and permanent residents
abroad possess the unquestionable right to exercise the right of
suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution 22upon
approval of their registration, conformably with R.A. No. 9189.
The seed of the present controversy is the interpretation that is
given to the phrase, “qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad” as
it appears in R.A. No. 9189, to wit:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is the prime duty of the State to provide a

system of honest and orderly overseas absentee voting that upholds the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. Towards this end, the State ensures equal
opportunity to all qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad in the exercise
of this fundamental right.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—For purposes of this Act:
a) “Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of
the Philippines abroad, exercise their right to vote; . . . (Emphasis supplied)
f) “Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is
qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by
law, who is abroad on the day of elections. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 4. Coverage.—All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not
otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day
of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives. (Emphasis supplied)
in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article V of the Constitution which

read:
SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
_______________
22 Comment, p. 13.
631
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 631

SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
. . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that

suffrage may be exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2)
not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of age,
(4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place where they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No.
9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or
permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country
unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume
actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than
three years from approval of his/her registration under said Act.
Petitioner questions the lightness of the mere act of execution of
an affidavit to qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or
permanent residents, to vote. He focuses solely on Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to Section
5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2
empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.
A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may
indeed give the impression that it contravenes Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution. Filipino immigrants and permanent residents
overseas are perceived as having left and abandoned the Philippines
to live permanently in their host countries and therefore, a provision
in the law enfranchising those who do not possess the residency
requirement of the Constitution by the mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intent to return to the Philippines within a
given period, risks a declaration of unconstitutionality. However, the
risk is more apparent than real.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with
which all private rights must be determined and all public
632

23
authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In
Peralta vs. COMELEC, the Court said:
. . . An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be

within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the
Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The
question of the validity of every statute
24
is first determined by the legislative
department of the government itself.
Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome

convincingly:
. . . To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the

Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the
attainment of some public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is
allowed. To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that what 25the
fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.”
As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified

Filipinos, it behooves the Court to take a holistic view of the
pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is
a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution
26
should be construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon, the
Court held that a constitutional provision should function to the full
extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.
Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character unless, either
by express statement 27
or by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest. The intent of the Constitution may be drawn
_______________
23 Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, 335 Phil. 82, 101; 267 SCRA 408 (1997).
24 L-47771, 11 March 1978, 82 SCRA 30, 55 citing People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56,
95 (1937).
25 Salas vs. Hon. Jarencio, 150-B Phil. 670, 690; 46 SCRA 734 (1972) citing
Morfe vs. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, 31 January 1968, 22 SCRA 424.
26 82 Phil. 771, 775 (1949).
27 Separate opinion of Vitug, J. in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, supra, p.
387, citing Marcelino vs. Cruz, Jr., L-42428, 18 March 1983, 121 SCRA 51.
633
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 633

primarily from the language of the document itself. Should it be

ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent28 of its framers through
their debates in the constitutional convention.
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the
first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that
Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the
parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said
law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to
have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The
Legislative Department) of the Constitution.
To put matters in their right perspective, it is necessary to dwell
first on the significance of absentee voting. The concept of absentee
voting is relatively new. It is viewed thus:
The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and
distinct from the regular system of voting, and to be a new and different
manner of voting from that previously known, and an exception to the
customary and usual manner of voting. The right of absentee and disabled
voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory; absentee voting
was unknown to, and not recognized at, the common law.
Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and economic
conditions devised to accommodate those engaged in military or civil life
whose duties make it impracticable for them to attend their polling places on
the day of election, and the privilege of absentee voting may flow from
constitutional provisions or be conferred by statutes, existing in some
jurisdictions, which provide in varying terms for the casting and reception
of ballots by soldiers and sailors or other qualified voters absent on election
day from the district or precinct of their residence.
Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an
absolute right. When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute,
it must operate with equality among all the class to which it is granted;
but statutes of this nature may be limited in their application to
particular types of elections. The statutes should be construed in the light
of any constitutional provisions affecting registration and elections, and
with due regard to their texts prior to amendment and to predecessor statutes
and the decisions thereunder; they should also be construed in the light of
the circumstances under which they were enacted; and so as to carry out
the
_______________
28 Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, supra, p. 56.
634

objects thereof, if this can be done without doing violence to their

provisions and mandates. Further, in passing on statutes regulating
absentee voting, the court should look to the whole and every part of the
election laws, the intent of the entire plan, and reasons and spirit
29
of their
adoption, and try to give effect to every portion thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person30

cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee.
However, under our election laws and the countless pronouncements
of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to
his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered
synonymous with domicile. 31
In Romualdez-Marcos, the Court enunciated:
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that “[f]or the exercise of civil rights
and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is
their place of habitual residence.” In Ong vs. Republic, this court took the
concept of domicile to mean an individual’s “permanent home,” “a place to
which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent.” Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of “the
fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi,
or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of
an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a
given area, community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One
may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a
person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave
as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly
normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various
reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile
of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:
_______________
29 29 C.J.S. 575-577.
30 1 WORDS AND PHRASES 264 citing Savant vs. Mercadal, 66 So. 961, 962,
136 La. 248.
31 318 Phil. 329; 248 SCRA 300 (1995).
635
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 635

“There is a difference between domicile and residence. ‘Residence’ is used to

indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; ‘domicile’ denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time,
but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.”
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by
the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our
election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that32
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
(Emphasis supplied)
Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to

his residence in this country, the framers of the Constitution
considered the circumstances that impelled them to require Congress
to establish a system for overseas absentee voting, thus:
MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the right of
suffrage, which here has a residential restriction, is not denied to citizens
temporarily residing or working abroad. Based on the statistics of several
government agencies, there ought to be about two million such Filipinos at
this time. Commissioner Bernas had earlier pointed out that these provisions
are really lifted from the two previous Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, with
the exception of the last paragraph. They could not therefore have foreseen
at that time the phenomenon now described as the Filipino labor force
explosion overseas.
According to government data, there are now about 600,000 contract
workers and employees, and although the major portions of these expatriate
communities of workers are to be found in the Middle East, they are
scattered in 177 countries in the world.
In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
and Agencies, the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon
Felipe, said that there was no insuperable obstacle to making effective the
right of suffrage for Filipinos overseas. Those who have adhered to their
Filipino citizenship notwithstanding strong temptations are exposed to
embrace a more convenient foreign citizenship. And those who on their own
or under pressure of economic necessity here, find that they have to
_______________
32 Id., pp. 323-324.
636

detach themselves from their families to work in other countries with

definite tenures of employment. Many of them are on contract employment
for one, two, or three years. They have no intention of changing their
residence on a permanent basis, but are technically disqualified from
exercising the right of suffrage in their countries of destination by the

residential requirement in Section 1 which says:
Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise

disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose
to vote for at least six months preceding the election.
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time they might
entertain an amendment that will make this exercise of the right to vote
abroad for Filipino citizens an effective, rather than merely a nominal right
under this proposed Constitution.
FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But more
than just saying that, I would like to make a comment on the meaning of
“residence” in the Constitution because I think it is a concept that has been
discussed in various decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly in the case
of Faypon vs. Quirino, a 1954 case which dealt precisely with the meaning
of “residence” in the Election Law. Allow me to quote:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, as the saying
goes, to improve his lot and that, of course, includes study in other places, practice
of his avocation, reengaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen
who left his birthplace to improve his lot may decide to return to his native town, to
cast his ballot, but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he
may not absent himself from the place of his professional or business activities.
So, they are here registered as voters as he has the qualifications to be one, and is
not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run
the government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus
revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him.
This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place

other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to consider
abandonment or loss of such residence of origin.
In other words, “residence” in this provision refers to two residence
qualifications: “residence” in the Philippines and “residence” in the place
where he will vote. As far as residence in the Philippines is concerned, the
word “residence” means domicile, but as far as residence in the place where
he will actually cast his ballot is concerned, the meaning seems to
637
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 637

be different. He could have a domicile somewhere else and yet he is a

resident of a place for six months and he is allowed to vote there. So that
there may be serious constitutional obstacles to absentee voting, unless the
vote of the person who is absent is a vote which will be considered as
cast in the place of his domicile.
MR. OPLE. Thank you for citing the jurisprudence.

It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million Filipinos who
should enjoy the right of suffrage, at least a substantial segment of these
overseas Filipino communities. The Committee, of course, is aware that
when this Article of the Constitution explicitly and unequivocally extends
the right of effective suffrage to Filipinos abroad, this will call for a
logistical exercise of global proportions. In effect, this will require
budgetary and administrative commitments on the part of the Philippine
government, mainly through the COMELEC and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and perhaps, a more extensive elaboration of this mechanism that
will be put in place to make effective the right to vote. Therefore, seeking
shelter in some wise jurisprudence of the past may not be sufficient to
meet the demands of the right of suffrage for Filipinos abroad that I have
mentioned. But I want to thank the Committee for saying that an
amendment
33
to this effect may be entertained at the proper time . . . .....
. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while

millions of Filipinos reside abroad principally for economic reasons
and hence they contribute in no small measure to the economic
uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as the choice
of this country’s leaders is concerned.
The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then
existing and considering the novelty of the system of absentee
voting in this jurisdiction, vesting overseas Filipinos with the right
to vote would spawn constitutional problems especially because the
Constitution itself provides for the residency requirement of voters:
MR. REGALADO. Before I act on that, may I inquire from

Commissioner Monsod if the term “absentee voting” also
includes transient voting; meaning, those who are, let us say,
studying in Manila need not go back to their places of
registration, for instance, in Mindanao, to cast their votes. .
MR. MONSOD. I think our provision is for absentee voting by
Filipinos abroad.
_______________
33 II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, pp. 11-12 (19 July

1986).
638

MR. REGALADO. How about those people who cannot go back to

the places where they are registered?
MR. MONSOD. Under the present Election Code, there are

provisions for allowing students and military people who are
temporarily in another place to register and vote. I believe that
those situations can be covered by the Omnibus Election Code.
The reason we want absentee voting to be in the Constitution as
a mandate to the legislature is that there could be inconsistency
on the residence rule if it is just a question of legislation by
Congress. So, by allowing it and saying 34
that this is possible,
then legislation can take care of the rest. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to

remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency
requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that
could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the
largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines
that the Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to
provide a system for overseas absentee voting.
The discussion of the Constitutional Commission on the effect of
the residency requirement prescribed by Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution on the proposed system of absentee voting for qualified
Filipinos abroad is enlightening:
MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a clarification. There

are certain qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage
like having resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in
preceding the elections. What is the effect of these mandatory
requirements on the matter of the exercise of the right of suffrage
by the absentee voters like Filipinos abroad?
THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?
MR. MONSOD. I believe the answer was already given by
Commissioner Bernas, that the domicile requirements as well as
the qualifications and disqualifications would be the same.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we leaving it to the legislature to devise the
system?
FR. BERNAS. I think there is a very legitimate problem raised
there.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
_______________
34 Id., p. 33.
639
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 639

MR. BENGZON. I believe Commissioner Suarez is clarified.

FR. BERNAS. But I think it should be further clarified with regard
to the residence requirement or the place where they vote in
practice; the understanding is that it is flexible. For instance, one
might be a resident of Naga or domiciled therein, but he satisfies
the requirement of residence in Manila, so he is able to vote in
Manila.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I then suggest to the
Committee to change the word “Filipinos” to QUALIFIED
FILIPINO VOTERS: Instead of “VOTING BY FILIPINOS
ABROAD,” it should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If
the Committee wants QUALIFIED VOTERS LIVING
ABROAD, would that not satisfy the requirement?
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Monsod say?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the phrase
“QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD” because “QUALIFIED”
would assume that he has the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to vote.
MR. TINGSON. That is right. So does the Committee accept?
FR. BERNAS. “QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD”?
THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept the amendment?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to read
my proposed amendment, I specifically stated that the National
Assembly shall prescribe a system which will enable qualified
citizens, temporarily absent from the Philippines, to vote.
According to Commissioner Monsod, the use of the phrase
“absentee voting” already took that into account as its meaning.
That is referring to qualified Filipino citizens temporarily abroad.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with
respect to registration we will leave it up to the legislative
assembly, for example, to require where the registration is. If
it is, say, members of the diplomatic corps who may be
continuously abroad for a long time, perhaps, there can be a
system of registration in the embassies. However, we do not
like to preempt the legislative assembly.
THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsod’s
amendment is only to provide a system.
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner is not stating here that he
wants new qualifications for these absentee voters.
640

MR. MONSOD. That is right. They must have the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications.
THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which they can
vote. 35
MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional Commission is to

entrust to Congress the responsibility of devising a system of
absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as stated in Section 1
shall remain except for the residency requirement. This is in fact the
reason why the Constitutional Commission opted for the term
qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to the system of absentee
voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed by Commissioner
Monsod, by the use of the adjective qualified with respect to
Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they have the “qualifications
and none of the disqualifications to vote.” In fine-tuning the
provision on absentee voting, the Constitutional Commission
discussed how the system should work:
MR. SUAREZ. For clarification purposes, we just want to state for

the record that in the case of qualified Filipino citizens residing
abroad and exercising their right of suffrage, they can cast their
votes for the candidates in the place where they were registered
to vote in the Philippines. So as to avoid any complications, for
example, if they are registered in Angeles City, they could not
vote for a mayor in Naga City.
In other words, if that qualified voter is registered in Angeles
City, then he can vote only for the local and national candidates
in Angeles City. I just want to make that clear for the record.
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Regalado say?
MR. REGALADO. I just want to make a note on the statement of
Commissioner Suarez that this envisions Filipinos residing
abroad. The understanding in the amendment is that the Filipino
is temporarily abroad. He may not be actually residing abroad;
he may just be there on a business trip. It just so happens that the
day before the elections he has to fly to the United States, so he
could not cast his vote. He is temporarily abroad, but not residing
there. He stays in a hotel for two days and comes back. This is
not limited only to Filipinos temporarily residing abroad. But
as long as he is temporarily abroad on the date of the
_______________
35 Id., pp. 34-35.
641
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 641

elections, then he can fall within the prescription of Congress

in that situation.
MR. SUAREZ. I thank the Commissioner for his further
clarification. Precisely, we need this clarification on record.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, to clarify what we mean by
“temporarily abroad,” it need not be on very short trips. One
can be abroad on a treaty traders visa. Therefore, when we talk
about registration, it is possible that his residence is in Angeles
and he would be able to vote for the candidates in Angeles, but
Congress or the Assembly may provide the procedure for
registration, like listing one’s name, in a registry list in the
embassy abroad. That is still possible under the system.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just one clarification if
Commissioner Monsod agrees with this.
Suppose we have a situation of a child of a diplomatic officer
who reaches the voting age while living abroad and he has never
registered here. Where will he register? Will he be a registered
voter of a certain locality in the Philippines?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is possible that the system will enable that
child to comply with the registration requirements in an embassy
in the United States and his name is then entered in the official
registration book in Angeles City, for instance.
FR. BERNAS. In other words, he is not a registered voter of Los
Angeles, but a registered voter of a locality here.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. He does not have to come home to the
Philippines to comply with the registration procedure here.
FR. BERNAS. So, he does not have to come home.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the Floor Leader wishes to
inquire if there are more clarifications needed from the body.
Also, the Floor Leader is happy to announce that there are no
more registered Commissioners to propose 36
amendments. So I move
that we close the period of amendments. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from these discussions of the members of the

Constitutional Commission that they intended to enfranchise as
much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose
parents’ domi-
_______________
36 Id., pp. 35-36.
642

cile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as

voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided
for Section 2 immediately after the residency requirement of Section
1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction,
37
which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the
strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency
requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad.
The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos
who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though
they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to
the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article
was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which
became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor,
thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into inrelation to
the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I wouldagree that the
Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.Let me read
Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution entitled, “Suffrage.” It says:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, “who shall have resided in the
Philippines.” They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence
so they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this
committee amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the
bill will have any effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked
in various fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the
interpretation here of “residence” is synonymous with “domicile.”
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, “domicile” is the intent to
return to one’s home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been
_______________
37 Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, 56 (1983).
643
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 643

physically absent from the Philippines and may be physically a resident of

the United States, for example, but has a clear intent to return to the
Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of the Philippines under
this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we
—that Congress—must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as
demanding physical presence, then there is no way we can provide for
offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr. President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2
of Article V, it reads: “The Congress shall provide a system for securing the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.”
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is “qualified.” In other
words, anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad
must be anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the
qualification, they cannot vote. And “residents” (sic) is a qualification.
I will lose votes here from permanent residents so-called “green-card
holders”, but the Constitution is the Constitution. We cannot compromise on
this. The Senate cannot be a party to something that would affect or impair
the Constitution.
Look at what the Constitution says—“In the place wherein they propose
to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.”
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros where Senator Cayetano lives.
We are separated only by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote
in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive
our Constitution is. I am not talking even about the Election Code. I am
talking about the Constitution.
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he
may do so. But he must do so, make the transfer six months before the
election, otherwise, he is not qualified to vote.
That is why I am raising this point because I think we have a
fundamental difference here.
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point
already well-debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And
the reason Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-
month/one-year residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably
that Section 2 which authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-
month/one-year residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr.
President, that one must remember.
644

The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence—and I

think this is so well-entrenched that one need not argue about it
—“residency” has been interpreted as synonymous with “domicile.”
But the third more practical reason, Mr. President, is, if we follow
the interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and
constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas
Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is quite
ridiculous because that is exactly the whole 38point of this exer-cise—to
enfranchise them and empower them to vote. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage

of the absentee voting process, to wit:
SEC. 4. Coverage.—All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not

otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day
of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.
which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and

Section 5 of the assailed law which enumerates those who are
disqualified, to wit:
SEC. 5. Disqualifications.—The following shall be disqualified from voting

under this Act:
a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with

Philippine laws;
b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship
and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment
by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of
not less than one (1) year, including those who have committed and
been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the
Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed by
plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person
disqualified to vote under this subsection shall automatically
acquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after
service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may
take cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or
tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the
formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on
execution of judgments;
_______________
38 TRANSCRIPT OF SENATE PROCEEDINGS (1 October 2002), pp. 10-12.
645
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 645

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as

such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later
than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration
under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has
not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to
return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the
immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared
insane or incompetent by competent authority in the
Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine
embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments
concerned, unless such competent authority subsequently
certifies that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent.
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189

specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is
“recognized as such in the host country” because immigration or
permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of
one’s residence in his country of origin. However, same Section
allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as
voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she
has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional
intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that “all citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law” must be entitled
to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a
system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical
residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the
framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a
system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit
itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required
in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or
permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression
that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is
not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section
5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes “provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to

646

To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent

residents abroad because by their status in their host countries, they
are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this
country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment
of Philippine domicile shall remain.
Further perusal of the transcripts of the Senate proceedings
discloses another reason why the Senate required the execution of
said affidavit. It wanted the affiant to exercise the option to return or
to express his intention to return to his domicile of origin and not to
preempt that choice by legislation. Thus:
Senator Villar. Yes, we are going back.

It states that: “For Filipino immigrants and those who have
acquired permanent resident status abroad,” a requirement for the
registration is the submission of “a Sworn Declaration of Intent
to Return duly sworn before any Philippine embassy or consulate
official authorized to administer oath . . .”
Mr. President, may we know the rationale of this provision? Is
the purpose of this Sworn Declaration to include only those who
have the intention of returning to be qualified to exercise the
right of suffrage? What if the Filipino immigrant has no purpose
of returning? Is he automatically disbarred from exercising this
right to suffrage?
Senator Angara. The rationale for this, Mr. President, is that we
want to be expansive and all-inclusive in this law. That as
long as he is a Filipino, no matter whether he is a green-card
holder in the U.S. or not, he will be authorized to vote. But if he
is already a green-card holder, that means he has acquired
permanent residency in the United States, then he must
indicate an intention to return. This is what makes for the
definition of “domicile.” And to acquire the vote, we thought
that we would require the immigrants and the green-card holders
. . . Mr. President, the three administration senators are leaving,
maybe we may ask for a vote [Laughter].
Senator Villar. For a merienda, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. Mr. President, going back to the business at hand.
The rationale for the requirement that an immigrant or a green-
card holder should file an affidavit that he will go back to the
Philippines is that, if he is already an immigrant or a green-card
holder, that means he may not return to the country any more and
that contradicts the definition of “domicile” under the law.
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VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 647

But what we are trying to do here, Mr. President, is really

provide the choice to the voter. The voter, after consulting his
lawyer or after deliberation within the family, may decide “No, I
think we are risking our permanent status in the United States if we
file an affidavit that we want to go back.” But we want to give him
the opportunity to39 make that decision. We do not want to make that
decision for him. (Emphasis supplied)
The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that

green card holders are disqualified to run for any elective office
finds no application to the present case because the Caasi case did
not, for obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting rights of
Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent residents in their host
countries.
In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or
R.A. 9189, they may still be considered as a “qualified citizen of the
Philippines abroad” upon fulfillment of the requirements of
registration under the new law for the purpose of exercising their
right of suffrage.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an
affidavit or a promise to “resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval
of his/her registration,” the Filipinos abroad must also declare that
they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they
must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return
“shall be cause for the removal” of their names “from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification
to vote in absentia.”
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a
Filipino voter permanently residing abroad who is at least eighteen
years old, not otherwise disqualified by law, who has not
relinquished Philippine citizenship and who has not actually
abandoned his/her intentions to return to his/her domicile of origin,
the Philippines, is allowed to register and vote in the Philippine
embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishments of the
place which has jurisdiction over the country where he/she has
indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections, while
providing for safeguards to a clean election.
Thus, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9189 provides:
_______________
39 Transcripts of Senate Proceedings (6 August 2002), pp. 30-31.
648

SEC. 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia.—
11.1. Every qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad whose application

for registration has been approved, including those previously
registered under Republic Act No. 8189, shall, in every national
election, file with the officer of the embassy, consulate or other
foreign service establishment authorized by the Commission, a
sworn written application to vote in a form prescribed by the
Commission. The authorized officer of such embassy, consulate or
other foreign service establishment shall transmit to the
Commission the said application to vote within five (5) days from
receipt thereof. The application form shall be accomplished in
triplicate and submitted together with the photocopy of his/her
overseas absentee voter certificate of registration.
11.2. Every application to vote in absentia may be done personally at, or
by mail to, the embassy, consulate or foreign service establishment,
which has jurisdiction over the country where he/she has indicated
his/her address for purposes of the elections.
11.3. Consular and diplomatic services rendered in connection with the
overseas absentee voting processes shall be made available at no
cost to the overseas absentee voter.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the

Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of
overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional
mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a
system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the
“qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present
in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are
components of the system of overseas absentee voting established
by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the
affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines.
He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence
from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent
resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an
abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the
Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the
opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his
domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by

Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
Petitioner’s speculative apprehension that the implementation of
Section 5(d) would affect the credibility of the elections is
insignificant as what is important is to ensure that all those who
possess the qualifications to vote on the date of the election are
given
649
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 649

the opportunity and permitted to freely do so. The COMELEC and

the Department of Foreign Affairs have enough resources and talents
to ensure the integrity and credibility of any election conducted
pursuant to R.A. No. 9189.
As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would renege on his
undertaking to return to the Philippines, the penalty of perpetual
disenfranchisement provided for by Section 5(d) would suffice to
serve as deterrence to non-compliance with his/her undertaking
under the affidavit.
Petitioner argues that should a sizable number of “immigrants”
renege on their promise to return, the result of the elections would
be affected and could even be a ground to contest the proclamation
of the winning candidates and cause further confusion and doubt on
the integrity of the results of the election. Indeed, the probability that
after an immigrant has exercised the right to vote, he shall opt to
remain in his host country beyond the third year from the execution
of the affidavit, is not farfetched. However, it is not for this Court to
determine the wisdom 40
of a legislative exercise. As expressed in
Tañada vs. Tuvera, the Court is not called upon to rule on the
wisdom of the law or to repeal it or modify it if we find it
impractical.
Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in fact, it
has addressed the expected problem. Section 5(d) itself provides for
a deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as
promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under Section 9,
should a registered overseas absentee voter fail to vote for two
consecutive national elections, his name may be ordered removed
from the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters.
Other serious legal questions that may be raised would be: what
happens to the votes cast by the qualified voters abroad who were
not able to return within three years as promised? What is the effect
on the votes cast by the non-returnees in favor of the winning
candidates? The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad who failed
to return within three years shall not be invalidated because they
were qualified to vote on the date of the elections, but their failure to
return shall be cause for the removal of the names of the immigrants
or permanent residents from the National Registry of
_______________
40 146 SCRA 446, 454 (1986) cited in Garcia vs. Corona, 321 SCRA 218 (1999)
and Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. vs. Trajano, 310 SCRA 354 (1999).
650

Absentee Voters and their permanent disqualification to vote in

absentia.
In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the
Court does not find Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as
constitutionally defective.
B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the
same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution?
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee
voter may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.—

... ... ...
18.5. The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation
of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by
the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is
empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the
fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or
countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible
by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries,
in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or
influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189
empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation
of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of
paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:
SEC. 4 . . .
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity
651
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 651

and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of
votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all
the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
...
which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim
the winning candidates for president and vice-president.
The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be
harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only
proclaim the winning Senators and 41
party-list representatives but not
the President and Vice-President.
Respondent COMELEC has no comment on the matter.
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily
includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the
presidency and the vice-presidency.
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally
disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to
proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and
vice-president.
In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:
18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of

the Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic
mail, or any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the
Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the Commission, . . .
[Emphasis supplied]
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution

which provides that the returns of every election for President and
Vice-President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to
Congress.
_______________
41 Comment, p. 15.
652

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power

that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to
encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for
president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners
for the said positions.” The provisions of the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes
and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and
vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of
Congress.
C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate
Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent,

are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit. (Emphasis supplied)
He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight

Committee with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the
COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control
of either the executive or legislative departments of government;
that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations
which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its
members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC
violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same
via the petition of any interested party, including the legislators.
It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted
its Comment. It agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of
R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent
COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections
upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the
independence of the constitutional commissions such as the
COMELEC. It asserts that its power to formulate rules and regula-
653
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 653

42
tions has been upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. where this Court
held that the power of the COMELEC to formulate rules and
regulations is implicit in its 43power to implement regulations under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution. COMELEC joins
the petitioner in asserting that as an independent constitutional body,
it may not be subject to interference by any government
instrumentality and that only this Court may review COMELEC
rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis-à-vis
its rule-making power, to wit:
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail.—

17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting
by mail in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in
countries that satisfy the following conditions:
a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to

prevent occasion for fraud;
b) Where there exists a technically established identification system
that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and
c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the
embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments
concerned are adequate and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon

review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A

mandating the independence of constitutional commissions.
The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement
that the constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with the
petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on
the ground that there is nothing in Article VI of the Constitution on
Legislative Department that would as much as imply that
_______________
42 G.R. No. 104848, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 253.

43 SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
654

Congress has concurrent power to enforce and administer election

laws with the COMELEC; and by the principles of exclusio unius
est exclusio alterius and expressum facit cessare tacitum, the
constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe its
authority to the exclusion of all others.
The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19, 25 and
portions of Section 17.1 are unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual
issue forged on this question raised by petitioner.
However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role of
Congress through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
(JCOC) vis-à-vis the independence of the COMELEC, as a
constitutional body.
R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:
SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.—A Joint

Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments,
Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the
Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage
and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of
Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives:
Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of
Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three
(3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power
to monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules.—The
Commission shall issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively
implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from the
effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be
submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by
virtue of this Act for prior approval.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Composed of Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
(JCOC) is apurely legislative body. There is no question that the
authority ofCongress to “monitor and evaluate the implementation”
of R.A. No.
655
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 655
9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the

lawitself and thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation.
However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A.
No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to “review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations” (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25
and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1],
the voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May 2004
elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the
Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One
such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC
shall be “independent.”
Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution
providing that there shall be an independent COMELEC, the Court
has held that “[w]hatever may be the nature of the functions of the
Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the
Constitution wanted 44it to be independent from the other departments
of the Government.” In an earlier case, the Court elucidated:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play

a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge
of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be
fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The
Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created—free,
orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of
means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of
discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and
political questions must be dealt with realistically—not from the standpoint
of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding
facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived
from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in 45a
peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.
(Emphasis supplied)
_______________
44 Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101, 107 (1949).

45 Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 294-295 (1941), cited in
Espino vs. Zaldivar, 129 Phil. 451, 474; 21 SCRA 1204 (1967).
656

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC

which is an independent body “except those specifically granted by
the Constitution,”
46
that is, to review its decisions, orders and
rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its
recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws,
Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by
exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has
empowered the COMELEC to “issue the necessary rules and
regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act
within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act.” This provision of
law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to
implement a law—the legislature grants an administrative agency
the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law
it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative
47
expertise of that
agency in its particular field of operation. Once a law is enacted
and approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress
relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review,
amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review,
revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and
revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003,
Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence
of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no
option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a
provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating
that “[t]he Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted
to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of
this Act for prior approval,” and the second sentence of the sec-
_______________
46 Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126, 129 (1949).

47 In Grego vs. COMELEC (340 Phil. 591, 606; 274 SCRA 481 [1997]), the Court
said: “The COMELEC as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional
body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has
more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally
respected and even given finality.”
657
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 657

ond paragraph of Section 25 stating that “[i]t shall review, revise,

amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission,” whereby Congress, in both
provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by
the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for
constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the
mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, “subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee” in the first sentence of Section
17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail
in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the
phrase, “only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee” found in the second paragraph of the same
section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of
voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress
may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the
countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by
the COMELEC pursuant48 to the conditions provided for in Section
17.1 of R.A. No. 9189. Otherwise, Congress would overstep the
bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC.
During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to
adopt the separate opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno as part of the
ponencia on the unconstitutionality of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of
R.A. No. 9189 insofar as they relate to the creation of and the
powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following
portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
_______________
48 SEC. 17. Voting by Mail.—
17.1 . . . Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:
a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for
fraud;
b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude
multiple or proxy voting; and,
c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates
and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.
658

a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of

Section 17.1, to wit: “subject to the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee”;
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit:
“only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee”;
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to
wit: “The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be
submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;” and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25,
to wit: “It shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission” of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution

mandating the independence of constitutional commissions, such as
COMELEC.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC
to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list
representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and
proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President
which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the
provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.) and Corona, J., concur.

Bellosillo, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
Puno, J., Please see Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
Vitug, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Panganiban, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Quisumbing, J., On leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Please see Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion.
659
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 659

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On official leave; Left her

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
Carpio, J., See Concurring Opinion.
Carpio-Morales, J., See my Separate (Concurring) Opinion.

Callejo, Sr., J., Please see my Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion.
Azcuna, J., Please see my Separate Concurring Opinion.
Tinga, J., No part.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The concept of absentee voting exudes an arresting charm of novelty

and importance. For the first time in our checkered political history,
we are expanding the frontiers of our electoral process—warily1
treading into a veritable terra incognita. The Absentee Voting Law
empowers citizens, hitherto outside the reaches of the ballot, to
assert their sovereign will and dictate the national destiny. It caters
to their fundamental yearning for some measure of participation in
the process of reaching fateful decisions for their country, although
they may be at some distant shores.
I concur with the collective wisdom of the majority. I wish
however to express my views on the pivotal issue of whether Sec. 5,
par. (d), of the Absentee Voting Law—allowing the registration of
voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries
by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention
to return to the Philippines—violates the residency requirement in
Sec. 1, Art. V, 1987 Constitution.
The fundamental law mandates—
_______________
1 RA 9189, An Act Providing for a System of Overseas Absentee Voting by

Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.
660

ARTICLE V
SUFFRAGE
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not

preceding the election. No literacy, property or other substantive

Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad x x x x (italics supplied).
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (d), of the Absentee Voting Law, the
restless battleground of passionate advocacy, provides—

under this Act: x x x x d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her
registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause
for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from
the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia (italics supplied).
It has been suggested by certain quarters that all Filipino citizens

who are immigrants and permanent residents abroad are considered
to have abandoned their Philippine domicile and therefore cannot
vote in Philippine elections, since they are not within the
constitutional contemplation of “qualified Filipinos abroad” who are
eligible to vote.
In this jurisdiction, it is well settled that “domicile” and
“residence” as used in election laws are synonymous terms which
import not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence 2
in that place coupled with conduct indicative of
that intention. Domicile is a question of intention and
circumstances.
_______________
2 Romualdez v. RTC-Br. 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960, 14 September 1993,

226 SCRA 408.
661
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 661

There are three (3) rules that must be observed in the consideration
of circumstances: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; second, domicile is not easily lost, once established it is
retained until a new one is acquired; and
3
third, a man can have but
one residence or domicile at a time. The principal elements of
domicile, i.e., physical presence in the locality involved and

intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish
a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these
elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual
residence in the locality does not result in the acquisition 4 of
domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention.
The mere acquisition of an immigrant or permanent resident
status by a Filipino citizen in a foreign country does not ipso jure
result in the automatic severance of his domiciliary link to the
Philippines, nor the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.
Different jurisdictions vary in their legal characterization of the
terms immigrant and permanent resident, with dissimilar
requirements, conditions and restrictions for the acquisition and
maintenance of those statuses. Territories with conservative policies
on immigration tend to be restrictive and exclusive, especially on
matters relating to residency (or domiciliary); while more open
societies tend to be liberal and inclusive.
To illustrate: In the United States, an overwhelming majority of
our compatriots are now enjoying the rights and privileges of
permanent residents and immigrants. The U.S. Immigration and
Nationality Act defines the term permanent as “a relationship of
continuing and lasting nature, as distinguished from temporary, but a
relationship may be permanent even though it is one that may be
dissolved eventually at the instance either5 of the United States or of
the individual, in accordance with law;” and residence as “a place
of general abode; and the place of general abode of a person means
his principal,
6
actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to
intent.”
_______________
3 Domino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, 19 July 1999, 310 SCRA 546, 568.
4 Id., at p. 569.
5 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31).
6 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33).
662

Thus, considering that intent is not necessary in establishing

permanent residency in the U.S., it is entirely possible for a Filipino
citizen to be a permanent resident in the U.S., i.e., the U.S. may be
his general place of abode, “his principal, actual dwelling place in
fact,” for an indefinite period of time, without however abandoning
his Philippine domicile to which he intends to return later.
Immigrants, on the other hand, have been loosely defined as

referring to “every alien in the United States, except an alien who is
within one of the non-immigrant aliens enumerated 7
in the
Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States.” They are
classified into the non-quota immigrants and the quota immigrants.
The quota immigrants may fall in either of two (2) categories: the
family-based preferences and the employment-based preferences.
Particularly interesting is the last mentioned category, the
employment-based preferences. These immigrants are conferred the
status as such on the basis of their occupational skills and the
employment demands in the host country. To this class belongs the
professionals, investors, managers and executives, skilled workers,
health workers, professors and researchers. Many Filipino citizens
fall under this category, and most of them opt for immigrant status
solely for the purpose of securing permanent employment in the
U.S., and intend to return to the Philippines after their purpose is
accomplished.
The diaspora of Filipinos in foreign lands started in the wake of
the bludgeoning economic crisis in the 80’s and its resulting acute
shortage of employment opportunities. This phenomenon has
continued to the present day as the steadily rising cost of living and
intermittent economic crises—worldwide in their effects—weighed
most heavily on the ordinary Filipino. He does not have much
choice: leave or starve. The lure of the proverbial greener pastures in
foreign lands is certainly a potent incentive for an exodus.
In most cases, the decision to migrate is borne out of the dire
necessities of life rather than a conscious desire to abandon the land
of birth. Most immigrants and permanent residents remain bound
very strongly by intimate ties of filial, racial, cultural and social
relationships with the Philippines. They travel back periodically to
be with their friends and loved ones; some even own, maintain and
_______________
7 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15).
663
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 663

manage their properties here; and, they continue to show keen

interest in, and keep themselves abreast with, political and social
developments in the country through the mass media. They make
significant contributions to the nation, through their regular dollar
remittances that have tremendously shored up our sagging national
economy.
In the face of these realities, I am convinced more than ever that

actual and physical residence abroad should not automatically be
equated with abandonment of Philippine domicile. The
circumstances enumerated in the immediately preceding paragraph
are valid indicia of animus manendi (intent to remain) and animus
revertendi (intent to return), which should not simply be brushed
aside in determining whether the right to vote should be denied the
immigrants and permanent residents. Indeed, there is no rhyme nor
reason to unduly marginalize this class of Filipinos.
It is significant to stress, however, that Sec. 5, par. (d), of the
Absentee Voting Law in fact disqualifies immigrants and permanent
residents from voting as a general rule. This is precisely in
recognition of the fact that their status as such may indeed be a
badge of their intent to abandon their Philippine domicile and settle
permanently in their host country. But at the same time, the
legislature provided for a mechanism in the law for ascertaining real
intent: an immigrant or permanent resident who wishes to exercise
his right of suffrage is required as a condition sine qua non to
execute an affidavit declaring that he shall resume actual, physical
and permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3)
years from his registration under the law; and that he has not applied
for citizenship in another country.
The law in effect draws a distinction between two (2) classes of
immigrants or permanent residents—those who have renounced
their old domicile in the Philippines, and those who still consider the
Philippines as their domicile of origin. The execution of the affidavit
is an affirmation on the part of the immigrant or permanent resident
that his stay abroad should not be construed as a relinquishment of
his old domicile.
I am not unaware of the possibility that the immigrant or
permanent resident may renege on his undertaking in the affidavit to
resume actual, physical and permanent residence in the Philippines.
But the law contains proper and adequate safeguards against the
misuse or abuse of this privilege, i.e., his name will be
664

purged from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and he will be

permanently disqualified from voting in absentia.
As a closing observation, I wish to emphasize that the absolute
disqualification of Filipino immigrants and permanent residents,
without distinction, from participating in the Philippine electoral
process would invariably result, as in the past, in a massive
disenfranchisement of qualified voters. It would be self-defeating in
the extreme if the Absentee Voting Law would founder on the rock
by reason of an unduly restrictive and decidedly unrealistic

interpretation given by the minority on the residency requirement in
the Constitution.
I vote to sustain the constitutionality of Sec. 5, par. (d), of RA
9189, and on the other hand, to declare unconstitutional Sec. 18.5 of
the same law insofar as it authorizes COMELEC to proclaim the
winning candidates for President and Vice-President it being clearly
violative of Sec. 4, Art. VII, of the Constitution, as well as Secs.
17.1, 19 and 25 of RA 9189 insofar as they subject COMELEC
implementing rules and regulations to review and approval by the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for being likewise
violative of Sec. 1, Art. IX-A of the Constitution.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
With all due respect, I would like to offer my humble views on the
constitutional issues presented by the petitioner, viz.:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the

registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries by their mere act of executing
an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1
of Article IV of the Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national
offices and party-list representatives including the President
and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the
winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall
be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regu
665
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 665

lations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate

without violating the independence of the COMELEC
under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
To start off,
1
let me stress the significance of the case at bar. Rep. Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003” is a historic attempt to translate to reality a long awaited
dream: the enfranchisement of millions of overseas Filipinos.
Undoubtedly, the efforts of Congress to give flesh to section 2,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution mandating it to devise “a system
for absentee voting for qualified Filipinos abroad,” deserves the
highest commendation. However, Rep. Act No. 9189 poses far
reaching constitutional issues that merit more than an invocation of
abstract legal principles or a simplistic construction of the
Constitution. For one, the petition affects the value of the right of
suffrage, a right that is the cornerstone of our democratic
government. It is the responsibility of this Court to strike a balance
between the need to expand the right of suffrage in favor of those
who cannot exercise it and the need to prevent the dilution of the
right of suffrage of those already exercising it. For another, the
petition compels this Court to define the extent and the limits of
Congress’ oversight powers or legislative veto over “subordinate
legislations” or the rules and regulations promulgated by
administrative agencies of government. Undoubtedly, this oversight
power is indispensable for Congress to discharge its broad power to
legislate. Thus, it again behooves this Court to draw the precise
parameters of the oversight power sought to be exercised by
Congress to preserve the delicate balance of powers allocated to the
different branches of our government in the Constitution.
Prescinding from these premises, let me discuss the issues in
seriatim.
A.
Does section 5 (d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate section 1, Article V
of the 1987 Constitution?
_______________
1 “An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified

Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” Rep. Act No. 9189 was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on February 13, 2003, and was published on February 16, 2003 at Daily
Tribune and Today.
666

Petitioner submits that section 5, par. (d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 is
unconstitutional for it allows immigrants or permanent residents of
foreign countries to vote for President, Vice-President, Senators, and

party-list representatives by mere execution of an affidavit stating
that: (a) he shall resume actual, physical, permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his
registration; and (b) that he has not applied for citizenship in another
country, viz.:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications.-—The following shall be disqualified from voting

under this Act.
...
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such
in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an
affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her
registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she
has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return
shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and
his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. (emphasis ours)
Petitioner also
2
contends that section 2, Article V of the 1987
Constitution limits the authority of Congress to provide a system for
absentee voting to those Filipinos who are temporarily absent in the
Philippines but otherwise satisfy the requirements under section 1
thereof, including the one year residence in the Philippines
3
and six
months residence in the place where they propose to vote.
_______________
2 “Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to
vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote
under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate
to protect the secrecy of the ballot.”
3 Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote
for at least six months immediately
667
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 667

4
4
Citing our ruling in Caasi v. Court of Appeals, the petitioner avers
that a Filipino who is an acknowledged immigrant or permanent
resident of a foreign country does not possess the necessary
residence requirements as he is deemed to have already abandoned
his domicile in the Philippines. He alleges that the challenged
provision amends or alters the residence requirements by granting
“conditional” residence qualification to an immigrant
5
or permanent
resident or through the execution of an affidavit.
The majority, thru our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice
Martinez, rules that section 2, Article V of the 1987 Constitution
mandating Congress to devise a system for overseas absentee voting
operates as an exception to the residence requirements as the
members of the Constitutional Commission manifested a clear intent
“to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
6
abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin,” viz.:
By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which

may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic
location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided
for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with
respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect
declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be
allowed to vote even though they do not 7
satisfy residency requirement in
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. (emphases ours)
The majority further holds that if actual physical residence in the

Philippines is required, “there is no sense for the framers of the
Constitution
8
to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee
voting.” 9
The majority affirms our ruling in Caasi v. Court of Appeals that
an immigrant or permanent resident of a foreign country is deemed
to have relinquished his residence in his country of origin. However,
it rules that this presumption is overturned by the execu-
_______________
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall

be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.”
4 191 SCRA 229 (1990).
5 Petition, pp. 7-9.
6 Decision, p. 22.
7 Id.
8 Id., at p. 26.
9 Supra note 4.
668

tion of the affidavit required under the challenged provision of Rep.

Act No. 9189. Allegedly, the affidavit is an explicit expression that
an immigrant or permanent resident has not relinquished his
domicile in the Philippines, to wit:
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not
the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is
not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go
back and resume residence in the Philippines, but more significantly, it
serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his
domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the
affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes
“provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents
abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to
have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the
affidavit,
10
the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall
remain. (emphases ours)
The majority further rules that “the act of the immigrant or

permanent resident in executing an affidavit pursuant to section 5(d)
may be considered as an express waiver of his status as an
immigrant or permanent resident.” Thus, the majority concludes that
section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 is not unconstitutional.
With all due respect, I disagree with the majority. But before
discussing the reasons for my dissent, let me put the issue in its
proper historical perspective. 11
Suffrage is an attribute of citizenship and is ancillary to the
principle of republicanism
12
enshrined in section 1, Article II of the
1987 Constitution. The right of suffrage, however, is not absolute.
No political system in the whole world 13has literally practiced
“universal” suffrage, even among its citizens. The scarlet history of
_______________
10 Decision, p. 26.
11 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary 582 (1996).
12 “Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them.”
13 Brent & Levinson, Process of Constitutional Democracy: Cases and Materials
1053 (1992).
669
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 669

the right of suffrage shows that restrictions have always been

imposed on its exercise.
In England, for instance, suffrage originated 14
as a political
privilege granted to land owners by the monarchs. The grant arose
from the theory that in the formation of the state, the people agreed
to surrender to the King all political sovereignty. In return, the King
extended suffrage to the freeholders as a vested right. The origin and
character of suffrage in 15England is chronicled by Chief Justice Holt
in Ashby v. White, et al., viz.:
The election of knights belongs to the freeholders of the counties, and it is

an original right vested in and inseparable from the freehold, and can be no
more severed from the freehold than the freehold itself can be taken away.
Before the statute of 8 Hen. 6, ch. 7, any man that had a freehold, though
never so small, had a right of voting; but by that statute the right of election
is confined to such persons as have lands or tenements to the yearly value of
forty shillings at least, because, as the statute says, of the tumults and
disorders which happened at elections by the excessive and outrageous
number of electors; but still the right of election is an original incident to
and inseparable from freehold. As for citizens and burgesses, they depend
on the same rights as the knights of shires differ only as to the16 tenure; but
the right and manner of their election is on the same foundation.
The economic theory of suffrage is also evident in the early history

of the United States. The 1787 U.S. Constitution, 17as originally
adopted, did not expressly provide the right to vote. The States
were left to determine who should have the right to vote in national
as well as local elections. Most States restricted the right of suffrage
to white males
18
over twenty-one years of age with a 19certain amount
of property. Other 20States also required religious, literacy, and
moral qualifications.
_______________
14 McCrary on Elections 10 (1897).

15 2 Ld. Raymond, 938 (1 Smith’s Leading Cases, p. 472), cited in McCrary, Id., at
p. 9.
16 Id., at p. 10.
17 Lieberman, The Evolving Constitution 563.
18 Id.
19 The last survival of religious test appears in the Constitution of South Carolina
(Article XIII), in force from 1778 to 1790, limiting suffrage “to every free white man
who acknowledges the being of a God, and be
20 Id., at p. 3.
670

Some legal scholars, however, contend that the right of suffrage is

presumed from the provision of the Constitution
21
guaranteeing each
state a “republican form of government.” Veering away from the
economic theory of suffrage prevalent in England, these scholars
argue that in forming the state, the people did not give up all their
sovereign powers but merely delegated the exercise of these powers
to some chosen representatives. The right of suffrage is one of these
delegated powers, viz.:
The people, in their original sovereign character are the fountainhead of

governmental authority, and all the powers necessary to be exercised in the
continued administration of a representative government originated and are
delegated by exertion of their sovereign will. These propositions, founded
on necessity, and illustrated by long continued practice, have become the
received doctrines of the American people... The people, in clothing a
citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a consistent
and perpetual administration of the government they ordain, charge him
with the performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that
respect constitute him a representative of the whole people. This duty
requires that the privilege thus bestowed should be exercised, not
exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens professing it, but
in good faith and22
with an intelligent zeal for the general benefit and welfare
of the State. . .
As a privilege delegated by the people, a citizen acquires no

indefeasible right to the continuous exercise or enjoyment of the
right of suffrage. “The people of the State, in the exercise of their
sovereign power, may disqualify, suspend or entirely withdraw it
from any citizen or class of them, providing always that
representation of the people, the essential characteristics 23
of a
republican government, be not disregarded or abandoned.”
Following the shift in its theoretical basis, the right of suffrage
was extended to broader classes of citizens. In 1870, the Fifteenth
Amendment was enacted prohibiting the federal government and the
states from discriminating on the basis of “race, color or previous
conditions of servitude.” In 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment
_______________
lieves in a future state of rewards and punishments.” See McCrary on Elections,

supra note 14, f.n. 7 at 5 (1897).
21 Lieberman, supra note 17.
22 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.
23 Id.
671
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 671

was ratified providing that the right of citizens to vote “shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex.” In 1964, the Twenty-fourth Amendment was adopted
providing that the right of any citizen to vote for President, Vice-
President or members of Congress “shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll
tax or other tax.” In 1971, the Twenty-sixth Amendment was passed
providing that the right of any citizen eighteen years or older to vote
“shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of age.”
In our jurisdiction, the right of suffrage has evolved from a mere
statutory right to a constitutional right. Our first election law was
Act No. 1582, which took effect on January 15, 1907. We had no
elections during the Spanish occupation of the country.
Like its foreign counterparts, the qualifications for the exercise of
the right of suffrage set in section 14 of Act No. 1582 were elitist
and gender-biased. The right of suffrage was limited to male citizens
twenty-three years of age or over with legal residence for a period of
six months immediately preceding the election in the municipality in
which they exercise the right of suffrage. Women were not allowed
to vote for they were regarded as mere extensions of the personality
of their husbands or fathers, and
24
that they were not fit to participate
in the affairs of government. But even then, not all male citizens
were deemed to possess significant interests in election and the
ability to make intelligent choices. Thus, only those falling under
any of the following three classes were allowed to vote: (a) those
who, prior to the August 13, 1898, held office of municipal captain,
governadorcillo, alcalde, lieutenant, cabeza de barangay, or
member of any ayuntamiento; (b) those who own real property with
the value of five hundred pesos or who annually pay thirty pesos or
more of the established taxes; or (c) those who speak, read and write
English or Spanish.
But apart from possessing the necessary qualifications, a voter
must not suffer from any disqualification. We elaborated the rea-
_______________
24 The exclusion of women originated in the common-law idea of the merger of a

married woman’s existence in that of her husband, and her unfitness by nature for the
occupation of civil life. See Cooley on Const. Limitation at 38.
672

sons for setting disqualifications

25
for the exercise of the right of
suffrage in People v. Corral, viz.:
The modern conception of suffrage is that voting is a function of

government. The right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created
by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or
classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early
stages of the evolution of the representative system of government, the
exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the
inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the
franchise in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the adult
male population. For reasons of public policy, certain classes of persons are
excluded from the franchise. Among the generally excluded classes are
minors, idiots, paupers, and convicts.
The right of the State to deprive persons of the right of suffrage by
reason of their having been convicted of crime, is beyond question. “The
manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity
of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction
of felony, or other base offenses indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to
exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for
this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and
not for punishment,
26
the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a
personal right.”
On November 9, 1933, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No.

4122 extending the right of suffrage to Filipino women starting
January 1, 1935. However, before they could exercise their new
right, the 1935 Constitution was adopted, once again, limiting the
right of suffrage to male citizens, viz.:
Suffrage may be exercised by male citizens of the Philippines not otherwise

disqualified by law, who are twenty-one years of age or over and are able to
read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year
and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election. The National Assembly shall extend the right of
suffrage to women, if in a plebiscite which shall be held for that purpose
within two years after the adoption of this Constitution, not less than three
hundred thousand women possessing the necessary qualifications shall vote
affirmatively on the question.
_______________
25 62 Phil. 945 (1936).

26 Id., at p. 948, citations omitted.
673
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 673

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, it was

conceded that Filipino women were capable of exercising the right
of suffrage. Their right, however, was opposed on the following
grounds: (1) there was no popular demand for suffrage by Filipino
women themselves; (2) woman suffrage would only disrupt family
unity; and (3) it would plunge women into the quagmire of politics,
dragging them from the 27
pedestal of honor in which they had
theretofore been placed. Thus, in its report to the President of the
Convention on September 24, 1934, the Committee on Suffrage
said:
The committee refrains from stating in this report the reasons on which it
bases its decision to withdraw the right of suffrage from the women and will
merely say that the principal idea in the minds of the members not in favor
of extending suffrage to women was that the sweet womanliness of the
Philippine women should be projected from political strife28
and passion in
order that sweet home may not lose any of its sweetness.
The proponents of woman suffrage in reply argued that it would be

unfair to deprive Filipino women of the right of suffrage already
granted to them by the legislature without giving them the chance to
prove whether they deserved it or not. They also submitted that the
right would make them more interested in the management of the
affairs of government and that “it was necessary as a matter of
justice to extend the frontiers of our democracy to our women who
had labored hard side by side29 with our men for the progress and
development of the country.” In a last ditch attempt to save the
cause of woman suffrage, women leaders distributed a petition to
individual delegates that reads:
We, the undersigned, duly elected representatives of women who believe in

the justice and wisdom of the enfranchisement of the Filipino women,
protest most solemnly against women being deprived of the vote in the
Constitution of the Commonwealth and against any change in the existent
Law, No. 4112, passed by the Ninth Philippine Legislature on November
ninth, 1933, and signed by Governor-General Frank Murphy on December
seventh, 1934.
_______________
27 I Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 217 (1936).

28 Id., at p. 216.
29 Id., at p. 217.
674
We call the attention of the Constitutional Assembly and the Legislature to

the plea for liberty made before the Congress and the President of United
States for thirty-seven years by the Filipinos; a plea based on the fact that
we are a liberty-loving people equipped and capable of self-government.
Such government cannot exist “half-slave and half-free.” The women of this
Christian land, serene in the knowledge that in peace or war they have never
failed their men or their country, in this crucial hour of the realization of the
sacrifice and devotion of the years, insist upon their political recognition
and their share in the triumph of the cause of liberty.
It is not a matter of plebiscite nor specific numbers. It is a right earned,
deserved and therefore claimed. It is not a matter of sex. In a democratic
government all qualified citizens, men and women alike, can and should
make their valuable contribution in deciding what their community will
undertake to do through its government, by what means, and through what
officials.
Under the law women suffer penalties, are summoned before the courts
by law—laws they have had no voice in making—and pay taxes. “Taxation
without representation is tyranny” and more so in 1934 than in 1776.
So confident of the unalterable righteousness of this cause, to you,
gentlemen of the Constitutional Assembly, we appeal for justice believing
and knowing that our cause is a just one, and that our rights have been won
thru years of sacrifice, devotion and service to our common cause—the
cause of men and 30women alike—the welfare and progress of our native land
—the Philippines.
In the end, a compromise was reached limiting the right of suffrage

to male citizens and leaving the issue of women suffrage for the
women to decide. In the plebiscite held on April 30, 1937, more than
three hundred thousand women voted for woman suffrage.
Thenceforth, Filipino women were allowed to vote, thus, paving the
way for women participation in the government.
To broaden the mass base of voters, the 1935 Constitution
lowered the age requirement from 23 years to 21 years. The literacy
requirement was also relaxed. It is to be noted that from the opening
days of the Convention, there was a prevalent sentiment among the
delegates to bar illiterates from exercising the right of suffrage. It
was proposed that only those who can read and write English,
Spanish, or other local dialects should be allowed to vote.
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 218-219.
675
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 675
This proposal was defeated for the

31
drafters felt that while the ability
to read and write was necessary, the specification of any language
or dialect would be discriminatory against the Mohammedans:
It is discriminatory against a respectable minority of the population of the

Philippines. It would serve to discriminate against the Mohammedan
population of the Philippines for which I am one of the humble
representatives. It is the opinion of this Convention, I think, to emancipate,
to enfranchise our backward elements, especially the Mohammedan
population. And you would like to curtail that right and that privilege by
inserting a provision that only those who can read and write either English,
Spanish, or any of the local dialects shall be allowed to vote. This
amendment would preclude the Mohammedans because their Arabic writing
is not included under local dialects. Because when you say, local dialects,
you refer to the dialect and not to the system of writing. The system of
writing is either Arabic or Roman. In view of this fact, Mr. President, I hope
that you will be liberal and tolerant enough to reject this proposed 32
amendment because it is unnecessary and because it is discriminatory.
Furthermore, the 1935 Constitution removed the property

qualifications under Act No. 1582.
33
We explained the reason for this
removal in Maquera v. Borra, viz.:
. . . property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of

the republican system ordained in our constitution and the principle of social
justice underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the
tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to
vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the
individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity
for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall by 34reason
of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to the public office. . . .
In sum, the 1935 Constitution gave a constitutional status to the

right of suffrage. Thus, suffrage is not anymore a privilege granted
by the legislature, but a right granted by the sovereign people to a
_______________
31 Id., at p. 225.
32 Id., at pp. 225-226.
33 15 SCRA 7 (1965).
34 Id., at p. 9.
676
definite portion of the population possessing certain qualifications.

To be sure, the right of suffrage was still subject to regulation by the
legislature but only in accordance with the terms of the Constitution.
The march towards liberalization of the right of suffrage
continued with the 1973 Constitution. The literacy requirement was
removed while the age bar was further lowered from 21 years to 18
years. Thus, section 1, Article VI of the 1973 Constitution reads:
Section 1. Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over,
and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and
in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election. No literacy, property or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. The National
Assembly shall provide a system for the purpose of securing the secrecy
and sanctity of the vote. (emphasis ours)
The rationale for these changes was expressed in the Explanatory

Note of Resolution No. 03 of the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms, viz.:
In keeping with the trend for the broadening of the electoral base already
begun with the lowering of the voting age to 18 and in keeping with the
committee’s desire to continue the alienation and exclusion of millions of
citizens from the political system and from participation in the political life
in the country, the requirement of literacy for voting has been eliminated. It
is noted that there are very few countries left in the world where literacy
remains a condition for voting. There is no Southeast Asian country that
imposes this requirement. The United States Supreme Court only a few
months ago declared unconstitutional any state law that would continue to
impose this requirement for voting.
Although there were more resolutions submitted proposing the increase
of educational requirements for voting than those advocating the elimination
of the literacy requirement, the committee felt that favoring the elimination
of the requirement would be more in keeping with its objective and that of
the Constitutional Convention encouraging popular participation and
equalizing the privileges and rights of the people . . .
According to the Bureau of Census and Statistics, the projection for the
population of the Philippines over 18 years old for 1970 is 17,659,000. Of
this, 12,384,000 are considered literates. However, the same Bureau
admitted that there is no real scientific literacy test in counting literates. All
that is done is to ask each member of the population the question
677
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 677

whether he is able to read and write and to take his answer at its face value.
These circumstances plus the well-known practice in all elections in
which political leaders spend their time in the barrios showing the
prospective voters to write the name of the candidates instead of explaining
the political issues to them, strengthened the conviction of the committee
that present literacy requirement is more of a joke, and worse, a deterrent to
intelligent discussions of the issues. Finally, the committee took note of the
convincing argument that the requirement to read and write was written into
our constitution at a time when the only medium of information was the
printed word and even the public meetings were not as large and successful
because of the absence of amplifying equipment. It is a fact that today the
vast majority of the population learn about national matters much more from
the audio-visual media, namely, radio and television, and public meetings
have become much more effective since the advent of amplifying
equipment.
In addition, the 1973 Constitution provided that no property or other

substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
The 1987 Constitution further liberalized the right of suffrage.
For the first time, it required Congress to provide a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad and to design a
procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without
assistance from other persons. Be that as it may, four qualifications
existing since the 1935 Constitution were retained: (1) Filipino
citizenship; (2) age; (3) one year residence in the Philippines; and
(4) six months residence in the place where the voter proposes to
vote. The wisdom of these four qualifications has not been
questioned at any given time in the history of our suffrage. It is easy
to see the reason. Suffrage is a political right appertaining to
citizenship. Each individual qualified to vote is a particle of popular
sovereignty, hence, the right of suffrage cannot be extended to non-
citizens. As an attribute of citizenship, suffrage is reserved
exclusively35 to Filipinos whose allegiance to the country is
undivided.
It is also conceded that the right of suffrage can be exercised only
by persons of a certain age. Nobody could doubt the reason for
preventing minors from taking part in the political exercise. Voting
is an act of choice and involves prescience. It requires not only a
_______________
35 Laurel, Philippine Law on Elections 2 (1940).
678

familiarity of political realities but 36 also the maturity to make

reasoned choices out of these realities.
But citizenship and age requirements are not enough. For the
vote to be more meaningful as an expression of sovereignty, the
voter must possess more than a passing acquaintance with the
problems and prospects of the country. Thus, residence is imposed
as a qualification “to exclude a stranger and a newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions37
and needs of the community and
not identified with the latter.” The residence requirement is also
necessary for administrative
38
purposes such as the preparation of
accurate list of voters.
I now come to the case at bar. The first issue is whether section
5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 extending the right of suffrage to
Filipinos who are “immigrants” or “permanent residents” of foreign
countries is unconstitutional. To resolve this issue, the following
need to be addressed: (1) whether section 2, Article V of the
Constitution dispenses with the residence requirements prescribed in
section 1 thereof; (2) whether an “immigrant” or a “permanent
resident” satisfies the residence requirements; (3) whether the
execution of an affidavit is sufficient proof of non-abandonment of
residence in the Philippines; and (4) whether the system provided in
section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 will dilute the right of suffrage of
other Filipino voters who possess the full residence qualifications
under section 1, Article VI of the Constitution.
(1) Whether section 2 of Article V dispenses with the residence
requirements prescribed in section 1 of the same Article.
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution prescribes two
residence qualifications: (a) one year residence in the Philippines;
and (2) six months residence in the locality where the voter proposes
to vote.
In its ordinary conception, residence connotes the actual
relationship of an individual to a specific place. To be a resident,
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country
is
_______________
36 Id., at p. 16.
37 Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453, 459 (1941).
38 Supra note 13 at pp. 1066-1067.
679
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 679

39
39
required. Even before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution,
jurisprudence has equated the first residence requirement (one year40
residence in the Philippines) with domicile or legal residence.
Domicile in turn has been defined as an individual’s permanent
home or “the place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends 41on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.” The domicile
of a person is determined by the concurrence of the following
elements: (1) the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed
place; and (2) 42
animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently. The mere absence of an individual from his
permanent residence without the intention
43
to abandon it does not
result in a loss or change of domicile.
The second residence requirement (six months residence in the
place the voter proposes to vote)44refers to either the voter’s domicile
or to his temporary residence. A voter who is domiciled in a
particular locality but has resided for six months in another locality
may register and vote in either locality, but not in both. To be sure, a
person fulfilling the first residence requirement also fulfills the
second so long as the voter registers in his established domicile. The
second residence requirement is relevant for two purposes: (1) the
determination of the place where the voter will register, and (2) the
determination of the place where the voter will vote. It ought to be
noted that as a general rule, a person should register and vote in the
place where he has established his domicile or the place where he
has resided for six months.
The intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission to
apply the residence requirements to absentee voters is evident from
its deliberations. They precisely used the phrase “QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS ABROAD” to stress that the absentee voter must have
_______________
39 Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300, 323 (1995).

40 See Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928).
41 Ong v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969 (1967).
42 Supra note 39.
43 Id., at p. 325.
44 II Bernas, Constitutional Rights and Demands: Notes and Cases 558 (1991).
680

all the qualifications in section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, viz.:

system?
there.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
Manila.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I suggest to the Committee
to change the word “Filipinos” to QUALIFIED FILIPINO
VOTERS. Instead of “VOTING BY FILIPINOS ABROAD,” it
should be QUALFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If the Committee
wants QUALIFIED VOTERS LIVING ABROAD, would that
not satisfy the requirement?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the
phrase “QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD” because
“QUALIFIED” would assume that he has the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to vote.
681
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 681



“absentee voting” already took into account as its meaning. That
is referring to qualified Filipino citizens temporarily abroad.
assembly, for example, to require where the registration is. If it
is, say, members of the diplomatic corps who may be
system of registration in the embassies. However, we do not like
to preempt the legislative assembly.
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
vote. 45
MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President.
In the course of the deliberations, Fr. Bernas perceived a problem

that may arise from the meaning of the second residence
requirement on the place of registration and voting. As noted, a
qualified voter normally registers and votes in the place where he is
domiciled or has resided for six months. Fr. Bernas feared that the
second residence requirement may pose a constitutional obstacle to
absentee voting “unless the vote of the person who is absent is a vote
which will be considered as cast in the place of his domicile,” viz.:
MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the

right of suffrage, which here has a residential restriction, is not
denied to citizens temporarily residing or working abroad. Based
on the statistics of the government agencies, there ought to be
about two million such Filipinos at this time. Commissioner
Bernas had earlier pointed out that these
_______________
45 II Records at pp. 34-35.
682

provisions are really lifted from the two previous Constitutions of

1935 and 1973, with the exception of the last paragraph. They could
not therefore have foreseen at that time the phenomenon now
described as the Filipino labor force explosion overseas.
According to government data, there are now about 600,000 contract

workers and employees, and although the major portions of these expatriate
communities of workers are found in the Middle East, they are scattered in
177 countries in the world.
In previous hearings of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
and Agencies, the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon
Felipe, said that there was no insuperable obstacle to making effective the
right of suffrage for Filipinos overseas. Those who have adhered to their
Filipino citizenship notwithstanding strong temptations are exposed to
embrace a more convenient foreign citizenship. And those who on their own
or under pressure of economic necessity here, find that they have detached
themselves from their families to work in other countries with definite
tenures of employment. Many of them are on contract employment for one,
two, or three years. They have no intention of changing their residence on a
permanent basis, but are technically disqualified from exercising the right of
suffrage in their countries of destination by residential requirement in
Section 1. . .
...
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time, they might
FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But

more than just saying that, I would like to make a comment on
the meaning of “residence” in the Constitution because I think it
is a concept that has been discussed in various decisions of the
Supreme Court, particularly in the case of Faypon vs. Quirino, a
1954 case which dealt precisely with the meaning of “residence”
in the Election Law. . .
...
In other words, “residence” in this provision refers to two residence
where he will vote. As far as the residence in the Philippines is concerned,
the word “residence” means domicile, but as far as residence where he will
actually cast his ballot is concerned, the meaning seems to be different. He
could have a domicile somewhere else and yet he is allowed to vote there.
So that there may be serious constitutional obstacles to absentee voting,
683
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 683

unless the vote of the person who is absent 46

is a vote which will be
considered as cast in the place of his domicile. (emphasis supplied)
Following the observation of Father Bernas and to obviate the

constitutional problem, the members of the Constitutional
Commission then discussed the system of registration of qualified
Filipinos abroad who will be allowed to vote. It was agreed that
their registration abroad would be considered as registration in a
particular locality in the Philippines where he is domiciled, and the
vote cast abroad would be considered cast in that particular locality,
to wit:

is temporarily abroad. He may or may not be actually residing
abroad; he may just be there on a business trip. It just so happens
that the day before the elections he has to fly to the United States,
so that he could not cast his vote. He is temporarily abroad but
not residing there. He stays in a hotel for two days and comes
back. This is not limited only to Filipinos temporarily residing
abroad. But as long as he is temporarily abroad on the date of the
elections, then he can fall within the prescription of Congress in
that situation.
MR. SUAREZ. I thank the Commissioner for his further
clarification. Precisely, we need this clarification on record.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, to clarify what we mean by
“temporarily abroad,” it need not be on very short trips. One can
be abroad on a treaty traders visa. Therefore, when we talk about
registration, it is possible that his residence is in Angeles and he
would be able to vote for the candidates in Angeles, but Congress
or the Assembly may provide the procedure for registration, like
listing one’s name, in a registry list in the embassy abroad. That
is still possible under this system.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just one clarification if
Commissioner Monsod agrees with this.
Suppose we have a situation of a child of a diplomatic officer
who reaches the voting age while living abroad and he has never
registered here. Where will he register? Will he be a registered
voter of a certain locality in the Philippines?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is possible that the system will enable that
child to comply with the registration requirements in an embassy
in the
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 11-12.
684

United States and his name is then entered in the official

registration book in Angeles City, for instance.
FR. BERNAS. In other words, he is not a registered voter of Los
Angeles, but a registered voter of a locality here.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. He does not have to come home to the
Philippines to comply with the registration procedure47here.
FR. BERNAS. So, he does not have to come home. (emphases
ours)
It is crystal clear from the foregoing deliberations, that the majority

erred in ruling that section 2 of Article V of the Constitution
dispensed with the residence requirements provided under section 1
of the same Article.
(2) Whether an “immigrant” or a “permanent resident” of a
foreign country has lost his domicile in the Philippines.
The next question is whether an “immigrant” or a “permanent
resident” of a foreign country has abandoned his domicile in the
Philippines. I respectfully submit that he has.
There are three classes of domicile, namely: domicile of origin,
domicile of choice, and domicile by operation of law. At any given
point, a person can only have one domicile.
Domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth and
continues until replaced by the acquisition of another domicile.
More specifically, it is the domicile of the child’s parents or of the
persons upon whom the child is legally dependent at birth. Although
also referred to as domicile of birth, domicile of origin is actually
the domicile of one’s parents at the time 48of birth and may not
necessarily be the actual place of one’s birth. Domicile of choice is
a domicile chosen by a person to replace his or her former domicile.
An adult may change domicile at will. The choice involves an
exercise of free will and presumes legal capacity to make a choice.
While intention is a principal feature of domicile of choice, a mere
intention without the fact of actual presence in the locality cannot
bring about the acquisition of a new domicile. Domicile of choice
generally consists of a bodily presence in a particular locality and a
concurrent intent to remain there permanently or at least indefi-
_______________
47 II RECORDS at pp. 35-36.

48 25 Am Jur 2d, Domicil §11 at p. 13.
685
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 685

49
nitely. Domicile by operation of law is a domicile that the law
attributes to a person independent of a person’s residence or
intention. It applies to infants, incompetents, and other persons
under disabilities
50
that prevent them from acquiring a domicile of
choice. 51
In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, we ruled that domicile of
origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and52 establishing a new one; and acts which correspond
with purpose. This change of domicile is effected by a Filipino who
becomes an “immigrant” or a “permanent resident” 53
of a foreign
country. Thus, we held in Caasi v. Court of Appeals, viz.:
Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the

U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are
conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his
occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status
should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that
he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered54his green
card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor . . .
The doctrine in Caasi is by no means new. Our election laws have

continuously regarded “immigrants” or “permanent residents” of a
foreign country to have lost their domiciles in55the Philippines and
hence are not qualified to run for public office. There is no reason
not to apply the Caasi ruling in disputes involving the qualification
of voters. In essence, both cases concern fulfillment of the residence
requirements.
Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 itself reinforces the
applicability of the Caasi doctrine. As observed by the majority,
Rep. Act No. 9189 disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent
resident who is recognized as such in another country “because
immigration or
_______________
49 Id., at §12.
50 Id., at §13.
51 Supra note 39.
52 Id., at p. 331.
53 Supra note 4.
54 Id., at p. 237.
55 See for instance, Rep. Act No. 7160, section 40 (f); B.P. Blg. 52 , sec. 4; B.P.
Blg. 881, sec. 68.
686

permanent residence in another country 56

implies renunciation of
one’s residence in his country of origin.”
We now slide to the legal significance of the affidavit to be
executed by “immigrants” or “permanent residents” to remove them
from the class of disqualified voters.
(3) Whether the execution by an immigrant or a permanent
resident of the affidavit under section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 is
sufficient proof of non-abandonment of residence in the Philippines.
Again, with due respect, I submit that the majority ruling on the
nature of the affidavit to be executed by an “immigrant” or a
“permanent resident” is inconsistent. On one hand, it theorizes that
the act “serves as an explicit expression
57
that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin.” This concedes that while an
“immigrant” or a “permanent resident” has acquired a new domicile
in a foreign country by virtue of his status as such, Rep. Act No.
9189 would consider him not to have abandoned his domicile in the
Philippines. On the other hand, the majority also theorizes that the
affidavit constitutes an “express waiver of his status as an immigrant
or permanent resident,” and upon fulfillment of the requirements of
registration, “he may still be considered as a ‘qualified citizen of the
Philippines58
abroad’ for purposes of exercising his right of
suffrage.” This presupposes that the “immigrant” or “permanent
resident” abandoned his domicile in the Philippines, but seeks to
reacquire this domicile by the execution of the affidavit.
The first theory is untenable. Its inevitable result would be the
establishment of two domiciles, i.e., domicile in the Philippines and
domicile in a foreign country where he is considered an “immigrant”
or a “permanent resident.” This ruling will contravene the principle
in private international law
59
that a person can be domiciled only in
one place at a given time.
The second theory is equally untenable. A person who has
abandoned his domicile of origin by establishing a domicile of
choice
_______________
56 Decision, p. 25.
57 Id., at p. 26.
58 Id., at p. 28.
59 I Restatement of Law (Conflict of Laws) 2d, p. 47 (1971).
687
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 687

60
cannot just revert back to his domicile of origin. He must satisfy
the same requisites for acquiring a new domicile, i.e., an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and acts which correspond with the purpose. An existing
domicile cannot be lost by abandonment alone, even if there is an
intent to acquire a new one; the existing domicile continues until a
new one is in fact gained. To abandon domicile, a person must
choose a new domicile, actually reside in the place chosen, and
intend that it be the principal and permanent residence. That is, there
can be61 no change of domicile without the concurrence of act and
intent.
The doctrine established in England that the domicile of origin is
revived upon the abandonment62of a domicile of choice has long been
rejected in the United States. Even in England, “the mobility of
modern society has fostered both 63
criticism of the rule and
recommendation for its change.” Thus, the prevailing view at
present is that if a domicile of choice is abandoned without
acquiring a new domicile of choice, “the domicil[e] of origin is not
thereby revived,
64
but the last domicil[e] of choice continues to be the
domicil[e].”
In his Separate Opinion, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice
Azcuna, opines that the execution of the affidavit is the operative act
that revives the domicile of origin, and “the requirement of resuming
actual physical presence within three (3) years is only a test of such
intention.” He further opines that “if the affiant does not resume the
residence physically within said period, then the intent expressed in
the affidavit is defective and the law will deem it inoperative.”
With due respect, I submit that the affidavit merely proves the
intent to return but not the other requisites for reacquiring the
domicile of origin. Intent, which is not coupled with actual physical
transfer, is not sufficient either to abandon the former domicile or
_______________
60 I Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 183 (1935).

61 25 Am Jur 2d, Section 15 at p. 16.
62 Scoles, et al., Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., p. 268 (2000).
63 Id., at p. 269. See Graveson, Reform of the Law of Domicile, 70 L.Q. Rev. 492
(1954); Atkin, The Domicile Act of 1976, 7 N.Z.U. L. Rev. 286 (1977); Rafferty,
Domicile, The Need for Reform, Man. L.J. 203 (1977).
64 Supra note 59 at p. 78.
688

65
to establish a new domicile. Thus, the view that domicile could be
established as soon as the old is abandoned even though the person
has not yet arrived at the new domicile, has not been accepted. In his
latest work on the subject, Scoles, an acknowledged expert in
Conflict of Laws stated as follows:
The element of physical presence is essential to confirm the requisite

attitude of mind contemplated by the concept of domicile. As a
consequence, a person who is to acquire a domicile of choice at a place must
actually be present at that place during the time in which the intention to
make it his home exists. For most people, intention is confirmed by the
physical presence of considerable duration looking toward an indefinite
period of time. However, in light of the function that domicile serves, i.e., to
identify a settled relationship with a place for a particular legal purpose, it is
sometimes necessary to make a determination when the physical presence
has been very brief. Consequently, no particular length of time is necessary
in order to satisfy the requirement of physical presence if that stay at a place
verifies the intention to make it a home.
...
In the case of the individual who has clearly manifested an intention to
change a new home and center of social activities, the question sometimes
arises why that person’s domicile should not change as soon as the old is
abandoned eventhough the individual has not yet arrived at the new.
Although this has sometimes been suggested as a possibility, it is contrary
to the clear weight of authority, probably because physical presence is 66
ordinarily the principal confirming evidence of the intention of the person.
(emphases ours)
Beale, another acknowledged expert on the subject, shares the same

view, viz.:
One or two authorities under special circumstances have held that a

domicil[e] might be acquired in a certain place while the person is on his
way toward the place with an intent to live there and during his journey
toward that place, although he had not yet actually reached that place. In
two taxation cases in Massachusetts, where upon the taxing day the person
in question was actually on his journey from a former residence in the state
to an intended second residence, whether in the same state or in another
state, he was held to be taxable in the second residence in the ground that
under those peculiar circumstances his domicil[e] would shift at the moment
of abandoning the first residence. These, however, were
_______________
65 Id., at pp. 62-65.

66 Scoles, et al., supra note 62 at pp. 248-249.
689
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 689

disapproved and overruled. In one other case, a similar intimation has been
made. In Matter of Grant, it appeared that a decedent had left a United
States reservation in the State of New York with intention to go to the
District of Columbia, and there establish his residence, but he had died en
route. Fowler, Surrogate, intimated that he was already domiciled in the
District of Columbia. It is not too much to say, however, that there is
absolutely no good authority for the opinion thus expressed, and that it is
legally impossible for a man to acquire a domicil[e]
67
before he is present at
the place where the domicil[e] is established. (emphasis ours)
Beale also states that with the rejection of the English “automatic
reversion” doctrine, physical presence is required before the person
can reacquire his domicile of origin, viz.:
The doctrine in England is that the domicil[e] of origin revives upon the
abandonment of a domicil[e] of choice... Inspite of a few English cases to
the contrary, this has become thoroughly established as the doctrine of the
English courts, the court being especially emphatic in cases where a person
has left his domicil[e] of choice without intent to return and has started to
return to his domicil[e] of origin. Here, evidence must of course be
introduced to show a definitive abandonment of domicil[e] of choice by
actually leaving the country without intent to return. The English doctrine
has been approved in this country in several cases, in most of which the
approval was a mere dictum, but in the United States, generally, the opposite
view is held, and upon the abandonment of a domicil[e] of choice there is no
change of domicil[e] until a new domicil[e] is obtained. . .
On the other hand, a few American cases follow the English decision in
so far as to declare that a domicil[e] of origin revives when a person having
abandoned a domicil[e] of choice is on his way to make a home at his
domicil[e] of origin, but the better opinion in this country does not allow the
reacquisition of the domicil[e] of origin until the fact of presence at the 68
place of domicil[e] of origin exists, as well as the intent to return there.
(emphasis ours)
To stress, the burden of69establishing a change in domicile is upon the

party who asserts it. A person’s declarations as to what he
considers his home, residence, or domicile 70
are generally admissible
“as evidence of his attitude of mind.” However, whatever the
context, “their accuracy is suspect because of their self-serving
_______________
67 I Beale, supra note 60 at p. 182.

68 Id., at pp. 183-184.

70 Id., at p. 82.
690

nature, particularly
71
when they are made to achieve some legal
objective.”
In the case at bar, the burden rests on an “immigrant” or a
“permanent resident” to prove that he has abandoned his domicile in
the foreign country and reestablished his domicile in the Philippines.
A self-serving affidavit will not suffice, especially when what is at
stake is a very important privilege as the right of suffrage. I
respectfully submit that what makes the intent expressed in the
affidavit effective and operative is the fulfillment of the promise to
return to the Philippines. Physical presence is not a mere test of
intent but
72
the “principal confirming evidence of the intention of the
person.” Until such promise is fulfilled, he continues to be a
domiciliary of another country. Until then, he does not possess the
necessary requisites and therefore, cannot be considered a qualified
voter.
(4) Whether counting the votes of immigrants or permanent
residents who fail to return to the Philippines will dilute the valid
votes of our fully qualified electors.
The only consequence imposed by Rep. Act No. 9189 to an
“immigrant” or a “permanent resident” who does not fulfill his
promise to return to the Philippines is the removal of his name from
the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia. But his vote would be counted
and accorded the same weight as that cast by bona fide qualified
Filipino voters. I respectfully submit that this scheme diminishes the
value of the right of suffrage as it dilutes the right of qualified voters
to the proportionate value of their votes. The one person, one vote
principle is sacrosanct in a republican form of government. The
challenged provision which allows the value of the valid votes of
qualified voters to be diminished by the invalid votes of disqualified
voters violates the sovereignty of our people. The validation by the
majority of this unconstitutional provision may result in the anomaly
where the highest public officials of our land will owe their election
to “immigrants” or “permanent residents” who failed to fulfill their
promise to return to our country or who repudiated their domicile
here.
_______________
71 Id.
72 Scoles, et al., supra note 62 at p. 249.
691
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 691

The majority downplays the effect of the challenged provision on

those who are already qualified prior to the enactment of Rep. Act
No. 9189. It is opined that the removal of an “immigrant” or a
“permanent resident” from the list of the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his permanent disqualification “would suffice
to serve as deterrence to non-compliance with his/her undertaking
under the affidavit.” The majority misses the point. Without section
5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189, an “immigrant” or a “permanent
resident” has no right to vote. Thus, even assuming that he becomes
qualified after executing the affidavit, he does not stand to lose
anything when he is subsequently disqualified for his failure to
comply with his undertaking under the affidavit. He will just return
to his original status.
B.
Is section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 in relation to section 4 of the

same Act in contravention of section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution?
Petitioner contends that section 18.5 in relation to section 4 of
Rep. Act No. 9189 violates section 4, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution giving Congress the power to canvass the votes and
proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President,
viz.:
...
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of
votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all
the Members of both Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
...
692

Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 9189 allows all qualified Filipinos

overseas to vote for President, Vice-President, Senators and party-
list representatives while section 18.5 thereof empowers the
COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates, viz.:
SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.—

...
18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation
of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by
the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is
empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact
the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or
countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible
by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries,
in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or
influence of the Commission.
On its face, section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 appears to be

repugnant to section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It gives
the impression that Congress abdicated to COMELEC its
constitutional duty to canvass and proclaim the winning candidates
for President and Vice-President. I agree with the majority that the
impugned provision should be given a reasonable interpretation that
would save it from a constitutional infirmity. To be sure, Congress
could have not allowed the COMELEC to exercise a power
exclusively bestowed upon it by the Constitution. Thus, section 18.5
of Rep. Act No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the
winning candidates should be construed as limited to the positions of
Senators and party-list representatives. In like manner, I agree with
the majority that section 18.4 of Rep. Act No. 9189 which provides:
18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of

the Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic
mail, or any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the
Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the Commission, . . . .
(emphasis supplied)
should be construed in harmony with section 4, Article VII of the

1987 Constitution. Hence, with respect to the position of the
President and the Vice-President, the Certificates of Canvass and the
Statements of Votes must be submitted to Congress and directed to
the Senate President.
693
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 693

C.
Does Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight

Committee created in section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, have the
power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules
and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate
without violating the independence of the COMELEC under section
1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
Both the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) agree with the petitioner that sections
19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 are unconstitutional on the ground
73
that they violate the independence of the COMELEC. The
impugned provisions require the public respondent COMELEC to
submit its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee for review, revision,
amendment, or approval, viz.:
Sec. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules.—The

Commission shall issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively
implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from effectivity
of this Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to
the Joint Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval.
In the formulation of the rules and regulations, the Commission shall
coordinate with the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor
and Employment, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
Overseas Workers’ Welfare Administration and the Commission on Filipino
Overseas. Non-government organizations and accredited Filipino
organizations or associations abroad shall be consulted.
...
Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.—A joint
Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments,
Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the
Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage
and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other members of the House of
Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives:
Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of
Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three
(3) from the minority.
_______________
73 Memorandum of Public Respondent COMELEC, p. 7.
694

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to

monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the Commission. (emphases supplied)
Public respondents aver that as an independent constitutional body,

the COMELEC 74
is not under the control of the executive or the
legislative in the performance of its constitutional function to
“enforce and administer75 all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election.” Public respondent COMELEC asserts that
its right to formulate rules and regulations flows from76
its power to
enforce and administer election laws and regulations. This power is
exclusive and its exercise
77
is not subject to the review, revision, or
approval of Congress. The Solicitor General shares the same view
that the role78
of the legislature ends with the finished task of
legislation. He opines that nothing in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution suggests that Congress is empowered to enforce79
and
administer election laws concurrent with the COMELEC.
Along the same lines, public respondent COMELEC assails
section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189 subjecting the implementation of
voting by mail to prior review and approval of the Joint Oversight
Committee. It maintains that the development of a system for voting
by mail involves the “administration of 80
election laws” and falls
squarely within its exclusive functions. Section 17.1 of Rep. Act
No. 9189 reads:
Sec. 17. Voting by mail.—

_______________
74 Citing Lucman v. Dimaporo, G.R. No. 31558, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 387;
Ticzon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 52451, March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 671;
Pangarungan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 107435, December 11, 1992, 216 SCRA 522.
75 1987 Constitution, Article IX-C, section 2.
76 Citing Gallardo v. Tabamo, Jr., 218 SCRA 253 (1993).
77 Ibid.
78 OSG Memorandum, p. 18.
79 Id., at p. 17.
80 Memorandum of Public Respondent COMELEC, p. 5.
695
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 695

(a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to

prevent occasion of fraud;
(b) Where there exists a technically established identification system
that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and
(c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the
embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments
concerned are adequate and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review
and approval of the Joint Oversight Committee. (emphases supplied)
The majority sustains the petitioner as it holds that “[b]y vesting

itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the IRR
for The Overseas Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the
scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.”
I agree with the majority but wish to add my humble thoughts on
this all important constitutional issue—the extent of the exercise by
Congress of its oversight powers in the implementation of Rep. Act
No. 9189. The resolution of the issue entails a two-tiered discussion
of the following: (1) whether Congress has oversight functions over
constitutional bodies like the COMELEC; and (2) assuming that it
has, whether Congress exceeded the permissible exercise of its
oversight functions.
Before proceeding, we must focus on the exact place of the
power of congressional oversight in our constitutional canvass. This
will involve an exposition of two principles basic to our
constitutional democracy: separation of powers and checks and
balances.
Separation of powers and checks and balances

The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers to a single branch of
government by deftly allocating their exercise to the three branches81
of government. This principle dates back from the time of Aristotle
but the “modern” concept owes its origin in the seventeenth and
eighteenth century writings of political philosophers including Locke
and Montesquieu. Their writings were mainly
_______________
81 Ogg & Ray, Introduction to American Government, 10th ed., p. 28 (1951).
696

reactions to the ruinous struggle82 for power by the monarchs and the
parliaments in Western Europe. 83
In his Second Treatise of Civil Government, John Locke
advocated the proper division of the legislative, executive and
federative powers of the commonwealth. He defined legislative
power as “that which has a right to direct how the force of the
commonwealth shall84 be employed for preserving the community and
the members of it.” He viewed executive power as involving “the
execution of the municipal laws 85
of the society within its self, [and]
upon all that are parts of it” and federative power as concerned
with “the management of the security and interest of the public
without” including “the power of war and peace, leagues and
alliances, and all the transactions,
86
with all persons and communities
without the commonwealth.”
Locke expostulated that executive powers should not be placed in
one person or group of persons exercising legislative power because
“it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at
power, for the same persons, who have the power to execute them,
whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws
they make, and suit the law, both in its making, and execution, to
their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct
interest from the rest of the 87
community, contrary to the end of
society and government.” But while the executive and the
federative are two distinct powers, Locke conceded that they are 88
intricately related and thus may be exercised by the same persons.
_______________
82 Nowak, et al., Constitutional Law, 3rd ed., p. 121 (1986).

83 J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Machperson, ed. 1980).
84 §143, Id., at p. 75.
85 §145, Id., at p. 76.
86 §146, Id.
87 §143, Id., at pp. 75-76.
88 §148, Id., at p. 77. “Though, as I said, the executive and federative powers of
every community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated,
and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct persons: for both of them
requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to place
the force of the commonwealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands; or that the
executive and federative power should be placed in persons, that might act separately,
whereby the force of the public would be under different commands: which would be
apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin.”
697
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 697

Locke mothered the modern idea of division of power but it was

Montesquieu who89refined the concept. In his famed treatise, The
Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu authoritatively analyzed the nature
of executive, legislative and judicial powers and with a formidable
foresight counselled that any combination of these powers would
create a system with an inherent tendency towards tyrannical
actions, thus:
In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the
executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the
executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law. By virtue of the
legislative power, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual
laws, and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the
second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the
public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes
criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The
latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other, simply the executive
power of the state.
The political liberty of the subject is a tranquility of mind arising from
the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is
requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of
another.
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person,
or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from
the legislative and the executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the
judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the
judge might behave with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same
body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers,
that of enacting laws, that of executing
90
the public resolutions, and that of
trying the causes of individuals.”
At the time of the American Revolution, the more influential

political leaders in the new states subscribed to Montesquieu’s con-
_______________
89 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (trans. by Thomas Nugent, 1949).

90 Id., at pp. 151-152.
698

91
cept of separation of powers. Some constitutions of the early state
governments even referred to the principle. But the concept
espoused at that particular time was a lot different. As then
understood, separation of powers requires a watertight
compartmentalization of the executive, judicial, and legislative
functions and permits no sharing of government powers between
and among the three branches of government. The Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, for instance, provides:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall

never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the
executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either
of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive
powers, or either
92
of them: to the end that it may be a government of laws
and not of men.
The 1787 U.S. Constitution did not contain a similar provision like
that found in the Massachusetts Constitution or any principle
proclaiming the adherence of the Framers to the principle of
separation of powers. But legal scholars are of the view that the
Framers essentially followed Montesquieu’s recommendation for the
division of powers, noting that the U.S. Constitution vests93 “all
legislative powers” in the Congress 94
of the United States, the
“executive power” in the President, and the “judicial power” in one
Supreme95 Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may
provide.
These legal scholars also note that the U.S. Constitution allows
the “sharing” of the three great powers between and among the three
branches. The President, for instance, shares in the exercise of
legislative power through his veto power, and the courts through
_______________
91 Nowak, et al., supra note 82.

92 Article XXX of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
(1780). See Jaffe, Administrative Law: Cases and Materials, p. 31 (1976).
93 Article I, section 1. “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”
94 Article II, section 1. “The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America . . .”
95 Article III, sec. 1. “The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from to time
ordain and establish . . .”
699
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 699

their power to make rules of judicial procedure and especially

through their right to interpret laws and invalidate them as
unconstitutional. Congress shares in the exercise of executive power
through its confirmation of appointments and assent to treaties, and
in the judicial power through its power96 to create inferior courts and
regulate the number and pay of judges. Thus, they postulate that the
Framers established a government guided not by strict separation of
powers but one of checks and balances to prevent the separate
branches from “running wild” and to avert deadlocks and
breakdowns, viz.:
The Framers expected the branches to battle each other to acquire and
defend power. To prevent the supremacy of one branch over any other in
these battles, powers were mixed; each branch was granted important power
over the same area of activity. The British and Conference experience has
led the Framers to avoid regarding controversy between the branches as a
conflict between good and evil or right or wrong, requiring definitive,
institutionally permanent resolution. Rather, they viewed such conflict as an
expression of the aggressive and perverse part of human nature that
demanded outlet but has 97to be kept from finding lasting resolution so that
liberty could be reserved.
Even then, some legal luminaries were of the view that the concept
of checks and balances is diametrically opposed to the principle of
separation of powers. James Madison, however, explained that
Montesquieu’s concept of separation of powers did not require a
strict division of functions among the three branches of government.
Madison defended the Constitution as having sufficient division of
functions among the three branches of government to avoid the
consolidation of power in any one branch and also stressed that a
rigid segregation of the three
98
branches would undermine the purpose
of the separation doctrine. He noted that unless the three branches
“be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional
control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim
requires as essential
99
to a free government, can never in practice be
duly maintained.” Madison’s
_______________
96 Supra note 81 at pp. 28-29.

97 A. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power: The Origins 60
(1976).
98 J. Madison, The Federalist No. 47 at 302-303 (new American Library Ed.
1961).
99 J. Madison, The Federalist No. 48 at 343 (B. Wright Ed. 1961).
700

view has since then been the accepted interpretation of the concept
of separation of powers under 100the Constitution. Thus, in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
“[I]n designing the structure of our Government and dividing and
allocating the sovereign power among the three co-equal branches,
the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive
system but the separate powers were not intended 101
to operate with
absolute independence.” In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court ruled that
the Constitution by no means contemplates total separation of each
of these essential branches of government and the framers viewed
the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against
tyranny. It likewise warned that the “hermetic sealing off of the three
branches of Government from one another would preclude the 102
establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.”
103
Thus, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Court
rejected the “archaic view of separation of powers as requiring three
airtight departments of government.” In determining whether an act
disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the
Court suggested that the proper inquiry should focus on the extent to
which it prevents the other branch 104
from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions.
In this jurisdiction, our adherence to the principle of separation
powers was succinctly 105
discussed by Justice Laurel in Angara v.
Electoral Commission decided in 1936, less than a year after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Justice Laurel emphasized that
“[T]he separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through 106
express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution.” Thus:
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of the matters

within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
_______________
100 343 US 579, 635 (1952).

101 424 US 1 (1976).
102 Id., at p. 121.
103 433 US 425, 433 (1977).
104 Id.
105 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
106 Id., at p. 156.
701
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 701

unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided

for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the
Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the
legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This,
however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-
thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The
President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session
whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as
a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to
the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their
jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly
also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary
in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and
hence to declare
107
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
108
In Planas v. Gil, Justice Laurel further discussed the intricate
interplay of the principle of separation of powers and checks and
balances, viz.:
The classical separation of governmental powers, whether viewed in the

light of political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke or Montesquieu, or to the
postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of
government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in
independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes
in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down “with mathematical
precision and divide the branches in watertight compartments” not only
because “the ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white” but also because “even more specific to them are
found to
109
terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other.”
It is now beyond debate that the principle of separation of powers

(1) allows the “blending” of some of the executive, legislative, or
_______________
107 Id., at pp. 156-157.

108 67 Phil. 62 (1939).
109 Id., at pp. 73-74.
702

judicial powers in one body; (2) does not prevent one branch of
government from inquiring into the affairs of the other branches to
maintain the balance of power; (3) but ensures that there is no
encroachment on matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
other branches.
For its part, this Court checks the exercise of power of the other
branches of government through judicial review. It is the final arbiter
of disputes involving the proper allocation and exercise of the
different powers under the Constitution. Thus:
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to

determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
“judicial supremacy”
110
which properly is the power of judicial review under
the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is, however, limited to “actual cases

and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument
by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented,” for “any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
111
conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.”
Courts are also enjoined to accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, “not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because
the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives 112 in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.”
The role of the judiciary in mapping the metes and bounds of
powers of the different branches of government was redefined in
_______________
110 Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra note 33.

111 Id.
112 Id.
703
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 703

the 1987 Constitution which expanded the jurisdiction of this Court

to include the determination of “grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on113 the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” The expansion was made
because of the dissatisfaction with the practice
114
of this Court in
frequently invoking the “political question”
115
doctrine during the
period of martial law to dodge its duty. Be that as it may, the
expanded power “definitely 116
does not do away with the political
question doctrine itself.”
_______________
113 1987 Const., Article VIII, sec. 1. In Sinon v. Civil Service Commission, 215
SCRA 410(1992), the Court defined grave abuse of discretion as “such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.”
114 The accepted meaning of “political question” is that “where the matter involved
is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole
determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government,
it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded
against was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the
courts refused to act.” See Aquino v. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196 (1974).
115 I RECORDS at p. 434.
116 I RECORDS at p. 443. Pertinent part of the deliberation of the delegates of the
Constitutional Commission are hereto quoted, viz.:
FR. BERNAS. . . . On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away
with the political question doctrine?
Mr. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR.CONCEPCION. No because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction . . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away
with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No certainly not. When this provision was originally

drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it
says, “judicial power includes” and the reason being that the definition that we might
make may not coyer all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So it is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from political
question doctrine.
704

117
Thus, in Marcos v. Manglapus, the Court held:
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] Given this wording, we cannot agree with
the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments
to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court’s
jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for
Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum.
We cannot, for example, question the President’s recognition of a foreign
government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may
appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us
that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend
the Constitution under the guise of resolving118
a dispute brought before us
because the power is reserved to the people.
Since then, the Court has used its 119

expanded power120to check acts of
the House of Representatives, the President, and even 121
of
independent bodies such 122
as the Electoral Tribunal, 123
the
Commission on Elections and the Civil Service Commission.
Congress checks the other branches of government primarily
through its law making powers. Congress can create administrative
agencies, define their124powers and duties, fix the terms of officers and
their compensation. It can also create courts, define their
jurisdiction and reorganize the judiciary so long 125
as it does not
undermine the security of tenure of its members. The power of
_______________
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political
questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.
117 177 SCRA 668 (1989).

118 Id., at pp. 695-696.
119 Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991).
120 Supra note 39.
121 Lerias v. HRET, 202 SCRA 808 (1991).
122 Mogueis, Jr. v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 576 (1981).
123 Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 (1989).
124 Rivera, Law of Public Administration 175 (1956).
125 1987 Const., Art. VIII.
705
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 705

Congress does not end with the finished task of legislation.

Concomitant with its principal power to legislate is the auxiliary
power to ensure that the laws it enacts are faithfully executed. As
well stressed by one scholar, the legislature “fixes the main lines of
substantive policy and is entitled to see that administrative policy is
in harmony with it; it establishes the volume and purpose of public
expenditures and ensures their legality and propriety; it must be
satisfied that internal administrative controls are operating to secure
economy and efficiency; and it informs 126
itself of the conditions of
administration of remedial measure.”
Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities
undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and 127
influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by
Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to
assess executive128
conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant
of legislative power itself and integral to the checks
129
and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. Among the most
quoted justifications for this power are the writings of John Stuart
_______________
“Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases in
Section 5 thereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure
of its members.”
126 White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration 592 (1948).

127 Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and The Legislative Veto: A
Constitutional Analysis, 52 NYU Law Rev. 455, 460 (1977).
128 Id., at p. 461.
129 Hearings of the Subcommittee on Rules & Organizations of the House
Committee on Rules, June 15, 1999 <http://www.house.gov/ search97cgi/s97=cg…
ction>
706

Mill and Woodrow

130
Wilson. In his Consideration of Representative
Government, Mill wrote that the duty of the legislature is “to
watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on
its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them
which any one 131 considers objectionable; and to censure them if found
condemnable.” Wilson went one step farther and opined that the
legislature’s informing function should be preferred to its legislative
function. He emphasized that “[E]ven more important than
legislation is the instruction and guidance in political affairs which
the people might receive from a body which kept 132
all national
concerns suffused in a broad daylight of discussion.”
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with
increased frequency to check the perceived 133
“exponential
accumulation of power” by the executive branch. By the beginning
of the 20th century, Congress has delegated an enormous amount of
legislative authority to the executive branch and the administrative
agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that
the administrative agencies 134
perform their functions within the
authority delegated to them.
The oversight power has also been used to ensure the
accountability of regulatory commissions like the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve Board, often
referred to 135as representing a “headless fourth branch of
government.” Unlike other ordinary administrative agencies, these
bodies are independent from the executive branch and are136outside
the executive department in the discharge of their functions.
_______________
130 Mill, Considerations on Representative Democracy (1947).

131 Id.
132 Wilson, “Committee or Cabinet Government?,” III Overland Monthly 275

(1884), quoted in Gross, The Legislative Struggle: A Study in Social Combat 137
(1953).
133 Javits & Klein, supra note 127 at pp. 459-460.
134 Id., at p. 460.
135 Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 Columbia Law Rev. 573, 583 (1984).
136 Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional
Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253, 264 (1982).
707
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 707

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its
oversight powers may be divided into 137
three categories, namely:
scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser138 intensity and continuity of
attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to
determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government
activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may
request information and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for
consideration of the agency involved.
Legislative scrutiny is based primarily on the power of
appropriation of Congress. Under 139
the Constitution, the “power of
the purse” belongs to Congress. The President may propose the
budget, but still, Congress has the final say on appropriations.
Consequently, administrative officials appear every year before the
appropriation committees of Congress to report and submit a budget
estimate and a program of administration for the succeeding fiscal
year. During budget hearings, administrative officials defend their
budget proposals.
The power of appropriation carries140
with it the power to specify
the project or activity to be funded. Hence, the holding of budget
hearing has been the usual means of reviewing policy and of
auditing the use of previous appropriation to ascertain whether they
have been disbursed for purposes authorized in an appropriation act.
The consideration of the budget is also an opportunity for the
lawmakers to express their confidence in the performance of a
Cabinet Secretary or to manifest their 141
disgust or disfavor of the
continuance in office of a bureaucrat. Congress can even curtail
_______________
137 Gross, supra note 132.

138 Ibid.
139 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994).
140 Id., at p. 522.
141 Rivera, supra note 124 at pp. 177-178.
708

142
the activities of the administrative agencies by denial of funds. In
the United States, for instance, Congress brought to end the
existence of the Civilian Conservation Corps, the National Youth
Administration and the National Resources
143
Planning Board, simply
by denying them any appropriation.
But legislative scrutiny does not end in budget hearings.
Congress can ask the heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either House of Congress on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Section 22, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent
of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each
House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted
to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the State or. the public interest
so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
This provision originated from the Administrative Code144 and was

later elevated to the level of a constitutional 145
provision due to its
“great value in the work of the legislature.” In drafting the 1935
Constitution, some delegates opposed the provision arguing that it is
a feature of a parliamentary system 146
and its adoption would make our
government a “hybrid system.” But mainly attacked was the
provision authorizing the department secretaries on their own
initiative to appear before the legislature, with the right to be heard
on any matter pertaining to their departments. It was pointed out that
this would “give a chance to the department secretaries to lobby for
items in the appropriation bill or for provisions
_______________

143 Ibid.
144 “The Secretaries may be called, and shall be entitled to be heard, by either of
the two Houses of the Legislature, for the purpose of reporting on matters pertaining
to their Departments, unless the public interest shall require otherwise and the
Governor-General shall so state in writing.” See I Aruego, supra note 27 at p. 448.
145 Id.
146 Id., at pp. 448-449.
709
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 709

of other bills in which they had special interest, permitting them to

bear influence and pressure upon Members of the law-making body,
in violation of147the principle of separation of powers underlying the
Constitution.” Despite the objections, the provision was adopted to
“prevent the raising of any question with respect to the
constitutionality of the practice” and “to make open and public the 148
relations between the legislative and the executive departments.”
As incorporated in the 1935 Constitution, the provision reads:
The heads of departments upon their own initiative or upon the request of
the National Assembly on any matter pertaining to their departments unless
the public
149
interest shall require otherwise and the President shall state so in
writing.
The whole tenor of the provision was permissive: the department

heads could appear but the legislative was not obliged to entertain
them; reciprocally, the legislature could request their appearance
150
but
could not oblige them especially if the President objected. The rule
radically changed, however, with the adoption of the 1973
Constitution, establishing a parliamentary system of government. In
a parliamentary system, the administration is responsible to the
Parliament and hence, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Members
may be “required to appear and answer questions and
interpellations” to give an account of their stewardship during a
“question hour,” viz.:
Sec. 12 (1) There shall be a question hour at least once a month or as often
as the Rules of the Batasang Pambansa may provide, which shall be
included in its agenda, during which the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime
Minister or any Minister may be required to appear and answer questions
and interpellations by Members of the Batasang Pambansa. Written
questions shall be submitted to the Speaker at least three days before a
scheduled question hour. Interpellations shall not be limited to the written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. The agenda shall specify
the subjects of the question hour. When the security of the State so requires
and the President so states in writing, the question hour shall be conducted
in executive session.
_______________
147 Id.
148 Id., at p. 449.
149 1935 Const., Art. VI, sec. 10.
150 Bernas, supra note 11 at p. 682.
710

The “question hour” was retained despite the reversion to the

presidential system in 1981. During the deliberations of the 1987
Constitution, the report of the legislative committee called for the
adoption of the “question hour” for the following reasons:
. . . Its purposes are to elicit concrete information from the administration, to

request its intervention, and when necessary, to expose abuses and seek
redress. The procedure provides the opposition with a means of discovering
the government’s weak points and because of the publicity it generates, it
has a salutary influence on the administration. On the whole, because of the
detailed facts elicited during the interpellation or in the written answers, it
will help members to understand the complicated subject matter of bills and
statutory measures laid before the Assembly. It may be added that the
popularity of this procedure can be attributed to the fact that in making use
of his right to ask questions, the member is a completely free agent of the
people. The only limits on his actions are the rules governing the
admissibility of questions concerned with matters of form and not with the
merits of the issue at hand. The fact that we also impose a time limit means
that the government is obliged to furnish the information 151 asked for and this
obligation is what gives the procedure its real strength. . . .
This proposal was vigorously opposed on the ground of separation

of powers. CONCOM Delegate Christian Monsod pointed out that
the provision was historically intended to apply to members of the
legislature who are in the executive branch typical in a
parliamentary form of government. In fine, the “question hour” was
conducted on peer basis. But since the delegates decided to adopt a
presidential form of government, cabinet members are purely alter
egos of the President and are no longer members of the legislature.
To require them to appear before the legislators and account for their
actions “puts them on unequal terms with the legislators” and
“would violate the separation
152
of powers of the executive and the
legislative branches.” Delegate Monsod, however, recognized that
a mechanism should be adopted where Cabinet members may be

summoned and may, even on their own initiative, appear before the
legislature. This, he said, would promote coordination without
subordinating one body to another. He thus suggested that the
_______________
151 II RECORD p. 46.

152 Id., at p. 133.
711
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 711

153
original tenor of the provision in the 1935 Constitution be retained.
After much deliberation, delegate Monsod’s suggestion
prevailed. Thus, the President may or may not consent to the
appearance of the heads of departments; and even if he does, he may
require that the appearance be in executive session. Reciprocally,
Congress may refuse the initiative taken by a department secretary.
Likewise, Congress exercises legislative scrutiny thru its power
of confirmation. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides for the organization of a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system. Consent of the Commission on
Appointments is needed for the nominees of the President for the
following positions: (a) heads of executive departments, (b)
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, (c) officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and (d) other
officers whose154
appointments are vested with the President under the
Constitution.
Through the power of confirmation, Congress shares in the
appointing power of the executive. Theoretically, it is intended to
lessen political considerations in the appointment of officials in
sensitive positions in the government. It also provides Congress an
opportunity to find out whether the nominee possesses the necessary
qualifications, integrity and probity required of all public servants.
In the United States, apart from the appropriation and
confirmation powers of the U.S. Congress, legislative scrutiny finds
expression in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 charging
all House and Senate Standing Committees with continuous
vigilance over the execution of any and all laws falling within their
respective jurisdictions
155
“with a view to determining its economy and
efficiency.” Pursuant to this law, each committee was authorized
_______________
153 Id.
154 1987 Const., Art. VII, sec. 16.
155 Gross, supra note 132 at p. 138.
712

to hire a certain number of staff employees. All Senate committees

were likewise
156
given the power to subpoena witnesses and
documents.
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of
looking at the facts that are readily available, congressional
157
investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power
of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987
Constitution under section 21, Article VI, viz.:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
But even in the absence of an express provision in the Constitution,

congressional investigation has been held to be an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. In the United States,
the lack of a constitutional provision specifically authorizing the
conduct of legislative investigations did not deter its Congresses
from holding investigation on suspected corruption,
mismanagement, or inefficiencies of government officials. Exercised
first in the failed St. Clair expedition in 1792, the power to conduct
investigation has since been invoked in the Teapot
158
Dome, Watergate,
Iran-Contra, and Whitewater controversies. Subsequently, in a
series of decisions, the Court recognized “the danger to effective and
honest conduct of the Government if the legislative power to159probe
corruption in the Executive branch were unduly unhampered.”160
In Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the scope of the congressional power of
_______________
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Investigative Oversight: An Introduction to the Law, Practice and Procedure of
Congressional Inquiry, CRS Report for Congress, April 7,
1995<http://wwws.house.gov/search97/cgi/s97_ction>last accessed on May 24, 2003.

159 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 194-195 (1957).
160 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
713
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 713

inquiry “is penetrating and far-reaching as the 161 potential power to

enact and appropriate under the Constitution.” It encompasses
everything that concerns the administration 162
of existing laws as well
as proposed or possibly needed statutes. In the exercise of this
power, congressional inquiries can reach all sources of information
and in the absence of countervailing constitutional privilege or self-
imposed restrictions upon its authority, Congress and its committees,
have virtually, plenary power to compel information needed to
discharge its legislative functions from executive agencies, private
persons and organizations. Within certain 163constraints, the
information164so obtained may be made public. In McGrain v.
Daugherty, it held that “a legislative body cannot legislate wisely
or effectively in the absence of information respecting 165
the conditions
which the legislation is intended to effect change.” But while the
congressional power of inquiry is broad, it is not unlimited. No
inquiry is an end in itself; it must be166related to, and in furtherance of,
a legitimate task of Congress.” Moreover, an investigating
committee has only the power to inquire into matters 167within the
scope of the authority delegated to it by its parent body. But once
its jurisdiction and authority, and the pertinence of the matter under
inquiry to its area of authority are established, 168 a committee’s
investigative purview is substantial and wide-ranging.
American jurisprudence upholding the inherent power of
Congress to conduct investigation169 has been adopted in our
jurisdiction in Arnault v. Nazareno, decided in 1950, when no
provision yet existed granting Congress the power to conduct
investigation. In the said case, the Senate passed Resolution No. 8
creating a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and the
Tambobong Estates Deal wherein the government was allegedly
defrauded P5,000,000.00. The special committee examined various
witnesses,
_______________
161 Id., at p. 504.

163 Supra note 158.
164 272 U.S. 135 (1927).
165 Id.
166 Kilbourn v. Thomson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).

167 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
168 Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 408-409 (1961).
169 87 Phil. 29 (1950).
714

among whom was Jean L. Arnault. Due to the refusal of Arnault 170
to
answer a question which he claimed to be “self-incriminatory,” the
Senate passed a resolution citing Arnault in contempt. The Senate
committed him to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and ordered
his imprisonment until he shall have answered the question. Arnault
filed a petition before this Court contending that (a) the Senate has
no power to punish him for contempt; (b) the information sought to
be obtained by the Senate is immaterial and will not serve any
intended or purported legislation; and (c) the answer required of him
will incriminate him.
Upholding the power of the Senate to punish Arnault for
contempt, the Court ruled as follows:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either

House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony
to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which legislation is intended to affect
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information—which is not frequently true—recourse must be had
to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed . . . The fact that the
Constitution expressly gives the Congress the power to punish its Members
for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary 171
implication exclude the
power to punish for contempt any other person.
The Court further ruled that the power of the Senate to punish a
witness 172
for contempt does not terminate upon the adjournment of the
session. It held that the investigation was within the power
_______________
170 Id., at p. 42. The question involved the identity of the person to whom Arnault
allegedly gave the amount of P440,000.00.
171 Id., at p. 45.
172 Id., at p. 63. The Court opined: “By refusing to answer the question, the
witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and
the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to
answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them.
That power subsists as long
715
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 715

of the Senate since the “transaction involved a questionable and

allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than
P5,000,000.00 of public173 funds, of which the Congress is the
constitutional guardian.” The investigation was also found to be
“in aid of legislation.” As result of the yet unfinished investigation,
the Court noted that the investigating committee
174
has recommended,
and the Senate has approved three bills.
The Court further held that once an inquiry is admitted or
established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to
make, the investigating committee has the power to require a
witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to
his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry must
be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution. Hence, a witness can not be coerced to answer a
question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry.
But the Court explained that “the materiality of the question must be
determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not
by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
_______________
as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular

legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt
only during the session in which the investigation was begun, would be to recognize
the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time to deny it an
essential and appropriate means for its performance. Aside from this, if we should
hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the
session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding
sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the
investigation is completed—an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which
should be avoided.”
173 Id., at pp. 46-47. One bill prohibits the Secretary of Justice or any other
department head from discharging functions and exercising powers other than those
attached to his office, without previous congressional authorization. Another prohibits
brothers and near relatives of any President of the Philippines from intervening
directly or indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in which the
Government is a party, more particularly where the decision lies in the hands of the
executive or administrative officers who are appointees of the President. Finally, one
bill provides that purchases of the Rural Progress Administration of big landed estates
at the price of P100,000.00 or more, and loans guaranteed by the Government
involving P100,000.00 or more, shall not become effective without previous
congressional confirmation.
174 Id.
716

legislation.” The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for

legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are
determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and 175not by a fraction of such information
elicited from a single question.
Finally, the Court ruled that the ground on which Arnault
invoked the right against self-incrimination
176
“is too shaky, infirm,
and slippery to afford him safety.” It noted that since Arnault
himself said that the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
P440,000.00 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the
latter’s verbal instruction, there is therefore no basis upon which to
sustain his claim 177
that to reveal the name of that person would
incriminate him. It held that it is not enough for the witness to say
that the answer will incriminate him for he is not the sole judge of
his liability, thus:
. . . [T]he danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to

the court, from all the circumstances and from the whole case, as well as
from his general conception of the relations of the witness... The fact that
the testimony of the witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is
not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to
prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert
his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection
178
against an
imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.
As now contained in the 1987 Constitution, the power of Congress to

investigate is circumscribed by three limitations, namely: (a) it must
be in aid of its legislative functions, (b) it must be conducted in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and (c) the
persons appearing therein are afforded their constitutional
179
rights.
In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, this Court
held that the senate committee exceeded the permissible exercise of
legislative investigation. The case started with a speech by
_______________
175 Id., at p. 48.

176 Id., at p. 64.
177 Id., at p. 65.
178 Id., at p. 66.
179 203 SCRA 767 (1991).
717
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 717

Senator Enrile suggesting the need to determine possible violation of

law in the alleged transfer of some properties of former Ambassador
Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez to the Lopa Group of Companies.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee decided to investigate the
transaction purportedly in aid of legislation. When the Blue Ribbon
Committee summoned the petitioners to appear, they asked this
Court for a restraining order on the ground, among others, that the
investigation was not in aid of legislation and that their appearance
before the investigating body could prejudice their case before the
Sandiganbayan. Ruling in favor of the petitioner, we held as
follows:
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of

contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The
AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the
inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon Committee was to find
out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly, Mr.
Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of
the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez to the
Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation
involved.
The conduct of legislative investigation is also 180

subject to the rules of
each House. In the House of Representatives, an inquiry may be
initiated or conducted by a committee motu proprio on any matter 181
within its jurisdiction upon a majority vote182of all its Members or
upon order of the House of Representatives through:
(1) the referral of a privilege speech containing or conveying a

request or demand for the conduct of an inquiry, to the
appropriate committee, upon motion of the Majority Leader
or his deputies; or
the adoption of a resolution directing a committee to

(2) conduct an inquiry reported out by the Committee on Rules
after making a determination on the necessity and propriety
of the conduct of an inquiry by such committee: Provided,
That all resolutions directing any committee to conduct an
inquiry shall be referred to the Committee on Rules; or
_______________
180 House Rules and Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, adopted
on August 28, 2001.
181 Id., at section 1 (a).
182 Id., at section 1 (b).
718

(3) the referral by the Committee on Rules to the appropriate

committee, after making a determination on the necessity
and propriety of the conduct of inquiry by such committee,
of a petition filed or information given by a Member of the
House requesting such inquiry and endorsed by the
Speaker: Provided, That such petition or information shall
be given under oath, stating the facts upon which183
it is
based, and accompanied by supporting affidavits.
The committee to which a privilege speech, resolution, petition or

information requesting an inquiry is referred may constitute and
appoint subcommittees composed of at least one-third (1/3) of the
committee for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the
committee as a whole is authorized to perform, except to punish for
contempt. In case a privilege speech is referred to two or more
committees, a joint inquiry by the said committees shall be
conducted. The inquiries are to be held in public except when the
committee or sub-committee deems that the examination of a
witness in a public hearing may endanger national security.184
In which
case, it shall conduct the hearing in an executive session.
The Rules further provide that “the filing or pendency of a case
before any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial or administrative bodies
shall not stop or abate185 any inquiry conducted to carry out a specific
legislative purpose.” In exercise of congressional inquiry, the
committee has the power “to issue subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum to a witness in any part of the country, signed by the
chairperson186
or acting chairperson and the Speaker or acting
Speaker.” Furthermore, the committee may, by a vote of two-thirds
(2/3) of all its members constituting a quorum, punish for contempt
any person who: (a) refuses, after being duly summoned, to obey
such summons without legal excuse; (b) refuses to be sworn or
placed under affirmation; (c) refuses to answer any relevant inquiry;
(d) refuses to produce any books, papers, documents or records that
are relevant to the inquiry and are in his/her possession; (e) acts in a
disrespectful manner towards any member of the Committee or
commits misbehavior in the presence of the committee; or187(f) unduly
interferes in the conduct of proceedings during meetings.
_______________
183 Id., at section 1(b.1) to (b.4).

184 Id., at section 3.
719
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 719

Nevertheless,188any person called to be a witness may be represented

by a counsel and189is entitled to all rights including the right against
self-incrimination.
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises
its oversight power is thru legislative supervision. “Supervision”
connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a
congressional committee
190
regarding executive operations in a given
administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and
investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in
order to influence future executive branch performance,
congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise
of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain
part of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies
through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when
granting the President or an executive agency the power to
promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions
require the President or an agency to present the proposed
regulations to Congress, which retains a “right” to approve or
disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto
provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a
law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress
does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime.
Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed

191
regulation will
become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.
The legislative veto was developed initially in response to the
problems of reorganizing the U.S. Government structure during the
Great Depression in early 20th century. When U.S. President Hoover
requested authority to reorganize the government in 1929, he
coupled his request with a proposal for legislative review. He
proposed that the Executive “should act upon approval of a joint
Committee of Congress or with the reservation of power of revision
by Congress within some limited period adequate for its considera-
_______________

190 Gross, supra note 132 at p. 137.
191 Nowak, et al., supra note 82 at p. 256.
720

192
tion.” Congress followed President Hoover’s suggestion 193
and
authorized reorganization subject to legislative review. Although
the reorganization authority reenacted in 1933 did not contain a
legislative veto provision, the provision returned during the
Roosevelt
194
administration and has since been renewed several
times. Over the years, the provision was used extensively. Various
American Presidents submitted to Congress some 115
Reorganization Plans, 23 195 of which were disapproved pursuant to
legislative veto provisions.
During World War II, Congress and the President applied the
legislative veto procedure to resolve the delegation problem
involving national security and foreign affairs. The legislative veto
offered the means by which Congress could confer additional
authority to the President while preserving its own constitutional
role. During this period, Congress enacted over 30 statutes
conferring 196powers on the Executive with legislative veto
provisions.
After World War II, legislative veto provisions have been
inserted in laws delegating authority in new areas of governmental
involvement including the space program, international agreements
on nuclear
197
energy, tariff arrangements, and adjustment of federal pay
rates. It has also figured prominently in resolving a series of major
constitutional disputes between the President and Congress over
claims of the President198
to broad impoundment, war and national
emergency powers. Overall, 295 congressional vetotype
procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes

199
since 1932
when the first veto provision was enacted into law.
_______________
192 Public Papers of the Public Papers of the Presidents, Herbert Hoover, 1929, p.
432 (1974).
193 Act of June 30, 1932, §407, 47 Stat 414.
194 See 462 US 919, 969 (1983), 77 L Ed 2d 317, 356. (White, J., dissenting).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id., at p. 970; Id., at p. 357.
198 Id.; Id.
199 From 1932 to 1939, five statutes were effected; from 1940-1949, nineteen (19)
statutes; between 1950-1959, thirty-four (34) statutes; from 1960-1969, forty-nine
(49); and from 1970-1975, at least one hundred sixty-three (163) such provisions
were included in eighty-nine (89) laws. See Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A
Contemporary Response to Execu
721
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 721

Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain

the balance of power between the legislative and the executive
branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate
vast power to the executive branch or to independent agencies while
retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of such power 200
without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law.
They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic
accountability as it provides legislative
201
check on the activities of
unelected administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too
deeply embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the
complexities of modern government have often led Congress—whether by
actual or perceived necessity—to legislate by declaring broad policy goals
and general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the
discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but
leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may not
have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims.
Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our
constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive
disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new
legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of overseeing
post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable
to determine whether its policies have been implemented in accordance with 202
legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue

encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any
post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond
that would undermine
203
the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. They contend that legislative veto constitutes an
impermissible evasion of the President’s veto authority and intrusion
into the powers vested in the executive or judicial
_______________
tive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind L Rev 323, 324 (1977).

200 Tribe, I
American Constitutional Law 142 (2000).
201 Id.
202 Javits and Klein, supra note 127 at p. 460.
203 Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 Harv L Rev 1369, 1373 (1977).
722

204
branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto
enhances separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch 205
and independent agencies from accumulating too much power.
They submit that reporting requirements and congressional
committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only the
exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow
Congress to review executive proposals before they take effect and
they do not afford the opportunity 206
for ongoing and binding
expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto
permits Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or
disapproval of “subordinate law” or those enacted by the executive
branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They
further argue that legislative veto “is a necessary response by
Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its
chambers.” In an era of delegated authority, they point out that
legislative veto “is the most efficient means Congress has yet
devised to retain control over the 207
evolution and implementation of
its policy as declared by statute.” 208
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S.
Supreme Court resolved the validity of legislative veto provisions.
The case arose from the order of the immigration judge suspending
the deportation of Chadha pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States House of
Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant
to § 244(c)(2) authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution,
to invalidate the decision of the executive branch to allow a
particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. The
immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to
implement the House order and the alien was ordered deported. The
Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the alien’s appeal, holding
that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress.
The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the
House was without constitutional authority to order the
_______________
204 Id. See also Stewart, Constitutionality of Legislative Veto, 13 Harv L J. Legis
593 (1976).
205 Abourezk, supra note 199 at p. 327.
206 Javits & Klein, supra note 127 at pp. 461-462.
207 Id.
208 462 US 919 (1983), 77 L Ed 2d 317.
723
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 723

alien’s deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional

doctrine on separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2)
unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from the issue of
separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the
presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto
was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is
subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution
requiring the passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment
to the President. Thus:
Examination of the action taken here by one House pursuant to § 244(c)(2)

reveals that it was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. In purporting
to exercise power defined in Art I, § 8, cl 4, to “establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization,” the House took action that had the purpose and effect of
altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including the
Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the
Legislative Branch. Section 244(c)(2) purports to authorize one House
Congress to require the Attorney General to deport an individual alien
whose deportation otherwise would be canceled under § 244. The one-
House veto operated in these cases to overrule the Attorney General and
mandate Chadha’s deportation; absent the House action, Chadha would

remain in the United States. Congress has acted and its action altered
Chadha’s status.
The legislative character of the one-House veto in these cases is
confirmed by the character of the congressional action it supplants. Neither
the House of Representatives nor the Senate contends that, absent the veto
provision in § 244(c)(2), either of them, or both of them acting together,
could effectively require the Attorney General, in exercise of legislatively
delegated authority, had determined the alien should remain in the United
States. Without the challenged provision in § 244(c)(2), this could have
been achieved, if at all, only by legislation requiring deportation. Similarly,
a veto by one House of Congress under § 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an
attempt at amending the standards set out in § 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of §
244 as applied to Chadha. Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than
enactment, must conform with Art I.
The nature of the decision implemented by one-House veto in these
cases further manifests its legislative character. After long experience with
the clumsy, time-consuming private bill procedure, Congress made a
deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically to the
Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable aliens to remain in this
country in certain specified circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice
to delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can be
implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in Art I.
724

Disagreement with the Attorney General’s decision on Chadha’s deportation

—that is, Congress’ decision to deport Chadha—no less than Congress’
original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make
decision, involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in
only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President.
Congress must abide by its delegation
209
of authority until that delegation is
legislatively altered or revoked.
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in

memorandum decision, two lower court decisions invalidating the 210
legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978211
and the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980.
Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes
containing legislative veto provisions although some of these
provisions required the approval of both Houses of Congress and
thus met the bicameralism requirement of Article212
I. Indeed, some of
these veto provisions were not even exercised.
Given the concept and configuration of the power of
congressional oversight, the next level of inquiry is whether congress
exceeded its permissible exercise in the case at bar. But before

proceeding, a discussion of the nature and powers of the
Commission on Elections as provided in the 1987 Constitution is
decisive to the issue.
Congressional Oversight and COMELEC

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is a constitutional body
exclusively charged with the enforcement and administration
_______________
209 Id., at pp. 952-955.

210 Consumer Energy v. Federal Energy Regulation Commission, 673 F.2d 425
(D.C.Cir. 1982), affirmed sub nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers
Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216, 103 S.Ct. 3556, 77 L.Ed.2d 1402 (1983),
rehearing denied 463 U.S. 1250, 104 S.Ct. 40, 77 L.Ed.2d 1457(1983).
211 Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 691
F.2d 575 (D.C.Cir. 1982), affirmed sub nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumers Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216, 103 S.Ct. 3556, 77 L.Ed.2d
1402.
212 Equal Opportunity Commission v. Allstate Insurance Company, 57 F.Supp.
1224, 104 S.Ct. 3499, 82 L.Ed.2d 810 (1984), case remanded 740 F.2d 966 (5th Cir.
1984), Equal Opportunity Commission v. The Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188
(5th Cir. 1984).
725
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 725

of “all laws and regulations relative to the conduct

213
of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall,” and is invested with
the power to decide all 214 questions affecting elections save those
involving the right to vote.
Given215its important role in preserving the sanctity of the right of
suffrage, the COMELEC was purposely constituted as a body
separate from 216
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
government. Originally, the power to enforce our election laws
was vested with the President and exercised through
217
the Department
of the Interior. According to Dean Sinco, however, the view
ultimately emerged that an independent body could better protect the
right of suffrage of our people. Hence, the enforcement of our
election laws, while an executive power, was transferred to the
COMELEC.
The shift to a modified parliamentary system with the adoption of
the 1973 Constitution218did not alter the character of COMELEC as
an independent body. Indeed, a “definite tendency to enhance and
invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the
independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding

219
of
free, peaceful and honest elections” has been observed. The 1973
Constitution broadened the power of the COMELEC by making it
the sole judge of all election contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of 220the national legislature and
elective provincial and city officials. Thus, the COMELEC was
given judicial power aside from its traditional administrative and
executive functions.
The trend towards strengthening the COMELEC continued with
the 1987 Constitution. Today, the COMELEC enforces and
administers all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda and recalls. Election
contests involving regional, provincial and city elective officials are
under its exclusive original jurisdiction while all contests involving
elec-
_______________
213 1987 Constitution, Article IX-C, sec. 2 (1).

214 Id., at sec. 2 (3).
215 Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 294 (1941).
216 Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101, 106-107 (1949).
217 Philippine Political Law 383-386 (1962).
218 1973 Constitution, Article XII-C.
219 Aratuc v. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251, 270 (1979).
220 1973 Const., Art. XII-C, sec. 2.
726

tive municipal221
and barangay officials are under its appellate
jurisdiction.
Several safeguards have been put in place to protect the
independence of the COMELEC from unwarranted encroachment by
the other branches of government. While the President appoints the
Commissioners with the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments, the Commissioners are not accountable to the
President in the discharge of their functions. 222They have a fixed
tenure and are removable only by impeachment. To ensure that not
all Commissioners are appointed by the same President at any one
time, a staggered system of appointment was devised. Thus, of the
Commissioners first appointed, three shall hold office for seven 223
years, three for five years, and the last three for three years.
Reappointment
224
and temporary designation or appointment is
prohibited. In case of vacancy, the225appointee shall only serve the
unexpired term of the predecessor. The COMELEC is likewise
226
226
granted the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, and to
appoint its own
227
officials and employees in accordance with Civil
Service laws.
The COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers but it is not part
of the judiciary. This Court has no general power of supervision over
the Commission228on Elections except those specifically granted by
the Constitution. As such, the229Rules of Court are not applicable to
the Commission on Elections. In addition, the decisions of the
COMELEC are reviewable only 230
by petition for certiorari on grounds
of grave abuse of discretion, viz.:
Conceived by the charter as the effective instrument to preserve the sanctity

of popular suffrage, endowed with independence and all the needed
concomitant powers, it is but proper that the Court should accord the
greatest measure of presumption of regularity to its course of action
_______________
221 1987 Const., Art. IX-C, sec. 2.

222 Id., at Art. XI-A, sec. 2.
223 Id., at Art. IX-C, sec. 1 (2).
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 1987 Const., Art. IX-A, sec. 6.
227 Id., at Art. IX, sec. 8.
228 Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126 (1949).
229 Id., at p. 130.
230 1987 Const., Art. IX-A, sec. 7.
727
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 727

and choice of means in performing its duties, to the end that it may achieve
its designed place in the democratic fabric of our government. Ideally, its
members should be free from all suspicions of partisan inclinations, but the
fact that actually some of them have had stints in the arena of politics should
not, unless the contrary is shown, serve as basis for denying to its actuations
the respect and consideration that the Constitution contemplates should be
accorded to it, in the same manner that the Supreme Court itself which from
time to time may have members drawn from the political ranks or even from
the military is at all times deemed insulated from every degree or form of
external pressure and influence as well as improper internal motivations that
could arise from such background or orientation.
We hold, therefore, that under the existing constitutional and statutory
provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, rulings and
decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be
confined to instances of grave abuse

231
of discretion amounting to patent and
substantial denial of due process.
The COMELEC is, however, subject to congressional scrutiny

especially during budget hearings. But Congress cannot abolish the
COMELEC as it can in case of other agencies under the executive
branch. The reason is obvious. The COMELEC is not a mere
creature of the legislature; it owes its origin from the Constitution.
Furthermore, the salary of the Chairman 232
and the Commissioners
cannot be decreased during their tenure. Enjoying fiscal autonomy,
the COMELEC has a wider discretion in the disbursement and
allocation of approved appropriations. To safeguard the COMELEC
from undue legislative interference, the 1987 Constitution provides
that its approved annual
233
appropriations are to be automatically and
regularly released. Also, Congress has no power to call the
commissioners of the COMELEC to a question hour. The
Constitution provides that the question hour is limited to heads of
departments under the Executive branch, and the deliberations
during the drafting of the 1987 Constitution clearly reflect this
sentiment. Be that as it may, the COMELEC is mandated to “submit
to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct234 of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall.” This provision allows Congress to review
_______________
231 Aratuc v. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251, 271-272 (1979).

232 1987 Const., Art. IX, sec. 3.
233 Id., at Art. IX, sec. 5.
234 Id., at Art. IX-C, sec. 2 (9).
728

and assess the effectivity of election laws and if necessary, enact

new laws or amend existing statutes.
Be that as it may, I respectfully submit that the legislative veto
power or congressional oversight power over the authority of
COMELEC to issue rules and regulations in order to enforce
election laws is unconstitutional.
As aforediscussed, the Constitution divided the powers of our
government into three categories, legislative, executive, and judicial.
Although not “hermetically sealed” from one another, the powers of
the three branches are functionally identifiable. In this respect,
legislative power is generally exercised in the enactment of the law;
executive power, in its execution; and judicial power, in its
interpretation. In the absence of specific provision in the

Constitution, it is fundamental under the principle of separation of
powers that one branch cannot exercise or share the power of the
other.
In addition, our Constitution created other offices aside from the
executive, the legislative and the judiciary and defined their powers
and prerogatives. Among these bodies especially created by the
Constitution itself is the COMELEC.
The COMELEC occupies a distinct place in our scheme of
government. As the constitutional body charged with the
administration of our election laws, it is endowed with independence
in the exercise of some of its powers and the discharge of its
responsibilities. The power to promulgate rules and regulations in
order to administer our election laws belongs to this category of
powers as this has been vested exclusively by the 1987 Constitution
to the COMELEC. It cannot be trenched upon by Congress in the
exercise of its oversight powers. 235
In Gallardo v. Tabamo, Jr., this Court traced the origin of
COMELEC’s power to promulgate rules and regulations. It was
initially a statutory grant. Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions
did not explicitly grant the COMELEC the power to promulgate
rules and regulations. The power was vested 236
by Congress to the
COMELEC in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.—In addition

to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution,
_______________
235 218 SCRA 253 (1993).

236 B.P. Blg. 881, section 52 (c).
729
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 729

the Commission shall have the exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:
...
(c) Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this
Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer.
...
This statutory power was elevated to a constitutional status with the

insertion of the word “regulations” in section 2(1) of Article IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
While under the 1935 Constitution it had “exclusive charge of the

enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections,” exercised “all other functions . . . conferred upon it by law” and
had the power to deputize all law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government for the purpose of insuring free, orderly
and honest elections, and under the 1973 Constitution it had, inter alia, the
power to (a) “[E]nforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections” (b) “[D]eputize, with the consent or at the instance of the Prime
Minister, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections,” and (c) “[P]erform such
other functions as may be provided by law,” it was not expressly vested with
the power to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
That power could only originate from a special law enacted by Congress;
this is the necessary implication of the above constitutional provision
authorizing the Commission to “[P]erform such other functions as may be
provided by law.”
The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the
power to promulgate such rules and regulations. The pertinent portion of
Section 2 of Article IX-C thereof reads as follows:
“SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.”
(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973
Constitutions. It is thus clear that its incorporation into the present
Constitution took into account the Commission’s power under the Omnibus
Election
730

Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), which was already in force when the said
Constitution was drafted and ratified, to:
xxx xxx xxx
“Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this
Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer . . . .”
Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the
aforesaid statutory authority to grant the Commission broader and more
flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further
from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to
depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time. Indeed,
the present Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission on
Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible

elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people’s sacred right of
suffrage—the citizenry’s vital weapon in effecting a peaceful 237
change of
government and in achieving and promoting political stability.
The elevation of the COMELEC’s power to promulgate rules and

regulations in the 1987 Constitution is suffused with significance.
Heretofore, it was Congress that granted COMELEC the power to
promulgate rules and regulations, and hence, Congress can withdraw
or restrict it by the exercise of its veto or oversight power. Under the
1987 Constitution, the power to promulgate rules and regulations
has been directly granted by the Constitution and no longer by
Congress. Undoubtedly, the power was granted to COMELEC to
strengthen its independence, hence, its exercise is beyond invasion
by Congress. Under any lens, sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No.
9189 constitute undue restrictions on the constitutional power of the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations for such rules are
made subject to the prior review and approval of Congress. The
impugned provisions can result in the denial of this constitutionally
conferred power because Congress can veto the rules and
regulations the COMELEC has promulgated. Thus, I respectfully
submit that sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 granting
Congress the power to review, revise, amend and approve the
implementing rules and regulations of the COMELEC, otherwise
known as subordinate legislations in other countries, are
unconstitutional.
_______________
237 Gallardo v. Tabamo, Jr., supra note 235 at pp. 263-264.
731
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 731

I now come to section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189 which provides:
Sec. 17. Voting by mail.—

(d) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent
occasion of fraud;
(e) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would
preclude multiple or proxy voting; and
(f) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies,
consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and
well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon

review and approval of the Joint Oversight Committee. (emphases supplied)
From the law itself, it is clear that Congress has already set the
necessary standards to guide the COMELEC in identifying the
countries where Voting by mail may be allowed, viz.: (1) the
countries must have a mailing system which is fairly developed and
secure to prevent occasion of fraud; (2) there exists a technically
established identification that would preclude multiple or proxy
voting; and (3) where the system of reception and custody of mailed
ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign service
establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.
Since the legislative standards have been defined, all that remains
is their enforcement. Our Constitution has specifically given the
COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. The power is
exclusive and it ought to be self-evident that it cannot be subject to
review and revision or veto by Congress in the exercise of its
oversight power. Again, the reason for the exclusivity is to insulate
COMELEC from the virus of partisan politics. In the exercise of this
exclusive power, the Commission must be accorded considerable
latitude. Unless the means and methods adopted by COME-
732

LEC are clearly illegal or constitute

238
grave abuse of discretion, they
should not be interfered with. Thus:
There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and
experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good
government. In the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the
conduct of elections, as well as in the appointment of election inspectors, we
must not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on
Elections the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly
belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission, as
ordained in the Constitution, requires that the power of this court to review
the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but
firmly in appropriate
239
cases. We are not satisfied that the present suit is one
of such cases.
I join the majority in holding that section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189
is unconstitutional for it allows Congress to negate the exclusive
power of the COMELEC to administer and enforce election laws

and regulations granted by the Constitution itself.
This is not to maintain that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, or the system it
devised to implement voting by mail cannot be challenged. If they
are illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, the courts can
strike them down in an appropriate case. This power is vested to the
courts under section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defining the
scope of judicial power, and more specifically under section 5,
Article VIII empowering this Court to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, “all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.” Again, this power is
exclusive and is not meant to be shared by any other branch or
agency of the government.
In sum, it is my humble view that in the case at bar, Congress
exceeded the permissible exercise of its oversight powers for the
following reasons: (1) it restricts the COMELEC’s constitutional
grant of power to promulgate rules and regulations; and (2) it
invades COMELEC’s exclusive constitutional domain to enforce
and
_______________
238 Maruhom v. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 473 (2000).

239 Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 296 (1941).
733
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 733

administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an

election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
I wish to stress, however, that granting the petition will not
invalidate the entire Rep. Act No. 9189. It does not also mean that all
overseas Filipinos cannot vote. The law affects two classes of
overseas Filipinos: (1) those who remain a domiciliary of the
Philippines but were absent at the time of the elections either briefly
or for a long time; and (2) those who are now considered domiciled
in foreign countries. To the first class of overseas Filipinos belong
the contract workers, students, members of the diplomatic corps and
their families, businessmen, and the like. To the second class belong
Filipinos who are considered immigrants or permanent residents of
foreign countries. The constitutional challenge in the case at bar
appertains only to the inclusion of the second category of overseas
Filipinos in the coverage of Rep. Act No. 9189. Likewise, the
challenge on the exercise of Congressional oversight power over the

COMELEC does not taint the core of the law. It merely affects the
procedure in adopting the mechanisms to implement the law. It
cannot void the whole law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I dissent from the majority’s
ruling upholding the constitutionality of section 5(d) of Rep. Act No.
9189, which allows an immigrant or a permanent resident of a
foreign country to vote for President, Vice-President, Senators and
Party-List Representatives after executing the required affidavit. I
concur, however, with the majority’s ruling upholding the
constitutionality of section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 with respect to
the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for Senators and Party-List Representatives but not as to
the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates
for President and Vice-President. I also concur with the majority
with respect to the unconstitutionality of sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of
Rep. Act No. 9189 subjecting the implementation of voting by mail,
and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9189
to be promulgated by COMELEC, to prior review and approval by
Congress.
I so vote.
734

SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
Indeed, the mandate of the Constitution is explicit—one

1
must be a
resident in order to vote in the country’s elections. But, equally
compelling is its other provision that directs Congress to adopt a
system 2 that would allow absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad. The deliberations by members 3
of the Constitutional
Commission on the subject are instructive.
“MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a clarification. There

“THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?
“MR. MONSOD. I believe the answer was already given by

“THE PRESIDENT. Are we leaving it to the legislature to devise
the system?
“MR. BERNAS. I think there is a very legitimate problem raised
there.
“THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
“MR. BENGZON. I believe Commissioner Suarez is clarified.
“FR. BERNAS. But I think it should be further clarified with regard
practice; the understanding is that it is flexible. For in-
_______________
1 Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution provides: Suffrage may be

exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
2 Section 2, Article V, of the 1987 Constitution.
3 II Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 34-35.
735
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 735

stance, one might be a resident of Naga or domiciled therein, but

he satisfies the requirement of residence in Manila, so he is able to
vote in Manila.
“MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I suggest to the
Committee to change the word ‘Filipinos’ to QUALIFIED
FILIPINO VOTERS. Instead of ‘VOTING BY FILIPINOS
ABROAD,’ it should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If
“THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Monsod say?
“MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the
phrase ‘QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD’ because
‘QUALIFIED’ would assume that he has the qualifications and
“MR. TINGSON. That is right, So does the Committee accept?
“FR. BERNAS. ‘QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD’?
“THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept the amendment?
“MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
“THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
“MR. REGALADO. When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to

read my proposed amendment, I specifically stated that the
National Assembly shall prescribe a system which will enable
qualified citizens, temporarily absent from the Philippines, to
vote. According to Commissioner Monsod, the use of the phrase
“absentee voting” already took into account as its meaning. That
is referring to qualified Filipino citizens temporarily abroad.
“MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that
with respect to registration we will leave it up to the legislative
“THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsod’s
“MR. MONSOD. Yes.
“THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner is not stating here that he
“MR. MONSOD. That is right. They must have the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications.
736

“THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which they can

vote.
“MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President.” (emphasis
supplied)
In election cases, the Court, more than once, has treated residence
and domicile as being synonymous 4
terms. In Romualdez vs.
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban, this Court has said:
“The term ‘residence’ as used in the election law is synonymous with

‘domicile,’ which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. ‘Domicile’ denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . .
. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice
of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there
must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.”
The instant controversy primarily revolves on the issue of whether

or not an immigrant or a permanent resident in another country
should be considered to have lost his status as a Philippine resident
and must thus be barred from participating in the national elections.
It is well to recall that, in acquiring a new domicile, there must be a
concurrence of animus manendi and animus non revertendi.
Intention is always crucial. Thus, 5the Court, in Romualdez vs.
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban and 6
Romualdez-Marcos vs.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), has delved in detail into the
intention of the parties to determine the question of domicile.
It is to be conceded that for quite sometime now, economic crises
have forced millions of Filipinos to leave their homes to work and
live in foreign shores. To most, it has not been a decision to uproot
themselves, let alone completely sever their ties, from the country
_______________
4 G.R. No. 104960, 14 September 1993, 226 SCRA 408.

5 Supra.
6 318 Phil. 329.
737
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 737

of birth. It is not at all farfetched for emigrating countrymen, when

conditions warrant, to get right back home. I am not prepared to say
that their immigrant status abroad is necessarily proof of an intention
to discard and to abandon the domicile
7
of origin.
Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, disqualifying a “green card holder”
(an immigrant of the United States) from running for a local public
office, was predicated on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
of the Philippines. This law disallows any person who is a
permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country to run
for an elective public office, unless he shall have “waived his status
as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.” No such express disqualification, however, exists for
the exercise of the right to vote. The reason for the disqualification
with respect to elective officials, I take it, proceeds from an
assumption that “resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of
such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland
for, with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another
eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their
choice in8 order to preserve their status as permanent residents

thereof.” The danger does not hold true with respect to immigrants
abroad who would simply be discharging their right and duty to cast
a vote for their candidate of choice.
The law must have recognized that animus manendi and animus
non revertendi, being processes of the mind and incapable of a
definitive determination, could only be discerned from perceivable
circumstances. So also, Republic Act No. 9189 or the “Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003,” disqualifies an “immigrant or a
permanent resident9 who is recognized as such in the host country” to
vote under the Act on the premise that such a circumstance can be a
cogent indication of the holder’s intention to abandon his old
domicile and establish a new one. But, in much the same vein, the
law acknowledges that the immigrant or permanent resident may
still be qualified to vote, provided “he executes, upon registration,
an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission on
Elections declaring that he shall resume actual physical permanent
_______________

8 Caasi v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 236.
9 Section 5 (d), R.A. No. 9189.
738

residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from
approval of his registration under (the) Act.” The affidavit shall
additionally confirm
10
that he has not applied for citizenship in
another country. I am convinced that these indicators used by the
legislature are reasonable gauges to establish the intention of the
immigrant not to abandon his Philippine domicile. The fact that he
has not relinquished his Philippine citizenship should help remove
any lingering doubt on his preferred status. After all, the right of
suffrage, now widely considered to be an innate right of every
national, is a basic and perhaps the most outstanding mark of
citizenship.
Section 4 of the Act allows all qualified Filipinos abroad to vote
for President, Vice-President, Senators and party-list representatives.
In relation to this, Section 18.5 empowers the Commission 11
on
Election to order the proclamation of winning candidates. Since 12
it
is Congress which has been granted by the Constitution the
authority and duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for president and vice-president, I echo the sentiment of
my colleagues that the power given to COMELEC by Section 18.5
of R.A. 9189 should be understood to be limited only to the

proclamation of winning candidates for the positions of senators and
party-list representatives. The election returns for the positions of
president and vice-president should then be certified by the Board of
Canvassers to Congress13 and not to COMELEC as provided for in
Section 18.4 of the Act.
_______________
10 Id.
11 Section 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing—
xxx
18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate
if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates
despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or
countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors
and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, and which events, factors and
circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission.
12 Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

13 Section 18.4. x x x. Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the
chairman of the Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via
739
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 739

R.A. 9189 creates a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee

(JCOC) composed of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, empowered to “review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing
14
Rules and Regulations (IRR) promulgated by the
COMELEC,” and to approve the voting by mail in not more than
three (3) countries for the May
15
2004 elections and in any country
determined by COMELEC. The Court here finds unanimity in
holding that Congress, by vesting itself with the aforesaid powers,
has gone beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. It is a
pronouncement that, in my view, can hardly be susceptible to
challenge. The Constitution ordains that constitutional
16
commissions
such as the COMELEC shall be independent. The COMELEC has
the constitutional authority to “enforce and administer all17 laws and
regulations relative to the conduct18
of an election” and to
promulgate its rules of procedure. The role therefore of the JCOC
must be understood as being limited only 19to the monitoring and
evaluation of the implementation of the Act pursuant 20
to the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
In view whereof, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of

Republic Act No. 9189 allowing absentee voting in the manner
expressed therein, but that, as regards Sections 17.1, 19 and 25, I
share the unanimous conclusion reached by my colleagues declaring
portions thereof as being unconstitutional.
_______________
facsimile, electronic mail, or any other means of transmission equally safe and
reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the Commission x
x x.
14 Sections 19 and 25, R.A. 9189.
15 Section 17.1, R.A. 9189.
16 Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
17 Section 2 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
18 Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
19 Section 25, R.A. 9189.
xxx
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate
the implementation of this Act. x x x.
20 Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
740

SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
“Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary

events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can
withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels, but at the same time1 bend with
the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events.”
The deliberations on this case have been blessed with extensive and
exhaustive discussions by the justices. The ponencia itself as well as
the separate, the concurring and the dissenting opinions ably written
by my esteemed colleagues scrutinized its many aspects and
ramifications. Their thoroughness and scholarship helped distill the
issues and enabled the Court to arrive at an informed judgment.
It is quite clear that there is unanimity of opinion in declaring
unconstitutional those portions of RA 9189 (1) granting Congress
oversight powers over the Comelec Implementing Rules and

Regulations (IRR); and (2) giving Comelec authority to proclaim
presidential and vice-presidential winners—a power expressly
lodged in Congress by the Constitution.
Obviously, however, there is diversity of opinion on the question
of whether Filipinos, who have become permanent foreign residents,
may be allowed to vote after executing an affidavit showing an
intent to reside in the Philippines within three years therefrom.
I will no longer belabor the penetrating legal pros and contras
discussed by the justices in connection with this important issue. Let
me just add one more point in favor of the constitutionality
2
of the
aforementioned provision in Section 5(d) of RA 9189. It is a
_______________
1 Tuñada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 64, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
2 §5(d) of RA 9189 states:
“The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

xxx xxx xxx
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country,
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission de
741
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 741

point that is borne, not of strict legalese, but3 of practical common

sense that even lay persons will understand. The Information Age
has shrunk the world, enabled Filipinos abroad to keep abreast with
current events in our country, and thus empowered them to be able
to vote wisely for our national leaders.
Qualifications of Voters
Let me start4 my explanation of my position by recalling that our
Constitution requires voters to possess, on the day of the election,
_______________
claring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later
than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall
also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall
be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.”
3 I have always believed that the Constitution should, as much as possible, be

interpreted in the sense understood by ordinary citizens. Thus, in my first opinion as a
member of the Court, I wrote in my Dissent in Marcos v. Comelec, 255 SCRA xi, xv,
October 25, 1995, the following:
“The Constitution is the most basic law of the land. It enshrines the most cherished
aspirations and ideals of the population at large. It is not a document reserved only for
scholarly disquisitions by the most eminent legal minds of the land. The Constitution
is not intended for lawyers to quibble over [or] to define legal niceties and articulate
nuances about, in the ascertainment of its import. Its contents and words should be
interpreted in the sense understood by the ordinary men and women who place their
lives on the line in its defense, and who pin their hopes for a better life on its
fulfillment.”
See also J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413,
423, February 18, 1970, per Fernando, J., in which the Court declared that “the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of
law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language
as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.”
4 §1 of Art. V of the Constitution provides:
“SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
742

a minimum of three qualities or attributes relating to (1) citizenship,

(2) age and (3) residence. In addition, our fundamental law says that
the citizen must “not otherwise be disqualified by law” from voting.
On the first, only those who owe allegiance to a country have the
right to select its leaders and determine its destiny. This is a
worldwide phenomenon. Thus, only Filipinos may vote in the
Philippines; aliens5
cannot. By the same token, only Americans
6
may
vote in America, and only Indians may vote in India.
The second qualification, age, assures that only those who have
reached the natural mental maturity are enfranchised to choose
independently and sensibly. Hence, only those who have reached 18,
the age of majority, are allowed to vote; only those capacitated
7
by
the law to enter into binding obligations and contracts are allowed
to elect the persons who would make and execute the law.
On the third, residence of at least one year in the Philippines—of
which six months must be in the place where the ballot is cast—is
required of voters. In our case today, this residence requirement is
the crux or centerpoint. I respectfully submit that to understand how
to interpret this qualification in relation to the Overseas Absentee
Voting Law, it is necessary to inquire into the reason for requiring it
as a condition for suffrage. Why does the Constitution insist on

residence as a prerequisite to voting?
_______________
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of

suffrage.”
5 http://bensguide.gpo.gov/3-5/citizenship/responsibilities.html
6 http://www.eci.gov.in/infoeci/elec_sys/elecsys_fs.htm
7 The Family Code of the Philippines as amended by RA 6809 states:
“ART 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided,
majority commences at the age of eighteen years.
“ART 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of
the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the
exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.”
743
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 743

Reason for Residence Requirement

8
I believe that, traditionally, the law requires residence because
presence in a certain locality enables a person to know the needs and
the problems of that area. Equally important, it also makes one
become acquainted with the candidates—their qualifications,
suitability for a particular office and platform of government.
Thus, the fundamental law requires, not just that there be a
minimum of one-year residence in the country, but also that six
months of that period be spent in the place where the ballot is to be
cast. Such detailed requirement will hopefully give the voters
sufficient knowledge about a specific town as to help them choose
its local officials wisely, quite apart from understanding enough of
the entire country so as to prepare them to vote sagaciously for
national leaders.
The Supreme Court had occasions to discuss this common-sense
reason for the residence requirement, in this wise:
“We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials
of districts or localities be acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of
their constituencies but, more important, with the constituents themselves—
their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development,
and all matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite period would
give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired
constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to 9
evaluate the former’s
qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek.”
“[T]he purpose of the residency requirement [is] to ensure that the

person elected
10
is familiar with the needs and problems of his constitu-
ency[.]”
Although the foregoing discussions were used to justify the

residence requirement vis-à-vis candidates for elective public
offices, I
_______________
8 I will no longer take up the question of whether residence should be equated with
domicile, or the impact of this equation, as these matters are already adequately
discussed in the Opinions of my colleagues.
9 Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, 337 SCRA 574, 587, August 9, 2000,
per Panganiban, J.
10 Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106, 1119; 317 SCRA 641,
October 28, 1999, per Mendoza, J. See also Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 248
SCRA 400, September 18, 1995.
744

believe that their rationale can easily and analogically fit the needs
of voters as well.
The Essence of My Opinion

The defining essence of my position is this: in the midst of the now
available e-age communications facilities, actual presence in the
Philippines is no longer indispensable to make discerning Filipinos
know the problems of their country and to decide who among
candidates for national positions deserve their mandate.
Indeed, the Information Age has given overseas Filipinos
convenient means to inform themselves of our country’s needs, as
well as of the suitability of candidates for national offices. After all,
many of them live abroad, not because they want to abandon their
land of birth, but because they have been constrained to do so by
economic, professional, livelihood and other pressing pursuits.
Ineluctably, they remit their hard-earned money to help their
relatives here and their country as a whole.
Verily, their easy access to Philippine mass media keep them
constantly aware of happenings in their native country. National
dailies and other periodicals are sold regularly in Filipino enclaves
in foreign shores. Several local and community publications in these
areas cater mainly to Filipino expatriates, publishing news and
opinions not only about their alien11
neighborhoods, but also quite
extensively about their homeland.
So, too, Philippine news and magazine-type broadcasts are

available to overseas Filipinos on a daily basis over cable television,
giving them the feeling and the intellectual status of being home.
Interactive TV talk show’s are now routinely participated in via long
distance phones and cell phone text messages by people everywhere.
Even more conveniently available are the websites of major dailies.
Whatever news and view’s they print locally are instantly accessible
everywhere on earth via the Internet.
Truly, the e-age has opened windows to the Philippines in a
pervasive and thorough manner, such that actual presence in the
country is no longer needed to make an intelligent assessment of
whom to vote for as our national leaders.
_______________
11 For instance, the Filipino Reporter, published in the East Coast of the US, has
successfully done this service for over 30 years now.
745
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 745

I make this emphasis on national officials, because the Absentee

Voting Law allows overseas voting only for 12
President, Vice
President, senators and party-list representatives. This distinction is
important, because the information available through websites and
other modern media outlets is addressed mainly to national
concerns.
To insist that only those who can demonstrate actual physical
residence in the country for one year—or only those who have
complied with the more difficult-to-understand concept of domicile
—would be entitled to vote would be to cling adamantly and
unreasonably to a literal interpretation of the Constitution without
regard for its more liberating spirit or rationale. Such insistence
would result in rendering inutile
13
any meaningful effort to accord
suffrage to Filipinos abroad. Such proposition would make the
constitutional interpretation anachronous in the face of the
refreshing and pulsating realities of the world. In my view, it would
be thoroughly unreasonable to expect foreign-based Filipinos to
come back here for one year every three years and abandon their
jobs just to be able to comply literally with the residential
requirement of suffrage.
On the other hand, the advances of science and technology—
especially in the fields of computerization, miniaturization,
digitization, satellite communications and fiber optics—has so
expanded the capabilities of our brothers and sisters abroad as to
enable them to understand our national needs, without having to sit
back and stay here for one continuous year. They are now able to
help us bridge those needs, not only by remitting their hard-earned
currency, but also by assisting locally based Filipinos to choose
national leaders who will steer the country in the perilous new paths
of development and peace.
_______________
12 The Absentee Voting Law (RA 9189) states:
“SEC. 4. Coverage.—All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified
by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-
president, senators and party-list representatives.”
13 Overseas voting is mandated by §2 of Art. V of the Constitution as follows:
“SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.”
746

Conclusion
In sum, I respectfully submit that physical presence in the country is

no longer indispensible to arm Filipinos abroad with sufficient
information to enable them to vote intelligently. The advent of the
Information Age and the globalization of knowledge have
empowered them to know enough about the Philippines to enable
them to choose our national officials prudently and, in the process,
to have a significant voice in the governance of the country they
love and cherish.
I maintain that the constitutional provision on voter residence—
like every other law—must be interpreted “not by the letter that
killeth but by the spirit that giveth life.” As heralded by the
quotation from Tañada v. Angara, cited at the opening of this
Opinion, our Constitution should be construed so it may “bend with
the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events.”
Finally, may I stress that when the reason for the law is
accomplished, then the law itself is fulfilled. Since the law requiring
residence is accomplished by the globalization of information, then
the law itself is fulfilled. It is time to empower our overseas brothers
and sisters to participate more actively in nation building by
allowing them to help elect our national leaders.
WHEREFORE, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of Section 5
(d) of RA 9189. I also vote to declare as unconstitutional portions of
Section 18.5 thereof insofar as they authorize Comelec to proclaim

presidential and vice-presidential winners; and of Sections 17.1, 19
and 25 insofar as they subject to congressional oversight, review and
approval the implementation of voting by mail and the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Comelec.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
R.A. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of

2003, has spurred quite a debate among various sectors of Philippine
society, both locally and abroad. Scholarly arguments on the fine
legal points of the issues presented by this disputed law have been
presented by sides both for and against it, saddled, unfortunately,
with a heavy dose of bitter emotion.
747
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 747

The paramount consideration in any legal debate over this

contentious piece of legislation is its constitutional validity.
Significantly, the short article on suffrage in the Constitution
1
concentrates on who may exercise the right to vote. The
Constitution underscores three categories on the 2 qualifications
required of voters—citizenship, age and residence. Congress is
authorized to limit the number of citizens who may exercise the
right to vote by prescribing reasonable disqualifications. It is
elementary, however, that Congress cannot expand the right of
suffrage by including those who do not possess the constitutional
requirements. To do so would defeat the very purpose why
qualifications are singled out for constitutional attention. The
sovereign will has determined that only those with the requisite
citizenship, age, and residence may vote. Congress cannot water
down or change the constitutional requirements.
The controversial issue in this case revolves around the
constitutional provision on absentee voting which states:
Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot
3
as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion because R.A.

9189 grants the right of suffrage to a category of voters who do not
possess the constitutional requirement of residence. These are men
and women who are still Filipino citizens but who have voluntarily
and unambiguously chosen actual, physical, and permanent
residence in a foreign country. In other words, the questioned law
allows non-residents to vote.
_______________
1 Constitution, Art. V, Secs. 1 and 2. In addition to qualifications, Article V also

calls for a system which insures the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot.
2 Constitution, Art. V, Sec. 1 provides: “Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens
of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of
age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on
the exercise of suffrage.”
3 Constitution, Art. V, Sec. 2, first paragraph.
748

As phrased, Section 5 (d) of R.A. 9189 grants to Filipinos who are

immigrants or permanent residents of another country, and who are
considered as such by their host country, the option to exercise their
right of suffrage. This would be accomplished by the mere expedient
of:
1. Registering as voters.
2. Execution of an affidavit declaring that:
a. She shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the

Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of
her registration;
b. She has not applied for citizenship in another country.
Proponents of R. A. 9189 are trying to construe Section 2 of Article

V of the Constitution as a proviso which expands and enlarges the
scope of the preceding section. They overlook the fact that while
Section 2 provides a system for absentee voting, any absentee who
votes must first meet the qualifications found in Section 1 of the
same article. 4
As stated by the petitioner, if the framers of the Constitution
intended to make Section 2 of Article V a proviso or exception to its
first section, they should have added it to the latter.
Section 1 would have incorporated as its last clause the following
proviso:
Provided, the Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by

Filipino citizens who are residing abroad.
The Constitution does not make the absentee voting provision a

mere proviso of the first section on residence qualifications.
Together with the system which secures the secrecy and sanctity of
the ballot, the provision on absentee voting is an entirely distinct and
separate section which allows only those qualified under Section 1
to take advantage of the privilege under Section 2.
The office of a proviso is to limit the application
5
of a section or
provision or to qualify or restrain its generality. However, a pro-
_______________
4 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 6.

5 U.S. v. Sto. Niño, 13 Phil. 141 (1909); Arenas v. City of San Carlos, G.R. No. L-
34024, 5 April 1978, 82 SCRA 318.
749
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 749

viso may also enlarge what otherwise 6is a phrase of limited import
had there been no proviso qualifying it.
Since the provision on absentee voting in R.A. 9189 neither
limits nor enlarges a provision of which it is a part, the phrase
“qualified Filipinos abroad” can be interpreted only to mean that
those who are qualified to vote under the preceding section may
become absentee voters. They must possess on election day the
constitutional requirements as to citizenship, age, and residence.
Proponents of R.A. 9189 try to go around the statute’s
constitutional infirmity by giving the word “resident” or “resided” a
labored and farfetched meaning. They use the fanciful interpretation
that immigrants who have moved lock, stock, and barrel to
permanently live in another country are still domiciled in the
Philippines.
The tens, if not hundreds of millions of overseas Chinese who
have migrated to other lands may be cited as examples. Even after
living in their countries of choice for two or three generations, they
maintain their Chinese identities through clannishness and language.
They take pride in the slow emergence of the old country into a
democratic and powerful economic force in world affairs. By no
stretch of legal fiction, however, can they be deemed residents of
mainland China. They have chosen to live in adopted homelands,
have become integral and, many times, leading members of their
communities, and will be buried there when the time comes. Unless
the Chinese basic law allows non-residents to vote in China, they
cannot vote there. A similar diaspora caused by economic,

population, and other pressures has led millions of Filipinos to move
to other countries. Considering the constitutional provision on who
may vote in Philippine elections, a distinction has to be made
between those temporarily living and working abroad and those who
have opted to permanently reside there. This Court must hew to
reality. It should not engage in fanciful or strained interpretations to
try to pass off as Philippine residents the more than 2,000,000
immigrants who have chosen to permanently reside in other
countries. Only a constitutional amendment, not an enactment of
Congress, can lift the consequences of the distinction.
_______________
6 U.S. v. Sto. Niño, supra; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas

Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055 (1960).
750

It is well-settled that in election law,

7
the terms “residence” and
“domicile” are used interchangeably. Having in mind the meaning
of these terms as they are understood in jurisprudence, we can close
our eyes and easily conclude that the exercise of the right of suffrage
by Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent residents abroad is
warranted and that the process provided for in R.A. 9189 is sound.
Unfortunately, such a conclusion would be erroneous.
“Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent 8 for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. On the other hand, we have held that the residence of a
person must be his personal, actual or physical habitation or his
actual residence or abode. It does not mean fixed permanent9
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
This last, of course, refers to the animus revertendi which is
determinative of domicile.
We
10
must define another term: immigrant. According to Caasi v.
CA, an immigrant is a person who 11
removes into a country for the
purpose of permanent residence. This is why it was held therein
that, having taken up such permanent residence in a country other
than the Philippines, the immigrant abandons his domicile and
residence in the Philippines.
In its common usage “immigrant” is one who comes to settle in a
country which is not one’s own. “Immigration” is entrance into a
country for the purpose of settling there. “Migrate” means to move
from one place
12
of abode to another; to leave one’s country to settle
in another.
There is always the concept of permanent movement inherent in

the word “immigration.” From as early as 1572 to the present, the
_______________
7 Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995, 248

SCRA 300.
8 Romualdez v. Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 104960, 14 September 1993, 226
SCRA 408, cited in Papandayan, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147909, 16 April 2002,
381 SCRA 133.
9 Baritua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100748, 3 February 1997, 267 SCRA 331.
11 Citing 3 C.J.S. §76.
12 Oxford Universal Dictionary, Vol. I, pp. 961 and 1249.
751
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 751

meaning of “settle” has13

been to fix or establish permanently one’s
abode, residence, etc.
Taking these definitions into account, we must now turn to the
first tool we have to aid us in our quest to understand this vague
provision of our fundamental law: the proceedings and debates of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It can be seen from the records
thereof that only Filipino citizens temporarily residing abroad can
avail of the option to vote as absentee voters.
With all due respect, it is not accurate to conclude that the
debates, interpellations, and opinions on absentee voting expressed
in the records of the Constitution Commission easily and
unequivocally show that Congress is empowered to enact a law
allowing immigrants to continue to vote in Philippine elections.
Much less is there any room for interpretation that an immigrant
who makes the facile promise to return and permanently reside in
the Philippines not later than three years from voting, may be
deemed a permanent resident domiciled both in this country and in
the city or municipality where he will vote.
During the deliberations on the subject provision, Commissioner
Blas Ople had this to say:
In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and

Agencies, the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe,
said that there was no insuperable obstacle to making effective the right of
suffrage for Filipinos overseas. Those who have adhered to their Filipino
citizenship notwithstanding strong temptations are exposed to embrace a
more convenient foreign citizenship. And those who on their own or under
pressure of economic necessity here, find that they have to detach

two or three years. They have no intention of changing their residence on a
suffrage in their countries of destination
14
by the residential requirement in
Section 1 . . . (Emphasis supplied)
In response to an interpellation by Commissioner Ople,

Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J., made the following remarks:
_______________
13 Id., at p. 1855, Vol. II.

14 II RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS
AND DEBATES, p. 11.
752

In other words, “residency” in this provision refers to two residence

where he will vote. As far as residence in the Philippines is concerned, the
word “residence” means domicile, but as far as residence in the place
where he will actually cast his ballot is concerned, the meaning seems to be
different. He could have domicile somewhere else and yet he is a resident of
a place for six months and he is allowed to vote there. So that there may be
serious constitutional obstacles to absentee voting, unless the vote of the
person who is absent is a vote which15 will be considered as cast in the place
of his domicile. (Emphasis supplied)
When Commissioner Christian Monsod and several others proposed

amendments, Commissioner Bernas made a clarification as to whom
the term “Filipinos” referred to in the draft provision on absentee
voting, applies:
FR. BERNAS: In other words, these Filipinos must at least be

domiciled in the Philippines.
MR. MONSOD: Yes.
FR. BERNAS: That is why we do not use the word16 “ABROAD”
because they must be domiciled in the Philippines.
When the term “absentee voting” was introduced into the provision,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado made sure that the provision’s
intended meaning was not lost:
MR. REGALADO: When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to read


That is referring to qualified Filipino citizens temporarily
abroad.
MR. MONSOD: Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with
system of registration in the embassies. However, we do17not like
to preempt the legislative assembly. (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
15 Id.
16 Id., at p. 34.
17 Id., at p. 35.
753
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 753

Ultimately, the Commissioners’ deliberations and debates left little

doubt as to who will be allowed to exercise the option to vote as an
absentee voter. We can glean as much from the following exchange:
MR. REGALADO: I just want to make a note on the statement of

could not cast his vote. He is temporarily abroad, but not
residing there. He stays in a hotel for two days and comes back.
This is not limited only to Filipinos temporarily residing abroad.
But as long as he is temporarily abroad on the date of the
elections, then he can fall within the prescription of Congress in
that situation.
MR. SUAREZ: I thank the Commissioner for his further
clarification on record.
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, to clarify what we mean by
temporarily abroad on a treaty traders visa. Therefore, when we
talk about registration, it is possible that his residence is in
Angeles and he would be able to vote for the candidates in
Angeles, but Congress or the Assembly may provide the
procedure for registration, like listing one’s name, in a registry

list in the embassy abroad.18 That is still possible under this
system. (Emphasis supplied)
To my mind, the Constitutional Commission envisioned two

different groups of people as the beneficiaries of this provision:
1. Qualified Filipinos temporarily residing abroad—citizens

who belong to this category reside abroad for extended
periods of time without intending to make their host
countries their permanent residence. This would include
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW’s) with fixed periods of
employment, students studying abroad, holders of treaty
trader’s visas, or seamen away from the Philippines for
extended periods. The Department of Foreign Affairs has
tabulated the majority of the 5,488,167
19
Filipinos living
abroad as falling under this category.
_______________
18 Id.; emphasis supplied.

19 Estimated Number of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) and Overseas
Filipinos, Memorandum for the Petitioner, Annex “B”.
754

2. Qualified Filipinos temporarily abroad, but not residing

therein—this contemplates a situation wherein the
temporary absence from the Philippines is not coupled with
any temporary residence in a foreign country at all. This
would include Filipinos who just so happen to be absent
from the Philippines for brief periods of time, but including
election day itself, usually because they have flown to
foreign countries for short trips.
It is submitted that a valid and very real distinction exists between

either of these two groups of Filipinos, on the one hand, and those
Filipinos who are permanent residents or immigrants in their host
countries, on the other. The key difference lies in the change of
permanent residence or lack thereof, for the framers of our
Constitution clearly intended that Filipinos who had taken up
permanent residence in their host countries would be excluded from
the benefits of absentee voting. No other interpretation can be
supported by the records at hand.
It is clear that the Constitutional Commission did not intend to

make absentee voters an exception to the general rule on residence
in the exercise of the right of suffrage. We do not agree with the
majority’s belief that the position of Article V, Section 2 of the
Constitution is indicative of an intent to make it appear to be an
exception to the residence requirement provided for in the section
immediately preceding it. As earlier stated, Section 2 is not a
proviso of Section 1. The following discussions are enlightening:
MR. SUAREZ: May I just be recognized for a clarification. There

preceding the election. What is the effect of these mandatory
THE PRESIDENT: Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?
MR. MONSOD: I believe the answer was already given by
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsod’s
MR. MONSOD: Yes.
755
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 755

THE PRESIDENT: The Commissioner is not stating here that he

MR. MONSOD: That is right. They 20
must have the qualifications and
It is patent from the foregoing excerpts that the Commissioners took

pains to ensure that the reasoning behind Article V, Section 2 of the
Constitution would not be misunderstood. They never intended to
accord a special status nor give special consideration to Filipinos
who have become permanent residents of their host countries. These
necessarily include immigrants.
Juxtaposing these definitions found in our jurisprudence with the
evident intent of the framers of our Constitution, it is plain to see
that Section 5 (d) of R.A. 9189, in its current form is
unconstitutional. It seeks to grant the benefits of absentee voting to
those for whom it was never intended: Filipinos who are permanent
residents, necessarily including immigrants, of countries other than
their own.
The majority claims that striking down Section 5 (d) of R.A.

9189 would deprive Filipinos abroad of a very important choice. On
the one hand, they can waive their right to vote and continue to
enjoy their status as immigrants or permanent residents of their host
country. On the other, they can manifest their intent to return to the
Philippines in a sworn statement within 3 years from the approval of
their registration as absentee voters. This is, of course, a superfluous
exercise. What needs to be decided? These immigrants and
permanent resident of their host countries have already made their
choice. They decided to move on to “greener pastures” rather than to
cast their lot here with their countrymen.
The long lines of applicants patiently and meekly waiting for
months or years to be granted immigrant visas by foreign embassies
is strongly indicative of their determination to permanently reside
abroad. Granted, they had very good reasons, even downright
pressing or urgent ones, to leave their homes for cold, far-off lands.
However, they made their choices willingly and, undoubtedly, with
full knowledge that they sacrifice some of their rights and privileges
as citizens and residents of our republic.
_______________
20 II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS

AND DEBATES, pp. 34-35.
756

We know all too well the sacrifices our overseas brothers and sisters
have endured to make better lives for themselves and their families,
and if they are happy where they are, then we are genuinely happy
for them. The sincerity of their concern for the motherland, as well
as the nobility of their sentiments, have never been in question.
However, if they feel they have to manifest such concern for the
welfare of their country by casting their votes in our country’s
elections, then they should do what the Constitution commands.
They should come home.
I also take issue with the majority’s claim that the threat of
disenfranchisement will be a sufficient deterrent against the
possibility of any absentee voter reneging on his promise to return to
the Philippines within 3 years from registration as an absentee voter.
However, as I mentioned above, is it not conceivable that these
immigrants or permanent residents of their host countries knew fully
well that they would never again be able to exercise the right of
suffrage when they sought permanent residence abroad? If they were
willing to sacrifice the exercise of this right then, what is to stop
them from doing so in the future? Not much, for if they register as
absentee voters and participate in our electoral process, they have
nothing to lose. They can decide to hold true to their oath and come
home to permanently reside here within three years of their
registration as absentee voters. Alternatively, they can vote during
the elections and never set foot on Philippine soil ever again. What
will they lose by exercising this second option? They risk losing the
right to vote in Philippine elections; a right which they forfeited a
long time ago.
It is unfortunate that R.A. 9189, in its present form, is saddled
with so many infirmities. Sadder still is the fact these problems
could have been avoided at the drafting stage. Evidently, these issues
were brought to the attention of the Senate by Senator Joker Arroyo,
as far back as the period for committee amendments. Although the
eminent Senator’s remarks were originally in response to the
proposal to provide for voter registration by mail, his parting words
on the subject for his colleagues in the Senate capture the true intent
behind the Constitutional provision on absentee voting. Fortunately,
the Record of Senate has chronicled them for posterity, thus:
Now my concern here is this; that while we would like absentee voting, we
do not want the process to be used by some enterprising people to
757
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 757

alter the vote. What am I trying to say? All our compatriots abroad, well,
they cannot be bought. They will vote honestly. The question is, just like
here, after casting their votes, will the results be honest and reflective of the
honest vote made by the absentee voters? That is really the question.
xxx xxx xxx
In our overeagerness to follow the Constitutional provision, we may find
gaps in the process. So I agree with Senator Angara when I say that the
registration must be here, they must first register, and it is not really that
difficult because they come home every now and then. These are Filipinos
who come every now and then. But for Filipinos, for instance, who have
lived 20 years abroad, is that difficult to figure out?
Must we really solicit and ask them to vote when they have lived there
already for 20 years? We have dual citizenship. While we grant them the
dual citizenship, fine. But for a person who has been there for 20 years and
has not even come back here, that is too much.
It is like that. How can we grant the right to vote to those who do not
care to come home and visit? Come home and visit, then they get the right
to vote. But if they do not even visit and then they will say they will file
their application to vote, having grown up all these years in the United
States, how is that? I mean, these are the things that we have to consider
because I, for one, cannot go against the Constitutional command because

that is what the Constitution says—we must provide for absentee voting.
So, the proposition that I have offered is that when they come home, it is
very easy. They just go up to the election registrar: they register there. They
do not even have to ask so many questions. But at least, they are
thumbmarked, their signatures are there, then the details are there.
These are the things. Because, Mr. President, if some of our overseas
brothers commit election crimes abroad, they cannot be prosecuted in the
Philippines. Let us face that. Why? Because all they have to do is not come
home. Then we will have another Mark Jimenez, perhaps. I do not know.
But when they come here and register, there is a certain attachment to us,
and it is not too difficult.
Look at our overseas workers, for instance, in the Middle East.
Everyday, we go to the airport and we see their groups of overseas workers
coming home.
So, all we are telling them is: “All right, you go to your respective towns.
When you go there, just spend 15 minutes.”
Mr. President, if these overseas workers or compatriots of ours do not
want to go there and spend 15 minutes, how can we give them the right to
vote? I mean, there must also be some external manifestation on the part of
our overseas friends that they do want to vote. And they do so because they
take time, they take pains to register. If they do not want to
758

take time and pains to register, they just say: “Oh, no. We give you money
there, so you better give us the ballots.” I mean, it is not fair.
What we want is to fashion a bill that would also show that the overseas
21
voter has some attachment to the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied).”
Jurisprudence has developed the concepts of “residence” and

“domicile” in situations where22 the two are in different places but
both are within the Philippines. A young man leaves his hometown
to study in the city. He sets up a residence for education purposes.
When he gets married and raises a family, he may build his
residence in another place. His work may take him to different
places and he establishes a new residence each time he and his
family move. He may have cast his vote in any of the various places
where he has resided. However, in later life he decides to run for
public office in his hometown where he has not resided for forty
(40) years. His hometown is still deemed to be his domicile or
permanent residence. The key element in determining one’s
domicile or permanent residence is the declared and provable or
easily proved intent
23
to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of
abode or home.
For immigrants, the manifest intent is the will, animus, volition,

plan, and intendment to establish permanent residence in another
country. The process a man goes through before he is given
immigrant status is so arduous and formidable that there can be no
doubt as to his animus. The fact that he is leaving the Philippines,
with all the emotional connotations of departure, to settle in another
country proves intent. Far from returning to the Philippines, his
more likely and provable intent is a desire to eventually get
citizenship papers in his adopted country.
Conversely, the cases where Filipinos may have resided in
foreign countries but whose domicile was still somewhere in the
Philippines clearly show not only the intent to return home, but
_______________
21 S. No. 2104 on Second Reading, October 9, 2002, Records of the Senate, pp.
90-92.
22 Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954); Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928);
Koh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40428, 17 December 1975, 70 SCRA 305;
Caraballo v. Republic, 114 Phil. 991; 4 SCRA 1055 (1962); Fule v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. L-40502 & 42670, 29 November 1976, 74 SCRA 199.
23 Id.
759
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 759

the likelihood or inevitably of having to come home and not stay

permanently in any adopted country.
The decisions in Philip G. Romualdez v. Regional Trial Court, et
24
al.25 and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, et
al. illustrate the distinction between temporary residence in a
foreign country and domicile in one’s homeland.
The petitioners in the Romualdez cases never chose to be
residents in the United States. They were forced to flee because of
the political upheaval known as EDSA I. Philip Romualdez tried to
return around one year after his forced flight abroad. He had already
booked a flight but it was aborted because he was not welcome at
that time in the Philippines. On September 25, 1991, he received a
letter from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service that he
must leave that country on or before August 23, 1992 or be
deported. The concepts of residence, domicile and animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi are discussed in these cases, but
there can be no mistaking the facts of the cases as entirely different
from those of immigrants.
Mrs. Marcos and her family were also forced to flee. Throughout
their residence abroad, they strove to return to the Philippines. They
filed a case against the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Executive

Secretary and other top officials to compel
26
the issuance of new
passports and permission to come home.
The rulings on domicile and residence in the above and similar
cases cannot be used to justify the validity of R.A. 9189. They do
not refer to immigrants.
I also disagree with the majority view that perhaps
27
it is time to
reconsider the doctrine in Caasi v. Court of Appeals and reverse it.
It is sound doctrine and should be strengthened instead of being
overturned.
I beg to differ from the conclusion in the majority opinion which
states that an absentee remains attached to his residence in the
Philippines because “residence” is synonymous with “domicile”.
_______________
24 Supra, note 8.
25 Supra, note 7.
26 Marcos, et al. v. Hon. Raul Manglapus, et al., G.R. No. 88211, 15 September
1989, 177 SCRA 668.
27 Supra, note 10.
760

“Absentee” has to be qualified. It refers only to those people

residing abroad whose intent to return home and forsake the foreign
country is clear. It cannot refer to immigrants. A mere promise to
return home within three years from voting is no proof of intent to
return to a permanent residence. The sanction for its enforcement is
so feeble that the promise will be an empty one. As earlier stated, an
immigrant gives up many things, including the right or opportunity
of voting in the Philippines, when he moves with his family abroad.
A sanction of future disenfranchisement would not bother him in the
least bit. In the meantime, the immigrant vote in closely contested
cases may have elected the President, a Senator or a Congressman.
Unqualified voters will have swung the elections. In the same way
that a counterfeit coin28 drives away or results in the hoarding of
genuine or good coins, the votes of non-qualified persons will not
only weaken or nullify the value of the good votes but may make an
election itself sham and meaningless.
The majority
29
opinion cites the case of Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC as an example of an absentee abroad whose permanent
residence is her hometown in Leyte. Mrs. Marcos never chose to
live abroad. She was compelled by over-powering circumstances to
flee to Hawaii. She and her family showed clearly the intent to
return home. Her case would be the weakest precedent for allowing
immigrants to vote in the Philippines. She was not an immigrant.
With all due respect, the argument voiced in Congress that the
affidavit-promise to return home within three years gives the
immigrant that choice without Congress making the decision for him
is deceptive and unsound. As earlier stated, the immigrant has
already made his choice to change domicile when he migrated
abroad. If he later returns to the Philippines, the choice is an entirely
new one. It assumes force and effect only when the immigrant
actually comes back home, tears up his green card and sets up
domicile anew in the Philippines.
However, I agree with the majority opinion that certain
provisions of R.A. 9189 are unconstitutional, to wit:
_______________
28 Greshams Law, Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 367.

29 Supra.
761
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 761

1. Section 17.1 of R.A. 9189, insofar as it provides that voting

by mail shall be subject to the review and approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
2. Section 18.5 of R.A. 9189, insofar as it empowers
COMELEC to order the proclamation of the winning
candidates for President and Vice-President where delays in
the canvass of overseas votes will not affect the results of
the election, considering that only Congress
30
can proclaim
the winning President and Vice-President.
3. Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. 9189, insofar as they provide
that the Implementing Rules and Regulations to be issued
by the COMELEC are subject to the review, revision,
amendment and approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee.
I have discussed at length the invalidity of the provision which

converts a disqualified immigrant into a qualified overseas voter by
the simple expedient of executing an affidavit promising to return to
the Philippines within three years from voting. It is beyond
comprehension how a mere promise of a future act, which is more
likely to be violated than obeyed, transforms a disqualification into a
qualification.
Ascertaining, after three years, who complied with the promise

and who violated it presents an administrative nightmare. I submit
that the valid system is to allow overseas voting only for those
Filipinos who have to return home or most probably return home
because of the nature of their work abroad.
In the debates over specific provisions of R.A. 9189, we tend to
overlook that the entire law has been hurriedly drafted in a form
which violates the principal mandate of the Constitution on suffrage.
The sovereign people have ordered Congress to provide 31
a system
which secures the sanctity and secrecy of the ballot. Instead of
securing the sanctity and secrecy of the ballot, R.A. 9189 does the
opposite.
The unconstitutional sections of the law have been discussed at
length. The majority opinion calls for a “holistic” view of the law.
Careful observers of R.A. 9189 indicate that such a “holistic”
view strengthens the invalid and highly unrealistic aspects of the
_______________
30 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4 (4).

31 Constitution, Art. V, Sec. 2.
762

32
entire statute. It does not make sense and it is highly improbable
that permanent residents abroad will visit our embassies to execute
affidavits promising to return here simply to exercise the right to
vote in absentia in Philippine elections.
How will our embassies and consulates in the one hundred
seventy eight (178) countries, island nations, and city states in the
DFA list comply with their election33
duties within the impossibly
short period provided by the law.
How will the identities of millions of overseas Filipinos be
ascertained, the temporary separated from permanent residents, their
passports be examined, and their affidavits of promise to return be
verified and transmitted to the thousands of precincts where the
sanctions on violated promises have to be enforced. How can
embassies and consulates publicize the requirements for registration
at least six months before October 31, 2003 in the one hundred
seventy eight (178) countries,34 island nations, and city states where
overseas Filipinos are found? How can they conduct exclusion and
inclusion proceedings?
Despite all-out efforts of COMELEC, it has not solved the
serious problem of dagdag bawas within the Philippines. Under the
loose provisions of R.A. 9189, dagdag bawas is encouraged without
fear of discovery, correction, and punishment of guilty parties

residing abroad.
A new and entirely efficient system for ferreting out and
punishing election offenses must go with the law. Only a few
obvious offenses have to be cited. Among them are padded
registration lists, accreditation of unqualified voters, vote-buying
and vote-selling, bribery, wagering on the results of elections,
double registration and multiple voting by one person, appreciation
of torn, defaced, or invalid ballots, solicitation of votes and unlawful
electioneering, rigging or tampering with the canvass and
transmission of results, and a long list of other violations of election
laws.
_______________
32 Belinda A. Aquino, Professor of Political Science and Asian Studies at the

University of Hawaii and Director of its Center for Philippine Studies has published
her observations in the Philippine Inquirer, June 8, 2003 issue, page “A-9”.
33 Memorandum for Petitioner, Annex “B”.
34 Id.
763
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 763

35
As observed by Professor Belinda A. Aquino, “to rush this
experiment simply to keep up with the May 2003 elections, with
some political calculations of its advantages to certain candidates
would be creating a disservice to the Filipino overseas communities
which the Voting Act has empowered to become full participants in
the electoral process.”
In closing, I invite attention to the exchange between Senator
Joker Arroyo and Senator Edgardo Angara on the Senate Floor,
where Senator Arroyo asked: Who could possibly take advantage of
the expeditious handling of Senate Bill No. 2104, what we now
know as R.A. 9189? Evidently, the two senators 36
agreed that it was
the administration that stood to gain the most. It is hoped that this
perceived benefit was not the reason behind the hasty enactment of
the law in its current, constitutionally infirm state. However, one
cannot help but wonder if the concerns and aspirations of millions of
our brothers and sisters abroad were truly served by the passage of
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. The entirety of R.A.
9189 has to be re-examined. For purposes of this petition, however, I
limit my opinion to the five sections of the law outlined above.
WHEREFORE, I view of the foregoing, I DISSENT from the
majority opinion insofar as it upholds the constitutionality of Section
5 (d) of Republic Act No. 9189, and I vote that said Section 5(d) be
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. However, I CONCUR with the

majority opinion insofar as it declares UNCONSTITUTIONAL the
portion of Section 17.1 which empowers the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to review and approve voting by mail; and the
portions of Sections 19 and 25 which empower the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations to be promulgated
by the Commission on Elections. I also CONCUR with the majority
opinion that Section 18.5, insofar as it empowers the Commission on
Elections to proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-
President, is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
_______________
35 Supra, note 32.

36 Supra, note 21.
764

CONCURRING and DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
1
No person has more than one domicile at a time. A Filipino
immigrant, by his permanent2 residency in the host country, loses the
Philippines as his domicile. He cannot reacquire it by the mere act
of executing an affidavit expressing his intention to return to the
Philippines at some future time. Residence for voting is not wholly a3
question of intention, but it is a question of fact and intention.
Unless his intention is fortified by the concurrent act of
reestablishing the Philippines as his domicile, he cannot be
considered a qualified voter under the Philippine Constitution.
With the foregoing premise in mind, I find myself unable to
agree with the majority’s ruling that Section 5(d) of Republic Act
No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) is
constitutional. For easy reference, let me quote the assailed
provision thus:
“SEC. 5. Disqualifications.—The following shall be disqualified from

voting under this Act:
xxxxxx
resume actual physical permanent residence, in the Philippines not later
than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act.
Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in
another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name
of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.”
_______________
1 25 Am Jur 2d §8 citing In re Marriage of Tucker (4th Dist) 226 Cal App 3d

1249, 277 Cal Rptr 403, 91 CDOS 572, 91 Daily Journal DAR 843 review den (Cal.)
1991 Cal LEXIS 1415; Wilson vs. Butler (La App 1st Cir) 513 So 2d 304; George H.
&. & Irene L. Walker Home for Children vs. Town of Franklin, 416 Mass 291, 621
NE2d 376.
2 Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88831, November 8, 1990, 191 SCRA 229.
3 Pope vs. Howie, 149 So 222, 227 Ala. 154; Bullington vs. Grabow, 88 Colo. 561;
Barret vs. Parks, 180 S.W. 2d665, 352 Mo. 974.
765
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 765

R.A. No. 9189 has been enacted pursuant to Section 2, Article V of

the 1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide “a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.” In enacting the law,
Congress granted the right of suffrage to Filipino immigrants or
permanent residents of foreign countries on the condition that they
shall execute an affidavit declaring their intention to resume
permanent residency in the Philippines. The rationale, according to
Senator Edgardo Angara, is that Congress wants the law to be
“expansive” and “all-inclusive.”
The validity of the above-quoted provision depends on whether it
conforms faithfully to the mandate of the Constitution. Does it carry
out the true intent of the Constitution? In various jurisdictions where
absentee laws exist, statutes are construed in the light4 of
constitutional provisions affecting elections and registrations. In
said jurisdictions, the constitutionality of absentee voting laws has
been upheld or denied based on constitutional requirements relating
to the residence of voters, the necessity of their personal appearance
at the polls, the mechanics of voting, including the place and method
of casting the ballot and the counting and canvassing
5
and other
treatment of the ballots by the election officials.
There is no dispute that the 1987 Constitution denies to Filipino
immigrants the right of suffrage. The Framers had no choice, they
had to maintain consistency among the provisions of the
Constitution. Section 1, Article V prescribes residency in the
Philippines as one of the qualifications for the exercise of the right

of suffrage. Initially, this was perceived as an obstacle to the
incorporation of the constitutional provision requiring Congress to
provide 6for a system of absentee voting by “qualified Filipinos
abroad.” However, the Framers resorted to the legal connotation of
the term “residence.” They emphasized that “residence” is to be
understood not in its common acceptance as referring to “dwelling”
or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or “legal residence,” that is,
the “place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent
_______________
4 State ex rel v. Whitley vs. Rinehart, 192 So. 819, 140 Fla. 645; Maddox vs. Board
of State Canvasser, 149 P. 2d 112, 116 Mont. 217.
5 26 Am Jur 2d §356.
6 Section 2, Article V of the 1987 Constitution reads: “SEC. 2. The Congress shall
provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballots as well as a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.”
766

home, where he, no matter where he may be 7found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain.” Thus, as long as the
Filipino abroad maintains his domicile in the Philippines, he is
considered a qualified voter under the Constitution. Significantly, at
the early stage of the deliberation, the Framers made it clear that
the term “qualified Filipinos abroad” refers only to those whose
presence in the foreign country is only “temporary” and whose
domicile is still the Philippines—thus, definitely excluding
immigrants or permanent residents of a foreign country. Let me
quote the Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
“MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, Madame President, I just want to

ask if the word ‘Filipinos’ is a general term. Does this refer to
Filipinos who are qualified voters?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, of course.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, that is the understanding.
MR. RODRIGO. Should we not spell it out in the provision or is it
already understood?
FR. BERNAS. It is already understood?
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the proposed
amendment on lines 15 and 16?
FR. BERNAS. In other words, these Filipinos must at least be
MR. MONSOD. Yes.

FR. BERNAS. That is why we do not use the word ‘ABROAD’
MR. MONSOD. That is why we are not repeating many of the basic
things such as qualifications, disqualifications and domicile
requirements.
MR. SUAREZ. Madame President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
_______________
7 Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, 385
SCRA 607.
767
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 767


system?
FR. BERNAS. I think here is a very legitimate problem raised there.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
Manila.
MR. TINGSON. Madame President, may I then suggest to the
Committee to change the word Filipinos’ to QUALIFIED
FILIPINO VOTERS. Instead of VOTING BY FILIPINOS
ABROAD,’ it should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If the
Committee wants QUALIFIED VOTERS LIVING ABROAD,
would that not satisfy the requirement?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the

phrase ‘QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD’ because
‘QUALIFIED’ would assume that he has the qualifications and
MR. TINGSON. That is right, so does the Committee accept?
FR. BERNAS. ‘QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD’?
MR. REGALADO. Madame President.
‘absentee voting’ already took that into account as its meaning.
abroad.
xxx xxx xxx
768

MR. SUAREZ. Madame President, may I be recognized for

clarification.
MR. SUAREZ. For clarification purposes, we just want to state for
the record that in the case of qualified Filipino citizens residing
abroad and exercising their right of suffrage, they can cast their
votes for the candidates in the place where they were registered
to vote in the Philippines. So as to avoid any complications, for
example, if they are registered in Angeles City, they could not
vote for a mayor in Naga City. In other words, if that qualified
voter is registered in Angeles City, then he can vote only for the
local and national candidates in Angeles City. I just want to make
that clear for the record.
MR. REGALADO. Madame President.
THE PESIDENT. What does Commissioner Regalado say?
could not cast his vote. He is temporarily abroad but not residing
there. He stays in a hotel for two days and comes back. This is
not limited only to Filipinos temporarily residing abroad. But as
long as he is temporarily abroad on the date of the elections, then8

he can fall within the prescription of Congress in that situation.”
The intention of the Framers to limit the phrase “qualified Filipinos

abroad” to Filipinos temporarily residing abroad is clear and
unmistakable. Therefore, a law, such as R.A. No. 9189, which
expands the meaning as to include those otherwise not covered (such
as Filipino immigrants or permanent residents of foreign countries),
through the mere imposition of certain requirements, “risks a
declaration of unconstitutionality.”
My reservation to join the majority springs from my negative
stand to the query—Is the mere execution of an affidavit by a
Filipino immigrant declaring that he shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years
from approval of his registration under R.A. No. 9189 sufficient to
consider him a resident or domiciliary of the Philippines?
_______________
8 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, VOL. II, July 19,

1986 at pp. 34-35.
769
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 769

It is a fundamental legal
9
rule that all persons must always have a
domicile somewhere. Equally fundamental is the principle
10
that no
person has more than one domicile at a time. A person is
considered to have abandoned his domicile if he chooses a new
domicile, actually resides in the place chosen,
11
and intends that it be
the principal
12
and permanent residence. In Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that the immigration of a Filipino to the United
States by virtue of a “green card,” which entitles him to reside
permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in
the Philippines, thus:
“Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel’s immigration to the United States

in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his
children or his doctor there; he entered in the United States with the
intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrant’s (not a visitor’s or tourist’s) visa. Based on that application of
his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently.
“Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of
immigrating; the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
An immigrant is a person who moves into a country for the purpose of

permanent residence, x x x.”
There being an abandonment of the Philippine domicile, the only

way for an immigrant to satisfy the “residency” requirement to
enable him to exercise his right of suffrage is to reacquire or
reestablish his domicile in this country. It is an established rule that
“where a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires one in
another state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former 13
residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence.” In
_______________
9 25 Am Jur 2d §8.
10 Id.
11 Perito vs. Perito, (Alaska) 756 P2d 895.
12 Supra.
13 Nuval vs. Guray, G.R. No. 30241, December 29, 1928, 52 Phil. 645. “Since
Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and
acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be a candidate in the municipality of
Luna, he needed to reacquire residence in the latter municipality for the length of time
prescribed by the law, and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so,
but his personal presence in said municipality.”
770

short, for an immigrant to reestablish his domicile in the Philippines,

he must again reside in this country with the intention to remain here
and abandon his old domicile in the foreign land. The waiver of his
immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it.
Mere declaration that he intends to resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines does not have the effect of
conferring upon the immigrant the necessary qualification of
“residency” here. To reiterate, residence for voting is not wholly14
a
question of intention, it is a question of fact and intention. A
voter’s statements, declarations, or testimony with respect to his
intention is not controlling,
15
but must be taken in connection with his
acts and conduct. Hence, the right to vote in a certain place or
precinct requires the occurrence of two16 things, the act of residing
coupled with the intention to do so. In order to constitute a
residence for voting purposes, there must be the intention to reside
there for voting purposes, and that intention must be accompanied
by acts of living, dwelling, lodging, or residing reasonably sufficient
to establish that it is the real and actual residence of the voter. To
rule that a sworn declaration of intention is sufficient to acquire a
voting residence is to establish a bad precedent considering that

voters can choose the place where they want to vote simply by
swearing that they intend to permanently reside therein.
Perhaps the majority would assert that such intention is
accompanied by the immigrant’s act of resuming actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years
from the approval of his registration under R.A. No. 9189. Such
future act cannot change the immigrant’s present domicile. Not only
because it is yet to happen, hence, doubtful and uncertain, but
_______________
An intention to return to a former domicile developed after a new domicile has been acquired
does not, in itself, affect the acquisition of a new domicile, since the same principles outlined in
the preceding sections apply to the reacquisition of the old domicile after abandonment or
removal. (25 Am Jur § 19)
14 Supra.
15 29 C.J.S § 19, citing People v. ex rel. Moran vs. Teolis, 169 N.E. 2d 232, 20 111.
2d 95; Coffey vs. Board of Election Com’rs of East St. Louis, 31 N.E. 2d 588, 375
111. 385; Park vs. Hood, 27 N.E. 2d 838, 374 ill. 36; Brownlee vs. Duguid, 178 N.E.
174, 93 Ind. App. 266.
16 Brownlee vs. Duguid, id.
771
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 771

also because it is a settled principle that a voter must posses all the
qualifications to vote at least on the date of the election. Only
persons who possess or will possess on the day of the election the
constitutional and statutory qualifications of voters are entitled to
apply to the 17
registrars for the registration of their names in the
voting lists. To say otherwise is to authorize a person to vote in an
election subject to future acquisition of the necessary qualifications
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. To be granted such right
before one can even qualify as a voter contravenes one of the most
basic principles in election law.
The majority rules that the affidavit required in Section 5 (d)
“serves as an explicit expression that
18
the immigrant had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin.” Again, I cannot subscribe to this
view. An immigrant’s plain declaration of his intention cannot
prevail over the actual facts surrounding his residency. Conduct has
greater evidential value than a declaration. The fact that a person
obtains an immigrant’s visa, and not a visitor’s or tourist’s visa,
plainly shows that his entrance in the foreign country is for a
permanent purpose. Indeed, declarations are always subject to the
infirmity of any self-serving

19
declaration and may be contradicted by
inconsistent acts. When in conflict with the facts, a declared
intention to acquire a 20domicile (or to maintain the domicile of
origin) has little weight.
Besides, to admit the immigrant’s representation that he has not
abandoned his Philippine domicile despite his immigrant status
21
is to
tolerate what we proscribed in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, thus:
_______________
17 Mitchell vs. Wright, DC. Ala., 69 F. Supp. 698; Cornelius vs. Pruet, 85 So. 430,
204 Ala. 189; In re Ray, 56 A. 2d 761, 26 N.J. Misc. 56; Appeal of Stokes, 16 Pa.
Dist. & Co. 486; State ex rel. Willhide vs. King, 30 S.E. 2d 234, 126 W. Va. 785.
18 Decision at p. 26.
19 District of Columbia vs. Murphy, 314 US 441, 86 L Ed 329, 62 S Ct 303.
20 Texas vs. Florida, 306 US 398, 83 L Ed 817, 59 S Ct 563, 121 ALR 1179; Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co. vs. Fields (DC Cal) 81 F Supp 54; Ashton vs. Ashton, 197 Okla
241, 169 P 2d 565; Stalmaker vs. State, 186 W Va 233, 412 SE2d 231.
21 Supra.
772

“In other words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for
immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only had
one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even
if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity
by permitting him to benefit from it and giving him the best of both worlds
so to speak.”
Honoring our countrymen’s sworn declarations to resume permanent

residency in the Philippines, notwithstanding their immigrant status
and the host country’s continuous recognition of them as such, does
not speak well of Filipino values. In effect, it encourages duplicitous
or deceptive conduct among our countrymen. We should not allow
such acts to be done behind the host country’s back.
Another ground why I cannot join the majority is the great
probability that the assailed provision may only be an avenue for
election fraud. Reality wise, our country is yet to achieve a truly
clean and honest election. To grant the right of suffrage to the vast
number of immigrants in foreign countries where we cannot enforce
our laws with the same efficacy as within our territory, is to
endanger our citizens’ constitutional right to an undefiled suffrage.
Paramount in the preservation of the principles of democratic
government is the observance of precautionary requirements
designed to insure the sanctity of the ballot. Consequently, it is
imperative that our elections are not tainted with, fraud. This cannot
be achieved unless we impose stricter terms on the grant of the right
of suffrage to absentee citizens. Significantly, the only sanction
imposed by Section 5(d) upon an immigrant who fails to perform his
promise to resume permanent residency in the Philippines within the
prescribed period is that his name will be stricken from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and he will be permanently disqualified
to vote in absentia. What a punishment for someone who made a
mockery of the election process! This punitive measure is virtually
meaningless. It cannot undo the result of an election nor can it
discipline or daunt immigrant voters.
While the policy behind absentee voting is unquestionably good,
statutes governing it should comply with the constitutional
requirement that they should secure the purity of elections and the
guarding against abuses of the elective franchise. Indeed, the vital
considerations of the absentee voting legislations are the
preservation of the enfranchisement of qualified voters and the
secrecy of
773
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 773

the ballot, together with the prevention of fraud and the achievement
of a reasonably prompt determination of the election results. Unless
such considerations are fully taken into account by the legislative
body, the absentee voting statute will definitely be vulnerable to
being declared unconstitutional.
In fine, let it be stressed that where the Constitution fixes the
qualifications of voters, these qualifications cannot be increased,
diminished, or changed by legislative enactment, unless
22
the power to
do so is expressly granted, or necessarily implied. The inclusion of
the residency requirement in the Constitution is not without reason.
It constitutes an invaluable protection against fraud and further
affords some surety that the elector has in fact become a member of
the community and that, as such, he has a common interest in all
matters pertaining to its government,
23
and is therefore more likely to
exercise his right intelligently. The specification
24
in the Constitution
is an implied prohibition against interference. It is not competent
for Congress to diminish or alter such qualification.
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional for it
diminishes the “residency requirement” of the Constitution by
including within the phrase “qualified Filipinos abroad”
immigrants and permanent residents of foreign countries. It defies
the clear intent of the Constitution to limit the application of the
absentee voting law to Filipinos who are “temporarily abroad.”
Thus, as statutes which purport to modify constitutionally fixed
25
25
qualifications are void, so must Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189
suffer the same fate.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition. I dissent insofar as
the majority declared Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189
CONSTITUTIONAL. However, I concur with its pronouncement
that portions of Sections 17.1, 18.5, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
_______________
22 29 C.J.S. § 13.
23 New York Election Law, Abrahams, 1950 at 27.
24 De Leon, De Leon, Jr. The Law on Public Officers and Election Law, 2000 Ed.,
at 488.
25 State ex rel. Palagi vs. Regan, 126 P. 2d 818, 113 Mont. 343.
774

CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
The case before this Court is historic and momentous. Historic

because the right of suffrage, which 1 through the centuries
painstakingly evolved into universal right, stands at the crossroads
in this country. Should the right of suffrage continue its march
forward and reach overseas Filipinos, or should this Court turn back
this historic march here at our gates?
Momentous because the core issue is the enfranchisement or
disenfranchisement of some 7 million overseas Filipinos. The annual
contribution of these overseas Filipinos to the national economy, in
terms of hard-earned foreign exchange remitted through the banking2
system, equals almost 50 percent of the country’s national budget.
The total remittances, recorded and unrecorded, of overseas
Filipinos may even reach 18 percent of GNP, almost the same 3
percentage that agriculture at 20 percent contributes to the GNP.
The nation has hailed the overseas Filipinos as the modern-day
heroes and saviors of the economy. Their blood, toil, tears and sweat
have propped up the Philippine peso through all the recurring
financial crises that have battered the nation. Although scattered in
foreign lands across the globe, these overseas Filipinos keep
4
abreast
with developments in the Philippines through the Internet, cable and
satellite TV, and even texting.
In recognition of the immense contribution of overseas Filipinos

to the nation, the framers of the 1987 Constitution introduced the
absentee voting system, novel in this country, purposely to
enfranchise the overseas Filipinos. Commissioner Blas Ople, the
former Minister of Labor who started deploying abroad large
numbers of
_______________
1 Article 25, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

2 In 2002, overseas Filipino workers officially remitted US$7.17 billion to the
Philippines (www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/spei/tab11.htm). At P53 to US$1, this is
equivalent to P380 billion, almost 50 percent of the 2002 national budget of P780.8
billion (RA No. 9162).
3 Rep. Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Empowering Seven Million Migrant Filipinos for
the Next Millennium, 10 May 1999, www.philsol.nl/FRosales-may99.htm.
4 All the major newspapers in the Philippines are posted daily in the Internet.
775
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 775

Filipino workers, triggered the introduction of the absentee voting

with this discourse during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
MR. OPLE: x x x
In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and

Agencies, the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe,
said that there was no insuperable obstacle to making effective the right of
suffrage for Filipinos overseas. Those who have adhered to their Filipino
citizenship notwithstanding strong temptations are exposed to embrace a
more convenient foreign citizenship. And those who on their own or under
pressure of economic necessity here, find that they have to detach
two, or three years. They have no intention of changing their residence on a
suffrage in their countries of destination by the residential requirement in
Section 1 which says:
Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise

disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have
to vote for at least six months preceding the election.
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time they might
xxx
It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million Filipinos who
should enjoy the right of suffrage, at least a substantial segment of these
overseas Filipino communities. The Committee, of course, is aware that
when this Article of the Constitution explicitly and unequivocally extends
the right of effective suffrage to Filipinos abroad, this will call for a
logistical exercise of global proportions. In effect, this will require
budgetary and administrative commitments on the part of the Philippine
government, mainly through the COMELEC and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and perhaps, a more extensive elaboration of this mechanism that
will be put in place to make effective the right to vote. Therefore, seeking
shelter in some wise jurisprudence of the past may not be sufficient to meet
the demands of the right of suffrage for Filipinos abroad that I have
mentioned.
776

But I want to thank the Committee for saying 5

that an amendment to this
effect may be entertained at the proper time. (Emphasis supplied)
From the start, the framers of the Constitution knew that the
absentee voting system for overseas Filipinos would have to be an
exception to the double residency requirement in Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution. This was the basic premise for introducing an
express provision on absentee voting in the Constitution. Unless
there is such an exception in the Constitution itself, overseas
Filipinos could never vote as absentee voters in view of the double
residency requirement in Section 1. Because of this double residency
requirement, Congress could not enfranchise through ordinary
legislation overseas Filipinos who do not comply with the double
residency requirement.
Thus, the framers of the Constitution, by an overwhelming vote
of 28 in favor and only one against, approved Section 2, Article V of
the Constitution, as follows:
Filipinos abroad. (Emphasis supplied)
After sixteen long years of debates, Congress finally enacted RA

No. 9189 (the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003), precisely to
implement the constitutional mandate to enfranchise overseas
Filipinos. Petitioner now asks the Court to strike down this law as
unconstitutional mainly because it enfranchises overseas Filipinos
who do not comply with the double residency requirement in
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution, as follows:

requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. (Emphasis
supplied)
Like the 1973 Constitution, Section 1, Article V of the 1987

Constitution imposes a double residency requirement before a
Filipino
_______________
5 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, pp. 11-12 (19 July 1986).
777
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 777

18 years or over may exercise the right to vote, namely: (1) one year
residence in the Philippines; and (2) six months residence in the
locality in the Philippines where he proposes to vote.
The threshold issue is whether overseas Filipinos should comply
with the double residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V to
vote under the absentee voting system in Section 2 of the same
Article. Stated another way, the issue is whether overseas Filipinos,
many of whom are not registered voters in the Philippines, should
come home twice to the Philippines just so they could vote in a
foreign country as absentee Filipino voters. The first time they
should come home is one year before the elections to establish
residence in the Philippines. The second time is six months before
the elections to establish residence in the locality in the Philippines
where they propose to vote.
Did the framers of the 1987 Constitution intend to inflict on
overseas Filipinos such a burdensome requirement as an essential
feature of the absentee voting system in Section 2 of Article V? To
require absentee voters to comply with the double residency
requirement is to impose an impractical and even an impossible
condition to the exercise of the constitutional right to vote. In the
first place, the second residency requirement of establishing
residence in a locality in the Philippines where the voters propose to
vote is impossible to comply since overseas Filipinos will obviously

not vote in any locality in the Philippines. Imposing the double
residency requirement makes the absentee voting an empty right of
overseas Filipinos. Certainly, the wise framers of the Constitution
were incapable of such absurd scheme.
If the framers of the Constitution did not intend such an absurd
requirement, should this Court now impose such absurdity on
overseas Filipinos? How many overseas Filipinos would comply
with the double residency requirement just to vote in Presidential
and Senatorial elections? How much will overseas Filipinos spend
just to come home twice within 12 months just so they could vote
when they go back abroad?
The concept of absentee voting negates a residency requirement
in the country of citizenship of the voter. By definition, an absentee
voter is a non-resident voter. Obviously, the double residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article V applies only to resident or
non-absentee Filipino voters. To impose the double residency
requirement on absentee Filipino voters is an egregious anomaly for
it will
778

require absentee Filipino voters to comply with the same residency

requirement imposed on resident or non-absentee Filipino voters. If
absentee Filipino voters are required to reside in the Philippines just
like resident or non-absentee Filipino voters, why create an absentee
voting system for overseas Filipinos in the first place? Applying the
double residency requirement on absentee voters will render the
provision on absentee voting in Section 2 a surplusage, a
constitutional mandate devoid of meaning.
Even without the absentee voting provision in Section 1,
Congress can validly enact a law allowing resident or non-absentee
Filipino voters—those who comply with the double residency
requirement—to vote abroad in Philippine embassies or consulates.
There is no constitutional prohibition on registered Filipino voters
who comply with the double residency requirement to cast their
ballots at a Philippine embassy or consulate abroad where they
happen to be on election day. If the absentee voting system in
Section 2 were for the benefit only of resident or non-absentee
Filipinos, then there would be no need to provide for it in the
Constitution.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution specifically introduced the
absentee voting provision in Section 2 precisely to enfranchise
overseas Filipinos who do not comply with the double residency
requirement in Section 1. Without the absentee voting provision in
Section 2, Congress could not validly enact a law enfranchising

overseas Filipinos who do not comply with the double residency
requirement. As succinctly explained by Commissioner Christian
Monsod during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission:
MR. MONSOD: x x x The reason we want absentee voting to be in

the Constitution as a mandate to the legislature is that there could
be inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a question of
legislation by Congress. So, by allowing it and saying
6
that this is
possible, then legislation can take care of the rest.
Evidently, the framers of the Constitution intended the absentee

voting provision as an exception to the double residency
requirement.
_______________
6 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 33 (19 July 1986).
779
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 779

The question of how a Filipino, who has become a permanent

resident or immigrant in a foreign country may reacquire his
domicile or residence in the Philippines is a matter for ordinary
legislation. The reacquisition of the Philippine domicile or residence
that a Filipino had lost is within the power of Congress to legislate.
The Constitution does not define what domicile or residence means.
There is also no constitutional prohibition against the enactment of
legislation prescribing the reacquisition of domicile or residence in
the Philippines, just as there is no constitutional prohibition against
the enactment of legislation prescribing the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. 7
Thus, RA No. 8171 allows a former natural-born Filipino who
became a foreigner to reacquire Philippine citizenship by filing a
simplified administrative petition and taking an oath of allegiance to
the Philippines. Section 5(d) of RA No. 9189, which prescribes the
reacquisition of residence by a Filipino through the execution of an
affidavit stating he is resuming residence in the Philippines, is
similarly well within the power of Congress to enact and is thus
constitutional.
While the absentee voting system is new in this country, it is well
established in other countries. In the United States, all U.S. citizens
18 years or over who reside outside the United8 States during an
election are eligible to vote as absentee voters. The trend 9
in the
United States is to allow “no-excuse” absentee voting, that is, a
qualified or registered voter may avail of absentee voting for any

reason. Absentee voting is understood in other jurisdictions as
voting by a qualified or registered voter without any residency
requirement. In the present case, petitioner wants a double residency
requirement imposed on absentee Filipino voters.
_______________
7 An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost their
Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of NaturalBorn Filipinos.
8 FAQs on Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act,
www.fvap.govquest.html.
9 A Guide to Absentee Voting in Maine,
www.state.me.us/sos/cec/elec/absentee03.hm; Absentee Voting in Florida,
www.bayvotes.org/absentee.htm; Voting Absentee in North Dakota,
www.state.nd.us/sec/votingabsentee.htm; No Excuse Absentee Voting in North
Carolina, www.msweb03.co.wake.nc.us/bordelec/absentee.htm.
780

The right of suffrage is the cornerstone of a representative

government like that established in the 1987 Constitution. A
representative government is legitimate when those represented elect
their representatives in government. The consent of the governed is
what stamps legitimacy on those who govern. This consent is
expressed through the right of suffrage. It is a precious right for
which many have fought and died so that others may freely exercise
it. A government that denies such right on flimsy or meaningless
grounds does so at its peril.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to
which the Philippines is a signatory, requires the Philippines to
respect the people’s right of suffrage “without unreasonable
restrictions” Thus, Article 25 of the Covenant provides:
Article 25. Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without
any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through

freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is duty bound under international law to comply in

good faith with its treaty obligations under the Covenant. To require
overseas Filipinos to return to the Philippines twice within 12
months so they may vote abroad as absentee voters is plainly an
unreasonable restriction outlawed by the Covenant.
When the framers of the Constitution introduced absentee voting
in Section 2 of Article V, they were aware of the country’s
obligations under the Covenant. In their discussions on the death
penalty, human rights and the Bill of Rights, the framers of the
Constitution
10
often referred to the country’s obligations under the
Covenant. It is inconceivable that the framers intended overseas
Filipinos to comply with the double residency requirement, an
_______________
10 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, No. 32, 17 July 1986; Vol. 2,
No. 43, 30 July 1986; Vol. 3, No. 66, 26 August 1986; Vol. 3, No. 67, 27 August
1986; Vol. 4, No. 68, 28 August 1986; Vol. 4, No. 69, 29 August 1986.
781
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 781

unreasonable restriction that would patently violate Article 25 of the

Covenant and practically negate the overseas Filipinos’ right of
suffrage.
There are some 40 countries in the world, including our Asean
neighbors Indonesia and Thailand, which grant 11
their overseas
citizens the right to vote while residing abroad. The inexorable
direction of history is to bestow on every person the right to vote
wherever he may be in this global village. Modern technology
12
and
telecommunications are making this happen even now. Those who
insist on the double residency requirement as an essential condition
for absentee voting by overseas Filipinos are turning back in vain
the clock of history.
The framers of the Constitution expressly mandated Congress to
enact an absentee voting law to enfranchise overseas Filipinos.
Congress has enacted such a law after a long and difficult struggle
by overseas Filipinos who patiently waited for 16 years for the
enactment of the law. That struggle is now part of the world history
of the evolution of the right of suffrage as a universal right. No
frivolous, absurd or impractical conditions should stand in the way
of enfranchising overseas Filipinos whose contribution to the
national economy is immeasurable.
Like the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the members of
Congress, I vote to enfranchise our 7 million overseas Filipinos.
This is an explicit constitutional mandate that the Court, like
Congress, must honor and respect. I therefore concur entirely with

the ponencia of Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez.
_______________
11 Petition Letter of Overseas Filipinos to the Philippine Government on the Right

to Vote, www.philsol.nl/ofw/pettion.htm.
12 In the 2004 U.S. Presidential elections, there will be voting through the Internet
under the initiative called SERVE (Secure Electronic Registration and Voting
Experiment). This will allow an eligible U.S. citizen to vote from any Windows-based
computer with Internet access, anywhere in the world.
www.servusa.gov/public/aqca.aspx.
782

SEPARATE OPINION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In the assault against the validity of certain provisions of the newly

enacted Republic Act No. 9189 or The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003, the pivotal issue centers on the constitutionality of the
grant, under Section 5(d) of the law, of voting rights to Filipino
immigrants or permanent residents in foreign countries, conditioned
on their execution of an affidavit declaring that they shall resume
actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines within three
years from the approval of their registration as absentee voters.
The controversy arises because the Constitution prescribes,
among other requirements for the exercise of suffrage, that a Filipino
citizen must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and
in the place where he 1is to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election.
Residence for purposes of ascertaining the right to vote and be
voted for in public office has been jurisprudentially interpreted to
mean domicile which is an individual’s permanent home or the place
to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return, the domicile of a person 2
being dependent on facts and
circumstances disclosing intent.
While there is no question that Filipinos who are temporarily
abroad for various reasons are still qualified to vote for they still
retain their domicile in the Philippines, immigrants are generally3
deemed to be permanent settlers of the country where they are such,
thereby giving rise to the conclusion that they have relocated their
domicile elsewhere.
Republic Act No. 9189 was passed by mandate of the
Constitution that “The Congress shall provide a system for securing
the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as4 well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad” but this did not exempt the
mechanics for absentee voting from the reach of the basic require-
_______________
1 CONSTITUTION, Article V, Section 1.

2 Ong vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967].
3 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition.
4 CONSTITUTION, Article V, Section 2.
783
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 783

ments imposed by the Constitution on suffrage. It is clear from the

deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission that
their intent was to limit absentee voting to Filipinos abroad who
have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a
voter, including the residency requirement.
A Filipino who is or has already become an immigrant or
permanent resident in another country can, I am convinced, by a
mere sworn undertaking to return to the Philippines for the purpose
of establishing permanent residence here within the statutorily fixed
three-year period, be allowed by law to vote in Philippine elections
without transgressing the rules laid down by the Constitution on
suffrage. For a Filipino immigrant or permanent resident of a foreign
country unquestionably has the Philippines as his domicile of origin,
that which he acquires at birth and is the domicile of his parents or
of the person or persons
5
upon whom he was legally dependent at the
time of his birth. A domicile, once acquired, whether by origin6
or
choice, continues until a new domicile is actually acquired. And to
acquire a new domicile by choice, the following must concur: (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to
remain there (animus manendi); and (3)7
an intention to abandon the
old domicile (animus non revertendi).
It is my view that the affidavit executed in accordance with
Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 by a Filipino immigrant or permanent
resident of another country expressing his intent to resume physical
permanent residence in the Philippines is an eloquent proof of his
intention not to abandon his domicile of origin in the Philippines. It
is a statement under oath of what a Filipino seeks to do for the future
of his membership in a political community. Why should this
affidavit be discredited on the mere speculation that the immigrant

might not fulfill his undertaking to return to the Philippines for
good? If Filipinos who are temporarily residing in foreign countries
are accorded full faith and credit as to their domiciliary ties no
matter how indefinite their absence from the Philippines, what more
in the case of Filipino immigrants who have formally declared their
intent to settle in their homeland?
_______________
5 25 Am Jur 2d, Domicil §13.

6 28 C.J.S. 30.
7 Romualdez vs. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408 [1993].
784

While he may have stayed on a more or less permanent basis in the

host country which conferred on him the status of an immigrant and
may be animated with all the desire to remain there, until and unless
a Filipino immigrant had categorically expressed by words or by
deeds his intent to no longer return to his domicile of origin, no
conclusion can be reached as to a change in domicile from one of
origin to one of choice, hence, the old domicile subsists. For at the
core of every Filipino immigrant’s being is the fact of his Philippine
citizenship. He is, after all, still a Filipino.
The acquisition of a new domicile must be completely perfected
by a concurrence of the factum of removal to a new locality, the
animus to remain there, and abandonment of and intent not to return
to the former domicile, for if there is a purpose to return,
8
whether
secret or open, no loss or change of domicile will result.
Two types of Filipino immigrants must then be distinguished.
The first, a Filipino who has opted not to execute the required
affidavit under Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189, is clearly disqualified to
exercise suffrage for he has manifested the animus non revertendi
with respect to his domicile in the Philippines, thereby effectuating
his acquisition of a new domicile. The second, a Filipino who
declares his wish to be reunited with his homeland has, without
doubt, shown that his residence of origin remained unchanged and
so he is entitled to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Law.
Therefore, until that opportunity to execute the affidavit has been
totally foregone by a Filipino immigrant, in the absence of any
conclusive evidence of his acquisition of a new domicile, the
Filipino immigrant’s domicile of origin is intact, his presence abroad
and his desire to remain therein notwithstanding.
I, therefore, vote in favor of the constitutionality of Section 5(d)

of R.A. 9189. I vote to declare as unconstitutional parts of Section
18.5 of the subject law insofar as they authorize COMELEC to
proclaim presidential and vice-presidential winners; and of Sections
17.1, 19 and 25 insofar as they are subject to congressional
oversight, review and approval the implementation of voting by mail
and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of COMELEC.
_______________
8 28 C.J.S. 31.
785
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 785

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I concur with the majority opinion and the concurring and dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno that Sections 18.5, 19 and 25
of Republic Act No. 9189 are unconstitutional; hence, null and void.
However, I dissent with the majority opinion that Section 5(d) of
Republic Act No. 9189 is constitutional.
The present petition assails the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (otherwise known as AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF OVERSEAS ABSENTEE
VOTING BY QUALIFIED CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES
ABROAD, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES), which was enacted to implement the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article V of our Constitution, to wit:
Filipinos abroad.
...
Foremost among the assailed provisions of the aforesaid act is

Section 5(d):
SEC. 5. Disqualifications.—The following shall be disqualified from voting

under this Act:
...
...
The petitioner posits the view that the provision is in direct

contravention of Section 1, Article V of our Constitution, which
reads:
786


I agree with the petitioner.

Section 1, Article V which prescribes the qualifications of voters
as to citizenship, age and residence is clear and unambiguous. On
the other hand, Section 2 of the same article authorizes Congress to
provide a system to facilitate absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad. I do not subscribe to the view that Section 2 was intended by
the framers to be an exception to the residence qualification
requirement prescribed in the section immediately preceding it.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that the Constitution
should be construed in such a manner as to give effect to each and
every part of the entire instrument. Courts should lean in favor of a
construction that will harmonize every provision of the Constitution
rather than one which raises conflict 1
between its provisions, or
render inutile any portion thereof. Section 2 can and must be
construed to contemplate within its terms the enfranchisement only
of Filipinos who possess all the prerequisite qualifications specified
under Section 1, but who are abroad and cannot exercise their right
to vote in the Philippines on the day of the election. Even from a
cursory examination of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution, the foregoing
intendment is made crystal clear. Thus:
...
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, Madam President, I just want to

ask if the word “Filipinos” is a general term. Does this refer to
Filipinos who are qualified voters?
THE PRESIDENT Yes, of course.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, that is the understanding.
MR. RODRIGO. Should we not spell it out in the provision or is it
already understood?
FR. BERNAS. It is already understood.
_______________
1 Lambeen v. Bell, 18 Colo. 346.
787
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 787

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the proposed

amendments on lines 15 and 16?
FR. BERNAS. In other words, these Filipinos must at least be
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
FR. BERNAS. That is why we do not use the word “ABROAD”
MR. MONSOD. That is why we are not repeating many of the basic
things such as qualifications, disqualifications and domicile
requirements.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President.
Commissioner Bemas, that the domicile requirements as well as
THE PRESIDENT. Are we, leaving it to the legislature to devise the
system?
there.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.

Manila.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I then suggest to the
Committee to change the word “Filipinos” to QUALIFIED
FILIPINO VOTERS. Instead of “VOTING BY FILIPINOS
ABROAD,” it should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If
788

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the phrase

“QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD” because “QUALIFIED”
would assume that he has the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to vote.
abroad.
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
vote. 2
MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President.
...
It is irrefragable from the foregoing deliberations of the members
of the Constitutional Commission that Section 2, Article V
_______________
2 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume II, 19 July 1986, pp. 34-35.
789
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 789

encompasses within its terms Filipino citizens who, during election

time, are temporarily abroad but who possess all the mandatory
qualifications for enfranchisement outlined under Section 1, Article
V of the 1987 Constitution. It is also clear that Section 2, Article V
was enacted merely to allow Congress to devise a system by which
this class of Filipinos abroad may be allowed to exercise their
political right to vote in their homeland on the day of the election.
From a reading of Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution,
it is very explicit that the requirements therein prescribed is enjoined
to be possessed by a voter immediately preceding the election. In
other words, the right of suffrage can not be granted to anyone who,
on the date of the election, does not possess any of the qualifications
as provided therein.
In light of the issue raised in the present controversy, it becomes
necessary to look into the denotation of “residence” and/or
“domicile” as a voting qualification.
For many legal purposes, there is a clear distinction between
“residence” and “domicile.” “Residence” means living in a
particular locality, and simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while “domicile” means living in that3
locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home.
“Residence” denotes that a person dwells in a given place but
“domicile” is a person’s legal home, or a place where the law
presumes a person has the intention 4
of permanently residing
although he may be absent from it. “Domicile” 5
then is a matter of
intention while “residence” is a physical fact. Hence, a6 person may
have two places of “residence” but only one “domicile.”
“Residence,” however, for the purpose of voting, is to be
understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling”
or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is,

“the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
_______________
3 37 Words and Phrases 339 citing Foote v. Foote, 77 N.Y.S.2d 60, 65, 192 Misc.
270.
4 Ibid., citing Carlson v. District Court or City and County of Denver, 180 P.2d
525, 529, 1 16 Colo. 330.
5 Ibid., citing Robinson v. Robinson, 61 A.2d 273, 275, 362 Pa. 128.
6 Ibid., citing Foote v. Foote, 11 N.Y.S.2d 60, 65, 192 Misc. 270.
790

7
manendi).” In determining a person’s “residence” for voting
purposes, the following rules are well-established:
(a) A person must have a residence or domicile somewhere;

(b) Where once established, it remains until a new one is
acquired; and,
8
(c) A person can have but one domicile at a time.
Clearly, for voting purposes, one cannot9 have a residence or be

domiciled in two places at the same time, for the right to vote in a
certain place or precinct requires the concurrence of10
two things: the
act of residing coupled with the intention to do so. Accordingly, in
order to work a change of residence for voting, there must be an
actual removal, an actual change of domicile, corresponding with a
bona fide intention of abandoning
11
the former place of residence and
establishing a new one. Hence, an absence for months or even
years, if all the while the party intended it as a mere temporary
arrangement, to be followed by a resumption of his former
residence, will not be an abandonment of such residence or deprive
him of his right to vote thereat, 12the test being the presence or
absence of the animus revertendi. Such is the case of overseas
Filipino workers who, on account of the nature or exigencies of their
work, fail to be physically present for some time in the Philippines
but are not deemed to have abandoned their Philippine domicile by
virtue of their intent to resume residency in the Philippines upon the
termination of their employment contracts.
However, the same cannot be said of Filipinos who, while
maintaining their Filipino citizenship, have in the meantime
acquired the status of immigrants or permanent residents of their
respective host countries. An immigrant, as defined in law, is a

person who
_______________
7 Coquilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, 385 SCRA 607.
8 29 C.J.S. §19; Alcantara v. The Secretary of the Interior, 61 Phil. 459, 465
(1935).
9 Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill 164; 146 N.E. 171.
10 29 C.J.S. 19 citing Ind.—Brownlee v. Duguid, 178 N.E. 174, 93 Ind. App. 266.
11 25 Am. Jur. 2d §69 citing People v. Turpin, 49 Colo 234, 112 P 539; State ex rel.
Parker v. Corcoran, 155 Kan 714, 128 P2d 999, 142 ALR 423.
12 29 C.J.S. 21 citing Mitchell v. Kinney, 5 So.2d 788, 242 Ala. 196.
791
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 791

13
removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence.
Therefore, a Filipino “immigrant” or “permanent resident,” as the
very designation of his status clearly implies, is a Filipino who has
abandoned his Philippine residence or domicile, with the intention of
residing permanently in his host country. Thenceforward, he
acquires a new residence in his host country and is deemed to have
abandoned his Philippine domicile. It has been held that where a
voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires one in another
state, although he afterward changes his intention and returns, he
cannot again vote in the state of his former residence or domicile
until he has regained his 14
residence by remaining in the jurisdiction
for the statutory period.
With due respect to the majority, I do not subscribe to the view
that the execution of the affidavit required under Section 5(d) is
eloquent proof of the fact that the Filipino immigrant has not
abandoned his Philippine domicile, as evinced by his intention to go
back and resume residency in the Philippines, which thus entitles
him to exercise the right of suffrage pursuant to the constitutional
intent expressed in Section 2, in relation to Section 1, Article V of
our Constitution. The majority view, I humbly submit, is non-
sequitur for it is well-entrenched that while intention is an important
factor to be considered in determining whether or not a residence
has been acquired, intention 15alone is insufficient to establish a
residence for voting purposes. Hence, a mere intention to remove,
not consummated, can neither forfeit 16
the party’s old domicile nor
enable him to acquire a new one. And the fact that a person intends
to remove at a future time does 17
not of itself defeat his residence
before he actually does remove.
I am in complete accord with the petitioner’s position that

Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 virtually enfranchises a voter
who, on the date of the election, does not possess the residency
requirement as ordained under Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitu-
_______________
13 3 C.J.S. §75; Caasi v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 229, 234 (1990).
14 29 C.J.S. §21, citing Woods v. Blair, 300 S.W. 597, 222 Ky. 201; Siler v. Brown,
284 S.W. 997, 215 Ky. 199.
15 25 Am. Jur. 2d §67 citing Felker v. Henderson, 78 NH 509, 102 A 623; Nelson
v. Gass, 27 ND 357, 146 NW 537.
16 25 Am. Jur. 2d §69 citing People v. Turpin, 49 Colo. 234, 112 P 539.
17 Ibid., Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill 141, 17 NE 232; White v. Slama, 89 Neb.
65, 130 N.W. 978.
792

tion. Indeed, the undertaking required of an immigrant/permanent

resident under the aforesaid section, “that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three
(3) years from the approval of his/her registration,” is ipso facto an
admission that he/she is not an actual resident of the Philippines and
does not, therefore, possess the residency requirement on the date of
the election but merely promises to possess the same within three (3)
years from registration. Consequently, Section 5(d), which in effect
attempts to permit non-residents to exercise the right of suffrage, in
direct contravention of the constitutional prescription in Section 1,
Article V, must be stricken from 18
Rep. Act No. 9189 as an invalid
and unconstitutional provision.
Section 5(d) is vulnerable for another cogent reason. I believe
that the provision is violative of the “equal protection” clause of the
Constitution. While it allows a Filipino permanently residing in a
foreign country to vote on the mere pledge that he will again
permanently reside in this country within three years from his voting
in the elections, a Filipino permanently residing in the Philippines
but for less than one year or, in the place where he proposes
19
to vote,
for less than six months is not allowed to vote. The voter
classification sought to 20be effected by Section 5(d) does not rest on
substantial distinctions for it unduly favors and extends the
privilege of the elective franchise to Filipino citizens who do not in
any way comply with the residency requirement prescribed by our
Constitution, while withholding the same privilege to those who
_______________
18 29 C.J.S. 19; Thomas v. Macklen, 195 S.E. 539, 186 S.C. 290.
19 Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Section 9 of R.A. 8189, otherwise known as AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL

REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING
REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING
THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR, provides that:
SEC. 9. Who May Register.—All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law who are at least eighteen (18) years of age and who shall have resided in the Philippines for
at least one (1) year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the election, may register as a voter.
20 Tin v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278, 289 (1999).
793
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 793

are and have been permanent residents of the Philippines, albeit not
in the locality or precinct where they intend to vote.
While it is to be conceded that 21
every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, this presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted, as in the instant case
where Section 5(d) has been sufficiently shown to be in utter
disregard of a specific provision of the Constitution. This Court once
held that courts should not follow the path of least resistance by
simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more
deeply, to relieve the abscess and so heal the wound or excise the
affliction. Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is
demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of
retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any22other similar
inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
I concur with the majority opinion that Section 18.5 of Rep. Act
No. 9189 does not pass the test of constitutionality.
The assailed provision empowers the COMELEC “to order the
proclamation of winning candidates presumably including the
President and Vice-President despite the fact that the scheduled
elections has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if
the holding of election therein has been rendered impossible by
events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or
countries, and which events, factors and circumstances are beyond
the control or influence of the Commission.” However, according to
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 4 of the 1987 Constitution:

later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes
(Emphasis supplied).
_______________
21 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394, 430-431 (2001).

22 Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, 666 (1987).
794

It is clear from the foregoing that the power to canvass the votes of
the electorate for president and vice-president is lodged with
Congress. This includes, by express mandate of the Constitution, the
duty to proclaim the winning candidates in such election.
As pointed out in the majority opinion the phrase proclamation of
winning candidates used in the assailed statute is a sweeping
statement, which thus includes even
23
the winning candidates for the
presidency and vice-presidency. Following a basic principle in
statutory construction, generali dictum genaliter est interpretandum
(a general statement is understood in a general sense), the said
phrase cannot be construed otherwise. To uphold the assailed
provision of Rep. Act No. 9189 would in effect be sanctioning the
grant of a power to the COMELEC, which under the Constitution, is
expressly vested in Congress; it would validate a course of conduct
that the fundamental law of the land expressly forbids.
It has been said that in determining the constitutionality of the
exercise of power by a department, the question to be asked is not
whether the power is essentially legislative, executive or judicial,
but whether it has been specifically vested in it by the Constitution,
or properly 24incidental to the performance of the functions of that
department. In this case, the power sought to be granted to the
COMELEC is expressly granted to Congress, and Congress alone. It
could not have been the intention of our legislators to abdicate their
constitutionally-mandated duty to the COMELEC. Congress could
not have meant to allow the COMELEC to arrogate a power that
rightly belongs to it under the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT
the petition to declare NULL AND VOID for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 for violation of

Section 1, Article V of the Constitution which allows an
immigrant or permanent resident in a foreign country, to
vote for President, Vice-President, Senators and Party List
representatives after executing the required affidavit;
b. That portion of Section 18.5 of Republic Act No. 9189
empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of
winning
_______________
23 Decision, p. 34.
24 Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. Social Security Commission, 34 SCRA 178
(1970). (Emphasis supplied).
795
VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 795

candidates without qualification as it pertains or affects the canvass

of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and
vice-president for being violative of paragraph 4, Section VII of the
1987 Constitution; and,
c. Sections 19 and 25 of Republic Act No. 9189 for violation of

Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
Section 2, Article IX-C of the same Charter.
CONCURRING OPINION
AZCUNA, J.:
I concur with the ponencia, but wish to state an additional basis to

sustain Section 5 (d) of Republic Act No. 9189, which provides:

under this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
the host country, unless he/ she executes, upon registration, an affidavit
Petitioner contends that Filipinos who establish permanent residence

abroad have thereby abandoned their Philippine domicile of origin
and replaced it with a domicile of choice in a foreign country. This
may indeed be true, but with the execution of the affidavit provided
for under Section 5 (d) aforementioned, the affiant expressly states
an abandonment of said domicile of choice. The legal effect of this
expression is to revive the domicile of origin. For unlike a domicile
of choice, which requires both intention and physical presence to be
established or maintained, the domicile of origin can be revived by
an intention properly expressed. Thus, the abandonment of the
present domicile of choice, by the execution of the affidavit,
operates to revive the domicile of origin to replace it,
796

because of the principle that no person can be without a domicile at

any time.
The moment1
a foreign domicile is abandoned, the native domicile
is reacquired.
When a person abandons his domicile of choice, his domicile of
origin immediately reverts
2
and remains until a new domicile of
choice is established.
On the abandonment of a domicile of choice, the domicile of
origin immediately reverts, without regard to any definite intent to
return to such original domicile, provided there is3 a definite intent
finally to abandon the acquired domicile of choice.
Through the execution of the affidavit, the affiant does the
operative act that makes said affiant once more a Philippine
domiciliary. The requirement of resuming actual physical presence
within three (3) years is only a test of such intention, but is not
needed to effect the change or reversion of domicile. If the affiant
does not resume the residence physically within said period, then the
intent expressed in the affidavit is defective and the law will deem it
inoperative, thereby allowing removal of affiant’s name from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters.
Petition partly granted, portions of RA 9189 declared
unconstitutional.
Note.—The registration of a voter in a place other than his

residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have
abandoned or lost his residence. (Perez vs. Commission on Elections,

317 SCRA 641 [1999])
——o0o——
_______________
1 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, SECS. 47, 48.

2 KENNAN, A TREATISE ON RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE, Sec. 191.
3 Annot., 5 ALR 300 (1920).
797
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2/21/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 405

614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner vs. COMMISSION

Election Law; Constitutional Law; Parties in Interest; Taxpayers have

repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal,

VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 615

Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections

must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or

not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go

616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections

for citizenship in another country.—It must be emphasized that Section 5(d)

VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 617

BELLOSILLO, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; Intention to acquire a domicile without actual

PUNO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; Residence connotes the actual relationship of

determine the domicile of a person.—In its ordinary conception, residence

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Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections

cessfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual

accuracy is suspect because of their self-serving nature, particularly when

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Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections

Undoubtedly, the power was granted to COMELEC to strengthen its

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; The power given to COMELEC by Section

620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections

winning candidates for the positions of senators and party-list

PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; Physical presence in the country is no longer

presence in the country is no longer indispensable to arm Filipinos abroad

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; R.A. 9189 grants the right of suffrage to a

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Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections

family abroad. A sanction of future disenfranchisement would not bother

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Concurring and Dissenting

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Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional for it

unconstitutional for it diminishes the “residency requirement” of the

CARPIO, J., Concurring Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; Section 5(d) of RA No. 9189, which prescribes

CARPIO-MORALES, J., Separate Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; The affidavit executed in accordance with

VOL. 405, JULY 10, 2003 623

CALLEJO, SR., J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; While intention is an important factor to be

AZCUNA, J., Concurring Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; The abandonment of present domicile of

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Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections

expression is to revive the domicile of origin. For unlike a domicile of

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by

1 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved the law on 13 February 2003. It