Description of document: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Directorate of Science

& Technology (DST), History of the Office of Special

Activities (OSA) From Inception to 1969 released on
appeal by Interagency Security Classification Appeals
Panel (ISCAP) (final release), 2016

ISCAP Appeal date: 2002

ISCAP Release date: 19-September-2016

Posted date: 03-October-2016

Note: For material from earlier ISCAP releases see:

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 Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel
EXECUTIVE SECRET ARY
MEMBERS c/o Information Security Oversight Office
700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 100 William A. Cira,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Acting Director
Garry P. Reid Washington, D.C. 20408 INFORMATIO"i SECURITY
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Telephone: (202) 357-5250 OVERSIGHT OFFICE
Mark A. Bradley
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Fax: (202) 357-5907
Nicholas M. Murµhy E-mail: [email protected]
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Jennifer L. Hudson
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND
RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Sheryl J. Shenberger
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
John P. Fitzpatrick, Chair

September 19, 2016

Please be advised that the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) has
concluded its consideration of the fourth part of mandatory declassification review appeal 2002-
0049 filed by you and that the 60-day period during which an agency head may appeal an ISCAP
decision to the President has expired. Enclosed is a chart that outlines the ISCAP decisions on
the documents under appeal and details the information declassified by the ISCAP. With the
exception of any information that is otherwise authorized and warranted for withholding under
applicable law, we are releasing all information declassified by the ISCAP to you. If you have
questions about this appeal, please contact William Carpenter of my staff at (202) 357-5250.

Sincerely,

w~~a, e_~
WILLIAM A. CIRA
Executive Secretary

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Joseph Lambert

Director, Information Management Services
Central Intelligence Agency Member of the ISCAP
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.0.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 13
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 19, 2016
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 13
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 19, 2016
 ,,- .·
.; I '

Xeroxed copies of the following documents forwarded

through SS/OSA to DDS&T Management Staff for Mr •.Colby's

review re Victor L. Marchetti book on 14 January 1974:

1. ·comparison of SR 71 and A-12 Aircraft;

COMIREX-D-12. l/l, da.ted 26 Sep 67, (BYE-5658-67)
2. DCI Briefing for Rivers Subcommittee. 20 Jul 67.

3. DCI B~iefing for Russell Subcommittee. 17 Nov 67.

4. DCI Briefing for Mahon Subcommittee. 19 Sep 67.

5. 303 Minutes;.13 Mar 69, (BYE-12,126-69).

6. 303 Minutes dated 20 Dec 67 (BYE-82,190/67 Series B).
7. Exerpt from 303 Minutes dated 17 Nov 67
(BYE-82,189/67 Series B).
8. Exerpt from 303 Minutes dated 6 Oct 67.
9. Exerpt from 303 Minutes dated 31 May 67
(BYE 66738/67 Series C).

10. 303 Minutes dated 18 May 67 (BYE--66,736/67 Series C).

11. 303 Minutes dated 27 Jun 66 (BYE~~7,018/66 Series B).

12. 303 Minutes dated 12 May 66 (BYE-66,704 Series C).

13. 303 Minutes dated 29 Mar 66 (BYE-66,703/66 Series C).

14. 303 Minutes dated 21 Feb 66 (BYE-66,701/66 Series C).

15. 303 Minutes dated 25 Jan 66 (BYE-63,003/66 Series C).

Withheld under statutory authority of the

Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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_,v-..1-.: .../L. .../L. I

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I COPY OF FIRST OFFICIAL FLIGHT PICTURE

I OF THE A -12 INCLUDED IN COPY 1

OF HISTORY.
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uand\e 1J\a BlEM~ti
I control Slstem
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... " . .:.. · · J . ;. ·

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 TOP SECRET

CHAPTER XX. PROJECT OXCART

Introduction to U~2 Follow-on Vehicle

Shortly after the operational commitment of the ·u~z in· June l956, ·
. . . . . .

research was beg~n to improve its, survivability and exte~d the p~~grarri• s
lifetime~ The outgrowth of the early studies -became a sub.:.project of

AQU.ATONE and was.called Project RAINBOW •. E;;;.rly estimat~s of a

high probability of success in U-2 overflights were based o~ the ·u-zis ·.

· · operating altitude. Its high penetration and operating altitude ·wa~ expected

. to diminish the p~ ssibility of detection ~nd accurate tracking by hostile

defense systems. Unfortunately, the Sov:ie~ air· defense warning system ·

..proved up to the challenge. The U-2 was not only detected ·by radar· as
. .
·. it penet:rated. denied ter.ritory, but wa_s tracked qUite ·_acc_urately in it~
. . . ·. . .
· · earliest flights over Satellite and Soviet areas. This state. of .affairs

could only lead to intensifi~ation of So~et defensive efforts,. and the

consequent shortening -~f the U-2's us~ful~ess a~' :a reconnaissanc~ .·

aircraft •

.Thus in July 1956,· a~ention turned to anti-radar research.

Dr. Edward M. Fur.cell of Harvard University. had dii;;covered a possible

•mean~ of countering·· or absorbing rada·r. emanatio_ns.: His ·discovery. led

..to laboratory work •in technique"s to _blci~ket porti~ns of the aircraft -~ith

.HANDLE .Vik\. .BYEMA~

T O P · £ E. G R .E T . CONTROL. SYSTEM.'·.

. . · ..·
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I ".
. radar· absorptive material$ in or.der to reduce radar d~tection. If .

I'
· .·continuing its reconnaissance role beyond the cu;rrent predic;tions which ·

were from eighteen months ,to. b.r.ro ·yea-rs.

I ·Project RAINBOW laboratory. r:eseai:ch and testing ·was :con-

I ducted. under the auspices of the .Scientific E:hgin~ering Institute (SEl);

. .
Ca~bridge, Massach:ise.tts, a CIA p~oprie.tary resear~h organization. · ...
I _Field testing wa·s _.performed ·by :the firm of· Edgerton, .·Gerri+.ershausen ... ··

l and G:reer, .Inc •• (.J?G&G), · at Indian Springs Air Force Base, Nevada.

Flight .testing rei;ults proved more promising tful.n .originally antici ...
(..
· pated. Severai RAIN-BOW -configured aircraft were deployed. to

I De~chment Bat Adana •. Turkey~. in '1957 a:n.ci-.riown on op~:ratibnal mis..:

sions with ~om.e deg.l"ee of success in .disrupting Soviet tracking of.the
r
·.mi.ssions.

It became apparent, however •. in m.id-1957 that radar carxi?uflag~.

_of a: conventionally-d·esig~ed and· structured aircraft had its limitatj.ons •. ·.

".The ~eight and .bulk of absorptive.
. material h~ip·os~d perf~rman,c·e p<'m~l-.,..
.
.. ' . ,

ties on the .aircraft. T.he narrow ..band :'.timitations of ·the ·camouflage

. technique.could. not cope with th~ fl'.'equency· spread _e~pfoyed by th.e.'

·Soviet air defense ~arning ~ystem ... Laboratqry testing. and measur-e.ment.

T 0 P S E C· B"E T·
I T 0 P S E C R. E 1'.
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, .
continued.: but ·operational employme~t terminated. . The next step ·

was taken·in.Augus.t 1957. Si-nee a sati~·fa.ctory:··sol.ution. tb :&e"·r~dar..

r •. P.roblem could' not· be obtained ~sing co.nventipnal

. . new appr'c>ach appeared nec~ssary. 'Focus turned .to the .fea·sibility

desfg~ ci.irc~aft, ·a_ ·.

1· ..

of a r.econrt.aissance aircraft designed. to a,. grea~y· reduc.ed rada:r ·

•. r

I cross. section spedficatlon as the ~primary obje_ctive .. Explo.ratory

· woTk in this ·dir·ecti6n, and subseqt;i.ent efforts, :came. to be '.k:o.own
I · ··within the Agep.cy as :Project .GUSTO. ·

I The· course· of. ~ction proposed for Project GUSTO is· quoted
•.
. : fr~m: a positio~ paper prepared by Mr., Bissell. fo:r: a meeting with ·the·
1-.
Deputy g:·ecfetary· of Defense, Mr. Donald A. Quarles:

I '.'a. The program of studie·s; measurement a.11¢1.

,. : expe;f.imeritation will be carried. forward with·all possible

.: ·sp~ed 1 -in .conjunction.with further work on.the .RAINBOW
. cam.ouflage, looking foWard the choice·of a design .a:Ppr.oach ..
· .. for a.· posslble·new ·airc·~aft within three months' time •.·The . ;:.,::::·::-
wo.rk :will be unde.r the technical direction.: 9£; the -above "."d.~s~tb.ed:
I ..
scientific staff in Cambridg.e:·with actual syste~s. respo.n.s.ibility ..
·remaining in«the·AQUATONE Project Headquarters in Washing-
ton~ D. C.
I · · .. .

· ,·'b. · Du.ring this pful.se, conta~t will. be. made. with·~ertain

in
I manufacturers as appropriate order:: to explore thej>ossi-.
· bilities of unconventional materials and st~ctures and recei v~ ·
. the benefit. of thei:J." views
.
on the general
..
design problem. .

I· ''c~·. It. is proposed« to maintain more c·ontfouous" and :.

more intimate contact than hithe.rto wl.th ~ppropriate comp~nents
I . in the Ai,r· Force and ·:the Navy.

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d. Appioprfate steps should be taken to. control
I dis'cussion with manu£acturers·in the aviation and eleC:tronics . .
ind'q.Strie~ ~ild ~ctions such as the is·s~ance·'of formal
~equi~:e:..
ments· which -might· stimulate .unusual interest in the concept·.
I. of a non-rada:r reflective aircraft. ·

. . . .(•e. As s·oon as it. is possible to select the. optimum

I design approach for a low renectivity -reconrtaissanc.e. air-
c::rait and to evaluate· with reasonable reliability· both its
feasibility and .its performance, ~ Gove-;rnn_iental deCision ·
I should be made. as to the ~dvisability of a crash·program to
pr~dUCe eight tO:twelV~ SUCh V~hicleS. II}:_/

I In a memorandum fo the DCI.. 26 Nover:nb~r 195.7; Mr:_ Quarles

. wrote that the Defense. Depa_rtment: was in: agreement with the purpose
I:· ..
. ~f the activitie'~ at Gambridge, and expressed a desire 'to_ participate.

I in a definite design projec.t d~cision at the apprppriate time. 2 /

I· Thereafter, joint Agency-DOD sponsorship ·characterized__policy

. and decision-making reading to the developm~nt of a folfow-,on

_' reconna.iss~nce .system.

. . . .

I In e~rly 1958, the Pr-esident's· Scientific. Adviser,

Dr. James R. Killian, re.commended :that feasibility studies

l" get ~nderway on an advanced manned reco~naiSsance vehicle.

l/-!l!&-.:.164671, 19. Novex:nber 1957,· Propos~d-Advanced Reconnaissance

Sys.tern. .See Annex iz L

· 2/ Zs--164678. 26 November 1957; Memorandur.ri;for Mr~ Allen Dulles

.. from· Deputy' Secretary of Defense, Donald A .. Q~rles ..
See Annex 122.

T.o·p SECRET

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 TOP S~ORET.

The Pre~ident concurred in the recommendation, la,y~.ng en:iphasis

" .

on the .security ·requirements s~ch an unde~taking would impofie.

f·. . Mr.. Bissell.was requested to. take action.

..
.
·rn. ..May 1958; Mr. Bissell

I.. . form'ed an' advi1:wry panel.composed.

. .
of D;. Edwin H. Land, Chair.- .

I;llan. "a..nQ. Drs. Purcell, H. Guyford ~tever·, Courtland D . .Perkins,

I : and M.r. Allen'.~". ·Donovan, Mr •.Ri.chard .I-Iorner, Assistant Sec re•. ·

· . taf'y qf the Air For~e for· Resear~h ~:tid Development;, Mr~ Gar;is?~ ·

Norton, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Develop:..

merit; G.ener~l·.Ralph P. Swoff9rd·, USAF; Colonel No~man C •. Appold,
•
ARD~; and Mr/·Bis~ell .completed .the Advisory Panei membership.·
I . .
A series of meetings were scheduled for 1958 to. ·consider the tech-

I nical features that must be a·chieved in order to provide ·an. adeqti.ate

. successor to the U-2. The panel was to rep~rt its ·findings to .

Dr.· Killian upon comple.tion of its examinations and make recom-

mendations
.
as" to . the tyPe design
. . it dete.rmined
. . .
.wo.uld. me~t the:.
.
. . .
r~quir~ments for. the next-generation .reconnaissance aircraft •
.. ; . - . '

· As .noted .earlier,· technical dire~tiop. of the. new th~ust in

. .
combating the Soviet electr.onic thre~t remained ~th the_ Cambri~ge ·...

·facility. Principals· i:O.".the redirect.ed effo.rt were SEI, EG&G and,

· .LOckhe~d Aire.raft Corporation (LAC)~ · SE! 'turned. its. energles to:

I.

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TOP SECRET ..

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th~oretical aero.dynamic models having minimum radar ~ross!'"'section
I characteristic.s. It e~gage-d in·wid~-~anging e'Xperini~nts. in..sh<ipe. ·

con'.~rol,·
. .
mode~ design
-
analysis,
.. and unconventional materials~ i.ab,;.'

·orafory c.alibration and measurements were conducted on radical.and

... '

~:xotic·nic>del desig.ns to assess their effectiveness in radar cross~.

I. section reduction. ~G&G continued .to operate the radar ·testing

J· range it Indian Sp.rings Air 'Fo~ce Base.; Ne~ada •. Project Heaq..,.

quarters had'.earlier, in support.of :Project RAI.NBOW, installed a

( .
hydraulic lift,· rad~rs, ante.nnae an.d associated _eq\l.ipm~nt at Indian·

I . S):)rings. 'Measureme!ltS were made on:·scale m9dels raised ·Oll the

hydraulic lift. Lockhea"d proceedeci-to preliminary d_esign work on

' .
a number of aircraft configurations and shapes, did win~ tlln.nel' .. '

'testing; t'ested the effect of materials and shapes for :reflective. char-

acteri~ties, and investig~ted substit~te. 1 non.::metallic str:uctures .for

: . . : '. ' " .
·p~rtions of. the airfra~e. · Lockheed subcontracted to Narmco, Inc~~·

San Diego, Califor~ia, for s~dies. ~£- t_he ·feasib~lity of certa~n·types

. . . .
. :of plaetic . and- high-modulus
' . . fiberglass materials for possible
.
use
.
in :. ..
.

,..
.the_ construction: of the GUSTO ,vehicle •. In addition) Lockheed was

proceeding on
. '

-.an ind·epen:den.t ·.configuration design _,study £.or a .new_ .

. . .
aer.ial .reconna.t~s~nc;e aircraft as ·a repla~.e~ent for the U ~2~
I
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II \\ann\tl ~\a t:NHaMl.

.&ontrn\ tjstiam. ·
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The Corivai:it.Division, .General·. Dynamics Co:rporation,. Fort.
I.:.
Worth, Texas,. .was ;a.pproached
.. fo:r. a proposal .that would ~mploy-the.
·. ' .

[~· ~· B-58. ·as a.~other airc:t"aft cai:>able. of launching a small, manned

. .· reconnaissance aircraft.
1·
Ther~ emerged in mid.-1958 two general proposals, one from
I Convait and one from Lockheed. The former consisted of.a higl;- ·

. Ma.ch, high-altitude~· sma:ll, manned ·vehicle. ram:.jet powered,

I which would be·launched from a B-58 aircraft. Lockheed pr:oposed

I.· · a P.ilot
.
... launched,
. .
high-Mach;
.
high•alti.tude, turbo-jet~po~ered,

farger. manned. aircra~t •. Both appeared c~pable of achieving desired

operatiol').a~ specifications· and within the desired development tin:>;e

frame.·
. .. . .
The Land Advisory Panel met for .the first time in Cambridge

on 3'1 Juiy
.
1958 .to obtain preliminary
.
views on ·possible
.
suecessor
. Q

... ~nd.et.takeri
v.ehicles •. The group was briefed on the approaches .. .
·by
.~.

Project Headquarters,· as well' as on oth.e·r .adv;a;nced pro.po~als sub-.

. . ..
'

·.: .,
mitted by th~. USAF~ .All mi~itary aerial reco~naissance proJec·ts

in being or in study were reviewed. lt. w~s too early to :n;l~ke .judg;..
m.ents·on the"i:nE!rit$ of'the various· . idea.s. an~ no firm recomm·enda-.

ti.on resulted from the·£irst meetl.ng. A second session was set fol'.
I . .
September 1958.

I ... 7
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· ftan~te via ~~.t.~\Mt.
·.· ~ontrn\ .s~stem:
 TOP SECRET

At the second meeting of the Panel no a·esign approach. deci~ion.

1. was made because it was felt there was need for· still further inve~ti-·.

· gation. One decision made by the Panel at its September 1958. meeting·
I .. was to eliminate !or the present any further _consideration of° Proj_ect

I CHAMPION, which was a joint Agency-Navy _feasibility study (paralleling

GUSTO} of a po·ssible ;high performance reconnaissance aircraft.· This·

I radical departure "from the conventional aircraft design proposed an ..
I. · -inflated vehicle, ramjet-pow_ered to _Mach 3, ..po.ssibly _r~aching-.125, 000 ·

feet altitude. The ·study. got underway after .NACA__stron·gly recomme~ded ...
I to the Navy that it be pursued~ Studies in connection with CHAMPION .· . ·
. . . . .
· had been conducted by Convair, Boeing, Hughes, Marquardt, and Good-·

I yea·r Aircraft Corporations.- While the proposal·appeared feasible;

..
the five years estimated to develop the- system made it ..least attractive
1. to ·the Panel.

A final meeting. 6£ the .Panel :was_ held in. Boston on lz° N~v~mber . •

1958 and its findings were reported to Dr. Killian, on 15. November sub-

I. stantially as follows:

I a. ·The successor reconnaissance aircraft. would

have to achieve a substan~ial increase in altitude and speed;
be. of reduced radar detectibility; suffer no loss in range to
1. that of the U-2; and be of minimum size and weight.

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HANDLE: VIA BYEMAN.
CONTR.OL SYSTEM .

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b •. The Panel concluded that the. small,· lightweight .
I. · a.ircra:ft ia\lnched-.fr.om-.the B:-58 appeared to be·the ·ffi-0st· .
· satisfactory d·esi.gn app.roach. ·It foresaw pos.sible· pr~blerns
·only .in a·e.ro.dynamic :heati~g and in'Ule ai:r iAlet. ~ystem. As"
1. . second a~d less ·aes.irable choice, the Panel selected a·similar
small, reasonab~y ·lightweight aircraft. capable,.of unassisted
· · take•off, but with slightly less spee·d and le.s·s :than desired·
I" .range.

I ". . c. •The Panel recommended that system 4eveiopment

be begun at once on an. expedited ..and .secure "basis. rt
. reques.teP, .the prerogative. of reviewing. alternative systems._
. should the Pan.e~'·s choice prove to be una.~ceptable •. 'J:./ ·
I Preliminary. P.residential approval was then obtai~ed to p~oceed:

t· with Project GUSTO investigations~

. . Pi:imary _interest now centered on
the: supersonic,
. .
high a,ltitude
.. unstaged
..
design proposal
. .
by ·Lockheed

: and the·CQ~vair design propo'sal pa..rasited:to the B-58 aircr~ft; ·The

Con~air des:~gn
.
,. . was
. . . t~ minimize
especially configured . .
radar . 'retur'n~ .

. The
. Lockheed design. ·rn:ade
. ~o co:h.cessions
. in
. this . direction which

tended to. compromise a.~rodyna.m,i~ pei-forma~c·e •.

.In December, 1958, Convair began:workon a· contrac1;. which

called.'for initi~l.studies, te.sts and pi:eli,minary·.design of a'high:altitude, .

. . s~pei-so~ic·.~~~ormaissi~ce vehicle· to repla~e.the U ~z. It. was·

. to be a
I .
. .

. 'four-and-one-half
.
months.. engineering
. ..
. .

effo·rt.·a.nd was funded. in.

.
the
I !/ QUS-0070·, ·15 Novemb~r 1958.· Memorandum for ·Dr~' Jaxnes.:R •...
, . Killian. Se.e Annex 123.

9·
1·. -'" . T ().P . S E ·a R :S 'l'
.·Han.dle
. vb BYU.iAU ·
\: . . .
£antral·
..
.
~ystem
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f, T·op SE.CRET

1·. amount. of $1, 200, 000.

• • > ' • •
Concurrently~ a contract was let 'with
• I ••

. .
Lockheed fol: similar studies· in the amount· of $.1, 000, 000.
I. : The ·Marquardt
.
Air~raft . Company;·
; . .. .
Va~ Nuys,
..
California,
.· ..

I .bega:.:p. prelimina·ry. e~gin~ering desi~n S!tudies and tests.necessary to .

. develop
. a ramjet
. engine which would
. be
. compatible. with· the airframe .
I
. . ' .

. . .
. design propos:ed by ~onvair. rt, ·too, . wa.s to ·be a foµr-and-one-half

1· . "months endea.~o.r which would restu.t 'fo· inodel·specificatlqns of the

. '
~:ogi.l'.J.e .and engine controls. The estimated cost of'the contract was
I $2, 500-, 000. ·Locld;;.eed designing to this point had considered. only. ·

I turbo:-jet propulsion ~yst~.ms, which were either. 'in· be_ing· or u+td·er

d~v.e~o.pment by the Air Force or_- Nav}r.

I Additional studies were solicited.from manufacturers·of camera
1· equipme~t, elect rbnic ~quipment, arid pilot·p:rotective assembly

r· systems (pressure suits; o:s:ygen sources,_ etc~ ).: E~&:G work a~ ·

. .
the .·range ·wa.s extend.ed in order "t_o provide· a _testing capa·bilitt for'.
'. :

I· the" cr~ss-section 'models provided by the "two ai:rfra:i:ne: contr~ctors •

. : Continued co,nsulta~t services ~e~_e maintain~d with·Narmco ~nd SEI.-

f.
T·his phase
.
of Project
.
GUSTO·wa&·
.
expected
..
to· .terminate
.
_at the end.

I
'
...

of June, 1959, and the t-0taI e"st~rn:~ted: -cd~t was. to be $~, ~20:. 000."

I: ,10:.
..
.
L '£OP S BG.R.E 'P
.

l. ·Handle via BYEMAW. ·.

.Control. Systam· ·· .·
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A. com:paris.o.n of the major d.esign feaW:res -~f the two _c.~mpetlng.".:

I·".· ·aircraft· systems .at' this. polnt i~' time· follows:.

1... . Lockheed Convair·

Aircra,ft design~tion '.l\--3. FISH.

I" Speed Mach 3. 2·· Mach ~;2

I Range·· 3200 n. m. 3900 n.m.

Altitude. ": 90, -000 .ft •.. 90; 000 ft.

I Launch.system- Pilot-launch From B-58

I Pl:'opulsion system
•
2 _turbojets 2 ramjets·

Weight 95, 000 lbs~ 38, 500 lbs •.-

I.
Pr.e4icted· first flight January 1961 January 19'6i

I It was ·difficult to ·compa.'re the two vehicl~s .from a. logi~tics. ·

r view· si.nce.'~little: ~as knoWn. at, the time of th~ requirements for ground

.
.
handling· equipment,.. f~els-, retrie~l
. .
j;»rocedu:J;"eS~
. . . . . .'
·etc. .
.
general,'.·
. .
In
I the A.-3· ~ppeared to be easier. to _handle on ~he g~oun:d;. the. Conya_ir.

.. des_ign·~ppeared--superior. 'in_meeting )?erfor.mance c:riteria-~

r
Throughout the sp"iin$ .of 19S.9, Lock.he·ed'an~ P~a:tt &: Whi~ey
r {P&W), as .one team, and .'co~vair and. Marquardt_-as 'the··other, ...
. . ' . . . . -. . .. . '

1.. . ... 'continued· thei.r design;· mo4el const~uction and testing, 'st_ruc.tura:l ..

in,.ve~tigatio~s. a~d ot~e·r testing. "Progress' of both s.ystems was

1- . 1.1

1·. : . ·,t._o. ~. · .s"E. G nE 'l'.!. ..

Handle· vla BYEMMJ'.

!.·".· ·tontrol ·System.
,,.. . .
·
r· : .•

TOP SEC-RET
I ·-
closely
.
monitored and<reviewed b.y .a".joint Ag~ncy-USAF
. . .
_e:valU<;Ltion
.
I
.

· teU.O. Both" teams

.
revised. plans.. ana:· design.s frequ~ntly. By ¥ay 1

· 1959, a summary comparison c~uld be ma.de of. th.e two systems~

. .
The.Convair FISH design was a relatively small· vehicle with
I a grqs-s ".Veight of roughly 40, 000 po~ds. The aircraft was to be ·

I stage.cl from a... B-58 mother air~raft,

. . . -£ly:a·4,
. woulcl .. . OOO·n1iie-rai+ge.

r . at a _90~ 000 .foot altitude.

Marquardt ramjets using JP type

It was power.ed-. by·two. 40:-i'nch. dia:nieter.

fuel. It was roughly s·o f'eet in.

I . length and 35 feet in wing span., It att·empted -to $i1.limize radar

•
r~fle~:tivi.ty ·by configuration ~nd spec~al ·materials.. Two small turbo- ·
I je"ts ·hia.d be;en inc'orporated for the subsonic porti_on _of flig.ht following.

I· .the '.tjl.Il;'l.jet powered supersonic

.
fiigl:it segment.
' .
its most. se;riou_s de-

ficiency was· the.. -inability of the current B-58A.mo~el to.-get through.·

1·

, .
the tra.i).sonic region of flight to get. th¢ required. Mach- speed fo·r: · ·

ef!icient ramjet operation (2. 7 Mach),; The next modei.• _the B.:.5SB,

would be powered
. .
sUfficiently
. .
to accomplish
. .
the. :task.
.
Inlet
.
ail.d
.... .
:

engine testing· had ~Ot: pro~eeded ·far enough at tP,is point tc>°surfa.c:e

major problems.

r· .
The.Lockheed design (no~ designa_te~
.
the A-.11) was-powered
. .

.by· two J •58 P&:W. turbojet engin~s. It was '.100 feet. lo~g_. ".had a wing
l· span 6£ SO feet, and would weigh '92, 000 ·pounds· at take-oft _It was

I.: . .12 ...

'!'.OP S.E CR¥: T·

.Handle via BYEMMi
.·.. . Co.ntrol: _System '. ···.
·:-~ . ~· ~.
 TOP SEC~:ST
I
_designeq to:fly 4,.100 miles a.t 85, 000_ to 95, 000 feet altitude. Its
I size made it.more susceptible to radar dete~tion,'.an:q. i~~ .s·oniC bo~m
. . .. . .. . . . . . .. ·.:
I
. ..
· :.. ~fi'ect was predicted to be m.ore serious .than the· smaller Gon~ir de-

·sign.. No serious ·aerodynamic problem~ were anticipa.ted with the

I.:·
engine installation. There was need,_ .however,
. .to up-rate
. the J-58

I .
engine to· a Mach 3 •.2 performance and to develop the·n~ces_sar_y
.
afte;r-
.

Lockheed by t_his tini~ was pro~~eding:to fabricate and t~st

I burner.

s_tructu:ra.l components using .'titanium •.

I .
On 18 May 1959, there was a ·CIA/USAF m~eting
.
t<:> discuss .the.
. .

,.: ...status
.
and future
' .
planning with regard to Project G.US.TO.
. General

Thomas D. White, Chie.f of Staff, USAF; Gene·ra:.f Jacob E. Smart,

1. Assistant Vice '(::;hief of Staff, 'Cl.SA£; and .Coioriel Leo "P. Geary SCl,._t

I fort~e Air Force·, and-Mr. D~ne·s, General Cabell; Mr. Bissell. and

Colonel. Willi~ .Burke

.
-comprised
.
CIA :represent~tion. -Mr. Biss:eu
.
I
- " ~

reviewed·the sta.tus of bo'th proposals, pointing ·out advantages ~nd

I ·•'''
disadvantages of each. Mr. Bissell noted that there would be an

AdVisory Panei meeting in Dr. Land 1s office hi B'oston in_ early June,
I" and" that it would make recommendations regar.di'ng the proper course .

[ T:he Panel's ·re·commendations w~cld be re-Viewed by the.DOD.,

_and a final sy~tem selection wo~ld res.ult which· would be the_·

I.
..
taken to

1-·~ .

.·Handle vhf BYEMArl-

I ..
Conuol System
I .
...

·1r 0 P ... S ELG R.E 'P ..

I
I: P:r;esident for.appr.oval. At ·General White's r·equest, a joint USAF•ClA

I . .
the technic_al exi)ertis·e .in final system selection.
.

(·.·. The Boston meeting did. not ·~esU!t in a d~cision ~eg.arding the.

two vehicl.es. It was agreed that from. an, operati.onal viewpoint. the

I . A-1 i with.its 4100 ~~le range and increased altitude. cap~bility ~s ·

. . . : .

I .. : highly: desirable·•. ti also had th~ a,dvantage .of co:i:t.ven~ion~l take-off

a'.nd the. ability to use a _short runway. Its mafor .design deficiency
1. Was ·that it would be .tracked constantiy •. The Convair FISH, being
. .

I a~ staged vehicle, was 8: much more complicated system to operate •..

·.On the .othe·r.hand;. the possibility of it's flying _missions undetected

1.
was greater than that of :the A-:-11. The technical experts on the :Land
. . . . .
Panel were
. . .
concerned
.
chiefly
'
with . aircraft
. .
design
. .
and radar
.
cross
..

section, not ~pera_tiona~ probl~;rns·. · The m~eting_ ended with the c;>n-..
. . . .

..clusion that sporadic detection and.tracking by·radar must be

I.· e;xpected .regardless of vehicle. The .Panel made no recommendations

as . t~ . choice.• -of aircraft, and the Agency/USAF briefing ~ea:i:n re~rned:·'

I . .. . . . .

"to .Washington to prepare·a· presentation ~or the Presid~nt •. Presi- .

.

I· dential approval was necessary .to.c.ontinue the.-G.USTOprogra~. ·

I· 14

1:.·_.

I· 'Dandle
. :via..BYEMAil
. .

.Control-..,S stem- .
I
TO~·.· SECRET

.·The· tempo of GUSTO activity qµicken~d duri:Ug the ~onth of

. .
Jtme, 1959. .syst.ems sel.e.ction m~eti.ngs: o~curr.~·d with.incre.asing,

· frequency as .··the co.ntract<:>rs subm,itted design changes and new .

apJ?roach concepts. Convab;. expei-ienced a severe ~etba,ck·w11.en pro-·.· .

curement.of the B-58B. was cancelied by the Air Force •..~he~small

Convair design,· staged from th.e :B .. sa·, had demonstrated succe~·s

, ip. aerod'Ynarriic te~ting and structural development. Radar testing

ha.d also· shown go<?d results. The co.st a~d operational complexity

· ' of reco:nfi~uring the older B-58A model mother aircraft now ruled

out. the .. FISH·de~ign •. It would have b~en necessary.to augment the

. B-58 With two additi.6na1 ·~ngines in orde.r for. it to . achieve the speeds
· . fo~ efficient ramjet engi.ne ignition . on the F~SH .vehicle. The small

. inventory of e~isting B-SSA~s further· complicated matters. since

·the USAF was now ext.remely reluctant

' . . .
to .give.··.up any. o(its most
. - . - ,.
·

advanced bornbe·~ aircraft for modific.~tion· to a drone mc;ther .ship•

. ·At
'
a meeting
.
in Mr. Dulles'. office on 14 JU:].y 1959. attended by.
. .

. . ·o.e:Q.~·ral Cabell, M:r. B~ssell,. n·rs·. K~llianJ Georg~ ·B •.Kistiak?weky,

.Purcell, ~and; Bruce Billings, and Frankli:O.-A~ Rodgers.> Project.

GUSTO- Wa.s give~ a thoroU:gh review. · It. ·wa,s ·deci.ded. that· neither

th~ C.onvair. FISH design nor.the L9ckh~ed A-11 design.met th~.

15.
 .·To P . SE C.Rf3 '1' .

. ··criteria· established for a successor system to U-2 rec·omiai.ssanc.e.

....
1: ·The gX:~:up wa$.··advi;sed that both Convair and Lockhe~d.'wer.e .inter-

I
. . . . . . .
. ested in s·ubmitting new design proposals. Both designs we.re powered

by.Navy P&W J-58 turbojet engines an~ incori:>orated reduced radar

I retul".n charactedstics. ·It was accepted that a co~pr.~mfse was

1. necess~ry be·tween _:radar 'reducti~n·atte:tn:rts and:mC!-~ntaining.good ..

I . aerodYI.lamic design:~ · The. g-roup recommended that GUSTO be con·-

tfou_ed, but in, the direc.tion of the new. desig_n proposals by the two ·

I manufac;:tu'rers. .
It wa·s further re~ommended
. that the .con·curren~e ·

I of the Secretaries of Defense and. of th.e ·Air.Force be obtained, and

the joint view,.be communicated to .the President.

I· . . On 15 July 1959 1 . General Cabell and Mr •. BisseU _reported on.

I GU.STO
.
status, first
.
to Air
.
Force Secretary DoU:glas
.· . . . .
c;nd
·.
General
.
White,
. .

I· ·Reaction ·wa.s· unanimous to go to th~ 'Prefii·d~nt and urg~ .continuation-_ · · .

. ..

I <.
of the program.

·The President was briefed .on 20 July 1959.· A'f;tending were.

I ..

. Mr. Dulles,
.
. .

Genera.I .Cabell, Mr. BisseH,

.
.

Ge,;,E:!.r~-1 .White;
.
Secretary·
. ·. ..

I· McEb;oy; · Drs .. ·Killian, Land. and Kistiakowsky.. The President

·1·· . approv.ed the_ direction the study had taken. and he instructed Mr. Bi's~ell,

16

.1
.Handle· ··via BYEM1\N ·....
·1. :. .. _.;·.. ·..
:,".. : ;

·, .ContrQI ·System :·
. · ..
 :P o·p. S E G 1t E T

.
.
.
. .. .
in consort· with per~onnel of·the Burea·u of th.e Budget; to determine .

.·if the necessary funding :a.'rrang~m~nt$ could be made •. C.Onti:r,i.uation .

I.
. now:hinged on the availability of funds. A choic.e of contr~ct(?.r.s ·h~d. <.

I· yet to be 'made~ bu:t· that would await. final design proposal. sub~issio~s~

I .
Mr. Bissell r~ported
. .
to ·his ~taff on 2l July .that a .clear-cut .
· go~ahead now awaited solution of the money problem·,. and that he
.

1· · would approach t4e Bureau of the Budget imm_ediately. He'_also

I ·~barg.e~·that highest secu~ity s~ndar4s had to c~ntinue and that ·

. Iai(>wledge o_f future activi~ies had to be restricted to a very limited

I· · ntixnber.

I ·Mr~ Bisse.11 met with Burea,11 of ·the Budg~·t p.ersonnel on

-2~. July i959 .. to d~scuss financial·.arra,Il:geme~ts. He indicated ·th_at

I. . approX:imately 9o·m.illion cloll.ar·s might be nee.ded. in FY 1960 for·obli-

1·· .gation against the pr~gram •. · .Th.er~ existE~d 75 mi~lion doll~rs buried, ..

.· fu·:th~ DOD.budget whic;:h ha.¢! been.~pecifically reserved i:r,i. the 'F.Y ·1960 ·
·1·.
·bu.dget for·continuance of Project' GUSTO; Very wisely this PfOviso
1.·· had be.en stipulated. in a. memorandum. of understanding with the Bureau

·.of the _'.!3udget "on: i6 Decembe·r .. 1958·. !/ lvfr~ -Bis~ell

.I· also gave estimates:

I'·.·. .!/'.o..'.nus·-0073, ..12 Decerriber1958 •. of

,
·Memorandmn Understanding •.
Funding :of Project GUSTO, etc. ·:Se~ Annex 124. · · · ..

. ..
17

::1·." ..
:·. Handle. via. ·BYtMAN
Centro\· System ·.. ·
.I· ..
.

. ·...
.

...... :.. '.··

 ·.
I T 0 P S .BC RE 'f

,.
I of F.Y 1961-1962 requi:re_ments. The meeting ended with the

eta.riding t.h,at necessary. financial arrangements· woul~ be ·forth.coming ·

to c~rry on the.~program.
.un.d·er-- ·

1.·
()ne major step now remained b.efore a full-seal~ d~velopment· ·

1· prog.ram could be entered. A .choice had to be Il'l.ad~ as to which

design propo~_al .would be pursu~d~ . By mid-August 1959, the latest:-

I . . . . .

pro~osals from Lockheed and Conv~ir were in,.hand.

.

They were.

I both unst.aged aircraft proposals;

. differing only 'in ~:x:ternal c'Onf:igura-
.

tion•. Both ·would reach an altitude ~f 90, 000 feet, fly-at Mach 3. Z
I . and have ranges. of a.pproximately_ 4, ?OO miles. Their size, weight~

I and aerodynanifo performa~ce were v~ry. similar~ Both had selected

. the P&:.W i-58 engine over the Gen~ral Electric _Corporation J-93..
I because the latter could not provid~ the high.c;;uise altitude of th~

1.· J. .;.sa". · A comparison

. . .
of their general.
.. . .
characteristics
. follo:ws below.
. .
. . .

I ··.(data ·as of 17 August 1959).

•·
Lockheed Conyair
I· Aircraft designation A-12 * KING FISH

I. Speed Mach 3. 2 .. Mach- 3. 2

m. · 4000·n.m.

,
Range (total) 4120 n ..
I ·Rang~ (at altitude) 3800 n. m. 3400 n.m.
...
*
,
..
... .
Designati~n -_ch,a.nged. to A-l·Z to distinguish it from· the A.;.11
·designator. for ~e all-m_etal vers"ion,p.roposed initially.
..
To·p
18

SECRET Han. df....•.

e vrn. B'irM ~r1 .
.1 c..:..... ~ ·

I· . . Control System:·
\.
1·.
I" Lockh~ed·. CQri.va,ir .
·.- (;ruise Aititude.s

'". 84~

~1 1
500 ft.

000 ft.·
ss, oo'o
88, 000: ft~
ft_.-

1.
. . Etid ·97 ~ 600. ft .• :· 94. 000 ft ..
I. D.imensions

I Length. . '
.. 102 ft •. 7.9. 5 ft •. · .

Span:·:·· . . ".:57 ft. 56. 0 ft •

I Gross Weight ·: · · 110~ ·ooo lbs_. 101·, 700 lbs~

I. ~\ler weight 62, 000 lbs •

r ..Radar Performance:· Only limited small model te~ting

had beel'l conducted. to. this point. Pre~icted goalS were

r·: similar· with .Convair appearing to be slfghtiy. better ·at ..

,. S-Band frequencies.
·.Cost Sumiri.a
.. ry*.
~-

' .... 12 Aircra.ft ..Program .

.Lockheed ..

96. 6 million
.•

.Fi.rat flight .2z.month.s 22 months

t-
On zo August 1959, the j~int DOD/USAF /CiA sou:r~e selection
I. group, upon. recommend.ation of its_ t¢chnical. adyisers; c:hose. t~e

I Lockheed .de.sign. Approval

. . to .Proceed.with
. .initial :development'_wa.s
. . .
.

1-. * ·EXclusive of engine costs~

\·· ''.

i .:
'''Handle' lji~ ·. BY~Ml1~.
vlw .•.&...1.1.i •.'

I
1·
..
· ·Control System :.
•.
 •,

I
I· ~ive~ to Project Headquarters i.inder th~ direction· of Mr. Bissell~

[ ·continuati:.on of the. Lockheed arrangement be.yond .initial development.: .

.. '' . ~

· wou+d depend on the. success

.
~£design changes. iri the A-12 to reduce
.
I.'. . ..

·the .radar cross:-section to a satisfactory ievel .. Two factors favored ·

.

• • > • • • •

I· . '

the. choice of Lockheed. There was·~ substantial difference in costs

·of th,e t:vio. progr.a~s, Lockheed b~ing .the)ciwer. ~· 'l'.~e othe·r was a.
1·
~onfidence o.r experience £actor. The·experience L,ockheed ..had.:

I gained in the "skunk works" type "o! ·operation .in the U -2 program

I . equipped it ·to launch into another highly c.lassified progJ;a:rn. with.out

attracti~g undue att~ntion in the in('.1\lstry. Lockheed po~sessed a

I ~~servoir of· labor ·that had beeri given s~curity cl~arances and .was

I..
readilY: available~ Lastly, due to his success in developing 1;h_e U .2

ah:craft, much confid.ence reposed in Mr. Clarence L. (Kelly)

1· Johns:on and his ability to "produce a new vehiCle~: ..

Notification ~as .circulated.

. . to
. all p,ersonS· associated·
.
witlj.'. ..
. ·-: ..

'1·"
.

GUS.TO :that, effective 31 August.1959, ·all ac.tiviti~s pel"formed W).de.r

•' .that.title had.been terminated •. This was to .minimize th.e possibliity

I
,. o:f' sp'ecula:ti.on about the cr~ation 0£ a. follow..;on prog.rar.n.

I
.,. . .

SE C"R. E·.T
. 8a~dte'.vla· s1r~i~t1 ·
I.,. ca~tro\ .System .
·.,.
I.
T 0 p s E· c R E.T.
I
Early. OXCART Development
1.·
Actlon. on the deciston
. . to proceed on . a conditional·ba:sis with ..
.

1-: .the. Lockhee·d·:design proposal wa·~- taken at orice•. A. new ope~ational ·

seC:urity clear~nce category·wa_s:estabi.ish~d in a -manner very. simi-· •.

I lar to that which covered· the U-2 program.~ ·The new project ·was

I· called. "OXCART". A demonstrated

. . ·"need-to.':"know."
. ·re.quirement
'

had. to. be established.in order to obtain an OXCART dearanc.e. · ·

I Authority to:·approve ·ciearan~es for·~ilit~ry and civilian personnel

I· .
was: retained by the Project Director·. Mr. BisselL. Clearance of
.

-1ndustrici.:l ..and supplie.r personnei

. was handled
- ·by. the Project Se~urity
I· . . .. . . . .

Staff in c:o·ordina:tion with .the: technical management group. Only·

,
I
..
. very .highe:st ranking and key pers"onnel from. th~ Ag:ency~ DOD an.d··

:else:where· in Government :Who ·could-:make a direct and needed contri.;.

· ··butiori w.ere cleared and briefed in the early day~ of the p;rogra~.
1· ..
·.On ·3 September 1959 a letter. contract was issued to· Loc·kheed ·

1· .. ·. Air.·craft
. .
Corpol;"ation to: proceed
.
With a~ti·
.
.... ~adar Studies,
. .
aerodyna~ic

I aircraft. Fou_r· and one-half niillion.doliars 'was obligated. against·.

I. ··FY 196.0 furids. · The contraet·called for const:ructio~ of a. one-eighth

scale model £pr immediate ·anti-radar (~R) testing ·a.t t_he Indian·
I.·.·
Zl .
1.·.· . T 0 P· · SECRET···
Handle -via· ·eYEMAN:
I\ . Control .S.y:stem: ·
 ., .

T. O. P. S .Jt; <;:i R E T ·.

I· . . : ..
Springs fa;ciiity; construction qf requir.ed test faciliti~s;·_.coristru~_tion ·

1. of :a fµll_-~~ale model for fo~Iow,.;on AR te~ting;. construc_tion 'of ail

I. a,irc~aft sectio_n of titaniwn;· w1nci tunnel· testing. and. so forth.· Pro..;

d1,iction of twelve.aircraft was called. for. ·This last item; ho'"ever, ·

I was conditioned ·on the contractor's ability· to ·reduce. radar refi.ectiVi.ty,

l'!~ove construction methods, and,. generally affir~ that th~ _des1gn

I would meet .the ·s.peclfications desired ·for .an advanced reconnais·sance.
1.: system. Production of. atrcraft would be subject to negotiation at a

I. later date·.
. . .

1:· The requirement. to. conduct radar tests ·on: a full-sca_le model

raised_. problems. Tlie hydra'(llic: lift. install~d·.~t Indian Springs was

1·.. not _capable of raising and lowering the full-scale model. ·rndian ·.

· · Springs. did nqt. affor~

. . pr~vent
-the necessary .security ·to . the model
1.· ·...beiO:g· ·a een _by_ unauthorized·. persons. · It was qecided, therefore,·. to .

1· :-inov.e the. AR
.
tea.ting ~quipments from Indian: Spr.ings to ap.other site·
. .•

where a h¢avier· hydraulic lift and pole device ·~o_µld.be.installed to

1· accomm~date·a fuli~scale mode.I and_, .eventually,· the ai.rcraft its.elf.

1. (See picture overleaf.) For_-reasons o.f security, acc_ess and.atcom.-

·.. modat_ions, W~te_rtown was sele.cted (fo~er U ~2 training.base).··.S.in,1:e·

I. . d~activation· ~£the Watertown.base in·M·a.Y. 1957, ·i.t had remained: in.
. :··

I· ca:retaker status~-·

1··. T 0 p. . S E C .R E.T ..

1. . .. ··· .. ··.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I .~ ..

I
I
I
-·-···-- - · ...
L . a.· :.., - .1...· .. ~§.::.,.. :. ..:-:.. :. .:.:.·.:. .~..;~~.·· -~~~·..':..:...:t..i"i-.. .:£.;.:.:~....... _...... .... , .... ... . ~:..:. ·:·:·. ,; :..\.,'' ·· ·- ···-·· -~ ·... . .... ':' ; . ·-
- - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - -
,
I . .:.
.....
TOP SEC:R:E':f.

As sca~e ...model testing ·continued at In_dian Sprin.gs,

I p.reparations.-were underway. to reopen Waterto:wn •. Appropriate·

1. arrangements. were made with the AEG to reactivat~ the faciiity. ·

and nf!cessary rehabilitation. and

' .
construction
.
got
'.
·underway in ·.
' ~

I: Octob~r l959. By la~e Novemb~r·the EG&G te~t range equipment

.
1· ·:. . :

had·been moved from Indian Springs and the Watertown site was

·rea-dy··for AR tests.. of the full .scale A-12 mock-up. The population

I of Watertown base approximated 75· persons, the. majority being
. .
I· cori.tr.actor personnel. The operation. under the _corrtmand of an
•
·Agency staff employee, was b"eguri on a. crash basis and under
I
I As the events described. above were taking place, the.
,. · Development Projects Division {DPD)· moved forward. in o~her

areas-. · In ad<;1ition to establishing a system of security,· it was ·neces -

.'
1· ·sary to develop cove~ storiE'.s· . T~e la.tter wa·§i rio. ~asy task. ·a~· plaus. -
..

r ible stories had to be prepar.ed; for e~ample, to· explain the new ..

·activity at L"ockheed (as well a:s-. at other contractors' plants}, ·and .

I the. reactivation of·Wate·rtown. · This yenture into:beyond-the-state-

,. . .. of-the-art in aircraff development,. if·kn"own in the aerospac.e ind~stry,

would quickly.lead to speculation as· to itE! true· purpose and ·ce~tain ·

I" 23
'.
I ..

TOP S·EGRET.
Handle via" BY£MAH .
··cnntrol .System·
 -.T'OP SECRET

c.ot;npromise of the concept.

A new memorandum of unde-rstanding was necessary with· ~e

'"· - .
· Ai.r. F:orce to delineate areas .o( re.spo~si:bility"between the· Ag~ncy.
I:
- ana the USAF·; In a: lett.er to the.:P,CI on .ls.· Se~tember 19~9.

I General White, Chief of Staff, USAF._ had· written a~ follows:

' .
I "l. · In·view of recent ev~nts
leading up to the. final .
.determination· of a successor afrcraft for the U-2, I am
. ta~ing this. opportunity to ~~sµre you of the Air Force 18
continuing iµterest in the project on the :s~rtle joint basis·
I- as our participation in the U: -.2 program~.· · '. ·. · · .

0
2. In this regard, I refer to the origi??-al agree.me.nt'
1· ·

.of August 1955. which 9utlined and defin~d in. rather "b'ro~d .
terms-the areas of respons~bility of .your Agency and the· Air .
1· Force;· I believe the intent of the basic concepts arid organi"'.'
..Z!!-tion:al structure ag;reed to in this 'doc.ument continue to b.e"
ya.lid. I feel, however, that after .four years 1 expe:rience "
I :. and the· somewhat alte·red circU:mstances in terms of. 'time to
the production of a sui'table article and ·the November 1957
memorandum from Defense in :.terms of Air Fore~ respons~·- ·
I-. . ·.
bility, that ·a rev'iew of this document would be profitable·
. and insure· an o.rder.ly continua1!ion of the joint functions _o_f
- the Air Force and. Central. I~telligerice . . ·
I · "3. l have directeq Col.· Geary to meet as soon as:
'possible .with:your designated rfepreseritatives to review·our
I· original document and· suggest such changes or additions as· .
.
WOU!d be mutually agreeable and beneficial. II -1/ "."
. - -.

I .A classified· contl:"act was wr.itte;n with the Pratt & Whitney

Division of United Aircraft ·corpo.ration.. to pro~de ·the propulsion

I
,_. . l/ _;PS"°-l.S5247, 18 September '1959. Letter to DCI from C.hief. of St'a.££,
._ :tJSAF, Subject: U.-2 Follow-on Program.

1·' .'%' 0 -p . S E C RE 'l'

I ...C~ntt-u1 SysUnn ·
 system for the·aircraft. Development of the J;..!;iS e·ngine had .been·

!'-: .sponsored·;originally by the U~S. ·~~v'y f~r its o~~purpo~.~s. ·:Navy.

· · inte.rest in· the i-58 d~vel~pm~nt,. howev~r/· was. subsiding :and a

I
· de.c.ision had been made by the Secreta~y of Defense to withd.raw
I
, ....
from the .program at the end of 1959~ · At this P9.int •. the USAF agr.eed

to assume sponsorship for·continuing:.overt d~velopme.nt, sine~ the':

... .·
engine ~d appli.catiqn to certain. proposed: advancecl t]SAF·weapon.. ·
I . ·systems. The ·cov~rt contract was a necessary device under vy-hich

I the· J-58. engine· capabilities would be. extended tot.he. highly classified
.,
. M~ch 3. 2., 'possibly Mach 3. 5, .performance ~t extremely high alti~
I tudes .. Contract term.a called for
. .

tlie' assembly ·Of three advanced

I .
experimental engines fo~
.
durability and reliability testing, and pr.o-
.

~sion of. three engines for experimental flight testing ir>: early 1961.
1· . . . . '

Due to the. long lead time involved in. the manufacture

. .
'
of jet
.
engine ·
•' '

I components,
. . . the .·contr:act. wit~ P&W
' .
t;l.cfoally
. .
called ·fo~ dell~ery
. ·. .
of

'hardware, where~s no decision had y~t been' mad'e to. proceed' with
I •
'. ... . . . .· . . .

the m~nufact'1.re of airfr~mes~ .The. decision to buU9. engines

.

had :
I to be .made at this· early date ·in order.to meet Lockheed's proj.ecte'd .. ·
. .

deliv~ry .schedul'e should a ·dedsi.on bE? rpa.de:t~

I airfrarµ.e
.

With productio~ of A-.lZ aircraft.

. . proc-eed
. .

I
, ...
.. .TOP
2.5

S.EC.RET
·· ...:·Randle·· via BYf~11\H
I.. · ::Control' System:· ·
1.·· .. ·.
'f' OP SE C·RE T"
,._
During the GUSTO prc;>gram,· r~quests for caqiera system's .. ··

I. ·pr.oposais· had been .;solic.ited from. several cai::gera manufa:ctU:~er.s.·

. ·Fair.child Camera," Hycon, P~rki~-Elmer (P-E), and Itek ·had' re .. ,
1·.
· · spon~ed··with .design e~gineering pr~:i»osais~· ~An .evaluation· t~arn .f."rom.
''

,,. "
Pr.oject.H~adquarters and the Agency's ·Phot~gra;Phic Inte~pretation

1. C_enter reviewed ·~ese and concluded in ~arly.1959 tQ.:at the P-E design

, ..
Wa:s·-.the.Q-e:at, .and re~ommended it.be c.l.los.en.for the. succ.es:so~ .recon-. ·

· nalssance system. The Land Panel

·. affirmed
. this view after. reView-

ing. proposals. · P-E ~.s given~ n·ew .contract·in October :1959 to

I· . '

: . begi,n engineering and design work for a ph'otographi~ system ior 'the
1: OXCART program. The Firewel Corporatio:n was asked to continue

1:' .. its s~udi:e~ .in pilot enviromnent re.quirem.ents.as ~as N~rmcQ its:

~.ork in.plastics and .other r.ada·r-abs'!rbent'materia~s .... ;Eastman.

1:·
a feasibility study for. a"camera designed· to OX.":
' '.
Kodak~gree<:i'to

I"
CART. opera~ional cha;act~ri~tics •.. EG&G '.\_Vas perfo~~ing the ~R·: ·
.. ... ' . . . ' . "

.tes,tfu.g on th~ OXCART model~ anC:l SEI .was. pro~di;;,_g consultant

1.·
· ·s~rVices. pertaining·to the radar· cross-section redu~ti6n featur.es'.of ":-·
. .

I the A-12. system •

. . ' As the ne~· ye~; apprOil,ched·, develo:pinents .in the OXCART'

1:
progr~m ~ere reaching a stage wh~n a fi~ai decision was. requir.ed
1~
Zp
•: <

[ 'I'o r · _'s E ·a R :s T..

Handle· via. BYEMAN

J... co·ntrnl Systea ·.
'.
r. · T 0 ;P S E C·il E T

1·. t~ engage .in_.production. ·_At an OXCART S:uppliers' M~eting on

I. ·16 December
. 1959, Mr. Johnson stated that
. ~
Lockhe~d needed
:
a con~
· figu.ration>freeze·and go-~head ·-~:ri a_ specific p;.oduction fig~re i-n ·.
I . _order to plan and •impl~me.nt to.cling. requi.rements ef~ectively.

I. - _Mr·~ Bisi?,_eH ag-~eed that. .such would be the principal subject, along
. . . .· .,.. ' . . . . . .

. with the radar- -~_ross -_section p.robl~~. at the .next sue~ meeting in_
1.· ~id-January' 1960.

I· - On ·20 January 1960, Mr~· Bis~ell, ·i_n c_ompany with Agency ·and.

USAF representatives, met the Land Panel consultants to_r.eview the

I .
status of the radar cross-section of the A-12.
.
The .Panel wa~ impres_sed

I. . ·with. the progress made in the. radar cross-~ectionareas~. ·It was pre-

dieted by Dr. Frank Rodgers of SEI that continued· ·testing would

1· ...·

achieve further improvement.in redudng radar· returns; .a co·ndition.-:

I neces·sarr to proceed toward_the·.final de·s·ign production decision.

·. However. at the OXCART 6uppliers'."progr.ess revie~ meeting

1·-
th~ next day, Mr. Bissell focused-on an in~:te~sing we_ight problem

I· •
creeping into the A-12 design.and: the. resultant altitude anc:l _range ·

I d_egradation. ·Mr. Jo1ulson· was di"tected to .inves.tig.at_e the weight_

problem in order to provide a specified minimu_m r?-ng~ and altitude.

I ...
p~ofile of the A-12. He was also asked _to provide estima:t~~ of A-12 ·.

I·
..
27

·T 0 ·J>·· S E C R E .T .
I
·H~ndle via BYEMM~
I. .Control Syst~nr
'•··.
I T 0 P . $ .E C R: E 'l'.

I performance at-Mach 3.'5. He was advised ·that a..decision·concer·mng

I g~..:a.head would not be made urttif the· information was in hand ·~nd..

eVa.luated~ The w~ight reduction and muii.nium mis:sion·p~oflle ·rep~rted.

I
by.Mr. Johnson several·diys later_ was c'~nsidered acceptable.· The

I .. Lockheed estimate of A..;12 perfo_rmance at a speed of Mach- 3. 5 indi:..

~ated a a;~ extr~ altitude~ .

I slightly improved range and 3,°000. feet of

On 30 ·Jantiary 1960 a firm go-ahead to p~oduc.e 12 air.c·ra:'f:t was ~om~' · ·

I municated :to:Lockheed~ The search·for a; manned vehicle succ·essor·

1· to the U .. 2 reconnaissance system, began ip.· August of 1957·, v;.ra;s now

comJ_)lete. : .
1. . · To this point OXCART Program _Funding Approvals totaled

1.- · -$49,,
. 497, 366. for
. FY 1960
. {$4·4 million £or engine. developin~~t
. and .ini-.

tial production by P&W). Additional work and.services !esulting

I ·from· the d.ecision to -build the:A-12. was estimate.Cl ·to be approximately
.
I· $44. million
. '
'

. more for a total FY

. .
1960'..program
·.
. .
approval .of $·93,
.
.780,
.
000.
·.

Wheri a-request -for.the ,rele~se .of·funds. . was submitted to the ~ureau

1.· '• . . ' . .

..... o~ the .Budget, th~ question was: raised by :Budg~~t personnel of. fu~er

I Pres"iden~ial ~pproval .being necess.a;ry to· contint1e .the prog.rafu ... They..

1· ·.were.
. .
assured
. .
such was.:·nQt
.
.
th~·«iase·.-: .At-the 20· July 1959 ·m.eeting with
'

. .
the P.i:esident, the Prestdent had sa.i~ substantially that the:"Agency had
I
2.8
I.. T 0 P S E G a E· T

I:_·
1·
.T 0 P S B 6 'R E '1'

1. $et .i.tself .certain technical goals .wl).i<;:h it..was pot sure i.t :<?ould

I.,· . . attain . . ,.- He

.
fl,lrthe.r
.
s.tate.d
.
if· these goals cpuld be. reached the pr:oj~ct
' . ..'

. . .

. cawd· proceed·•. Mr. Bissell had.d.et.ermined, . ·the.time of the

at . last
I.
,.
. . . . ' ~

. . .
· technica~ reyiews,
.
that. the .Pr.esident's
. ..
.guideline.
.
had ·been: .·complied·
. ~ '

· . with~
.
·and that
.
it _would. not.be.ne.cessary for the Ag~ncy
. .
to return.to»
.

M~
I the ·Whi:te
-.::· .
.
.House
. .
for further
.
approval.

· _oft}:l.e JnternationaI·D.iVision
.
of th~ ·- Bureau of
M,r. Robert.
.

.
the Budget,·
.
Macy,· Chief
.
appeared . .
.·

. . . .~ .
1· ..
·:sati·sfied.with th.e-~information but requested a rnemorandum.»f.rom

th:~· DCl to· confirm the. record.

I. . .·. . . .. . .
On 8 M'.arch 1960 the Director signed
.• . . .ii
·such a mernorandti.m ·to the Dire~tor of the Budget. -

I · Lockhee.d'.s forecast schedule· for ·delivery of".A-12 1 s ~all~d

,. ~~r first airframe delivery in Ap~il 1961 and the l~st in August of

1962; As prime contractor, Lockheed was:given ·as

. .muc]J. latitude
.

1-: as· possible t~· insure the schedule. w:eUld b.e met. The prime con..;:

1.· tra.ctox was authorized, for 'reasons of security. timeliness. in'pro-:

,. .-:curement~· ·and over-all syst~ms cor:ripatibility, ..to._dispense with

com:petitive bidding ·for. a~tfr_ame subsyste~s pr:ocure_ment, ·provided

I . reasonable and prudent judgn:i.~~t·:was exerc;i~ed in>awar.di~g ·such.

contracts. :However> detailed ~~cords_ we1.-i':u; ·:be 1.naintaihed. by

1·
1/. Atta.c~e:Q.t to. OXC-03.23-60~· Z4 ·F~brua;ry ·1960~ :Bureau:· of. the ·
I·:· - ·~udg·et -Request for DCI 1'4emorandum Concerning OXCART·
Presidential Approval.;. .See Annex 125.•: . · ··
,. .. 29:
. .. : " ..

T O P 5 .E C R E .T..
1·
..."·
 .•,.

'l"O P· . S E C. R:.1£ 'l'.

1.:···
·. 'th~ contractor· ;~g.arding s~lections and e.valuationa. The rational~
1:. and·iauthori'trfor this procedure is .contain.ed·in AnneX 126;.

··. The.philosophy of management,. developed and employed sue-

1~
.. · u·-2. prog.ram,
·cessfully in the . .
·was. retaine.d
'
£br tlie new. pr.ogram.:
. .
·

I .. · .
The. philosophy had been to. s.elect contractors carefully and to gra11t .·

·~~m .maximum. ~echnical responsibility. and authority'to get.the job

I
:

. done in ac:;~_ord~nc.e. wit~ con:tract ter.ms an4 functio~l· specifications.

1··:. ·When. faced ·with significarrt technical c;hoices or ·chari,ges having impact
_,.··

I· on funding, schedules or performance; tht;l contractor would re.fer the

"" . . ' .
. . . . ' .. . . . . .
matter -to the ·ProJect Director for advice. arid/or decision •. T·echnical
1·· . . . . . .

·-_progress of' the contractors would pe monitored· by Headquarters. by·

. '

I· ..means
. of periodic reporting;
. supplie·r conf.ere:t).ces
. . . and vi~its to coil,-
' .· \ .

· · t.ractor facilities. The monitoring rei,;po:nsibili:tY re:;:;ted in tlie 'hand.s.

I <:!£ t4~'!)evel~~ent 'Bra,nch,. DPD 1 •. who in tu·r~ .. :r.e~~hed..~~:.~~he: P:roject·
. .· ·..
1.
'

Dir.ector.··Mr.' Biss·ell. · Th·e a.dvan~ges" of ~uch a. re·l~tion~~ip·

.
betw~en
.
customer and contra:ctO-r were. several... Decisions could be made
I . . . : . . . . . . . ..
more .qutckl.y; direct channel .relationship sayed Va.luable time, and
...,,,,,....

I·" . ._direct contac'ts stimulated

.
' . ~ffort .and
. greate.r. . des·fx-e
. to
.
achie~e ·goals
. '

·.on ~e part of the ;:contr~ctors.

I
I·· 30

1· : .. Bandle via .BYEMAtl

-1 Contrar System ..
1.
T O.P .SE C.R E.T
f:.
It is·a.Ppr~priate at this time to sumin~rize:.the si~tio~ at··
1. $e outset° of the new program. Lockheed Air.craft Co.rporati6ti

I (LAC) was· the prime c9nfractor ~or the ·ai,rfram:e. Pratt ~ Whitney

, ..
Ai:r·craft Divisionf ·.United Aircraft. Corpo:r~tion, was .. res.ponsible for

· engine devefopment and producti~n.

. · ·Direct
.
co~tracting
. for
.
c·ertain
.
i.

auxiliary systems ·-was reserved to Project Headquarters; DPD/DDP.

I· . . . ..
. -·~· ·.•
In· due ·~OUrSe supplie~S Of·c~'eras ·an~ other·senso;S, navig_ation. :. ·.
1··.
and. flight control" systems, "lite support and p~lot envirorun."ent·.~quip-

I ment; and other· services were s~lected.

•
The
.· ..
prlmary. camera manu·~.

facturer cho~en w<,is. Perkin-Elmer. Because .of .the :extreme compleXity

I·. of the design, a decision was so6n·m.ade .tnat·:.a.·_badt-up camera· system·
. .. . . . . ..

I n):igh-t"l:)e·nec_es.sary in .the e·~erit the P-E design ran .into production

problems •. Eastman ~odak:was asked to build a camera •. The

I Minneapolis ,.."Hqneywell. Corporation was. selecte.d- to proVide l:>otb.·th·e
. :. .. ~

. . .
1· ·iner.tial na.vigation syst~m and an autoina.tic flight cont~ol system•. Th~-.'·
. ' ..
· · Firew~i Corporatiori·a!ld _David Cl.ar~ Corporation became th~ prime
I. .... .source". of .pilot ·~quipment: and a·ss~ci~ted 1i~e ~\1ppo.rt. ha°~d.~re •
,.
.·. The attention of:the Development _Branch, DPD; ·for the next two·

..Y~ars w:ould, be mainly .on.the development, engine~rin:g a.nd man~ac~.

I
tl'.Lring·fof the. airframe 1 engine and associa.ted syst~ms~ It is quite"'·

I. 31

I'..
. T 0 P. . S E C.R :S T.
. ~-

I. . .
·.
 ...
I.
I . '
impos.sible. to detail. here ·the ma.ny.,difficultie's that beset' the ea,rly

J· · :stage.a
. .
of the
.
program
,. . .. The e.xpe:denc.es
.
of Lockheed
.
a~d. of
.
Pratt&:..,·.
. .

.Whitney illu~tra.te the mag~itude of these:·proble:nii:; in. te.rms·.'b'oth of:

I. doll~.rs and of effort.

,
I
....
Lock:11eed ha.d designed an aircraft system ·tha~ r.~pres~nted a

major'milestone in the field of a~rona':1tical technology.· When Lock-

, ..
h~~d turned to pr.oduction; it ran into many challenges.

flight regim-e i-p. whl.ch .the A-12 aircraf~ wouid o.perate wa~ expected,,to
. :

The Mach 3. 0

,
. generate· extremeiy high temperat1;1i'es. on .the surfa.ces of the airlra~e.
1-..
.
During
.
the. de·sign
. .
pha.s~,
.
the cop.trac.tor h,ad. ·evaluated
' .
such ma.teria.ls
.

... . . . ' . ' . '.

as steel boneycomb. high.heat ti:eated. steel;. hig.~ ·~eihperature alu- :

I: :µii:r;i.um
. .
and magnesium .alloys, and· titaij.ilim."
..
A. titanium alloy
.
was. '

,. cho~en .because
.

.
. .
of its high :strength to weight ratio; ·it retained its ...
. .
st~eng.t:h at· elevated ·tem~erature~; a.nd·tooling costs app.~ared to· be· .
• • •#

I· . le_ss ·than.for steel honeycomb, ,;,hich ·w:~s the n·ea·rest mate.rial 'to· it

, ... in chB.racteristics.

·. ·rt was'_soon learned that 1;ooling for tHaniUm. was considerably·

I, . n;ic;>re. sophl.~ticated ~hari for ai~fra.m,:_fabricatio~:

,..
conventianai ·

Speeial furnaces a~d .t~e~nnent.s. ·had to b.e· developed.a.n¢1. :employed"

.. to "handle ·th·e· metal •. 'The supply" of-.high qua:lity tita-p.ium metal ·wa:s ..'
·. . '

I.' . ... 32 ..

I.
. '.
..
T 0 P. . ·s. E. d R ':El .T
.
.. Handle via BYEMArl
I ,. CnntrohSystem
 T· o· P S E. C R iS T .

. li.ID.ited and' ~ostly in eal'iy .1960, -arid. the capacity oitb:e/few available' .

,
I.
...
;
· s.tjppliers:to.fi~i
'

wa~ .estimated
.
ordei:s was.·margiM:l

to ave.rage
.
f~oµi. tlm.e ·to tiµ:ie.
~ .

~·ost a.bout $21.per.'~ound. ~~·January .196:0 •

Ti~:a:niU:rn
..

, ..

....

..
.During._the: first y·~az:, th~·'.contracto:r· .repo.rt~a· many p~oblem

.arE;las, p~rtic~arly in the ·supply of t.itanium. He experi'e~ce~·a.

I:.· hig.h rejection ·r;:it~ of stock.. due to poor quality c6~trol.sta~da,rds 0£

. . ' .. ' . . ·. . •, '

the·rri'.;taf s~ppUers. Much ti~e."wa.~. lost due to l~ng'thy"d:eli.Y.ery

I delays.. .Th~re was also. a high waste. factor, due. .to not. only the re-

I.· ,jection· rate, but.also to mac:hir:i.ing -:methods. An example· of.this · : ·:

I. occ.urr~d. in th.~ case where a. 1; cioo pound bille·t was required for

machining down to an od,d'.'·"shaped.. 66·-pound fitting:.. ~achining ~osts

I •.
:. ·~azi.thr.ee to :four times hlgher than.ini~ial estinia.t~s •. ID. <the .cou~se ·
.of over.coming thes·e deffci¢ncies~ L6ckheed ~a.d no chqic.e but to ·
I ·.. develop· its o'Wn techniques tO handle ·the metal.:. Consequently. costs.·
.
I ·a.n:d·. ti.m·e
. .
involved increased
. .
~onslde.ra.bly
. . . .
'
.. · Op. 14· SeP.temb~r·. .i960
.. . '
·. , .". ..

I the
. .
contractor
. . '
·r.evl.sed
.. .
his ·delivery
' .
schedule· to.

. fir~t ·~ir~i-aftis. delivery- slippe.d four

.
:tlie extent
·.. .
that the.
·.
·

months;' and the twelfth by 'one

~

I: month~ . The first ·flight .date fo~ Aire.raft No. 1.was now 30 August
·.· ..
I
1·. .
. 33

r·.
.
. . )r 0 P, . s B e. R 'JE 1;....

· ·· · ·Handl.e. via BYtMMf

I.. . . .· Control .Syst~.m ·: . ·.
.. ..
1·.
,.,. T O.P :-,s.E:C RE T
. . .:.

, ....
·As a c.onsequence ·oi foreca~ting

. . . .
d_efici~ncies arid technical

problems· encountered alo~g. the w,ay-,··p:rices also ~hanged.· LoC-kheed

..
..

'

:. bad orighlally. quoted_ a iz:..:aircraft p'.t"oductfon price of '$9·6, o.oo. 000.

I" . ' in·Atigust ·'19S9 ... Incre~~;sed 1*aterial.prke·s arid· prog:i-am·'cha.'nge~-
I·. ' ·caused an upwa_rd revision to.· $103~ 7S:f., 00.0 in Janua~y 196:0·.
..
TJ;ie --prime cont:ractor had to select subcqnfa:aC:tor~ for variou$
1·
..
CL.ircr.aft systems.; components,.·:parts. and: materials: Thf} .SUQCQn-·
I . . trac.tor~ experienced countless :proble~s as de$ign ant:l'production .
.
I encount~red the· inflexible: demands impos~~d·by the ·e.nviro~ep.t "vvithin ·

which_· thei-r product ~as expected. to operate •.

1· ' . .
· What·ha·d hitherto been ~ati$factory design_ for parts_:'and· fittings

[ now proved unsati~factory in this.new aircraft. · Su'bc:;ontra.c:::to~ r~search

and development prog~ams ~d to_ be initiated .to' find n·-e~ mat~rials and
I.
· m.ethods to meet'. tlie .rigid. specifi:cations imposed·.· : ·The result was
,. '

much clos'er than ~sual •contract~r rel~tion.ships

• , •
.and ~har'i:r~g. ofe te~h-

: nical
. kllow-...how.
. . .
Ti1e costs. inc reas.ed .on th~. o~e
.. .
'hand,
. . b·ut-. focalc{ilable·
.
.. .
.... ·benefits.were .derived· on the othe·r ..· ·.The ·OXCAilT program was"·d.es-

tine·d...to bear the fin~ncial brunt for many'adva~ces in-the 'science of .. '
supersonic aerodynamics \'\11;1.ich. Oov~r~ent and bidustry would. pr?fit"".

,. ably employ in £.utu·i:e p:i;og.ra,ms. ·. ·

I: . . .
'TOP.·SEC.RET. 1.~'l"UIU
Ha.nndle
U "l'l ' ' "'""!
. . · • · n·
ud
I'. . .V t1.

.Control s~ste·ni . ·
~-thl'U.\ .

.. .~ ...
 TOP SECRE'P

. .
·It .is recalled: here·that·:a low -ra.da:r cros.s-section was a·

.. r-equirenie1'-t. that the follo\V..:.on rEl°conn·ais·sa~ce-aircraft had ·to· meet~

:_· ..:.. The· choic·e··of .man~~c-turer be~n .~ade With .as.~uran.Ce-s .that
I .. . . . . h:a:d
. .

·.de.sign .could achieve. a· satis_f,13-ct9ry . goal in:this respect~·· Si"nc·e

.
his

finai
. A-l2 configurati-on· and design was." not firmly es~ab~is~ed when Loc:k-

heed. was ~hos.en, anti-radar.testing

. . .· .
continued
. . . bas~.
.at _the. Watertown

on th.~ :£ull..;scale.·mock-up. The .airfra~e

:
areas. giving. the. gl'ec;te:st·
,.

·.radar
. ... return".w.ere
. . .the
. vertical
. . .tait. the. inlet,
. "and ..·the
. fb-rward
. side:.
. .

. .
.of the engine nacelles. An improvement in the chine and: wing. regions

was also being looked at. ··Research in ferrites, high-tempera:tU.r·~.

I . absorbing materials and high-temperature pla~ti-c structures was

I.· going_ on to find methods to reduce. the return. .It wa_s .proposed to

construct the vertical tail section· fi_ns··of. laniinated plastic, . art"d·

I Na·rmco·wa.s
·. . subcontr~cted"
. . to build the
. . . fins·
. •... The work i-0:. ferrites
.. . was.
.

I. exp~:cted to. be. heipful in reducing the ·~~flectivity:: 9£ tl:te _inlet a~d·.
. . .
·. engi'.I').e nacelle surfaces.· A ine.tal and.plastic surfac~ a·rrangement
I::·-.
···¥·· ·. was·.proposed for. th"e chine. and wing edges. Jn: ·combJriat"ion,. it was .
. '
I. "hoped that a significant reduction in radar l,""eti.lrn could _be. accomplished ..

-..While Lockheed ·and its subcori.tra~:tor$ came to .grips with ·a.irf rat:ne
1·. . . . . . .

.
. . .

.. '
.

.. fa~.r.icati.on, th·e engine manufactur_er ~s- _experiencing . Pr_oblems: of_ .

I.· his o-wn ..

1. . . .·- ...

SBGRET

I·. . ...
,.
T 0 P SEC R E.'f.

I
The· fin~l de~igns-· submitted by both Lockheed and Conval.r in·.
I. the·sutnmer of .~959 inco:rporated ~·Pratt & Whitney_,Mach 3~ 2 J •58 .·.

1· .. :
·engine. A firs_t run had- be.en made in·December _l9S.7 as a Mach 3. O .

design test-stand e?;.gine a~d it had e~J.oye.d impressive developin~nt. ·

I· p.rogress· during. the_follo~ng two years. In its presentation.of cost

I es.timates in the £all.of 19?9 1 P&W forecast a total of $80 million

. .
"'
'W01J;ld be require~ through 31 December 1962 for fu:rther developm,ezit;'.
I ·p'roduction of ·36' eng~nes, and maintenance, overhaul, and spare. parts.

1· ,.
support. Corripany r_ep.resentatives felt _it would not be"toa' dufi.cult

.:.ss ·engine from' its current stage of development (the

1· to.take the J

Z6, 000 po~nd thrust P-2 ~od:el) ~nd incor.porate the features· .necessa.ry .

I .
for Mach·3. 2 flight (in 1:he _32, 500
.
p~undi:;:.~l'r-µ.st.JTilD-20.model). _··so
c.onftdent were they"that the_y priced the ~ngiri.e at $iso, ·ooo per
1· unit•..

I
The ·figure w,a.s one P&:W had be.en-using
.. . .
.
. for other
.
jet . engin~ sales,
.
.~nd.
.
..
they estimated it to be a valid figure for the J-58 •
..

In ~ugust 1960 P&W informe_d·Project Headquarters 'it was ex-

I.
.. periencing, co~side"rable i~creases in cost, particularly.in materials:
~·

I.
• • • • I ' ' • • •• • ., • • •

in the development and. p:roduction ·portions. of. ~e contract. Deyelop-

I' roent costs- iricreas:ed by $12' ~illion- and·the. p;od.uction co~ts for' .

. 36. engine_~ by_. $iO+ mill.ion. Project Headquarter.s, 'whil~ greatly

I
. . 36
. . .
...
1--"·"
. H3fldi 8-; VJa
' 'l'J\li:-~i HJ
1· ..Control System · .·
a l.1..hUil
I
I ., TO··p

disturbed·,: agre~ci to fu°nd·the additional dev~·fopn;tent.costs 'Yitliin

I·· ti~it~:~ .· rt.~a.-~ f~r~ed to reduce the· 'oi.de~ for engin:es· from_.36°to 30:
I because of the limitati~n on funds ·available. · P~.att ·& Whitney gav~-. _.

assurance·:s that the J -58 program .(:oill,.d·be:ac-complished: within th_e

I revised dollar estimates.

I The rapidly incre.asing costs in the eng~~e .prog_r_am w_ere du'.e· ·. ·

. .
. to va:r.i_e.d _problems that surfac~d ·a.s. th·e development pha,se "proc·ee-deq..·
1-.
·-The ··high·Mach performance de.sign. introduc·ea. t_ernperature environ• .·

1. . ments that were never previously experienced or antidpated •. For.

..
. . . . .

. e:Xample,· the e"ngine thru'st requirement ~ictated a_ turbine designed

I. for_·~n avera.ge.1990° F. inlet. temperature·. Eady tests on the·stand·
. . .
I: . .
revealed extremely hot areas in the.turbine where tem:pe-ratureE:J

peaked ·at 250.0° ·F~-. T~e materials used in combu~tion sectipn and.
I·
·fu_rbinELf~bricatfon could not ·sustain .such an ex~~eme. condition .. ·. -.Many
I c~stly engineering ma~-h.oU:rs went _into· ·redesi~n· of th~. co~bu~tio~

.section and turbine~ New mate.rials .and alloys wer.e. selected ·for the·
1.-· ... . · ..
..

•tu:i:-bin:e ··~a:~·es arid blade·s. ·:Each cha~g~ ·that was tn:corporated had. to

I . be verified on·the test stand.· ·.A cha~g._e or modification i:~l/O!ie:~rea

r . of.the. ·engine would quite_. possibly;necessit<l:t·~ ·redesign;~ r~work,

exp_eriment, and test 9n:.other engin¢:parts. · Bu;rne.:t· c.fus· .and diffuser

1·
37
1· ..
'f O r: -S E C R :S T

I. ··. ttandle via·· BYEMMJ

.· ·..Contror _System
 ..
.T 0 .P S E C ·R E T '.

~ ..
cases .were re~esign~d .to ·even· out the tempeiatur~ profii_'e· and at

tbe:sam~- time to endure:.the extretne heate •. Choice of ~dequate ..

.
new ~at~;ials".
. int~.Oducec;l
.
_fabr.icaticm
. . . . .
diffieultie.s:
.· .
_' 'New
.
and ve;y
.
· ', '

· expen:sive ~a-chining ahd ~elding processes»had -to. be,dev.i.se.d. ·:·The

.' . . . . ' ' ..
' . . . . . ·. '

.....· : . '

afterburner lii;iers. were fo~d to. be too light and s'ectlon~ would

.b~ckle d,uring test ~uns. The .bucicl.ed sections.would tear loose. and

-·be ·J;>lown. out the engine tailpipe. The compressor roto:t'· d~si.gD: was.

I . .
f.oun4 to be _inadequate strucwrally ,_and it .required reconfi.gu-ratioµ,.

Major engi~e com:ponentsi such- as. the Hamilton Sta.nda.l::d ,n~:in and-_
I".
afterburn~r· fuel c6ntrols and the- Vickers_ hydraulic pumps were

1. breaking_ ~own .far ahead of their expected operating time-s·. Again

,. heat. was the major cont;ributor _to tlie lack of mater~als durabilit}I'. ·
. . .
ani;t to equipment malfunctions. ·-These :engin~ co:r.n±>onent- supplle.rs
t· f~und· themsel~es havhig to go int_o :cra_sh ~:~gineering· development
. .
and testing. to· £inCI satisfactory 'designs and. niateria~s with whi.ch to ·
I.
modify and retrbfit their hardw~re which -was air·e~dy otj· pro.duction

"' .. lines.
.
'' ..

J: .. . .
With each new fix to th~ engi:rle ·oJ;" a componen.t, there was. an,

"aec-on:1'panying pe;r;.alty: in the form of. add'ed- W:eight.: co;r;.curren~ly, .

I: .
then. a ·weight ;requc_tion campaign wa~.:neces:~~ry to ~em.ain. ·withi~

I. 38 ,

t ·:.
1--- .·Handla. via· SYH~t\N:
-.-.control ;System
I
".P 0 P . S ·;s :C R. E 'i' ·

I
the. orig~nal ·w~ight ~stiin.'ate that .had.:been· pJ;"o~d.ed· to the· airfrarruf
1·: · ··manufa~turErr~ A vicious cyc1~ h~d ~e~eloped .. ·.· Ji'.or each ·problem
....... Was
I ;
. .that aros~, a 'd<;)mino effect result~d whic_h costly anq.'.ti~e- .
. .'•.; .. '

consutning.
1. . It shou~d ·pe .riot~d her'e that consideration (;f developing
. . .J -58
t:P,e

1· : . " from a. Mach 3. 2 engine.to a Mach 3._ 5.. capabi~ity wa.s· dropped in
Decemb:er 19-60. W:eighi; and·. fuel . ·re~ulted
trade-()ff's in no...
app;r.eciable
I . . ' .

improved pel."forri:lanc.e for the A-12 mission.

.

I .
Continuing· Development:
. .

·Se.lection of ·Test Site

I·
In the:fall of .19591 the matter of·s.electi~g a dom.estic flight.·

I test and ~perational site was taken up ·by the' Development Project$·

·Division•. The OXCARTope.rational conce]i>t envisioned· that. mission.s

[.. . . ... ' . . . .

,. would be floym from·and retuxn to· a·.domestic base with range exten-

sion accomplished by a.erial· refuetings. enroute. For securitY . "

. r~~son.s· t~e ·project could n?t be locq.'te~·.at. an·active mUitary ·base . ·

I :

. wh~re it would be
:
subject
.
'•
to '
wi~espread
.·. .
scrutiny~:. The criteria
.
.for
.
I·· site s.·election r~quired that'_ the ba.se b.e ,remote £];-om. z~l:etropolitan:

areas;· re~ote from civ~l and milita.~y airway$ to ·preclude ae.rial

1.
observati.on ·or co.llisfon;° be easily a·cc.essible by. air; have gooei
I
, ..
T·op: SECR.lCT
39

· i4' · ..~ . rntr~ iA l1

H3flulfl via LH !.ii!P,H
Control Systern ·
 'l'.or· s E c RE 'F .
. year-round weather;· be capable of accommo4ating lar.ge numher~ of·

I p~·r_sonnel; have POL

. .
storage facilities;'.be- fa.irly clos._~
.
to. a~ -Ai.r. '

Force. installa.tion;-. be near a soU:rce. ·of :labor;. and have a·n· ·a, 000
I· .foot r.unwa y.

A total" of ten Air Force·ba~~s thcit were progra~med for· ..

closure w_ere inspected during .this·period. All ten we~e evaluated

I·
. · .. f.or. possible. use. Nohe
. met the. remoteness
. . . .. test, . and.at
. . most
. of.·

I them the annuq.l .operating costs would be. unacceptable. Oply~ Edwards

I Air
. .
Force
.
Base and
.·
the Watertown s~te
.
-were
. .
considere.d
.
worthy of.

serious cqnsideration; and the. security-at

. .
the. ·forrr.i.er base was·
I·. subject to question. Watertown was deficient in .pers_onnel acc.ommo-

.· d~ti_ons, POL storag_e· and its runway·,was inadequate. Howeyer, t~e .

security if provided _by virtue ·of its location within the restricted -AEC· ·

tes.ervation, made' it ideal

. for clandestine.aircra,ft
. .
testing.·.and.:.opera...;.
. ... . .

itons. What it lacked .in physical

.
·plant ·~ould_ be ~ectified with ·a "r~la-

I. tively moderate-construction program.· On 23.December 1959· the.DDP

, ...
app.ro~ed
. .
a decision -to establish Wat~;town
··.• :-· .
_
.
·as. the
..
prhnary·
. .
dome.sti_c,·
. .

.. bas'e for:Proj.ect OXCART,· ~ubjec.t to,.the·concurrence· of ·the itSAF

. .
... ·

arid: the AEC. .

His decisio~. however,· .did_nof i~ply. t~at
.
a.larg'e_pro'-
. .
1-.:·:
g111m .of base-improvements and,. new· construction"b.e start~d. · Until·

T o·p S Ji; CR.ET . • . y··rH•').·1· ·..

Randie 'J1!1 ·B L1u_w. . .
.. · 1 · ,., . . n·\l_l.;·· '·

contro\;;S.ystem ·
.... ·
 ..
..
I· TOP s·ECRET

I ·.a ·finalgo-a'liead. to build aircraft was.. gi~en, ex:penditur.~s t~ 'im~rov~

I Waterto'\Vn :facilities were to. be Hrnited.oD.ly to 'those neces:sa.ry

' '

to ..
.
I: s·ustain>th:e AR ·test program.

during ·early OXCART period~)

{See overleaf. for view of Watertown· ·

I .
. With the-Janua·ry. 1960 .app_roval .for the-.t'.ull-scale progr;:1.m, the
'

.. .
1. a.dyance planning" in selecting an operating
.
., .
base .paid
. .
off.; Early identi .. · '

. ffoation. of the.Watert~wn base perrriitted Headquarters engi~eers to

I develop a:n· orde.rly pl~n to ready.the bas'e for_ the .aircraft and ·a.ss«>cf-.
:: .

I a.ted. ground equipment on s cheduf.e. Lockheed. :was consulted from. the

. . ' . .
very beginning on what faci,lities 'V9uld be~.requi'red to support the
I flight test program:. Loc::kheed ·estimated major iten+S such as runway

I .
loadi~g weigh~s. m~ntJ1:1y fuel. consumption., hangars and .shop spac~, ..

·and numbers of people necessary to conduct the fll.gh,t test .. Other· con ..
I tractors were consulted on their need$. Armed with:the.major requ~re- ·
...
I: "
ments, Hea.dquarters
. w~·S a.ble to com~ ~p with
.
a preliminary
. . construction
. . .
1·
,
· engi:q.eering plan.

Since the Watertown·base Wa.s within the AEC nucl:ear test site·~
.. . --· -- •• > ,_ ••• ... ,, ........_ .. __ .....
·-••• ..- ... ---· ..
.... - - · · - • • , . . , ... ,,._,, ••o -:·r~-··''""'•"~-- ,.•M _ _ _ _ ,.,.,_..,._ •• > "'"'":~·-·
" .
·... ·it was ne.cessary· to obtain AEC appro~l to rea.ctivate. the base. An
• • ., • • • • • ' : . . ' ••••• , • . : ........ _ ... , ••• 4 - - · - - :. . ··---¥-·--· ~...... ·-···:·· ...

agr.eement drawn up·:in 1955 bet-we.en th.~· Agen¢y and. A EC allowed the.
I·
'. Agency tO iise· the ·watertown"sit~ for th~ U ..;i' flight·testing and t.raini~g.
I: 41.
:I.
'• T, 0 P S E C: R E 'T .

Handle.' vin BYH~AN

1. :Ccntrnl. System.·:
.... ·.
...
··,
:. ... · .•• ...
·.:
. .. ~
r:;:: ... •.
·r.~..

· ....
. .... ...... .. '~· . ·::

·.·.; . . .. . :
...
...: ... ;·.·
. .. ....
· ..
;

. ·'
..... '·
, ·I,::··:
~· •. r...:. :
... ,, "· • .
··: :•
.:·.
I t'' ·. t . . ..
•', ·, .... :-: ::.\.I ... ......
·" ..... ·'·~·· ...·.·.·.... • '• l'f...

.. " ~=.
.. ··.·
...... •••• .' ..... •• • .. •• ·; t<. ::: •• ;

..
: .···:
. .

.•.' '
·. . [">.i~~t~--',""•;,~°"·-..~-~-·••~,·-··~-~,.....~.
- •• ·"' """--
"--·-··-
. •.. . . " ~. -• --· ...-,-~ .•"'· ~ . ; " ~
~ .._•. •..-,.,.~
... ~' ~
- . • • -·--· -
~.
A~ ~
""" -...

•..•~ ._..
~-
. -..
-- . "'~
~
'>,~ .
- ~--
- - .. - ,.;- .;.,~ ·->.--.-..
"~
..... -
~ ~~
.- .•.-·,,
-..."'- ~•••-...--.-.•--~-..-.,•._,.··~..• ...·,,-, -' -. ·.•·.. . ~
,.,:>:, "-• --··.
...
..< ........
" ;..,·~..
"f!~lg... . "~if.f&i
· r n = - ~ f
"'"'Uf. . .. ~
" "~•~.B~ntr . l-~Aystaid,;.,+;:"i:Oi~,,
... ........ ff
~ ~-•f~ --:
t .J!lx vt'J·u·
..... ,.".';· :-.
"i! .. . ·:·:: '· : . ~~-~
''. ,. . . :'U.'-.:...J•........... '.. ·::•, , ; -. , '. .• •.·> "',,

--~ ~ -"~,~ ~~ ~
I -,;: - · · .,.-_-.- - ;>•,,...,...._
- :::-,."'
.. .<-,--;,
-- - • "'.- ,.:. ""--;,- • ·'"'"' ;C .:.-.- '.• ••••
·,•,,"-"
•'•."" ., , , . -. .•,
. Gt
' •i . ·•

~~--....- ,, -.--,_· . -- -··--·--=-

• --. - -·..•-'_.,,_.
.- ._ " -' . , . ; ,..
.> •.
;[O'-'f". - • ,._-•
,_ ·b'"-. - • -.C• .-.-..- , .- - •
i! p;-:'f:."': -· .. -:.,, "'.'-.... - .,....~..'~ .... :::t •--~,
·-·.; ...:.....,._ '1.-":'·-""' :,,,.::-~:..... .·· ~ _:;
-. --- • .Al> ..~ ~~....:....-*""-
"! ...... -:i'-;:;:-,,,:;::;;_::;
... . ., . ' . ... :-: : . ,. . u
.a ..
' .... . . . .
·'
..

:.:·:1 .'~~~.~~~. -~?. ~~~>'.:::· _,~~-~; ..... ' .....

·" 1 ._:_ . .,. • ·- .... • ' .. '!i<Oi •.. . _ - . •
. .. .,._ . .
"'~
 ·I:
·:1. ·'I' 0 P S E C R B
.4
'r

,
·To ·p~eserv·e cove~;and·$·ecurity._ the· AEC ost~.ns-ibly managed_ the.
:1 ·facility~·: All construction, maintenance.and hou~ekeeping had been .
.. :· '

· iperforµied
.. by .an .A.EC proprl:e.tary
. .con<;:~rn,
. . the »Reynolds:
.
Eiectric ·

.1 ·· . · ancLEtigineering C.ompa~y (REECO}. ".The 's~me tj'pe arrari.gement

~.s :renewe4 with·the AEC and·REECO.

.. _,. There·wa·s. considerable·

,ad;vantage tt)hav1:ng-. REECO pe.rf~.hn. the work~ .. It was a q~~itfied"

I '··const:r.u~:tion organiz.ation, . equipped' to ·handle the job and

, the·· sc~-m;e •. :Its relation to AEC ·pro~ded. the ·cover esse~tial .to the
was -.on

I . security "of .the· ope:'.!:'a.tiOn. Its" ejnploye,es. posse.ssed security clear-

.·1·: '
.
.
· ances· to work on the Nuc~ear Test Site.
.

.,
· :"A cover story for. the reactivation of Waterto~ ·was pr.ep~red ·
1··
in the.form .0£ a public information release to use in :reply to pres.s

I or
. other inquiries.
. ·it stated.that the ·.AEC
. fadlities
. .
at the site
. ·had

to
.1 . · been:;JI:\.ade availa.bl~ EG&G to !=onduct various and sundry radar

studies :with support from the USAF. The remot.e site Wat? chosen to»·

1· .. ,:edu~e ·the· 1Lkeliho6d. of .outside interference :af£ei:ting instrument

' .

1: .cali.bra.tfon and Ultimate test results.-. Use of AEC facilities did· not

affiliate ~e AEC .~r any'. of tis pl'o'gri:1:rp.s wlth: the ~ork going o~-,a~.

,...
1: . Wate:d:own. ·.. The AEC and EG&:G were· tu:~nished the t~xt·of -the p'r'.~ss

statement to use.. as· l'equired •. They.were· also inst~ucted to·pass

42.
I
T 0 P .S E C R. E T
I Bandle via nYEMAtl
Cnntr'nl s. . ,;.,. , .,
.u · u Y~-~tiil .
. .<·_:
I
,. ·.~rther
.
.. re·quests·for
- :·
information· .to HeadquarteTs, USAF,· Office of.
. .

I.'· .... ... l~o·rmatiori:-ser.vice, · wh<:> would jn turn seek replie"f! fro~' Project

ke.8.dqua-rter·s ~ ·
I. In ~rder for. the. reader to app.r.eciate the task of p~~~a·~ing.
. . . . . . : . - ' . . . '.• :. .

1· tbe.. base for occupancy, c::erta.in facts are nece~sary. Due .to its

. ·· loca,H9n;. 120. ~ile~ from the nea~e~t metropolita~ ar.ea (Las. Vegas), ..
1.
·per~onnel we.re required to liv~ at. the site during the work week.

I )n i.960 the nu:mber~ were low,. beginning with 15 and growing to ..

· 150 by the yea~'s end. This number represented chiefly contractor
I. . personnel engaged •in the AR testing a~d base construction. Except :..
r· fo~ contra·ctors based in Las Vegas (EG&G:and REECO)" no contractor

p~~·SOnnel were allowed to ·.m_aintain residences in Las Vegas ..

Lockheed supplie.d a C-47 ·shuttle service between Burbank and

Watertown £0.r its £reight and passenge~ needs .. A·.chartered D·-18

-{Lode.star):..was ·provid.ed· for tr.ansportatioD: betw~e.n ·La~· :Vegas ·and··

I
the base, ·chiefly to suppor~ the· EG&~ contingent. Surface access

I
, ..
to Watertown was quite ·?-if£icult because of distance and .the fact.

that the ·only road-leading into the· site had deteriorated since "19.57.

Im:inedj:ate needs at Watertown ..were fulfilleP, on an as-needed·.

1.·
basis during '19f!O. Surplus housi.ng in tiie".form of trailer.s w~s
I· . 43
': .
. .
.'l' o·p SEC :R:E T
Handle vi.a lWtM1~-tr ·
·Control System.
'.
.....
,
I·.· . .
,. .

. \

procured.to-billet co~stru~tion workers.as t}faey.arriyed .. A new well.

I wa~ c;lug. ·Limited recrea~ional facilities were pr0Vi.4ed .. An Agency · . ··

staff ciyil eng_ineer v:1as as.signed tO the base. He p_r~,yi_ded tn~·_nece.s­

1.·
..
.
~ary
.. .
engihee~ing.
. .
guidance
. . to th:e Chief
. of .Base,
.
and
. .
p~rfoi-med
. . liaison.
.
.
I .
for Project Headquarters with the construction· c?ntracto~,

·:By_ May 1960 the. OJ:'.>.erations .:Bra,.nch, DP:Q, estimated a require-

1·
· nient for ·500,. 000_.gallons of aircra:f~ fuel per month~~:· -~~i~er st()rage

I· fa¢ili.ties ,at, .nor.~eans. of tran.s.port to, Waterto~_~xist~_d. ·F.uel

.. .:. ;. :: 1: =- ....:. . . ·.: .

would .he rail.:.transported to Las Vegas from the· refin.~ry. ·After

,.
1·
examining airlift, ptpeline, railro_ad, highway and comb_iJ:?-ations· of

these modes of transport, it was determinec;I that true~.- transport

I··. Wa.s ·m.ost" ec~momiCal. Eighteen tnUe$· of highway le.<:!-d.~~~ :i~~o the.

. .base nee:ded· re·sµrfa:cing .to bear truck-weights,

.
but this was cheaper

I·. .
. .
than to construct rail .or pipeline system_s •
.

I
, ...
Initial ·estima:tes. of A-12: runway req~irements ·cal~ed for an

8, 500· foo~ length .. The existing runw<!:-y was a 5, 000. foo.t asphalt

strip i:ncapab~e of supi:>or~ing the weights .of the A-12,. Plans for a

I· _new conc,rete ·ru.nw~y were d·rawn up and. prelimi~~ry eU.gineering begun~:

..
The section of the AEC Nevada. Te·st.Site ·on which Watertown
I bas.e .wa·s loc~ted was ·officially d~~igriatedt'A~ea Sl" on AEC_:rnaps~
0

1:
.44·

I.
.. . ·Handle via BYEMAM
I· . Contrnl System . . .
. :.
 ,.
. ..
I. .

SECRET
I As such,· it was afforded' the normal. s.ecurity. protection the rest. ·of··.

I .tlie AEC"~eservation enjoyed.: . T.he.re were some 14·, 000 acres· of.. \:

I. land immediately adjacent t~ and overlooking the. Watertown f;.cilify \

that. were not part .. of.·the AEC complex. Unrestricted access. to the. · :}
-. j•I .
I· adjoining property would permit unauthorized viewing of the base's
i

I .activities. Legal measures were instituted to ha ye the

-
l~n9.
. . .
~ith-.
I .
/

d~awn from.public u.se in an attempf to provid.e /. a'.p~otec.tive.···.sc~reep..··

I .... . .
i
).
· In ·October.1960· a USAF cover. organization was ·established to: ·

I give the activities at Watertown a legitimate character •. This organi.-

/ . . .

I. · .zation was designated Detachment 1, l1Z9th (.USAF) Spec.iaf.Activ.ity .

.Squadron, Mercury, Nevaqa. Its parent unit ·was ·a· fictitious. unit at

Fort Myer, ·Virginia. All Agency staff and c.ontract personnel ·were

given USAF ·doc:umeritation. upon assig:t;tm.ent to. the .-field ~ctivity. ·

. CiJ!.,/USAF Ag,li'eement on ·OXCART '_

I'
' .
!
On i4 October 1~60 the·fi~al've.rs.ion ofthe.·joirit CIA/U.~F

agreeme;nt on organization a;nd delineat~a'n of· ~esponsibilities fqr

... · Proje.ct OXCART was completed.:. ·The document was· ~ign·ed i:ri.
. . . . .. .. . ... ·. . ·.. . . . 1/
February 1961 by Mr~ .Dulles ·and GeneJ;"al· White·, (;hief of ~taff, ·usA$".'...,...

. .
I· 'l I· OXC-0321 (BYE 26'08 -6.6), .. 14· October 196-C).
._.. Organlzation· and
Delineation of·Responsibilities Project OXCA.R':r~ See.Annex 127~
1.·
45.

'I..."

........ ·-: ....

. .
.. . 11.11· · n·•· rh't'i·•.u.1·
Han .. e~.a rt-:-:.. ·ro t.·J
. .

·": .control Systco ·

. . i. ...
 ..
T 0. P ·s E C R)S .T ·

USAF .Procurement: .LRl Versioi;l,of A-.!Z ·

I · '. .: l:zi O~tober
. 1960.the:USAF·d·~cided.to buy a lO~g range in~~rcep.tor
. : . . . ··:·.:·:.

I·. ver·sion·of th.e A-12. T.he Contracts Staff of DPJ) was a~ked·.to write.

the ·co~tract:s·. A ,twofold .purpo.s·e wa~ served. by havin.g contracting

I· perforrp.ed outside normal military channels. The ..' security of the

I·.· · A-f2. program would.be preserved by ke.eping .the:.AJ:"-12 purcha.se

...
·classi:fie·ci. Secondly, the· order £or three AF-lZ afrcraft·made. easier
I· a de:c:::ision to redtic·e the· 12 A-12 afrcra~t order .to 10 •. The cost esti..;

I
,,. .
mates· be'ing submitted by Lockhe~d .were· exceeding ava'ilable funds.

A· reducti~n in the numbe.rs ·of A-12's· to.be procured wa~. '!:he·only"

. .
. practical st.ep that ·<?ould keep the
..
·pr~gram
'
.
budget ~n balance.
.·
Addi:i:-g
. .
three AF-12 1 s. to the pro<1:uction c~ntra.ct therefore lessened the itn~

pact of a two A-12 ai;rcraft reduction on Lockhee.d, and eased. the '

.strains ·on the OXCART bud,get. Included· in the _USAF. AF"!''l2·procure...:

. wa:~ ?on order for .10 J -58 engines

' " ment .
a.s a follp:t.Y-oti
. .
to th~'.:30
.
.engines '

' . . . :

1·.«; · p~eviously ordered for t.he OXCART program... ·Extension of the en-
• ' • • • : • • • • • • # • • • • •

I ....· . . · of Pratt &: Whitney • The total AF-12 program. (Project KED.LOCK) · .' ·
' ' • . •• • •..•:. • .+:->

e~timated t·o 'C:ost,,over .$111 ml.llion, one-half,.of'which w~s

I .was
.. . . ..: for

..
~lie··Hugh~·s Aircraft Company to.. design and .buii:d\the 'fire c.~~trol and
I 46

.T.OP· SE G.R E·!I'

"ffandf evra- BYH1j'1l

.Cnntror·systefJ}. :;.:
 .~t:.:.~·
.. , t . ."'J!lllllll.>:-··s-'.''. ...,..,., . .~,:'. :~<:: ·.· !".{'11111!"' '~?!''.....!<" Jll.!I'"''"....'(' .{. ~· ,,...,.,,_.,, •... ·.· ');,' ~
".(",~'
., .. ,
'.-·.
.·I:,.· •.• I\)\"". "t
·~. ~; :L.
;i: ~;"~:.: . .t:
'i: ;
.'1·

. ..... , .. .: ..
.... : .~.~.
/
:.·· ...

...'

J
I
.I
!.
.. •
·,

:
i
:·
iI
,.
t.
1··· -.·
TOP ·s:Ec"n:sT
. .. . .

I.
: ':mtss~le.. system for the AF-12·. ·The contracts' were th¢_ first of .many
I .. .
the,.:.A,gency .would w~ite for the. USAF in follow-ox:i-_?r assoC:iated.pro·.

I: og"ra~s -to.preserve :th~· s~c·urity .of_A ~l~ development and produc~ion•.

. .
.-. Ar~~ 51 Designa~ed
I Th.e scope 0£ DPD activities· in.the .OXCART program widened.·

I . . .
in 1961 as the _program picked up mqmenturn. ·Action. was expedited

·to r.eady the operating. site !or occupancy by the aircraft an4 t~st' · · .'

,.
I· ··personnel. Security considerations ca!ied fo:i; a new name by which

·the site would be identifit;!d. ·. Some· association· of the· CIA and the. U-2 ··

1· : with ·the·ba.se had· become known in ·uncleared USAF.and·industry

· _ci.~cl~s as a result ()f the ·Poviers: incident in- May 19.6_0~ .To minimize

I possible sp.eculation by unwit_ting persons-,· ~11 earlier terms of ref~r- ·

1· . encie t"o the base, such as ·"Watertown", "Grooi:n ·Lake"; "The Ra~ch 1 .1 ;
. . .
·etc., were ordered eliminated froin the :vocabul~r·y of OXGART_-cl_eared

I personnel. . Henceforth it was to be r·e.ferred to siI~1ply as. 11Are·a 51",

I· ····-.
the official °AEC designator for that pbrtion
.
of. the :Nevada·
. .
Test Site.

""Every ·effor.t·would be. m.ade throughout the p;rogram to disassociate·

I .
Agency interest in the base.".
.

I Tables· of. ·orga.niza ti on .V-(e re drawn UJ;> by the Ope r.a tions and

Mat~riel·Staffs of DPD for initial manning·.. The first ·T/0 for the
I.
._47
1· T () P a E C .R E T

1-.·
1·. operating detachment called· for 70 personnel...· Per.sonnel levies
. .. .. .

, ..
.
·were ma.de on. the ·usAF
.
.
for
.
.sary to man the. detacJin:1ent~
the varj.ous
. military
. specialties
. .
.
neces-
.
·
.
.A. ·p~sing s.chedule for USAF detailees.

was wbrked out,. timed to 'the estimated: arrival times of the A-12·
[.
. aircraft. It was planned to have people identified by 1 May 1961;

I "
ne.cessary
. clearance
... . and processing
. by·.1 August; .in place at Area. Sl
. .
by· October, and ready to begin trainj.n~ on 15 ·Marc.h 1962.' · . ·
I·
'The Air Force personnel ·wer.e .carefully selected prior t9

I nomination for duty with CIA.· as in ·the case. of .the U-2 program.

-Because of ·cfos e ~orking

. ·.
·r·ela tionship~ ·with .SA<:; in the.
.
·ti -2 program; ..

-a request was sent to ~at Command. fo·r. guidance in the procure.ment

.of a detachment c·ommander~ SAC respon.de.d with nominations· for a

commaD:d~r and key memb~rs of his staff; sc'reeried from the ranks
I
_of the ·strategic Air Command.
OXcART .Pilot Selection .
. . .
Great emphasis .was put on the· choice_ ·of pilots for ·the pr.ogram. ·
-•"
(ien·er~l:Don Fli~kinger . was"tasked to coo·rdinat.e the medica.1 and·
. .
. physiolog~cal .criteria. Operational ·requirements were established .

. by the,-DPD"operations staff. 'The pilots ·had' to.: demonstrate outstand-

....:
' .
'
· ing proficiency and professional competency.' They. 'h().d to be.jet
I ..

48
I: . . T 0 l? . ·s E C :a· E 'I'
... Ha··n:~1·e·
" U :
:v·ia- Pv:n~ ~rt- ·
!.I n-'.'" ••- - -
a. .Control_ s~·stum . :
 'f o·p .5 E C RE T

fighter pilots with ce:r.tain mandatory· experience qualifications: in.

· ·the fates(jet' fighter a.ire raft. They had·to. b~ ·emotionally ~tab1e,

.we1l·m9ti~ated, enthusias.tic anQ.,poss.e$.sed of. ·good.pe.rson.al habits.

I
It was desir.ed
. that they be between ·~s and 4o,
. . of ·ag~; under
yea.rs
I. six feet tall a~d 175 pounds or les·s in \Veiglit. The size qualification

was. dictated by the size of the A-12 cockpit. {See overleaf for yi.ew ·

of .pilot in cockpit. } Air

. . Force pilot
. fiies weTe sqreened- quite
. car:e-·.
.

. .fully for pQSsible candidates and a list of pilots .was obtained .. ·Back-

ground investigations and security assessments· eliminate<,i some.".

PsychQlogica1 assessments and physical. eJ;Caminati·ons. eliminated .

others. All remaining nom;inees were given a f~nil review by the ..

Agency Medical and Psyc~ological Staffs prior to final ca.n4idate

selection.

Pre-evalua.tj.on processing ;t'esulted in ·~ixteen·p~~ential pilot·

I nominees. This group. underwent an int.ens.iv.e. s·ecur.ity and m.edica.l

1. '
scrutiny by the Agency. ·Those who remained were then a:i;>proached
~.

to take emplo)rmerit with the·A~en~yon.·a. very.highly c~ssfried.pro- ·.

I . .
ject involving a very a.dvanced aircra;ft.
:

In November,·· 1961, commit-·.

I ments ~ere obta.iried from five of the group. The $mall numbe.r recruited.

required tha:t a ·Second .selection proces S be un:dert.akep, 'Qualifying

I
49.
1. ·- . TOP SECRET

I::
\
I T.E):P SECRET.
1··.
standa."rds were not relaxed, but administrative procedures were: .
I revis-ed·to· ~1gh~~n:u.p pre"!"eva:luation·p~ocess-ing ~~d spe~d up pilot

1. ·candidate_. identification •

.Pi.lot .selecti.on wa_s conduc.ted tinder ~e cove~ legend of

I "e::itablishing selection. criteri~ fo·:r -spa.~e crews 11 •. ~rrangemertts
.
I.
.
·were
.
made. with
.. .
the USAF
. '•
to .ef£ect appropr1ate transfers
. . . . . and assign-
ments to ·cove·r their training, and lay the basis for thei; "tr.a.D.s"itiori
I from military
.
to civilian
. status. ·Pilot"
. .
compensation
. . and insurance

I ..
a:rrangemeht"s were--similar to that for the u_:..2 pilots.

Only· one £urthe r step remainec;l b~fore a pilot would ·be brought
0

I . .
int(>· the operational phase of the ·prog·ram. · Following_ the
.
Powe~s ·

I ~cident, an Overflight Panel had ·beeri e.s tablished- under the· Di rector

S~c~rity Ag~ncy 1 s a~proval

1·· of to gra_nt,the final or disappr?val on
• i

•
-e~ch i~dividual ·from
• w •
a ris~-of~capture ·and ass~cia"ted consid"erations
• • • • • •

I
, ..
standpoint. _The panel-had .repree(~ntation ~rom the Office of S.ecurity~.

CI :Sta.ff, Medical Staff,· TSD, · OTR, and Project Headquarters.. ·The ·

Pa.net met periodical~y the next t_wo yea._rs until the· initial pilot· com-
I· plem.Emt was: ·complete.

I
1.· 50

1·· .T0 P ·s .E. G R E ..T . . . . . . .

,_. .··HanJ1n
u '" ,;·,~ nvt::~ ~1'-1·,.
·'i ......... , ....... s t

· Contrn\ System •.· . .

•.
 C05492927
·1
:·1·
·1· .'The ,Area Si physical build-up in 1961 saw completion of::the·

B~ s·oO-fo6t concrete rUn.way, 100 'feet. wide for c.ost saving purpo~e.~
.1·
. .
. ve!!sU:s 200· feet for rrtilitar.y runways.· Three surplus Navy hangars·
:.1 were obtained, dism~ntled and erected· on th~ north side of the, ~ase. ·

I. Surplus Babbitt .housing was located on

.
~n old NaVy-
. ·. ·.·
install~ti'9n.
.

·Slightly-over 100 ·of.these buil~Hngs ·were. b:-an.sported to Area.Sl and··

.I .. . . ' .. . -. .

made . -:ready for occupancy... The 18 ·miles of road paving wa·s ii~s·q
.

I completed· in 1961.
.....
Since C'Ommercial power was not available,. addi-

.tiop.al generators were brought in to p~ovide the. electrical.power

I·· r.equired by ·the growi~g installation. The fuel tank farm wa~ begun :..

·1
.,
.. .

..
in 1961; and co:nstruction was ·completed in early·l962· 'with a capacity

for-1, 320, 000 gallons of fuel. : Ware.housing and shop spac~ was._ pro- .'

·. viqed,. either by new .c~nstruction.. o.r re:habilitation of <:>lder. buildings.·

1· •

Essential" facilitie·s .we.re r~ady

.

in· time ..for the forecast delive.ry

•• lill

dat~

:1 of Aire-raft
. ·.
No.·. 1 in
...
Augu,st.1961.

. Pelive ry :·schedule: Delay~

.•·.
.1.·... . .
.Lockheed. reported
.
.
in January
.
.19.61 that. tooling
.
problems
. ..
were .
.

·1 being solved.• but that 'the material ·delive.ry· situation was a dismal

picture. In particular, titanium wing extrusions were far behind'

I·
:.:, ·- . T 0 .P
51 .

'S E C R E T.

.·.1·
,C05492~27
·I ..
. . ·. .
- :FOP SECRET
··1·
·:· ·:
delivery sched';l,le. Without material, Lockheed was unable to .wo·rk ·

.to-a· programmed manp9wer. le.vel. At ori~ point,· in· March 1961,

· .o~y· 20% . of.:th~ labor-force was able .~o work on fabrication due

to material shortage~ In one o.f his. progress reports, Mr. Johnson_

wrote ~s follows to Mr. Bissell:

"Schedides are in jeopardy on two Jr6nts. One. is in

. the assembly of the wing and the· other·is in sa:tisfacto:ry .
d~velopm~nt of the engine. Our. evaluation· shows that ea.th.

I:· of these programs is f;rom 3 to ·4 months behind the current _

schedule~: While every e"ffort is being· exp-ended t0.-m:ake up
much of this time, I would be greatly amiss not to state

., .I··
..
these facts, .so that excessiye overtime. is not applied at
g:r~at cost in.such .areas· as development.of facilities at the
test area. And there may be other. important vendors in
trouble trying to .make the initial schedule. 11

Mr. Bis~ell responded with the following·sharp message: -

I./

I· "Johnson from Bissell.

~1 "I .. I have learneq of. your expe~ted additi~na1 delay

in.first flight from 30 August.to 1 December .1961. This news·
.is· ·extremely shocking on to.p of our preVious s_lipJ:'ag·e:frorxi
.1 ·May to August and my understanding as
of.our meeting .
19 December that the"titanium extrusion p·roblems were
· e s ·9 entially ove re OO?-e.
·I. "-2. In addition to the problems· iri. overweight and·
·-1· effects. on .performance uncertainties·"in the A. R. field, ..

1/ .oxc.:.1433, 7 March.1961. LAC Progress Report #18· (filed in.·

·I D/ R&.D/OSA files)~

:1.- 5Z

'·.1 T· .0 P S ;s· G R ·:s T

.·1:· ... ·.
 C05492927.
:I 'f' 0 :P

·1·. ·.· . · ..
· · ~nd .the=. ·extrern..e. difficUl..ties being encqtintered ·~y ·otlier . ·
..
'I · contractors, t}lese delays caus:e.-me to question. th¢
desirability of condnuing .the re·c.onnai_ssance
.thi-s.. airc:"raft.·
. . ·version. o(.

.1:· . "3. I trust this is the la~t of such dis'appoiri.tments

·short of a severe earthquake in BU:rba,nk~ . On that assump- .

.I tion I presume you ·are working·_round the .clock. t_o cornplet e.

·the wing .a:sse:r:ribly and wiU employ ail re_asonable short cuts .
. to expedite·"corhpleti.on of the first several airc.raft and .re..:.
:1 covery of delivery· schedule!'! ASA..P. ·
.
11 4~ .. I
~hould ·welcome your. remarks oh mea~ur~s
·.I you ar~ taking to prevent skyrocketing costs due· to. this·
delay both .in Burbank and .other: suppiiers On' t}fe s\ibJects
of build .. up at the test site, perso~el acquisition; .ovex:-
I. time, etc.
. ..
. 5. I -an1 a~ious also to explore the impact. of .the
11

I "highly-accelerated flight test program of·this additional

delay .. This. has become an item of ·major expense. and per-
haps· need be replanned on less c;qstly basis." ll : ·
I It was imperative at this point _that Proj'ect Headquarters·

;I·
.. ,. . impr9ve its capability to monitor airframe

. fiscal and ~iming

deve~opment·against the..

requirements . . It was. decided to employ a top-level.

ae~onautical engineer, to be resident at the ~ontract~r 1 s. faciiities,

I. who·~-ould monit~r program progress and sub~it technical repo_rts .

.In Ma:y.1961 an_exper-ienced in-plant:representative: ?f_the·Agency ·was~

. il).stalled·.and his indep:endent reports~ kept the program.

. technical staff°
·:1
. . . . :_ .. . . . ..

abreas't of c1ev'eiopments at Lockh~ed ~n a_more timely b~~is.

.1.· !./. AP_IC 8511,

··~ ..
7 March 1961.. ADIC: to· BEIGE.

·..·· 53 ..
".
I TO.P SECRET

I
 ·C05492927
.·1· . .,

..
:, .

T6 improve. ~elivery
TOP SEGRE'±'

of titanium a ·Hea.dqua:r_ters team: Vi.sited.

-·I .. ··.
Titanium
.
M'etals
. :
C~rporation
.
( TMC)
. . .,.
dir~ct!y
. to irripri:;~s
..
on _its '

-.-1 . ·
.
P.re~iQ.ent·the hig~ national objectives and.priority of the OXCA~T- ':
. .
program . . Fuller. coop·erati?n was· promised .by the titanium supplier~
.1 In, ·:M:ay L9ck~eed ·reported that sufficient. sheet metal was ori hand fol,"

1· capacity production; but. that extr~si~ns ~ere still ·giving troµble.

The·fir.s:t flight_ for Aircraft-No. ·1 was ri.ow·set for 5 Decer.ri:.ber.1961.

-.I ·Concern' was again expr·essed with ~e statu.s of engine development

a?-d-possibte· la:-te· deliveries_.. · ..

By mid-year, fabrication ·of ·the first airframe was 'in h~nd;.

On 11 September, Pratt & Whitney info'rmed Lockheed of their con-

tinuing difficulties with the J _,5g in terms ·of we~gl:tt, delivery and

.I performance. Completion
. dp.te
.
£or Aircraft. No. 1 by now had slipped.·

to zz, De·cember °I961,-: and .f'.irst !light-Z7 Febrliary 19(>2. · In order· to

·.1.· m.ee:t eve~ this· last date, a substitut~ .~ngin.~ wou~d b_e .P,ecessary sh~c_e.· ·
.·1. the;J'-58 would not·h_e r_eady. It was proposed that a P&W J-75 engfo.e,

designed Jar th~· F.;.1os and _flomi in the u-2,· be u:s~d for: early ntghts .
.··1. Th~ engine, along with o.ther components,. ~ould' be fitted to the A-12

ah~frame,: and it. ~ould power.. the air~raft saf~ly·to

I .
. .
altitudes .-up to·.
...

.
50, 000 fe~t and at ~-peed:s up to Machi. 6 .
·1.
54
::1··· .
..
.;£
':F 0 ·p .S E G R B ':F
 .C05492927
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..
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, •• •
T 0 P SECRET

Adding to the anguish that ea.ch: slipJ.n-~elive.ry caus.~d at'

. ·1
. ..
.Project .H·eadq,~arters wa~ t:he accompartying in~r~as.e in cost ... · ·On··

13 Novernber ..1961 the tot~l p;,:opo's'.ed target price for IO·A-1z·a.ircraf~ .

.·.1 .. .
.
."submitted.by the contractor .·had r~~en to·$i6s, ~oo, ooo ..
,:1·. The
.
J-58 engine development
. . problems
. . '
of. Pratt
. ... &: .Whitney
. were· ·.

.·1: · · ·· . . . ~n the-'preceding
dii:ictissed . ..
p_ageS!
'.
of tl:l.is c;hapte~. .
T.hese technical

problems were tc:> persist .o:i;1: into 19.61 :and beyond, with progre'.ss.. slow · ·
:.·1· in s.olVing:,them. .The spiraling·costs atte:n.ding.the engine.de.velopment ·

·1. prog:rar.n was· also causing. concern.at Pr~ject Headquarters. Pratt&:·

~rigina~ estimate~,
._, .... . Whitney,· in submittlng:·its cost had sadly esti- '.

., ..
mated·on the. low side.·

···In January 1961 the Navy.a.nd.th'e

' ' .
Air
. Force
. entered-'·.i1'-to
.
negotia:...
·.. . .
·.

tion·fo~ direct funding of the J.-58 devel6pment program. This,.: in

··1.· .. -effoct, :-reduce.d Proje.ct Hea.dqua~ters~ funding. requirements. How-

I ever.· b"y· May 1961, the ~OSJtS had again risen •.· T~~ production."c~st"

of the 30 engin.e~ . w~s no.v-· estimated ·a~ over $45 million,· ~nd hy.
·1···
·,
. .

September ·19·61, ·tl:ie _c~st~ had -inc;eased 'f;o, over .$51 ~i~lion ..
. ....
The Air Force accepted a grea~el'. financial responsibilit.y in.:

eng~ne proc.urement b.ecause ·of its· in·volvement ·in . the AF-12 prqgz:am.
1·.
0

. . . . . . ·.
It was a_lso· P.e.i;ivfng mariy t~chnological ben:-efits in o:fu;~r Air F.oree .
. 1. ·
: .... , ·55

·1.
-C05492927.

. ,
·.1.

prog;rams~.
... ,·
TOP

The Navy. continued.to

·..
-SECRE-T
... ·
'··' .- ~

~rovide "funqs fo:r. si~ilar reason~-.:

.·1 J:?es:pite Jhe·magnitude.o_f its devel.~pment problems and the c6nse-

. . .

quent ·cost increase, the· J-58 engine ·was sti11.c-onsidered the o~ly
>I
..

pr·operfr stzed '.propulsion system for the. A-12 family of aircraft.· .

·I If the contractor were to.be held to the terms of the· contract•

. the. con?.:pa~y· would ·hav.e indeed been in se~rious .fin':i-n<;:ial Jeopardy'.

:1· . It was a..e m~ch ~o.·the interest of the_ Government~ as ·to the.·company.
·. . . . ... ~ .

'I:- that· such did ·not occur. The additional 10 engines required for

·the AF-12 program afforded ~he· opportunity.t-o.r·en-e'go.tiate the.

I existing engine procurement C«:?ntra.ct. ·.The contract was. ar,nerided
1:. : to permit rep'ricing ·i:ii·e 40 engin~s at a higher ~it levei •... The revised

·I ceiling pri~e would guarantee ultimate- recovery to Pratt. & Whitney

_of all the projected overrun. •The net· res'ult was tha.t·Pratt &.Whitney ·

I . WOUld.··llOt run the· risk .of defaulting On .the. delivery Of engines. It·

would also result in P&W deliv~ririg the 40·el'.l-gines wi:thout_a.penny

::I-
profit. An account. of the n:egotia_tions and contraCt action ier ~ori-
.1· ...... : tairied in Annex 128. -
i./

I ·Project Headquarters was not gentle. in.

. its relations
.
with: the
.

engine c o~t-ractor d':1 ring these· t~ying days,. and· in one instance
·. 1.
ll. OXC-2401,· 17 OC:tober 1961. _Price Oyerr~·on Pratt·&- Whitney
:.I · ·Engines, Contratt No. TT-1002. . .. . ·

·5Q·
:;·1··
'l' 0 P S 13 .€ R E T

. ,_'. -Handle· vin B'/£MMI .

Co.ntrol ~"".!:-('.!-:n · ·
._;j.;~r.;;;J
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·-1···
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·:1.
.strongly ..r~co~mended to Prat-~ &_Whitney rnanagem~nt._that:.
1·· . reorganization was nece~sary •. Pratt.&.- Whitney p.;,.oduction.. f~cilities· ..
were-in. East Hartford~ Conne·cticut, and its ·res~a··rch and development
I fac.ility was ·in West Palm ,J3each,: ·Florida.· In vie~.of·the app~rent

I
.
., ..
.
stagnation of the_ prog·ram, . partic:ularly in accti.mulati!lg meaningfu~ ·

engine test time. ·-:Mr. ~iss.ell; as part o_f _his strategy, re~ommetid'e.d:

that p~-im~:ry development work be c.o-located with"p.ro:ducti"on·in:

·I· Connecticut .. He concluded_ his l~tter of 29 Novemb~r t9_61-'to PX:att &

·1 ..· Whitney's General Manager, Mr. L. C. Mallet, with the following:

..... ,.· "In :vie";_, of increasing n~tional_ artq international .

. emphasis on high Mach number manned flight~ it must" be
clearly understo_od that this customer as .part of th~- de-
fense co~munity-is ~bligated to examin~- a::na· re-exa_mine ·
.I all avenues leading. toward the expeditious and ·economic
realization of this goal. · In thi_s regard 1 . the ·contractor's

·1 progress and performance must b·e.and is_ reappraised

continuously in relatibn ·to the progre~s achi~ved by com-
. ·petitive p-~ograms. 11 };./ ·

_·-1 Pratt &·Whitney ~as already r~sl'onding. with shi~ts ·in managerial

pei-s~~nel to and withiri-'the_ Florida facility rather than rel~c:ation to

I: • Hartf~rd.- Definite im,prove~ent ·began:to .app~ar in the: e11g.ine -d~.vel_.
·1.·. · opment managem~nt picture. arid the tactic of relocation tq Hartford
I.··

1: was· not presf!ed further.

·.
1 I OXC-2661, 29 Novemper· 1961. Relocation JTllD-ZO Engine
·_1 ·Developm_ent Program. See.Annex 129.
57'
:.1.-· · .....
_:,_
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T· 0 P S E C .R ·::e; T

.1 . In addition, and as a r·esult of".Headquar.ters co~ti~ued p·ressure

:·1 .. t() get the .program moving, two o~her contract~r. :reorgani~ati~Iis ..j.,~r-e: ·

Sub;tantiai.increa_ses in·engiri.~ering.manp~wer'°and ...

·1· ··implemented.-

. test facilities· availability we-re undertaken by Hamilton Standard Di\ri..:..

I ..sion (fuel controls) and Vick~rs Inc .. (hydraulic pump~), both subc~n-.

·1. tractors to Pratt &·Whitney~- These actions ·were· implemented in the·

Fall of 19·61 and in January 196.2 ·respectively. · _.ay.Dec'embe.r l96~

I the~e efforts had resulte.d in stibstantfal.improve~enL Fuel·c_ontrol;

I hydraulic pump, and engine turbine durability had each increased to

the point
.
0£ acceptable operation at their extreme temp~ratu;e
. . .
environ;-
1. ments for fifty hours .. After integration of thes~ improved components

:1 into.the engine as a whole, the engine satisfactorily con:lpleteci its

·.. fifty hour ·prelimina:ry flight rating test in Janua.ry i963. (See overleaf
·1 . · ·fo:r-pieture 0£ J-58 engine on test_starid-.J

·-I · · Events of 1962-1964

Deta·chment l; 1129th-(USAF) Special ·Activities _Squa(ir.on Established

··1. ...
· While awaiting the Lockheed ·night test ·phase to begin ·in early

I _1962, the operatibnal detachm;erit 'was taking form under the command·
.,·
I
\1·
.l

..
•·

·.
.. ·of Colonel .Robert J. Holbury,. USAF. Colonel Holbury .had been

r~(:<;>mmerided as the Commander .by Headquarters, SAC.· -!!).

r·. ' . 58.

.l" .
...
..

T.0 P SECR.:ET
I .

.l\.
\. ·.· ...
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'l'OP SECRET

Novem~er i961, he a~d his. stat:f·ha:d. be·en g.iven seve~al·daysi briefing .

.at .Pr.oje_et Headquarters~ . ·His charter_ is api>ended u .Annex 130~. ·

. continue.d. at the site _as Deputy Commander ror: Sup.port.·

. Key st~ff l'ersonnel were fi·rst se~t to A~ 12 gr~und sch:ool at .

B:U:rbll;nk· and ·to F-101 training> The F--101 most closely approximatep

·the A-12 .in.flying

. . chara.cteristi.cs
. .
and w~s ··equipped. with two.. .a£:te~-.
.
. . .

burni-ng engine.a. As un,it ·training would,de~el~p, -the ·F-101 was to

_:serve primarily ~s a trainer-for ~he A_.:.i2 _pilots, and s~condly as a .

.. cha.Se aircraft to moii.i.tor A:-l2 take-o~fs, l;'efuel.ings, a~d la~dings·.

Headquarters' planning for detachment training called .for

:_several types of support aircraft .to b_e supplied ·by .the. USAF. These

.I. included eight F:..101-'s for training, two T-33 1 s f~r proficiency. flying,

a C.•13.0 for: cargo transport,. a U.-3A.Ior administra..tive purpos.es, a .

I helicopter .for .sea;ch and r~s-cue 'and ·a. C~ssna~lSQ fo~ liaison ~s.e~ ·

,,.
:I ..In addition, .Lockh~·ed ·provided an E':..104 .to. a~t as ch~se atrcraft._d~r-.

. ,. ing_ the A-12. flight ·test period •. The s_upport"aircraft began ar.riVirig.

in the Spring of 1962 .

Maintenance.of the support a·ir6r.aft w"as· to be accomplished ·at

.1·· Area 51 •. Additional personnel w~re required, ari.d in _JulY: the staffing .'

·;_, .;.-__ 59

.,,.·.
j."Q P S E-C .RE T
.· Hannie via DYG;?Arl ·
·.Control _System .
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. ,. 'i' OP
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SECRET

complement at Area 51 {also referred to.as Station·D within n·PD to·

:1:·. · d~stt·hguish it'fr~m: ,the U-2_.detach.merit~) increas.ed to.144.-position~~-

.··1 ., Most of ·tlie·new po.siti()iiS reflect~d .the needs to mai:O:tain the.'s:uppo_rt

airc:raft .

,.,:
.1..:
...
. .
.In JatlUary 1962, an agreement was reached with the Fe4eral .

Aviation Agency that expanded. the resti::icted air space in

of Area .Sl. 'The pui:pos~. of.the restricti6n was.' to prevent ~uthorized

th~ vicinity

aircr_aft fr:om overflying A:rea' 51. Certain FAA air traffic controllers:

I. were cleared for'·the O~CAR.T Pr~ject •. Their f\inction was to i:nsure

..

,.
that the unauthorized aircraft did not violate the order. The -restricted·
-.1.
air space Wa.s expanded .in s:u,bsequent years as 'the :A-12 began flying .

longer train;ng ~outes over the continental l,Jnited States •. The expanded.
. . . .
. ·.air space restriCtion was necessary to allow the A..:.12 to cli~b out to
·:1· . . . ' .

op~r1i.t.ing ~ltitudes unobserv~d by other airc:i::-aft•. This 13ubjed: wni be

1· · . treated la:ter in more de.tail.
..
... ,_: .
Bt:iefin,gs· were given to ~e North American Air Defense Command
.

.· .. to. prepare them for . the fll.ghts of the .A-12..

.. The· brtefings and Clearances

I ' .
were necessary to .pr~clude ai'r _deferis~~£ighters _reacting to the 'appear-:

·-1··.
. . . a.nce-.of high-speed, high-flying tµiidentified aircraft~· Procedure.a· were···
. .
~stablishe·d with NOR.A:D :whereby A-12 flights ·would not-exc:ite air defense
-1:. 6.0
..

:1. Handle via. BYEMAM

· .Control· S1sta!i1. ·
I , ....
 .C05492927
,I TOP SECRET

·I
.I. ~iscus·s the:appe'a-r~nce of this high:pedormance aircraft on their.

: radar. scopes.
.
I· ..
Ref-qeling coric.epts req~ired. prepositioni_ng of ~st quantities .

·I . . ' '
of fuel. ~t .certain
,•·. . points
. outside
. the Unit~d State.s·.
•. '
Special
. tank farms .
we~e prog'ramrned at Beale Air F~rce Bas~. California; Ei~lson Air
:1·
Force
.
Base., Alaska; Thule Air Base,· Greenland;
.
·Kadena Ai.r B~!Se,

.1
'

·. Okina:wa; a,nd at Ada::nia..; ';['urkey. Since the A-lZ used specially refined

I fuel; the-se tank·farms were reserved exclusively for use by the·

OXCART program •.~v~ry small de~·chrnents of technicians were·

.I· ins.tailed at thes·e locations to-maintain the fuel s·torage· facility and .

:I. arrange f~r periodic quality control ·fuel tests.

. . .

I. . Firs·t Flight _of the A-12

At. the Lockheed B:urbq.nk plant, ·_AircJ;aft No. _l ( se.rially numbered

I 121) had co~pleted.assernbly~ It was· give1:- itS final· tests and ~heekout
•' ..
' 'during ·January and February; 1962, . Whe~ the· engi~eering test.s. _were ..
I completed, th_e a:ircraft was partially disassemb-ied ·for. shipment to

:.1. Area 51. !t.''h.ad been ~stablis~ed ...;.ery ~arly in_oX.CART p,l~nning_ that..

.for. practical reasons, l. e._, ·inadequate-runway». th.e A~lZ. could not fly
'I .

tr.om
'

the Burbank in.a.nufactUring facility to' the

.

test site. The ~ov-~nien~ ·

·1·
...

. ..
61

·I
,.
;_·,

'I' 0 P ·. ·s E .G RE T

..
. Handle -via :BYEMMl
. ·:
Cnntrnt . 31~1m~1
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.I.· .
TOP SECRE'f
:1.
of. the· fuU'"!s.cale AR test model had ·be.en succes.sfully acco1:l?-plish.ed
.'.'I: . '

via· a."specia.lly-de~igned -trail~r truck, over ·453 miles of highWa.y in~·

:., . .. N~:>vember'_i959. ·.A. thorough. surv_ey of the route wa~ made in Jurie

. '1961, to determine the hazards and:problems _of moving the 'actucil

I aircraft. It was found possible to. move a package'~ which.'m.easured

·I· 35. feet wide p.nd.105 .feet

.
long, without major
. difficulty. '
Obstructing· ..

road·sign~. had to be.r·emoved, trees needed.trimrxi~ng and som.e road-..

I· · side earth banks required .ie·veling~ · Appropriate arrangements were .' ,
. -
1. made with police authorities and loca1:.o£ficials to-accomplish
•
th~ s-afe

. transport.of. the airc_raft. · The ~ntire fuselage; minus w.ing.s, was

·1 . ·crated and .cov_el'ed, load.ed on.,the special-~esign. tratle~ and moved

I· ·out.<;>£.. th~ aurbc;i.nk

. pla.nt
. ..
on 26 .Febru~:ry 1962.
. '
It a:-rrived at Area.
. 51.
. '

·1·
"
. : two d?.tys l~ter. (See overleaf for· enroute picture. )

~ .Reas~sei:nbly
. . of the aircraft ms
. accomplished and
.
·the J..: 75 ·

·I ... engines· installed in prepara~ion'f9r.ground.:i:uns and .taxi check~ut's ...

"
prior to flight test•. When fuel was placed in the 'tanks, numerO'us lea.ks
I . developed, .ma~y of a dangero'l,l.~ .nature. :·The tank se_aling cor.p.po:un:ds .
..
.1· .
had failed in lar~~ areas ..due to non:-adherence:_to the .metal~

., .. necessary
.
to ·strip the tanks .of the f'aulty sealing tompounds
.

flight .~s
.

ag.ai:tl. dela.y~d·.
. ~
It was.

and reline :

the~ with ·new materials; First

. .

1.
'

·" 62.
:t ·
.. ..
':e 0 P · S .13 C R E T

Hanma via BYH;~i,;n .·

'I. ..· ' g6nticl _s;~.tcm ··
 - -· ...
- -··-··- ·- •• - -· - - -
- , .,,,.,
•t.,
.
......... 0
0
(Jl
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·:·- ..·.
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\,!) .
N
.._]

... ._

·, .. : ··: . .
:.:.
..· '.•" ···... "
;.. .
.
. '"" "''~·.~:'
.
t·;··i"'·· ·~ ~·,,..
.
.e-·::., -·~;,.f.,,,trllx.
·.·. -: ... ·.\ .. :.··
...
/~',..,.:· ~;'.

·. ;J.;:-:>::·".· ,. .
·: C05492927
·I·
TOP .SECRET
··1··
. .

Lockheed turned to. a fuei tank: s ~aling compound tha~· would

. pe: sati~factory for early' s~age flight te~ttng and repaired· th~ air-

·craft's fuel tanks •. On Z6 April 1962,. Aircraft.121 ~ade its mafden

flight of some 40 minutes; ....and it performed. satisfactorily....

I . 30 April 1962, the official first flight of the OXCAR'J:'
On . aircraft
' .
.

.·1 ·occurred, witnessed .by Project pers.onnel led· by Dr. Herbert ScoVille. ·
. ,. ·*· r·epresen~tives from.
.
.·1· : Deputy Director for Res.earch, co:opel'ating

government agenCies, and .Participating contractors. T.he a:ircraft,

I .pil~ted by L<?ckheed test pilot,. Mr.· Lou~~· ~h~lk,. took off at 170 knots,·
·1 · at.a g;ross·weight .of 72, 000 pounds,. and cli~bed to 30; 000 feet alti-

·tude. · Top speed of 340 knots waf? attained. , After 59 minutes of

flight, the aircraft landed. ·The ,t>ilot reporte~ the ~irc:raft res.ponded

·1. . well an4 was extremely.. stab~e. Mr. Jomis~n of Lockheed reported

·.it.to be the sm~othest of£i~.iaf fir.st flight' of an:y aircr~ft·he had· de;..
I signed o~ tested. On its secon~ flight,. 4 ~ay ~962, />..i~c.raft :j.21 ·

.1·· . reached .Machi. l~

.
On both nights, ·only.· :r:P.inor problems were
. ..
offic~et.l
1.·. .reported·. (se·e overleaf for first flight picture.)

.,
·I
..
* · ·.Pr·oject Headquarter~, formerly ·n~velopment Projects Divisipn ··
-in-.'.DDJ?, was~n~w the. Office' or' Special Activities under the
Deputy.Director for Research~

63•
·
·

··I;
,
....

..
T 0 p s :8 c R.' E T ·. . 'HanitJ'
uU
-'. ,,;,~Y: RVfM
\I •·

.Control· Sy~~am.
HI
~I :..~.u'i11
 '.\
1 . :.•~
"·"

. ;:•
.... .. ·.
'·

'. ·'··
' ...
.. :·:·
. ' ... ...

.' '.
... '

. .1:
., . ~'

.. .:
~~ .. : .. •.
~·· ·. '

. .·:_:
......
: :-..• ··
:·C05492927
I:
.... ,-_ ....
. .

M;r. John A. McCone (who had. succeec1ed-·Mr;.·Dulles· as DCI

·I iri. November 1961) sent the foliowi.n~ m.ess~g~ of. cong:r:ati,11ati~·ns:

·-.·1
. .
"To Mr.· ·Johnson from M~.-- McCone:
. . .
11
· Have been brie"fed by Dr.- Scoville· on the events of.
1~ last Monday. ·Wish to ex~end rny·best·wis·hes for c.ontinuep
·success~.::: Now th.at we_ hav:e :i:he initia,l fligh:t aGCOin;plished~
tam directing every effort be made.-by this Headquarters
·I. t9 expedite ·an aspects of pr~g-ram· in o-rder to -a~tain an op~ra-
. tional 'posture as ·soon as. possible. : Please· p~s,s· to those who ·. ·
. -. assisted ."you· in this accomplishment. my" pers·o~al apprec.ia~ion:.
I . for a job'·.'.weil done; 11 ·]:_/ · · ·

. By now, the Pratt_.&_ yYhitney J-58 (JTllD-20_ modei) engine_ .

I . development program was in _an" inten_sive -ground endurance. testing .

··1 . ·.·p_hase preparatory to flight.quaiificati9n.: Four· 50-hour-~relim.ina·ry

.· endu~ance engine tests had ·been completed •. · Test tim·e accumulation.

I
..
.
-,. .
reflected the following figures: ..

Totai:. En.gine Tiine (Various_J..;.,58. c~n#gurations) 3, 883 h:ou·rs-

:Afte:r:burner: Time· · ' 548 '11
· JTHD·-20 Configuration T.\~e · · l, 030
·I Mach_ I. 5 Tempe_rature Time
Mach 2. 0 T_emperature Time
39a
· z4.3
II
,,.
"

··1. . .,..
l\(1ach 3. 0. Temperature ·Time
Maxim.~· Turbine· T·ernper~ture ·Time
. 23'
2 76-.
11 "

."
.. · .E:ngine Time. With Automatic Conti;ois . 295 ... II

·1.· . .
·Significant progress was· being made in problem .. a~~a:s such. as·..

. ,_ . hydra~lic
. pump durability~ combusti~n .tempe·ratu~e~
. . dist~ibution
. a.s

1 / ADlC "0737,: .·7 May 196.2, Hqs to Lockheed.Aircraft Corporation.·

:~.I
64

.,
··1.··
..

-·
...
..
T 0 P
-
· S E C -R·E. T.
H·a··n'
· .d' Ivc .·via

Cnntro1 _System
'n·,t1r:,,1nii
,. ·I? l.ltlnU
 ,
.·C054 92 927
.. .

.:1:
it affected tu:rbine.dtirabtlity. 'and engine controis development •

.·1. . Additiona.1 fadliti.es were· authorized-.~o acc·eie.rate develpprµent a:.-nd

:. 1 ... enduran.c.e testing. ·Production e·ngines. appeared to be on a firm

. ,_s.ch.edule, ·and the first production"engine was-.deliver·ed bi.August.

··1· Aircraft .No •. 122 was deUvered· to Area ·Si o:q. Z6 June. ·It
>I. .spent three. months. ~n AR.testing 'before enghie ins~llatton and final.

. No. 123 arriv~d

e.ss:em:bly..• · Aircra·ft . . in August and. ·flew.:in October!
:I»
. .

"The tilvo;..s.eat trainer A-12 ·wa~ deliv~r~d in Nov.ember 196Z. ·.It .

.I ·~s. to be used to train OXCA~T Project pilots." . It had b~el;l. intended

.. . . . .
:that it alsQ be power~d by the J-58 engines. However~ J-58 engine·
.·.1-. deli'very delays·.and a desir.e· to begin pilot trai.ning. concurrently with .
.. ..

a decision. to install 'the. s.maller .3:-75 engines>.

• I » fligf:lt
..
test prompted
. . . .. . '.. . -.

·1· .·The otrainer. flew iii,itially in- January, 1963.. 4ircraft No.· IZ4 ha·s

.rernaine-c{the only A-12 to be powered by the J-7.5. ·The fifth aircraft:

* ' . • '

.. '' ..
I . . . . . .
to be delivered'-in 1962 •. No. ·1zs, arrived at the Ar.ea 17 December 1962.:·

The yea~ 196Z witnessed.the establishment of. the So.viet p;t"ese:nce.

.1 . i~·Cuba. 'The u:-z•s were zriaintaiziing a regular· recQnnaissap.ce vigil . . · .
. . . . . .
·:1·
,
...
.. over the island~ and it Was on one ·of' these .tniss:i.ons.
' . .
in Octob.er·
. ''
that

.. , ».
the presence of offens.ive :m,issiles was discovered •. Thereafter, · . . .'
..
u..:z .r·econnaissance increa·sed:and on 27 October·1962 an Agency.u:.2
. .1.
· ..
65

::I
.. Handl?. v1a.:E'lt~:1AN ...
11 .... . ·contrn\ ·System .·
..
.·
l C05492927
I.I . .. .
.

:;I
,
. .

. (flown by "a. SAC ·pilot on' a SAC-directed.reconnaissance

. . mi·s.slon. over
.. .: . .

· . :cuba)·waifsh~t. down ·by a s.urface-to-at~ :c;nissile'.

,.
. The
. . :prospect of .
.
.
. .
. . · possibly being denie·d ~ontinued
.
rn.a.rfu.ed, ·high.:.a1tihid:.e ~·eco1:maissanc.e
. .. '·. . . ·.

of.Cuba·suddenly·appeared very real. ·The ·OXCART program a,ssume_d.

·I:
.
._ , g.:r.eater significance fu;;\n· ev~r;..:a.n~>its.
.
achtevi~g::an . operci:tiori.a.l
bec~mEt one _of ..the highes:t national pri'o;ities •
.

At the·.close o~ 1962, .the program had two aircraft in· flight

status.

.I .. fes.t ·Staotus. one powered by two J -75. engines- and the other· with- One.

<1:· J-75' and one ·J-58. A speed. of Mach 2. 16 and altitude of 6.0, 00 feet

· had been re~ched. · Auxiliary components. and payloads had be.en. fioWn.
.1 at low speeds, but· theii performance could not be assessed further

I. W;itil. the
.
a.ire raft reached design
. .
speed .and altitude
' .
... ' .

. The primary causes for the slow· start in the· flight tes_t-program:

.. ,·were tlie· slow d-~ihrery ~f .engines .and_ poor en~ine p¢r-formance at·· ·
.
. ·altitUde. ~nstead
. .
0£
.
14-~ngines
. . .
promised for delivery; 9 h.a.d
. .

b~en
.
.
deliver~d
'
·in lat~ Nov~znber
. . -- . ." -
1962·. ·. Of:th~
. . .
9, . oniy
. -.
4 could be
. .
considered
.

. for ·1:1eie in the flight te_st J?.rogram •. At a time· of g.:teatest need.to ·reach.

an. operatirtg capabilit_y, .the· program ~ppeared 'to .be. at its' .lowest eQb. ~

·1· ·. ·.At the initfative of the ,DPD Pr<:>ject Offic~r; ·the f~llowing· mes- .

.
.
,.
...
.
sage ~~s prepared .to send'.
. ' '
to the
.

66'
.Pres.ident.6£°.United Ai:rcraft.Co~poration··
. . .
.

-:
.··.
. . . -
,· .

l:":I: T. 0. P 5 Ii? 6 :R-JS T.

.H _: d.r. . ... "B...... ~-~J ..
' an n. ta
i:; ' L. ..u
IJ· . ,,,_ ,.. ~, ·~
l .
1}1· ... ContnH Systsa .
 C05492927
.:1.
:1
. in order tq. place pre.ssure on UAC'top managemen.t: .
.I "Mr. Ho:r.ner' from Mr.· Me Cone:

:·1. "I have been advised that J.-58 engin'e deliverie~ ~ave
.:·b.een: dela:yed again due to· engine cont1'ol pr.oduction p.roblerri.s.

·1· · At this moment,. we have four engines with satisfa.ctq.ry con-·

· ·trols an:d one with a questionable. control. to operate two air-
. c·~af1;~ · By"the ·end· of the year it appears we will have ·barely
enough i-58· engines to ·support the flight test program: ade-
·.1 qtiately. .Fµrthermol'e we have b~en for.ced to use ·J-75 .
engines· in ·airplanes one, three and· four •

.1~ . .
"Furthermore .due to various engine· difficulties· W.e have·
no~ yet ·re(l.che:d design· speed and altitude .. Engine thrust and
. f~e.l con.s\J.rnpti·on.deficiencies .at present prevent sustained·.·
I . ·a,ight at desigi:i con~itions· which .i~."so necessa.ry ~o c.omplete
development of' the complete ·system.: ..

. "This situation gives me the greatest of coricern.l;>ecause

of the critical. impor'tance of the program. It is necessary
that ·the United Aircraft Corpor.ation, Pratt & Whitney, particu- .
. larly.'~e Hamilton Standard Division, place.highest priorityqn
~e solution of ~11 technical and production problems:.and assign
. ·to them the most senio'r and competent men within your com..:
.. bined organizations. ·

.1· .· . "The :OXCART prograffi.· has been desig~at~d of·the ..v~:r_y .

high·e·st national.priori~y and :.I cap.not emphasize enough·tl_le . .
necessity of·its reaching. operational status .as:.quic;kly as possible.
·1:- Would appreciate· your .infqrmb1g: meperson~liy,: of your aCtions
taken·tO. correct these difficulties. II !/ . . .

,I·. . ". ··By the ·erid of January 1963, t~n engines were avaUabl.e at A.rea 51.

The ;irst flight ·With J-58 engines occurred on: 15 Janu.ary 1963 •
.·1
I/ ADIC 9838~ 3 December 1962, Hqs .to. United Aircraft. Corp.·

67
...
. C05492927·

·1. .'£' 0 p
· .

·1 ·'Thereafter, all A-12 aircraf~.were·fitted witq_ ~e J-58 engines. upon

·1. ·:. delive.ry to·A~ea~"51. ·:Flight.testing,:was ac(:elerated and c6ntractoi;.

.· .1.. pers.onri.el wen,t to a thre~·.shift work d,ay •. w~~h each succeedihg step

into the highe.r·Mach regime) ne~ probl~m_s··were'unco~ered • . The

:1 . single: m9st important probl.em tha~ paced flight. development of the

.I '' A-12 was· the .air inlet and its cont:iol system. A supers_onic inlet.

Or ·air ind~cti~n SY.'~t~m is designed to provid~ best' possible a.era- .

0

dynamic .performance over a ,;range of supersonk Mach numbers .with

a ·stable and steady flow of' air to th.e engine.; .. As P,ight testing moved

into Mach Z.4·to.2._8 ~regio~s •. the airc.raft wa.s·e::llCperiencing·sevei:e

... , inl.et duct roughness. .An imp.roper airflow match

tween·
. th.e inl,et and the engine. 1t was also· detE;lrmined
. th.at ·iqiproper

·aerodynamic coritouring o(~e inlet P,u~t·~a·s a: contributor to the" .

was occurring be-

:I . rqughne13s.
.
Rede~igrt:
.
corrected the latter.· Investigation
. '

reve~leq
.

·1. . that .the·p.rimary caus·e of the improper airflpw to ~e ~~gine. was. th~.

.·1· ·cont;ols system which activat.ed: movement of the inlet spike. Two

control designs· had been developed, one h:ydromechanical and the

.I other~ a back-up cipproach, electronic. ResolU.tion .of this problem

Was extremely difficult and considerably pr~longed the da,te'wh,en the. ''
.1.
., . '. ' ' ' ' .

A-.'i2 would' be declared operationally .;i:eady. ·

.. '

.'68'

..
,~1·
.. ,
.':F·O P S E.d ·RE 'l'

·1.'
'' ... ' ...... ·-··
 ·: C054 92 927
·1.
.,:.
''.

'I' 0 p

., Another·px:actic~l.
. pr~blem developed
.
in·the
.
-spring
.. .
'

Co.s.tly damage ·Nva:s occurring ·to .engine's

of 19'63 >
.
'.

..
.. ' .
I ci'ue _to f'o'.1-"eign. obj~ct~ being ingested in the engines.
'

The £or~·ign
. .
:"objects
. . - ,·
were·primariiy
. ,. . .
nuts, bolts, clamp:s. and·otherdebris:'left
. ·
I
'

b.ehind·in the manufacturing pro~ess. They were. sucke.d· ·out 6£.

·1·.· inner nooks and crannies of the nacelle during

.. .
·groun~
.. ·...
run:-liP or

·take-off, . and ·entered th:e in~ke: duct~:. A !horough ·ihvestiga.ti~~.

'.1· i'nciudlng·,the ·possibility :of' sab6tag~.· ~(:)ncluded' the principal cause

1· to-be cait'el~ssness and. poor ho'?'selteeping: ·Rigorous inspections

. . .

:·1. and controls corrected th:e situation,. and subsequent o.ccurrences

. .
. were irifrequent.
·1·: . " '
Firf?t A-lZ I,.;o.$6

·:1 The first aircraft loss occurred in the· ~pring· of 196.3. · While

. a r.outine:tra~ing-:flight,·
on . 24Ma·y1963,. one of the. detai;hment.
.
.
.~

I . . . .
pilots ·qotained an errone·ous ind,ication of air .speed·a~d. e~ecte~ to'.

·1 . . eject from t~e aircraft. T}le a.ircraft' crashed 14· mUes s'outh of

. Wendov.et, Utah. The pilot wa.s .unh'q. rt.. For public. consumpti.o~,:

.1 the airc'raft .wa·s identifled as an F-10.5. The complete wreckage

I was"r.etnoved from· the ..scene an.d'.~eturn~d tc;> Area ST by ·26 May.

"
All .individuals at the crash sc·ene we;re :.i.dentifiec;i an4 ·request~d to
·1. 69 ...

. ~.1;: T ·a P
.
5 E q. R .E
'
T
C05492927.
·.:I· .·'For . S)3 GR ET

I· sign.secrecy agreements. Press. inquiries concerning the pilot'.s

I identity were forthcoming, :and the following story was issued by

Air Force sources:

.I "The F-105 aircraft was on bailment to Hughes Aircraft
Company fro~ Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson
.I Air Force Base, Ohio. The aircraft piloted by Mr.· Coliins.
ol"iginated from W:right-Pa.tterson Air Force Base on Friday•.
After a brief stop at Nellis· AFB, Mr. Collins., early Friday .
I. afternoon while testing a classified system,. experienced air-
craft difficulties and bailed out from his aircraft in the
vicinity of Wendover •.Utah •••. 11 !/
:1. ·All A-12 ·aircr~ft wer:e ground~d· for .·a. we~k pending.ac~ident
. .

·I. ·investigation. A plugged pitot statie ·tube during ici~g conditions wa.s.

of the faulty cockpit .instrument indications.

I foun·a to be the cause
.: .

The ac.cident was listftd as an F-lOp .crash on official records. ·

1· USAF A- lZ Procurement

:1 ·Closely interwoven with the ·chronicle of OXCART d7v~lopment

were th~·· eve~ts..occurring o~ its periphery. We i:ecall that in Decem.-·

I ber 1960 the USAF~ using· Project procurem:~nt channels, .cont:ra~ted

I . for thre~. long.:. range ·interceptor (LRI) vers.ions of the A-12•.· ~hl~

program.was given the cryptonym KEDLOC~. In January· 1962,· the

I· u·SAF ··added: ~no:ther five A-i2 b-qy to the e~is-8.ng A.- l2. p~~d~ctio~ .
.·I. . c·ontract, and ·it was termed the WEDLOCK program.·.

];_/ · See Annex 131 for newspaper stories on the crash.

70
HANDLE ··V:IA BYEMAN
.'!'OP SEGRET
CONTROL SYSTEM
.C05492927 .
.:1 ..· .~ ..

T a p . s E c.; a.
·.1 E .T .•

In.1962, another reco~aissance ·concept was. proposed by

I . :: .: .,·the
. . . .
Deputy.Directol."
. . . for Research and .Engineering·,
. .
Departinent. of .

I _:Pe~ense.;.. whi.ch would offei.an :alternate·to:'the marri;ied supe~sonl.c

reconnaissance .system. It' was a Ma,ch 3. 3 ramjet ·ciron.e· ai:t"craft

I to be launched· £ram an A.-12 mothE:r .ai;r.craft. After f.ea:sibility

·1.
'•
.studies· were. c.omple.ted· by Lockh~~d and evaluatec;1 0 a go-ahead, w.as

authoriz·ed by the P~ntag.on (NRO).. M~.nagem.ent an.cl t~chni~ai ;noni.-

1. toring of . develcipment was assi.gned to CIA :(Project He.adquarters; . ·

..1 riow OSA) on 17.. 0ctober 1962 by _the Direc'tpr: of- NRO. .On 4 June 1963,

fbr_ .. p~litiCal ~easons (during a USAF-CIA tug..:.of.:.war on the NRO),

I the:"-fesp~nsibility was shifted ·f~om CIA to' the" USA;F. ~he program
·I· .became known as TAGBOARD. ·"T~o of the. five WEDLOCK A-12 air-

to a
I. craft"·Wer¢ scheduled· for cortversion

conf.igu,ration;
TAGBOARD:drone launch

On 6 Novemper 1963 the remain~ng _three were trans-

·1 £erred to the OXCART program. · · " · ·-. .

. 1 .. .... On 29.January 1963, the Secretary of I?·efense approved purchase·: .

of six additiorial ai'rcraft for Air For.ce'use as a _-general·pu.rpose
··1. 'rec;onnaissance :Vehicle configured to carry· a variety of intelligence.

:I. · .c<:>llectiori .systems·. A;.,. addi~iona'i procurement of·2? was appr'C:>ved

. . .
byihe 'Secretary of..Defense.in_Augu~t. 1963. :. Th-is·new configu.r:a.tiort
I. .71

.1 .. .

TOP _SECRE'T . :Handfa \'.1·3 BYE::~::: .

·. Control System ..
.1.
:
 ·c05492927 . ·. . . .
-I ··.
. ... .
· .... ,
. .......
. : \.

.. ·. . ..·· :··

. ,:.· . :
.···· .

. ·-
. ,•. . .

..
~ ·:

... Moi\:day:mornlng~ March 2, .. · 1964 - ·.-

. ·... ·:;, ~

:I···· ~:·.
,.:-.
Page l~
. ,, : ~ ..

. .•

·.;I·:·-..... ·: ...
.· ,. ..:
~ .
.
.

.. ·:
...
. - .. ·.·

.. -:
·
·.
. ·~. ·:
. ' :;~.-~~-~·-~:f:'"··'""~.-r· ~-:~~~··"!er'.·:.• _,~:,.-:.·: . :.,. ' . ~.:~.";?.\:~
:

. :;I:<·.·-:.~_ .. -
......... ,.:U·~:, H;ls .Do~en..A-lli:\::41
·. ··.
; ...
..~ ·, ··. ~
..

.-· :~·e~s~. ;~lre~dy. ·f Iyit1 g:::-~~.-~. -.·;~.·:~: j_.

·~·

·I ·: ~.~~iu~GT~N :~,.-:"sen~ ("Fa~~ ~h~ '._.Niitioh11-~-cis);:l. ·

,.
·. ·.-.· ..
I ·.
Rlchatji ·B. · Russell· (D-Ga.) Russell- md1cated the plan!3''J
\;.aid..S1:1~da;r -~ere :are ·1~ or is far adva~c~. fu. required ]
.tl.2, . of " the··· :pewly:~unvelled tests. : ·: · :. · .. : ~ ·. ·, . . .
,.

.. ·~
.;
'
·:
..• ...
.. ::··. :. .
: ..... :
V;S .. ".manned missile" jet "It's:been put through-all,<!
·ghter. pla'nes already flying kinds of tests,• he said,.- and: J: ·:·.::··
·· nd. that they ~ave success- not~d that . others are con• ·
: q(ly p~ssed n~.merous tests •. tin~ing: He s~id .it is .virtual·<~ ..... ··
..Russell .. ·cha1rmaJl . of. the ly m shape. to be accepted ·~
·1:'.· enate. Armecl. s e MT ice::; fornially. by' the:: Air. Force,:'.~j
Committee,·· said_. .h"' had This ha·sn~t..taken place YE:!t.'.j' .
Jeno.i.yn..~bout ·~h~ ~.ooo~m.il~~ . Presi<;ient. Johnso1t told.hi.a.,
an-hour A-11 since wo1·k first news.· (:onference Saturday· ·
·:1-· , begari"on it in ~959;·:a.~~hough t.ha:~ the plane's-performance~ ·

,.
i President. Johitson:: JUSt -~n- 11 far e~ceeds .. that. ,.or any...
>nounCed its 'existence: S~tut- other.· aircraft iil -: the. world·~- .

.. .:t ~~[i{;~:·:i~~~~~~~~ :·:~~.ter~le~ t~;K~i;1i ~~td-~a .kno\vied~~;~ ·

. . ..- ..
> ·..z....:...:.J·v4'·'·1- . : ..... ;..~·~ .of the plane's .existence was;:i
!the· reason· h~ ·rec en t1 y·l
.' . ..- Urnocked out.of.an appr-0pria-·;.i
ltions· · hilt a· .$40 ··million =i ·

;·I ... request for furids to,de.velop·; ·

· an. improved· manned .~nter.;_ ~:.
" ·ceptor; · · ·. .. · .: •': : "
.,,, .. . · ::- H~:~aid·he does not:lmo:w ·4.
)'·.,.;.>: .. :,·. . ,. .,·
.• why tjle Air Force ask¢':f!>r: l . .. ·.. .... :_ '.

-~~~j!~;;f:~11:;·~:::~ ..
·
1·
.....
: .....
.i ·.

·. ·:" .·

I:.
·1.
.····: :-·

'• ::·

:·1 . ·. ·..
•.
·' ..
:': ·. . . .,'. ' .~ ..
.. C05492927 ..
,.
.
···1··. .
-~ .. '·

·;· .1. "VEGAS· SUN

,
LAS
-:. ·:.
Wednesda,y,'. March 4~· ~9~4

,
_: ... ..
. .Pi<:ture 'p. l; story P.ag.~ z.
.. .
.··•
..
..

· 5€Eret•9f ·SLZilihg~eW.--Pldh~.
,,
-1::
..
·Probably :··Hisfory's. Best K¢pt. l .
·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ·.. . . .·: c
...
..
,,_ : WASHINGTON:.(UPJ)..,.. Aiµer• '[>lane. could fly· over_ dlstances in· the· ·mmt~r.Y ·and · cMllail I
lcats -revolutlona'ry All aircraft, ot ;thbU!iands of miles and at al- ·raaj(s ·of ·goverimi'erit and in the I
. secreyy devel,oped With !iUch tit1,1des above. 70,000 feet. ·. alrCri!-ft lndustry. . : :
s~celis that the. government _-Joh~son said_ ther_e would be ' The ·~e_oty · b~gan .·_on . Lock· :
· ,still ls congratulatmg itself;·_has extensive. tests at Edwards· .to heed: Aircraft's sprawling acres /
;I :been: test- !IQwn for about two learn the All's capabilities a5· a iri Bilrbank, Calif., where apari ·
· )"~rs· In· remote regions· ot the long-range interceptor. · .· frorn the nialn\ plant; .there. is
. -west. .. It Is understood that' the . SU• a· -hangar nicknamed the "Skunk .
~ The 2,000..mile-p~r-hour jet's pel' - secret airplane, started in Works.... . · . · · 1
·1··. .

.-·· .· -:·,·
·un.h.eralded flights over the wide 1959, -began and m_ay continue This 1tangar- is the domain of 1
~n, · .Sparsely poputate.d . ~eas chiefly as a r~connaiss8,nce air· Lockheed Vice Pr~ide~t · Clar~ i,
.riac~n-t.he secret drills over U~h craft-a successor. -to. the .slow ence L·.. (Kelly) Johnson,. one,·
· 20 years ago when the Afr Force b11t high-flying U2 design whicn of -the .great aircraft· designers.
·:,:-::_ . _:·_ - :W11s· tUming the 1329 into: his- was then :five years old. '. : Whene':'er the gove~ment wB:nfs
- . :. :· - - ..
19ry's \first atomic _bomber. . SECRECY KEPT . .: · • - . someth!ng revolut1oµary, . It is ··
t: J..boµt a i:l~n of the Titanium . Secrecy surrounding the plane, likely -to t~m · to .Johnson•. He

.
_., .
..
Alls ~ve been built so _far and over six years, was. remarkably came up- .with the 1'"104 fighter,
. :ftighrs.: now are beginning. at well kept. .Editors of Aviati<m a l,~n:rz:.de-pe.r-hour plane_ at.:a.
:'the test center at Edwards Aii Week magazine said that they time ..whe? most other fighters
F'.orce ~ase; In mor.e .PQpulous learned of tbe-A.11 program· one were flymg .about. balf that: ..
califomia. · ·. · · · · and a ·half years ago and yield· speed. ~e.designed 'the·u~, prob.,. ·
FASTEST IN WORLD ed ·t.o Air Force enn:eaties to ably the high~st :llylng a1_rplane

I ".President. Johnson revealed pubhsh nothing about 1t. Ironic· before the, All.
the'. All program at bis ne.ws ally, _the>' were scooped when 'SKUNK WORKS' : ·. "
conference last S11turday, saying Johnson. reyeale,d · the • proj!?Ct Des!~e.r ·Johnson . went - to·:.
~t .-the. plane's . performance t.oo late for th~ir. ~eekly dead- work m hts !'Skunk Works'' with :
i

~·exce.e:ds that .of any other.air· line. . · · · · · ·.·. : . the .building . surrounded ·by.
I : craft:m ·the world today.': Be- How was. the secrecy .main- guards .and' employes adfnlttea ·
.- .. sldes·· its: a~ility .to·· fly:_ h'iote talned so·well?_-It is a testimony only: alter· careful secm:IiY:
. than three- times the ·speed ot to the .disclpltne · ot- ·hundreds, screening•. Very. fe\'V' -people at •.
:;-1
..
. ~µn~~ the. President sald--the p~haps .thousands,· of _persons Lockheed not ·working· i;>n the·..
· · · · "'· ·· ... - . --· ··. · · · . project kitew anything .about it, ' ·
...even· some :of its top: officials. ·
: ~ Pos~ibly hundreds of- (ieople in , ·
...:the· Pentagon ·and elsewhere· in:··
.. '.
· · ;the military kilew . something '._ .
·. . . .~ ... ' .
'• .·.....', - .,about .the AU ·but there is·no
. _;evidence tha.t ·anyone·· talked. · ·
.1 The airplane had .a ·classifies,· . .

:I. . ~on ·higher ·than. "top. secret"_.;

·a c1a·sslficat1011 which itself was
·. 'secret;::_. . · . .· · · .
f:' Within·- tbe hangar, pl11nes .
,were ~ustorn-made .bY- the -care. · ·
•_:;1. !fully ch9-Scn :empl_oycs. '.I'hert
twas n~ semblancci_ of. a produc-
. tfon li1,1e as . Jn oth~r -~~a~f!!· :..
. -,_- ,·
.•

...
 :C05492927 .·
..
:1
_,_._
. SEC RE 'f' .

. wa:s.· de~ignate4 the R- lZ {late_r redesignated_ as the SR~ 71 ). cIA·

._.,_.
.aga-ln .a_ct~d as procur~ent age.~t •.

1· ·A~U Aircraft .P;r_ogram Surf~ced-by 'W-hite·Hc:,use

As the- numbers of A~l2 family of aircraft .on. order-·or.propo_se~:l

I for order grew, so· did the probiem of preserving the .covert character

·I of the OXCART program. Seri'o~s _consider~tion wa.s being given by.

th~'Se:cr·etary of D~.fense to is_suing a ·press re.le~se announcing the <·

·1 existence ·of an X-21 developm~nt (actuali'y the AF version of the A-lZ).

··1. in Januar:y 1963·•. Since the action was tied directly to the l3--70 contro-

I. ·versy, it was feared that there·would be more politica~ controversy · ..

and .critical examinati~:ri. which could possibly e:J;'p.ose the·A-i2~ When

I the situation was re.viewed ·by th~ :President'e;. Foreign Intelligence_.

·1· · _A~visory Board-, it was tne.·Board's conVictiori. that it.wo:uld be best

not:to make-_any statements. which: would poss~bly ~e$uit iri exposing

·I··
.. -- . .
. . A- lZ development,.' or. any
. .-
~ilitary
. : . . . . ..
ver·sion ther_eo£.. The· President

·1 ·dec_ided not to surf~ce t~e R-12. : .No stat~m~nt was made· at· that

time, ·but· it .Wa.s .apparent that as the delivery date of the.first R-12
·1 . approached,._ .public disclosure of ·L~cKheed's work in·, Mach 3. o' :

.1-. . aircraft manU:factUre -was lnevl.table. ·

:1·>
72

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The Agency's c.hief concern with surfacing w~s to protect.'

.I the AR aspects and capabilities of'the 'A".'"12, and to protect the ·Scope

·and nature of the activities ·at Area 51.. Th~ ()XCART program had
·I progressed through development,. construction •. and a yea~ of flight.
·1: testing and training without attracting public attent?-on. · It now ap-

type aircraft.
I peared advantageous ·to surface some version of the A-12

to ~erve as cover for the OXCART program in the event of incident

I or inadvertent exposure •. The loss of Aircraft·No. iz3.'in MaY 1963

I be (;ame a case in point •.

The matter .continued under revf::ew. during 1963. ·.The Depart;_ .

·1 '

ment of Defense was. having diffic';llty in conceali.ng its participation

. . .

.1. ·in t~e program due to the incr~asingly high rate of ·expenditures as ·

.the .SAC R-12 aircraft came·into production •.· Political pressures.·

.1 .. increasec:f in the DOP/Congressional co~troversy involving appropria.-
. . . .
I . ·. tions for the· improved manned.interceptor and the .manned
' . bomber. ' '

In addition, the Administration desired to make Mach. 3·. 0 aircraft

.1· technology data available to participants and .evaluators of the SST

·I program.

There was growing· awa:i:-eness in industry and in the· p~ess.'of

the· existenc~ of the program. .See Annexes 132. and .133 •.. Operational .

.I 73

:I. 1' 0 p S.E C .RE 'l' HANDLE :VIA BYEMAN

C,ONTROI,.r . SYSTEM.

·.1·
. .

.· ... ·.
·. ~·····;•',?-••••• . .- .......... ,-~ ......~;..-.~ . . • " .••.
..
..
,
·co5492927

.·1
actiVity, ·b_oth iri numbers of aircraft and extended flight, profile~;

was. increasb.1g the .probability- of acddent~l sightings axid incidents•

··All .parties w~re in agreement ~t an an;ioun~ement to the public

· ··was necessary.

Pre~ident Johnson was apprised of the matter. on 29 Novernbe·r

· 1963,.. a weeka~ter
' . taking office. . He .decided. that
- surfacing .was in

.6J:'der an!i direct~d ~-paper be prep~red for a~ounc~n:i-ent in:the

. spr.ing of 1964.' At.his_ 29 F·ebr:uary 1.9~4 press conference", the

.President made
. . the foilowing
.
statement:. . ·
' '

11 The United States has· successfully developed an·

· adva:nced ..expedmeri.tal jet airc·raft, the A-11. ·which has
beeh tested. "in sustained flight at more than 2., 000 miles
p~r hour·and at aititudes in excess of 70, 000 .feet. '·The
·I··· performance of the A-1 l: far exceeds· th~t o_f any other .air-
craft in·the world today.. The dev~lopm.erit of tJ:iis airc-raft.
has' b.een made possible by .major advances in aircraft tech:-'
nology-.'of great significp.nce for both military a.rid commer-
. cial applic.ations. · Sev.eral A-11 aj,rcraft are ~ow being flight.·
t.ested-at Edwards Air Force Base in_ Califo'rni~ •.. T.h~ e~is:- :. .
1· tence ·of .this progrcrn is .being di~closed today fo permit the·
. orderly e~ploi tation of this ·advanced technology •in" our.
military and commercial program.
I·. "This advanced.experimental aircraft, .cap~ble of

I ','
high:speed and high altitude an_cflong-range.performance. ·
. . · of thousands of miles constitutes a technical·a.ccomp~ishrnent.
that will facilitate the ·achieven:ie~t of. a_.~umber of important .
military and c·omm..erclal re·quiremen~s ... The.A-11 aircraft
I npw at .Ed~rds Air Forc_e· Base are undergoing extensive· .
t~sts to de.termine their -capabilities -as long-range inter:ceptors.~ .
. ' .

I· ·: 74 .

:,1·· ..
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TOP si3ci':R:E'f'

.-:I.
The de~elop~ent. of supers·onic· commercia~ tra;nspo~i.a:ircraft
.:_.,.
.
will .also be greatly ass.isted by- the lessons lea"rn~d. from this ..
A--11.p·rog~am. F'6r. example, on·e· of the important. t~chnical . .
:··· .
"'•.

,:·1. ..
. a(::hievements ·of this project ha·s been the mastery of·the · '. · ··
.. metallurgy and. fabrication 0£ titanium metal which ia required
· for the high temperature~.experiericed by aircraft :trave1ling..
a.t more tha:r;i three thnes the ·speed of s·ound •.. Arrangements:: ..

I ar.e being made· to make this an9, ·other imp.ort~nt :technical. · ·

developments a.Va.ilabie unde:r appropriate safeguards to those
directly engaged in the Supersonic l'ransport Frog.ram. ·
.·I "This· pr~ject was. first star~ed in 1959. Apprpj>riate
·members .of the Setj.at e and the House have b.een kept fully
·.·I . ·iriformed on.'the·program· since :the'. day of its mception.'.
..

.. ,. 11
The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation of Burbank,
Ca.Uf~~nia, is the'.manufact'1,irer.of tjle aircraft. The air-
craft engine, Pie·J-58, was designed and built·by the Pratt & .'.

·1 Whitney Aircraft I?iyision of the United Airc+aft Corporation~

..The .·experim~ntal fire control and air-to-air· missile· system·
.for. the A-11 was developed by the Hughes Ai1"craft ·company~.
:

'I. "In view of the continuing importance o! these ··develop.:.

ments to O'!lr. national security, the de~iled performance of ·
the A-11 will remain strictly cla:ssified .and all· individuals
.1 as,soc.iat~d;with the program have been di.rected to refr~in ~ro~· ·
r.ri.altjng ~ny-further disc.,1.osure conc~_rning this progr~~· -i::d6·: · ·. "
not expect to discuss ·this important matter''fur~her With. ·you' . . . .
·1 to¢fay, but c.ertai~ a'ddltional information. will be inad_e availa'l;)le .
to all of you after this meeting. ·If you car·e_, Mr. Salinger .

·1· will
.
ma,ke the ..appropriate
.
'
11
arrari.gements., . l/ · -
.The reference-.in his annoµncement to the A-u
11
·was deliberate·.
11

. .
.'
I To.announce the airer.aft as being. one ?f the 11 11
~ .series woul4 not

:I
..

, ..
..
l/ Te:lct of s.b.tement to the .press by President Lyndon B.- Johnson
read at:his. p.ress conference.on Saturday, 29. ;February i964./. ·

75

.1·· T.O p s E 6 RE 'l'

,.,_ .•.

· HancJe. ·via ·avrMAN

' .
f ontrnJ Syslem ·'.
'
-~··
....
 ·co5492927

,
·.I
...
. ~ .
TOP S:E C RE. T·

"'·'
have . be.en com~ietely .true; whereas the. 11A.:.U 11 ~d been the. origin~l ·
:·I designatiop. of..·,the ·all-metal air.ci·~t first·p-roposed ~y Lockheep.~

:I.·
, .. ·
s'u#aced .~
:liA-:~1~ 1 was. subsequently redesignated.
.

overleaf :for press treatment of the announcement. )

.
the YF.:.12A.
'

.. In order.to p~eserve the distinction between the "A--11 11 and·

(S~e

:1 · . the. A.:.12., Project Security had briefed pra't::!tic~lly all witting person- ·

. :·1· ~el in: g. . ov.ernmeri.t. ~nd . industry

. ..-on the:impc;:nding
.
~
annou~cem;e~t
. .... ·Thi~
was to prflclude relaxation of the OXCAR'; security standa;rds. There

I was considerable press speculation on an Agency r9le

. ·- . . .
'

in . the A-.11 · '.

..
'

·:I develdpment bu~ it was neve':r ackri.ow~edged by tl1e GovernmeI_l.t.

Ti~ed·to the President's· announcenl.ent, th~ A.-ll's were floW:n

I: . from Area 51. to" Edwards Ai;i; Forc.e. Base, Cal~fornia. All sub.sequent

·:1··. A-ll/YF-12A activity

' '
was done at Edwards AFB. On 24July196'4, · .

the President announced ·the SR-71. {R-12) devel?pment •. The existence·

I· of-Area· 51~ its' activities,and the .role .of CIA in its ope;~tio~. was pr~-

.1: served and has never ·become public information•

.. O,XCART ~ilots
1.· · ·In ~ovember 1962,· the fi'l::st group o~ four A-12 pilots .were

1·: s~parated·from the Air ~or.C:e with t4e understanding trutt they could.
• • • •

,,
'. 4 •

upon. iratisfactory t~rmination of the.ir services with:Project OXCART:;

·I·:
/, . ;.
76.

:::1 .
. ·.·
'• .·.
•.
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-C05492927
,
,,

T·o·p . SE G"RE T. ·
·1.
so desire •
.·1 .b'e reinstated to.active ffi.ilitary service shoul<;i they ..
. .

''independent contractors 11 to the Hughes Ai:rc~aft Compan:y."

. '

The
. pilots had arrived. atAr.ea. .. 51 in mid-November 1962,..and
. . . . '.
. . . . ~ ' .
beg;an training in the A-12 in Ja:.nuary, 1963i whE?n the two.:..seater

t'rainer, Aircraft
.· 124, ·became availabfe.to.
. . the detachment.
. . As· J-58 .

eq~ipp~d· aircraft were n:ia.de available by .Lock}l.eed, the piiots ·"began·

flyil;lg: t.hem.- Training flights were Umi'ted. t~ _developi:i:ig .Profic.iency; ·

aerial refueling_ training, navigation.training, camera syete~s· op·era..:

-tion, .. and so on.· Altitude.and speed restrict~ons. _ap:i>lied until

Lockheed flight test validated a partictilar flight p~ofile,· whereupoll:

detachment aircraft were· allowed to extend to the saln.e limit; .The

OXCART"program· was a first in the "manner it.moved.forward after

delivery of aircraft.· Development breakthroughswere ve.ry quickly

validated -or rejected by flight test and t}?-e result·s were passed on to

the detachment: for ~ncorporation· in.training· pr~cedure~. A s·tandard

. . -. . . . . . ,• ..:

Air ·Force we~pon~ system pr~gramming·

. . cycle. ·divid~s de~elopment,.
. .

.
·flight test, and operational traini:ng in~o three. distinct phases, one . ·

· following the other. This s~quence res_ult:s i~ a ·~onge_r time span to

achieve .operational readiness.

.
By comparison
. 1 concurrent development,
. . . ' .. '

77··
.. · ·.
T o·p S ~ G RE T
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· C05492927
.,

T 0 p B .E c RE T

·I flight test, ,and operatioµaltraining greatly foresh~rte_ned the time

•.

:I wh~~· the A.-lZ cou,ld be declared ope;t-ational~y ready;

Fu,~ther. Con'.struction·at Area ·s1 .

.I ··To ·accommodate. the additfonal ~ircra,ft 'which-had b~en ord~red·

·I . (.ttir~e
. YFcl2 1 s .and five more A-lZ's)·,
'. . :
facilities·at·Area
. 51 were furth~r
.

·~~nded in t 96.;3. An additional. ~ngar, . an ~dr.nii;.istration buiidirig, ·

·1 new mess l:l.all and a special handling b'uilding fol: ·the ·carne:t:a :sys'tenis
.. . ' . . ~ . ; . .
·I· _.w~re·constructed.
.
Base population
.
r~ached
.
1423 in Novembe.r 19_63.

Additional:'BOO ia.Cilities were iristalled. From .e?X::perience gained in

I 'operation of th~ aircraft, it Was decided to _ex~end the runway. · The ·

I extension-was necessary to provide an accepta:bl~ margin' of safety

in the event of. rejected take·-of£,. . The air~raft would u~e the a.ddttfon~.
I -.· . .

length to come to a stop rather than.,.-un out on the lakebed where struc:'"
'

I tural damage might occur due to surfa._ce roughness. The r~way wa:s · ·
.. '

extended by n~ 000 f~et of loa~-bea,ring asphalt wit~ additional 5, 000 f~et

·I
of:. graded over-ri.ins on each end. (See' ove~leaf).·

I .. ·.Continued ·Flight Testing .·

,.
. I·
. •.
It was. ·r~ported at the end of 1963 that there. had· been 573 flights;·
· to~a:lirtg 765. ho~rs .since first ·flight in April 1962.~ :Nine aiJ;cra!t we~e.

.in the. inv.eri:tory am;l:·th~ three more would be 'aVaila·ble by t}?.~ :end' 9f:
:1· 78
. . .
::I o . P .. s E. c n ~- T
~

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....]

J
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. . .
.
.. •.> I.
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~

.......
.... .

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·. ..:. .'
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·· ..
.. :::~ I
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.. :.. ·.::;
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· . ~Odle Via,BYEMAPi·;
·( : ..

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l
··Gnhfib·r. . .$ys:iilni' . : .~·: . )·
[ '.'·
.... , ~ \~. ~· ·~
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.~ .. .·.. ' · ............. . ·~ ... '·· .!,., ::.;;:_,....·'•::.:".~\: ..... .
 C05492927·
.I· TOP SECR.ET

.:I. ·Ma.rch 1964. On: ZO July·, the first.Mach 3. 0 flight had. be~n achieved

·1 ·• by-fligh~ test aircraft~,.

'' "". .
In Nove~ber~ Ma.ch 3: 2 had. been reached at
. .
781000 feet altitude~ The i:rllet duct. roughnesS-. probl~m ·appeat-ed. to
·I·. b~ solved, but the inl~t.perform·ancie·Wa.s still beiow design require-

I m~nts. The entire aircraft system was operating reas.onably. well ·

·I· .withifl the limits. of testing thus far •. A ja:n.:mtng ·device to work

.a,gain,st the guidance link. of the SA•2.. missile sys:tem· ~as.·i~:d~v.e.lQp.-.

. .
I merit-and was ex.pe·cted.sh~rtly for testing. The .two cam.era systems .

I were also performing satisfactorily within the limits of airspeed and

. altitude flown to dat~~ A third camera system, built by Hyco:O., . was

I i:O.herited with the three -WEDLOCK aircraft and was part· of the ·

I OXCART sensor inventory.

Maximum effort for the next few months Wa.s t9 ·be dire~ted
I: . toward optimizing the inlet to ~ firm ·production.. configul-a:tien, im-.
; .

1· proving· ai re raft. t~ans onic perf ~rmanc e, .. and op~r:a, ti~g '.at high ..
. ..

te~per~tures and altitudes to provid~ th~ proper. enviromµent in .

.I· which to test equipment and:sens9-rs. ·

I The longest sustained ·flight at design coni:liti.ons was conducted~.:

. ' '.' - . . . .

,,
I' on 3 Febrtiary 1964, an:d ·it lasted.for

6 3, ..000 feet.
io i:nin~tes. . at ¥ach 3. 2 an:d·.
. . .

Flight test data continuec( to show inlet..J;»e#ormani:e .

79

~I· .
.. . . '!' 0 ·p S :E C R 'E !:F

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 C05492927
1· TOP ~~CRET .

.·I to be deficie.nt between Mach 1. 8 and 3. 2,. resulting in excessive"

1· fuel consumption•. In- May 1964, a special task force· was _for.tn.ed

to focus exclusiv~ly or.i. the aircraft illlet/propu~sion.interfac~ prob-

I . .
lerns. ·It was comprised of. senior performance personnel.from fhe

. ._;.

.
I .
contractors involved, and it stayed in resid~nce at· Bu:!:'.bank Un.til a·

. co.mprehensive inlet/engine..improvernent prog~am ~as.·developed •.·

I :By May i964 a limited ~ach 2.35 operational.capability. had be.en:

reached, but the basic inlet/propulsion interface probl~~s still".

I
remained.
·1··· Project SKYLARK

I About this time, Project OXCART operational planners em- ~

barked on a program to qevelop flight planning as performance data : ·

·could be documented. Operational planning wa_s ·developing apace· · .: ·

·with fl:Lght test and detachment training~ As each -new: perfo;i:-marice ·

plateau was reac_hed and proven, it became a flight planning ;factor.

. . .
Project Headquarter·s, foreseeing a possible contingency whereby·

the A- lZ might be _needed t_o overfly Cuba, began an in-house opel:'a- .

· tions ·plan for th_at purpose. It was designated ·operation: SKYLARK.

Flight testing
.
and d~tachrnent ....training suffered
. . a. s~rious

:1·:.· interruption.in mid-y~~r of 1964 •. ·On a shakedown flight«:m 9 July

I: 80
. .

TOP HANDLE" vi BY.E~i. A-:

·::I· · CONTROL SY~TEM .

. . ; -.~. ~ .· ... ;=.:.-..: ..... · : ...

.·. C05492927

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. , ...
T 0 P S .. E G R E.T.

Ai;rcraft·No. · 133 crash~d just short. of the ~unway ·on ~ts fi~l
. ...

;I· :approach. At an ·a.ltituc;le of soo·:feeta.nd. air.speed .of ZOQ kii~t·s·,

· !.the aircr~ft -began a ·smooth s.teady roll to .the le.ft.' The .Lockheed.
·I test pilot. could not over~ome the ·:roll, a~d at an appro:Xilnate

:·1. . 45 de~ree ba~· angle and 200 fe~t a:l_tltude he ej~¢ted safely~ . The;

. ' p;r.imary. ca.us~ 6£ the accident ~as tiia.t th~ ·ri~ht outboard ele:vrori .
I servo :valve stuck in a partially open position.· The.fleet was·• : ..
. _,. . .. . . . . - -·.. . . . .

.gro~d~d: for. a .month for incorporation

~ .
of fi~.s.:
. . . ·The· :£le.et no.w·
·•·· ..
; . ·. sto-od at eleven. air.craft. *.
Having occurred within the Area_ 51 r.e.servation, thi.s acdden,t

received no publicity. All Area 51 personnel»were ·admonished

against discussing the crash, and it· was q.uietly inve.stig;a.ted. by an·

ac~ident -investigation board •.. Neither the press nor the public were

eve.r made aware that th·~ accident had oc.cu.rred:

,,~ On 11.Augus·t, SKYLARK b ecame.a directed proj~ct with. the .

0

.·· . . 1/
imposition ~f ~n emer.gency operational readiries!;'! dat~ of 5 November. -
I .•....
*:The .delive~y-of the ·three-USAF··A-12 1 ~ had been c:ompleted

I· ·in ,March.for a total .of 13. The loss of Aircrafts 123 and 133
reduced that total to eleven.

22 August ~964.". DDCI Me:qiora:ndurn:. to DD/S&T,

I· lI BYE-463l·-68,
.sul)ject: SKYLARK. {Se~ Annex 134~)

.1· 81

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.. . ,. . . ' ~ .. .
 ··co5492927
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'fO~ SECRET .
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A str~nuous· effo.rt was begun-to prepare .the aircraft, pilots, .and·

I supporting ·elements for a .relia'Qle capability. Th.e goal .was ·a· .

·Mach 2. 8 and 80, 000 .feet altitude. capabil~ty. · SiXteen mandatory

.-changes. or additions .to the airc·raft were ~ece.ssa;y.•· Only one of ·~he

electr_onic countermeasures equipmentS would be available b-y the·

. . .
readiness date, camera per!ormanc'e would ha've to be. validated

· at·the .SKYLARK
.
level.
'.
pilots would . '
have to be. Mach Z. 8
..
qualifi:ed,:
·~

and"nee-essary,coordination with supporting elements would have to

.be acco~plished. A senior intra.;.governmental committee·; including

representation from the ·President's Scie.ntific Advisory Committee

. I·: . . . .

. (PSAC), had ·exarnineci the problem of ope.rating over Cuba without

·1 the full com~lemep.t of defensive systems. It. was its a·sses.sment

. -
·1· that· the first few.-overflights could be conducted ·without them. Thei·e-

aft~r, .c~unt.ermeasu~e!? would 'Qe necessar.y. 'The. deli:Very schedule

I .
of ECM equipment. wa~ co~patible
. .
with this c·our_se of action:.·

.I Four of the six ·detachment aircraft were turned· back to·

Lo·~kh.eed technicians for· mo.dification and update. By 19 Oc~tober

.1 the mandatori ·hard~r~ modificatio11.s yriere complete and the aircraft ·

I returned to the detachment. This was more than two weelfs behind

. the sch.edul~d date because of° variou~ .aircraft' systems integrati<?~

I 82

,:.:1 .... s·E C_RE T.

Handle via. B.YH'1Afl ··
,:1··. .Cootr.o~ ·systsm ·: ·
·.c05492927 ..
. ,.
:1 . ..
.' ':,..

TOP· BE CR E>r..

.·:1.·· problems. .A tnwtitude . otunrelated malfunctions had ~de the air-

' .. . . . . .

. . unacc~ptable
·"I . ·· . .·craft .. ~'
froµi an .operational
. . r_eliability
. .
standpoint and:. "

. .
: 'required t:orrecti1:m. · This in turn delayed·Detachment pilot
. ' .
t~aining,"::

I '. : • .. • • • • • • • ,.> • ' • ~ • '

' . .systein.s and payloa9,. validation, an~ over~all 'r_eliabil~ty det~.rmi~-:

.
tion.
·..
:. In fact,
..', : . . to
di;e . . tl:ie delaxed
. . .·; ;··
deliy~ry of: aircraft, o~y
,•: . .
three·'. '

pilots 'were !>~1ng q\iaiifi~d f~r the .~onti~gE\n~y. ·The Detachm:'ent

simula.teq..SKY.LARK
. missions
. on·tx-aining
. flights· 1 · practici):l:g
. mUltiple
. .
·

.1· .ae.rial refuelinga ·and operatiitg ~ystems ·and payloads.· On 5 Novembe-r

. :19.64, a ..litp.i.1;ed emergency SKYURK capability was an.D.o~c.ed. · Wi,th·

tWo weeks' notice; th~ P~CART· ·d~tachment could a~complish ~ Cuban .

.·overflight.- but .with fewer ready aircraft and pilo~s than had been

:originally planned.

Primary detach.inent em.phasiS in t~e ensuing· weeks was devoted

I · ~ de~eloping .th.e:-SKYLARK capa.biiity into~· sustained cap;a.pHity,

· wi,th ~i.ve _ready. piloh and five _opera~fon~l aircraft~ ·The ·ma~n ~a::sks·
I were to determine aircraft ra:nge and'fuel c'onsumption: attain r'epeat-

.I. abie r~liabl~ operation, complete pilot training.,· prepax:e a family'

·of SKYI.;.A.RK missions;·: complete .coordinat~o:ri .of .:roq.tes· with. NORAI)~
I GONAD and FAA, and exercise .. com~and and contrc;>l. thr·ough opera:-
. .

I· tiona1 readin~ss .inspecti.on ~d c~mmand pc>st exercises. ·

. . \ . . . . . . ' ., ~

·1 . 83

.'.I··.
'.
·T·:o .P S..EC R.~. T
. .

Handfa via··BYEAMM.
~.:1·
. .
·Control- System·.·: :
. ·.·.
 C05492927
I·
.....
·1.··.
·...
.
I .
· Pri'fu.ary emphasis. in th~ L.oekhe.e4 flight te~t p:i;:ogra~: ln:· . the_

.:I ···weeks. following was devot~.d ·t~· a~celerated testing. ·0£ defen.sive· sys-

tems· and.a.tt;;i.inm.eri.t of ti).e. origfo~l. Mach 3·. 2·-performance ·s1»ecifi- ..

I ca.ti.on~. ~nd im.prov~we;nt of equipment an.d· comp~n.ent reliability~ ..
. .

I:· The highest speed. ~o~ at this. poiP.t had.been Mach 3; ?7, .the highest
altitude _:i~:ttaine(;l. was .:a 3 >' 000 feet,· and a. ·su.~iained .flight .of 3Z ·minutes
:':·1
ove;r Mach3. 0 .at 8Z, 000 feet. had been reached.

I Three yea:rs 1 experlence in high altitude, high spee.d: flight

testing had .pro~en that achieving a reliable cap~bility. at dea.ign

I -
spec1fication
.
was an ext:reinely diffi~ult
-
and. frustrating
.' . ·ta:sk.·

·I M~cih . be~n
Z had .. . reached after
. .si:x:
. ·months ·of flYi.ng,
.
and Mach 3

I: · after 15 months. Two ·years after.first flight; Mach 2 time j;otaled

38 hours, Mach 2 .• 6 time, three hou:rs .and MacJ:. 3. time les·s th.an ·ori:e

:I· hour. Af~er three yea:~s, Mach 2. tim:e had ..increased t.o 60 .ho~rs •. ·

. Mach 2,..{> ·titµe to .33 h.ours,: and.Mach. 3. 0 tim~ to 9. h~urs~ '-Howe~e·r,·

·1·
-· · :~u.:Ma:ch 3. O time was. confin~d .to. fllght tes.t .ai:rcra?t,: ~d De.ta.ch~
·1. . .
ment airc·ra:ft were restrict~d:to Mach 2. 9.

I ..
I.·
·.... , ..

..
« ·84.

. ·ua·
. .·n·. d1·e· ·._,ufa
....... P.YFMAU
D ,.... ~ .
:I. ....
·. ControJ ·Systa0: . ·
;<. • . _·: •. « ' :.~. ·"
 ·co5492927
,·1· .·
'f 0 p .S E.C RE.'f
~·1·:
··:Events· of 196 5 : ...
I. .ox~gT :O~.velops Operational Capabili~
... ..... ......

I
·1·
..

built (eleven.of which.remained}. ·Twin J-5~ engine.!? h~d powe·red

·I .. 143 flights and had accumulated 9Z8 ·h:ours. S ~ven a i :rc:raft. .ind udir.;g

the .train.er. we.re now assign:eci to the: deta:chm:ent-.and ~our. r"emS:itted ..•.
.'· ~

· m,flight "test. SKYLAR!<:- aircraft op.eratiorml perft>rrnance·had reached

a:speed
.
of
.
Mach . Z. 9, a ;_.ange of 17.o·o .nautical
.
tiiiles.-
. . . and
.
an altitud.e
.

of 76, 000 feet. Inlet modifications and a faster climb. sch.edule w~uld. · .
1. ·ai1ow ~Mach ·3. 05 .speed and· increase r~nge .to Z500 nautical miles·•.

I on. 27"J~nuary 1965

.
one of'the flight te.st aircraft
.
flew a SILVER ·

I .. .JAV~LIN x;nissi.on •. It wa"s the first .in a s~·ries 0.£ ~ong'.'"range, high".'

speed flights -~te.signed

.
to demonstrate .the
.. . .range. capability.
maxim.um .

I·· The. total flight

. time ~~ 1:40 hours
.
with
. 1:~5
.
·h.ours . abov~: Mach.
.
. .
3.1.
.
Totai :range ·was 2580~ ~au~ic~l miles. at cruise altitudes between
.1.· •• 75,·6.00
. .. ~00
and 80» .
feet". . . It . ~:epresented·the
. .
longes.t sustained
.
flight .

·:1·
' '

closely approximating design co:riditiqns.

•.

··1· ~. 28. January 196.5 11 Exerdse Echo" was: .conc;lucted ~ith joint.« ·

Pr'oject Headquarte.rs, SAC> .. Detachrn~ntand FAA parti<;tpi:ttion .. !t

·1 85

:I\
.-1·.
. -: .
·-···co5492927.

·I T:OP

:-1· :wa.s a simulated.SKYLARK m_issi~n and. served to exercise all

I elements that. ~ould he i~volv.ed in an ·a.ctual _overflight• ._ All phases

·-of the-··.exe.r_cise.. were_ successfui.: It was ~ignificant becaµse it inaug-·
·.1 .
·_urated op_~rational miss.~on type· training by the Detac_hment.
. . :

.1·
' -

_T.wo modification programs wer_e erµbar}t.ed· ~pon ·a~ Area 51 .

in 1965 • The ·objectives were·to increase speed. i~prove reliability;

. 1. improve range; increase mission: du:ration and_-to incorporate elec-- :

·I .:tronic c<:mntermeasure.s • T~e first, or Phase. II· SKY LARI{ modifica:tion~

1.· . . was to impr9ve the SKYLARK cap.ability to a M~ch 3. 05 level and was
·_begun in the' spring of 19.65.··. The second, or minimum major niodifica-

I tion (MMM)~ represented the ·min-imurn actions ne:cessary to achie:ve

·I:·
,. the design ·¥ach 3-_ ~ ·performance oh a repeatable and reliable basis •

.SKYLARK
. I I. ~edifications included:·
. further improvements
. . in the

inlet sys tern;. strength en big. the »structure of pla~tic pa~els; inc r.easing
:

1· the. aircrcift's.
.
supply- of nitrogen (nitrogen is· used as the inert fueJ.,·.bink
. . ' ,

·"J>r~ssurizi~g medium, and an_incre8:sed supply°w.ould·~pi:ovide·f~r rh_ore".:·:'

I_: refuelings on a rnissi_on)i. strengthening th~ ~ddde~ ;os_e; ~nd.Lnco-rporating·

I'. . minor equi~·ent changes. The .MMM p_rograrrt. included changes td

·alll:)W· a faste'r climb. S~hedule; provided space in. the ·chiµes to insta.ii
1···.
the ECM equipment; stre??-gthened fuselage' s.~ation joint 71::5 (tb.iS: W'E!-~·. · ..

I 86

I 'l' 0 P . S E C. R: E T-

I.
..................,;,,,;;,o-...--..,;.........· --------'·. _,. _._________..._. . . . .·- -. :. .· --·____. .-_
. _,_; ______;__;.;__.
·.. C054 92927

I
..
. . .
TO~··s:ScRET

.1· '. J;lec;:essary b.~cause oithe.incr¢ased... ~ertding rn'ov~ni~nt.. being intr~d~ced-_

:1. ..by the weight of the ECM gea·r, heavier' payloads, and to pr.ovid:e.a
):. .. .· .- .

·1 ·better safety margin); and. increased· the liquid'.oxygen supply for· .

longer missions.. The MMM program also c9nvert~d the. inlet corttrol

.1· system. flight Mach number extensio.ns had been paced by th,e air.
.'

I. ..
.inlet sys.tem and its interactiop.- with the· e·ngine·.. ~eY. to .pro.per inlet.·

performance was.. the control sOystem:· Th~ pe.rfo.rm~ce ·of"th~ ·:p:r1~ary

I ~et· control system had not been ·cc;>Iis~dered satisfactory. ·Inlet. ~ough­

nes·s· and shock expwsio~ had permitted 'speed· extensions. only in small' .. '
I
incre;ments to Mach 2·. 8. After extended
. :fiight test :and 'instrumentation"
..
1· .
.
.
. .
.
.

the._ contractor opted for the back-up· ele.ctronic inlet contl:'()l system .over

·I· ·the hydro-mechanical system. The MMM. ·program p.lso standardized

.th_e configuration of the .a.ircraft. The numerous .approaches to solving

I· A-lZ problems had resulted. in non-standard configu~a-tions for sev~ral

1· ..
of. the .aircraft. At completion, tht3 modificatio:~1.- pr()g.rams would pro-

··- .vide a'" uniform .op~rati,ng fleet of A-12 1s, equipp.ed .and capable of per-
·1· ...-: ....
' forming· the· design mission •
.

::1. The modification programs .were phased in ~·uch.

. . . .. . .. . .
a way
..
that at
. .

iea.st f.iva' airc~aft were availahle-.to the deta-c.~~ent. at all ti~es fdr. ·
I .
. training
. . and. proficiency
.
flying: . .A,s. airc'raf~ were
.
compl~teq
.
~nd
'.
·I .. . 87

·1
Hanaia via BYEMml
·1. Control _Syst1Jm --
:i.::
 C05492927
1.· T O.P

·1· .
. .
accepte.d by the. Detachment, the' pilots ·b~gan to acquil:-e. e~~~ience

I in the higher Mach numbers that the modifications pern:J.tted. "On.·

25 March 1965 a· Detach~~nt pilot flew~ Deta.'ch~ent airc~aft at .

I· Mach 3. O for the· first ti,me. The-:teafter, accumulation

.

6£ time.at the»
.

high speeds became rou~ine, and ~11 the Detachme~t pilot·s were

Mach ·3. 0 qualified by mid-1965. .

The year 1965 can be considered the high point.in.leve.l of activity·'

in the history of the program~ .T.he b~se. at Area 51 reached· full physical·

growth with the completion of construction. Ei~ht Butler shelter-type

·hangars now·housed the 'De,tachmenj; aircraft. ·Commercial power

. . . ' . .
finally reached the site. Area s1··was now comparable. to a normal USAF .

installation, though on a X·educed level. Its population .reached CL high ·

. .
of. 1835 during the year •. This large number is at'!:=ributed .chiefly to .

the fact that the· J>rime. contractors were ~or king three shifts a day'- on.: ..

the modification programs. Other inci:-eases in the Area 51 personnel :

totals w~re results of an in~rea:se in th~ Detach~ent T/O to.280~ the· ·

· TAG.BOARD. activity ~hich haq begun in August 1964~ and the base

construction and support activities •..

"Three
.
Constellation
. aircraft
.. now made daily .sched"Q.led workday -

flights between Burbank and Area 51 to transport contract~r. personnel .

. 88 .

T 0 P .,S E G. Il E T .HANDLE ..VIA.BYEMAN

":CONTROL SYSTEM
.·

·.- ..·
...... - ....- .:... ·-- .- .
'
~ ~ .
 .. :
C05492927
·1
TOP SECRET
=1·
and vital freight~· Two. daily C-:47. shuttle ·flig_hts. ~ere :made iro~- .
.1· Las. Vega_i!f.·to ·t.ransport EG&G per~~ritiei·to operat~ the :t:adar r~ng~.

·I. _: __ Ril.nge·~ctivlties now included ope~ation. of_ a surplus.USAF radar· which·

.. ,., li~d b.een procured from Fort Fisher~: North Carolb:~a,. arid moved to

Area. .SL -It was.. a FAN SONG rada·r simulator-; and ~it . wa;s employed .
. '.
. . . .

I in the
.
.
OXCART EC_M
. systems
..
. .
flight' testing program. whj.ch was
.
b.egin~ '
.·
.n.ing·to :g.et unde.rway •.
I In ·the ·spring .of 1965 ... Project H'.eaaquariers and the De1;achment.

·1 bega~ conting-encyplanning for possible .A.iz_overflights in the Far_···

~st.
.
Since the. ai·rcraft was not yet capab~e
. .. '

of_ reaching its qesign

~

.I ·range, it was. not feasible to mount s_uch oper_ations from Area 51. It_
·=1· .
'
·was now _necessary to plan for: ·an c:>verseas. A-12 operating base in the

.. ' ..
Far East·. A forward detachment did. exi_s-t at Kadena Ai:i;- Bas·e,
I ' '
. .

Okinawa·,;-_but· it was capaple ~£ supporting o~ly the. KC~l35_. refueling

·'I·· tankers. Under

. . .the original
. '
OXCART .c;:oncept
.
of.ope,rations,
. . .
the.A-lZ
. .

.I ., operated from Area·Sl. a,nd the supporting tankers operated from the

fo;rw.ard .overseas bases ..

I Project BLACK SHIELD Initiat~d

· O? .18 March 1965 the DCr. (M~. McCone) and S_ecreta:.rie.s McNamara
I
aiid Vance had a C:Onyersation on the i~creas'ing.hazards t€rU-2 _a.nd dr~n.e·

I reconnais.sance of. Communist.Ch{na. ·o_r- the m·eeting he wrote as follow·s:

··..
1-.· ·.89

TOP S .. E_C_R ET
1.· ·ff~ndle'J1ia· Bvt~,fAN .
:-.·.. ~ontrnr Sy_ste.m·
. . ..
.C05492927
.:_I· . l'.: O P . S ·E C R E 'f

. I. · ·. .·"It _Wa.s ·fu;ther agreed ~hat ·we. sl:iould pro~eed immediately.·

With all preJ>a.ratory steps necessary- to ·operate" the. OXCART .
I ~ve~ Communist China, flying out . of OkinaWa.. It ·~as agreed · ·.
t;h'.at w:¢ sh~ul:d proce~,d with all const~ction and rela_ted a·i:range-

·1: . ments. ·However,: this deCision did not authorize the·d.eploy-· ·

ment of tP,e OXCART .to Okinawa nor the decision to fly the
OXCART ·over Comm.unist China •. ·xlie:·decision would autho~ize·
all prepar.atory steps and. the e~p.endit:ure of .such funds. as might.
·I· b..e
.
involved
. --
•. " l-1 . · . . · · . -- . . :·
.

The DPCI {Gen. Carter) transmitted· Mr •. McCone's .memorandum·

I·
to the ·DD/S&~ for actio~. _Annex 135 conta,ins the text of the. DDCl's ·

I,· m~t.n:o:i:-.andu.ID~ . O:r;i_.zi Ma~c:ti, Gen. Ledford, AD/SA, briefed Mr. Van.ce .
on· the. ope-i-a-tional conc.ept of a Far East O~_C;AR'.i'. ()peration .. The· plan
.·1·
. was_"C:alled ProJect· BI:.1\CK.SHIELD. Mr~· Vance advised . he had directed

.I· the D/NRO, Dr~ McMillan, to. provide the.facilities a~d l'l.ecessary sup-

I port to impiement the plan .

.A joint CIA/USAF team. _went.to Kadena to ·survey.the· fa~ilitie·s

I and ·:construction requirements·.

. . . .
The existing .special fuel storage a_rid
..

.1··· c.ommUnicati9ns
. facility, . plus the adequate run~ay, made Kadena
. the.··'.
logical choice of ba:ses on which to locate an· OXcART .op_erating ~etach-
·1.· ..
ment. .rt wa·s als·o centrally focated . relevant to·potential target. areas.
.
.

.-1 After construd:iort

. and. othe·r ·support. requirements
: ~
~ere det¢rmin'ed~

1-· l/. Memoran~um. for the Recor.d, ·1s March 1965~ Dis·cussion ·with ·
- Secretary M·c:r\ramara and Secretary Vance concerning: Aeria.f ..

.1·. Re.connaissance over Communist China. See Annex 135. .

90 ..

.1· TOP S E.C R·E·'i'-. . .

Hand'ot.
..
t•jn nm·-~·•"
•j • u I <1
..... •\
u "f • •
.:ii o....i, ....... .

·I Contrnl Systc.m
.. ; . · .. ,_.
·· ... ·· .·· .
 ..
'.: c 0 5 4 9 2 9 2 7 ..
.. I .· .
..
'i' 0 p SE CR:E 1'
··I.:
... · Se_cre.taioy Vance ~ade available $3. 7 millicm.·to. assure ·that the ;_eces·sa:ry
.·I suppqrt capability would b~. av.;i.ilable by. early £aµ of 1965. (See ··

.. :J\,nne~ 136.) OXCART planning . for"· BLACl<>SHIELD called .for .staging

I~
t_hree A-12'.s·tci Okinawa for 60-day.TDY periods twice a y~ar, .with
1· . . . . . . .

a,bout ZZ5 pe.rsonnel involve.d. A- secori.d phase BLACJ{ SHI~LO cat_>a-

·1· bility. would ·be to·establish. a permanent detachment.

.
. . .
·On .3 June 1965-, ·the Secretary ·of Pefense. noted to the D/NRO.
I
..

·"that the·Soviets :were deploying SA:M 1 s.arbund Hanoi. He que·r"ied the

. . 1/ .
:I· ·practicability of substituting OXCART air~raft for U-2's and drones. -

The D/NRO_replt~d (;n·S June 1965 that the ~ontrolling £actor on the .•·
·I:.· us.e of· OXCART was ·th!'!. question of performance, operational.readi-.
. .

·I ness, and aircraft reliability, :and s.econdly, ti.le question of vulnera-

· bility.. He .advised that a· progra:m. W3-:!:!.. being ·devele>ped to "make..

·I:· . . . ' ~

'.Sf:a.tistically. valid. dete·:rminatipns of the rang~, .fuel consumption, :~nd

I other op~rating pa·ram.eters of the airplan~ in its finaf confi~urati~n•. 11 • Z./

. .
The D/NRO stated he would report again (circa l J~}".) to include
I ..
an. analysis of vulnerability ·and aircraft pe·rf_ormanc.e ve.rification by

I . operational aircraft.

,
I
...
1/ .BYE-5451-65, 3 Jun·e 1965 •. Memo:i:andum. :from the .Sec·retary of

y·
Defe~se.to·the:.. Under.Secretary·of the .A.Ir.Fore:~ (.se;e·Annex 137).·

BYE•31S30-65-, · 8. June:.1965. Use of OXc.ART over China arid Southeast·

Asia:( see Anne~ 138): . . ..
·.

1·.·.. . 91

TOP" ·s~c':aEir· ..
·Handle via ·aYttiAM ·.
I_:, .Control Syst-Om.::
- '. . . '
. .i
,,05492927
'l'OP SECR:E'l'

With. a •
p~ssible d~ployment ove~seas· in
t • ' .
the .fall; the Detach,ment"·

"·I. be.g.an a cop:i.pr~-hensive ai:i;-craft·arid ;airc:raft:systems .re_liabtlitY. .vali~ .

. . - ·." . . . . . '

... datlon program._·:. As· aircra~t. com:pl~ted the~ m~dification prqgram,:

.I'. . .

' .. the. Detac~el).t s.et out to d~m9~s:trate '.complete sy~ter.p.s '.reli~bility ·

,
.1. .
. ..
·at Mach-_3.-05,
,. .. .
230Q.NM .range, and

.
·the validation J?roc es s.
.
penetration
..
altitudes of 76~ 000 feet.

1. C.on;S.iderable improveme:i;it in aircl"aft performan9.e and in the.

I· · ope·:rati.on
. of an:ci:llary .sys~etns was. observed

. test and evaluation program.

.
in the p.ost-modification
. . .

The. _inlet, ·cam·era. hydraulic, na~iga-

·.1 . tion and '.flight co~trol systepiS ·all demonst::l,"ate~ ~cceptable reliability.

1· _.However, due to the _sustain~d ti~eheing fl9wn at the_ high.Mach; high ·

. ·temp.erature environment, new problems surfaced~ ·Most serious

1· · a_mon~ them Wa.s with the. electri$:al wiring system •. El~ct:r'i.cal _wh·ing ··

.I connectors and. components had tb wi.tl:ls'tand. temperature's -C>Vel'. 800° .F

along with structural flexing, -vibration and shock~ Repeated m.alfunc-

I .. .•. tions were occurring in.the i°'1et
. c·ontrol, com!".!lunications -e9,ui:pment,
. ...
· ....
' '

·1 ECM sy~tem.s,, a11:d cockpit in.striµnenta.tton: whiC.:h were ~ttribu~ble -t9

. .
wiring failure·s. There was distUrbing eVi.dence that ca.reless ma.inte-
I nan'~e
·.
was also contributing to. eiectrical. co~~_c::tor :f'a.Hure~! '-There

1:
9Z
.
·1.:. . 'F. 0 -l? . 5 E :C .ft E 'f

. Handle via HYHNitr

:1-..
. '
~tiritrnl Sy~teni
,
-, . -· -.. ...... ·,
 C05492927

·I
:_.1·
were c_onfinue(I"°fµel t~~k s~alant p~obl.~~s.: -~ compoun:d had ~till .
I not. been founc;l .tJlat-witjistood
:':';

the_· ~ange: ·of temperatures ..and ~tr.UC-'

·1 .. .· tural flexing. There we~.e air conditioning failure·~, trans4ucer .and·

indi~ator ·failures·, oscillations in ..the· i~et system •. and a host of mis.-

·1 cellane~us bugs .app-~aring du.ring _air~raft ~per.atio~. Frequent fospec-

1. tions·w.er~·necessa~y to asi;ure the durability of the engine. Flight

and. :ground test cle~elopment ·wa:s still required to improve· the· du:ra.-
.1· .
. bility of::engine 'c.omponents,"· such as.the c'ombusti9n secti<;>n, and the

I .. accuracy· of the engine control systems •

·1 . . . · · Project Headquarters and detachrhent·mai~_tenance supervisors

. ve:ry carefully observe_d Lockhee·d ·procedures and prc:>gress in solving_

. .
.. the new prob.le:m.s. The3'.~ were indications of. les.sening interest in
... ·the .'prog.ram~ and a lack. ~ggr~ssi.:ve interpr.eta~ion·of flig_ht test-_.
I
. . . o{

;results.· There·wa.s·m<?unting concerri that the BLACK $HIELD ·

I. . . .. .
readiness date schedule would not be met. Prompt. corrective.action. ·

6£ Lo.ckheed ~s ·in The q:ua.Hty ·of rnci.intena~ce

I on.·
. ..
the part
. .
order.

.:·needed drastic improv~:rp:ent . The responsibility for.:deliverin_g an

I ·aircraft '.~ystem .with a~ceptabie. reli~biiity to·.:meet .an ·ope~aticma.i'. ·

I com.rnitment lay squarely upon Lockheed.·

.I

,.
1·. T o. ·P. · S E C R. E. T
..Handle via· EYfMAU
·contrQtSy~tem ··
~....
.C05492927 .• ...

I
:,
.. . . .

Mr .....Para:ngosky, Deputy for .Technolo~y, .. osA. ·met with · .

M~~-. 'Johns.on at the Lockheed

. .
.plant
. . . 3·A~gti~t
6n -
1965.. A frank se~sion.

.. ·1·. . iensu~q· concern.ing the, meas~re.s necessa.ry to insure 'tba.t BLACK

SHr:IDLp ·a~d OXCART. commitments .w.ere made.' Mr.· Johnson con.-

·I eluded that he shquld go to Area 51.~~ a full-time basis to.ge:t the.job

1· ·done .e:Xpeditiousl.y•. Mr. Daniel ~ughton,

. - \
Presiaent of Lockheed,·
.

co~curred With the 'pro~osal •. He offe·re<;l. the full support of ~he .. oorp~
o~tion in te.rm.s of seniQr people c»r. any other as'sistance to a,cli.ieve
..
·
BL;ACK SHIELD .readiness. ·Mr. Johns.on began full-time duty-at·
•.
Area.51 the ne;xt' day. Iri addition, he augmented the·Lockheed con- .

. tingent·at>Area, 51 with senior ins~ector·s. e1ectrica.l technicians· and

·1 ~anti.facturing p~ople.

The assignment o£·top-~evel stipervtsors ·r.esulted i~ improvement

I in maintenance .crew pe·rformance, better inspection procedures;. and a.

:.1 :general tightening-q.p of Lockheed· ~anagemen:t at ~rea ~l~ · The ~nd . ._.

1. resul~ of t~e contractor ;reorga.ni~ation .was to ge(;F?roject'.BLACK S~ELD

"back on' schedule. F~ur ·prim.ary .BLACK· SHtELD.11Llrcraft
. . . id.~nti~- ..
were· ...

I fied: a.nd~ ·upon completfon of 'f.!.lodH'ications, .wen~ into a flight·p~ogram

I· t,o: valf~ate BLACK.. SH!EL~ op~rational· profile sorties; · ·Flight test ~ir:..
. .
craft:esta.?lish~d tlie following perfo'1-rriance.miles~ones::during 1965: ·

I·· 94·

1·. 'fO.P SECRE'f.

Handle via- BYfi1Ai'J .
I . .· Contrcr .Sy~t~m ··
 ,.
·.co5492927
...
'f' o·p S E C lt El'
·I Maximum Speed .
·.'.

':
Mach 3,. 2~
Maximum Altitude · 90,·o.oo
I ·Maximum Sust~ined·"·Tune:
.At.or·above Mach ·3.·0:
feet

l:l7 hours
1: At or ab9ve Ma-ch 3." 2 : 1:14· hours·

Dllring· the course -~£-B;L.4C~ SHIELD . validation flights·~- .

·1· Detachment"a:ircre1.ft, flown-by Detac~ent ptlo.tE;i,. recqrded_ a ~axun;q.m ..

I- · ~.en,durc;,p.ce.fl.ight :of.6:20 hours du,ration _and_an?.ther oh which- 3:_50'· hour~

.·
of Ma!.'.:l?- 3.- p o;r above. time was logg~d·. , . .
I . :On. l4_Augu-st,.·a £1ig~t test air.c;:ra:~t-flew f.rqm Ar:ea 51 to

Orlando, Florida, and return. thence to. Ka:nsas Ctty and--r~:turn •. it·
. .
·simulated, ·exactly as. plannedt. an op~rational mission with: two air ··
. . '

·refuelings and three cruise·legs •. The_fli.ght cov~red 6500 nautical ·.

miles in 5:·27 _h9urs, including air refueling ti~e.'. ·Between 4 Cl,nd 15.

. A..ugust,. an aircraft was" deployed to McC~y A'F.B~ 'FlOrida, for a series

I
- . . . . ' .

of _climatic- tests to det~r:mine .vehicle pe~£oririance in ar~as _of high

1.· · humi~itY~ Cockpit .foggin&• hot-air d~f~ing,_. and .wj,nd~hield rai~

.removal were· items which- required environmental testing.- ... ~

Data·
I···....... . . . . .

· obtained fr-om the· flight. testing at McCoy indi~ated that· _descents ·.into_
'

I. moist. warm clirriate~ presented n<:> flight saf~ty ·proble~ss. and that ·

_,... . '
-it was fe~sible_ to operate in such a cUma.te, one w~i~h was_ very.

. ·sunilar to that of Okinawa.

I 95

~:1·"· T 0 p· : S #r
..
c-· R E ·T

·1.·
 C05492927
1:1 .. ..
T 0 P . ·s EC RE 'l:'
·'I
oh ZO·Nove.mber.1965, ·BLACK SHIELD valid~tfon :wa~ completed.
·1./· '.1'h.e ~frcraft 'sys·tem w~s pei:fo"rming· with acceptable :r~liabj.lity arid

I ··repeatability •. The· detachment was manned, equipped and trained.

.:, The· two· ·prima.ry cam.era systems ~ere.performing acc~rding to.:·

, ..
. specification. A cons~derab.le amount·of"materiai hao been.shipped .by.

surface, and ~s·ln place at Ka.dena·tO support ·a depl-<?y.tn~~t. ·Kadena

...fa.;.c~litt=~s"-Y,r_e!'e:~~ssei:i.tially completed.· A deploynie~t s.chedule .cailed

·I · · for an ope::tating capability in being· at Kadena Air Base on ..

I 15" January· 1966. To strengthen the declar~tion. of operational readi._ .

:I :ness he was soon. to make, General Ledford called.the principal con~

"t~act~rs t~ a m~eting· at Headquarters <;>n 23 Novem.ber.1965. There he

-a.sked for, q.nd r¢ceived from each one,· a written stq.tem·ent that ea:ph ·

·1·. contractor felt his system Wa.s .ready for successfU.i BLA."CK.SHIELD

. operation. Statements were received from. Lockheed_(aircraft a.nd.

I . . ' .
over.;an systems); Pratt & y.Thitney (engines); Minn'eapolis-Honeywell

.1 . : (Il'fS and Flig)l.t Control .System); Pe"rkin ..·E~er."arid Eastman: Kodak .

(Cameras). (See Annex 139 for statements provided.by the contractors.)

,
.1
..
Qn·l:Decemb'er 1965.• a proposal_"\Vas f.orward~d to the 303·Com-".:
mittee via the.D/NR.0.that the.OXCART F~r East deploiment.be .

.approved .. It was indorse~ to t;he 303 .Committee ·by the D/~RO. on'.:
·I
·1· 'i'. 0 P
96

S E C R: B T ·
O
nauu
~\
e:.-.Vl3.· n'\p"f.UM ·
n : ttJ;1n . ·
.I. CtmtrnL Syst~m
 C05492927

,:
I.
·._...

2 December 1965
. (see
.
.. 'l' 0 p SE GR.ET

Annex 140}~·. ·The 303 Committee examined

I the .matter the .next day. It did .not approve an actual deployme·nt as

requested. It did agree that all steps be taken·~ short of moving aj.r-

craft, to devel~p and maintain a qui~k reaction deployment capabiHtY.

'ready to deploy-within a 21'"'.day period· any.time after i January 1966._"·

(See Annex 141.}

·1
OXCART Accomplishments in 1965

-I A·review of operatiohal activity_for 1965 reveals that 600 ·.A.-12.

I. flights had been macie for a total of approximately 1000 .flying hours. ·

·. · .There had b~en a sharp increase i~ Mach 3. 0 flight .time (108 hours "·.

1.· · .. acc~_mulated as
. compared to ·only. 8. hours total Mach
. 3. 0 .time acquired
. . .

·prior to 1965). and detach~ent sorti~ effectiveness rose from a low of

·I
. 2.5% in 19.64 to 65% in· December 1965. A sortie is rated effect.ive'.

I
. .

. only if all. subsystems perfor_med properly and ali planned ~bjectives :

.. ·
1-· . ·. ·of the. ·so~tie were satisfactorily a_ccomplished.· The OXCART Progra~ ·

had re~ched th.e· ~tage .where it was capable of. co.b.ducting. reconnaissance· .
·1 .
. . . .

of Cuba and deploying to the Far East, simultaneously if ·required·~ . The

·1· · ·year's accomplis_hments, however, were clouded:by the third aircraft·

· loss.
:I On 28 De~ember 1965," Aircraft No. 126 crashed im.m.ediat~ly

.I ~fter ·fake-off at Area 51 and was totally destro.yed, The pilot ejected

.1· 97
. HANDLE ··v:IA · BYEMAN .
. T 0 P. . SE G'R ET ·. CONTBOl,. SY.STEM·

.. . . -~ .. . .. ···.
·C05492927

-I·
'i'.·O P 5 EC ~·E 'f.
·1 .
sa,.f~ly at an altitude ·of 150 feet. ·Th~ a:ccident i.nve~tigation board.
". ·... :
determined !=}1e ca us~ involved human 'errol'.". whe):ei~ a flight: line.

electrician.had. ~onnected the ya·w·and pitch gyr~s.· ~f the aircraft .

. ~·tab11ity .s·ystem in ~eve~s·e.. This. resUlted iil. complete tincontrolla-

I bility of the aircraft when it began a
..
series· of violent yawing and".
.

'"
·1·
pitchin·g. gyrat~ons immediately afte:i: lift-off.

. The
.
Office·of Security was

·inquiry into the :accident.

dire~:ted.by
.
the
.

It was concluded that the accident occurred·

.DCI to .·c~~d~Ct ~:h.

I as the result of unintentional errors on the part ofthe workers di-

I·· · rectly i.ri.volve.d •. There ·was no indication·~r e.vid.~nce of sabotage;.

·malicious intent or wanton disregard qf ~rope·r pr~c.edures. There

·1 was-~~ publicity connected with.the a:ccident. · Corrective actions·
. .
included closer technical supe.rvision of mainte:i;lanc;e ·personnel,

· increased erri.phasi:s on ·formal training ·courses and higher maintenance

·. standards.·

. Assignment of responsfoility for reconz:i.aissanc~ of·targets .in

"•"'.
·the' Far ·Ea et s oHciified emplq~ent c.oncepts and. tactical' t~ainin.g'.•.
. . . . . . .
. Training programs and requirements were focused upon. B·l.ACK Sffi~LD.
. . .

. . .. planning; Training for ~hree .AR missions •. over~water rendezvol,l:s,·

single-engine refueling proficiency, sub.sonic missioris and :ECM

I 98
1· TOP. SECRE·T

I ..· . - ...
! C05492927
'.* .
..
·1·
..· .

. proce~ures, received heavy emphasis.· Pilot fatigue"s-~dies ·we·re : ·

:·1·. · co~ducted
.
tb verify ~ilot c~pability.~o'.p~-r£o:i:;_n
' . . ..the.~iss.i~n~'of·d~:ra~on:
. .. '

·1-·. expeet~d in deploYi.ng" subsonic to overseC!-S. loca:tfo~s·. ·

Subsoµic
.
deployment to the
.
Far Eas·t _wa.s·
.
re;i.sed.
. .
With--the ·v~l.i.da-
. . .
.

·I-. ti.on <){.a.reliable

. .
~ver-water
. ci.ir-refueli~g
. . ~ende·zvous.
.. .,.
~yst~txl;.
. . '
T·his

-1· d_eV'elopt.n.ent made supersonic deploym·ents .feasibl~. arid ma:terially'.·

· reduc·e4 the· s_tagi~g logi:;tics requirement and· pilot fattgue ~actors:.

:I Ba:-sic inflight an_d 'photo·. flight· line. .tactks evolved from the_ U -2

1· opera~onal, experience.: While the A-lZ spt:ed,_alti~de, and'·ECM made.

. .• . ·.

_., .. . the '

·airc~aft
. Virtually
.
invulnerable to enemy
. . . .air· .defense reactions,.
· special .techniques had to be deveioped_ in planning can;iera ·flight

1- ..
iine~ due to th!'l hig~ speed arid turn -~hara?teristics. (86-nille· turn :radius).
of' th.e aircraft. Although ·stable flight-lines wer.e ~1anned o~er_ :primarr ..
·I' target a;rea,s~ bonus phc;>tograpby could"-be .planned. .on du~ing .a c·oordi~. .. '

·I nated turn.-

,~ !n-FU.sht ·Refueling· UFR} Xech.niques.

··'· .· ...· . ' . . . . . .. .
..... .Pe,r~p.s ·the .most singular ·~nd.·cer.ta.ii:µy a .first in tactics was ." · ·

,.
·1: ... the development and establishment. o!" t~e air refueling. re~d~zv"ous and: •..

.. .· acc.ompariying
· . tb:e . air . r~fu:eli~g 'techniques.··
.

solve.d-_ertcompassed--:getting the A-12 £rcm1 ve:ry higl;l cruise i:iiti_tudes \..

The ba~ic- prQblem
.
.
to be ·
.
.

I:
. 99

:I··· '.·."

I:· . .·Handle . virr '.BYEitiArl

iliiiiiiii--~-. ..,... ...,.......__
... '
. .;.......;.........;....__------~::ontrnl. ·svstem :
_......;.;..._.......;.._;_................... ; ;. -.·...;..·
.C05492927
·1::·
t .O·P S..E G RE '!'
;·1
(80, OOO·plus) and high supersonic ·speed (Mach. 3. z}_ to th.e co~pa.~ative_ly_ ·:
:I- ·:low {.30, 0.00·.feet} a:fr_ refueling_ altitude. and-speed (Mach. 80},·· difec:::tly.

·behind .the ~nker in position fo~ a hookup._ Th.e. com.°piete rertdezvous .

I . a~d· :r~fueling operat~on.from.cruise' altitude b_ack to c;r~ise altitude

·1· encogipa_sses some 700.nautical·miles; the rendezvous is accomplis_hed

fi·y.-·means. ~-£ the:A_."."-lZ's navigation system _plus a UH)?,. discrete radlo.:

·1 ..
. .
system which proVides rang.e and ·azimuth inforµlation. · ·An ai;rb<?r1?-e.

.1··.. . beacon .and· TACAN are used-as additional reridezvous equipment~ : Aft¢r
~ . .
. c·onside_rable test and evaluation, today's .A~12 refueling t~ctic consists·
.I
of a·240 NM. descent fo a 30, 000 foot le·vel 1".efueli~g profile. The··

·I. ·receiver pilot utilizes one engine .in· afterburner during actual re.fueling.
. .·

··1· Af~er refueling, the A-l2. climbs back ~p _to cruise Mac!?- .<3.1/3. 2) ai-i.d

c.ontinues mission •.
:1. In the early days of the pre-ope1".ational ~er.i<;>d._ .considerabi~.

··1· c·oo.tdin.ation
.
effort Wa.s expended. iri the establishm.ent
. ..
of.
. air refueling·
.
track.a and_ attendant :Pr.ocedure~ for ope.rating"th~ A-12 into the Polej.'r
·.1· •. ~reas-•.
.
Some initial training rout.es we·re conceive4 and planned along ·.
.

1· . these liries_and included the p;ocedure~·necess~r·y·fo~ ove.rflight._of.

· Ca:rla:da . . The cooperation of the Canadian Goverrrinerit·.to ~se ¢inadian ·

.I· :
.. . . . . . .
: airspace was. obtained in 1963. ~
.l/

I. fl l)YE ... 3194-63, 4 September 1963 (see Annex-142) •.

1·
,
: 100· . ' ·.

TO~ SECRET
..
. .
· Handle via··:B~£U1\M ·
cont.ml ·syslam. · · ·
C05492927
..
. .l' 0 P S E C R: E -'f

Th.e ..foregoirig, .. o~ course, was 'consi.i;;.teii.t with .the ini.tia.l

.I .OXCART
... .. con.:cept
. .
whi~h
.
er:rvisioned
"
tj}e Sin.a-Soviet
. .. . . . .
Bloc as the ~rim:ary·
.

area .of irite':t~st. Subseqo.ently., as. political inte·::re$t an~ et,nphasi~:

I:·. shifted to the ChinaiSo~theast Asia area, traini~g .routes: were do~­

.1 ,.
. .. over.the
centrated '· . ·southern
. United
. Stat~s land mass and some Pacific

· Oceari: areas •
.1· ... Mission ·Planning

I· The tormulation :C)f operationaLtactics has.,been .a C()ntb1uing

effort designed to optimize mission

. c~pability consistent·with require-
I .:m.ents and safety.
. .

The A-12 Tactical Doctrine Man:ual was develo?ed

I .
and formalized ·to govern all A.-12 operations ... This ~anua.l p.re-
. . -
'
. .
.

·.scribes.in detail.,A-12 operational planning factors,: .tactics ~nd pro-

I . cedures for the employm:ent of.the A-lZ rec'?nnaissan:ce system. "·

I OXCA~T program mission planners began :-vorking· up a dossier·

of· BLACK SHIELD missions,· us in~ the «:iompute:rized technique.a devel-. ·
.I oped in ·the two prior :years .. Until late fall of 196~ OXCAR.T mission· . ·· ·

I· .... , ":planning was in the primitive state. of manual manipul~tfons :and. .: ...
~ # ••

I computa.tjons.
"
utilizing
.
data .subscribeq by ·contra.Ctor specifications.

·.By: Nq,vember 1964 enough graphs, . cha:rts.,. and.. benchmark data. had·

I ..
b~;en
. { ' .
gather.ed to begin'.a comput.er p;r9gram which wa:s :to ·":y.E:ntually .·
.

,'". . affo.rd a~ autcm1.ated flight plan:·

T 0 P
'101

S E. C RE T'

I. '"··
: ~ ..
.co5492927· ··
.·.1.·
_:,. 'I' O P 5. E ·C. It E. T . · ·.

., ..
With this °limited..capability, mission pla~ers began elim.ina~i.ng

ea·ch·manual :£u,nction of planning .. · .Prior·to the s.ummer· of 19'6S.: · ·

'1· ·aii.tomated .magnetic: variation, minimum fuel .. req.uired ·to.d·es'ignated

bas.es,: ~long.·with a flight ~Ian format had eme:rg.ed.". The nee.ci for
.1 mor.'e 4efi.ni~ive-.type systems:capaqi~ities·'and vehicle p.erforinance

:.~I· mission planning factor~ ·bec;atne apparent.. Significant prog.ress .was.

·made iri automated·mission

. planning 4uring· the. A-12 Va.lidation
.. period..• .
.1 . . .

.. inciuding the fdllowing·~major accomplish·m~nts:

I· ( 1) Automated plotting ca.pability •

.
(2) .Post.-·mission plot to .inertial nayigation system tape .. .
I· (3) Distance to "go" information.
. . . .

1· (4): Extraction of certain.'~ata in flight pians .for. NPI.C's

··1·. use in :correlating mis·sion "take" ..

(5) Sun
.
relati.ve·
. .
bearing
.
wi.th its change
.
.rate
. .p'er. . minu.te.
.

.I (6) A defe~se analy.sis program to give .probability.of

·.

I mi.ssion success.

. · ( 7) Inertial navigation sy,stem~ progr.am. :

I . .
This va.lidatioJ1 period, which ended i.n November 1965, saw

· the· advent· of wo.i-ldwid'e ca.pi:i.Bili.ty ·of the :INS tfystem. testi~g. a.n'd val_i-

dation of. all

.
.weapo.ns .systems
.
and
. .
repeatable
.
.performa:nce
. infor~ation.

102

TO.:P SECl:';ET ..

Randle· via BYErtiAtr

·. cnntrQ\ ~1st~m
·C05492927

·I. ...

TOP s·EdRE.'i'

I
With.,data.gleane·d iroih this validati~n·_period, mission pl~nners·

I .. : were able
. . to incorpo.rate
. .
:into·. the copiputerized
.
flight·
.
plan the A-12 .·

.I. 'b.irn.·radii,is, aut~m_ated weather_' data and !'l,lel curves :for:the dif~
ferent. typ~·s -.of cruise profiies.- Additionally a K<:::;-135 -~utoniated
I flight plan was developed whiCh has been d~clar~d th~ most advanced·

I . $ystem ever afforded a .supporting organization.·· At this time., all

C?~m.era progra~tning data· wa~ also iil.~luded in the autom~ted

.I. . . pr.ogram.
.
·I In si.un~ar·y,
. .
with a.minimum munber 0£ specific computer

. inputs ~uch as d~parture coordinates and tiJ.~e; target.coordinat~s

I ~nd· destination coordinates, the computer progra~ could output a

.1 complete
.
.
flight plan c;lepicting all necessary·
. information for planning
.

and· employment~· A customized planning· concept_ with a mission gen-

.1
eration co~tdown 0£ 2,4 li_ours was·tried a..i:id.ptove_d.·

·I Th~ ~omputer
. .
program is. c.apable
.
of planning
. rniss~ons at·

eith,er _subsonic or supersoni.c spe'eds,' varying'. P?Wer settings,

. rri~imum'-altitude -~r long~range ·cruise .:Pr~fifos a~d varying g"ros~.

I.' . will autqrn~tically.compute
weights, and ..
fuel consuihption
.
utilizing .....

·I
I· 103

.
1· ·1'· O P : S E .C .R E .'i'

·r!l ·-VW• · ·nv-r

Hanu.e· • ~J

·.1.·
11
!H~:~1:-1r .
:control -System .:_ :.· ·
 C05492927
_.,. .,·
'·
:TOP SECRET

,
·1
•.

.. J!:v~nts of 1966 ·
...
Th.e·l966 ·train:ing p·rogra.rn. in~luded·a ~ission-.plan exerc"i·se._in ·.

April to fa:miliariz~ new mission planners wit~ flight_ pla~niri.g p:repara-

I ·tion. and timing. Film handling az:id movement·procedures. stimulating·
·.1
. , ..
both ,SKY.I.ARK and. BI,..ACK SHIELD operations, were exercised;

command
.• . .
post
.
exercise
.
in May checked . out.the .special
.
prqc.edu~es
.

to_.be followed by supporting commands ~n the Far 'East for BLACK .

.:
A

I .SHIE~D. Forward base exercises.were_ conducted at Adana •. Turkey,

.
·1
. .
and Kadena, Okinawa. New procedures., schedules, and· prio·rities

were developed _with.the SAC KC-135. aerial.. refueling tallker support'

I unit.·. By mid-year, liaison and coordination with app-ropriate U. S~

·'.

:I Navy and ~SA.F commands had compressed·to seven da.ys t_he

.
·resp~nse
-
time· to launch an overflight of Cuba .. -Experience gained· from·BLACK
.1· SHLE:;LD training exercises resulted in a ;revis.ed_operation_s plan.,t~at:.· :·:

1·· reduced trom 21 to 15 da_ys the respons.e time to deplo.y ~nd con).m_enc.e

operations at Kadena.
I· ZI Air Traffic.Control' Proced~res
··•··
I· I~_April.1966 the problem of air traffic cc;:>ntrol·at altitudes above·
. . . . . . ...

60, oo·o feEft . wa·s· the "subject" of a meeting· between. Projec·t.Head:q~_rters,

I -

USAF a.nd FAA.

. . . . .

The increase_ of :flying activHy by 'YF-12's· and SR-'71.'s·

. .

I 104

. ~ 0 P. ·: S .E c: :R:E·'r'.
I
,Handle via· :BY.EMAH.:
I .. ._· controt:'System-
... C05492927

'
I ... .'f' 0 P 15 E C R: E T
):t.· from both .Edwards Air Force Base and Pahndale,,.Califor~ia, made' .

:'·1." ~
it necessary, to ~stablish procedures which'.wo'uld provid.e ·for air traf~
ffc control.at .altitudes· above 60, o'oo feet without .comp~~mise' of 'pr6ject
.

security. ' Th~ OX.CART operations .p.ersonnel contrf.buted substantially

I to the. .development a.nd establishment

' .. of .flight separatiqn
. criteria for.
.
~is previ~usly uncontrolled airspace, and the establishment _of code'd
·I· altitude repo~ting to protect the classified .aspect of. .operations above . .
. ' '

I· ' '

60, ooq fe.e.t.

\ '

I ·As mentionea earlier, contr.ol of a:irspac_e in the environs of

. Area 51 was.rnandatt>r.y to preserve security of the base and the flying

:1. . activity: The task of safely and s.ec;urely operating 'a. supers~nic air..;·

craft whi~h public~y did not

.
exist,. from
: .
an air base .whieh
.
also did .'not.
' '

exist~ required the establishment of unusual; specialized proce'c:lures~ ·

The following
. are example~:
.. .

( l )- YUJ.etide'.Approach ·Control:

This. a.pproa.c.h cont.rol was. establisheQ. in January 196Z. ·.

I ostensiply as the'airsp.ace c9nt,roll~ng· agency for.,a.µ. of the Nevada.
. . . ' .. .. . . ' '

I· ' AEC Test·Site: but in fact did ~oj control tne ahspa-~e s~rround-
i~g. Area. 51. A sep.arate c·overt approach cont'rol was :~stablished-.
·1 at Area.."51 :v.rhich ma:naged and ~ontrol~ed all flight activity ~e;i;e~

:I« 105

:I.:"·
'•
:.

'1'0.P
. .
SEC.RET
.· ' . ' ... fJ\it'~~j\lt
Hamlte. vta. u i ~hu•J~
I~'. -.. .
Control .System.-·
· "
~- ,·~ ..
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-I (2) . Yuletide ·special Op.erations Area: ·

.··1. . As #ight.. test and training progressed and performance

. . .

.. 1. .. envelc;>pe 0£..th.e aircraft increased" access. tc;> .additional s·ecure ·

· 4-irspa,c·e was req,uire.d.. Th~ Yuletide Special. Oper~tirig Area

'·:I" (S~A) was established .in early·l.963 ~estrictin~ use ~f-des.ignated

airspace north of Area 51 specifically .fo,r .Area: 51-aii-craft~s. 1fSe

·I·
be~een altitl,1de.s of 24, 000 fe~t and 60, 000 fe~t. This SOA has

I be.en revis.ed"periodically due to changing requirements a~d is

·1 pr"esently approximately 150 ·NM· by 350 NM in area on an East- .

West. orientation.

I· (3). Arrival/Departure C~rridors: .

Co.vert procedures ~tilizing _covert ar.ri val/departure

corti~or.s for support aircraft ?perating from. Area SI were. also_

established in coordination with FAA. These procedu.re.,s pro-

. vided for ·fl.iing of ai~c raft-. cl~a;rarices· os.tensibi}• from.Nell is.

- Air Force Base, Nev<ida, thoug~ in fact the air<;: raft were· ~ying
.1 ·from Area 51.

I (4) Mode X - IFF/SIF:.

Thi.s discr.ete, .selective ideritifi~ation ~eatli:re ~as"..

I . d·e·velop·~-d and installed in.A;1z aircraft for _secure·flight following·.

'I"
106.

1·
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.....-- ..
C05492927
:::-1.
·1·.:. .
In this" system, the. airb6.rne' t ;ans ponder »responds _oajy to

1- gr.olJ.Ild
.
radal-s specifically
. . .
~odi£ied_-to
. . . be. c~tnp~tible
. . .
.with.· the· ...
• .. airborne eqtiip~en_t .. ·Installation was made only· in. ,sele(::ted .-.
1.-- gro.und radars. This feature -was· nece.ssary to insure adequate ..

. . 1·. f.1,ig_ht. following since all ~-12.flying from Area 5~ through July

1_965 was flow~ bl~ck, i.e., no flight cle~_rance was filed. .The
.·1 covert aspect of ~his' type' of flying required extensive .coordi~a-
. . . . ....

·I- . tion and the ·establishment of speci~lized procedure~·. wHh FAA. ·.

and:NOAA_P to assure· no compro~i.~e of A-12 ai~cr~ft:~~istenc~ ·

or performance should -~he aircraft be_ trac~ed by their· radars·.

(S) ·clearance Fil~ng Procedures:·

_·A..;~z cleararl:ce filing procedures be~un. i_n J-q.ly 1965 .

. included. o~tensibly ·departing· VFR from Edwards AFB _as -a~ ·

·l- .
SR-71 to· a 'fix w~thin the. Yuletid·e SOA; there ·_picking up an IFR.
.

·1 cl~arance.for• a ~oute of flight.above 60, 000 fe~t; z:eturning to·

a fix within ·th,e so.A, ca~celling the IFR flight plan and oste~sibly ..

I . .
. p~oceeding to Ed_~a_rds VFR for a iaJ?.ding. ·

I OXC.L\..R T. Pilqt Training .;. :. . .

IridiVi.du,al ·pilot flight activity in 1966 was· g~ared to_ ma-intaini:ri~

I·: . .
p_r.:oficiency and operatfonal readine~s.
. .
Mci~t train_ing ·flights i:ticlude"d

I· - 107

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. .

S .E ·c· R-E
. .
T:
ua· Mdln11
· fl II
v·~~
ICl -!Jh.vr·M ~" . ··.
l i.:!~!Hii
..c·imtrol· SysteR ..
: .......
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:_·I·.
~t least.-o~e ae:t'i~l refu~Hng and a:v,er~ged 45 m~mi-te;::i of M·ach .3~ ·o ·.

I ·ttm.e.. The pilots ·were· checked out }n night flying a~~-_r:f~eiing~.;,>

.. ,. ·.·
..
Escape* -~~sion and survi~t.trainh~g ccintinue:d.witli em~hasis· on
• '# ' • ' • • • • •

t:i:opical and se.acoast fir~as. Para-~ail -training- was in,stituted as . . ...... .

:·I· part of the ·water: survival training program: .

.1· . Av:e~ag~ A-12 f1:ying. time.for the ·six pilots.who were ~ach ~· Z

qualified increased.to 353 hours •. Two new p~l?tS "came into .the.
·:I . . 1/ . .
.progr.am. in the .fall of-1966. - . Their tr~ining· :fol.lowed the same.
.·

1·· general pattern of th.e earlier group~ of pilots. ·All.A-lZ pilo:ts

completed the Loc°kh~ed A-lZ ground ~raining course~- . This course

·I cqnsisted
. .
of academic
.
instruction on normal 'and.
. em·ergency
.
procedures
.

·.1· '.for.the
. a·ir:craft; propulsion system
.· and.aircraft
.
systems.:.
. ... . Academic·
. .

training accomplished concurrently with the A·-12 transition flight

··1 . ·prog:i:am consiste.d of exten!3ive .inst~ction·.on· the navigation;. sensor.
.
:I and
. ..
ECM
.
ay~tems;.

Concurre°ntly,'wi.th operational readin~s.s flight traini~g; addi-

·1·
:,,,. ....
..
....... · . -tional academic instruction w~s dev°c:>ted to aircraft syste.m.s, plus .

tactical doctrine study. The .:objective was to. reach pea.k {lrofic:iencj .

. i/ Fo): a re.capitulation of pilot: ·s·election.;;i.nd rec~itr:ne1~.t·phasing,

see· Annex.143. · ·
·.
·1. 108

·1
'' '.
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:1 .'i' 0 :P S E C If E I'

;'I. in ai1 areas during :the peri~a ... 5tand·a:~diza.tion (gr:ound phas~f

:·1 requir~d the·pH~t to succe.ssfully pa!>s.a c~mprehen~ive eJ:(a~"ination·.

I ..
cm ·an a spec.ts· .of aircraft operations and tac.tics. Integrate·d in.to". the·
·. .
f~rma1:·pilot training program are· spe~ialized cours.~s of instru~tibn ·.

·I'. as follows:
{ 1) ·Pressure suit fitting arid physiological training.
I
.. ,. (2) Security .and resistanc;e t.o interrogation t.raining •

(3) ,Escape and evasiOn tr_aining . . .

. · Once decfared ope·rationally ready; ·each pil~t continueQ to receive

I· extensive gro:und an<l flying training to assure opti:murn:proficiency.

:-I To the maximum:. eXtent possible and c;:onsistent with flying

I
,
safety,. OXCART.project pilot·training was conducted concurrently

with the manclacturer 1 s deyelbpmental flight testing. As an· example;

.. ..
;Lockheed.cleared d,etachment pilots incrementally for. ~rau;_ing at ·.

1· . speed regim~s_
.
beginning a.t Mach 2.. 35 and.ultimately to Mach .·3·~_,?·~-·. ·.

· th~ airc-raft design operating speed.

. .

This unique -training phil<?sophy

I pr~ved ·advan_tageous in that the detachment attained ope:ratfonally-

.1 re;a.dJ' status· far. more quiCkly than _had_ the normal Air Force

Catego~y _I, II· and III approa:ch been f~llowed~

·1 Prior. to A'!"lZ
. . . training~. all OfCCAR'I'. pilot.
flight .
candidates·
. . .

1· were qualified in the F-101 aircraft ·to iriclude ae_r_ial refueling. The

.109 - .

I 'l' Q.p
. ;·

5 ]{C Ji E '1'
.

Handle 'Via .BYEMAN

I·. C1mtrol Syste!lf ·
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F·lOl wa$ ·used .as the' companfo~ train.er· ai:r~raft to the A-lZ.to·
' ....

·.I
: .
·.aU;gment pilot pro£ide11cy.

. Th:e:·b~s·ic ·A-12 £lying. training program co.i:tsisted.of ?l·t~aining·:

"· .

. . .· .

I· missibns and ·approximately .52+30 flying hou~s .. The p;rogram requtr.ed

·1 ~- .. eight t'tansition mi~si"ons. and a.. standardizci;tion cb,eck in th~ J ...75:..equipped

two:..se~ted·A-lZ.,trainer.· 'A tota:l 0:£ twelve· tra~~ing.flights.w~re :~equired.

·1 . in. the J-58-equipped A-12 dui'i~g.the ope~ational readiness ,phase •. Traill-

·1 ing :includ'ed day and ·night transition flying, instrument flying", aerial'.

reftj.:eling;:_._navigation_, ·photographic pr~c.edure.s, ECM training, ·Pl.tis

,
.
·I .
nt>rma.1 and emergency proce.dures for all systems • .The fina.l:three.

. .. training, mission:s. were. simula.te:d operatio~l x;nissfons· with m-ult:iple .

ae-rial refueliri.gs.

I Depl~;9'me~t _and Use of OXCART Opposed:

:1· While
. the OXCART
.
De:citchrilent
.
trained for its ope.rational
. . role,.
attemp.ts were made to commit the ~apabfli~Y: "to operational ~Se~ At

.I
. . .. • . . . . I

.the 17February1966 me~ting of the 30:3 Committee, the questio~ of

deplo}ring the OXcART to the Far East ipas ·again raised. .Mr. Vance·
·1 . advised that· Mr. McNan:i..ara still _opposed ~eployment on ·the ba~is

.1 '· that the situation remained uncha.ng.ed si:rlce December.1965 (s . ee

On ZZ·Ma.rch 1966 the.Direct~r (Admi~al Raborn):·

1:-. Annex.144.):.

·expressed his deep concern .over. the. lack of ad-equate phot~graphy. to._.
. . . .. . '

I
:1· . ..

.I,-.
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,'.•

1· .··. detect'.i ·p6s~ible Chinese Cor;nmliriist strategic build-up. ·in South: · ·

·I
ot"sa:t~Uit~ <;:over~g¢ the _d~f~ns.ive thr~at to U -:-2'~··and
.1. · · tations. and .·

.d:rones: wa,.s s~riou~ly inhibiting·.ti~·ely: acquisitio~ ofhig~ ·res.olu~ibn

·.I· '•'•

photography~·
. .
He therefore reco,mmended that.the OXCART
.
aircr~ft

-:.·.-.. ..·.be _deployed

.
~ntr;nediately·
'·. . .
to. Okinawa;,. fly missio~s over, North V.l.et~am
. .. · . ' ~

.. ·. ~s ~oon ~s .possi~le; and be ready: ~o ba~k.u? the:u~2 and. ,satellite

:1 . . .cap~bility
.
.
-in Soath'•.China· ~hquld they prove incapable
.
of
.
:fa~lfilling
.
the

i:ritellig'~nce requirements. ·The· i.CS supported this yi~w. ·At th~

I 28 March 1966 ~eeti.ng· of the· 303 -·comm.ittee, ·.:Mr. van:c~ s~ted
..
·1 ' .

tha:t he ·and.Mr-.·McNarn.ara were stiil aga.iri.st deplo~ent despite

'

. . . ~. ~

.1· the J:CS views·. . They felt tha.t existing· systems

. could. proVi.de
.
suffi-.

. cient cover~ge of North Vietnam. . Since." the . De~rbnent of De£:17se

·. 1·.
, ...
..
. was. the .prin(llpal ci.istom.er an4.wa.s willing to live with iesser. cover-. ·
' ' . ·. "' . .

a..ge,: the- Cotlimittee concluded not.to deploy at' that time. ·It was recom-

. ·m:ended:.• however, ·..that a:fter· further .study .of certain .aspeC:ts, ·the
·1· view~ of the DOD and .CIA b.e brought to the c;i.tte~tion o~; the Pl'.'esident. ·
···, .

.1 (See: Annex 145.) ·

· Sub:s'eqµent disc'IJSSions of" the matter .o~curred on.ii ;May 1966 .:
1···. and "'Z7 .iune i966,;· The minutes:.o{tµese meeting.s refle:Ct lha(the

1·.· . i~ l
.. ..
.
1··. . ·":T 0 P.· SECRET·

1. ..
Handla via BYfr·MM.
.. .. ·. ·ControLSys1ri~1 ~
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C05492927 '

. I .. ·.
.:·1.·
.
CIA . fa.vo:i:-ed.
. .
immedi?-t~
. .
4eployrrient
'
~nd us
.
. e; the State»Departm~nt:.
.
·· .'

I". .~·s:agai1;;1st;
. .
the DOD' was split,. wi~lf lv.!ess:t:~~
. ' ·. . . .
McNamara
.
and.;Vanc~.
. . - '

."opposed·atid"the. J·ciirlt Chiefs· of StafLir,;; favor .of. deploytii.ent.. 'l'he

" ..
I ...
. . . .··. . . "

·1
,
.. .
had cqp;ie to pres.e?lt.the di.;;ergent Views to th~ Pr:sident: ·.(See

... "A#ne~es 146·and147.) 'l".his· was" d~iie and on-.1z:August 1966,.'

Mr.
- . .

·wait R~stowadvised·the
. . . . .

DCI {Mr. Helms) th~t·the· Pr~si(ie:ri.t ·

. . ...

·1 · . ha.d ..decided for the time l:?eing·.not'.to:~eploy

. .
the OXCART
.
(s.~e. Annex':
. . -

·1 '148)~

., ....
. . ··
.
On 6 Septeml:1er 1966 a proposal was !!t.:1.l:>lnitted ·to the 303 ·com-:

initt'ee .to :conduct QXCAR T ·reconnaissance missi.on's over C~ba: ..

'

·The Director had recommended,. a.nd. the ·Secretary

. of
. . Deferis e had
.
..

- . the OXCART c~pa.bility

· . concu·rred (see. ·Annex.149)that .
be exerdsed
.

ove'r Qu.b~ 'to confirm tl:ie reliability' of the basic aircraft system, ..
. .

I· to.test th~ EWS against .the Cuban SA .. 2 def~nse·s if they responded,,.

a~d to evaluate a Soviet.;.· type defens:i·ve .env'ironment reactiori

. . . and
1.
. . . . ' .

,. capabilit-y: to a low cr'C:>ss sectj..on, ·Mach 3. ·O 'c~.ircraft •.. While it·

would provide
.
high~r
. resolution
. ·photography tha:n tQ.e.SAC·t.l":-·Z
.
was '

~urt~.ntly· obtaining,: i.t wa:5 ;,_ot propo.secf that,the:'OX~RT repla.c~

·I tha:t·capability. The main obJective was to ·esta~lish and. nlidate th·e .

,
I
.
~.
.. ' '
112 .

".
.Han:..""" ~11i" 3ur11~~ ftl
l.Ut; ,YIU . "ltl~!t'Ji ·. .
'. ·· .·.Cnntrol
• . ' '·1.l3...,
R' 1 ~!t1·:m'.
.. :.1 •• J. '
 C05492927

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~:I · operational capability of the OXCART system to perform· r·e~onnais.sance . ·

I 0£ a-."defended area.

•. The. .. 303 Corp.mittee- considered the .proposal on-IS September.·

._,,· . . . . .

i966. In general, the.attitude was _negati~e~ · In spite of ~dv~ntages .

.
. 1· . whic:b,
..
.. mig-ht
.
accrue
. . . . .
.
from testing. in a hostile. environment, the opinion
.

pre.Va.iled tliat introduction -o_f OXCART over Cuba .wo~d disturb the ·
I ·existing calm:
' .
prevailing
.
in. that area· of· our for.eign affairs •. . -_ Untii an.
' '~

I· .. overriding .requirement could be p:r_ese:nted·. the majority decision.

. wa:s.. not to cornrn,it 'the A,..12. to a Cuban <?Pe;-atiC!n.·

·1
: Further Deye!opme.nt and Testing of._A-12· sx:stem

1. Although A-lZ pe;r:formance had been validated at the high·

Mach and hig.h: ~ltitude, there were still .P;i:.oblems. to be worked out.
1:
Until. the.real world of the ~-lZ's. flight regime wa$ actually experi-

·I· enced, its effects oil aircraft performance had. been unkD.o~. Vib.ra~ ·

ti~ns, .aero-elastic effects, thermal·and mechanical shock du~ing

I . transients. ey~tems interactions,' .control accuracies and. envi;ron":'

I..
mental conditions make up this ·reai world. The interaction of these

.1 variables affect range, for example, 8:_B. follows:

a..·· Inlet:spike 4% inaccuracy penalizes inlet performance~

I :by-3%.

1· 113
•.
.
1·
'
:B .E C J:l·E '1'

.andfe vm• ..B..Yt.:1

H tMniJ•• ~1 .
I·· Control S1siem ·
: ·'· .
r . ; :··
 C05492927

·.I·. .'P 0 P S E C .R E 'i'

.:1· b •. 1% inlet leakage penalizes inl~t performan~e by-1%.

·· ...

. . . . . .

, ..
.I
.. .
c. Inlet bypass one-tenth inch.in~ccuracy ·p~nalizes

iplet perfor:rnance by 1% .

_d .. Infet perforfu.ance o~f 5% increases fuel consumption

.·.1 by ·5 % to 10%.

'Fuel consumption. 5%· to 10% highe~ p.enaliz.es aircr~ft.

:1 e.

. .
I f. · Engine turbine
.
temperature
.
40°t low pe~alizes.
_,,. · air.c:raft range by 5%~

g. · Flight:_.path en~ironment.19°· ·C. ·hotter than standard

.1:
,. penalize~ aircrcift range by 7% ..
h. __Envi~o~ental temperatUre she~rs c·ause unscheduled:

contr~l su~face nioveI'J::lents resUlting in add°itional d;ag.

·1·· i. Fuel te_mperature and density ·variations cari reduce

...
I fuel onloa~ by 1, 000 to. 2, OOO:lbs;;

j •.·Less ..than precise center of gravity- manageme~t

:I cau"ses control surface -movements resulting in addition.al drag.

I-·· k. D.~viations from optimi:m climb s·ch~dule feduc es

fuel available for cruise.

·1· En:gin_eering «revelop~-en:t and flight festing ~oncep.trated on

further improving the air. inlet-controlsy.ste~,. ~ain. and afterburner.·

1· 114.

::1· 'f o· P : S E G R :.E ':;[':

·.I .ControLSyst~u
C05492927

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·_·1 contro.ls, bypass door schedules,. Mach hold, autopilot and stability.·.

I augmentation ·sy_stems •. A performance optimization flight program·

· was run in conjunction with hardware impro.;_,.ements. · A ·relia:ble

I ·cruise c~pability was established which ref_lected an. approximate

I 200 miie .increase in operational tanker-to"'.'"tanker range. ·_ ?ruise

range,. with 6000 pounds of·.fuel reserve,. reach~d 2.870 n~ut~cal ~les
.....
· at altitudes rangil~g between 75,°000-84·, 000 feet at :Ma«;:h 3. i. On .

.I 21 Decembe.r 1966, a flight tes.t aircraft flew a.··twa"-a~dal-refo.elings.

mission of 6:09 hours'· duration of which three hours and thirty ·

I ·.minutes were flo~n a~ or above Mach 3. 2 ·_-:On~ legof the mission

-1 covered a distance of 3067 NM. :operational aircraft wer.e-_never to

attain that- range because the_ program termination gro.und rules

I restrict~d the necessary hardware improvements in the fleet. ·:_While ··

:I· . . . '
it is doubtful that the origina_l 4000 NM range figure would have been
.

~I
achleved, -there· were prospects of improving range performance ·

.,-. beyond _those ·aemonstrated. ·

·On 5 January 1967 the fourth A-12· was lost •. Air.craft No. 125 1 s

·1- :· -accident occurred during <:Jescent about 70 miles from Area 51, near.·

Leith, Nevada. It involve·9 ·a: ftiel system gaging malfunction which

·I . resulted in a_ higher
. .
th~.n actual fuel quantity reading. · Because of . ·.
.

I . ~. .

·HANDLE ·viA -BYEMAN-

I T 0 P .S E C R ET CONTJ?OL SYSTEM

I· ·... ·
. \, -..· . :. ·. ··~· ..
·C05492927·

.. 'l' 0 p s E. d ;t E T
..

·:I. . . .
this, .. the aircraft's fue~ supply depleted. b.efore: r~achhtg the base •.
. .

·1·. Th_e.:aircrP:ft wa.s totally destroyed •...The pilot Wt;i.S eje.cted but -was·
..
kUl.ed ·when he failed .to separate from the .efection seat priol". to .its .
·1 iinpa.ct.. :

:1·· A search was i.µitiated for the wreckage

. and .pilot by Area ·51

. ·personn~l and aircraft. The wreckage was disco~ered o~ 6: Janµa.ry, ·

I and .the pilot's body. was recovered on· 7 January. -"\ ·.we.ek ~s. spent .
. : '•'•

I
..
r~tri.:ivin.g pieces o.f the wreckage~ The cov.e~ :.st~ry for ..the .accident·

. was .that an SR-71 aircraft out of Edwards AFB, was -~is sing and pre.-:
I. sumed down in Neva:da, · The aircraft was ·on a,. reutine test flight. and"

·1 the pilot was· missing. This .story was released.via U~AF: cha..nnels

9n 6 January, and the pilot was ic:I'entified th.e nex.1: day a.:s ~ civilian .
.I . test.pilot.·. Although his. employer :was not disclosed, the .new·spapers"

.1 id~ntified .him ·as a Lockheed er:nploye.~ •. This story. was n~ver refuted: .

by USAF Public Information Offiters~ Annex.iso for san).ple~ of

I See

prea.s.· rep.ortin~.
:1. • . Flying activity was susp~nded pending investigation o{ causes ·.

I both.for the crash and the seat separation failure.. · Upon determination

·of causes, precautionary action in th'~ fo·rnl· of inspections- and ·.cali-

1· ·. '.

br;ation
. checks
. was. taken
. .. · rectu:renqe· of sim.il~.r.:matfilnctions.
to pre'clude . ' '. ..
I. 116

I·, .'l'· 0 P. S E.C.R El. '1'

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 .C05492927
::I 'l' 0 p. SEC~ET
•.

·t.·
'
,
... ..
.·
· 0£ inte.:res.t is the.facf that.nQne .of :the four A-lZ a~cidents .ii:ivolv:ed

t:P,e "high.1'4ach number·:,. high temp~ra.ture, .,regime of flight.

. ' . . ~
All
:.··
the accidents. involve·d traditional problems trlhe~eri.t in a.ny aircraft.
·I In fa.ct, the A-12 by now. was ,perfo;~ing with a litgh ¢.egree of relia- .
·I: bility at th~ high Mach en~Jronment._ D'.etachment 'flight.sortie

~:ffectivenes.s, was near 80%. Major subsystem reliability was .ais.o .

·»I
.goocl. A detailed examinati~n »of' O~~RT experience data all:d

I -sys:tem.s.·r.eliability.. is.·contained in a·final report on ·that s"ubject

·1. . dated lS' J'ahua:ty 1968 (B YE-8725-68), a copy of which is appended.

h.ereto as.·A.ppendix !. This document ~rovides a. GOmprehensive

a~d ctetailed record. 0£ the: l.evels of reliability of major aircraft

system.s.
.
1 .caxn.era.s, and ·electronic warfa.re systems.
. ! .

. Detachment training ~n the sprii:i:g of 1967 consisted. of routine

flying !Qr.pilot proficiency and ~ys_tems·checkout, with emi:;hasis

on tw.o aerial .refueling mis.Sions. Such profiles w·ere si~llar .to•

those that would be flown on.operational rnission,s should eithe.:t'.· the

I SKYLARK or BLACK SHIELD ctintingencfes be a;ctivated. ·Con-·

.I "'· . .
· struc.tion at l{adena w~s nea·r comp~etiqn exc.ept.-for nevi.hangars.
....

P~ovis:ion ha(.i been mil:de t~ use.' other hangar. fadlities on ·a t~m-· ·.

I p:ora+y basis ·should ·the need arise.: Fi~al BLACK sHIELD

117

I
 C05492927
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·I
depio~ent planning; was. coinplet~. appropriate operatio:n•s. ord.~r.s
I.:· · were issued, an.d the Deta_c~men~ was cap.able. of being in position

I:·~ .re.adr to"hy an ope.rational rni.ssion fifteen ciays after notification ·.· .

The .plari· called for .flyi~g ·the•.~ -12 1 s non-~top .fro~ Area 5.1
.1· · to go.

· to.Ka~ena with three aerial.refuelings .enroute. ·Supporting tankers·

I woUld operate from Beale. Air Fo;ce Base, Californi~; from Hickam

.·1. ~ir.. Fo~ce Base;: Hawa;~i; and from. Kadena, Afr Force Ba·se_. ··Okinawa .

In .a crisis situation, the deployment rou~e could be extended, to.

1·. include photographic coverage of North Vietnam and recovery at

··1 Kadena.

1:
.1 ·
1· . . .

1·
:I
·1.
..

1.· 118

T. O:P SEC :R:E T

.1· . Handle" via'.· BYE.~.~j~t.l ·
I ,ContrntSystem . .:.
. '
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C05492927

T.OP ·ssc:a:aT
~ 1· .
OXCART Deploy~erit, Operation~~ and te;rmin~ti_on ·

I: During·:May 1967. concern· was g:r.o:wiri:g".~ver.t~e po.ssible

introdu.cti-on.of offensive surface_--to,..s~i"face·rritssilei? into-North:

1. _Vietnam. The problem of·detec:ting.. such missiles .was discus~ed
. . . . ·.

·. . 1 ~th the President on ·11 May; He r_equested a proposal on how ·best

·:1 · tc;>.monit.oi· .the situation. The _Agency re·sponded.the ne.~t·-da.y.wit17 .

. .
a.br.iefi:n,g ·to the.303 ·commi"tt.ee on the.photographiC.:c.6ve:r.:a·ge.~.e-

I quired for.missile searc~ and th~.. extent of exis. ting cove·rage,.

which ·waii·inadequate. ·cIA prese~ted. a prop()sal to ~se· the A-l-2's. ·

·The Stat.e and. :Oefense members of the 303 Committee decided to

· further examine the requirement and. t}l.e political risks.: While

.they conducted· th,eir

.
examination,
. .
a _f9rmal
.
proposal
.
to~
d~ploy .th.e
.
·.

OXCART.was submitted.. to the 303 Co_mtnittee.by.Mr. He.lm's on

.1/. . . . . .. . .
15 May 1967 • .,... On. 16 'May: Mr. Rostow ·repo:rted t~t·. the ·President ·

I: had given his approval for·immediat_e deploYni:el?:t ap.~: use of the·

.OXCART. over North Vietnam.. (See 'Ann_ex-152 .£c:;r".an'..accouP.t of

I·· •· events. leading to-the· deployni.ent.decision.}. The .BLACK SHIELD
.·

contiri.gency.plan·was immediately placed"in effect> ·on 17~_ 18 and.

1/ BYE-2369-67. :15 May 1_967;~ Memoran~um for 303 Committee,

Stibje·ct: ·.OXCART Reconna.is~ance ·of North Vie_tna'm, .Anne~· 15L-

1.19·

I.. ·..
• _.. t '•
 C05492927

,.,
.......
; ..
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.•..

. 19 May,-_ logistic~! air~i£t to KadeO:a 'wa~ acco~plished. Six

~-141 ai~c.raft tr.ansported a:ppro~~a:t~ly 12.0~ OOO·. p6und~ of c~rgo

.' ' . . . .
and e<til'tpinent.and the .. task force·personnet:iro:m Area 'Sl.. Corri-
.:1 xnunications and support,team·~.were positioned at Hickam AB and
:I at Wa.ke ·Island to a.~sist in rec;::overy of the aircraft in case of .. ·

eriierge~cy landiiigs .~t either· site. A;rrang~me.nts were confirm,.;d

.I t~ fully J?rief the Ambassador

I. j SOXl, E.0.13526

T.he ..Prim.e, Ministers of Japan·.

·I . and Thailand wer& advi#!ed, a.s were·th~ '.?.resident and:. Defens~ Mini-

I st~r of the Re.public of· China~ The Chiefs· of the Air Force· of

of
I. Thailand and the Republic China were ·also briefe_d. The reactions

. ,. .were favorable. On Z2 May the firstA-12 {Serial No. 131) flew to• .

Kadena from Ar·ea:Sl,

.· non-stop in .6:06 'hours for a .qistanc.e of 6874
.
.. .

1· nautical miles. Refuelings we-re. ace om:E>lished: west of San Francisco, .

near fia~a.H'.and nea;r Wak~ Island~ · There.-were no majo'l.":airc.ra:f~

I ···'.: ·.·malfunctions; ~nd the flight Wa.s·;compl~t~d·as planned w.ithout.

1:· dif#culty.

Aircr;;ift No. 127 departed Area

.
..Sl on ?4 May and a..rri~ed at ·...
I.
.. '

Ka.dena 5:55 hour.slater. Again the:flig~t~ facludini{three ·refu'eling.s, ...

I. izo·

I . T. 0 P. ·? -E C R: E T ··.. .
·:.1·1~n~f
uttli
.
0.
' . '•

via· llVP:tM!.. ··
. .v.. , ~ ··-•• ... u,
.
;.'.'

I: · Control' S;stDm .
• • • • • t • •. • • :: ~ " • ~
 , ..
T·O P S B CR E 'f

wa:s accomplis}_led without 4ifficulty. Ave.rage speed from take·.:.:.off

. ..
.. I•

. ,.
I ·to la~di~}S. including· refueling tim:e, was Ma.ch·z. 03~

A-.lZ, .·No. 129, was ~au~ched as pl~nned on. 26 M~y i967. ,·The fligM. ·.

proce.eded.norrrially ~til the ~ilot .expeTienceci ~n r~~~ti~l Navi.gation.. :

The thi:rd..

I·· . . .
v' ~·:

. ~ystem problem and corrtmunications difficuities in ·the vicinity of .

.· . . . . ' '

:1 Wa;ke :Island•. Under.the circUill.Sta~ces, he elected .to make a pre;-

cautionary landing at Wake Is.land. The P.:teposition~d e~erg~~cy. ·:

1·. recov:ery team,
. . air~.raft without
secured the .
incide'nt and .continuation:
.
. .
·1 of.the.flight to Kadena was acc~mpli.shed the'next day.·

·On 29 May 196.7, the .deplOyed .unit at .Kadena w~s ready to fly ..
·I. an ·ope.rational·missiOn; Under the command ?£Col. Hugh C. ·Slater~

.·.·I . .~ecom.'e
'.(who. had . . Area s·r Commander
. in September,
. .. .
1966), tWo
,

hundred a~d sixty.personnel had depl.oyed to :the prepared BLACK

.I· SHIELD facility at Kadena. Exoept-.foi: hab;gars, ~hich were. a.:mon~·

·1 short of· completto:n, .the facility .wa·s. ready

. . ' .. .. . . .. . '
fo; ius~ained
.
. ' .
· operatli:>t:if!~
. . ·. . .

On :30.May 1967 the K.~dena Detachment was al~rted.f~r a missi~n for

I· ..... the 3bt.· The 'first BLAC.K SHIELO ;flown on 31. May. ·
. . mission
.
was ' ' .

·I . . 1967.
.. . . '

Two photog.raphic ·flight lines: were floW:n,. one .ewer North -. . ... :

_V'i~tnc:m and the .second <;>ver ·th~ DMZ ·wiih good _resul:fs.
I. .. .
·'was fora duration of 3·:39 hours, a·nd the <;rµise legs we·re:.:fl.oWn.. at:
The miss'ion ·

·1·. 121 .. : \

:1.·. 'f.0 P · SEC R'E T

I.
. :.
C05492927

.·1 .

I Mach· 3.1· and 80, 000 feet.· An analysis. of the mission is contain~d.
. l/ .·. . .
·1
. .
. on pages 3 apd· 4 of.Annex 153 •.::- Sev,enty.of the 190 kno~n SAM·s.ites

in North Vietnam were ·photographed as were. 9. of ·the Zr COMIREX'

·:"I . priority ·one targets. Three more missi.9ns wer~. £16~ in J~e 196(. ·

I ·.AU operational missions wc;:~e pia_?-ned, directed ·and controlled

.by Pr.6jed Headquart;ers against ta~gets id.entified- by USIB and ·

·1·.
a.t>prove_d py higher authority. ·A cons.tant watch.was maintained ori ...

:I _the we.~ther in the target ar·~as .. Each .day at a _specified hour

(1600'hol:lrs lot:al)·a mission alert·b.riefirig occurred. If the forecast

weather
.
appeared favorable,
.
the £ield.was.alerted·to a mission and
..
·1 provided a:. route to be flown. T_his alert preceded actual mi.ssion·

I · . .ta:Jce-ofi by 28 ·to 30 hours.

. .
Twelve
. . . . (H·l2f
.hours . p:d.or. to. "take-C:,ff,
. . . ..
··

a second reVi.ew cl ta•rget w'ea:ther·wa~ made. If it continued favorable~ .··

·.·1· ·the mis_si6n .ge·n~ration seqtience .. contint:ied. ~At. H-2 ·hours, ~ 1 !go~iio-:-go 11

1. d·eCisio~ ~a~·m.ade and communicat~d-to the ·field .. ·r.he final·decision,

i~ shocld be n~ted, ~s notjust bci.sed on the .target area weather- fac-

I tor. Weather had to be a·deqUa.te·also in. the refueling ar~as.. and at ·

.1 the launch ~nd recovery base fo~ safe.ty of flight. reasons.

11' BYE-44232/67, 22 Sept~~ber 196.7.: '-'BLACK.SHIELD.Reconna1$-

sance-Mi$slori.s, · 31 May-15 Augu~t 1967". · (Annex~s-154 and 155
cover BL:A-CK SHIELD mission~ .from August 1_~67 through Marc_h 1968·. )...

122
..
l' 0 f' · S Ef C R E l'. ·

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C05492927

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·1. in the field,· ol'erations and. niaint~na~ce generationbega~ with·:

:1 the· receipt. ~{ ale::t notification... A p·r~mary aircraft. ~nd pilot,• a.s

well as a back".'UP aircraft and pilot,: was. select~d. The aircraft

.I: ·were .given thorough pre-mission inspeetion .c:i.ti:d· .s.ervicing, ail

·.1·" systems·
.. ·were
. ..
checked,
..
arid
.
the camera .was lo~ded
. into. the aircr~ft~ .

The pilots were gi~en a. detailed mission ·route b:riefing in the

·1 early

.e:ve~ing prior to th~· day of fli~ht •. · c;):ri the.. niornin·g of the." flight, ·a

I fiQ.a). briefing oc;curred at which time the a~rcraft and syste:rps status

was N~p·orted;. last· mi~ute weather and intelligence .was. briefed,. arid
I any flight
. .
plan·amen.d~ents
.
or.changes· were provided the pilots. Two.

:I· hours prior to take-off,, the primary pilot wa~ given a medical exami;...

of
I nation, was s.uited, and trans:ported· to the airc:raft.. In the eVent

equipment malfunction o.r for ·other reasons the primary ail-craf.t

·1· coUld not. take off, the sp~re or back-up was· prepare-;! t? ·execute the

I mission.one:hour later.

A.·typic~l r·oute.profile for .a Bi.ACK SHIELD ·~ission ·ov~r North

I Viet.nam included a refueling. shortly after take-off,. south of: Okinawa,

;1. '.
acco~pli~hing
. .
plann~d
. .
photog~aphic
.
pass(~s}, . withdrawing
·-
. . . ..
to a. .

s.ecohd a.e.rial refueling in the. Thailand area~ and returning to·

·1· . .
Kadena; Mission Hn:iing,.· tactics and rputes were varied, consistent
. .

with ph~to~raphic° require~ents and. threat an~lyses.;·

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.··I. ... . .. T 0 P .S E. C ·:R E 'I' .

··1·
..

Ftillo~ng recovery at Kadena. ·the caniera film wa1:i removed.

.·1
· ..
.
, .
.•
. f~om tf:te·aircraft,. boxed, .and. courier.ed by specia~· c;i.ircraft to the

proce·ssing facilities.

.._the·· Eastman Kodak plant· in

Proce$sing of ea:rl'y_ missions· was done·at·.

Roche~te:r/ Ne:W York; -~nd -photo·.intei-.

::1 :·pretation at the NPIC. In late summ~r,· the respo~s.ibility for J?ro-

c_e~sing . .a.nd exploitation. of BLACI(SHIELD ~ate;iaf.~as ·piaced o~

·I the:Pacif~c Theat~r photo interpretation center at Yokota,· Ja-pan. ·

.·.·1 T:Q.e. tim.e- saved f)ermitted the photo intellig·ence to .be in the hap.ds':Of

the·Americ"an commande_rs in Vie:tnam within 24:ho~rs· of the- comple~ion

I
of a BLA.CKSHIELD. mission.
··1· During the
·.·
course of the-BLACK SHIELD operations~ 29 missions ..

·I were. flown, ·24 over North Vietnam; :z over Cambodia, and 3 o.ver
. . . . . . .
North Korea. Fifty-eight photographic- flight:line·s
. . . were. accomplished~.·

··•I·
.

All·mi_ssions ·wer~ .launched. and recovered from Kadena,. except for

.1 one·prec~utionary landing at.Ban Takhli, Thailand.

.
That aircraft
.

returned . to Kadena the . ·next day. . . 153,· 154

Annexes ap.d 155 contain.
·1· . ·.

maps. and routes of.all BLACK SfnELD rnissi.ons.

I Enemy· radar tracking

. .
was· reported
. . . on all
. . but
.
four
.
missions.·
. . . .
. It.

rartg'ed fr'ori:'l ve.r'y bri~£-refle~tions

. . of. the. A-iz"• s presen.c_e,on.early_ .. ·
·I . . .

·missions to extended and a_ccurate .tracking·~ . On' three ·missions, SA-2

.

·,1··
. .
124.

·:.1·-.
. di n· v·a•· ·?J11!~1'-'U~~'
ffan . ,. ,)\ '"
~,,
·'
I ti . I . l. i1.i"ill
.

.I
.i

· Control· Systenl, ..
 C05492927
(.·
...
·.
,._.
· ..
missil.~s were.· .unsuccessfuily·
. . launched at the. A-12.
·. ..P
. OS t :o. n····
lg.ht···· .

1· ~ns.pection
. .... . .of .the. missi9n ~ircraff·o(30
. . . . Octohe; i96.7 ·~.eveale"d..
. that .· ·...

·a piece. oCmetal ha·a penetrate~ the l;l~rface=of the.air·~

I:·.
, . . .lower wing
. . . . . ·.

craft~
.·
It·was
.
not. an
.
SA,,..2·. warhead
.
pellet, but .Pci.ssibly.. a.:part
.
of:
.
.
. ...

th.e:.debr~s.
.. .. . .
from
.
one
.
of ~e missil~
. . detotiatio~s ... : Eight missiles.
..
were.·

r~port.e·~ laU:nched du~ing the. mission ... Re:sum.es o~ BLACKSHIE~D·.

I·· . :i:xti.i?si~n~. are contained in Annex~s 15~~ .154, and 1!55 .. · Th:~y .mcl~de ~ ·..
·1. route.<lesc·i-i:ption, ·enemy l".adar tracking, ho~·tile. r~action, extent'.· ..

of coverageii,-.. and ·"target stati~tic-s. . .

.I·. . :In ~arly March 1968 the USAF's SR•7I"aii-cr~ft·arr.i.v~d at.
. .
Kad,ena to reliev.e the OXCART Detachment or" -its BLACK, SHIELD

commitment for North· Vietnarp ~overag~ ... The ..OXCART Deta·ciiment.

:weht on.standby status to back up the SR-::11 -~apabi.lity. ·The last·A-12 ·

:. ·1 operational mission was: flown on 8 May.19.6-ff.·over No.rth.Ko~ea.
;1. The cove~ plan for BLACK SHIELD _expla:ined the p.resence ·o.f

:the aircraft.at.Kadena as·e~perimental test·bed versions of the

.1 ... ,. .YF-12.A an.d SR'.".71 family, undergoing environmental and fi.eld·"t;estef~·

·:1 (See Annex :156 for text of.the. contin.ge_ncy .~rtd cover plan:.). The

c)XCART vehicle had, be·en".on Kadena"_for. over-_a.:m:onth ~efoxe th~

.the
.
first. lo.cal
. newsp~:pers··:ieported
. .
':th.eir pres.enc:e .. · The ...USAF·.PIO
. . .
..

125.

-..·'l'·O P ':S ··,E·c R.E T. ·

.Randi~ vi~~-BYEMAN·. ·.
. . Cnntrnl Slstam. ·
'.· .. •.
,'·. ·: -. .. . . ·. .. :
'·: ........ :··. . . ~". . M o•o••,MO.O,•
. C05492927 ·
I· 'f1 0 p

.:·I: . . . .

·news release, in response to an Okinawan press inquiry, was in

·1 accordance with the cover story. After "the initial articles in F<:Lr

Ea_st newspapers; nothing significant was reported when reference.·

I· was made to the presertce .o:f the aircraft o~ Okinawa.and they were..

always termed USAF YF-IZA/SR-71.aircraft~ ·

·with reaffirmation of· the OXCART phase-out dec~sion, the.

Kadena DetachmEmt was advised to prepare for redeployment to

·Area 51. . Project.Headquarters selected 8 Jnne 1968 as the earliest

. possible redepfoyment date. Flights. of A-12 airc~aft w·er~ to be

I· limited to those esse.ntial for flying safety and to .maintain: necessary..

:I pilot proficiency to re.deploy ·from Kadena and ferry the aircraft -to ·.

I Palmdale, .California, for storage •. AU. Area 51° airc.raft (Nos. 121,

124, 128, 130, and 132") were placed.in storag~ at Palmdal~ QY

·1· 7 Jnne".1968.

On ·4 June 1968, Aircraft 12.9. departed Kadena ·.Afr B~se on a:.

, functional che.ck flight. whieh was required_ du~· to_- a:ri engine change.

I· ··It did not return. The last known position of the air.craft was 520

I·. .
nautical
. .· miles· east
. of Manila.
. . ·Search and"_'I:·escue operations .were.
.· ...
begun: shortly_ after.the mishap •. No visual or ,radar sightings were

reported. The primary cause .of the· io.s ~- is. unde_te~mined. The

I 126"
·· ...

HANDLE" VIA BYEMAN ...

I T 0 P SEC R :s·T CONTROL SYSTEM··

·I
..... ·,. ·'
 C05492927·
I· S.ECRET

1·
.most probable cause was catastrophic faHure of an engine; . (See.·

I Annex 157.for press·cove~age.)

· rn a·dditio:Q. to the five A-12 1

s lost during the course. of the ·
·I . '. OXCART Program.· two F-101 aircraft were lost~ Both accidents

1· were fatal to the.pilots. On l June 1967, Lt • ._Col •. Welton.King·

' ,. . .

I was killed when the ·aircraft tail section separated in flig.ht shortly . ·

after take-off at Kadena. · On . 26 September 19.67, Lt. Col. Jam.es S.

-. .

I Simon, Jr., was killed when he. inadvertently flew his air~ra.ft.into
,·:.

r·~capitulaHon of air.craft iosse~ is: att~ch~d

I the ground at Area s1.· A

·as Annex· 158.

I The two r.emaining A-12's

. .
redeployed to·A~ea S{ in
. . .
June i968,..
.

1. After post:..flight .maintenance, both were ferried

. . .
to. Palmdale
. .
'
where

they" joined the z'.est of th¢ OXCART fleet in. st~r.age:~ The. Kadena· . : .
·1 operation .V.:,as closed out.as.of 30·June ·1968. Of the.tota~ thfrteen

.1· · .. A-12's procured; eight remain. Aircraft installe.d and ground equip.-

. .ments (with appropriate. spare· systems) will be retained at ~alm.dale ·,

I. to support all A-lZ 1 s in storage.
.
Spare parts· and· equipment will be
..

1·
,
. . ·.
. ..
stored -at· Palmdale to support at least
.
a 90-day level
.
for the five

. .... ~perational A-.12 aircraft. stored•. It. will be po'ss~ble to remove the ...

aircraft from· storage at some future date and prepa.re them .for. opera..:.

I tion. This will b~ accomplis.hed only. at great· ·cost in ~o~ey and time •.

.1· 127
.HANDLE VIA BYEMAN: .
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J ,·· ... ..
.·· . ; .. ..
. . ....... ~ .. - ····:,--...
,..""". ·:~·.,. , ..
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C05492927
. ...

T O.P ·$.EC RE T
1·:
Sui:nniary ~f OXCART Accomplishments·
·1
. •.

.,
-
.. .
....
.
. The OX:CART Progr·am las~ed_ nine y~ars •. The tota~ cost,

including development, produ-ction, ·maintenance and operation, an.d·

support a~ounted ,to appro_ximat~ly $9SO million. . . From: ·concept to

.·1:··.
opere!.Hon~ it pioneered the way in the: aerospace industry to ~each

I the. plateau of Mach 3. z flight·.. The technical. data ·accumulated over .

_the :n.i~e yea.rs._hav.e made·, and will ~ontinue to make, ·significant

contributions ·to deveio~ments ·i~ supersbnic aircraft, high Mach

I . turbine engi~e:s, _aerial reconn,aissance, ele.ctronic coun,termeasures)

···life support-and ancillary systems.

·I· It ·was particularly. responsive to pr_iority. intelligence· require-

·I ments when it \V!=LS maintaini:n.g surve~llance-of North Vi.etn~m.· it

-·1. ._did not de.tect the introduction of offensive miss'iles., .but.it 'did provide
. . .
bomb·dama·ge··ass-e-ssm·ents and over-all military logistics ·estimates
-.1 to the .field commanders. ·It located. the Pueblo in Wonsan· harbor.

·I ·a~d k>royided valuabl·e info:i:m_ation relative ~o _the siz.e and dispo~ition

of North koreari. forc·es.:

1· A summary of activities ~at Area 51 during the B~CK·SHI-E):..p
. .

d.~ploym:.ent ·is conta,ined i~ the· .Comma~de_r's: Mon1;hly A.c.tivitie~

Report for Aug"u.st, 1967, which is ~ttaclied as·Ahnex 159 •

. ·128
.. . .
·.'FOP SE 6-RE 1'
Ha.··odie-.
. vl~ BvtMi~'
~ ••• ui.-i.·t

"Cnrrtinl ~;1~tpp.
Ul_~µ u . ":'JV~¥1}J. •
.
 C05492927
.
::I ;

T 0 P . S E· C :R E 'l" .

.1.. fostscript ·

·1 · I.n a·'t~remont. '!it.Area 51 on: 26. Jtine1968,

..
AchP. lt.~us ~:.· Tayl~r•:·
. ~.

.. I .
. . .
Star for. Valor·to the folloWing pilots in ·recognitfon·of·their participa.-
-

11 . tio1l in the BLAC.K SHIELD Opera-ti.on:

I . Mr. ··Kenneth S. .Collins

M·r. Ronald L·. Layton · ·
·.Mr •. ,F-;rands J. Murray

I · . Mr.· Dennis B. SU.llivan

· ·Mr.. ·.Mele Vojvodich .

· Th~ pos.thumous ~ward to Mr. JackW. · Wee'ks-.was a.c~.epted by nis :wid~w.

·I
•The USAF:Leglon of Merit was p~e.sente4 to: Col. Sl<:!oter and ~is
:1 deputy, Col. Maynard· N •.Amundson. · The Air Force Outs~nding

·1. . Unit AWa.rd was. presented to the members of· the OXCART I?etachm.ent
.,: · (11Z9th
. .

: suppO.rt;fo,g. units•
. .
Special Activities -Squadron,·
. Detachment
. ' !)and.the
. . . USAF·.

·1 ..
·I •
.1 ,'•.

I ..

--1
'' ..

:I · · . '.-' . . . · ~ : ''".i<Mstt:
. . Hanrtie v1a
• .· • " - ' I
S.1r..:.···~f~
• • -lt•.,._,.~'f

Contt-01 ;. System/.
,I
\!
~.
. ' :.
·C05492927

:·"I 'f' 0 P .. S E C It ·E T

:1 . ·· OXCAJ;t1' -~has·e-Out

I .On 10.1':-f.ove:rnber 1965, Mr. W •. R.. '.Thomas,. Chief of the.

·rnterna~ional Division>· and Mr..s. -B~" Leach, ·Chief of the Miiit'3..ry

..
I·· . . .
Division, Bureau of the Budget;
.
sul:>~itted a memorandum to the
.

1·. . .
· .:}3udget.Director in which they expressed concern at the.total c·o~ts

of::th~"·A-12 and SR-71 progra:I:tls, both pa~t and projec_ted.

. ·1 that ~- 5 billio'n dollar~ would have been spent on.both' progra~s.
They stated·"

'I ·thr~ugh FY.1966, al;ld expected 2~ 1 billions·mor~.would be· sp.en~

. . .·
through 1971. They questioned the requirement, first for the total
·I nwr{ber of. aircraft represented i~ t~e combined fleets, and second,
·. I the. r.eqU:irement
.
for a separate
.
CIA (OXCART>° fleet.
. .
Several alter-
. .
natives -were posed to_ achieve a substantial reduction in forecast
·I
spe·nding; They recom:mended that:the A-12 program.be phased out.
:1· by Septernb·er 1966 and th.at there be no furt~er procurement of SR-71

Ann~x:
:I a.irc·raft. Copies
.. of this·memorandum.
. . . .. (see
. . 160) we;e dist:ttibuted
.

to . tl_te DOD, D/NRO an:d liCI.with th~ suggestfon. that: these age.ncies·

I e:xplore the alternatives set out in the paper. The Secreta,ry of .Defense:.·
. .

.I declined. con~i.dering the pr~posal, presj:unably bec~use,,the ·s.R.-71

would n.ot be operational hy S~ptember i966.

I ·The ~atter rested··\mtil July.1966 when M·r. Schultze.~ Directqr:

_:·1 0£.~e Budget, .reopened· the. subjec~. He prop.os~d that a_ study of the

>_, .130' ".·.

· T 0 !' . 8.. E C It .E T

.I
" .. ·.·-···· . . ····-·· ...
··.·.·-: " ..
.,
C05492927·

,_.,.
..
T 0 P S :e·p RE T
.
~ .

re.l~tionship b"et.ween .the OXCART and SR-71 programs ·be·mad·e· by~~

I DO:p/CIAfBOB·in time.£o::i: FY 1968 budget deliberations. H~ suggested

. alternativ~s that the study·g·~oup might examine:.

1.· possible
. . .

1. ,R.e,t~nti,on of $epa._rate A.:.12 ahd SR-71 fleet~. i.e.

·"I· status quo.

. .

I- 2. Co-location of the two fleets.

.3 •. Transfer
.. .. th~ OXCART.
. ·.·. . mission. .and aircraft
'. .
·to SAC
. •.·
I-.-.-- 4. · Transfe~ the OXCART mission to ·SAC .and store the.,

A~l2's as attrition replacements for the SR-71 1-s.

I.
., 5 •. :Trarlsfer·OXCART, m.lssion to SAC and dill!pose of

th·e A-12 aircraft.

I·
:the study group.
I· The DCI ·(Mr •.• H~hns) appointed Mr. Carl.Dut:ke.tt, Assistant

I. . Deputy. Director for Science and Technology. as ~he Agency mem:ber,

. and the DOD appointed Mr.. Herbert D~ Bennington•. Mr. Duckett .

:1 .

_sh9rtly thereafter be·came

. . the Acting
'

DD/S&T and. wa~ tµl.8.ble

.
.. .

to .d~v.ote
- .

'
... . . . .

·I .
the tlme required to· the study• He
. appointed
.
Mr°. .John Pa:ra~g_o~ky,
. . . '

who :was. then the AD/OSA,. as the Agen~y's· ·~ember ·o! th~ study groQ.p •.
·1:. . .. . ._.

.. Throughout th.e- summer ~nd fall of'.1966 the panel,\::o~du~ted a·q.etailed .

I· 131

1· TOP. SECRE.T

:I:;
·l
 C05492927

I '!'OP .5-ECR.E~.

_':t· ' . -
. appraisal 0£ the two· fleets, e::i,::a_mining_ the _r,e!ative technologies,·

·.1· operatic~! capabilities I ~upport fadlities a-~d :cqsts. •'The capa,bilities

. . ·.·. .

. .'of advanced .airc:rafi. we~e bal~nced. agairist those of ·satellites and

·I· : drones.
.

The. s·p~cfalcovert._and civilian'charact_~ristics of the.OXCART

. . ..

·1. fl~et were ·reviewed for the effeCt that termination o{ the OXcART .

.1· proj~ct would ·have. on .u~ S, relations in matters of clandestine recon-

·naissa~ce.· -The study_ g;oup identified thre~. principal· alt~rnativ~s

-1· for decision.· They were:

1. 1. Maintain the
.
status· q\,1.o.and'.coritinu·e
~-- ·.
both-fleets
.

. at the· currentfy approved levels·•. Estimated.costs thr6ugh

·1. FY 1972 would total $1.. 377 billio~.

2~ Mo~hba.11 all A-12 ai~craft, but maintain the OXcART"

:1·
·.capability b.y· sharing SR-71.aircl:"aft betwee~·SAC and ·qIA.
·1. . T~is =Would· save $252 million .oye.r th~ :ffrst alternative.

·1 3 •. Terminate the _OXCAR.T flee_t in Ja~ua.ry 1968 {~ss~~ing

a~ operati;ri.al re_a.di~ess date oi.September 196 7 for the S!l~71) ·
I, ...
'•"' and_ assign all missions to ~e SR'."71 fleet. A cost-sa:v1-ngs·of

-I $365 rnillion Vfould ·be realized by adopting this alternativ~. .·

The.report made·n~· recommendations per se. Its_p~rpose was .to pro-

1.
:,
. ..
..
. vide: ipform.ation. upon ~hi~h highe~: ~evel j\idgrrt-~nts ~ou1:d. be· made •

132·

·1- TO :P

1·.
;• ..
· C05492927 · ..
.I ..
.,
.,

..
·. .

...
. .
,..
.A copy of the Fischer-.Bennington-P~rangosky report. ii; attached
. .

at! Appenpix I I.
.. ·. . .

On1Z December 1966'.there :was· a·nfo.~ting. at the·Bureau of the

·:1:
· Budget attended· b.y Mra Hel:m.s. ·Mr~'. S~h1:11tze,· Mr .. .Vance, and· ·

I Dr.•.' Hornig, Scie:'!'.ltific Ad~:sor to. the Presid.ent. · A. -vote w~s tak:en

~e alternati~es p?s e·d i:q ·ihe· Fis~h~r-Bennirigtoi::i:-~arangosky

·1 on

~epor~.; Messrs. Vane~,..

. . .
S¢hultze f:t.nd Hornig v~ted· to. terminate
• • w •• ::. '

.~I· .;the· OXCART fleet, and :Mr· Helms voted !or . . e:vent;ilal. s~a;ring ·~.f

The-BOB ~nime·d.i:ately prepared

I··· "th.e SR-71 fleet between CIA. and SAC.

a. lette.r. to th~ ~refiident conveying the course of·.actibn r~commende~

~.1 by the majority.
.
Mr.
. . having dfssent.ed·frotn
Helms, .
the·majority,
. . . .

I·.·
,. .. :requ.ested
'

. .
. .a letter
.
. be
. .prepared by
. the DD/S&T .to". the·
.. .
' . President
'
.
. .
. ~tai:ing the case !or c:;;IA remaining in 'the. recoriri.aissanc;:e business,.
'
'

'

, ..
.and his ·reasons for voting·as he ·did;.

On.. 16 Decetnber 19661 Mr: s·chult~e hand~d· Mr.·

memorandum to the Pre.sident which r.equested a decisi9p. either 'to·
fielms a draft

":I •• share.the SR. .. 71.fieet betwe~n CIA and SAC,· o°:r· to terJ:I?-inat~ the-.C:r..A.

I· , capability en~irely•..On .ZO _Decemb~·r:~r. HeIIDs.. wro~~·Mr~. Schultze.

that new ·iliforination of considerll,ble signi!icanc~· had been b.rought to ·

·1· his·attention concerning SR..-71 performanc.e. He ·request~q another
. . . . ·.
~I 133

1.· S E.CR·E·T,
' . .

·.: ·.Handle. via BYtMAN · ·

:1 . , .

Cn:ntrcl .System .
. ·-: .
 ·co5492927 •.,·:

-.I T_OP. S ~ C RE 'i'

·.1 .. . .

.,. .m.eeting a;'ter l .Tanuary t_o reView pe.rtinent facts, and also requested

that the.~emorandum to the President be withheli;tpe:hding that me.et-..

. ..-".;_.::_ . . .

··1·.·- ing_'s ou~come.,._", Specifically, evidenc~ and data .had bee:n obt~ined
. • .....

that· the SR-71 progra:m·.:v;,as having. serious technic~l problems and

~ere was· real doul;>t that it w~uld. achieve an ope~ational capability

by
. the. time the A-12. p·rogram
~ .
was
.
scheduled
.
far
. termination-.
.
So
.

l concerned_ was he with SR-71 capabiiiti~s, Mr. Hel:n;ls ch~nged his

·position.from ·a.ha.ring the.S_R-71"aircraft with SAC to a firm.r.ecom-.

. .

mendation to retain the OXCART fle_~t ~der d viii~n. s:ponsorship

_a~d sepa.r~te basing.:. Other.· eleventh hour atte~pts to review the
·I· s.tibje~t w.ere in vain. ·:On 28 !.>ecember.1966, ·the President accep~ed

:1
,.
'•,the ...recommendations
. . . . :of. Messrs. Vance,·
... : Hornig :and
. Schult~e.
. and·.

· directed:th_e teri:nination of the OXCAR'l' program by 1 January 1968. ·. ·

T.Q.e .deci-sion to terrninate"the·OXCAR',l'·program required.

I
,.. the de:Veloprnent of al'1:·o1'derly pha.s e-down procedure •. After.cotisul-.

. tatlon. with Proje.ct Headquart¢rs·, t~e· ~/~,RO advi~ed the_ Deputy

Secretary· oi'-Defens~
. ·on: io .January 1967.
' '
·; .. · ... '
._;
' ·. -

of the pha$e-ouf schedule

...
~f
.... · . .

:I·
'

a:irc"ra~t. Four:A.-.1z·!s ·would be pl~ce.d in ~torage. in July"l967 •. t~o

:I -1fro"re· by-D.ecember, ~nd the last fo,;_r by the end.of J~ua.ry 1.968~.

I.
., 134

. Handle. via. -BYEMAH

I · Co~trul . System'.
 C05492927
I.
.·1·· Until l Juiy 1947, ·tile OXCART Detachme~t was .to maintain

·1. a. :worldwide capability to conduct ope~ationar missions ~rom a. pre- ..

··pared ·over~eas location and sim~taneously fro~...Ar~a s1:·iri_ NeVa.d:a.

·1. The operatiortaf r~adiness,posture was .to include mainterianc;~ of a:·
·1 15-day
.. .
. .
·~
quick. r~action capability ·for deployrn~nt .to th~ Fa·r East and
··7-'.. '. . ····'. . . . : . ' . . . ' '. .

a. 7... day quicJlreac:ti6n for deployment over Cuba. :Setween.1 July

·1:
. .
a~d 3lPecember 1967, the.capability would be maintain~d t9· conduct·

1· . opera~onal'missi~'ns from:either a prepared.overseas base· or from

Ar,ea. 51, but.not sitnultaneo:us.ly. · The quick ·reaction capability ~or
·I.· either· Cuban overflights or· deployment to· the Far East would also ·

I· be ~aintained. · On ~ ?vtay 19.6 7. Se~reta~y V~nce directed that the·.

SR.-71 a.s·sume the·responsibility to conduct Cuban O\;~rflight~ as. of.

·.1 . .: . ' . .

1 J"tily.1967~ an:d·.th.e dual cap~b~lity of !5outhe.ast Asia and Cuban·

., . ..

:.1· o:verfligl:].:ts ·by 1.·Pecen:ibe.r 1967.

.1 A: joint CLA)USAF working group.. was. established .by· the D/'ff!RO

to coordi~ate planni~g actions incident to.th~ OXc;ART phase-'out.

·I The. ·gl:'OUp was responsible

.
. .for identifying
. decfs~oris
. and problem
.

·.I. areas, recQr.rimending c,ourses· of' action; and advising. the NRO~

CIA; and :USA.F of. progress

. . .
in ..the phas.e-out.
.
Th:e . code name SCOPE:···
.
·1.·. . .
COTTON was given·-to the
.
~ve:r-all phase"."out ·schedul.e;. .

.-1
·..

..
...
.
, ... ·
T ·c>-:P
135

s
'

~·: cR
-
E. r
..

.I.
. ', .~ ... . ,•.
C05492927 .·,:

I T 0-P SE-.GRET
··1.
Basic assµmptions to guide ·the· phase-out were m~de~-_ 'J.;'here

would be no further rnafor

.
-up-dating of . the A-12
.
aircr·aft.
.
· Only
.
. thos~ .

.I ~ngineering change propos.:i.ls; retrofits, and ·modifications which .

affected sci.fety of flight .or were absoli;;_tely es.sential to in~ntain an·.

.I ..
operational capability would be authorized. All aircr~ft would ·be·

I mothballed and stored ~y 31 January_ 196~ •. No new c·anstruction would

·be, authorized at Area ·s1 and it would be .closed upon removal· of

1· .

. aircraft and other assets. _No ne:W _equipment

.

proc~re:me~ts ~ould
.

I be made, a·~d spares and supplies _woU:ld be. maintai.ned af; l~v~ls suf.,.

ficient o.nly to. susfail.1 the. (;>perational commitment·through: 1967 •.. The·.
1. . OXCART engine inventory would. pe reduced,·. and_ overhauls an~ i_m-:- ·.
··1 provements. would be accomplished
. .
only as·necessary.
. .
Procurement
.

·a~tions for USAF detailee personnel wouid be suspended~·

. 1· As a~tion items we.re identified, the D/NRO issued a ·series of.

I ,SCOPE COT'.I'ON decisions. The TAG BOARD p_rogram would remain ...

at Area 51 through :1967. OXCART assets at Kadena ~nd d~?loyment

I flya".way kits were to be m~intained .through.1967. T~enty ·engines
·1 would be st~red with the air~raft~ · R~pairable items, excess to

<1 OXCART .requirements,. would be redistribu-{:ed

N~· airframes would be cannibalized.

. to other programs
. •..

Guidance e9uipment, cam.eras,·

. .

-:1
1. T 0 P.
136.

SE C .RE T ··
HA;Ni)LE : VIA ..BYEMA'.N
CONTROL SYSTEM

·1 :·.
..,· .. . .
.. ·· :· . ~ . - . . . ..:--
~

.··
;,,
C05492927
'
.....
. : .

..
.,.

T Q P .. SECRET
~ .. ' .
...
·· '

.· .·.

,. ··:.·
.

... .
EWS and. pilo1: .eqtiiptl1ent.- would 'Qe ·r~ta.:ined·in µiiniinum quan:tities
. ·; '

.:~d:t}'pe~ to ~upport the. atored air'craft.· Residual stocks 0£·.A:-12.

·.spares.. comm:on to· the _SR-71 ·woUld b~ .us~d by t~e iatter pro'gra~ •
.I
· Responsibi~ity .for fqilow-on contr~ctirig and·Jundi~~ f()r· J -58 'engine· · .
·I·. . .
,, : . ..
. :
.
.'product improvement would·transfer to.the trsAF.:·.is well as !or·
". .· . . . . .~

··I ·the ·YF-1?.A,. beginning in FY 1968 •. · Excese support asi;ets W<?uld

be··redistributed to· other ~NRO programs •. :Ov~T.seas. facUiti~s~ ;

1·,
. , except at Kade.nas woW.d:be·

we.re
. '
tra.n.~ferred

.
to ·the ba.se at. which they .

located effectiv~· 1 Ja.nuary·l968~ . A gr'adua.l transfer: of SR-7.l. '

contracting re·sp'on~ibilities would .be made to the USAF. ·The ·rad~r· .·

. 1.. range. at Area 51 would be diSrnantled and. transferred. to USAF in-
. .

_::I .st.allations.- Res ear ch .and development. w(>:uld. b.e._·suspe_I'ld~d £or

count·ermeasures·as they applied to OXCART •..

:.:.I
_ , ..
~
P:roje.ct Headquarters moved.quickly:to ad~se. the .contractors.

.oit~e phase-Qut
. decis~on.: '
At
.
the same
. .
time they1 al~ng ·With, ·a.Ji
~ .. : . '

·I: witting p.ersonnel, ~ere cautioned to obs~rve .the same standa;rds of_ ·

s~cu:r.ity quring ternl,il'.).ation as w~re obse;v:dduring the develO.pment

·1 and operational readfaes.s . stages of the pr~gra:m. The ·security pre:.;

1· caution
. . ks
~. ·necessary
. .
to protec"r
.
CIA 's role. in the. progr.;t.m,
'·•,
CIA .

·pJ;"ocurei::nent and: contracting methods. and. m'?st-import.antly,,· the

·,1
.. .
.
,
·. . .
...
.
TO·P
.137

.
1·. . : .
..,.C05492927
···I TOP SECRET

:t mission posture for the year. Dissemination of the information was

::t .held.down even in the cleared community until orderly phase-out

II plans could be worked out. Premature release of the information

among contractor employees could have had a serious effect on the

'
:I
operational posture. Realizing the short term prospects of the

OXCART program, technicians might seek employment elsewhere.

The delicacy of the situation was not lost on contractor management;

I
~- but by careful planning, they were able to maintain their capabilities
I
I·
and program excess personnel into other activities at the appropriate

time.

With the program committed to a definite time-table, certain

specific actions were taken by Project Headquarters. Systems. in,

or scheduled for, flight test, unless very near operational acceptance,

~-
were removed and ptaced in storage or made available to other NRO

programs. These included second generation ECM systems, the

side-looking radar, the infra-red sensor, and the System XVII

Elint collection gear. An aircraft standard operational-ready config-

uration was adopted. Any equipments surplus to the standard· config-

uration were removed from. stock and returned to depot storage. Two

of the Perkin-Elmer cameras, which were scheduled for overhaul and

up-date were removed from the inventory and stored.

138

T<OP SECRET
Handle via BYEMAN
Control Sy~tem
·. C05492927
..1· .·..
·. .:

1·
Ori 16 ·May 1967,···th~ Presid~nt directed ~he deplo}im.ent of··
·I. ·OXCART to . Kadena, ,.Oki~awa, · for re~o~aissanc·e ·of Nor'ih Vietnam

·.I .. for the ·p"rima·ry purpose ·of dete.cting,.surprise· introducti.on of.

offensive mi~siles.·: Three'.air.craft·were depi~yed, "and the .:ftri:;"t ·. . . ·

·I
. ~

. .
.mission was flown· on 31 May 1967. ·The ·deployment ha·d the eif~ct

·1· of slowing a.ctions to phase-out OXCART, ·but the 31December1967

·terrnination· date. still

. a·hided at the. time. :-of.the. deployrn.ent. In Jup.e.
<·1 . . -

th'e:Agency ·prop:osed·two _options to modify the phase-out in ~ew of

·. 1 t4e· Kadena- deployment._· O~e wci.s to defer -~othl;>alling of any ah-craft

until 3l_D~cember 1967 to h:1sure ·a back-up_ capability for the· deployed

..1·· .aircraft. The second option was .to continue the entire ·oxCART fleet

·1. through FY 1968. · The D/NRO was amenable to. the first option,· in.-.

.fluenced by. the fa.ct .that .the SR-71 h.a:d'· not yet achieved ·an ~pe:rational

._. · EC¥.eap~biiity; .Octoper. wa·s th~ earli~st date it would.be ready~· ·The .

:I . . . . . . . . '
Deputy Se2retary o.f Def:ensE? modifi_ed the delay 'in mothballing.:aircra!t

1:· .by r.ecommending orie test aircraft ·be putd'.o\vn in July·and .the<remain- ·

. ing eight in·Decemb·er 196·7~ He f~rther directed that SAG would be

··1·::
.: ·. · ..
..
re·sponsible for :Kadeil.a . ~peration~ on 1-_ne~ember 196.7~ using SR-7Ps •

. ··At th~ lZ·September 1967 meetfog.~f'the.NRP. ExeC:l;ltiv~

I . .

mittee {ExCom), Admiral

.

Taylo.r stated.-
.

that
..

the
. .. .

OXCART-air.craft"
.
Com- .

. . . . .

,
. . . .

··.I.
.

139
..
····Top· SE.CR E.T

,· Handle .vi a BVEMAlJ

.I ·..·· c. on· I "'·;-.J·',.)m
t~;...1 ·
Ul ~}J~l~H
 C05492927
,:·I
TOP SECRE'f'
·1 ·
.woUl.d be -~thdrawn
. . .
fr.om. Ka.dena.
. . by. mid-Nov¢mb~r
. . . .to .m~l<;e. way. for
. .

·the SR~71 op:erat.~on •. He· pointed out that_ beginning 1 December e~~

perienced-cont~a_ctor.."p~rsonnel. W<?uld b~ reassig_ned from the pro-

·1· . ..
gram, and spa·re parts supply ~ould he depleted to.·a point_wher~ it

would be mpst difficult to. sustain an operatio~al:posture. ·· October 1 .

.1 was emp~sized as· ~he de.adlin"e by which any meani_n:gful charnge in the ..

·1· pha·se..;out schedule.s;ould be effecti..,;.e. Dr. Hornig stress.ed.the

.importance·:of
. .
the SR-71
. being
. operationally ready
. before the·point"
.
·.1 of no r·eturrt _ha.d be·eµ.·· l'eached in the pha$e-out of the.OXCART. He

reque·s.tect"a current c9mparis6n- of ·th.e OX.CART ~nd SR.-7l. Pr~ Flax;.:_ . -:· _,.: . ·
'I·. .

D/NRO, -~aid he wo~id provide· such· a paper prior to 1 October for.

I . revi,ew.- by the ExCom~-. ·.

·1·. The.minutes. of:the :E:XCom meeting of 29_ September, whiC:h best

·refl~ct the situation vis-a-vis the. SR-71 depioy~eri:t·for·;BLACK SHIELD,

are quoted.herewith:

"Mr •. Nitz_e .stat.ed th~t the purpose of this·. meeting Wa.s

. to review the . ·st_a.tus of the·SR-71,_ to determine:what problems
may have a_risen f.roni SR..:.71 Cat"E:~go;ry.III Tests, ·and·to-recom-
- mend·.actions fo.r the future on OXCART- phasedown and·S.R.-71, ·
de:ployment.

I "Dr. Fla.X r.eferred briefly to the-.papel'.S he had· : .

distril:~uted to.the members, .p.ointing out-that they sum!nariied·,.,..._
about two":'thirds· of the information available frqrn the. $R-7l' ·' ·
1·· Category III Tests (whic_h would. be:officially conclude:d about

.
,,..·. .140 ·.. :.1 .

I·
.....
 C05492927
.1
'I
·October 1,. 1968.) •. He .stated··thq.t, in g~neral, .the. S.R.,.71.
·1 a·
Was .in satisfactory state"and.it was the judgment of.· ...
op_erational experts that .the ,Air .Fore"? ·could assume the
· 1 .. . · North Vietn~m mission·s ori Decembe~:l, 1967.. This .....
jµdg:in:~nt was also reflected in a· Joint Chiefs ·.ofStaff
statement that ..the SR-71 is ~ea:dy for o~erati_onal·employ­
.. ment."

"Dr •.. Hornig .referred.to the d6cum·ents ftir~ished .to.·

the ExCo:i:n and, ·in particular, to data-dealing with.the·
. viihierability of both the OXCAR,'I_' and SR-7J. a,ircraft~
He pointed out that, from· his asses.sment of the data, the·

·.1 . ·. S'.R.-71-appeared to be two to four ·ti:me·s more vulnerable.

~han.the.OXq.A;RT,. based_ori the li'3t~d equipm~nts, · .sta.tis-
tic.al factor~,. and performance cµrves. ·.There· followed-a."

I detailed di..scu_ssion on vulnerability studies, operational.

techniques and. impact, ECM systems and capabilities,. ~he
present acti-vicy of the eneP1-y; his- intentions in the future, ·.

I· and _the outlo.ok for .future ope+ations." pr. _·Hornig . then .

col:ll.pared the paylOad volUmes of th~ aircraft :and the photo.:.
graphic swath widths of their senso~s~ He believed the

. ,
1·
..
.
committee should not be too ·has.ty "in .rea.ching a decision to·
deploy the· SR:-71~

r 1Dr.
.

:Flax stated that a

· .

siniple.comparison-"o~
sm1;h widths' was n:o:t, in his vi~w. a valid way to .compare· ..
. ·the mission coverage capabilitie·S Of the.aircraft a;i.d that a
sensor .

·1 fac;:tor of two in· vulnerability which might be assumed _on,

· this. basis did no1; reflect mission requirements in any .event,.
· since corople:te area coverage .of. North Vietnam was not
··1 . being !:!OUght or a~hi°eved. .

· •. "Mr. Nitze .outlined the following options fo.r c·o:nsid-

.1 eration: (l)·delay the transitiop. from·OXCART to the SR-71,
(Z).recommerid ·a reversal of tJ:ie December.19.66 decision,
or (3)-adh·ere to that decision~· The dis_cussio~ tuxried to the·
1··. fi-r.st. op:tion. Asked· the. desirability of this option, Dr~ Flax·
·stated that if ·there we·re no economic restraints ·whatever · ·.
he would prefe.r to retain the_" tot~l force. However, e~on~mic
·:1· constraints
. .
were very
. ·real and he believed .
a firm decisi.on.

·. 1. ... . 141

'PO.P SECRET
Handle .·vfa. B'ffMAN
1-: ·. Control .System
.·co5492927
.1··.
._, :· T·O.P SECRET

,
.
"•

was ...<?alled for at this time. "A :s.i.x-months': ·d~lay., in ma.~ing

"·

... . the transition, he pointed out, .could cost $32.-o·millio:n.· ·:A·

to.the·c.ost of. re~lai~iiig o:ic.ART
"

questi6n was. raised as

aircraft from. stora_ge~. ·if re.quired. . s~ted:

.·I ·that t_his would involve approximately $300 ·to $500 th9usand
per ai'rcraft, if ·don,e within the firs:t ye~·r.: I I:
also· pointed out:that the present financial plan pro_vides .
I· ...
some OXCART ov~rlap by. providing for continued operation
~a,i A_rea 51 during· December.- ··. · · ·

.. ,
I· ''Mr. Nitze obs.erved that the additional.$32. O.million.
re.quired !or a «:lelay-in transition.from. the .OXCA.R.T.:to. the :·
S.R.-71 'was -ext~emely critical i~ today's 'budgetary envi:r;on;.

,..
m.ent. Dr. Hornig favored a delay of six months.· Dr.· Foster
·agreed ·With the ·concept of delC!-Y but recomm~nded a shorter
pe.rio.d: somewhe.re. be.tween three and six months •. Mr. Hoffman
stated thl:it the origina:l deeision of last D~cember should be:
followed uncha.D.ged. Mr~ Hehns favored· a delay. Dr•.Flax.··
agreed ·that a·clelaywould provi'de a· higher degree of cdnfi .. · ..
..I dence in assuring continued operational ~£fectiveness in the
face of possible improvem~~t· of North Yietnainese defenses,
on
..1. ··which wer.e.just now beginning to be brought· to bear' th~
·OXCART air-era.ft.· The cost of this insurance.·would of cours. e·
be ~~lated to th~ length of deia.y in phase-ov.t~ He believed
.. ,._ · that the S.R.-71 deployment should not be held until the ver)r last'
day of any agreed-to delay.;per,i'od; if a three-month delay were
recommended, ·the SR-71 ·deployment should. b_e schedlJ.l.>ed .for ...
·.1· mid':"F.el?-rua.'ry 1968. · ·· · · · •...

"Mr. 'Nitz.e asked for a:tnemor~nd~·spelling out (i)

·I· wh~t the ·decision for· a three-month· delay would do for 'the

. ,., . prog~am·; -(2) the associated costs~· and:(3) .what is intende.d- .

for. the inte.rim.. Dr.: Flax was asked to prepare· such a ·paper.•
'Mr. N1tze.sta'!;ed he· would confer.with the· Secretary· of Pefense··
oµ, this.matter .early in the ·follo~ng week. if!/ ·. .·· . :

l/ ·BYE-52712-67, 29September1967. Minutes ofNRP Executive.

....... .Committee .Meeting.· (See Annex 161~ ') . ."

.1 14-Z

·1:
:I
 T 0 P S E. ·a R l3 'I'~

. , . ·retaJn
. :
the three OXCART
. . .
aircraft
. .
.

a~ .K~dena.through
. .
LFeb·ruary
. .

s~c WOl;ld.assurile-.BLACK SHIELD op"erations by 1_5 February. AU.

1968.
.
The deliberations .whkh follo:Wed -resulted in a deci.sfon i;_o .
.

1. opf rational aircraft woUld remain flying until 3l March 196.8, ·at .
.I
.... ,. . which·
·.

·. . of
. .
tim.e
.
they :would be

3 ·Oct~be,,.
.·
.
·mothballed.

1967 to.. the

•·

. Deputy
. . .
Th~ deta.ils of the. extens.ton.

. and "the ~e~ised phas~~out plan are: contained.in~ D/NRO memorandum

Se~~etary of .Defense
.
.(se~. AnP:ex 162.).
. ·.

·.I. .
On
.·
29December1967,
. . . . .
the/Deputy
. . . .
Secretary of. Defense advised .'

·. · th.e D./NRO . that .the OXCART progr:am wa~ extend~d through 30 June.
···1 ·.
·1968. The. SR~71 was to ass~e -North Vietnamese
. reconnaissance·.
. . . . .

.·1 · by.15_.March 1968~ OXCART aircraft were directed to reinaiil. at

Ka.den.a: for 30 days thereafter to provide a contingency overlap.·

:·_1·
The original d.ecisio~ to ·termi~ate the prograr:q., made in

.·I I)ecei;nbel:" 1966.~ ~ended now· to be obscured by the.BLACK SHIELD

the two extensioD,s··. of the terminati~n-date.

·:1 deployment.and
. . .

de~isi~n no~. ~ppeared .open to ques_tion and_ the:feeii.rig preval.ted that

That·

I· . Presiciential· reaffiJ::mation ·was req"µired. '.l'he. President's Special

Assistant, Mr. Walt Whitman Rostow, h~d expressec:l th_e _opinion ·

I
•.

.·that ·rerrioval .of·the·OXCART capability from the Fa.r East .. should

1. ~ot be und~rtaken unless ·the President -~pecif.ically approved~ K.ey · .·

.1- l.43

:1. . .. .
. Randie. via. BYI!~.~H
I
. .

Control
. .. . -~us~·:i::m
µJ l · .·· ..· .
'{i
. .·- .. ........ .
.:_
C05492927
I.I .T 0 p . s ";g c R .E T
(·" '

,..
i.
1.·.1
, . . .
Cong res sio~al figures .and members. of·the._Pres,iderit's Foreign·.

intellige:r;i.ce A~visory Board and tl:i:e P~e-side.nt·'s· Scientific Adyisory

.

"Comm:itte~ al~o ~oncei"~ed.~ith

:.1.
i' ...
we-re the loss -of OXCART. Conse- •.

' quently the·· ExCom clecid~d· to re~pen.-the·. matte.r <L°nd once again

i:.1·
> .

.. , ·exam.hie ·a:1ternati ves to outright. ph~se -out .. of th.e ·1>r~gr~m: . Aga(ri .

the :arguments.. wer~ mar-~halled in defense of retaining th,e· O){CART·

cap~bility, ·buttressed no~ by its d~monst.rate~ op.erational per£o~ance. ·

{In March the SR-71 unit deployed. to Ka.dena with three ·aircraft · -

and on 15 March assumed the.BLACK SHIELD mission... The.·OXCART.

aircraft remai.ned"i.n pl4.c~ to provide .a. contingency back-up capability,

·and
.
to provide cove·rage of North Korea .as-~ res·ult of th¢ .Pi.ie.blo·
.
affair.)_.

.I . A study of the feasibility_ ~nd cost of continuiI1g the OXCAR'I".

·program ·beyond its phas~.:..out date was c·ompleted in the· spring .of

.. ,.
I 1968. by the D/NRO.
. .
Four alterµ.ati.ves were considered:

1. · 'i'~ansfe.r_an ·o~CART aircraft to .sAc

· -1968; substitUte Air Force £6~ contra.ctor -support where possibl.e;

.

by 31 October ·

.·:1
• turn the testA-12 aircraft o"'.'er·to the.SR~'71 te·st facility. FY 19-69.·

·I · cf:>sts would be $62, 160, 000 •. .- . ·

.•

2·. Transfer OX.CART as in alter~ativ_e i .. ·above, and -

I : s.to-re eight SR-7l's. ·FY 1969 ·costs would--be"$40, 960: 000.

I. 144

:.I· 'T .Q P S. E C ft E 'f:

Raridre via::. B\tMArJ· .

. 1· .Controf-Sys-tem
K. .:···. f:
. . ~ ....... '""':'
 C05492927
··1. :·
.. ,
.. , .

. and
.
~t ~·e~l~
. .

roana'ge-meri.t.
. . .
·.. 3.•.. (.:iose

. Air F6~c~·Base,
. . .
.
A~ea "51 and co-l~cate OXCART

California;. . but with

.
.
fieet
.
¢.LA reta~nfog

rg" 1969. 'cost w~uld be $72, 240, 000.

.
.
'
with.SR:-71

control
. .

.
1s
.

4~ Contiriue OXCART operatlonsoa.t ATe~ 51 ·~nder CIA

. . .. . . . . .. -: .. . . . . . . :. . 1/
.I _. ~._on~rol and·meil\ag~ment. FY°l.9l?9 .c?s~s woul.d .be $72, 000, 000. _; ·

.... ,. . Mr •. Helms" expres'sed hts· reac;:tions ·tO. the. alternatives consid·e.red

by. the NRO in:. a memorandun:i- .to Messrs. Nitze, Hornig, an~·Tfa?'

.1 dated.ls
.
.April.1968.
.
·In it he questioned
. . -
~i:iy, ·if·eight.-S"R-7l's . could b.e

·1 ·store.d. in one option.- they could. not be storecf in all the' optfons,. With.·

the. resul.tant saVi.ngs applied in each case." . He .questi_oned the lower· ...·
: .,- ..
cost_fig~re·s of com~ining the·A-i"z 1 s wHh the ~R:..n•:s.and.disagreed,

. I .. for ·s~curity r~asons, with co-lo~ati.ng tbe t~o ·:fleets:. Abov~ all; .

howev.er.; he felt-_ the key question was the de·si~ahility of. retaining: a
.·1 .
covert civllian·capabili.ty •. It:was his judgment .that such a requirement
.

continued.· In conch~SiC?n, he. flatly r"ecomrn:e:nded "main.tenance of .th~

I .
OXCART capabiliW at
. . Ar~a
. . .·
51 unde·r ·cIA. management. -
. u
.1·
1/ B..YE.:..12~21-6·8, 7 .March.1968. · D/NRO Memora~dUm. to the Deputy
·1. S~cretary of Defense, SubJect: Study of Options £or Continuin·g _. .·
.Oper.~tfon of the OXCART Aircraft.in FY 1969 .. See Annex 163.

·I· 2./ liYE-.6441•68;. 18 ·April l9q8. Me~orandurrt-from·-DCI t·~·Messr~~ ·Nitz·e

and Hornig; Subject: .Considerations Aq~cting ·ox<;:ART Pxog,ram
P.-iaseout. See Annex 164~. · . · ·· · · . . ·· ·.
1.
·.,,.
. .
·.. Y 0 P 3 ~ e It E 1'.

I Handle ·via ·:8Yft~i~?1

. ·;, ·. ·.·
.Contrnf Sjstem
;C05492927
, ..
·.I·
. ,: ...
TOP ·s E GR E'T.

Tim.e,.·hovreve~.•. Y!as ·fast ·ru:i:ining.9ut .fo'r the OXCART -pr~:g. ram.

•.

··1· The:prime
.
con~ide.'ration iri.,eve~y phase of discussions
.
.concernirl.g
~ .
the.
.

This was made ~ery· clear in the penulti~ate

"·1··.·. . .. - . . .. . . .· . · . . ·. , 1/
. . · paragra.ph of the minutes._of the ExCorn meeting of 29 April 1968-;- ·
.·.1. · Despite the very cogent reasoning ·of the .DCI, suppo:tted by the Presi.- .'

Sci~ntific·Adviser,
I· .dent's . ··. . .
the Deputy ·Secretary of rieferi.se.
.
!elt
. the

cen'fral iss.µe was .budgetary. Since .in tl).e ·FY 1969 b.\tdg-et.it·had .been
·.I" '~ssurned that th-e" OXCART program was terminated, there simply

:.1 .. was no. mone.y .available to s·ustain the·progr°am. On 16 May.1968 'the.

., :
.
. .•
. "Secretary of Defens~ re·C!.:ffirm.ed the ·original decision to te·rminate _the

OXCART progr~.m and'_ store the airc·raft~

.

At his we~kly luncheor{ ~ith

.

his princii:>al advisers on Zl May' 1968; the Prei:;ident co~firmed the·

· Secreta-ry's decision .... ·

·1

,
I·
...

.·1 . . • .. ·:
. .
Minutes o{ NRP Executive Committee...
l/ BYE-13'013-'68. 29 April .196-8.
(Annex 165 ). ·
I· .146: . . .

·;·I· T.OP 'S.'.E C. R E T ·

Han.nie'Vi? fiVF~~i\illj
·I:
t.'li . •il .. ~4.u&1ai ·

·. ContrnJ··.~ystem"-,
. .: ·.··
 C05492927
I
:_.,
OXCART A l.lXilia ry Sys tern Develqpment:

·:. 1. Eiec"tr.onic .. Warfare. $yste;m.s_ .·.

. . ~ .

One:;pf the original ,design goais· in· the OXCART program was

to produce.. a~·_airc~_aft with a .ra.dar cross--sectfon ~uffi~iently reduced ..

.
,
1··
.. .. .
. . to mc:+ke.,it difficult to .be detected and/ o·r. t~acked ·with accuracy~ .. ·The ·
: #• ,·,

. art.ti ~;a:d~·r

fo.r ..opti~um.
· .
• •• • • ·' ••

a·erodynamic shaping and choice. of"in.q.terials

. . ,•
• •

:to m{ni~
.
• •

i~·s ti~g:· pr-~g';afu. ~a-~. pu.rsi{ed :t~ p~ovid~· :d~ta: ~eces sary
• •

· ~ize'. radar· reflectivity. No Pr·ovision was made to equip th.e.

· . OXCART aircraft. with de:fensi~e el'~ct·ronie: sys.terns in. its. origin_al.

I design. Its s·afety..was assumed to lie· in its. low level' of dete.ctability,

·I ·and in its speed·a:n~.altitu·ae •... -~

The,. cross-,section levels that the designers· ~cQ.ie~ecf were, in

,
·I
..
. fact, quite low.

their radar.
However, the advances the S_ovie_ts. were making in

defens~ _network were equally imp~essive .. · I(beca:me. ap-

·I ·~a.rent, ·as more became ~o~ about the Sovi.etair._.de!ense system,

. ·that the OXCART aircraft

·. . .
would be una~le .to ove;rfly·
.
hostile ter.rito.ry ·

-:I . ...... without.- penetration :al.ds •. The ~ar1y-Wa.rnhig .TAi,L-1QNG 'radarr which

·1·. WC!-S replacing older

.
equipments. throughout
.
th~· Sc;>Viet Bloc; was :e.sti.,.. .
:q1ated t"o be· c:apable of d~tectirig .and acc~rately tra~kj.~g ·the A-12. :
·I ·. d.uri;ng· an ov:e.rflight. ·.Improved performance was hein:g ·evi~ence"d .. ·
·.
1. · 147

.
:1:
..
.

. _tl
,,fti r.ivn~.i\':\V
·. ff'.in"'uJou ·~1~1. u •i;lill1l't .
.. ·.··· .. '•
. ...:Contrnl .system : . ~-. _
 C05492927
.,
:.··1 ·,

. I
TOP SECR...ET
'·1··_· ·. ..

:... ,. ·
. . . .
in·inissile. associated .radars. A much more ·threatening environment

e~i_sted by the end of-1.961 tl;ian had.peen planti:ed against in. 1959 ... The·

·1. · iiew. threat.en~rorun·ent assessrnent spurred an: alr~a_dy·inten.s.ive .

c()llection program to n:ieasure the--paramete·rs and sens.itiVi.ties of·

·:I new gel1eration Soviet radars. Vulnerability as~essments ind~cate·d ·

.1
:,
that the SA-::-2 threat was .suffident to·warrant employment of ECM .. ·

e.qliipment
. .
and camouflage
' . te~h~iques
. .
•. · The resultan~·data".and
.
c~n-
..
clusions :provided the base ~n .. which coun:termeasurE!s wer.e dey,elqp~d.

I· T·h.e conclusions were_.expressed in an OSI repo~t.as foliows:

. .
: · ".The.prindpal con~lusions of this study are as follows:·
:. 1 (l)":The QX~I.t.T vehicle·..can be. detected·:a~d tracked by.,the
· SoViet TALL KING radar network at significant rang.es
· (essentially line-of-sight}; (2) Soviet interceptor~ ..can be
·I ·scrambled in .t.ime tq.attempt an intercept, }lowever, -.in ·
view: of limited speed and altitude perforniance, as :weli

·1· as insufficient AI .radar and AA.missile capability,...the prob-

abili1;y of a.successful engag·ement is exceedingly small;
(3.).th~ SA-2.missile systeI!l :i:nust be considered as a d.efinite
threat to. the· OXCART vehicle on th~ basis of the capp.bility ..
·I of the FAN SON<;i .r.adar to a·chieve· detection at a· rang~ ·that is:
· ·adequat.e to perm.it launch ·of at least one. and probably :three

··1: GUID.ELINE ·miss'iles. ·

These a·tatements lead quite na,turally to. the· require-

11

i.nent..that all possible means of ·redudng. ve.hi~le vUlnerabiiity

·. 1·: In
.b~ explo~ed·. : addition ~o penetration aids .destr.ibed in._ .
Chapter V, feasibilit}r-· studi~s related to the .following eqµip- .
a· tri,ent :coric.epts are beirig. actively.pursued: ·(l) FAN SONG. . . .
radar detection and tr:ack .indicator; (2) stra;,.ge: E;;.ignal 'detecttir.
whose .purpoi;e is to d·etect·and identify radar signals "that may
·1 i4e

.,
··:.I : T Q·P S E C ·R.E. 'i'

Handle· via. BYP'-!~N ·

_·. ·~nntrj)~.:·System .
·C05492927·
.·I. T.01? S .E C.R:E.T
_.:1.
..emahate f~om m.issil~ guid~nce ·radars who·s~· ~har~cteii~tic·~ ·
_are presen:tJ.y ~nknown;.(.3} bar-rage and/or. decep'tion jani~ing
·::1·..
·
of the:FA_N .SONG ·radar; arid ·(4) a ;ffilssile lc_i.unch in:ciicati_on> . ·
. radar ... rt· can· be s.een t_hat·these equipments; -prop~rly inte~
·,_,. ....g'rated,. should: provide the· capability .of .the.OXcART vehi~1e'·
. t·o monitor and react' to the·_ Soviet ABS in such manner a·s . a
.io· ·redti"ce vU!nerability to a]]. a_ccept?-ble level.
.··1 ·,

"Investigations of the v.;Lrious elem.~nts _of the Soviet

ABS elements a~e contfr~.uing. in orde.r to p~rmit ·refinement
.·1 of tP,e pr,esent p_erforr.nance._estimates;_ In
a·ddition," typic_al .
missions are belng examined critically to ·pr.ovide information
re-~ative to. opthnum,techniqu~s _and tactics -for success:fcl ·
·. I·· p:~:ri~tration. The ·results of thes·e· studies· will
fq~-thcoming. -report.-'!· l I ·
.. ··-
given in a.· be .. ·....

a • • • •

·I . In.the.develOpm_ent of OXCART co~ntermeasures· a·conscious

effort was made to avoid techniques and equipments· which duplicated;·.

.·1· or: adapted, military hardware.·.· This was to."prevent poss.ible com-.

I:
., ..
: .
J>romise _of military systems -should an A·-12 lo~s o~cur ·<luring 9ve,r-:

flight~ . A family o# nc)\:el wa.rning an_d jammi~g devices emerged:

· \inder what
. .

was called. .the SU,PERMARKET-

.
approach t.o
.
the problem ...
.

. . . . ·. . .
. .
It· consists of: a· number
.
of eiecti-onk syste~s;
. . .
passive
.
and active,

to -~a-rn .the -p~fot of missile activi.ty. and to initiate jamming and. con-

fusion signals.· A re.d:undancy wa·s des.igned into th_e fotal package .to .

.giv:e a lowe~. deg.ree .of vulne:rabiHty·a?-d to assure a high _degree o{

1 / -SC-04312_~·64, .19 February 196_4. 6sr Repor_t,~ Subj-ect: OXCART

- VE:hide Vttlnerability Study: . ·(On file in D/O(OSAirNTEL~)

I·
;.,
.
..;
.
·T 0 '.£>"
149-, ..

S. E C ft E T .
. · .. ·~~~~In .1,"r-a rn.rr·~' ~1 ..
. ·n~HllHi ·" t' . ....... ,4 .

·-1.·.
·. ,
Control· System·.·:. ··.,
·.
 ·co5492927 .•:

:·1··. . .
T .0 f'. . S E' G R E 'f
• . . ··

':-·1 . ··total.sys tern reliability. A numbe~:·of· combt1:iations .of systetii~- w~s- .

.· ...

. .. ·· .·.-·... .- . . . _.... . . . .

.I- ;rnad-e.available,;for.:
.. ·. .
use o"xi·
. .
a_:: given.
. .·
mission
..
.. Judici~us
.
-emp_ioyment ·__ :

··1·
. . of the e"ambinations wo_uid prplqng ·fu.e A :..i2 1 s freedon1 of operaticµ

over .denied. areas~ . The defensive

.
.electronic
'\.
warfare systems
.
that: . :. ·

:·.I wer·e developed, an:d .empl~yed in

l ••• • • •
the OX.CART airc·raft,
•
y,1.-ith a". brief.
• • • ..

functforial-description of each, are. lis"ted below:

..
:
-1
.
, .
BIG BLAST -.(Active· Jammer) - De-llies target_ range_
fr.om tlie SA-2 _radar to force the rnissile into-a ·.thre·~ point
guipa_n~·e ·mode an~ early. -arming of the fuze ••

BLUE DOG .~-(Active Jamme.r.) Recogniz~s miss:ile

.1_· guidanc;e activity and acti~ely transmits false co~rriands .tc>
·the SA -2· mi"ssile guidance_ systems.· ; . . ·

·1· .
· PIN PEG -·(Passive· DF .. System) - Passively interce.pts .
.$A·-z rad~r frequency signal, Locates and po.sitions SA-:2. · _· ·
. 1:· ;
radar site._in azimuth ~ithin" vulnerable zprie. ·. . .
..
·MA.n MOTH...; (A~tive:.Jamme_r)•- Denies SA"".2 tracking
-I radar accurate angle b;1formation resulting" in ·large missile ..
m:iss dis~n.ces, 1/.

. A. Signal Intercept Package was also de~eloped to. collect _Eiint

I-
data; It ~as succeedeQ.: by Syst~m 6S," an ~dva-O:ced Eli~t cbllectio~

·--1· syste~i which-monitors the frequency·.rang.e·o£ 50 to_.12_•. _s_oo _MfI~ .· ..

-.~I and provides analog reco:rding of the signals.

-:I 1./. Fox. a more. detailed d~scription of the ECM system.·.s de'veloped
for ·the :OXCART prog~am, s~e Electro.riic Warfare Sy-stems
Data.'Book, October 1967· (BYE.:.4424(>-67), published by the. ·
:I.· · Air Systems Division, Office of
Elin.t,. PD/S&T •

=·
. .1·:
.'f' 0 p S ECR.ET:·

.1.:·_ .
.....
,_.,.
·co54 92 927
.. . .
'·.
·T·:ep SE.GRET
:.', .

'·I· Sec~nd generation ECM equipments. that w~_re in. deveiop~erif ··•
.
·1· .
and/ or te·s.t ~ta.ge when the OXCAR'l'· ·program· w~s closed- ~tit w.~re~

: .1.
i:.:1
I 50X4, E.0.13526
I
·.1
_·:1. '--~~o-c-·CA~s~ro_N_._\~~ls_o_x_4_,E_._o_.1_3s_2_6~~~~~~~~~/
·I.
A funded. study ·by ·Perki~-Elm.er· in 195_9. e-xplor~d the feasibility
··1·· of de"veloping a.precision photog.raphic _reconnai.ssa~~e sensor for use.

I · . in a Mach 3. 5, 80, 000--foot-altitU.de. veh:icle~ having ·a phc;itog·raphic·

. .
·range of zs·oo nautical miles. The principal problem areas identified
·1 tn the study were:

I.··· ... ,
a.. Control· of the' camera e_nvir<?nrnent, i.e .• thermal,_

;_I . I

b.· Effects of turbulerice and .shock wave on the optical

I· wave front entering th~ c~mera·.

·I ·1s1
..

'I .. T 0 J? ··s ·E GR E. T

Handle via BY.£MAN .

I. Contro1 _-.sys\001
 C05492927
I 'l'· _o P s )3 _e ·_a .IB }P
.:1 c •. Optimizing .the. component~ of.the sensor system.

I to provi_de photographic i::ange,'. s_w~th ~idth ·and resolution

·: within:~_the confines of the availabie- spaee~ ..

.-1 d. · Pr~viding a window for~ the. camera to :iook thro:Ugh
~n· the .outside
I . that·is · 55'0° F ati:d less than 1S0°F on the insid.e

that will not distort t~e imagery to a.-n una:cceptable extent.

I I>uring
. .
.the ensuing deve.lopment
' .
and. test phases·. of th~
' . Type I system, .~

·.1 4
these identifie~ areas proved to be the,mofit ·troublesome.
• • •
..
They still

I The- design pl\ilosophy employed by Perkin-Elrri~r· refleCt~d a

need for controlling ·the camera operating envi:r'onnient and in some

areas extending.
. . . the state. of the art to ..achieve· the .maximum.
. perform-
·a.nee.· This
.
resulted . in.a ·complex
·.
design that ~ould give e:x;cellent

r_es:ults if it could be -adequately .maintain~d .and· se.rviced· in the field;.·

however~ concern, about reliab-ilfty resulted -i:n (e-ttin.g a cont~act to'

Eastman Kodak for th~·dev~loprnent.-of:an alternate sys"tem thcl.tvv:ould

·I . . : ~'
be easy. to ·servic.e. and have high r:eliability, .·but would npt have a.s

·good a ·i:es·olution potential~ ·B_o~h .c,ameras wei-e fligP,t-tested in oth~r

.I : vehicles -pr.i_o.r to the availability.,~£ the:A~l2,..and·both.'essentially · .·
··1. . achieved th.eir design goals· •. .wh.~~. 'the
' .
deli~ery .s:chedule
. of th.e ve-
' . . -

-I
,
bides
' . . forced
. . a decision in favor of the production·
' . .quantities of one

.15Z .. ' • 4 ~ ....

~...
·1 •
. ·.':··. ·. ; ...
T·op. SE.CitE"f.

_:.1.- Handle. via BYEMA~J

0 v,. . c..... :·
ll~n+,. ·1 ,q,,c:.'-r-~·· .
1.Juuu
 C05492927
·1
<I .or the other, the Per~in·..:~lmer came·r~ was::seleeted on the basis. of
:.,
..
..
. its
.
det:nori.stiated.
. . . reliability.. and better
. .
.ground:· resolµtion.
. . The ·La,n:d
.
·
·,
Panefcoticurre.d in this decisibn~. Eight p-.,.·E .. cameras wer~ ev.en.tuallt
·I procured.. Eastma·n Kodak ·built two ·came;ras.
..

The thfrd cam.era system developed by Hycon·for.the USAF

A-I2 .prog.ram. was introduced. to the OXCART ~nvenfory to·~.erve as

. a .back-up. for the .P-E camera. .in the event the East~an camera . was

phas:ed .out. It is a·framing. camera as contrasted ~ith .th~ panqramic

design of.the other two, and.basically foll~ws. the de~lgn i>hiios.ophy so

successfully
. . used.
.
fo·r many years with the_ Hycon. B camera .in. the U.-Z;
..
that is,.la:rge scale, large format a~d long focal length. These charac-

teristic.s limit ~e amoun~ of photog~.aphic coverage.·; and require an

· · amount of thermai ·control ~f the ·Optical system tha·t SO far has not
·1 been· avai.lable i.n .the .A·-lZ. ·

·I Significant Developme~ts:.
. ..
0

a. An air bar syste1P of su~porting the film du:ring· its

1· . . . .

passage·through·the camera ·results in> extremely low

. .
f~ictiori

and ·tension on the film, reduc:e.s·.abras_ion and permits .right

...
..
,. angle direction changes . in the film travel.
. . .

· b. Vacuum· windows with dual glazings inhibit the transfer

..
··.
,
·1.· ..

...
_.· .. ·
of high
.
t~mpere1.tures.
. .
from the outside. to

T.Qp
153· ..
.
th~ inside of the vehicle.

S-E GR E·'i'· ·
-

.. Handle .via BYEMAH

--··

I .·: .·Control :System

C05492927
I
·.·1·
without di_storting· the ··cain.e~a 1 s view ..of th~· ground. Studies

,
. . . . . . .
and· development in ph~~ograi:>hic window technology for .;supe·rsorl:i~:

.. . airborne vehicles have established _manufactu~ing -techniques "a.nd

.'•.

the ·effects of therinal..transien.ts on ,,,;i~dows· that ha:"ve proved..

·1 ~xtremely valuable in re.corinaissance vehicles and sensor design ..

I c. A technique for synth:ronizing film velocity with

optiCal- ·system scan rate permits continuous· photography·at

I vehi.cle rate. and. reduces camera dynamic motions ... 'I'.~is tec.h-.

·.I nique·has be·en applied to._other sen.sor~ in recel_lt years ...

Ove.r 200-test flights of the .Perkin·-Elmer ~ystem in the _ye.ars ·

:1 1964 through 1966 ~stablished a· degree

.
of. reiiability and performance.·

that cu~inated in 29 successful ·operati_onal reconnaissance missions·

in s·o~the·ast.Asia dul'ing the period from May 19.67 to ·1'4a:y 1968. No·

failures. were encountered~ Each of these·.missions covered approxi~

. · mateiy, 100~ 000. square miles of denied t·e~ritory. The Eas'tmari. Kodak

ca.in.eras were ··removed from the in..;,:entory in July 1967 as part. of the
I OXCAR'I' phaseout program. The Hycon camel.'.a, ·having entered the

·.I .program-lat~r, continued·t-~sting thrqu·gh 1967 and was validated ~s

being ope-r-ati.-0naHy rea_dy•. It was not employeci·.on .-operati·onafiniS..sions"

"I due to "the satisfactory perf~rmance. of the Perkin-:Elm~:r: ca:i:ne:ra. . .•.

·I 154

··I .TO·P SECRET.

Handle via. BYfM,\tf

:1 ··..c·ontrol Systam ·
. ~ . . ·.
 · C05492927· .. :

'.1··
..
.·
, ...
.
TOP

·. Iriert_ia,1. .N~viga,tion ·sy.stem:

SECRET

·Th~
.
.Miimeapolis-Honeywell
. . Co:rporation
. (M-Hj: ~as:·s~le~ted.
. . . to·

.. _, ..
. · .·· pro'vide~:th~ _ine:rtial navigatio~ s.ystem~ It is ~. self-coii:tairi.e.d, system

. : . and· operates .wit~o~t the use of elect:t;omagnetiC radiation· or external

-~·1- referenG.es. In ope.~~tion it dispiays p·resent position! ground. speed~

·,, a~d the direction:and distance to go· to any of 4;2 'preselect~d posi.ti~n~~.
·I
When ~perated in the appropriate mo.de the aii-~ra£t ·w.ill b~. ,stee.red ·

··.I autom.atic;ally
. . .
to ..each point in. the.·flight.
.
plan sequentially with· ~o ·
. . ... - ......... ·.· ...

I· pilot action· required·. The INS has·demonstrated a hig.h.degree of

reliability;· The· sp~cification erro~ ratio fo.r the .system i~ 1•.5 nautical

. miles per hour 9£ flight. The -sy.ste!Il consistently .dem9µ..~trated less

::I
., ...
.. : th~n on.e nauti.cal mile-per h~u:i:: .error .

. . ··Automatic ·Flight Con.trol ·

The ·automa."tic £Hgh~ c.ontrol .system £or the OXCART, also.:built

. .

, ··1
..·
. by .M-H:.
. systems.
includes:· stability augm.enta:tioJ?.,_ atito:Pi.1ot and air data.·

The three axis· stability aug~entation s·ystem is a corribina-

.tiorLof- electroni.c a~d.. hydraulic equipment ··which .augments

·

the natural
stabiiity .of the aircraft.·. The system w~s. de.signed to take corrective_.
acti~n· ;~pidly wh·e.n its sensor~ ·a-ete~t·.pitch1. yaw or .roil-tn:otion whic~

change the'·.pl"oirer ·attitude. of th~ ai:r:craft~ · The resultant .dampe:nin:g .

I· 155"

-T ,Q :·p· . S E CR E T
··1. ._., ·.

Handle ·vi.a BYEMAR ·.

·~1·. Control. System ·. .
-.·-.·.
. .
~· .. --r--
C05492927
.·I
'l' 0 P . S. E .C R :S 1•
. 1.

.
.. ,,
...·
..
effect is essential 'to· maint~ining the· ·st.ab.le. platform ..nec-essary

·high quafi£y. phqtography. · While the 'stability::a~gmentati6n sy~·t-ein...

fol;''

. .
autopilot and a(r. data com:puters.. w.ere·.nOt u~ique ·t~ the A-12·; the.
. .
aeroelastic and
. '
thermal.problems
. '
assoc~ated
.
·.With .·A.-12. fllght inc~eas:ed . .

the sy~te.m ·complexity in te'rms of r.equi~e·!f I;'esponse rate.s. cooli~g

. r.equirements,. etc •
..
.. . ·.·-:. -~.

The siae:.:;:looking radar desi:gned for· the ·OXCART vehicle is a

high ~eS·olution· syn.the.tic aperture radar usirtg optical :recO.r·ding of

the. doppler signal a~d using ground-bas·ed .. optic~l co;~elation techniqu.es •

.Two fUght units· and one engineering breadb.oard. we:re procured. In

a.ddition, a strip correlator and t'\Vo detailed correlators. were procured

. .
for "support.
·.I
.,. The. radar..oper,a.tes at a ·frequ~ncy of 9~ 4~i,gigaher.tz ·with a·

pu~se w_idt?:.of 20 nanos~con:ds.

.
.•
.
. : .
Peak ·power i's one r.q:ega.vv:att. ·Pulse · ·
.

·1 repetition rate. is 4, ooo pulse~ per se~o~d. T~e r·ecei"ver ~oise :figure.

"is 6··1/2"q.b. ·sys·tern.resolutfon

. is approximately 15 fe·ettn·range._
1... .

and 8 feet in
.

azirh~th (a lo!ig tra~k.f over. ·a swath

. .
.

z.o nautical miles. ..

'·I wi'1e centered aboU.t 30.nautical·rniles .off-track.· The soo feet of thin: :

bas~d film.,U.sed·for O:t:"i.gin~l reco.rdi'n.g.·will ~over appr~xima:tely l, 000

·:·I 156

:I··
. ~I. ,·
.HfimUe via· nYEMAtl .. :
:Controi .':System. r ··
 C05492927 ,·
::I
I ..
,
..
miles of trc;ck~

... leng"th of 10~feet.

The system weight i~· about 950 pounds wit~ ~n antenna

1· . ·The .syst.em was fir~t proposed'i.rt April:~£ 1960"by .the Scientifi~ .·

. .
Engineering Institute. - Developrnent
. . . . . of. the equipment was initiated. in
·1·. August
. . . .

~960 with. Westinghouse beiI~g the· prime .con.tractor for ·de.~~lop"".

. .I m'ent.of ra;dar equipment and Itek deveioping the airb~rne r.e.corder and·

· the . optica1:·~orr:elators~· Initial flight t~~t was.:started° in Mar~hl9.62.

I. in:.an especially rnodified. F-101 aircraft. _In 196'4 the .sys.tern 'v\fas
:

I· (ieliver~d to-,Ar·ea.51 and underwent e:x:ten:siv~·gr~unci'c·he~·ks. Subse•

_, queritly;. in early' 1965, the _system was retUrned to the·faddry and F~lOl

·tes.ts· continued ·as OXCART aircraft were not av~il~ble.for ·this t~~t.

·I' progr.am because of other high.'er priority acti.(,ities ... Over 200 Hights"

·1 were made in· the F-1.01.

In lc;l.te
.
196·5.a review ·was
.
made. of . the. ~equtremerit
.. . . .
and. u.seag·e
·. .
·
.
I . . . .
of the OXCART ·radar and. a decision was made: to reii:].stitute the .flfght
. . . .
.

:
.

te~t program. ·Equipment was th~frefore. returned .to the

I ···- fall ~f 1966 a"nd flight test w.ork initiated. ·Initial .flights.were u,nsucce~s:-
field in th.e

"'I ful ii:i that the. antenna suffer¢d breakdo:WO when operateq

·T~his problem
~ .. was apparently s~lved in. I'i:~c:ember
. .
l9.6·6
.
·and fl_fght t1:fsti

· we.re programmed for ·early. 1967. · Howeve~, as only one ai:I'-eraft was
.
at altitude ....:.
".
:.

-·.I.
..
157

·I·
..

. ,. .....
"•
'fOP ... SE'dRET

.ffandte· Via DYH·lAN .

.Control. System
C05492927
.·:1. . .
T 01' ......
,:

·.·1. .
:,.
: '

. .
'
config~~ed
.. .
'
for. a~cepting the r~d~t.1 it v;i.as. an early Victim of the.
,
. ..
. . '._. pha;s_e.qow,l; d~cision. as opera'tional ,capability:would. not _·have b~en".

.·:1 .' ·available :without extended -down -ti~e. ot.~ddit:ionai

. . aircraft for out-

,
. . .

-fitti~g with ~odific:ations.

. designated :the AN/APQ-93
. rad.3.r was
. . The . .
(XA-l) and. was·

·1:
,.,
.. '. developeci under th,e guis·e o_f an Afr Force: secret procurement, The.

· .prqgrain was ,also kriown. as INVAR~

..
Adcl:iti?na.l work was done on the F.-101 in .S\:(ppo.rt o(Na.vy rada~·

programs·. The capability of theAP0-93 ·is b·etter· than .m:ost of the·

existing side-lo_qking ra.dar·s but is sorriewhat.1ower i:O:'perfp.rm.an:ce

.·.1·· . . . .
than soine test and development model~ now in_ existen.c.e ... ·····'

.·.1 '.
In~roduction. At the _.tim_e the ·A-12 a ire r~ft was· .being devel.oped,
·I:
.., ther~ were- no :op~"rational aircraft i~ the USAF_.in\.entory th<;Lt had an.

·equivalent p:erformance envelope." ·Aircraft that were-in e;t;iste.nce.

in 1959 "that presented similar pro'\Jlems, in ter~s of life support·

'.I
,. .. .,
.....
' requi:rernents, ·were "the F-104,.·B..:sa, F-10"6:. V-2 and ·x-1s~. Life-:

su~pod·equipment used in such ai:r:;cra.ft p:r_oyided ·a ba.si.c- fo~dation •.

up<m--whrch· the lif~ !=J\ipport equipment tor· the A-lZ- ~s cievel~ped-.

I · Li~e support equipment .has, in gell.eral~ _two ba~ic :f~ction·s :_

I .(1) to:· enable the pilot t~ fly the aircraft and coroplet~ the mJssiOn
• • • ' w

158 ..
I
.. .
T o·p s E".C R >s T
·ffan.die via BVEMAN.
·.I...
Control ,'.system·
' .~ ",.
 C05492927
I·
., ..
T. 0 P . , . 15 E. 'e 1t .E. T ·.·

throug_hout the ·entir.e perforJriance- envE?lope:·o~(the v.ehicle,· und.er

:.,- both no-rm~l-and e~e.rgency _operating .condition~>and .(Z) to en~ble

·the pUot to safely escape _fro~ the_· aircraff th~oughout:its perform-··

1 .·.
· ance envelope in the evell:t .of ca~~strophic emergencies.· ·In prd~~
·.··1··.. to provide· these ·f\µlc_tion·s, A ·-12 llfe support _equipment had to include

·I . a safe. and. reliable pressurization, air conditi~nfag; .and oxygen ·

system "with ade:quate red~dancy and dur_ation ·to -meet any ,oi;>eration~l ··..
. . . .. . . . . . .

I
:

,
. . .
. req.uiremen:ts. In addi"!;ion·:the equipment had to._provide·the".,pilot with: .

.. back-up pressurization ~nd. an emergency :oxygen supply, and protec-

tio~ from windbl~~t~. ~ig~ tempe':"atures, · d.eceleratiori. and spinning in

:1 the ·eve.nt of emergency escape from a disabl'ed ah-craft ...

I
.. , Specific Problem A re as. . 'l;'he specific pararn.~~e~s and problem ·

·ar_eas P:t:esented by the A-12, ar·ound.- which the "life support_ eqµipment

had· t6 b.e developed, ·we·re as follows: ·

(1) I>"ressure altitu'de. ·Th~ A-12 V:,ould op·erate up·fo

a maximum altitude c;;f 100, 000. feet above sea level.

•.. · (2) Speed. T~e A.·-12 ·would· opeta.te .up -to a· ma:ximum

·speec;l of. Mach -.3, 5. a_t maximum: altitude;· or a maximum equiv~

alent.airspe.ed·of 450 KEAS~

·.I
.
.. , ...
. .
. 159

muuJ. !a
Ln..lfe' r a··Vt"
V. .. ~ ~il .
1Ll~1Rh ·
Control :_.System .··
...
·.··-. _·.:-~.-
 ,
· C05492927 ·
..
:.
.· ..
\··

:::.1··
:,,. . J3): Range/D~ration. :'.Th~ A-Ji. woul¢1..have,. bec~u~~

.of aeri~l refu~ling,. a .wo:dd:wide range.· with fl~ght d'.lrations

'in. excess ·of 8 to 10 hours·•.

::.I .
.·.. ·· (4) ..windblast/Decelera·ti:on~. The worst windblast/

··1 decelerat.i~n. conditt~n-s under which a piiOt could eject would .•."

z· at 74, 000 feet, ~hich would expose th~ ptlot;

I. be_ at Mach· 3.

at~ the ·m~m·ent. of eje~tiori. · to an ins~ant~ne9us maximum dynarpS~

·I pr--:issure· ~windblast) ·or 950.lbs. per squa·xe foot and a.m.aximum.

.-, .· '

linear deceleration .qf 9 G'l)l..

' '

. . (5) Teinper.atures-. ·Un~er .norn:ial. .A·.:-12 op:·~atilig. condi-

.I·- .. . tion,s the pilot w'oU:ld require protection_ from radiant heating due

.·I·:. to.~irc·raft skin and windshield, .~emp·e.ra~ure~ .approaching. 400° F .

• •• . . .• • ..!. .

Upon
.
-ejection
. at 100; 000 feet and Mach 3. 2, ··the .p~lt>t would
. b~ .'.

,
:

·:1.· exposed to an i.n.staritan~ous. of 800° F. ·

. stagn~tion
. . .
.temperature
.

....
Upoil. dec_eleration and .free fall from high altitude!?. the. pilot.wo~d
' . .. ' : . . . ·.·· 0 . '
be· exposed· to temperatqres of -67 For lower.
·I~ (6) Spinnins. :!~a ·pilot eje<:ted at ma.:Xim.um altitude, :whe~~
. . . . . " ·.

:I it is ~safe . to. ope·n

.
a normal pa.rachute, he :would. ente.r.
. .
a flat-
. ' ' ' .

_-spin which· would be·uncontr.ollable .. Suc_h a~spin1 which ·could.

I . exceed ·zo-0. RPM would p.roduc_e s~r~ous. to fatal ·in~u~ies.: and·

1-.
:,1 T O·P. SECRET: .

. .Hand'e via ~''EMAtf

: I: .. '

.. •'':.
. ·control .Syst~a ·.
 ,.
C05492927.
'
. . . . .·

,.
.. ...

. .·'.
...
T O P . S E .C R: E T
..

·::1. ~ . .
· opened·<:t a -1ower .. altitude.
.

1. " A-12 .Life Support Equipment Developm:el).t .. Life support:

eqU:ipment falls into two ca~egorie~:: '(i) airc~aft s.ystems,. arid (2) .pe·rs ~
. ·1 .onal equipment.
. . .

The following .Paragraph's desc.ribe th.e A_-1_2 ·equipment

.

._, ..
. ·and ..briefly c~ver the de~elopment of. each item.'.

· Air<:raft":Systetns we·r.e d.evelop~d by th~. p.rime contrac.toi",

.:.1
. Lo¢kheed Aircraft Corporation:. and·included the. following items:.

~··~1
....
a:. Pr·essuri.zation .and air condition~ng systems:. The·

.··1 . cockpi~"·Pr.essurizati~n .schedule for the A-12 was .unique as .compar~d .

to existing high: performance·aircraft.. The cockpit. rer:q.ains e~sentially :

"··1·
.

.. , .
unpressul:"ized from.ground level up .to a flight aititU:d~ · o(i.6'. 000 ~eet.

.At flight ievels . . from 26, 000 to 10.0,,.000 fe.et,· the cockpit remains ·

_i·s.obaric:·at 26;·000 fe'et (5.· 25 psia.).· · This schedule·was chosen to .give

I (1) ·opti~u_m teriiperatures and airflc;ws to the co.ckpit air ~onditioning·

system·especialiy·d~:ring a~d· descenti

. ·1• . ... .. .
climb
. . (2)
.
lowest
.
oxygen
.
c9n·- .

.,. . .
'suin.ptio'n co.n.siste.ht with a·dequate physiological proteetion:. (3) safest

pressuTe differential
.
across ·the cockpit· glass during .critical
..
.
refuel-
.
. . .

I : ii:ig man;euvers...

. ,.
. ..
"1-.. '. "T o· P · . S E C R E T
.. .Handle" via· BVtMAM
:1. .Control Syste~ ·
. :·.·
.. ·.
 ,
C05492927
... .
..
T 0 '.P · S E C '.R E ·~
.. ··.. '
:::I·.
.
..
..... , . . ~
·The.-.·ab· ·c.onditioning systeni . .clio_ser_l wa:s· al~o· µn:ique·

.70D?-ple~·e~y dual. system w_as chosen •. · The.unique pr.ol:>l.em.ofaero-,.'

. "d~rnfo n~ating· ~f this vehicle dfctated.that, ·{·9~ mis.si6i:l:·c::p~pletion:·

ill; th~t ;i.

. ' . . . . .
.·'.I:
· ·and ad,e.quat~ pilot prote9tion, ·a_ ~c:>m,plete redundartcy of air c~ndition:..-.·
... ,_. • 4! • • • • ~ .. • • • '

... ,. ing h<Ld. .t9: be provided~ The· sy:stem: was ·therefore. cox~:strµct~d with. ·

-. one syst~m pro.viding cockpit/p~lot.cooling and :the. sec.and system . '.

·. .p~ovidixi.g Q and.. E. bay ~ooUng; '. Iri the

. . . ..of failure ·of. the -sy~te~
event
.:. I
~ ' .

. ,,
.
...
~~Oviding COC,k~itipilot CO~lina;-1 -:the pi~ot w6uld 9p~rate
s·elector· to"divert the Q ~nd E. bay" coolin:g' to the ·.cockpit/pilot•

. · Changes and rnodifica:tfons. w~~e made to the air· co~ditioning

a C~OS~over· _· .

. s:ystem over"the yeai:s until peak efficiency and maxirri:um pilot <:ornfort

·I·.
.
were achieved.in 196.6.-67.

. , _ope:r~tional c~ncepts:,. a co~pletely.'redtµlda.nt

. .
oxyge.~
.
supply·and .
. .

·delivery. syste~ was provided in the .A-lZ.~: The initial syst~m. con-·

:si~.ted of two h~gh pressure o:X:yg~n cv:iinders. and associated piumbing, ....
:I. · ·reducers and regula to.rs. .A.. fail~re of ·(:me·. sys.tem ~ould have no _·effe·ct .

. I.· ~n the pilot. becaus.e the.. se.~ond

~ ,. .
.sys~em
.
'
~ould
.
continue to provide the '

pil:qtwlth;·hi-s. Ufe~sustaining oxygen ... Only th.e du.ration ?f supply·.

I wou-ld.pe affec:te9, with such a ·f~ilur·~ .. ·Th~ (!alcUlate:d d-~·l:'ati;,n.for

·:I. . 162. .

~1::·
..

, ..

: ' :.
flandta· vla BYEMAtl ·· .
.Contm~ SystaJ?l-
.~ ..
 ,,,.
C05492927

:· . 'f' 0 p

.,
:
. .

both: systems being" used·was 15-3/4 .hours while failur"e of one system·

.,. · a;fte·r s·-1/.4' hours of Hight would reduc.e the total oxygen du~·atioh to

.10.:..l/2 hours available~ :_In th~· period' 1964.::65 the :o~ygen.· system:~ were

convert_ed to .liquid oxygen (LOX), ·using.' two 10-li.te.r .cortverters,

I·
,. either.one of wl?-ich.would provide in _ex~ess 6t 14 hours·:·o~ygen availa~.
· bility at _altitude .. In addition to the added safety margin,_ this
..
c:~ange

incr.eas:eq'. .reliability and reduced weight an_d volume :o~c:upied_-by -~he

o:X:ygen ·system._·

c. Ejecti.on System. in ·1959 ·LAC" analyzed th~ possible.

e"scap_e systems for the" A-lZ including ·fuselage no~e capsules, encap- .

sulateq seats, and· rocket-catapult seats. It.was determined that,

because a: pressure suit was r.equire~ in any case, du~ to po~eriti;al lo!!!S
. .
. of cockpit pressu:i;e, the most· rel.iable~ light~·$t,' sm:anest_ and safest
.·.1 es.c:~pe .. sys.tem whi.ch would satisfy the high and low' lev~l esc.a.pe" pro.b-·

·I. · len'l.s· for the A-12 consi~ted :or a full press:ure suit an? a rocket-catapUl.t

·1 ·'ejection seat. The pressure suit proposed was that. developed for. the

,
... ~ ..
X-15, because cif its demonstrated ·capability for re~istance .to windb.last··

and· elevated·
. .
.
. .
.
temperatures ·which
.
·exceeded. .the resistance
.. .
required
. .
·for .

.
,
I
..
.
.
use in.the h.-12. The ejection seat· ptop·osed was ·ehe upwa:rd eje.ction·

· C-2'. seat as used in t~e ~-104. The

163
c·-2 ejectioP. seat pyrotechnics .

:.,,
,. T 0. P S E' 0 R !e. · '.f.
..

: Handle. vhf BVEMAtl ·•

· ..
Conticl System
.· ..
...
.
,
C05492927
.. . .
:.,. · were .mo9ifi.ed for use· hi. the A-12 ~o qualify ~hem for_ s~:rvice' use

:1 . . at fhe·:.e'le~ted .ternperature·s ericoun't:Sred

. . :with·. the A·-12 (i. ~ •. ,. qi.ta.lifi~d

I·· ·The escape system wa:s qP.alified throl,lgh. testing· including·

·I· ...

.,. component tests, system £un.ctiona.l {breadboard) tests, stati.c tests~·

., ...
· Edwartls AFB track tests, aircraft drop

and· finally.-'by infltght

.
·eje.ction tests u·~:iing:·.a·spe~ially
" .. .
ta.st~ .at El Centr~,' Califo~ni~,
equippecl. ·F~l06

at El Centro .. ~he.test peripd covered a span.:froin. 1960 through'finai . ·

.

··., .
·I in:flight ejectio~ tes.ts in August:l964 •. "The...A,·-12 eje~tio~ se~.t was·
.. . ' : ·.
equipped with a rocket catapult mounted.on the rear' of the seat~ which·
:1·.· p'ropels·: the _seat upward on vertical guid'e-rails during eje~~ion . . D~ring .

.I·· ej,ection, se.;a.t to afrc.raft attachments.and pilot. to sea~ attachm~n~s are·

disconn.ec.ted .by .quick..:di~connect fittings; one for all el.ec;t.rica.i leads,

.:1. one--:for the. suit'.vent ,hose, ·one for. the. norm~r:ai~craft qxygen supply..

·I and one· for actuating th~ eme_rgency oxygtm supply; ::c'h~ seat incorp-

·.1: •.. . orated the.· following_ fea.tuFe~:

(1) A headrest for support arid positioning· of ..

.1 . 'the pilot's _head during.ejection ..

·:I· . (Z) A centrally l~cated ejection p·... ;i.·:ing·which·initiates

,,. ,•the en~ire ejection s·eque~c~ and preclude's

' .
a.rm flailing after .

,
•"'
...
··ejection. ··.. ·.·:
., · ..
. ._,.
.. ....

: H~-"te·
atlU ,;ia· P.''rMM'
.JlL~.l.~•1
II:• .·

. 1.
.. . ·.· ·- .
. Control Syst~m
. ; .. . .....·
 : .. ,
~~C05492927.
.
·

,.
. .

TOP SECRET·

.. , ...
(3) A. ·s.houlder
. .

harness and inertiai reel i~ck

asseµibly;- -w'hich locks· th¢ harn_ess atitomatical~y dt.iring ·

~hel)ever 1~ a fo·rwa~d
.I ejection,
. ..
a·. 2 to
. 3 .G force. is·
.
exerted
. .

directfon,. or manually-·_ when desired ·by the pil~t~ '

. . .. .

,.
-1:· (4) A pyrotechnic operated- automatic ·o_peni~g seat ..

. belt and nian-seat separator.·-_ Ari" airspeed _sen~or is

·.attached< to the aircr~ft .pilot ·static systf7m .al).d s.enses'

. l·- aircraft;aii"speed :at ejectio"n. ·If aircraft ai.rspeed is .belo-w

1.· 25Cr..-KIA$. (later . changed to_ 290 KLAS), a 0."6. second· delay

is s.elect~d b~tween seat ejection. and. s ~a:t b_elt/ s-epa.rafor ·

i.I
,., ..
.. actuation. if ai.rspeed is above. 250 KIAS (late~ .changed tc;>.

290-300. KLAS), a 4. 0 secon,d delay. is select.ed by the sensor .

. . _This variable·.d~lay-assures .that the pilot is ciU:tomatically ..

.·-1.···
·. s.~par,p.ted from the_·:seat .as· soon._as-_po~sible! and within.the .

'.' (·.· .... : limits df tol·~frabl~ -G fore.es for de.cel~ration and parachl.it~

!.,
i .. .

.,
deployment.

(5) ~ee g~ards . which erect forward to' pro.~ect· the

,
.

.. .. .. (6) . ~n.-·a.utpmatic foot-r~traC:tion and reterition·_·system .· .

. which pulls the pilot's ~eet"into ·s.tirrups and hoid~---the:m:'

I 165"

··I .
-li~ndie :. via BYEMAN
.( .. ·control .System
 ·.. ,
C05492927

_,:,_ T,OP SECRE'f·

~ntil
. .automatica:lly released. at man/ seat sepatatfo~~.
:1 .
f •• •

. The:f'oot-retention cables .are a~tq~atically. C·Ut a:t mah/seat

.

.I . . · s~pa,ration or may be mariup.ily released by .Pulling a head ..

... :,, rest m9unted ~~1;ing for firing the, 'cable cutte·rs in

eve~t of rapid g'~ound eg~ess .

the ...

.·1·
.. , ·· {7) A <;anopy remo~l
. .
system·'ti'ed., .pyr~technically.
. .

to the '.ejection se-at .D-ring, ·and also ret:n:ovabie by. alte;nate ...

internal and external canopy jettison han;dles.

I.·.·. Per·sonal Equipment: ..

..
· a • . Pre~sure Suit/Oxygen.· Sy~tem. The David ·Clark Co.',
·1 . . "

worki~g with.the Firewel Co., de"veloped

. . .

a .·new pres~ure. su.it !o:i: use in

. .

.. . . .....

I the
,..
A-12.. which
.
r.epresent.ed·
' . .
'
a .s·tate-of.-.the-art
. . irnpr.oveme~t
. . . . . .
over
.
. .th.e .

.faen existing X~l5 presstire suit and ·th~ U~AF· i?tanc:J.ard Af P.:.:zzs-2 ·
. 1.
,.
.

full pressure suit. The major improvement~ and <;hanges; from· previo~s .
.
s.uits w.ex~
' . .
a dual oxygen regU:lator
. .. a~d
.
dual suit
. ..
pr~ssu.re
. . controller
: .
for .
" .. .
;1 irlcr.~ased re~ia:bilityand saf~ty, increased heim.~t visor. thickrtess 'to . ·

. "·:Pr~vent d.eformation or ·failure :from the high temperatures· which ·could

I be ·~ncountered i.n the A:-12; a·flotation vest fo·r water s'urvi.val.which

·I· ..
was·. focorpprated into ·th~ .;ou.ter·
. c·over
.
·of the pressur~
. suit~· and an'. ...

aluminized fla.m¢:'resistant
' . fabri~ out.er .cove~ for. protection . .from high

:.. .., I· 166

.·
T 0 P· . ·s E .C R E T ·
..

··Handle. via ·ovrMAH·

.I" . ·.' ~o~trQi ·System··.·
 ·C05492927
·r·
.'

. . ·•· ,..

.. TO~ S.E G RE 'l'

·1.
.
1. · enc~untered
. . . . . .
. .
upon ejection a~. maximurz:i altitude· and airspeed. '

.. . b. ,.. Par,(icbut~/Ernerg.enc;y Oxygen System~ · Standard

.
I · ejection seats, pressur·e· suits .and aircraft systems '(oxygen; pres.suri"".

:1· ~~tion, 9-nd air. cqnditionihg} had to be upgrad~d and improved for ·use
. .
'iii ~he A-12; a~d the e'f!ox'ts in~olve~ repr~sented· prod~ct impro~ement .
.I However, :.the. pers.oncil para.chute' reqµired to.complete the A-12 .life

I· support' system was.an entirely n~w co-q.cept and requiredc.~nsiderable.

a·. : developm':e.nt and te'sting ef.fo;rts: The.'developnient .and:testing program. · .

sta.rted with a compl~.te reVi.ew of parachute .system's· ~n· existence in

1: ea~ly 1960 and :an initi~t manned.parachtit~ jump. in. Septe~ber 1960,

·1. an4 ended with.final configuration full sysfom·~e~ting-(pa.rachute and

~jection se~t) by.foilight ejection fro~. an ·F-i06 during.Aµgu~t l.'964;

·.1·.
., .... ·
The initial:para'c:P,ute 'jump in September 1.960 mad~· by Ca.pt. Harri

.Collins; who ·was the .Program manager and prim(;!.ry tes.t ~subject·
' . .

. throughout the developm:ent-, established the "requirement for ~n

. . .. . ""

I enti.rely·new parachute· concept'. "In.this ju~p the subject wore a.:

·:I
..
full press.ui•e suit, ·a .p~cked surVi.val (~eat) .kit,· a~d a stand.a.rd para-·

chut~. The jump was prog.ram~ed for a: ·50 second. fr~e .fall.ta .
.·1· a·etermin-e the body position.that·would be .encountered~· .Arter only,·
.. ,·

:·1.·
( ..
i..

i· .
,. .
40 secondi;· of.free fan the .subjeet was 'spi~ing· ~ta .l!a,te of ·140 to'.

TOP
·.....
167..

SECRET.
. ..
r •• •

·Handle. vi~· BYEMAN .· ·.

.1.· .··ControtSysfom ··.
 .,
C05492927.
.I.
,.· T 0 P" .$EC
. RE
. T

..

, ..
: .15_2 ~M
'
in a ~ad and ha.ck down
.
~o~1tion.
. .
...
·:_The jum:p~r
.
overrode
. . .
th~
.

.automatic .time_r and puli.ed the parachute.'ripcard.and sus~ined-high.

·.1
· . parachute suspe~si.o~ lines t_o wind ~p· app.ro~'imately_ 28 ·time's c;eatirig

the danger· of chute collapse. -_This ju~p indicated_ that ·an A-12 pilot ~

.
., ejecting· at maximum altitude·would
.
re.quire·
.
a ~tabilization
.
paracl;mte
. . to .

. · keep. him
.
in an U:p:right and. stable. position. during f;e_e. 'fall:. to. <in
. .
al ti:.. ..·~

·. ~de,wher-e
.. .
th~ in~in.parachute.~oUld
. ·. .
be.deploy.ed,(approxirriately.15,
.
000
.

. ·feet); There were a t'otal ·a£ 5 rri<:>del C°onfigurations dev~loped and

tested during the complete period;.. Models A; B, aJ?.:4·c w:er'e purely

a·evelopmental and ·Model. D was the fi~sf «)per~tiop.al configuration.· A - .

I ·total of Z81 tests were made· on these _model parach':lt~s and their·

sub-s.ystems and covered' the period from J_anuary 1961 through August
~: . I·
1963.
.
· .Du.ring.1964 the· fi£th and
.
current.. parachute .configuration
.
(Mode(E)
.

.'.·I
; .
was. developed and· tested. This configurcitton was develop·ea to .. iiili:>.rove ...

comfort-. ·~eliability, and"maintenance of the parachute. An additional ·

I . : 37 •tests were required to quali;y. this model;. testin'g being·. ~ompleted:

::1 in August 1964. .

.

The· pe~son.al ·parachute dey~loped for and. use~ iii the ·A--12 has .

.thie .following. major features: ( 1) A 78 -inch di~mete r, aut9tjl.atically

.1 168

I· . :·
.··: 'I'O P ": S E C k E T ...

· Handie--vi_a BYHl.~N
·a· . ·: .Control :,System
 ~C05492927 ..·

:·I
.. , .deployed,.. ribbon,..type, ~emisflo stabiliz~tion'.p.~rachute 'for
. -;

·1 ma,intain~~g,;.~he pil_ot in an upright position during. desc;e~t from

. . ' . ' . • ..
:I m.a.ximurn altitUde. to .15~ ooo·feet, «zJ a 35 .... fQot diamete'r, main

.1·. .parachute canopy', that is aU:toma.tica:llY

.
deployed at is. ooo... feet,
.. . ·- ...
and (3} an emergency oxygen sys.t~m·that.. i&·11t;11toma:tic.a1Jy'activated .

.1 upon ejection co~sis.tin:g .of two 45-:cublc i.nch high. pressure'·oxygen·

:1.: cylt·nders integ·rated into th.e parachute"ba~kp~n ~ontaini~g the ..... ·

.. · automatic parac:l;iute actuators. ,(See overl~~f- for picture of pilot,

I suited up and ready for flight.)

. 1.
1·
.1
·1
. . :

1.
.,.
:I:
..
.1· ....
,
.. ....
169 .

. .

·1 liandie :via· QYFMAll

ControJ :System . .
..
C05492927

•I
I
I

·.:.;--·:.~ ..

-·~
: ;'
..
~
..
'
'.Handle via BYEMAN
i Control System
•• ·.r..:...... ····.•-:.·.···-..-.
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 14
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 19, 2016
C05492929 .··
I . f-.

T 0 P SB C R E T
I 19 November 1957
PROPOSED. AD~ANCED RECQt:JNAISSANCE SYSTEM
I ,_:
· i. Background:
I a. The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities included- in its latest semi-annual
report the recommendation 11 that an early review be·made of
new developments in advanced reconnaissance systems". In
the text of its report, the .Bo.ard states that it is aware
of two proposed reconnaissance systems~ It is known in-
formally that this is intended to refer, on the one hand,
to the several ·proposals now under consideration in the
D~partment of Defense for a reconnaissance satellite and,
on the other, to a study currently in progress in the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency of the feasibility of a manned
reconnaissance aircraft designed for greatly reduced radar
cross section. .This memorandum deals e:?tclusively with the
latter of thes~·two proposed systems. ·
b. The study in question had its origin in the
I RAINBOW Project, the purpose of which was the development
of radar camouflage which would be applicable to ·t:he U-2
aircraft without serious impairment of performance and
I suffic~ently. effective to permit a small percentage of re-
connaissance missions to go undetected and greatly to
reduce the accuracy and e.xtent of radar tracking of recon-.
naissance missions even when detected.. Although consider . . .
I able success has been achieved toward this objective, i t
began to be apparent by mid-summer 1957 that only limited
and temporary success could.be hoped for through the appli-
I cation of passive camouflage to an airc·raft of. conventional
structure. Briefly the reason is that (so far as .known to
the U.S. Government) all camouflage devices in use, under
I development, or even contemplated, in either the United
States or Europe, are either too heavy or too bulky for
aircraft application (except at prohibitive cost in per-

I· formance) or ·are inherently:· narrow banded. At the same

time, the Russian radar·system is already characterized by
a very considerable degree of ·frequency diversification
which is rapidly increasing. Any·feasible combination of
I narrow banded solutions can cover only two or three regions
in the whole spectrum and can therefore give only limited
protection. ·
I .XS-164671

I T 0 P S Ei G R :S T · · Handle via BlIMAK

Control System
I
 C05492929
I
·._-

I'
. "~

c. These circumst.:-mces suggest that only a rm.:,~h

mo:re radical appro<:1ch offers the possibility of re;;::; ·;_1 7 -
satisfactory results. The objective must be to ach·!..evi:=
i!"1herer1.tly broad barn:k:d so,lutions) which would afford

I protection not only over all the ranges of frequer:...::ies

in which Russian radar currently operates, but also ·a-
g:' 1nst s<:;ts operati.11g at: (1e.w points on the spec.tr.um,
p, :·liminary consideration l<'!d to the conclusion th.<J': ;tny
I radic~·ll approach would involve
st.;ch
t~onal materials, or unconventional
the use of tmconvt-:n-
structures,_ or un- -
conventional configurations of aircraft; or some
I combination of the three and would, therefore, inevi.ta bly ·
require the desigii. 9f an entirely new aircraft opt!..mize<l
with respect to radar reflectivity.. Accordingly) an E=X-
ploration of possible design approaches was set in motion
I in August 1957. ·
2. Study Now in Progress:
·1 a. Unconventional materials, structures, and con-
figurations all have a cost in terms of weight or drag)
I so any of the radical appr:oaches now under considerat·::...on
will involve a compromise between the invisibility of the
aircraft and its performance. In the present state of .
knowledge a clear cut choice of . the . optimum approa·ch :Ls
I difficult and no one can be certain that even the· be~.t
compromise -will be worth~~.ile. The familiar techl::iques
of reducing reflectivity are either too heavy and bulky
I or just not effective eno~gh and the accurate evaluation
of the reflectivity of complete aircraft is extraordinarily
difficult. Accordingly, in its present phase, the st-udy
I i3 focused on the."invention 11 of new approaches to the
electronic objective and upon· techniques of 1neasur-e.ment and
experiment designed to reveal the ·effectiveness of these
nppr.oaches. At the same tlme, recent advances in the· sta·ce
I o::~ the art in aerodynamics must be reviewed in an ·~ffort t:)
offset as far as poss:i.ble .the inevitable penalt.ie& ·to .:-tir-
c:r.gft performance. In.the next phase, it will be neceL::s::.ry~
I and it should be possible, _to weigh the gains to bE.: .achL,v.::.r!
in the form of reduced reflectivity by each approach ag.'L·1st
L~s aerodynamic costs and on this basis.to select one (;:re:~

I ar; most two or three) as the most promising. Once the field
.has thus been harrowed, it will be possible for an aircraft
manufacturer to develop a concrete proposal (or alternative·
proposals) for an aircraft ·which will achieve. the best per-
I formance obtainable within the state of the art employing
the approach that has been selected, ·

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b. Especially in its present phase this is more a

I scientific than an engineering study, though .the scien-
tists must have access to competence in airframe design
and in structures and mate;rials for their guidance. Ac-
cordingly, a temporary technical staff for the. Project
I has been assembled in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in a
small separate facility. The core of the staff is the
group of scientists from MIT's Lincoln Laboratory who
I have been working on the RAINBOW Project for the last
year. · They will be supplemented with two or three addi-
tional men in the field of electronics and will be
I assisted by consultants frO'!Il several other organizations,
including the A. D. Little Company (on certain materials
problems), possibly the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics, and firms on the east and west coasts that
I are conducting both full-scale and model tests under the
direction of the technical staff. In addition, basic re-
search contracts have been concluded with Bell Labora-
I tories and the Farnsworth Electronics Company (a Division
of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation).
Considerable effort has been and is being expended to
I develop really reliable measurement techniques, including
a small range in Cambridge for model tests of low fre-
quency reflection, a large.outdoor range at Westinghouse
for model tests of hign frequency reflection and equipment
1· for full-scale testing (both ground and flight tests) at
Indian Springs AFB, Nevada. Most of the personnel and
facilities .thus assembled had already been employed in the
I RAINBOW program and the wo:r.k on the production of camou-
flage application to convep.i;:ional airframes is still
proceeding. ·.·-. · ·
I C"• Since the autumn of 1956 INhen it began to appear
that the. RAINBOW Project might achieve .some degree of suc-
cess, the Air Force and the· Navy have been kept informed
I ·of its progress and have pro~ride<l support. Knowledge of ·
the activity has been close.ly held but has been available
to a sufficient number. of officers in each Service to in-
I sure that the. implication.s'.of radar camouflage for mili-
· tary programs could be taken into account. All of the
arrangements described in the preceding paragraph were
I·' made in the first instance as the means of carrying out
the original RAINBOW development· of radar camouflage and.
are believed to be satisfactory to the Air Force a.nd the
Navy, at least in connection with that program. When
I emphasis was shifted to the:. above-descr.ibed study of a

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more radical solution, a very few senior Air Force arid

I Navy off_icers were so informed and are aware both of the
character of the work in progress and of its purpose.
The bulk of the work done ~n this country in aviation
I and electronics and of the competence available in the
Government in these two fields is to be found in the Air
Force and the Navy. Since the Central Intelligence
Agency neither does nor should possess any parallel capa-
I bility, the most intimate cooperation is required if the
above-described program is to have a chance of success.

,.
I 3. Preliminary Conclusions:
a. Although, as stated above, it is too soon to
judge the technical feasibility.of an extremely low re-
flectivity reconnaissance atrcraft, such a system, if
fea~ible, would have notable advantages as a complement
to a reconnaissance satellite. Operating at seventy to
I eighty thousand feet, extrerr~ly high resolution photography
and excellent electronic ·intelligence is available. Since
radar reflectivity would be exceptionally low in the X-band
I the aircraft would have a high degree of immunity to both
aircraft and missile interception. If not susceptible to .
~ore than sporadic detection and tracking, its immunity
to interception would be further enhanced and the politi-
I cal obstacles in the way of its employment would be reduced
to a minimum. In particular, it. is believed that (if fea~
sible) such a reconnaissance vehicle is more promising than
I a manned aircraft designed for greater performance but.
without benefit of radar camouflage. Although it would
be entirely within the state of the art to build an air-
I craft with a ceiling of ninety thousand feet (or even
higher), it might well be subject to interception by
ground-to-air missiles by the time it could be operational.
In brief, it is submitted that any reconnaissance vehicle
I can achieve reasonable immunity from physical interception
and political frustration only by going far higher than
manned aircraft or achieving effective invisibility to
I radar.
b. If, on the basis of a favorable outcome to the
I study now in progress, the decision should be made to pro-
ceed with the reconnaissance system herein discussed, this
project should be carried out .with maximum speed and se-
curity.. .There is no slightest;:: possibility that a succes-
I sor aircraft could be operational sooner than ·the spring
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·of 1959 ~ yet by. that date it seems highly likely both
I that the U-2 will be obsolete and that the urgency of
the need for photographic reconnaissance will be even
greate:r than it is today. The management and organiza-
tion of this later phase of the project, if it is under-
I taken, should be chosen with these objectives in view.
c. An appreciable part of the possible benefit of
I the present study and of any project that grows out of
.it will he lost if the tightest security is not main-
tained around it. It.must be emphasized that in the
I fields of radar and of passive and active countermeasures
there are not likely to be a few crucial secrets~ the
safeguarding of which can protect the security of the
whole system in which ·they are used~ Most or all of what
I is known to us in these fields is known to the Russians
and they are as capable as. we ·of devising and understand-
ing the design approaches now under study. The only way
I to achieve a decisive lead over their radar defense is to
develop a system and have it operational before they have
discovered that an intensive effort is being made in this
area.
I 4. Proposed Course of Action:

I a. The program of studies, measurement and experi-

mentation will be carried forward with all possible speed,
in conjunction with further work on the RAINBOW camouflage,
I looking toward the choice of a design approach for a pos-
sible new aircraft within three months' time. The work
will be under the technical direction of the above-described

,
.
I scientific staff in Cambridge with actual systems responsi-
bility remaining in the AQUATONE P:roject Headquarters in
Washington, D. c .
b. During this phase, contact Will be made with cer-
tain manufacturers as appropriate in order ·tO explore the
possibilities of unconventional materials and structures
I and receive the benefit of their views on tbe general de-
sign problem.
c. It is proposed to maintain more continuous and
I more intimate contact than hitherto with appropriate com-
ponents in the Air Force and the ·Navy.

I d. Appropriate· steps should be taken to control dis-

cussion with manufacturers.. in the· aviation and electronics

I 5.
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industries and actio11s such as the issuance of formal

requirements which might stimulate unusual interest in
I· the concept of a non-radar reflective aircraft. ·
e. As soon as it is possible.to select the opti-.
I mum design approach for. a low reflectivity reconnaissance
aircraft and to evaluate with reasonable reliability both
its feasibility and its performance, ·a Governmental deci-.
I sion should be made as to the advisability of a crash
program to produce eight to twelve such vehicles.
5.
I If the above-outlined conclusions and course of
action are generally satisfactory, the joint report by
the Secretary oz Defense and the Director of Central In-
telligence, although it should avoid any description of
I the concept ·and study herein discussed, could respond to
this part of the Foreign Intelligence Board's recommenda-
tion with the ·statement (a) that one of the possible ad-
I vanced reconnaissance systems known to the Board is being
studied, {b) that for the present at least questions of
funding and management are in hand, (c) that the study is
I proceeding with the utmost sense of urgency, and (d) that
joint recommendations for action will· be submitted if and
when the feasibility of the system is established.

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I
. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
I Washington, D. C. ·

November ~6, 1957

I
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ALLEN DULLES
I
On November 19th, you and Mr. Bissell discussed with
General Twining, General LeMay. Admiral Burke and me the
subject matter of Tep SeeFet 164671, I wanted to let you know

I we are in agreement with the exploratory work that is now going

on in Cambridge and elsewhere. Noting that you expect this to
reach a definitive stage about three months hence,' we will be· glad

I to consider with you at that time the feasibility and desirabilitY

of proceeding with a definite design project. · · ·

I While the· Navy, as well as the Air Force, is very much

interested in this project, we are looking to the Air Force to·
carry the Defense responsibility for it and particularly· to be the

I agency to underta~e any follow-on project of the kind proposed in

· Paragrapq 4. e. of your ·Tep SeeFet 164671.
. . .
·

Wit~ reference to Paragraph 5 of Tefl SeeFet 164671, we

I concur in the proposed joint report in resp?nse to the FIB recom-
mendation.
I
I {Signed)

Donald A. Quarles
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I E 'I'

15 November 1958

I MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. James IL Killi.an

I An advisory group composed of tbe undersigned, together

with tlle Assistant Secretaries :for Research & Development o:f
the Air Force and the Navy, have considered over the past

I several months the technical fe·a:tures which must be achieved

in order to provide an adequate successor to the presently
operational special reconnaissance aircraft. These features
are:
I Substantial increase in operational ceiling and
probably also in speed to avoid interception;
·I Low susceptibility to detec.tion by radar and
other modes of observation; · ·

I No sacrifice .in operational range;

Minimum size and weight.
I The group has evaluated a number of proposed special
:reeonnaissance aircraft concepts. These various concepts
I h~Lve included the use of unique engines, special fuels,
launching by rocketry or mother aircraft, new structu:::-al ma-
terials and design methods, unusual design configurations and
other features. The advisory group has had access, it is
I understood, to all design proposals that have been made to
the Military Services that might be of inte.rest in the. recon-
naissance application and have considered the technical char-
I acteristics of certain aircraft now under military development.
It is our conch1sion that the most satisfactory design
I approach is one based upon a new, small and reasonably light-
weight aircraft carried aloft to supersonic speed by the B-58
as a mother aircraft. The special reconnaissance aircraft
would cruise by itself at substantially higher altitudes but
I over the same distances as now achieved·and would be powered
by dual ram-jet engines using conventional fuel. By reason of
its high supersonic speed, cruise altitude, and design fea-
I tures, this aircraft would be much less susceptible to radar
detection and tracking than current aircraft. There appear to
be no unusually difficult problems in terms of facilities or
I techniques in the development of this. a·ircraft and its engines
except perhaps those.of aerodynamic heating and of achieving
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I satisfactory ram recovery with a complex air inlet to

buried engines.

A second and technically somewhat less desirable

I choice is a similarly small .and reasonably lightweight
aircraft capable of unassisted take-off, flight at the
same high altitudes but at slightly less supersonic speed,
I and over about three-fourths the desired range when using
conventional fuels. This alternate ·design would be pow-
ered by twin ram-jets quite similar to the preceding case

I in1 addition to a pair of currently developmental small

xurbo-jets adapted to supersonic speed. This alternate
design could achieve full range by either refueling at
supersonic speed or by use of special fuels suspected of
I posing certain operational problems. This alternate de-
sign would be more suscep·tible to detection and tracking
by radar. The development of the alternate aircraft would
I pose somewhat less of a problem in aerodynamic heating but
.the flight performance is predicated on extremely close
control of all weights including somewhat reduced payload.

I While this alternate design may be available sooner than

the other, the ram-jet development could be a governing
factor in either case.

I We.recommend that the development of a new aircraft

be undertaken at once. on a highly expedited and sensitive
basis in order to ret~in our' abilj.ty to conduct special .
I reconnaissance. We. recommend further that the former pro-
posal utilizing the B-58 to launch a newly designed recon-
naissance vehicle be selected for this purpose.since this

I aircraft appears to best meet all of .the desired technical

features. Although a more detailed comparison may reveal
·that the latter proposal could be developed at somewhat
less cost, this unstaged system does not appear able to
I meet all of the desired technical features with the same
success. In case the system·we recommend is not acceptable,
we would wish to review other alternatives.before recom-
I mending f irml~ a second. choice..

/s/ Edwin H. Land ·'

I Chairman
/s/ Edward M. PlJ_rcell
/s/ IL Guyford Stever
/s/ Courtland D. Perkins
I /s/ Allen F. Donovan.

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· 16 December 1958-:.
.

·I l'llEMORl\NPJ.i'1.\1 OF UND.ERSTANDING
-~: ··: .
FliNPI:NG OF · PRO,JECT · GUSTO
1'"'ii '19 59 !\NTf]fY · 1960 .
I 1. For the pa"i:>t foµrteen months feasibility studies .have.
. b~(?n in progress looking toward the· de.velopment of a new in-
.I· telligence collection :system . . II). May 195& a panel of consul.-
. ~l?;nts \vas establishecl by the Scientific Advisor to. the Pr.esi-
.dent: Who acted .also on 'oehalf of th.e .Secretary of. Defense and
the Pirector of Central Intellig~nce.
I tn a report rendered in
late.;Noveinber, this panel indicated its choice between com-
peting; design_-:i:;1roposals and recommende~. that the development
· ·of the intellige1ice ·collection system be under.taken immediate"."'"
I ·1y on an expedited and highly secure basis. Althoug;h
cons4.dc;?rable further work will have to be done before t.he
·

optimum conf igura·tion. fOr the· proposed system can be deter-

I mined in detail, . there is agreed to be a strong presumption ..
tha:t ·substantially
.
the de$ired performance
. ·.·
can be
.
achieved.
.

2. ·With the: feasibility studies' completed the next. phas~ ... "
I . ot this project, .if. ·.it is to go forward, w-i11 involve. exteris_;
· ive "testE!·, de:velopnient of detaile_d design, final ·ae.te.rminatiori.
of Gonfigurat:i,.on, and (in order to achieve a.capability at the
· eariiest pos·s:f.ble .date) some ;fabrication or procuremen:t of
l;~ng· lead items-. This. phase of the project w:i,1_1 require···.four
·to six months :for its completion and will not involve a major
:financial commitment. .At the completion of ·this phase, a ·
much mo.re so.lid estimate of the pe1~f<frmance of the· system· · · ·
and O"f its total .. cost will be available. and·.a final de.·cisio.h
can: theri be. made to aq·aridon the undertaking or carry: it. thtqugh
to completion.. It is pl;anned in the near future to s.eek< .
app:roval. for this. next phase. · Presumably~ such. approval will
be, granted only if the development of the prqposed intelli..:. . ....
. ·• ·g~nce co:i1ec·tion: system ·ts. conside:t;ed worth while ·subject to·
.~:{,:m:or~ firm demonstrat.ion of its ·performance and ·a sa:.ti·.sf:ac;,., ·
tor.y .. h:ar.d... ~~t.im-3..t.e., of. ·it·s cos~. · ·

3. Partly because many. of· .the d:et~ils of the optimum .

. c9nf:igura·t-ion remain to .be determined and· partly .because .it .
.1 · is be·lieved that cost e::rtimates. submitted by the _coilt~~ctor.-s
un«ier consideration. will be
subject. to considerable' change in
the course. of negotiation,. firm and rel.iable est:j.mates ·of
to.tal. funding requi·red cannot be made at this t:i,me.. It seem$
I cUhir;-.howev:er~ th~t the. mirlimunt cost o:f the syst'em may be in

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the n~ighborhood of $100,000,000 and could well turn out
I to be higher. It has been firmly estimated. however, that
the next phase will cost between $4,000,000 and $5,000,000,
depending in considerab.le part on whether two competing de-

I signs are carried along through this phase or a final choice

of design approach and source is made at this time.

4. It is understood that if approval is obtained (on

1.·· the terms outlined in paragraph 2, above) to proceed with
the next phase of the project, this activity will be financed
by release of funds from the CIA Reserve in the amount of
I $4,000,000 to $5,000,000. This sum will be obligated almost
immediately and will be wholly expended during FY. 1959 .

.1 5. It is understood that if, after completion of the

next phase, approval is received to. proceed with the develop-
ment of the .proposed system, $75,000,000 of FY 1959 and/or
FY 1960 Department of Defense funds will be made available
I for this purpose but these funds are no.t a part of the FY 1960
CIA budget and will not in any way affect the Agency Reserve.

I 6. With respect to the management.of the $75,000,000 to

be made available to the Agency in the event of final project·
approval, it is understood: .
~

I a. That these .:funds wil:I. be available for no

purpose other than the project herein referred to, and

I
,.
b. That CIA will have the same degree of effective
control over their use that it would have if they were
obtained as a release from the CIA Reserve.

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

I CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(Signed)
L. K White
· (Signed)
Robert M Macy
Deputy Director .(Support) Chief, Internat 1 l Div.
I 16 Dec 1958 16 Dec 1958

(Signed)
I Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Special Asst to the Director .
for Planning and Development

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I OXC-0323-60

I 24 February 1960

I MEMORANDUM FOR:.

THROUGH:
Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director (Plans)

I .SUBJECT: Bureau of the Budget Request for DCI

Memorandum Concerning OXCART. Presidential
Approval
I ' "
1. This memorandum cor.ttains a recommendation for DCI
Said recommendation is con~ained in paragraph 3.
I approval.

2. At a 15 February meeting attended by Messrs. Saunders

and Mason df the Agencyrs Office of the Comptroller and the
I undersigned, Mr. Robert M. Macy of the Bureau of the Budget.
stated that it was his impression that further Presidential
approval was required beyond that given OXCART on 20 July 1959,
I prior to implementing the full scope of the program. Mr. Macy
was informed that it is the consensus of opinion of the DCI,
Deputy DCI and DeButy Director (Plans), who is the Project

I Director, that no further Presidential approval is required.

Further 1 he was advised that the technical radar objectives.
of the program remaining to be achieved, and discussed with
the President at the 20 July 1959 meeting, were reviewed on
I 20 January 1960 by the Project Director, certain Agency and
USAF personnel, contractor representatives and special consult-
ants, who determined that technical radar objectives were being
I achieved satisfactorily; the Agency then initiated appropriate
action to implement the full scope.of the Project. Mr. Macy
appeared to be sati~fied with this information but·requested
that a memorandum for the record to ~his effect be forwarded
to the Bureau of the Budget by the DCI. ·
3. In accordance with the foregoing request of Mr. Macy
I for a memorandum from the DCI to the Bure~u of the Budget, it
is recommended that the Director .approve and sign the attached
memorandum. The memorandum may then be returned to the under-·.
I signed for transmittal to the Bureau of the Budget.

I (Signed)
WILLIAM BURKE
Colonel, USAF
Acting Chief, D·PD-DD/P
I Attachment
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I 8 March 1960

·1 .MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of the Budget

I · · A'l"rENTION; Mr. Robert M. Macy

Chief, International Division
SUBJECT: Project VULGARIAN
I
When the Project known to the Bureau of the Budget as
I VULGARIAN was discussed with the President and approved by
him on 20 July 1959, the presentation included a statement
of technical objectives believed to be attainable. These

I expectations of accomplishment, including both technical

radar characteristics and vehicle performance, were based
on extensive feasibility studies undertaken prior ·to that
date, the results of which had been reviewed by a panel of
I· external consultants. The approval then granted obviously
presupposed that the anticipated results would be achieved,
so it was felt desirable six months after full-scale initia-
I tion of the Project to review the work so far accomplished
in order to determine whether, in the light of the addition-
al information acquired in extensive tests and measurements,
the original objectives still appeared to be valid. Such a
I review was undertaken in a series of meetings on 20 and .21
January 1960 by: the CIA Project Director, USAF technical
representatives, and Drs. Edwin H. Land, Edward Purcell and
I H. Guyford Steever acting as special consul tan ts. The re-..
sult was favorable in that the evidence presented, which was
far more definitive than that available at the time of the
I original decision, strongly supported the conclusion that
the objectives discm:1sed with the President could be sub-
stantially achieved. Accordingly, the Agency is proceeding
with the Project. ·
I
{Signed)
I ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

I /Initialed:·
- CPC .
<./Originator: .
- (Signed)
Deputy Director? · Richard M.. Bissell, Jr.
I . ·nD/PJ

I S B O.R B .T
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I OXC-0152
I 8 December 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy DirEt.ctor (:E~lans)

I THROUGH: Deputy Director (Support)

General Counsel

I SUBJECT: Competitive Bidding on Certain OXCART

Components

I 1. This paper contains a recommendation for the Deputy

Director (Plans). Such recommendation is contained in
paragraph 7. ·
I 2. PROBLEM:

I. A decision is required to permit or disallow competi-

tive bidding for certain OXCART components for which Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation is the immediate consumer.
I 3. ASSUMPTIONS:
a. In the CHALICE Program, which in many respects
I serves as a model for OXCART in the fields of administration,
contracting, security and finance, time deadlines, security
considerations, and the.relatively more simple equipments
I involved dictated that normal open competitive bidding for
prime and subsystems not be fol'lowed. Adequate justification
for sole source contracts was therefore available, and no
I major shortcomings in the sole source system occurred in
CHALICE, since no contractor defaulted in performance.
b. The OXCART Program> on the other hand, can be
I said to represent a more significant forward step in the state
of the art in many fields: aerodynamics, thermodynamics, pro-
pulsion, optics, etc. It is therefore, reasonable to assume
I that the element of risk is proportionately larger along with
an obviously greater dollar requirement for the equipments
needed. Thus a major failure, such as·the selection of a man-
I ufacturer whose product might not prove adequate to the diffi-
cult task, would be not·only more costly but more difficult to
explain. Were it possible to connect such a failure with the
sole source mechanism, in whi.ch competition had been ruled out,
I th·e error would becom~ even more conspicuous in :the light of

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. hindsigl1t . . Consequently~ it appears that any recourse to

I sole source bidding, undertalten either by ourselves as the
prime customer or by our pri1ne contractor in the form of
subcontracts,- should be amply justified before such a de-
cision is made. '· ·
I 4. FACTS BEARING ON TI-IE PROBLEM;

I a. One area in OXCART serves as an illustration

of the problem, and that is in the procurement by Lockheed
as the prime of three major integral components: (1) air
I conditioning equipment, (2) inertial guidance gear, and
(3) automatic pilot equipment.
b. An as yet undesignated number of dollars, esti-
I mated as running into the million~ for each of the three
· equipmertts, is involved. It is not ·.possible to estimate the
probable dollar differences between bids of the competitors
I in each field, since they are being asked for state of the
art equipments in each instance, though all competitors have
had experience at the a.dvanced and sophisticated level in
I their special areas. The principal subsystems and major com-
petitors are as follows:
Air conditioning ins·tallation: Hamil ton Standard
I ·Mfg. Co.
Airesearch

I Iner:tial guidance gear: ·· Minneapol·is-Honeywell

Manufacturing Co.
North American Aviation
1· Corporation
Nortronics (Div. of
Nortnrop Aircraft Corp.)

I Automatic pilot: Sperry~Rand Corporation

Bendix Aviation Corporation

·I c. In the view of Mr. C. L. Johnson, Engineering

·and Research Vice-President of Lockneed, each of the above
concerns stands as a recognized leader in the special fields
I enumerated. were OXCART not ringed with the highest security
considerations~ and were the same system of principal prime
contractor subbing out aircraft components employed, Lockheed
would invite design competition between these competitors
I followed by competitive bidding. This would add a minimum of

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thirty days to the procurement process (and to eventual
I delivery date), when contras~ed with the sole source mech-
anism.

·1 5. DISCUSSION:

a. Open competitive bidding has the undeniable

advantage of creating a permanent record to show that the
I Government's interests were "adequately protected" and that
all possible savings consistent with the nature of the re-
quirement were made. · ·
I b. The greatest potential problem encountered in
employing competitive design and bidding on OXCART stems from
1· the truism that only one competitor can finally get the order.
Since the orders cited as examples above will be for dollar
amounts running into the millions, the acq~isition of the fi-
nal order can and would become a matter of considerable con-
I. cern to all bidders. The loss of the final order might well
occasion active disappointment on the part of the lose~,
leading either to an overt inquiry of the military regarding
I the program for which the components were sought, or possibly
to a request for interested Congressmen or legislative com-
mittees to investigate the validity of the final decision.
Either of these actions could b.e poten't'.ially destructive of
I the security we are attempting to ensure for OXCART.

c. Another area of potential damage would arise

I from surf acing these exotic and sophisticated requirements
among more than the required minimum of industrial concerns,
simply because definitizing the specifications would in effect
I give away much .of the performance of the basic vehicle. This
can be justified within a single company, but it becomes
questionable when it is known in advance that the information
will go to more people than.will eventually have.to use it.
I Even though substantive briefings could be given to top offi-
cials in each bidding concern, with a view to holding them
responsible for containment of information, the working 1evel
I engineering force in each company would come into possession
of enough information to permit· at least speculation on air-· ·
craft performance characteristics. In addition, competitive

I bidding would surface nwnbers of components required, which

would tip off production objectives.

1. d. The basic fact is that we are attempting clandes-

tinely to construct a manned, high-performance aircraft

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costing huge sums of money in a domestic political climate

I unfriendly if not hostile to such programs. The magnitude

. of the costs of inajor i terns under OXCART precludes relianc.e
upon the protective coloration of "proprietary in-house
research and development. 11 There are today, in contrast to
I CHALICE in 1955, no other USAF or U.S. military airframe pro-
curement programs in existence to which we could attribute
activity on the part of a supplier of major components were
I questions to be raised at any level outside the witting circle.
The cancellation of the F-108 p~ogram and the recent reduction
of the B-70 effort to prototype status are _but two examples.

I e. While it is true that there has been limited com-

petition in the basic airframe design phase, it would have
been possible if challenged, to attribute this activity to
I advanced feasibility studies since no actual production was
·involved, and the dollar amounts were modest in comparison to
actual production costs once design is fixed.
I f. We have been assured by the airframe manufacturer
that in the event sole source procurement on subsystem compon-
.1 ents needed by him is authorized, he will exercise the greatest
care possible in picking competent concerns and obtaining from
them all available evidence to substantiat€ their design deci-
sions. It is, of course, in his interests to-ensure this sort
I of compliance as· much as in our own.

g. The conduct of a program of the scope and charac-

I. ter of OXCART requires a delicate balance between many forces
to achieve success. Too much conservatism, either in planning
or execution, may be as damaging as an overdose of liberalism
in these same fields. What must be demonstrated is that all
I. aspects of major decisions have received thorough and prudent
consideration, and that all reasonable precautions consistent
with the priority of the mission have been taken to ensure
I. .proper performance with maximum technical gain for the funds
committed to our trust.

I 6. CONCLUSIONS:
a. The adoption of a system of competitive bidding

1. for major OXCART components, either wholly open or carefully

controlled and limited to not more than say two participants
at most, contains the ingredients of possible unexpected
surfacing of the OXCART program-as a major aircraft procure~
I ment effort under United States Government, if not CIA-USAF
auspices at a time when such programs have been largely

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elimi1iated. Tile risk of such exposure must be ass:µmed to

I be a calculated one.
b. Dollar savings ppssibie through limited competi-
I tive bidding cannot accurately be estimated, since few knowns
. are available where new and advanced components are required.
That such savings coulq occur, as between bids of competitors

I in a specific field, cannot be ruled out.

c. Because of the magnitude of the dollars involved

· in even such component procurements as were outlined under
.I paragraph 4 of this paper, the device of nproprietary develop-
. ment at company expense 0 is not available for concealment
J?Urposes·.
I d. Competitive bidding for component or subsystem
procurement of necessity will reveal by extrapolation much of

I true aircraXt performance and scope of program to companies

who will have no requirement to possess such information if
they are not successful bidders. ·

I e. Even limited competitive bidding will add an

increment of time, estimated at a minimum of thirty days, to
first flight of prototype date. Slippage of this date cannot
I but lead to a like delay in operational readiness date, and
delay in bringing the OXCART capability into being cannot be
cons:ider.ed as in th.e national interest.

I f. Lastly 1 additional Security manpower would be

required to clear, record, and maintain concern over princi-
. pals and employees in concerns ultimately eliminated from
I competition as unsuccessful bidders; This concern would have
to be maintained throughout.the life of the project with at
best no positive result.

I 7. ACTION RECOMMENDED:

a • . In the light of the considerations discussed and

I weighed above, and for the reasons set forth herein, it is
.recommended that you approve the adoption of sole source pro- .
curement for those components, systems, or subsystems whose
I performance, con;figuration, c_haracteristics 1 materials, ·major
expense, or specifications could be assumed to be indicative
of the existence of a major effort in the field of manned

I propelled supersonic flight, provided that reasonable and

prudent. care be exercised by ·all concerned, not only in the

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initial selection of a source but in all manageri~l and

I substantive areas possible.
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b. That wherevei~ l;l.ndted competitive bidding is
I possible without interference with the execution of the basic
mission, each case of this sort will be considered individual-
ly upon recommendation of the prime contractor. Approval to
conduct limited compet.itive bidding· will in each instance come
I froin the Deputy Director (Plans) .

.I (Signed)
WILLIAM BURKE
Colonel, USAF
1. CONCURRENCE:
. · Acting Chief, DPD

I (Signed)
Lawrence K. White
Deputy Director (Support)
I (Signed)
Lawrence R. Houston
I General Counsel

Recommendation in paragraph ·7 APPROVED;

I (Signed)
Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
I Deputy Director (Plans)

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I BYE 2608-66

I OXC-0321

14 October 1960

I ORGANIZATION AND DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES

.PROJECT OXCART
I
1. General direction and control of the Project shall
I be exercised jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Chief of Staff, USAF, subject to guidance from higher
authority and coordination with other departments of the
Government as appropriate. They shall furnish.policy guidance
I to lower echelons, ensure the conformity of operations under
the Project with national policy, and make recommendations to
higher authority ·an matters transcending their own authority.
I Further, it shall be their. joint responsibility to resolve
dif'ferences that may arise at lower s:taf'f and· opera ting levels.
.
.
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I 2. The following are the organ:iizational elements which

shall be responsible for the conduct :of the Project: ·

a. CIA
I (1) 'fhere is in existence a Project Headquarters
headed by a CIA Project Director. An Air Force off'icer is
I assigned as Deputy Project Director. · Project Headquarters
·will establish an operational unit presently planned to be
stationed in the Zone of Interior. This unit will be manned·

I by USAF and CIA personnel in numbers, proportions, and skills

as agreed betwe.en the Project Di,;rector and the Air Force Pro-
ject Officer. ·

I (2) All military personnel assigned to Central

Intelligence for full-time duty on this Project will be carried
on CIA rolls, chargeable to CIA for a projected minimum of
I three years~

b . . Headquarters USAF
·1 (1) . Chief of' .Staf'f, USAF, has assigned supervisory
responsibility to t~e Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations.

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(2) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations has
I designated an Air Force Project Officer who, under the guidance
and direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, will
be the action officer and point of contact for all functions
related to USAF interests in the project.

(3) In addition to the DCS/O Project Officer

I there has been established a Project Staff. This Staff in-
cludes selected officers designated by other interested Air
Force staff agencies who will act as points of contact for
the Project Officer within their several offices.
I 3. The functions ahd responsibilities of t~ese elements
will be as· follows:

a. The CIA Project Director and the Air Force Pro-

ject Officer shall have primary responsibility for the devel-

I opment and execution of ·all activities concerning the Project

within their own org~nizations; the resolution of differences
that may arise at lower echelons; and the reporting of pro-
gress and the making of recommendations to their respective
I chiefs. ·
,
b. The Project Headquarters will be responsible for
·1 any continued research and development, operational planning,
and the direction and control of aGtivities in the final op-
erational phase of the Project when overf.lights are being
launched.
I c. The Air Force Project Staff shall be responsib.le
for implementing plans approved by the CIA Project Director
I and the Air Force Project Officer, and arranging for Air Force
support of Project activities which can appropriately be fur-
nished through staff channels or by other Air Force commands.
I d. Security of this project within the DOD.will be
the responsibility of the Air Force Project Officer. All
clearances for personnel within the DOD will be approved in
I advance and monitored by the Air Force Project Officer.

4~ Activities under t~is Proj~ct fall into thr~e phases.

I These overlap.one another in time but may be distinguished ori
the basis of the kinds of activities involved in each. The .
following are the specific authorities and.responsibilities of·.
I the several organizational elements in the successive phases
of the Project: · ·
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a. The first phase is that in which the major

I activities are: research and development, procurement, the
construc~ion and activation of a test and training base, the
testing. of equipment, and operational planning. The Project
Director shall have control of these activities. The Air
I Force Project Officer will pJ.~o.vide and coordinate necessary
·Air Force support. This will be a matter for informal agree-
ment between the CIA Project Director and the Air Force Pro-
I· ject Officer. Full and complete coordination of all Air Force
elements during this phase is _esse.ntial.
. . . .

I b. The second phase will be. devoted to flight test

and training. Th.ese activities will be conducted at the test
and training base. The operational flight trainin~ will be
conducted in accordance with syllabi and standards as mutually
I agreed between the CIA and the. Air Force. Phase II terminates
with the decision that crews and.equipment are operationally
ready.
I c. The third phase will be that of active operations.
This phase follows the decision as to operational readiriess.

I The final decision as to execution and timing of actual over-

flight missions shall rest.jointly with the CIA and the USAF,
subject to such. guidance as may be received ·from higher au-
·1 thority, and in accordance with notification, coordination,
and support procedures currently employed in Project OILSTONE.
The line of command _shall be direct between operational units
and the CIA.
I 5. Responsibility for the overall security of the progr~m
shall rest with CIA.· In view of the security aspects of this
1· project, it is important that maximum practicable compartmen-
tation be maintained in both CIA and Air Force Headquarters.
Compartmenta tion should . include provision for logical, inno- .

,.
cent explanation of the activities involved•
I
APPROVED FOR USAF: ·APPROVED FOR CIA:

Isl Thomas D. White ·Isl A. W. Dulles

Date 15 February 1961 Date 18 February 1961
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s E. CR E '.F. OXC-2401.
I 17. Oct~ber 1961.

. MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director· (Plans)

11 · ~ri'ce Overrun on Pratt & Whitney.Engines;

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Contract No. TT-1002 ·

· l. Th.is memora.nd'W.n constitutes ~ status report on negotiatio~s

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to· date relative·: to subject price overrun on.the first 30 engines. It
. ·also .contains a. recommendation in Paragraph 10 for requested 'concur•

II .. rence of the DD/P · ·

1, .
! i. Background facts:. · ·

a. September 1960, EsUmated Cost to Co~pi.ete

i September 1960, Contract Ceiling Price
:I Established . · . . ·
September 1960, Potential Cost Overrun
'. 29. 7

~greed to be absorbed by l:-1ratt &: "Whitney $ 1.8 M.

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' b •. June 1961. Estimated C.Qs.t to C~mplete. ' $46. 065. 000
· Contract Ceiling Price · 29, 700, oo.o '·
'$16,365,0.00
I Cont:raeto:r's Claimed Ove1"run (June 1961)

September 1961. Pratt &t Whitney Estimate ·

"c •.

I to. Complete
Contract Ceiling .Price .
·· '

Pratt $t Whitney Projeeted Overrun

· · ·.$'49, 768, 515·
. Z.9. 70C). QOO

1· (September 196i). · . .
Harniltt::»i .. Standa rd {subcontractor)
· $ZO, 068, 515
. LSOO. OQO
P,rojected ·ove,,-ru1{ .

I Contractor's.CJ.aimed.Ov~rrun·(Sept·1961) ·. $2.1, 568, 515

d. CQntrac:tot now·proposes a contract amend-

I ment addil1.g 10 addtl ~F .. 12 ¢ngin:es and .

~epi-icing 40 engines at $64, 768, 51~.'

I * Broken down as follows:

Contract Ceiling Price for 3~ engines $Z9,700,QOO
Cost Overrun on 30 engines ai. 568, s1s
I 10 additional (.AF-12) engines l:?,500,000
·. $64,'76~. 51'5

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3. Exploratory negotiations were held with Pratt &: Whitney on
29 September to· determine what percentage of this claimed civerrun
should le'gally and equitably b~ borne by the Governm.\int at this time

,,
11 (that is, concurrent with' the procurement of 10 additioIµl.l engi~es).

t
I 4 .. Pratt & Whitn~y*s first, and.final. position was that they
. should ~ hq.ve 100% coverage o:t' ~ssµra.nce of future_ complete
coverage of this overrun. Further, they argued that if legal consid-.
e;ration exists foi- 50% relief; it.must ~lso· ex.ist for 190% relief.

I amount
·s. The Contracting 0£ficer;s positfon was as follows.· The .
of projected overrun was not seriously questiq"ned (there being
no profit componetit" hicluded. and the contr~e.t being redeterminabie.
I downward to.actual -costs). It was. rather,· as~mn_ed.that the pro.i.
jected .overrun and perhaps even additional costs would materi.ali.ze ..
It was further recogiliZ"ttd ~t P;ratt .& Whitney should be 'able within
I a ''reasonable time 11 .to recover JOO% Qf this ove::rrlin...;... spread over
this 40 .. engin& procttrelll.ent and . subsequent engin~ procurement. The
practical question, the:ref~r;:-wa.e as to Wh$the;l" it was reasonable,
I equitable. and legal. for P~tt &: Whitney to :recover 100% of overl"un ·
in. consideration of its assuming an obligation to furni~h 10 additional

I engines. With considerable cogency. Pr~tt & Whitney pointed out

that it could not be &$Sured Of future .engine procurement,

I 6, Culminating several suggested compromise formulae, the

Contracting Officer proposed tentatively. and foX" dbcussion purposes
only, that the Gover~ent at thi.s time pick up $12. 8 M of thh $21. 5 .M

I overrun as. a.?l increase in ceiling pi-ice. the bi:ilanee ($8. 6M) thereof
to be ldt open for final-uegotia.tions. aitel,"- delivery of the 30th engine
·(April 1963), with the understanding tha.t i.£ Pratt &:_Whitney had not

I b.y that ti.me been able to make prora.ta recovery on additional engine.
procu:rement that _the present col).tract wou.ld then pick up the unr~eov•
ered balance. Even this prop9sal did ·not at first ·appea,l to Pratt &:

I Whitney. Moweyer, by subsequent telephone cQnversations. they have

indicated gene:ral acceptance o£ this formula.. The $12.. 8 M inc:reaae
in price was a.rrtved a.t as fe>llcws:
I Projected over-run ·
Less 1. 8 M previously agreed as being
. $21 t 568~. 515

**
I absorbable by Contractor l_, 800. 000
"$19. 768~ 515

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,. Bal. Fwd. $19. 768, 515
Less 6. d M bona£ide changes 6, 000. 000*
!II Materials increase
50% Mate.rials increase .
$13.768,515
. 6. 884, 251*
$. 6, 8S4, 258 *
!I
j * To be accept~d by Govt ~.s ~eiling .incl"eaee:

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Scope changes
1/2. Mate~ial Coat Increase
$ 6,000,000
6, 8'8:ii, 2.5 7
1·,.
I . ** .Final negotiations to be postponed_
$1Z., 884. 25 7

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until delive:i-y of 30th engine:

Initial p:i:ojected overrun

1/2 Materi!U Cost Increase
$ 1. 800, 090
6,884.Z58
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$ 8,684,ZSS

· 7. The ~bove forrp.ula actUally would guarantee ultimate

I recovery of the entire overrun. Its on1y virtue from the Govern-
mentt s standpoint is that it~ defer$ final aceepta.nce 'of this overi'Un.
ha.lance until approxbnately April 1963, i:n the hope that such ba.l ..
I ·.a.nee can in the meantime be absorbed on aqdit~onal engine
procurements. ·
·

I 8. Essentially, this same result couJ,d be achieved by the

following contract aetlon. Within the framework of the present
contract the present target and ceU.ing prices {Z7. OM and 29. 7 M,
I respe~tively) could by amendment be increased (to include 10 addi•
· tlonal engines) and the 40 ... engines Ji'epriced at a new target. priee
of 56. O M a.nd a new .:e~llng price of 64. 7.i.M, ·with: a provh10
I clause to the effect that Pratt .& Whitn~y will use eve:ry effort to
· price eaeh_ future production engine to include l/ 40th of .the 8. 7. M .
overrun- such revised target and ceiling prlcee a.r:rived at as
I .follows: · · · ' ·

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Present Contract Ceiling $2.9,700;000

··I Additional lO•engine. Coat,
Bonafide Changes to Date
13,500;000
6. 000 •.000
50% of Materials .In~rease 6.884,257
I R.eVised·'l'arget Pd.Ce . . $s6.os4,2si

-, Balance of prese~tly pl'ojected Overrcin:.

Initially projected Ove;rrun lt 800, ooo.
SOo/o of :Matei-~als Increa.'Se 6. 884, 258 .
' 8, 684, 258
Revised Ceiling Pi.ice. $t)4, 168, 515 '
I '9! F'rom a p:rog.ram management standpoint, there, l.a the
~, n~cessity to consider· that:there eoUld be additlO:nal overruns before
delivery of tb:ette 40 engines. Sub&equent relief, ~lmilar to that :now
being grant~d by repricing, wou:ld be extremely difficult to Ju.stify

I. under the present forrn of cont re.ct.

10. On the ha.sis of the above tacts arid, alternate solutionsa the

I Contracting Officer recommends ~t the cont.rac:t be a.mended to

( l) procure an additional 10 enginee, ca.nd (2} to esta.blish (reprice) '
40 engines at a new target price o.1$S6,084, Z$1 and a new ceiling .
price of $6Z. 968, 515t with a pr~lv\so .cla:u1'e requiring the Contn.cto:t'
to use its best efforts to pdce each. of the ne~t 40 future engines
inclusive o! 1/40th of the $6, 884, 258 .portion of the present overl'un

I not now inQluded in the n~w target price of $56. 084• 257- it being ·
u11deretood that upon determination of final price under this contra.ct.
the Government will reimburse such portion of. ~e $6,.884, ZSS aa
I has not been recovered op. fub.lre (interim) engine sales. Thi& would
guarantee ultimate r~cove:ry to Pl"att & Whitl:ley of all presently ·
projected overrun ·exeept th~ $1, 800, 000 which the Company ol'lgl•
I nally agreed to e.bsorb. P:ratt .& Whl.tney has n9t yet agreed to
· reiinqttis}l. its claim to thia $1, 800, 000, but it 1& believed that throug~
further negotiati,on,s they will do so. ' '
I. {Signed)
·STANLEY W. BE~RLI
I. Paragraph .10 recoxnrnendatiori
Colonel, 'USAF
·Acting Chief, DP:P-DD/P ·
APPROVED, subject to
I availability of funds !or the purpose:

\~\f!l\~«i\ · . ,. , · 31 Oct 1961

I RlCH:AR.P M. BISSELL1 JR. DD7P
4
Hamlto vhi ~WEM~~i
ttmtrni iy·:;tem
I BEC!tE"f'
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OXC·2.661

29 November 1961 .
i .

11i MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. L.. G. Mallet·

General Manager
Pratt & Whitney Ai1'<:rait Division

[I United Aircraft Corpq:ration

Hartford. Connecticut

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SUBJECT: Relocation ..... JTllD-2.0 Engine Development
·.Program ·

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With the advent of the first J56 engine :run in December 1957,
impressive development progress was made during the subsequent
two year period. !t iei. our understanding ·that:. ·

11 The first 50 hour endurance teat ·was c·ompleted in 1958.

11I The fir$t Ma.ch 3 sea level demonstration run was made
in July 1958.

!I
I The first Mach ·3 sea level afterburner run was ma.de in
October 1958.

The fil"~t p ... z engine rati;ng sea level 150 hour endurance
I test was made in November 1958.

1. The first heated inlet test stand

December 1958.
:run was ·made in

I The second P-Z engine rating eea level 150 hour endurance·
test.was mad-e iti January 195.9. · ·

As of December .19S9 over 1750 hours of £1lll ... scale running

I time had been accumulated, ~stablishing a.ri average of 73 hours
per month. .

I Sl.nce February 1961. it has been apparent tha.t .the JTllD-20 en•
gine development p:i-ogram has. and.continues to suffer from the
I inability to accumulate sufficient meaningful engine test time. Time
a.ccumulation for the 10·1/Z month.period from. Decernber 1960 to
15 November 1961 is as follows:
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11 · Total ~:mgine timEi: .7Z7 hpurs at 70 hoil;ra per month .

(55 hours from 16 October to
. 15 Novembe;r)
·

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Afterbu:t'.'ner time: 230 hours .at zz hQurs per month.
at 6. 6 hours J>er month
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Hot inlet ·time: . 69 hours

Hot turbine time: 2.5 hours at ·Z~ 4 hours per. rri.onth

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Time at Mach 3 lnlet conditions: o hoµ.l"s·

While it is acknowledged'~ha:t engine controls problems have.·

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eont:ributed to this inability and notwitbstand.ing the. recognized ·. ··
magnitude of.the effortt the customer ha~ conclu4ed that this situation
I,I . is due i!n:· pa.rt at least to certain inherent shortcomings attribu.te4 to
the remoteness of the Florida Research and Development Center. ·it
iS felt that these shortcom:lngs by. their inherent and chronic nature
I have and wili C:ontihue to cop.tribute to this d.eficiency and have: a:1,1d
l I· wiU corit~lbute to incr~as•d deveiopme~t;and prototype coats.• ;Since
. the contractor's orlgina.festl:mate of.September 1959. reque~ts tor·

I•11 .. substantiil,l amounts of additiOnal funding were 1nade in .Atigust'.1960 .

. and ag~in in May 1961. lnltial. engine 4eliveioies ~ecetttly·were \delayed .
several months because of fos.u!ficient;_ development progr~ss .• i ~n
addition, .the« recent r~organization of the E'.'lotlda Research 1'j.nd;
De:Veloprnent Cente:t undertaken l>y the contractor.· attests to th~ ~xi$t ...
•

ence of these· and cit:her shol:'tcOmings. It i~ the ~ustomer's i?;tip~e ..

sion, stemrriing from the ..appa~e:q.t inability to aceum,ulate inean'.in.fui
I
,. engine test time. that these ·"shortcomings are:

a.l.*ea. of ei.pedmental engine assembiy.. . . . . ..

. '· \

Factory perso~et ~ne~perienc~ particularly in the: ~· ..

·. ~:
·., .

t,\,,, \
\

Questionable quality and/or ·qu~n~ty}>f ·ftrst lin~.i;; :.:':!.· ·~ \ ·

:I assembly supervision. .· ,i' ,'; ~ :0~S
. . .: .
;
,·
. ·{•.,

Deficiency in !lumbers parttcularly of ~,cperim~n~l ·-,

I engine asa&mb.ly.per.sonnet·for ·handling periodi!J.. ()f uiiantfc;.i""
pated peak load. Manpower. flexibil,lty for rui.ndling ;the~e '~
I ... . , !

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Contrnl; Sysiein\.
I "!.:_.

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I pea,k loads is apparently l~cki~g .·due, to the siie and geography ..
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of the Florida facility. · < . . . .·· · . .• · ·

1·1· Difficulty experienced in

moving appropriate factory
i personnel to Florida from Hartford because of per.sonal incon ...
i venience. incentive, and unfon. restrictions.
!
1:1
!
Ge~graphical :rernoten:esa of the .effort relativ~ to monitoring
and control of vendor technical problems. ·

11
!
Geographic r.em,.oteness· frQm much f1rnaU shop vendor
capacity centered in New England useful in affo,..d.ing·flexibility
!I in
.
manufacturing operations.
.
· · ·

I Geographical decentralization of procurement :relative

1·1: to vendor cost~ and incentive for cost reduction.

G.eographi~al remoteness 0£ the e.ffort relative to top

11
1.
management· coril.munication
.
. . ..
and control.
;
.

During early discussions in 1959 concerning implementation. of··.

.

the JTliD-20 engine developr,nent- e~ort. this custorile).'. was advised by

11.· th~ contractor Of the desirability Ol utilizfog_the FloriG:a .R.es.earc}i and
Df;)lvelopm.ent Center for development and· manufa.ctdre of prototype

11I · ·engines. During 1960. however, it became apparent to the contractor.

that the un,dertaking of both development and production ~fforts under ·
the same basically experimental organh,;ation and at the Florida loca-.

11 .tion was not feasible. A decisl()n, therefo.re, was made.and imple ...
mented by the contractor that. the .production ef£prt b·e returned to
Hartford in order to eliminate some or all.of the shortc.omi~g·s cited
'
·1 above.

In order that the present engine developm·ent situation be improved,

11 it is felt ln keepin.g with the best interest of the United States Govern ..
m~nt. that aeful con.sid~ration by·the •contractor i:ri.ust be given to the
·teasibllity of :moving the prima.:ry development effort in addition to the
prototype program to Hartford at .$ome optimum da.te in the ·not far
1.I· distant future. It is the custo:rner's fe.eling that· Hartford is the cen ....
. tx:alized local point of Pratt &: Whitney's and the United Aircl'aft's
activity in terms of engineering. and. ·produCtici.n .experience, facilitieli,
I 3

I SECRET

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 C05492929
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!1 S E C R E 'i'

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I
experienced manpower, and manpower flexibility and therefore is
in position· to overcome the exi.sting deficiencies of 1;he rernote
Florida development effort~ Further, since the overhaul o! proto;.:
tYPe engine$ will be concentrated in the Hart-f9rd area. lt Wou!d
appear desirable ~n terms of communication to have the developn:,.ent
effort nearby. Concerning ·the. contingency of existing Florida te$t
(I facility capacity, consideration might be glvei+ to the retention of
this capacity utilizi11g engine airlift commutation be.tw.een ~artford

I•
and Florida. The fa.ct that the JTllD .. 20 engi~e development is·.
believed to reflect a continuing. effort points up the advisability of
a timely decision to relocate in order to utilize nio111t efficiently
the contractor's capability at Rartfor'd, which it .is believed will
~·· become more available as etxist.ing programs a.re c;:ompleted or
reduced in scope. As an interim measui-e, it is expected that every·
effort is being and wilJ be ma.de to correct the current assembly
I
l
Ir floor situation in Flo::rlda. ·

The COl'ltractor's timely. comments concerning the feasibility

! ,. of relocating the primary D-20 development effort t<> Hartford in
Ii .. view of the foregoing are sp~ci£ically requested~ · ·

l In view of increasing national and international emphasis on

1'.igh Mach num9er manned flight, it must be clea.~ly understood that
thls customer ·as part of the defense community· is obligated to exam•
ine and re-examine all ave;nues leading toward the expeditious and
economic realization of this goat In this regard. the contractor's
progress and perfor~ance must be and.is ·reappraised ·continuously
in relation to the progress achieved "by· competitive programs.

t.•~· .
(Signed}
RICHARD M. BISSELL", JR. ·

I~ cc: W. L. Gorton

I.~
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I 25 November 1961

I MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Robert J. Holbury

SUBJECT Instructions
I
l. Assumption of Duties
I You will proceed on/about 15 November 1961 to assume

I your duties a·s Chief of Base, representing the Central

Intelligence Agency ~t Watertown, Nevada," referred to
I hereinafter as your area.

·1 2. Status
a. Your status is that of Commanding Officer, Detach- ·

I ment 1, 1129th (USAF) Special Activities Squadron.

b. Your status ·as Chief of Base will·be made known to
I those U.S. officials and industry personnel whose cooperation
in furtherance of your. mission will be solicited.
I 3. Mission

·I . You will develop, ·as soon as possible, . and tn.aintain an

operationally ready unit capable of executing missions as
I· directed by Proje.ct Headqtiarters~ .

. 4. Operational Duties and Responsibilities

I a. Within ~our area.", your assignment is that of Chief

I of all.CIA operations with authority·over all CIA staff

.I Randle via BYEMAN

Control System
I
 C05492929 SECRE'.i...
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and detailed personnel and respo11sibilfty for the
supervision of any CIA~directed ac~ivities phased through
I · or at your area. 1
!
;

.·1 b. Within the framework of the prog;ram for your area,

and under the directives you will receive from Headquarters,

I you will utilize personnel, materiel, facilities, and

funds so as to ensure the most effective use of these assets
I toward the accomplishment of the over-all mission.

I c. You will maintain compartmentation of activities

and personnel to the extent required by security and as

I necessary to preserve ·the l.ong-term effectiveness of the .

program .
.I d. You will consolidate administrative and support
facilities to the extent and in the manner you deem best
I to carry out your mission.

:I e. You will develop and· maintain up-to-date emergency

plans for your installation and will be :familiar with
I applicable war plans as developed by Headquarters.
5. Line of Command
I As Chief o:f Base in your area, you will be responsible .

I to the Chief, Development Projects.Division, the Deputy

Director (Plans) and the Director of Central Intelligence.
I 6. Finance
You will.review, supervise and approve all financial
I
I
., SECJtE'f
Handle via BYEMAN .
Control System
 C05492929
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SECftE'f .

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and budget~ry ruatters, plans, estimates and expenditures

I . relating to your operation. Current authorizations to

expend funds will be made known to you; it will be your
I

I responsibility to ensure that these authorizations are

not exceeded, and that policies and procedures in
I appropriate CIA regulat:ory . issuances are observed.

I 7. Comm.uni cations.
You will utilize the established communications system

I and procedures between your base and Headquarters.

·communications, both cable and dispatch, to and from your
All

I base, will be accessible to you to the extent and in the

manner you desire. You will refer any matter of particularly
I sensitive nature to the Chief, DPD, on an Eyes Only basis,

I· or to the Deputy Director (Plans).

8. Security
I You are specifically charged with the maintenance of
physical and operational security in accordance with CIA
I security directives as applied to your area. You will

I report any unusual ·problems to Headquarters.

9. Records
I You will maintain, as.prescribed in reports directives,
records of activity currently in progress, status to date
·I '!

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Control System
~
 C05492929.
I
I and projected adherence to programmed completion dates.
Delays and a111endments to programmed activities will be
I reported to Project Headquarters as discrepancies are
'·
I ascertained.

1· Isl
RICHARD M. BISSELL,JR •
.1.··. CON<.';UR:

/s/
·1 Stanley W•. Beer li, AC/DPD ·· .

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I Handle via· BYEMAN
Control System
SECRE'i'
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I
I · TAKEN· FIDM

SA'.f..T LAKE TRIBUNE ·

I SAL'f LAID!; CITY,' UTAH
25 May 63.
I SA'l'URDAY

ASSOCIATED PRESS RELEASE

I PAGE 19

I.

I
R;v Associated Pi·ess h

·1 LAS VEGAS, NEV.; .May 24. f

· -A jet trainer oi1 a · flight t
· Olit of Nellis A.ir J;>cwcc Base ~
. ~
crashed F1·iday l4 i11ilcs south ~
. t)f Wendov~r, Utah, ·the Air i
. I<'orce annolm<!ccl. The pilot !
ejected :from his plane ·safely. •
i•:f1E CR·ASir ;,.,;is i1ear the· !
; Nevada-Utah line. . · ~.
:. · Nellis officwls said the plane ·
; is nor.mal!y ba~ed at Wright· <
· Patterson Air · l<"'orc:e Base, t
·I ..
,.,,,.,-., ... '
·
· Qhio, . . . . . . . . . . _ . . . . . .
The pilot's name was not iin·
. m~diafoiy released. ..
l.
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 C05492929
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•.' .. .:.

t1'. . ·· -·
<. .
,.~
!,,.,,. ·-"·' f ....>J Jt.,,,..Jj;. ..__ ,.,_.... ;f, ~ ......,; ": ...

NEVADA'S LARGEST -i-No. '""''MOST COMPLETE NEWSPJIPE&

~.. \Xl ,l . ~.:. ,. . . ""·,,_;,../....,,,,"• /:, .., .•
~lt:
. ,/;.,~ ~-"· L J.; .......: /...... ;•.,J
•',;

I
: ....,..:.:L.. : LAS.VEGAS, NEVADA, SA1:U,~£?.A.-Y, MA'(25, ·l;96~:.:-. .:-~. ,.,.c ........ PH01'11.

I. . I
r
I
;-~:"'·• ,;."·'• •r.u•,,-~---·-· ··--.~1"f;'t'"',:'"'•", ,.. .. ~~;•r,1

~T ·~.:1- 1
..Vii C1V . .,Jl 0t!.,.. . .. .:. -·
Crasl1. Forces•
I :Pilo·~ Bailout .
. An JN05 'l'hunderchief, ··appar-:1
~lll.ly on a olassifi'ed missroii", '
.era·sd'led and burned :nem:- :t\e Ne-.·
Vfl:fo-Ut.nC1 slate Jine Friday, or-:
liciails -at Neliis Afr Force base:
I announced.
." The pilot, who \~s u'.1identified,:
·had taken oH .eai11cr in the d-a;r
· ;
·. ·,

at Nellis, mid· pm'achukd 1b IS-afe<:'

I ·ty fr()m ~1~s disabled c1·aft 14,

miles southeast ,of Wendover:,
·Utah. . .. · . ·
: Nclli-s officials said· tl1c super-;

I ;so1iic plane wa-s allrad1ed {o U1a:

;Air Resea1·C:1 aml .Develop1i1cnt
. . at·Wriaht
:f:center c • Patt.9rson AFB.!.
~Ohio. . 1

i ·Apparently 1be br.ief arm~m1:e·f

.mcn.t wa'S :rM !:hart was aul~r1~,;
l ed hy: high Air. F<Jrce 0(1[1c~als. ~
· . It was Mic second fo1id out for;

I ait AF pLlot fo t:ic Ncva:Jla-Ulah:

oa1·ca in as mnny days.
'Jihur:rd.ay an A.it• ·F'n•rcc pHot on;
a .rcfudin" mli,-sio<n fi;ad' 11'> bait
)

ou.t of his"' F-105 '1'1mncforbii-d jet;

I '_'.lftcr !.rouble ckwelo1)C(I nca1• Ka;
:inab, .The. pilot Major T:homall ,T.;
lWillfams: · 48, trafoing 11~l ·Nell~
~F? w.a~. untta.~:~1~. ·, ', .. ~
I '~:"'. t~' ,,.JY ~. I:; W!"'1f
·~· :Ji. -~=:; . ~ ·.• -~
...1o.,,.',·
n ·
;,_t:......
i: ·i tl:
•• .I ...... :11-.
 C05492929
,s.:, \ i I ~
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·.;

~~ fJ' .1-~ ?'."''.'.') r~~ ·-~

t:5 fj~
.. \~'; ~.~·i.
I
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l"·;)

I
I
I ____:...-._.....,..____
.._,:..,·~..,..,..,_.,.._ 2S, .J 963 ..
·-.-----··-
Tuesday., May

I ·~·-·

I //~/?L. E./J/ ;-;/;./(/' The Air T•'orc:e identified i\fon· :l

'day !Jhe pilol Wll<l bailed oi'.1t of !
I /:> t;"'e / 3
/7
~is l>trickcm ,F-lllli '.fhunder.chi~fjet
lighter '!lt'.ai" the Ne1r.id11-Ufah. bot~ i::
.~· Friday. ·· :
·i
OfJkiaJs · .ai 'Nellis Afr, Ji1m·c~ l.
.Dai:e $aid J1e as Ken Colliu.~. - :
I '.dviiiaiJ employe of Hughes !;\fr. :
cmft Co. . · · · ·p

·. T~1~.
S. 2..5 m .illfo~ <~r".i.f; .cr.ashcd)J.~
I ancl burned· neat"·Wendqver, U!ah. ;
: The . Ail· Fm1Ce· refust>~i tfot two ::·
'. <l:ays to name the )liJnt. When i·t .S!
: did klimtify nlm, '1!11e Air Fotx...e g

I , did not ~-ive Callins' age, home ~

: 1wwn_ or dt.y of emplr,ymcmt. Hugh· ,i
?1es ,\~:rcraft. however, h.;i5 a .miljo!' fl:
I ltilimt. ;i~· S1111!11 Monfoa,. Calif. · 'l?

.I l
N<>llis <;ffi.cials s;,1kl Co.]Ji1.;s wa/;
;£11
opM·.i tinR Hu?" ·figthfr~, pl·ane on (
J
• loan :bl 'Hughes dur,ing elecfl'onic!'i
1- devoklt)m en t. · · ;
' . . .. ' \l
1
~ !1 hc plane f:l:ir;k off· froi11 Nellis. '
ii J4. .is ordin111~1.\' assigHed fo llhe ·
!(; :vrigb.L -. J·>·a.t.l~rspt1 Ai·q.··m.·ce.Bast!.

,.
m Ohm. A i·~ea~·cfl a11d de'l'e!op-

I .'- ·m<l41t center.

}
.: I
·
"'.l'he tlclay in announcing tJJ~ :
name of Uie pil()t r1>.~ulted from ..:•
>I querrying nc>! only ·wr1:11 -the mm· ·•
:- ta.ry, hut with the Hu~he.<l All'· :.
ij <i1.•aft'f.-0., over t11e· weckend,¥·~rid· .,
f 1maldng r;ertain t.hat the a·elatives· .,
::1of the. p1l~f: wei:-c propcr!y .· reas~1:

I ' su.:.ec.I of ]us safety;'' the. Ai.r F.C>1:1:e ·~

,. 1 said.
$,
. . . . ,
'Nnmes of p~lols \~ho hail ou'tf
." ::a ft:l!y arc 11...ually mad'e jlublie
A immedialelv.
I .:. 'fi1e lmit-11ur: . and . :;ubilequeni: ;
If crash were 4:he second i:n .two.'
i~, clays. An ·Air· F'ot'.ce: pilot Oil· a '.
f'..
!ii'
"!"I.I
r:'t'
~
j(~:
11
'<fu.
ifj;
;:~
-
!\',1
I
!'ir'
iJ

: refueling mis~ii)11 biid fl:> h-.lil 0LJ1f ;

I r-~· ... '

~:itj of - ilill:-.. 'l'lfiiffdcrCl1iCF:- Thtibkl.3\'
' \t:±, 1~'1~11 ;J;e sirigle·eni?ine Jet develop.I [ · .
(;'}:;~:: tr~ul1.I~:: . .,,«..:. . . " ., .. 1•
r-..
C05492929
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1.1
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SECRET

II
'
CHRONOLOGY OF PRESS AND INDUSTRY AWARENESS
OF A .-12 PR.OGRAM

II! l Nov 63 News article in·Herald~News, Fon,tana. Ca.lifO.rnia,

speculating about "super secret project site". ·
II 1 Nov 63 Mr. Marvin Miles, Aviation Editor, Los Ange).es
I Times, telephonicaUy contacted Westinghouse Corp.,
Pittsburgh, attempting. to c;:onfirm if employees of
/I ·that firm were travelling covertly to "the desert 11,
each week in connection with top secret ,project
I which he suspects may have CIA association~

Oct 63 Dr: Jametl! B. Rea, independent consultant to

I several aircraft firm$ presented briefings a~ Hughes .
Aircraft Company and Telecomputing Corporation
during which he a,ccurately and openly speculated
I about recent LAC develppments. ·

Oct 63. A contractor empl9y~e from 1?& W enroute from·

I Los Angeles lnternatfonal Airport via taxi to the
Project Terminal at Lockheed was queried by the.
· driver as to 0 whether he was enroute to Nevada".
I July 63 &: Mr. Robert Hotz, Editc:,u·. Aviation Week, indicated
Sept 63 his awareness of developments at Burbank.
I 5 Sept 63 The Hartford Coura.nt, Hartford, Conn. , referred
to. the "aecret 11 development of the .J -58 engine in
I an art~cle on the SST.
. . .

. Apr-Oct 63 Seve:ral sightings of the Project OXCART·vehicle

I by commercial airline crews.
' .

June 63 Convair Techrep at Norton AFB, Ci!l.lif. , wrote to

I ·.his home plant at .Fort Worth advising that LAC
has secretly developed a Mach 3. aircraft,,using
titanium alloy. ·
I
SECRET
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C05492929
I SECRET

I March 63 . Col. John J. Smith, USAF, Ret., and his Requirements

Staff at North American Aviation {NAA} deducted from

I various indications in industry that Kelly Johnson

has a Mach 3 aircraft inflight test~

I Feb 63 Mr. Robert Widmer; Vice President, Convair, Fort

Worth (cleared OXCART}; advised that it was common
knowledge in the aircraft industry that Kelly Johnson
was involved in the manufacture of an advanced U-2 follow
on.

Jan 63 Mr. William Clegern, Assistant to Director, Advanced

Technology, Martin, Co., Denver, i:o:formed a. group
of people at his firm that "Lockheed was working on a.·
I super U-2 that would fly in excess of 100, 000 feet at a
speed of 3. 2 Mach. 11 His statement was based on hearsay
·.and his personal speculations. ·
I Apr 62 . Admiral John. B •. Pearson, USN, .Ret., ·Vice President,
Development and Planning, NAA, .accurately concluded.
I from his speculatl.ons and industrial indications that ·
Kelly Johnson was developing a Mach 3 reconnaissance
aircraft which would operate :;i..t 80, 000 to 85, 000 feet~
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. CON.TFOL SYSTEM

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I BYE-4631-68
22 August 1964
I
I MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
SUBJECT SKYLARK
I
, l. It is essential as a .matter of the highest
I national interest that we have an operational c~pability

I to conduct reconnaissance flights over Cuba with the

· · OXCART vehicle as soon as possible and in any event no
I later than the firs~ week in November, with character-
istics on the Qrder of Mach 2.8, altitude 80,000 feet,
I with a range of 2,500 nautical miles, or better as

·1 feasible, with four of this type aircraft.

2. You are to take all appropriate actions to
I insure that this highest priority objective of your pro-
gram is not in any way hindered by competing requirements
I o:f any kind. You should insure ·that the contractors, the

I field commanders, and anyone els.e having a direct impact

upon the program are aware of this highest priority

I objective, and you should bring to my attention at the

earliest possible moment any proposal or directed course
I of action which might. in any way interfere' with our

I meeting this objective.

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3. We seek in Project SKYLARK an urgent operational

readiness and we must be careful to introduce into the
I progl'am during the next several months only those modi-

I fications, procedures, and additional equipment, as are

necessary to attain this objective.

I
I Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director
I

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C054 92 92 9'·.
TO:P 8EC11ET
I
,, EXAMPLES OF INIYUSTRY. AWARENESS OF PROJECT OXCART

I l. North American Aviation, Los Angeles, California

I Admiral John B. Pearson, USN (Ret.) VP (Development

and Planning) North American Aviation, Los Angeles,
I California,. advised in April 1962: Incidental to his
responsibilities with NAA (monitoring all military
I activities within aircraft industry) he concluded a

I full year before that Kelly Johnson, LAC, .was developing

a supersonic Mach 2.4 - Mach 3, long-range, high-altitude

I . (80,000 - 85,000 feet) air~raft which would probably be

twin engine and have a dual mission, reconnaissance and
I intercept.

I Basis for conclusion:

a. Evaluation of.United States Government's defense

I n~eds.

b. Recognizing the need and r·ealizing that the F-108

I program has been cancelled, he noted that
, . no overt mention

I of a replacement was beil1g made.·

c. The infrequent appearances:·of Kelly Johnson during

I the past two years was an~indication that he was actively

engaged in a new program.
I d. After.the cancellation o:f the F-108, he determined

I that several
'
of ·the people. who were. working on the GAR-9/

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C05492929 TOP SECRET
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I ;.i;'l'.J;:i;o;»'•A•· ..;

1· program. When he speculated to an old friend at Hughes

that there was probably no current.use of the GAR-9

I unless Kelly Johnson was building something at Lockheed,

the old friend was noticeably startled and changed the

I subject which Pearson took:as another clue.

e. It was common knowledge that the J-58 program
1· at Pratt & Whitney was continuing as a production effort,

I with no published customer or use.

f. A budget analyst at North American advised that

I the previous year's budget failed to identify uses for

$150 million.
I Admiral Pearson at the conclusion of the discussion
observed that the primary need in his .opinion to preclude
I further disclosures of con:firmation of the Lockheed pro-

I gram would be the publication of a cover story for Kelly

.Johnson. He also suggested the possibility of consider-
I ing briefing some aviation ·editors such as Marvin Miles

of the Los Angeles Times.

I 2. Cross Country News, Forth Worth, Texas·
I Cross Country News, art~cle of 31 January 1963
(aeronautical newspaper published at Forth Worth, Texas):
I "LOCKHEED SST SAID IN :X STAGE.
. .
A HIGHLY GUARDED
SECRET MAY BE REVEALED·WITHIN,THE NEXT.FEW DAYS. LOCKHEED
I . ~ ' .

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,T-OP SECRE'l' Control System
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I · ·~f.~f'~~}.~f~~::s?.<;'~:>.:,.AiicRAFT ~· · F3ii:RnA.Ni<< :ls rucPEcTEn To ANNouNcE ·A NEW suPER.:..
SONIC TRANSPORT OFF THE DRAWING BOARDS, EVEN IN THE X
I STAGE LOCKHEED O~'FICIALS SAY NOTHING. NO DETAILS CAME

I WITH THIS TIP, FROM SOURCES CONSIDERED VERY RELIABLE."

"HOWEVER, IF THE LOCKHEED SST IS FLYING, OR ALREADY
I- FOR FLIGHT TESTS, IT MAY EXPLAIN WHY NAJEEB B:ALABY, CHIEF
OF THE FAA, ASKED THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT ADVISORY GROUP,
I TO SLOW DOWN ON THEIR $1 BILLION DOLLAR PROJECT. GOAL HAS

·1 BEEN TO HAVE A U.S. SST FLYING BY 1972. FRANCE AND BRITAIN

ARE IN A .JOINT VENTURE,. EXPECTED IIA:VE A l, 450 MPH PASSENGER ..

I PLANE OPERATING BY 1970. 'r:tIE u .s. :rs EXPECTIID TO TEST

THE 2,000 MPH RS-70, THIS SPRING.rt'
I "LOCKHEED MAY INDEED REPEAT THEIR SLOGAN "LOOK TO
·-

I · LOCKHEED FOR LEADERSHIP", IF THEY

WIDE OPEN WITH THE SST IN 1963."
BRE~ THE WORLD MARKET

·I · 3. Martin Co., Denver, Colorado

William Clegern, Assist~nt to Director, Advanced
I Technology, Martin·co., Denver, Colorado. During the

I week of 28 January 1963, Mr. Clegern in discussions before

a grol:lp pointed out several areas in the design field in

I
. . ' . .
which his company had no particular interest. He observed
that it might interest the gr~up ~o know that Lockheed
·1 was working on a follow-on vehicle, a "super U-2" that

-1 would fly in excess of 100,000 feet at a speed of 3.2 Mach.

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. In art. :i.rite:fv·i~w oii 11 February 1963, he observed that
he recalled a reference made to Kelly Johnson's plane by
I an unrecalled source during.a visit to the Los Angeles
area in November 1962. He indicated that his position
·I with the Martin Company includes future planning. He

I reasoned:
a. The United ~tates needed a follow-on to the U-2
I since satellites could not provide the photographic
resolution possible with manned reconnaissance aixcraft.
I b. That the new plane would have to reach a speed

I of Mach 5 and f~y at 100~000 feet.··

c. By studying the Government budget he came to the
I conclusion that the project budget for the next fiscal
year would approximate $340 million.
I 4. Convair, Fort Worth, Texas

I Mr. Robert Widmer, Vice-President of Convair, Fort

Worth, was interviewed on 19 February 1963. He observed
I that it is his opinion that ·it is generally known in
the aircraft industry and particularly on the West Coast
I that Kelly Johnson is invoi~ed in.the.manufacture of an

I advanced aircraft probably designed for the same purpose

as the U-2. He stated further he has heard from many
I individuals that the. aircJ'.•aft is flying~
i
He believes
he hear.ct speculation that it· was· flying at Edwards Air
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I Base~ Mr. Vli°d~~r further sta:t~d that representa-
tives of Systems Vendors who travel considerably spread
I rumors, speculation, etc., throughout the industry as
' .

.I to what other aircraft companies are doing. He indicated

that this type of individual was the prime source of
I his awareness.
He mentioned that the advanced state of ~evelopment
.1 of the J-58 is another item which has caused considerable

I speculation in the industry.

He mentioned .that it was significant to him that when

I all of the officials of Lockheed took up their stock options

1.·. recently (published information) .that Lockheed was indeed

in a healthy financial position.

I 5. North American Aviation, Los Angeles 1 California

Colonel John J. Smith, ·(AF Retired), Chief of

I Requirements, and members of his staff Messrs. Julius

Braun, ex-Army Colonel, Fenn Taylor, ex-AF Colonel,
·I Jamie Wallace, ex-AF Colonel and Thomas Collins, ex-Navy,

I North American Aviation 1· advised on 15 March 1963 that

they had deduced that Kelly· Johnson had a plane using two

I .· .. '
J-58 engines, with a range of about 4000 miles with an
·altitude of 150 to 160 thousand feet; point design ram
1.. jet were employe~, or 90 ·to.· 100. thousand feet· if accelerated
ram jets were used. They speculated that the wings are
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.. of sta:inie~~'··~te~l about 65 :feet long and the plane

has been flying since the fall of 1962. It was the
I opinion of this group that the plane was started about

I the fall of 1959., and the Hughes ASG-18 is tied in with

the plane. According to this group the plane is probably
I a two seater and the program has a budget pf about
$200 million.
I The process of their deductions was as follows:

I a. Colonel Smith had experience in the early U-2

project; it was apparent for him that the need for an
I advanced version was existent. While in the Air Force,
he had tried to kill the ASG-18 and due to the dropping
I of the F-.108, he figured that the ASG-18 must have some

I other application or it would have been similarly dropped.

b. They observed that the funds allotted to develop-

I ing the J-58 engine did not seem to them justified unless
..
there was some high altitude airplane available in'which
I to utilize the J-58.

I c. They also were aware Hughes Aircraft personnel

were on a special clearance list which supported their

I conclusion that the.ASG-18 was involved.

d. They concluded that it appeared to be about
I $200 million not specifically accounted for in the

I Government's budget, and such a~ amount would not normally

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I b;e' ''made up of a iarge number of small items, but had to
include a major project.
I Some of the better LAC engineers are known to have

I left their normal work and gone into a hush, hush project.
e. Usage of liquid hydrogen and oxygen is published
I in secret documents available to NAA including destination
of shipments, quantities, etc. It was observed that a
I considerable amount was going to Jackass Flats (AEC test

I flight area) which they knew did not use much, if any.
Consequently, they concluded it must be going to the site
I where th~ U-2 was tested, supporting the opinion that a
flight test program must be underway.
I f. They observed that flight test personnel were
..

I leaving Edwards Air Force Base indicating another flight

test program somewhere else.
I g. Indications of subcontracting for precision valves
'
for apparently LAC fl'ont organizations and such valves
I would have no other application than for this type plane.

I 6. North American Aviation, Los Angeles, California

A weekly information. summary for the week ending
I 15 March 1963 prepared by t.he. NAA Programs Staff for
distribution to NAA executives .. The summary included the
I ,

following paragraph:
. ·.::

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"X°II-STUDY OF HIGH ALTI'l'UDE RECON AIRCRAFT (S) AFSC

HAS BEEN DIRECTED BY HQS.USAF TO IMMEDIATELY PREPARE A
I DEVELOPMENT PLAN P'OR A HIGH ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE AIR-
'
I CRAFT. THIS EFFORT WAS INITIATED AT HIGH LEVEL AND IS
REPORTEDLY BEING PUSHED BY GENERAL LEMAY. WE UNDERSTAND
1. · '
$2.5 MILLION HAS ALREADY BEEN ALLOCATED TO THIS PROGRAM •

.1·· PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT KNOWN AS YET, BUT ~E

BELIEVE THIS AIRCRAFT STUDY WILL CALL FOR LONGER RANGE

I AND GREATER SPEED AND ALTITUDE THAN THE CURRENT FLYING

LOCKHEED RECON AIRCRAFT. LOS ANGELES DIVISION HAS BEEN
·1· DOING IR&D WORK IN THEIR HYPERSONIC RESEARCH PROGRAM
APPLICABLE TO THIS REQUIREMENT AND, IS NOW FOLLOWING UP
·1 ON THIS NEW PLANNING STUDY. IN ADDITION 'IO LOCKHEED, BOTH

I BOEING AND REPUBLIC ARE REPORTED TO HAVE CURRENT STUDY

EFFORTS AIMED AT .THIS REQUIREMENT."
I Officials of NAA involved were interviewed on 18
March and produced a file entitled, "Lockheed Project".
I It contained notes dated May 1961 indicating that

I Lockheed is reported to be developing a very high altitude,

·130-140 thousand feet aircraft, utilizing the ASG-18/GAR-9

I. for AEW Picket Patrol and high-altitude reconhaissance.

It was pointed out that the above type of information was
I pieced together by bits picked up by the staff. It was

I also concluded that._ the J-58· engine had some new use for a

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1· ·high altitude· plarie to justif}" the. funds put into it.
The same was true of some exi~ting purpose of the ASG-18
I at Hughes Aircraft .

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T 0 P S.E CR ET
I 22 Ma.rC:h-1965

I MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Scienc·e and Technology

I SUBJECT Aerial Reconnaissance of Communist China

I l. Attached ls copy of Memorandum fQr the Record of a

discuss~on Mr. McCone had with Secretary McNamara and Secretary
Vance on l~ March. Also attached ls a memorandum !or me
forward·
I · tng the prior reference for necessary action.

2. J\.fter informal discp.ssion 0£ thi$ matter with Colonel Ledford

I 1 telephon.•d Colonel G.eary who stated that he had beel} called on
prepare a briefing on this subject for Secretary Vance and that he was
to

in the process of discusal.ng the matter with Dt. M<:Millan. Geary

I said h.e intended to stick entirely to. the support phase of the acthrl.ty
and. if operational considerations came up would suggest that
Secretary Vance be .bdefe~ by Colonel Ledford. Geary sald that already
I available on Okinawa was £uel. communications an operati.om• building
and an adequate runway. Not available wae a hangar or any other means

I of putting the birds under cover. Geary felt that a 1 October readiness
date would be the earliest that could b.e met. Geary said he had also
been asked to look into the matter of putting the drt,;ers back into blue
sults but allowing them to keep the same rate of compensation. We
·1 both agreed that the pilots would not accept any such rigged-up deal ·
like this even if it were possible. Geary said that going into this whole

I operation on a temporary basis should be looked upon as only the initial

move and that we shoUld make the facility permanent. He said we ai-e
ta.lklng about several milllon dollars of facilities. Geary also said it

I is a fallacy to think the pi.lots have more protection if they are in uniform .

. 3. I then pl•~.ed a call for Secretary Vance but was unable to get

I through. Later in the day. Geary informed me that he tot) had been
unable to s~e Vance so he had written a. memorandum to him which
covered the following general points:

I BYE 4546-65

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The operation is fE1asible. from Okinawa. Three a.lrcra.ft
I could be moved in and be operational. in 60 days~. but this would
be· on a crash basis and would ·result in a virtual shutdown of
the raneh area. October 15th would be the earliest possible
I operation date under the present extensive modification program.
Modification and testing of the entire facility to a.a sure necessary
range and operational readiness would take this length of time.
I During th~s period, ~he Okinawa Baee would be resurveyed.
Geary would want to add a new banga.1", increase sifle of the fuel
farm. start proeessbig and move the additional support personnel
I requtr-ed. military or otherwlee, adjust SAC tanker aaaets to
pl'Ovide tb.e 7 •ll fl.gU.re for three refueling& and add to the aide
ae ·necesllary. Geary estimate• the. initial atrlift cost would be
I approximately $1 ..l/2 million for essential equipment. to set up
the program·a.nd there would be a continual annual. airlift .cost
of $2 million. Air For9e suppor:t of M & 0 funds would be about
I $ZOO, ooo a month. The additional ha.ngat- would cost a m~lllon
dollare.

I . That was the glat of Geary's memorandum. to Vance as reported

to me by Geary. Geary also i"epol."ted that the Air Force ·Judge Advocate
General said lt was legally lmposstbl• to reimburs~ the pilots over and
I above no;-m.al military pay if they returne.d to their blue sult etatua. . It
took two pages for this Judge to ea.y that. but the anf!lwer was an un ..
equivocal "no, it cannot be done."
I 4. I eub$equently talked to Secretary Vance and effered to glve him .
a bl"iefing on the operational aepects of making these flights frOm.
I Okbmwa. ·

ACTION to DD/S&t.T: Please ~rrange with SecreJa,ry Vance'•

I o££ice to give this briefing aa soon aa posalble.

I S. In going lnto this matter and taking a11 the :va..rieus actions
neceasai-y and indicated by this memorandum and by Mr; McCone'•
memorandum of conversation. the· following should be bo:rtne in mind:

I (a) A decision bas been made to take all the necessary

preparatory steps to put into Okinawa. wh&.teve~ construction and

I relat~d arrangE:1ments are ~eeded to be able t& operate the OXCART

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in operational :flights over Communist China. {Ii it is considered
I essential ·to expand facllitles at Taiwan for emergency use of
this Base. please come up with statement 0£ requirements. )

I (b) No decislon·~s been taken to move ~ny. OXCARTS to

Okinawa. This decision ,wo\lld probably be made by the President.

I
,.
(c) No decision has been taken to un-sheepdlp or to return
to blue suits. CIA pllots. This.decielon would probably be made
by the President.

. (d) No deci.alon. has been. taken to !ly the OXCART Qpera ...
tlonally over. Communist China. This decision can only be made
I by the President.
(e) No declrdon has been taken as to whether or not the
I aircraft and pilots would be military with mllita:ry markings and
military pilots. or civilian with deniable charactei'lstlcs of ·
aircraft and ptlot. .This dects:.on can only be taken by the
I President.

{f) No decision has been taken as to whether· the operations

I will be conducted by SAC or CIA. Thie decision can only be
taken by the Pre11ldent in light of the several considerations noted
above.
I 5. There is an anomaly here that \legga:re analysis, Vance and
McNamara have been adamant in opposing the use of rnili~·ry U-2 1 s
I and u. s. military pilots ove:r Com:munist China. They have been ha~Cl~.f
against this than the State Depa.rtm.ent. Yet1 at the same ti:me, they :i:;iow
propose ut~lizing military aircraft and military pilots in a much less
I deniable and much more flagrant vi,olation of normal overilight proce~ ·
dures. · tt ahou.ld be borne in mind tha.t the President and only the
President can make the decision as to whether we will use U. s. military ·
I pUotst presumably with Air. Force ma:rklngs. or civilian pllots. pre ..
suma.bly ·with no markings. This obviously is a decision of the greatest
importance tnvolvlng national policy at the bighett level.
I 6. Fina.Uy. i£ the is to be conducted secretly. whether
ope~ation
or not it is to be denied or deniable. then the Agency positlon ls that
I Ol'.\.ly the Agency can properly conduct the operation. i£ the opera.tlon ·

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is to be cond\Jcted on a plausibly de:n.iabie basis or. Gn a "blank stare-·

I never-heard-of-it 11 basis even though it is apparent that tbe Chinese

will be a.ware of the overflights, then it is Agency position that the
ope.ration can be conducted in this manner only by the Agency.

I 7. Until such t{me that the President bas made ;the consc,ioua
and firm deci..sion that the United States Government will admittedly

I overfly Com.mun.ht China. in military aircraft with military pilots

(I am talking here about OXCART) then it is the fi:rm position ·of th~
Agency that any o~~er overflights ove'l" denied territory wUl be
I conducted by the Agency ln accordance with past procedures.

8. Please review this merrio:ra.ndu.m and Mr. McCone'a memo•

I rand.um in grt1at cieta.U and.give me a listing of the variOJ1S actions
you propose to
take.

I (Signed)
Marshall S. Cartei>
I Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

I
A ttacbm.ente
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Di stri.butlon:
I 01.'ig (Cy #1 ..
Cy #2
DD/S&T
AD/OSA
Cy #3 DDCl
I Cy #4
Cy :Ais
1
O/DCl(Mr. Elder)
D/NIPE
Cy #6 ER "via ExDir
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19 March 1965
I
I MEMORANDUM FOB.: General Carter

I Attached is a copy of my memorandum for the record

on my meeting with Secretaries McNamara and Vance on
I 18 Mar(lh. concerning aerial reconnalasance over Communist
China.

I I call your attention to·ce~tain specilic actions on the

part of Cl.A and understand you will contact Secretary Vance
to make preliminary arrangements for the C.IA actions and to
I discuss the operational actions ref!1Jlrred to 1n the memoran~_um.

I (Signed)

JOHN A. McCONE
I Director

I
Attachment: DCI M/R #17, 18 Mar 65
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Dictated but not read.
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18March1965
I MEMORANDUM FOR THE .l\ECORD

I SUBJECT: Dia~us~.ton w~~h Secretarr :M:cNam.ara and Secretary Vance

doricerning Ae·rtal llecorinaissance over Communist China

I l. I report~a·f:fu:i:t ·re~en:t··p~oble~d wl~h the dron&s catising

the loas o! 3 of.them :and thtfMIG 21 attacR:on the March 14th.U .. 2
I mis:alon~ whi'ch apparently {though 'not 'a'bl3bltiteiy conflrmedf .
involvctd 3 air•to-air miaelle firings, led to the eonclualon tb.&t1

.,
I . . . a:. The use'~!. 1'.J'."zts.~er'comm.µn1,,.t Ch~ la becoming
:'-''increasingly' ba~al"dous because of'SAM's. and MIG 21 attack
' techniq~es;

b.
· ' · " ·

The recent problems with drones tn.a.y· cause an

·

hiatus ln the activity which would n•cessitate use of u-a•s

I · foJ' South China coverage of priority targets east of Kunming.

I With respect to drones, the cause of the :tr.oubles ha:s ·not as yet be.en
deternilned but it ie felt by Defense, NBA, . di.A' and the manufacturer
that a. ChlCom jamming of the drone guidance system la highly un-

I likely. (In a separate conversation Col. Steakley confirmed this;

aaid 4 or 5 drones were ready; a tearn was in the field to exam.lne
trouble;. prod:&lCtioJ'.l,.
' : . :.
. .. ' ' .. "'. ~ per
of new d.ron,f1!S
' .:
week. )
I 2. tJSU~. in considering the pl"Oblem on March 17th, reaffirmed
the :p.eceseity for continuing aerial reconnalesance of Sou.th China.
Secreta't-t.es McNa:n:iara and Vance concurred in.this judgment.
I
3. Therefore it was decided to continue the use of U -2 1 s on

I priority targets weat of Kunming and to extend thie ·coverage to all

of South China if drone opeiiatlons a.re temporarily stood down. There
was no disagreement that the n~ed for intelligence outweighed the rtsk.

I It was further agreed that we should Pl'c;Jceed tmmed~ately

with all preparatory steps necessary to operate the OXCART over
I Communist China. tl.ylng out of Okinawa. It was agreed that we
should proceed with all. construction and related arrangements.

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I However this decision did not authorize the deployment of the OXCART
to Okinawa: nor the decision to fly the OXCART over Communist China.·
The decision would authot"ize all preparatory steps and .the expenditure
of such funds as might be involved. ·
. . -

NOTE: After satne discussion it was decided that Okinawa .

was preferable to Formosa and~ steps are· to be t.aken.in
anticipation of deploying the OXCART to Formosa unless it
is considered advisable to prepare a runway to provide an
alternate emergency landing base.

I 4. It was recognized that the basic decision involved the penetra-

tion of dented air space by an Ar:nerican plane with an American pilot
{CIA or Air Force) and this decision was not beh:ig made at this time.

I _ Related to this decision was the question of wheth.er the planes would.
be operated by SAC or by CIA. Both McNamara and Vance favor SAC_
operation and the consolidation of the OXCART planes into the

I RB-71. SAC unit.

5. The two problems which became immediately apparent are

I. pilot's pay and secrecy. I stated that CIA pilots (form.er Air Force
officers) receive considerably higher pay than that received when in
uniform. Also I pointed out the unsatisfactory.security of SAG opera-·

I tions as evidenced by unauthorized disclosures of U-2. 1.s in Saigon.

drones in Danang, etc. · ·

6. ·With respect to relia_bility, I expressed grave concern over

the reliability of the plane, pointing out that at speeds of Mach 3 - :
3. 25 and at 80, 000 feet, we have encountered a series of unanticipated
I · ... difficulties and that I did not think that the plane was fully "debugged". -
I indicated a number o-f planes would b.e ready for operations by Sep-
tember, one plane might be ready considerably in advance of. that_
I date, but that I would give no positive estimate until I had gone to the
site with a number of experts and reviewed the situation carefully . ·
myself.
I 7. These decisions authorize all arrangements and the expendi-'.
ture of funds necessary in connection with anticipated operations of.
I the OXCART out of Okinawa by either CIA or the Air Force. · DDCI_ ·
should confer with Secretary Vance 6r his designee concerning these _
arrangements. 'Planes themselves should not be deployed and the final
I . _decision to fly the planes over Communist China will not be. n::tade at
. this time.

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IHI: DEJ>U"fV SECREYARY OF DEFENSE
20301

·.•
"

I SUDJEC'l': OXCAR'l' Operation Old.nawa.

,.
I It ill our dcGirc tho.t the ruiniluuin construction be o.ccompl;::.ncd
o:t Ka.dcno. Air Bo.oc, Ok.tna.uo. neceGGnl"Y to provide '£or O)/eratio:;:;

,.
· bcc;inni11c in the fall or 1965. · Baoed. upon a. rev:tev of the list ot
i te.ins enclosed "With you:t" xnernoro.ndum o'£ Mny 7, 1965, toe;cther with •.

infori:w.tion subsequently i\u:nichcd by representatives ot the Air

· Force, the conatruotion i tem.s set :t'orth on the enclosed lint o:re
n.pp:roved. ·
..
The approved conot:i."Uction ia )?remised upon l_)roviding fol' the
I,. operation and mo.intennnce ot three or foui• aircraft and about 250
~ersonnel.(20 officers, 45 ai:crnen and 185 civilians, including

I ...
contrnctor employees) • . . ' I
· .

.. llhile the :four new butlel' ·type hangars nre ·under con::;truction,,
.. .. .
.•
the cncloced procram contemplatcG ·tho.t..ha.ncar facilities will be
:Provided by tbe interim use ot th1·ec corrocion control ho.nco.-rc ·which
. . '·• . . .
.I ·will revert to their intended ·J:>urpoGe a.s soon as the butler type
·110.n~nrs are ready for occuprmcy. Four ro.ther than :f'i ve butler type
. ...
.. ,
;;pQ.' G shouJ.c1. proVicle the requi:r.ecl livine quarters con::;i::;tent with · . · .,
I the contemplo.t~d numbers o"l o:f'i'iccrs and· civilionc. The neu ·r.iess · ·. · ·. " . ·
. . hall is not inclu.ded since it is unclerst:ood that this c.m be :pro·. ...... ".· .:_;; · ·

I .. -': . ::. . .
·: .. · vided. t'hroueh the expansion o"i: a SAC raess facility currently :planned_. ·
~ :ror const:r\l.ction o.t Ka.clenn.. It is .f'urther understood tho.t the ·
· ·:·· '.·'. ; : .',·• · addi tioneJ. fuel required., pending completion o'f the construction or ·· · ·. ~
.1· : .·:-; :· . ..
'. · . ::."::· · ad.di tional. storage :t'f:lcilities, can 'be tem.Pora:rily provided by a. barge
or other a:rraneement so as ·to. provide tha ne~easar,y fuel support by ~-~:: ...:'.1•."' : :~!~~
the foll. o'f 1965. ·
...~

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1

1
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•• ; ·:.
.
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•. . kiANOL~ VIA

·. :·
.. ··.:: . iOP
. SECRET
..
. ();ow'l'ROL! 6YSICM ONLY
BYE»:M;

Eatim.'lted. Coat

·row.• new butlor .typo hn.nea.ro

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llo\I butlor typ~ l30Q (4 uni.to) l,46o,ooo

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Dut1or ty;pc airmen a .. quutorG (l. ° 'Wlit) I•'
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.-
.;· ';. '... ~' I . 223,000
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'. ,· '. )'.'/)t,. : ~. ·:>..••
Utilities :200,000
~·· .

I Enlarge POL-3 1 101 000 banol ~

nnd. piping· · . .. .. ·.• . ~.
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 C05492929
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TOP SEGRET
I
I THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington

I 3 June 1965

I MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

I As you know, the Soviets are deploying surla·ce ;.to-air

missiles a.round Ha.not. l pre111u~e· this will prevent us from
continuing u ...2 flights over the area a.nd that drone~ would also
I be vulnerable to such weapons.

I Would it be practical to meet our eontinuing requi remen:t

for :reconnaisaa~ce by substituting A·ll's for the U..:Z•s and
drones?

I
I RMcN

Robe.rt S McNamara

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Handle via B YEMAN BYE 5451 .. 65
I Control System Only

'i'OP SEGRET
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C05492929

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TOP SEGRET
I Depiirtment 0£ the Atr ·Foi-cEI
Washington . : ...
I Office· of the June 8, .1966
Under Secretary
I
MEMORANDUM :FOR. THE SECRETARY O.F DEFENSE
I SUBJECT:. Use of OXCART ovet! China and southeast Asla

I 0£ the several factore bearing on the use of OXCART. ati-eraft

I over China and Southeast Asia, the one that now contr.ols i& the
pe.rformance. operational readiness. and reliability of the airplane
itself. $~cond in importance is probably the queatlon of the vulner-
ability of the airplane to $A .z mis.silee.
I . . .

As a result of our concem about performance and operation.al

I readiness, we <:onsidei- that we must plan for sta.gin.g from a Weatel"n

Pacific base such ae Kad¢na. The preparation ot the base can keep
pace with that of the ai.rcraft.

I The use of a foreign base, however~ introduces the problem

of foreign reaction, since the OXCART closely resembles both the

I SR .. 71, which has officially been identi£ied with reconnaiseance, and

the YF-12.A, which has been 11exposed11 in th& i~ade press as ·a: dis-
guised reconnaiseanc:e airplan~.
I 1 am not prepared tn th.ls memorandum to render a compreh,ensive
rt!port on these issue.a. A brief account .followlJ of ata.t\la and of
I actions under way. ·

I . It is believed that the air intake and inl$t control problems

have been solved. All aircraft.are·b.l\!llng equit>P•d.•h tht:t £ina1.inlet
I configul'a.tton. As an objective, a readinees date of 15 September ha•
been esta.Pliehed. A flying progJ:"a.m la belng developed, for tra.•ntng,
and to makest;;atlstieaUy valid determination$ of the range. fuel
I consumption, and other. operating p&.1."Ameters of the airplane tn its

I Handle vla BYE.MAN

Control System Only
T 0 P · S E C .i,;t E ;t;
BYE .. l6530·6~.
Handle via BYEMAN
I· Control System
C05492929
I T 0 P S_E GR ET
... · .
. . . . . . . . . . ·. . :.· . . : .· ..

final configuration. Careful statistics will be kept on the.reliability

of all subsystems. Flight performance as observed in. the last few

I weeks, and the performance ?f subsystems dtirtng the last several

months, are ei:icouraging, but va,lidation will require extensive flying
under uniform conditions.

I Staging Base

I The OXCART airplane is limited; by expendables other than

fuel, to three refuelings. Under this limitation,. and with the range
performance that one can now predict with full confidence (about 260.Q

I . rriiies), one cannot penetrate China and return without using a base in·
other. than U.S. territory •. Even at a range of _3500 miles,. which is
about the best that one can today expect for the future, ~ Chinese

I operation is marginal, and Chl.na ca!Ulot be covered, wholly from U.S.

territory. Hence, quite apart from the convenience, operating economy,
and be"tter safety that results from eliminating long approach legs and
extra refuelings, there is a need to use a foreign base. .

The CIA has recommended use of Kadena for temporary detach-.

I ment operations for periods up to 60 days. I concur .. · Mr. Vance has
recently authorizecI$3. 7 million to provide minimu~ construction.
, . and facilities improvement requirements, and initiating actions are
I under way at this time.·

Vulnerability

A clear consensus was never reached on the/vulnerability of

the OXCART to Cuban SA-2 defenses, .at the time that this issue was
I examined. Conditions over China and Southeast Asia will be more
favorable than those that were expected over Cuba: the airplane will
·.be operating at higher speed and altitude, and an array of counter-·
I measures will be available •. Furthermore, . since an atmosphere of
war already prevails, loss of an airplane to defensive action may
not carry the same political implications as in the case of Cuba.

A technical analysis of vulnerability.is being made.· It will

be reported, along with specific recommendations about the u~e of .
I . countermeasures, well before any operational decisions are necessary.

I 2

I TOP £EGRET HANDLE"

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C05492929
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TOP S.ECRET
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Analyses will pt-obably not be complete before a decision is necessary
I to establish facilities at Kadena.

I think it is safe to predict, even now, that the analysis of

I vulnerability will not conclusively prove that the airplane is safe
from SA .. 2 fire. My judgment. based on my own eonclusions from
the Cuban case. is that the risk of loss from defensive action can
I be kept lower than the risk of accidental loss~

Further Consideration
I I shall make another report abQut l July. At that time, the
success of the new inlet and inlet control configurations n;iay be
I verified on the mission. rather the.n eimply the flight t~st. aircraft,
It at that time, inlet performance remains a problem. we will
attempt to estimate a new readiness date. and to compare this
I with the readiness we might predict for the sa.. 71.

I (Slgned
Brockway. McMillan

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· C05492929 } ..

1.
·I November 26, 1965

··I Jack C. Ledford

Brigadier General, USAF
,I. Director of Special Activities

Subject: YJTllD-ZO M.is'sion Capability

:_I Reference: Nove~ber Z4, 1965 Meeting

:~1 Dear General Ledford:

In response to your request to me for an expression of our opinion on the

current level of reliability and readiness of the YJTI lD-20 engine for use·
in the performance of Black Shield type missions, it is our considered
judgment that recent flight testing has demonstrated that missions of this
type can be reliably performed providing the engine receives the careful
attention to maintenance and operational details it currently enjoys. This
I is not to say that we consider the engine in the A-12 aircraft installation
to be fully oper.atio;,.al in the normal military sense. Although the engine
has been qualified by completion of numerous 150-hour endurance tests on
I test stands simulating, within our facility capabilities, high altitude -high
Mach number missions, it has not dem.onstrated this same degree of dur-
ability when subjected to the effects of the a~rcraft installation. Flight

~'1:· ·testing has revealed numerous problems of interaction between the air-
craft and engine not heretofore known. Many of.these have been defined,
simulated and corrected by continued engine development testing after
completion of the initial 150-hour qualification test. However, there still
remafo many such problems to be more fully defined and corrected before,
in our judgment, the engine can be considered satisfactory for normal
squadron use involving daily flights by many aircraft.

1· By way of example, five aircraft were operated by the detachment during

the time period 15 September through 20 November. During this time, 54
sorties of which 14 were of approximate Black Shield mission duration were

I· completed. These sorties indicated a very high degree of engine reliability,

in that no engine related incidents would have resulted in a flight abort in the.·
·c:r-itical mission leg. However,. it should be pointed out that during' this time

I 14 engines were removed from the five aircraft after flights for suspected or

I
Handle via ll'ff.tAAN ·
FLORIDA Hl!SEArH;:H ANIJ DEVl!LOl'MENT
Wr!.ST P/\LM or:Acn. Fl-OIODA
C£NTr:::J~ control System
I General Ledford· -2-· November 26, 1965

I real engine discrepancies.- In our opinion, this is too high a rate for sustained

I day-in and day-out squadron operation, although satisfactory for operations

.requiring only three or four sorties per month.

I In summary, it is our judgment based on the rec9rd established during Black

Shield validation flights and on over-all flight experience to date that Black
Shieid type missions can be performed using current YJTl ID-ZO equipment

I with reasonable assurance that aircraft will not be lost during the critical
mission leg because of engine failu:ee or malfunction. Our analysis shows
that in the last 300 flights through November 20, 1965, no flight was aborted

I because of engine trouble once Mach 3 plus cruise was initiated.

Very truly yours,

... PRAifT&Vr.HITNEY AIRCRAFT

I
I. Assistant Chie.f Engineer
Florida Research and Development Center

I pk

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I:·
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I Handle via BYEMAN
Control System
 THE PERKIN-ELMER CORPORATlQN

·1;
' . KE:NNETH G, MACLC:ISH
VICC PRC'Stl>f;HT ANO OIRi:CTOR Of' [ff~ltlCCAtliO.
NORWALK
CONN S:CT!CUT
£L£CTR0•0PTICAL O~YISION v.s ..A.

'l

Ii i
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November 23, 1965

ll ·j General Jack Ledford

•.·~·
CIA Headquarters

Dear General Ledford:

I ·!·
i
Personally and on behalf of Perkin-Elmer, I wish to express
our utmost confidence in the readiness of the Type I camera systems
for the Black Shield operation.

I. Prior to the recent resumption of flight testing,, the B

camera system had undergone over two years of field operation, in-

•,.
volving 42 flights and over 1-1/2 million feet of film, with only
one in-flight failure. In two and a .half years in the field, the
A system has made 41 flights and exposed a million feet of film· with
.··. j an unbroken record of reliability. Moreover, since March 1962 no
..
'•
.flight has had to·be rescheduled because of camera problems •

From my own observation I believe that the difficulties of the

I l
last three weeks with the B camera are transient in nature, are as-
sociated with the break in flight operations, and will disappear
with the resumption of ·the flight test program and the start of
·operational missions.

-I The photographic quality achieved in the recent validation

flight of the A system is reported to be the best achieved in the
program to date.

Our operating personnel are enthusiastic and confiden~. Their

feelings are shared by Perkin-Elmer management. We .stand ready to
·1!
•, help you insure ~hat the operation will be a success.
' Very truly yours,

·1 I
lC~~~
i

·1 l<GM/mt
){, G. Macleish

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 C05492929
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SECRE'l'
I
I 23 November 1965

.I· MEMORANDUM FOR Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford

I SUBJECT Readiness of WLO Furnished Systems

for BLACK SHIELD Operations

I In Reply Refer To WL0-1311-65

I As discussed with·yoµr personnel this date, the WLO

I furnished syste~~ are fully satisfactory for use in BLACK

SHIELD operat~.ons. The .WLO furnished systems as well as

I the supporting"logistics and personnel are available and

·1: ready to support the program.

.I {/!Jcvl~4~ ~
.,. MARLOWE W. IVERSON
Project Engineer

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·1 ·\\aud\e via iWEMAl · ,
SECRE'i'
tontro\ S~stem .
1.
 C05492929 ..•' '·

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I. £ECRE'P

I 23 November 1965

I MEMORANDUM FOR Brig. Gel'1. Jack C ~ Ledford

·1
1- 1. As of this date, I am pleased to report that, in
my judgment, the Honeywell Inertial Navigation equipment
1 is operationally ready.

,-. 2. I have car'efully reviewed the performance of the

airborne equipment, the readiness of the ground support
equipment, and the experience level of our personnel and
feel that each area is operationally ready.

l-- ~
,,)
~---
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....... ·1
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/J

7-.:<:c:..:.:- v:_.J__
1--- G.M. FALCK
Program Manager

>I
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·1.
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SECRE'f' Control System
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·1,·:
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22 November 1965

· MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Special Activities

I
l. In our opinion the two Type II 11 0 11 configurations

I from a standpoint of l"eliability, consistency and repeatability

are opel·ationally ready. We have had 39 flights with one in-
flight failure. 'This occurred in January 1965 and was a faulty

I fuse-holder. This was immediately replaced with a new design.

2. While ·.,,Ne are now achieving 20 to 24 inches of ground

I resolution on the average, we feel that this is susceptible to
improvement as the aircraft achieves a more consistent profile.

3. Our field cr.ew of four (4) people have been with the
instruments a :minimum of over a year and C\-re considered ready
·for a staging deployment as is indicated by their record of performance.

~E< L. GREEN

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:.1.· &ontrn\ Sjstem
•. C05492929
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·1>
ZZ November 1965

·1
To: Gen. Jack Ledford
·1· From: C. L. Johnson

I· Subject: Readiness of Black Shield Aircraft for Deployment

1· Dear Jack:

We were discussing recently the state of readiness of the Black

Shield Oxcart aircraft and their crews for deployment in j:he Far
I. East. I proposed to put ii.n writing my comments on what I think
of the reliability and safety of the operation contemplated. They

.I are as follows:

L To the present date; we have flown this type of

I:. aircraft. 2, 155 times for a total of 3, 132. ·flight hours. There has
been intensive testing of the aircraft and its systems for three
and one-half years.

I 2. The recent Black Shield validation tests have

proceeded with excellent reliability of all ·components, with the

.1:. exception of a radio and an oil pressure gauge. l believe we

know the solution to these problems and within a week or two we
will have the_se devices suitable for oper~tion.
1; 3. ~During the flight test program we have made
over 700 refuelings from the KC-135, including night refuelings.
1: These have_ beeri very successful.

· 4;. The P&:.W J58 engines have had a very good

·I safety record since we started to fly. Like all engin·es, there are
always things th.at can be improved, and we are working diligently
on these matters. But I k11ow of no outstanding problen;. which
1· should prevent deployment.

5. I am very pleased with and proud of the project

·1· pilots, in terms of their proficiency in the aircraft and the amount
of training they have undergone. I have ·no reservations as to tJ::e · . 11\l.\
•

.
I; .
qualifications of the crew. . . .
·
· Hand\e "'a
BYEWm11
· .toutto\ s~tem. ·.
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 C05492929
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- 2 .-

6. The inertial guidance system now has a record of

reliability. In addition to this device, a nurnber of standby navigational
aids have been provided, including radio homing. I think the reliability
and success of the INS and the aircraft instrumentation are sufficient
for· the planned deployment.'

7. The use 0£ electronic countermeasures gear, com-

·1 ·
. . .
bined with the vei-y low .radar cross section of the aircraft, wiil make
it a very difficult target to be handled by a surface-to-air missile •
Also, l do not know of any aircraft in the world today which can success-

::1 . fully intercept the Oxcart aircraft •. ·

Over-all, my considered opinion is that the aircraft can be succ.ess- .

:.1·· .· .·. .·
. fully deployed for the Black Shield mission with what I would consider·
.· .. to be a.t least as low a degree of risk as in the early U-2 deploym.ent
days. Actually, considering ·ot;1.r performance level of more than four
time.s. the U-2 speed and three miles more operating altitude, it is·
probably much less risky than our first U -2 deployments.

I think the time has come when the bird sh.ould leave its nest.

·Sincerely,

,. CLJ:vm.p

:·I
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...

·.1:·~

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C05492929 · 1

I DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON
I O~FICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OXCART
BYE 3065-65
2 December 1965
I MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

I The Deputy Under Secretary of

State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
I . Director of Central ;. Intelligence ·

I . SUBJECT: OXCART Far East Deplo:Yment- :- CAROUSEL

I Justification for OXCART deployment to the Far East was

stated in a communication distributed to 303 Committee members
on December 1, 1965. . · ·

I Three aircraft are programmed for movement in January 1966

to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, where support facilities are in
the £inal stages of preparation. Movement of detachment person-
·I nel to Kadena by USAF airlift has been arranged for early January
·1966, pending approval of the deployment~ .Materiel airlift is·
scheduled for completion by mid.-December.
·1 The OXCART aircraft will be committed initially for cover-
age o:f highest priority Chinese and Vietnamese targets in areas
where missile defense systems prevent high-resolution coverage
.1 by the U-2. Missions will be planned at a sortie rate of four
per month.

I The attached proposal outlines the sequence of events and

the time frame in which the three aircraft are to be deployed
to Kadena.
1· RECOMMENDATION:
' ~.

That the 303 Committee consider the appropriateness of

·I OXCART deployment to Kadena at this time. ·

I '/s/ .

1.··· ALEXANDER H. FLAX

Di1:ector
National Reconnaissance Office:
1·..
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OXCART
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
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 C05492929
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I 6 December 1965/

I MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

I SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee,

3 December 1965. - ...

I . : PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Ambassador·· Johnson, Mr. Vance 1 and

Admiral Raborn

I Also present were General Jack Ledford, Dr. Albert

Whee.lon, and Mr. Hunti.ngton Sheldon

,... l. OXCART

a. An extensive and·detailed discussion of the status and

future. use of OXCART took place· with cmi.siderable emphasis by
General Led£ord on the tested capabilities of the aircraft and
its systems as· revealed by the comprehensive statistics on every
flight made thus far. · '

b. The proposed· timing of an actual OXCART· deployment to

Kadena Air Base as requested in the basic paper (BYE 3065/65)
was not approved for the month of December. Mr. Bundy stated
that other complex national and international problems which
were to be sorted out in the month of.December pre-empted this.
Mr. Vance indicated that Secretary of Defense McNamara was of
the same mind. However, the Committee did agree that all steps
to ready the forward operating base to the greatest extent
possible - short of moving the a~rcraft - be undertaken with the
purpose of a potential quick reaction deployment within 21 days
after 1 January 1966. · ·
c. Admiral Raborn emphasized the current lack of. intelli-
gence in the face of various indices of increasing aid by the
Chinese to'North Vietnam. The decreasing reliance (due to mount-
ing vulnerabilities) which can pe placed on IDEALIST in this
theatre and the decline in the performance o:f certain random
.programmed satellites pointed to a need .for OXCART with its wide
·1 coverage and one :foot resolution perhaps sooner, rather than
later. ·
d. The Committee ·then.tackled the problem of the current
I si_ngle base capability and concluded that steps should be taken

I BYE 6300/QS
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 C05492929
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·1· .,<. · .pr.qmptly to develop a simultaneous dual base capability.
·'~:

Dr. Wheelon indicated that this would require an addition

t~ the budget for more technical personnel and more equip-
ment, but the Committee agreed that a dual base capability
I was funda·mental to maximum ·operational use of the system.
e. Dr. Wheelon pointed out.that, in addition to deploy-
I. ment and prior to eventual use, base support rights for
recovery would have to-be negotiated with governments on
Taiwan, Manila, Bangkok, and Seoul. It was apparent .that
the State Department would take the lead in this field and
I that special briefings by persons connected with the program
. might be necessary at that time. ·

I 2. NRO Forecast for December 1965.

a. The NRO forecast for December was approved· by
I telephonic vote on 2 December 1965.
b. An additional IDEALIST flight for coverage of North
·.1 Korea for December was approved telephonically by Committee
principals on 3 December (see ADIC 0457).
3. · Ban Takhli Withdrawal
I Committee approval not being obtained for Sino-Indian
.
border coverage from Ban Takhli during the months of October, .
.1 · November, and December, NRO issued on 15 November; "Withdrawal .
· of IDEALIST Detachment at Ban .Takhli 0 (BYE 3000-65), .which
· returned personnel and equipment to Tao Yuan and Edwards Air
.

1: Force Base.
· 4. Cambodia
·1.· When weather interfered with the accomplishment of the
Cambod~an coverage approved in
special minutes of 8 October 1965
(BYE 58345/65), approval for another mission was obtained from

I . the Department of State on 5 November.. 1965.

I . ·-·:·-· -

1::. Peter Jessup

Isl

Distribution
I Ambassador Johnson
Mr. Vance
Admiral Raborn
I -,::_
BYE 6300/65
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN .
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 C05492929
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4 September 1963 ·
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Centra'i Intelligence

·.SUBJECT: OX.CART Briefing f.o"r .Prime Mhiister

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and Defenee Minister of Canada

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is fo:r your information only.

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memorandum
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2. On 29 August 1963t Air.· Marsha'.1 S1emon, Depiify Cornrnande.r,

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·NORADi Col. Leo P. Geary, AFIGO..;.S: and the undersigned briefed
Prin::\e Mlnieter Pearson of Canada. on the-OXCART /KEDLOCK. pro-
' grams. Air Marshall c. R. Dunlap. CAS; ~CAF ... was also present·.

!I · at the briefing. lmi;nediately sub$equent to .the presentation .to the

Prime Minister, and at the latt.er's r:equesti a .simila.r brief~ng was
·given to the Minister for National Defense, Mr.· Paul Hellyer.

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3. The briefing was carried out in accor~a.1).ce with instructions
contained in 'your Action Memorand\im No. A-280 (BYE 4Z81-63) ·

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dated 1August1963. Materials ·Used in the briefing included photo ..
graphs of the A-lZ and AF-12~ a ma.p depicting typical training and
·.·. development pha,se flight routes affecting Canadian air space. and a.
10-:rninute film clip of the. AF:..12 and the GAR-9 air-to:-air missile.

4. Arrangements were made .for the b.riefing to be given in .

I the P·l'ime Minister's "alte'rnate. 1i office which ls located in'the East
·. Block of. the Parliament buildings. ·This enabled us to avoid exposure
to the reporters and photographerE:J.vrh o normally frequent access
I areas leading to the PM's primary office.
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5. It was quite apparent. upon being introduced to.·Mr. Pea~son,

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that his cu:dosity had b~en piqued to considerabl.~ degree by the
President's personai phone ~all to ~rr~nge for. th~ meeting •. His
initial query, offered in a. jocular vein but n9t whoily wi~out a discern-
I ible trace of concern, was whether he was guilty of sor.ne hein·ous

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. _breach of s_ecurity. {The Prim~ Minister pos·sesses a TK'fJ'. clearance!).
· we aseu:reci him th$t s·uch was n9t ~he case, aadtng "at 1east not vet".

11 .6. Air Ma.tehal Sle~on then- ex~lalned the pµrpos e_ of our visit
and stressed the ihlghly sensitive nature of ·the program.. T_he Prb:ne
Minister s.eemed .to. be most i:mpressed by the fact that a prOjf?c.t of
1· this magnitude could have:been)rought to lts. present st~ge of devel ..
opment without public ex.Posure of .some SO.l_"t and he comm.e~ted to '
this effect on several occasions during our approximate.ly one .. hoµr
I discuBaion.
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7. Although we w~re completely candid about acknowledging

I that the A-12 was a· follow•on to the U ~z. we emphasized that no··
h\gh-:level pollticaldecisioti to.utiliz~ it in that role had been made
C>1:' even. ·a.t tl\i~ point~ had been c,on~.ide:red. tn subs eq\lent di!iCUS-.
I sions we focused attention ()'n the .interceptor vers.ion. aided and
abetted by. the fiim clip whlch f'eatured. the A F-12... '

I ._ 8. Air _Marshal Slomon, ·anticipating the qµ.ery. took the initia: ·

tive_in empha.si21ing the necessity for testing tb.e aircraft and navi .. •·
gation aystem b~ an environment whiCh woul<i require. use or' Canadian ·
I a!r spa.c~.· l:le
assµred t_he Prime Minister that b.e had personally·
fovest.igated ·ttib, aspect of the.1>ioposal and. was completely satisfled
that there was no
~l~ernatiVe •. If this ques:tion had occurred to
I Mr.· Pea.rson. the Air Marsha:l's a~s'1rances .appa:r~ntly were more.
than satisfactory and the subject was .not"broacbed. again during our
~sl~ . · • · · · . . . . ·
I . 9. Col. Geary provided ~ runnlng commentar·y for the· film

I clip which Mr.· Pears9n viewed th·roughout with obviously keen

interest. At the conclusion 0£ the film~ we sumn:iarbed b'i-iefiy what
we desired with regard :to overnight appr~val and supp~rt and a.seis• .
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~a.nee as it might be required in the event of a.~ mishap.or :forced land-

I ing in Canada. . · . ·· - . · ·· · ··

10. In l'el&p()nee. ·Mr. Pea~son stated that he w.as desi~ou~ of

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providing _any ·~111.d all assistance we might· require, ·concerning··
· appro".8-1 Jo~ overflight, the Prime Minister granted same with' only
I one m1nor qualif\cation;. i~ e.. that.his
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ajiproval
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'be brought
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within the·

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framework of existing. intergovernmental agreements b~tween. the U.S.

11 and Canada.. . Re foresaw no difficulty in being able to accomplish
this an~ considered this essential political protection in the event· of
an incident. ·Air Marshals Slemon and Dunlap agreed that this would
I J>OSe no problem. Air. Marshal. Dunlap was ini:ttructed by Mr. P~arson
to review the pertinent doeuinents and to report back to him on his
findj.ngs. It was agreed that when this had been done. the Prim..e Mini ..
I ste::r would. call the President pE:rsonally, and adVise him that he was
approving our requests. (On 3 September at appro:ldmately 150()
Air Marshal Slemon called th.e under•igned and reported that the Prime.
I Minister would call the :President that afternoon. Tl).is information was
passed to the Office of th.e DDCI which had als.o been alerted by a call
from the Air Marshal. )
I _ 11. Before leaving Mr. Pea·rson we. requestei:l .his views cone ern-
lng the need for briefing Mr. Hellyer', th'e Minlster .of' Defense. The
I Prime Minister's opinion was that in the event of an inc;ident that would.
require supp01'.t and assistance from ·~he deieiuie establishment it. .
wollld be almost essential that the De£ense Minister .have advance
I knowledge. of the program if h~ were to respond with the alacrity and
efficiency which would.be deslreduri~er su¢h·clrcumstances~ (Although
Air Marshal Dunlap would be .ou:r primary contact in a situation. .of this
I nature, it ismost: probable that til.e Defense: Mbiister would bec0me
involved.) It was· agreed that Mr. Hellyer should be brie£ed and the
P~ime Minister called and made the. neceseaty arrangements.
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. lZ. The· briefing. for the Defense Minister followed. the same. pat-
. tern as that fot- the Prime Minis~er .and lit.a reaction was essenti~lly
I the same. He foresaw no problem in meeting th~ Prirl'.l.e fylinister' a
injunction that the approval be brought under appropriate clauses of ..
existing agreements between. the U.S~ and Canada.· and assured 1.ls.that
he wou.ld be happy to provide a:ny a.ss.istance that might be re.quired.

13. Although we were prepared~ as~ la.st resort ...to give

I assurances that Canadian air space would not be used in con.Junction
with overtlights of denied areas •.. unless there wa,s prior .refel'ral to
the Prime Mini.Ster, such a commitment :was ·not sought and; conse-
quently, was ru.)t :made. The Defeilse Minister did: observe ·at one point
. that such operations wquld present a ~omewhat·different sitµatlon;.b-qt
.We permitted thiB observati6n to pass. Without comment. In this con-
I text it sho.uld be recognized, howevel'. •.' th~t the strong emphasis we

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placed on the fact that we were seeking approval only for use ~f
Canadian. air space fo.r test .and training flights might bring any
more exotic use dangerously cl.ose to a breach of faith, even in

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the absence of ·an explicit commitment not to .do i:JO.
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14. In conclusion~ I \VOuld li}(e to not~ the unstinting ~upport ·

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11 and cooperation provided by Air Marshal Slemon. He is obviously ·

held in ·high esteem by tl:\e hi~rarchy of the ·present -Canadian
administration and hi!\' unqua_lifled en~orse:rne~tand persuasiveness
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I were unqoubtedly :major factors ln influencing the Prime Minister ·

to grant his approval without any crippling restrictions.

I (Signed)

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Special Assistant for Liaison
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Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
I U.S.C., section 403g)

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PROJECT PILOT SELECTION, PHASINGAND TRAINING:

Selection Criteria:
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i ' l. During January 1961. Project Headquarters established
the following prerequ\site qualification criteria .foi" Project pilot
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candidates: ' '
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I. a. Flying Experience:
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( 1) A fighte.r pilot with .outstanding_ professional
competency.
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I (2) Mandatory Qualifications:
(a} Minimum of io·oo jet flying hours.
(b) Minirrittm of 100 hours in Century series a/c.
I (c)
(d)
Air refueling experience~ . .
One;oohalf of flyfog expel'lence acco:tnplisheid.
in tactical units,
I (3) Desirable Oualifications:
· (a) MultiMjet engine ail'craft experience.
I (b) Flight.test experience.

(4) Good accident and flying record.

I b. Psychplogical Fitness:

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( 1) Must .?ossees high degree of:
. {a) ·Emotional stability.
(b) S,tability of personal affairs,
I · (c) Motivation.
(d} Acceptance of and enthusiasm .for the ·
proposed assignment.
I c~ Physical Qualifications:

I ( 1) 'Physical characteristics:
(a) Age: 25 to 4o. .
(b) Height: Under 7Z inches.
I (ci) Weight: 175 pounds or less.

This criteria remained standa..:rd throughout the program except for

I Century aerie's aircraft experience w}lich was increased to 500 hours
in 1966 and aerial refueling experience became a "desirable· qualiflcationi',

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I B. Group Ph.asing:

(1) · To insure an orderly input to the programmed training,

A-12 pilots were recruited in phased groups to insure efficient use·

of available flying hou.rs. The following are pilots recruited, date

recruited and group phase assigned for training:

Group A:

Alonzo J. Waiter, Jr. November 1962

William i.. Skliar November 1962
. Walter L. Ray November 1<_162
Kenneth S. Collins . November. 1962 ·

·Group· B:

Ronald L. Layton . February 1963

Jack W. Weeks FEibruary 1963
Mele Vojvodich February 1963 .·

Group C:

. David D. Young June 1963.

Dennis B. ·Sullivan .June 1963
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The f~Uowing pil.ots were recruited in 1966 as:

(2)
.replacements:

Russell J. Scott November 1966:.

Francis J. Murray .· bctober 1966

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(3) Summary of pilot status:

I Name EOD Remarks.

I ·Alonzo J •. Walter, Jr. Nov 62 . Returned to USAF Mar 64

William L. Skliar .Nov 62 Returned to USAF July p7

Walter L. Ray Nov 62 Fatality in aircraft accident·

.January 1967

Kenneth S. Collins Nov 62 Still on board

Ronald L. Layton Feb 63 Still on board

·Jack w. Weeks Feb 63 .. Fatality in aircraft acc.ident

June 1968

Mele Vojvoqich Feb 63 ·· Scheduled to return to

I USAF July 1968

David D. Young June 63 Returned to USAF March 65 ·

I Dennis B. Sullivan June 63 . Still on board

I Francis J'. Murray Oct 66 · Still on .board

Russell J. Scott ·Nov 66 ·. Civilianized Julie 67

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.21 Februaryl966

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MEMORANDUM
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.RECOR.O
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SUJ3JECT: Minutes· of the Meeting o! ~he .303 Comniittee. 17Feb1966

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I PRESENT: lvir, Bundy, Ambae..eador Johnson, Mr. Vanc·e. and.
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Mr. ·Richard Helms. · ·

· Gene.ral Jack Ledford was also present.

11 l .. Resumption o!-GRC TA.CKLE Ove:riligb.ts

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On the resuinpti~n of GRC ~ACKLE overflights. the al'guments
. were heard an.d Mr. Bµt\dy ·s~icl he felt the matter should be·
.. resolved by the principals. He directed the ·Executive Secretary
to prepare a. sumrna~y, and·the Sacretarles of Defense and State
c~uld determine the issue with'litgh~r· ~uthori.ty at an ea..rly date ....
General Ledford JndicateCI: that r.esumption ciould b~) construed to
m.ean a. bank of f~ur mtssions; . """ .

Z. ·OXCART ·

. The Executive Secr~tary raised the question of the decision

on.the d.epfoyr.nent of OX~R.T. 'Mr. Vance ata.te:d that he could speak
for Secretary. McNamara, who felt the situatfon had not change.cl
since earlier discussiona and'he remained opposed tq deployment
at this tin'le. Even deployment without a missfon wottld attract·
undue attention.· Mr.. Bundy asked .fo''i a. summary statement on this.
: matter as .well and.sal:d he planned to bring the status o(QXCAitT
to the a.ttentic,>n of higher authority~ · ·

3. . ..... '

Sign~d •

Peter :Jes sup

Distribution
A~ba:ssado~ Johnson
· Mr. Van~e ..
. Admiral Raborn BYE 66701/66.

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i •" MEMORANDUM FOR THE. RECOaD ·
TOP SECRET
· 29 March 1966

I . SUBJECT: Minutf!s of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 2.8 March 1966
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PRESENT: Ambassador.Johnson~ Mr. Vance, Admiral Raborn,
Mr. Richard He~ms. and Mr. Peter Jessup.

ii Dr. Albert Wheelon., General J_ack Ledford. and.

Dr. William Tidwe.11 were abfo pr1:~sent.

I Hisn Resolution Photographic Coverage of South qhtna. and North. Vietnam

(.B YE-0064-66 ). :. . · .. _·. · · ' .· · · · . · . .

I a. A lengthy discussion took. place on the merits of deploying and

utilizing OXCART at
this time. Admiral Raborn explained: th~ Agency
paper which reaomme~ded the immediate deploymet\t of OXCART to.
I Kadena tp satisfy inteliigence ci)mmunity requlreinerits which wer~ not
being satisfied a.t this time th.1·ougb the. qther available methods. i.e.
KHo.7 (satellite photography), TROJ.A:N HORSE, BLUE SPRlNGS. ~rid
I IDEALIST /TACKLE fiights.

b. Mtich of the. dis~usaion centered .around the·three principal

I target area.s .... the border, the trla:n.gle (NVN). and South China-·and
the relative degree of present .coverage. ·. Dr. Tidwell presented a
cha.rt which depicted the ·gaps ·and we~knesses of present coverage:
I the eatller limited success of BLUE.SPRINGS, t.he,inadequacy 0£
TROJAN HOME, th:e lnc:reasing difficulties in· the use of GitC pilots .
(due to stepped-up :air .defenses a.rid Chinat reluctance). and the built-in

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I hindrances in KH-7 coverage (due to weather and the pre .. programming
limitations which underline its lack ·0£ mobility for Spot ta:i:geting).. ·

f 1 · c. Ambassador Johnso,n and Mr: Vance cited the recent mark~d

. improvement in. BLUE SPRINGS capabilities with the introduction of ·

I a decoy system. ·

d+, Admiral Raborn made hls main point q_~ite clearly: Being .

I charged with the ·responsibility of not being caught by surprise, having

a major list of requirements. ·and presently having ~n inadequate
coverage by the aforementionecLmethods,. he coµld only opt for t;iie
·

I introduction of a new vehicle which was ready and gave every indiCa- .
tion of being able to improve production.

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e. Mr. Va.nee returned to the nub of the nie!.tter and stated
there was a split opinion in Defense to.the following extent: The JCS
was against deployment to Kadena w.ithout immediate use and was in
favor of deployment and use against South China. However: lvh< .Vance
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I. this time largely on the h1eue that the introduction of OXCART could
be seriously misinterpreted by tb.e Chinese.. Messrs. Vance and
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·.McNamara felt that sufficient coverage of North Vietnam could be
obtained at this time by maximum use of existing· means. ·

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Admiral Raborn felt the cpverage was simply inadequate and
cited the point that each mission uncovered news.AM sites.

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· g. There was additional spc:icula.tlon as to what signal
deployment would give to the Chinese. Different viewpointf;! showed
themselves here: Mr. Va.nee felt the ·Chinese reactioQ. could be one.
I of fear~ Le. that the USQ wa.s preparing more aggressive moves~
Ambassador. Johnson commented that they could. interpret the deploy-
ment as a despera.te measure.

h. There was additional e;icoha.nge about using OXCART for

North Vietnam. alone, but it waa apparent that once OXCART was
employed in Vietnam it would be but a short time before it .was .
used .over South China. Returning to how China would interpret
the use of OXCART, two extre~es of interpretation came to the
surface: One viewpoint was that it could signify USG intent to invaQ.!e;
the other tha~ China would regaJ>d it as simply one more in a long

I li.st oi violations of sovereignty ·which they have been recording

. monotonously. · . ·

.i. Am~assador Johnson 'summed up by saying that since.the

I Departrn.ent of Defense was indeed the principal customer and DOD
was willing te> live with lesser coverage, he could accept that and

I the committee's conclusion was that We should not deploy at this

time. He fully understood Admiral Raborn's dissent. a~d the reasons
for it, and he recommended that <iurrent opinions on.OXCART be

I brought to the attention of higher authority by the two Se.cretaries

and Admiral Raborn. at an early date.
(Signed).

I 2.
Peter Jessup

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12May1966

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. MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
! SUBj ECT: Minutes of the Meeting of ·303 Committee, 11May1966
/;I_
l ·PRESENT: Mr. Rostow. Ambassa.dor Johnson. Mr. Va:p.ce, and

~
Admiral :Raborn

Also present were Gen; Maxwell D. Taylo:r .. Mt:~ .Huntington

Sheldon. and Dr. Albert Wheelon.
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11 l. · A wide.;.ranging discus.sion took_ place on various aspects
t of dealing with the possible deploynient of OXCART.

[I 2. It became apparent that although the target breakdown for

North Vietnam was well summarized statistically, a qualitative

I analysis .of these targets had not been attenip.ted. . Th~ acceptability
of the tact that 11 targeta wotild remain uncovered had also not been.·
dete:rmined.

I 3. .General Taylor felt that a statistical and qualitative

analysis should.also be done £or the South China targetS in order to

I obtain a: more complete picture. General Taylor also made the point
that we were addressing (in the proposed deployment of OXCART) the
questiOn of surprise.attac~ by China rather .thr,i.µ tactical improve-ments

I in the war in· Vietnam.

4. Mr. Rostow raised the question of whether •. if the declsion

I were made to bomb POL in North Vietnam, this would have the corollary
effect of raising .our requireme~ts for observation. Mr. Vance thought
the answer was yes*. Gene:ral. Taylo;- felt tllat the bombing of POL in.

I North Vietnam was ne>t a consideration in the deploy_ment of OXCART.

. . . . . . . .
5. Admiral .R.8.borrt and Dr. Wheelon made a detailed explana-

I tion of the w~therb:i..g asset of GR.C-piloted U .,.z•s. They'' pointed to

problems <:>f the .Chinats wanting 11 canned·routes 11 • the problem 0£ .
the Chinats themselves becoming their own weather experts, and the
I Chinats using some of their quota 0£ missions for ·their own use. i.e.
the Straits.. Charts depictec:l a tale of woe in wllich there was. one
flight in March for South China, one in April for South China (plus· one

I Straits) and one in May (one Straits). Admiral Ra.born called this a

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hand .. to ..mouth existence ·9n a month-to-month .basis. Dr. Wheelon ·

' pointed out that despite the var.ious ob~struetions of the Ghinata. their
pilots had been undertaking missions under dlfi}cult c~;>nditie>ns>

I 6. Mr.· Rostow asked about the q~ality of other intellig•.mce

such as SIGINT for 6overage of South China~ Mr• .. Sheldon pointed
out tha.t SIGIN.T had seriously dec::lined when .the. Chin~se had shifted·
I from. ra,dio to landlines in key ~r~as.

1. Ambassador Johnson raised.the question: ,Why d() we make

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the decision· now if the recommendation is for a Sept~mbe:r deployment?
Admiral Raborn qnderlined the. fact that he had always :stuck to the
30 day stretch as the safest time factor fol' a deployment. · Gene.ral
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Taylor raised the question~ .If we a~e going to make a: covert deploy-
. ment is ·th·~re any other better time than right now? Will the:te ever
11 be a more. propitioll.8 time? · ·

. 8. Ambassador Johnson made the po_irit that the° principals h~·d

·1 not sufficiently addressed themselves to c~ver ·and contingency prob ..
a.
lems. The ela.Qorate. cover ·plans were to certain extent self .
deluaory. I.t waa one thing for..the pilot to 118.ve .memorized a set
story .but quite another (or the tJ. s. Government to _know exactly
I .how it £e1t and what it wet.is go~g to s·ay. · .

. 9 •. The Executive $ecreicU'Y qu.ieri~d whether the cani~~a

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·complex now available: wa.e not.far.-euperi()r t9"1;ba.t malnt!i,~ne.d, "in. ·
existing systems. :The. retorfwas, yes-. there was a markedtimprove•

I ment in resolution in: the OXCART $ystem. · ·

a
.· · ·

·lo .. The Executive SeeretaJ."y indi~ated major !actor· it;.\ the

d.eployment decision woµld ~e the negotiations with foreign gov~rn:..
I inents for emergency landing ·rights.' He particularly cited Ja?A:ri
.with its_ j;raditi~na a.
.. l propr.ie~a.ry_ in,terest in Okin.aw.,. Ah-iba·ssad.\)r,
I Johnson said th1s ~as a puzzler, an(!._he want¢d to thit1k and disc;\is~
the Japa.nese·aspects with his colleagues. · ·· . :-,

I 11. · General Taylor remlnd.ed the' principals ·tha:t they -sJl.ould

. not forget to address themselves to the basic question: ls.n&.\v the .
best time for deployment? · · · ·

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~· · 12. What then. in conclusion,. did the meeting decide?· First,
there would be a qual~tative judgment on the target qu~stion in .
. regarg to North Vietnam an~ a statistical ap,d qualitative judgment
on the··target problem in:sou~h China~ Second. the principals
11 would do their homewor~ on
just what posture the· USG ~ould .take ·
(i. e. contingency statements) in regard to. deployment of OXCART
I and its pl.nned :uses.· Third. Ambae.sador Johnson wo\tld explore
11 the problems sur.raunding deployment. to Okinawa that :~r-dght ari15e
w_ith Ja~n •. ·. When the aforementioned problems have been assessed.
then the ·Committee wquld be in a better position to pose the entire:
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. problem to higher authority.· · ·· ·

(Signeei)
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I Peter Jessup

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EXpans~on of Minutes .•. "
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17 May 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE.RECORD
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i SUBJECT• Expansion of Minutes of Meeting of the
303 Cornmitte.e, 11May1966
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i
At the request of. Mr. Vance,. sentence two of paragraph four

III. of .the minute·a of the 303. Committee me~ting of 11May19.66

11
I .
(BYE 66. 704/66) is expanded to read: . "Mr •.. Vanc·e thought

I the answer was yes but pointed out tmt you would ~veto weigh
i I·
against that need the increa~e·d dsk disous~ed·in.,pa-ragraph,5
! .

I of SNIE io .. z ... ()6,

.
'Reactions
.
to a Possible u . . s. Course of

Action' (BYE 44001/66)."

I (Signed)

I Peter Jessup

I
I
..
I
;

I ·.. '. ~

I T 0 P S E G R E. T

I
C05492929
II
f

ii.
I
'l'OP SECB;;E'l"
27 June 1966

II MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECOR:O

I. . SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting. of the 303 Committee, Z4 June.1966

11· PRESENT: Mr. Rostow, Ambassador Johnson; Mr. Vance.

M:r. Helms.
.
and .

ii
I. Dr. Albert Wheelon wa~ also p·~esent.

i•1.1 OX CA.RT

a. On the question of deployment of OXCART, it was agreed

that the time had come to pt'el\'ent the· divergent views to hlgher
authority. T:he line-up is approximately a$ follows: The CIA is
in favor 9f deployment and \1Se at t}\is time. The·.State Department

I is against. ·The Department of Defense is split to the extent that

Secretary M9Namara and Mr. Vance .oppose deployment at this time.
whereas the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in :favor of deployment and use
I at this. time to satisfy requ.~rements .of targets in South China:.
. The President's Foreign lntelligeJ.lce Advisory Boa.rd is .on recol'd
as favoring deployment and use at this time.
I b. Almost all of the necessal'y homework seems to have been
completed except for the area concerning the public stance of the
I ·United States gove:rnme:n,t. There: seemed to be ,some ambiguity about
wh~re the United States -stood officially on overflights of China.
At a. news conference on Z7 May 1966, Secretary Rusk. repli.ed in
I answer to a queatiod that 11 They (U.S. pilots) have insiructions
not to intrude into Chinese 'ai~ space" and later in the same con ..
ference, 11lt is true th.at we do not instruct our pilots to overfly
I China. u.

c. Ambassador Johnson said that w·e· cquld hope, in responee

I ·.to any hue and outcry. to point ta' some Chinese violation as a
causefor our. action. We must.a.void questions of basic confidence
in the U. s. government as in. the case of the u-?.
I . . .
. . .

d. A s~rcunary of the rea~on~ for and against deploynl.ent of

. .

this system was to be pret>ared at an

eariy date for preeen~~.ions
I to higher authority.

(Signed) ·
I Peter Jesaup
. BYE 67, 018/66
'T 0 P S E C R ·E 'l' 1rn,
HG.1 ,,(~lf'
..Ur:0 .,,'i~ ~YEM.ftt~
1. .:.J

tij~rtrn1 ~ys~111
~- • • ..
 C05492929
!I
s. EC
11
t
!'
T 0 ·p RE'!' Handle via BYEMAN .
Control SyE!tem

,I THE WHITE HOUSE

11 . August 12. 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Di;recto:r of Cell.tral Intelligence .

;
ii The President has .decided for tne time being that OXcART

will not be deployed.

I In order to minimize the time lag iri bringin:g OXCART to

I bear during an emergency. would yQu be good enough to ctinsider

shorten the
I
)I with Secretary McNamara measures that might

estimated 21-day deployro.ent interval.

present

f
l
1
II (Signed}

W. Yl. ROSTOW

ii
i cc: Secretary Rusk

II
I
Secretary McNamara
·, .

I
I
I
I BYE '2.7019/66

\\ant\\0. ~h\ ~~UA~l\.

T. 0 P . S E C R B T

I &oi\\\O\ S1ste\\\ .·
C05492929
ii
!
l T 0 P SE C!t 1B T.
11
i
· The Secretary ~f Defense:
\I
I. .
Washington ·
I

!I 31August1966

!1
I
!I
;
MEMORANDUM FOR. THE DIRECTOR OF CEN'l'RAL INTELLIGENCE

to pr~pose to the
11
'
·I concul' in your recommendation

303 Committee that it approve 11 test flights" of OXCART

I•l.1
I .
over Cub~ i~ addition to the present MC u .. 2 coverage.

i
i (Signed)

11
lt
·Bob
. .

\1
i ..
Robert's. =McNamaxa

I
11·
I . cc: CJCS.
Dir~. DIA .

II
I
II
I . Hancile:~~BYEMAN
Contr()l System Only. ·
I TOP ssca:s'F·. BYE~5~13 ... 66 .
·.OXCART
I

'
'·.

·---· ...... ~-~_.:..____________....................._ _ _llilli_illlllil

 C05492929
·I ~iri~i'c~, EyENING OUTLOOK

I !Spots· Lost Santa Monica, California

·1 spy Pkme . . Saturday, January 7, l96i

: ·.Test. PHot
. .
Not
..
In ·
I
·: .

: .;Nevada Wreckage.·
· LAS VEGAS, Nev. (UPI) ..

I ...:...The Air Force announced

today that the wreckage of \ :
.th:e m~ssing SR-11 super spy \'-;
plane; the world's fastest- ~ .
.I operational aircraft and sue- .'.
· .!ssor to the U2 reconnais-
1· ance plane, was located from
p 1e ai~ late Friday. :.
i A spokesman said the black, .
velin-like: aircraft crashed .
approximately four m i I ~·S
-z ..
l,Spy .Plane ,
I southwest of the town of Leith,

I !Nev. ·
· ; · . An Air Force helicopter crew·
jwho examined. the wreck'age
iSaid there was no evidence that .
Co'n.tinuelf front Pag~. l
nounced July 24,.-1964, that the'':'/..,
a i r c r a fit was "capable of ~(;"
;the civilian test pilot who flew • :·.
.the aircraft was still aboard at .·
lworldwide reconnaissance," he.:.~;;;
·1said it would be used "dur.ing.w ~·;:
the time or impact. . .. ' periods of military hostilities ·~ .~
An fotensivc ground and air \; and in othci· situations in which .•,,...;
Uu~ United States military"j''"

~
~~~~h ~as continuing for ~e . :
forces mi1y be confronting for<.·., ..;
Built By Lock11ced eign military forces." · · ~·
The plane, made by Lock- · Flyin~ at maxhnum capabili· ;:,:
heed, was capable of flying tics, the SR7l can survey · •::i
,ooo miles an hour at a top , 60.000 square miles or land or :?,;
altitude of better than 80,000 o;-,cim in each hour of opera. ··~;
cct. It was described in 1964 tiqn. It is equipped with the" t
as the most advanced aircraft
of its type in the world.
The Air Force announced
l
!·
lalesl elpctronic reconnai;<?·~ ~
. sdnce cqmpment. ·
One Other C1·as1t
· ·~
'.'."'';·J
· Friday the black, javelin-like · One other. SR-71 has crashed. ''.::·~
plane .had been missing since · In February of last year, two;::..:;
Thursday arternoon on a rou- ·Lockheed crewmen· ejected·,,.:;.
I :ine test flight from Edwards
\ir Force Duse, Calif. ·
The SR-71, made by Lock-
'"'Cl'' New Mexico during an un• ;,,.,,
dis.closed air emergency.· .... -.·1,....
One of two civilain test t1i···,,;5

I:
iuge jet engines, is a more so. Jots, James T. Zwayer of Lan-
•histicatcd and· advanced spy caster, Calif.. bailed out and.: .
·'
·lane than the U2 model in was .killed. William A. Weaver,- :.
rbich American pilot Gary . Northridge, Calif.; snrvived·-"I.
i'rancis Powers was shot down. the jinnp. . · ·"'· .u..
•vcr Russia in 1960. . c The SR71 was developed .
.. First Flight . i1·om the YFl2A triple·sonic ..in..
. Jn 1965, a year after it ma,de . ' t11rceptor. The two planes ·lll'e~l
ni~arly identical. inco1-porati11g. {~
ts first flight from Palmdale,
:alif., the SR7l became opera- ~double-delta "'i".'4 design.'.-'.::· ~f
ional with the Strategic Air·
::ommand at Beale AFB in
'lorthern California.

I As a strategic reconnais-
iance plane, it has a top speed
:if Mach 3 (three times tli,, .
!!J>ecd of sound), and a top alff>
t~dc of more than 80,(}(lO feet. \
I ';\ P r c s i d c 11 t Johnsrm an~
•1
Ii1rn To Pa1!e :i
__..,.:..--·· .......~ ........... ~ ..... ··-··-
Column tJ
-·-~---··--~··~
C05492929

I
I EVENING OUTLOOK
1· Santa.Monica1 California
Monday, January 9, 1967

··1 .

I :I~est Pilot's Body

·!found After .......
t
I · Desert Jet Crash .
: . EDWARD S AIR FORCE
BASE (AP) - The body of the
· man who piloted the . ill-fated
. SR71 reconnaissance jet last
week was found nearly 10
·.miles from the plane's wrecl•·
. age. .,
·' Walter L. Ray, a civilian test
··. pilot for the Lockheed Ai.rcraft
· · Corp. of Burbank, took. the

I · . sle11det, experimental craft on

a run Thursday. : It crashed
some 73 rnHes northeast of Li;1s
· . Vegas, Nev•.
· Ray, 33, is 'survived by his
I · .··widow, Diane C a r o l
. 'mother, Thelma Ray, of Ha-
. tana, . Ill.; a sister,. Elmora-
e;.
his

¢ea.lka,.of Elkshart, I11d.,. and

.a brother, Vernon O•. Ray, Or"
. J.nge, Calif..
• •.
. . . .
•
.. 1
.~
.I
 C05492929
........
I .,,.,- . \
( )

I AVIATION WEEK 16 Jan 67

I
I.
1. . : ..
·-:··

SR-71 Crash Probe

I . ' Los Angeles-Seven-man Air Forco .
team was .here l<ist week to Invest!· ..
. gate the 'loss of an experimental

I
model of the USAF/Lockheed SR-71
rec~nnaissance jet Jan. 5 near Leith,
·Nev.
The aircraft was. !'lbandoned in

1. flight and crashed. Lockh.eed test pilot

Walter L. Ray, 33, ejected from the
experimental uirplane but did not sUr·
vive the ejection.

I The SR·71 has been Involved in five

accidents or more. It is a two-place
aircraft normally manned by a pilot
in me front cockpit and a reconnais·

I
sance systems officer in the rear. An
SR· 71 B is fitted with an· elevated rear
cockpit and dual controls for pilot
training, but the standard model has

1· ·no piloting controls. in the rear cock·

'pit, . .. . .
An SR·71 was damaged Jan. 10 at . .. .. ~

Edwards AFB during a wet runway

braking test. The accident occurred
-1·. · after the drag chute failed during e
high.speed taxi run to test the brake
system. ,

·1.· Tho oircroft' continued. to the end

·of the . runway, stopping on the · dry
•:Jakebed.
I

The landing gear apparently failed

I as the aircraft passed over the rough

. transition area between the lakebed
and the runway. The airplane' was
damaged considerably. ;. ·, . · , .· ·
.. I

I
I·
1·
:·.

I tjl ti.•· ·0. i.: A c..- ·

..
C05492929 :· -.
I · 'I'OJ? s~ccm.~T IWJ?Ji'
GXCAR'l'

I CENTFV\L. INTELUGEi\lCE AGENCY.

WA::;HINGTON 2::;, D. c.

I OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

BYE 2369-67
I Copy ~of 8
15 MAY 1967
!.'IE:MORANDUM FOR: . The Deputy Sf,:)cre.tary of De:fense
I v{p~cial Assistant· to the Pres.ident
(Mr. Rostow)
I The Deputy Un.der Secretary .of State for
Political Affair~

I . SUBJ'ECT: . OXCART Reconnaissance of North Vietnam

I 1 The attached documeti:t is forwarded to the members

of the 303 Commit-'cee for further consideration and approval
as a.result of the meeting on Friday, 12 .May _1967. ·
I· 2. Part I delineates the requirement for expanded, .
repetitive; ·high xesolution photography with particular atten-
tion to those priority areas where the emplacement of,offensive
I missile systemi is considered most likely.

3. Part II is an· operational plan to. obtain this

I phot;ography. The plan proposes the use of· the OXCART VGhicle, ..
·deployE?d to and operating from a' prepared base·in Okinawa, to
overfly and photograph the priority areas·o;f North Vietnam.
I
I fa~~vL~~--
I Richard Helms
·Director

I. At_t·achment - l
As stated
I
1. OXCART
TOP SECRET RUFF
HANDLE V'IA BY:!:::.;:;.::·; TALENT
KEYHOLE CONTROL SY8'.::':S.MS
JOH{TLY.

I "·
C05492929 .. ,,

,,
I ---'T~o~P~~s~E~o.;;.p.;,;.1¥~T+'-

Withheld under statutory authority of the

Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)
OXCART
RUFF

·1 SAS/0/0SAAL..---------'l(J.3 May._ 67)

Distributi.on:
l · '- Special Assist;ant to the President (!iiir. ·nostow}
1. 2 ;._'The D0puty Secretary of .Defense (via DIA/TCO)
3 - rJ'.'he Deputy Under Secretary of State for .Political Affairs
(via State 'TCO) . . · '
I 4 - Director of Central Intelligence
5 - 'Office of t11e Specia·1 Assistant to the President
.(1.-lr. Jessup) ·
G Deputy Director. of Central Intellig~nce
7 - Deputy Director of Sc-ience and '1'0chnolog,y
8 Director, National Reconnaiss~nce Of~ice

I
I
I
·1 ·.. ~

'

I.
I
I
I
I
I
.1 OXCAR'l' .HANDLE VJA BYEMAN TALENT
KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEMS
TOP SKCRET RUFF
',I JOINTLY
 C05492929
I Haodle Via
· ilYEMAN. Talent ~KEYHOLE
TOP SECRET RUFF BYE 2369-67
Page 3
Control Systems Join lly OXCART .
· NO . FOREIGN DISS~M
;. ·1··.--, !
. .. · .

·I
I:
(

I
I OXCART RECONNAISSANCE
. OF
I NORTH VIETNAM
1·
I:, _
1"'-' "

I
1.
.I
I
I
I
I{~_.
TOP. SECRET RUFF Handl11 Via

I OXCART
NO FOREIGN. DISSEM
. BYEMAH Talent ·KEYHOLE
. Control Systems fointly
 C05492929
I Handle. Vici. B YEMAN
Ta.lent-K.EYHOLE
'i'OP SECREP RUFF
OXCART
BY.E 2369-67
Page:;· 4
Control Sy$ ten1. s Jointly NO FOREIGN Dl.SSEM.
I
1- CONTENTS

I A ttachm~nt I - Map - Present Photographic Coverage

North Vi.etnam .
I A tta.chm.ent II - Map - Priority Sensitive Areas

I' A ttachm.ent III

North Vietnam

- Rationale :for Search Area Selection

I · IL OXCART Re.connaissance Plan {Presented lZ May by Gen. Bacalis)

I Attachment I

Attachment II
- Cha1·t - OXCART Deployment· Tim.etablc

· - Map - OXCART Deployment.Route

I: Attachment IU. - Map - Typi·cal OXCART Ope.rational Mission
North Vietnam

I Attachment IV :., Sample OXCART Target Cover.'age Nor".:h Vietnam

I ..
1· l ..

I
I
'•:.

I
I
I TOP SECRET RUFF
OXCAR'I'.
Handle Via B YEIV'.1.....:\N
Talent-KEYHOLE
NO, FbREIGN DISSEM Conti·ol Syst.:in'ls

I Jointly

.. :.
 C05492929
I 'i'OP SEGRE'!! RUFF·
OXCART
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

IIANDLE ~IA BYE 2369-67

BYEMAN TALENT KEYHOLE Page 5
.. fONTROL SY STEMS JOINTLY

I. DETECTION OF OFFENSIVE MISSILES IN

I NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH PHOTOGRAPHY

GENERAL

1. Examination of operatiOnal limitations, vulnerabilities,

swathe. widths and othef related aspects of present photographic

reconnaissance activities in North Vietnam· reveals that it would be

I inadequate to provide tiinely and positive assurance <:>£ detection of

I offens~ve medium range missile systems if they are introduced into

North Vietnam. (For detaih see discussion of Current Cbverage.)

I While the remedy suggested in this proposal will still not provide

I "positive assurance 1.1 of detection of such systems, it appears to be the

only photo recce plan that will materially increa·se the.likelihood of

I such detection.

I
1·
I TOP SECRET RUFF
OXCART
· No FOREIGN DISSEM
I HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN TALENT KEYHO.LE

I CONTROL SY STEMS JOlNTL Y

I
I
 .C05492929 ....
...,,, ,........ ,,."'"-·· ... ....
·.~·· ·-·~ ,;

·1. . TOP SECRET RUFF ..

. OXCART
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
-1:
HANDLE VIA .

I BYEMAN TALENT KEYHOLE

CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
BYE 2369-67 .
·Page .6

.1 Coverage Requirements

2.. The primary requisite is, of course, .nearly complete

covere1.ge of North Vietnam with particuia.r a.tten,tion to those-iPriority

I areas where the emplacement. 0£ _offensive missile systems is consider~d

·1 most likely .. Ideally it w.ould be ~esira_ble to obtain thorough coverage

of the important rail transloading yards o! ;l?ingshiang ·and Kung Ming in .China i
I ordei· to detect possible introduction 0£ offensive missiles at the earliest

I _possibl~ .date~ i.e. whil<? they .are in trarisit. This n:iay ·be politically

I u11desb:ablc. The1·e!orc this operation:al pi·oposal confines itself to

the likely areas iri North Vietnam including marshalling yards and spurs

I _·in the North Vietname~e rail system ·as well as the port of Haiphong. A

second requirement is that the coyerage be repetiti~e.

I . '
This is es sentia.l in

order that new.activity or changes in the·nature o£·preViously observed

I activity. can be detected promptly~ ·.A third and equally important re~uire­

I. . nient is adequate resolution to identify different types 6£ missiles or

missile-associated equipment. Resolution on the. order oi 2-1/2 to 3 feet

I ·is needed to distin:-guish between mis.sile·s and. missile-as.sociated ground

I . support equipment and other hardware such as armored.vehicles a:i;i.d

transport equipment. ·
I TOP .SEGRET RUFF
, OXCART
I NO FOREIGN DISSEM P.....~NDLE VL~
. BYE:MAN TALENT KEYHOLE
".......iolO"•·... ;_·.;;.·~_.-.·_,;...·....;.;_.··.·....
'·_.. ,... ;:····;.;..·....;.;.--.._ _.;........._---..:;_ _...__;,_..._..:.....;_'._.. .:....·c:...·~:..........."-"-·":. ··= .. :.:.:t;:li1'!~'~1 tlt ,.~V.:RT~~A'.~ Ti°\T7'.T~T .V ·
j' C05492929
'i'OP bi!lGHlil':f n.O'F)!'
! IYKtv.LA,N TALEN·:r·KEYHOLE ·. OXCART.

I• . .
! vON'l"ROL ~YSTEMS JOINTLY

. Current Coverage
. NO I<'OREIGN DISSEM
BYE 'L3l'J-l7.
Page 7

1
11·
! 3, Followiµg is a brief :rev{ew of the. limitations of. the cu:rrent

;I ·photog:raphy on North Vie~nam..

· a. Satellite Coverage

':I · High .. :resolution coverage is currently being provided by the KH-

I and KH-8 satellites. Weather is a limiting factor ~wing to the difficulties

. .

in scheduling satellite co:vera.ge to coincide with periods of g'ood weather.

1· . Additionally, the width o:f stereo coverageof thes~ vehicles is limited,

I however, to nine. niiles fo:r the. ·KH-7 camera systen"l. and . .five miles fo1•

the ~-8. system. Because of the constraints of, the· hlgh-resoluti.on

I • •

systems, only a f_ew high-priority targets su.~h

!

as the Pinghsiang rail

I . trans shipment po~t and the Hanoi ii.nd Haiphong ·~reas .can be photographed
.... ' ! • . :

on any one mission.

I The lower re~olution KH-4 missions are capable of providing
1

I the necessary overall coverage\ of North Vietnam. ·because they photograph -. ·

an area. approximat.ely 160 miles ~ide. · Experience has shown, however..,

I that only about one .KH-4 mission a. year---they ~re launched about once a
..

I •\ .
month--finds
. North .Vietnam sufficiently
. . cloudless
.
to .obtain
.
adequate

I ·_ ovei·all coverage of the country. · The quality of KH-4.photography would

generally permit the dete_ction o:f a mis_si1e site of standard configuration,

I but betta:r resolution would be requh·ed to identify missiles or missile!""

I· a.ss~ciated equipment and to detect a well-camouflaged site or <?ne of a.

novel configuration. (S.ee Attacliment I)

I 'I OP SECRET RUFF·
OXCART
p 2x. 0 ·,.,o;r;rx·o,,.Y· t:>tQhp). ·If'·
·. C05492929
I
:1 l~fau~dh~ Vfo.
. B YEMAN Talent-I<EYHOLE
. 'l~OP SEQRET Rl,Il?1<'
OXCART
BYE-Z3l9-67
:Page 8.
Cont:rol Systems Jointly No ForeiS,n Dissem·
I
. b. ·High. Altitude U-2 Covera'le
I This recoru;La;issance aircraft, with any of its camera· systems,·

I is capable of providing the. required resolµtion· to identify missiles and

I . missile-associated equipment •. The vulnerability of the U-2 to. multiple

launches of SA-Z missiles imposes serious operatipnal limitations on .the use

I of this reconnaissance vehicle .in North Vietnam. Therefore, since the

·1· introduction of surface-to-air missiles into North Vietnam i~ 1965,. operations

of the~e aircraft have been restricted to areas outside the range limitations
' ·. . " .
oi known SAM emplacements. This has generally confined U-2 photography .

. to the nor~hwestern portion of ~forth Vietnam..

Since the beginning of the yea·:r, 67 U-2 missions have been flown,
I 37 of which covered po;rtions of North Vietnam .. · Much of the photography
. : . ' ' '
. . . . . . ·,

I ·.from these missions~· however,· had clo.ud cover. (See Attachment l)

c. Combat Reconnaissance Coverage

These missions range from high level {30, 000 ft?et} to low level

:1 (500 feet) with the m~jority between .5-:10, 000 feet. The'<:iuality of this photo:.

ii graphic cove ra.ge ranges from excellent to poor', The National Photographic

Interpretation _Center reports that it received photography from an average of·

.I
TOP SE.CRET RUFF. ·Bandle Via.

I . OXCART
·No Fo:i;eign Dissem
,·
. ..
BYEMAN Talent-KEYHOLE
· .«control Systems Jointly

I : •.

. ':.'
·. :•..

. .. . :' ....
. . ·.
"• :'.
 C05492929
I 1-fancll0 Vi.a 'J."OP SECRET RUFF BYE- Z369-6 7
B YEMAN Talcri.t·KEYHOLE
I ~t>i1t1·01 Sys tcm.$ Jointly
OXCART
No Foreign Disse:tn
Page 9

I 800-900 0£ these missions a month during 1966 and 750 a month this year.

·I About 20-25 pe1·cent .of these, however,. arc flown to prod~ce infrarod or side~

locking radar imagery--a product that cannot generally be applied to identifying

·I mis.siles. Much of the cove:r:age consists o£·~hort film strips coveri1:1-g major

I r~a.d and rail segments, point targ·e~s such as the Thai. Nguyen Ir~~ .and Steel · ·

·Complex, and: other strike targets. ·The shortness of the flight lines and the

·I narrow band of ~lateral cov~rage be.cause of the .relatively low .altitude of the
I reconnais·sance ah-craft re,sult 'in numerous. ga~s in photo co~er~ge. Mo 1•eove1·,

·tactical reconnaissance aircraft are prohibited from flying iii the sanctuary or

I buffer a.rea--that part of North Vie~nam within 2.0 .miles of the ~hi:i;ie~e bo:rder.
I Becau·se this. effort is utilized
. .
p~imarily
.
to support st~ike. operations, the ove~-
.I all photogra~hic· covera_ge of North Vietnam by combat. reconnaissance. aircra~t

has been relatively limited. (See Attachment I) · ·

1. . d. Drone Coverage

Low-level. drones--2.4 have been recovered thus far in.1967--are flown

·1 ·
at 1, 500 feet .and provide ex.cellent quality photography: T.h e low
. . d e of th e
a i·t1tu

, .drone, however, ~estricts the usable photography to· ap~r~ximately one mile ~n
I either side of the flight line. These missions are directed primarily against.

criti_cal targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong_areas • ._

I .· .'The nigh-level drone--five out of twelve have been recovered--is flown

I at an altitude aboye .60, 000 fee.t but is vulnerable t~ the SA-2 mis;sile. Most of.

I · . TOP SECRET RUFF

.OXCART
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1105492929

·1 Hu.rl.dlc. Via
.B YEMA.N 'l'alc11t-K1.CYHOLE,
TOP Sl:CRET RUFF
OXCART
BYE..:2369-67 .
·pC;i.gc 10
Co·nt1·ol Systen1.s Jointly No Foreign· Diss em·

the ~i:gh-level drone.missions have been pro.gra:mm~d over the eastern portion

I of the· China/North Vietnam border where tactical ail,"craft do not operate, bu~·

1· for missile search pU.rpos_es they.have not provided any usable photog.raphy

·I of. that. are.a, largely b~ca:use of unfavorable weather . . High-level drone

. photography is. capable, however, of.providing identification of mis.sil:es or

.I missile-~ssociated equipment" under optimum operati~nal and weather .eonditions:

·I· The above notwithstaind.ing. high-level dron~s have proved to~~ highly vulnerable.'· ..

. Thus-neither the high .. level drone with its vulnerability nor th,e low-level drone

I with its very narrow coverage, could ;rovtde t~.m.ely r~petiti~e· photography
·1 necessary for the detection. of :e type of rni~-~ile s'ites .in ~uestion ..
0
(See

Attachment I}'

I
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No Foreign Pissem
Pago· lO~A

I · Prio1·ity Search Areas

4.
. .
The priority missile search areas delineated ~n, the. attached map
.

I are a slightly modified version of those £ir~t established by the LOOKOUT

I .Task Force over a year ago. Th~se areas are receiving additional study.
. .

rn·general, our considerations for establishing priority. search areas--

I particularly for fixed .. site medium-range missiles-_.were the availability of

•1. ad'equate i·oad nets and the suitability of terrain for the emplacen-i,ent of the

. site and for mask~ng or camouflaging it. A secondary consi¢l~ration wa-s the
I availability of air defense
. protection with such weapOJ:?.S
. . as the SA.:.2
.
surface-.

I to-air missile. {See Attachme,nts II and III)

I Attachments: 3
I - Map of Photographic Cove1·age
II - Map of Prio.rity Missile. Search Areas
I III' - Rationale for Search Ar.ea Selection

,..
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C05492929 . ATTACHMENT II/PART I
BYE 2369-67
I PAGE 12

PRIORITY SEARCH AREAS FOR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES

I • Ching·hSI

I CHINA

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Page 13
Contl'ol Sy.sten'ls Jointly NO FOREIGN DISSEM ATTACHMEN'l' III
I
Rationale for Selectin$ Search Areas for MRBMs in N~rth Vietnam..
I Priority l: T,his area- -a short distance north and west of Hanoi- -is given

I :fii•st pl'ioi•ity because it already has ~xcellent SAM and AAA defenses .and

good interceptor defenses, good rail and road facilities, forested areas
I foi· conceahnent, .and suitable plain to hilly terrain .

.I Priority 2: This a1:ea ~long the rail line from Hanoi to China is given

second pdority because of the rail' transportation available and its

I location well inland·and be);lind a barrier of SAM, AAA~ and inte1·cept6r

I ''· defenses. It also has;extensive forests f<;>r concealment and-large areas

I of suitable t'erra:in. ,.

.Priority '3: ·This area well north.of Hanoi is given th:ird priority. because

I· of its rearward position·~ good roads, extensive forests for concealment·,

I and generally suitable terrain. This is the best area for defense by

Hanoi's interceptors. Much of the nor.thweste.rn part of thls area is

I too.mountainous to be suitable.

I· P;r:iority 4: Two ·areas have been assigned fourth priority: a strip of

hilly cowitry along the Moc Chau - Lai :chau road in the n0rthwe st,
I and ~ strip ·along the northeastern co.ast from Haiphong to the Chinese.

1. border .. Exc~pt for the SAM-defende.d Haipho.ng vicinity.._ ·these areas ·

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T;.dunt~KEYHOLE
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l:» 14 .
Control Systonu Jobitly NO FOREIGN DISSEM ATTACI-'LMENT III (cor.. 'd}
.I
-I V:.ould be difficult to defend from air attack .. They have good roads,' and

. offo'r generally suitq.ble tei·rain ~n'd g;od opportunity

. .for Cioncealment.
.
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Rationale for Selecting Search Areas for Tactical Missiles

I The areas for these missiles were selected-. entirely on the basis

0£ weapons· ra~ge .
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I
II. OXCART RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS PLAN
I
1. The required .pb.o·tographic cove:i:·age o:f North V.i0tnan1
I will .be accomplished by the OXCART vehicle operating from
Kadena Air Base- in 01-tinavra.. This oper~ting locat.ion at Kadena.

. has been prepared for OXCART operation for some.time.

·2 •. Operational missions wi_ll be pl~nned, directed and·
co:1.1trolled by the Central Intelligence 4gency .ope.rations
Center.· Three OXCART at1.. craft and the n~cessary· task force
'.,.
l~;·:.:.:::::-personne~ will b~· _depl~ye~ from Ar~a 51. to. Kadena.
. · . > ·· .3 • . 'With this inv~ntory a minimum of nine (9) successful

I .operational missions per month caµ be :flpwn consistent with

available weathGr. Overcast skies are a predominate feature
1· as:;iociated·:-with the monsoon season and. limit the nuD1ber of days
suitable for effective photog1•ap.hic reconna:Lssance. As the
1. monsoo~ season ~anes, the number of clear days increases
'
permitting.more. f~equent, repetitive reconnai~sance coverage.
I
,.
.
· 1'Iissio11s will be launched on a twenty-four hour alert
..
This will permit maximum utilization. of the favorable weather
ba~is •

ave.ilable.: In addition to the operational missions ,£1?wn:,

1. necessary test and prpf iciency sor·ties will be. :flown front" Kadena ..
! ....

..• \
I OXCART
maintain
ai~craft
·!.

~he
will be rotated between Area 51 and
' ,,
required number o:f operationally ready aircrs.f"t' at
K~dena\ to

I · KaQ.ena .:
; •/,'\

OXCAR'I' HA'.NDLE VIA BYE~llA:N· TALENT

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·1 ...
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OXCPlRT Page _16
I 4. Proj r.·c+
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ox·CAR-<Y1
.,l.
h"'S
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b·een ma.Lncai.n·
.l .. .. 1 ng. a cap!.l.;)'.l..l..:1.ty
. ••. ~ J. to

I d0ploy to Kadena and to launch the fi:rst operational mir.;;sion

fif·i;een (15) days a:fte1• appl'"OVal of iinplenient&.tion of this

I plan. Dependent upon aircraft condition upon arrival at Ka<lena

tlle first operational mission could be lamicbed on the thirteenth
I (13th) day after. approval- 'l'hree (3) days aft.Gr approv<.:..l is

I re,ceived the supporti11g task foi.. ce will be in place, necessary

·logistical support will be ai1'"lifted. and the supporting tanker
I aircraft will be deployed. The OXCART aircraft will. deploy on
aiteJ'.•11ate days starting- with the fifth (5th) day after aJ;>proval.
This deployment schedule is included as Attachment I to this
..
I plan.,

5.. The OXCART aircraft will be flown non-stop from

I A:r.·0a :_51 to Kadena with ·three aerial:- refuelings en.route. These
refuelings will be supported by tanker aircraft operat~ng f~om
I Bez~le AFB, California_; Hickam. AFB, Hawaii; and Kad~na AB~\ The

I ·deployment route is planned to p1·ovide for adequate fuel

-,
\.
'.\

reserves at designated recovery bases in the event o:f a mis.~ed

' .
ae1.. ial refueling o~ loss of one engine. The deployment l"OU..te ·,··>'
is included as AttacJ:i...ment I! •. '' -,.
;·('\,.,
· e. .Should a crisis situation d~ctate, an extension 'of .-'.' .
\.
.\
~- .,_ :),..
the deploY'~ent route froa Kadena for photographic coverage of .,.
~ ..
,\

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SYSTEUS .

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Page 17

·I North Vietnam and return to KadGna .. is possible •. This would

I :require two add.itional . aerial refuelings for a total elaps.ad.

i iu1e of e hours and 40 :minutes.

I 7. A typical OXCART opez'atio1lal m.:tssion from. Ka.den.a

\~ith two aerial refuel:tngs enrout~.. is inc·luded as Attachra~:rlt IIL

I S. Coverage m? tlle uajori ty of the SA-2 defended ~*l"0as

·I of Nol"th Viet11am northward :from the DemilitU!.'.'ized Zone is

possible on one missioi1 which will p:rovidc pho·tograpllic gi•otmd
I z·esoluticns fl."Oni l ·foot to 3. 5. :feet. ·An enla:rgement of. this
typical 1...oute is included as Attachment IV ... I<'le::dbi.lity of
·1 operation will perm~t several possibie variations of this
:1 route to provide addi t ion~:l coverage ·of North. Vietnam..
9. The OXCART vehicle is.virtually invulnerable to SA-2

I
I. and. other defensive systems. :in Nox·th Viet11am. because o:f its

high oporationa,l altitu(ie:, high speed and the Electronic Counter·

i·I
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M~~suxcs systems installed.
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BLACK SHIELD DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE \.!)
N
DAYS FROM 1
\.!)
'GO AHEAD'
2 3 .4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

V)
lST
z XCART
0 I TO !llllllllllllllllll
...... KA DENA
u
-<(
2ND
i- XCART
zw I TO llUlllllllllllllll
KADENA
~
>- 3RD
0 OXCART
...J
0... I TO
w KADENA
0

NPIC L- 3 136

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·~:<>.·.. :.~'}~~v:t.
~ "·,--.'4~.~;._:v.}-.,~:,..~,..:~::.

.K.APEfA· .
. i • MIDWAY 1$.

~·-·r··~~~W!A~KEL----·-: ·-=~,-r~-::tff••• .
31..:
. . . . • .. /

·1 ~AC•F•C ·~-o_c_E_A_N-+i"~~~~~~~~-;- ~~~~~~~--ili-1

I,.
I DISTANCE: ~73
NM ! :
TIME: 5:34 HRS . l
!
·1

j : SPEED:· MACH 2.9/3. ~ ,·

MINIMUM FUEL RESErE 7.500 LBS
1
1 1
' ! i
..i. _; ·~- .I }(PIC L-31 3S I .~~-

Handle via BYEMAN TALENT TOP SECRET OXCART

KEYHOLE Control ~ys tems . j
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 C05492929
I I 0 P ·. 5 E. C It E 'I' .

.I 18 "May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeti11g of the 303 Committee, 12 May 1967.

PRESENT: Mr. Rostow, Ambassador K.ohler,. Mr. Vance, Mr. Helms.

. .
Admir_al Taylor, General Bacalis, Mr. C~rl Duckett, and
I ·Mr. }.;!ark Wagner were .also present.

OXCART Reconnaissance of North Vietnam

I a. buring higher autliority 1 s we_ekly iuncheon on Thursday,
11 May, the detection of offensive missiles in NorthVietnam was
I discussed. Higher authority asked for a proposal.

b~ In response, the Agency prepared overnig:ht .a· ·m.e~6ra.nd~m .•

I for discussion the following da:y, 12 May, before the '303 Committee.
The memorandum was distributed at the meeting. and the discussion ..

I took the form of a briefing. Mr. Mark Wagner dealt with coverage.
reqUirements and the .extent of current coverage. The _second part
.. of the briefing was an exposition, by Gen·eral Bacalis of a proposed

I ·.use of OXCART to obtain the desired coverage •..The discussion

accompanied by charts, depicted a. deployment schedUle> priority··
search areas, tentative .operation_al tracks, vulnerabilities,· refueling,.

I and kindred matters.· ·

. . . .

. c. A numbe~ of detaiied questions were _ask~d. It was decided

I that Ambassador Kohler would ·address the question of political risks,

and Mr. Vance stated that he would examine the intellig_ence back-
. ground leading to any likelihood of the introduction of offensive. ·

I missiles •. Both principais would then refer their findings to -the·

c:tppropriate Secretaries.

I · d. While these step$ were in progress; a· second Tuesday. .

luncheon was held on 16 May,· and Mr. Ro stow reported to the execu-
tive secretary that higher authority at that time gave his approval
I for immediate deployment and use. The Cj.eployment to Kadena Air
Base from Site ·st was expected to take 13 to 15 days~ .

I BYE 66, 736/67-B

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
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C05492929
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I TOP SECRET

I e, The InterdepaJ:tmental Contingency Planning Committee

ls presently ch'culatlng its plan for members' approval. The
Agency prepared OXCART Reconnaissance of North Vietnam
I (BYE 2369 ... 67. 15 May 1967) as the basic operational document.
This has been dlstrlbuted to the prlnclpals;

I f. Tl;t.e authority for photogra.phic ·coverage of North

Vietnam excludes any penetratlon of Mainland China.

I (Signed)
Peter Jessup
I
., Distribution
Ambassador Kohler ·
Mr. Vance
Mr. Helms
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00/SA---9}~~---
I D/SA---~::_ _______ _

'I· DIRECTORATE OF

·1
- /::
~

SCIENCE & ·TECHNOLOGY .·

I
I BLACK SHIELD Reconna"issance Missions
I 31 May - 15 August 1967

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Byemrm-Talent-Keyhole-Comint BYE No. 44232/67
Channels Jointly DST-BS/BYE/67-1
22 September 1967
C05492929
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national security of the
.,.,
United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U.S. Code Title 18,
Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the reve·
lation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as
its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the· United
States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the
United States. It is to bt~ seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels.
Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining .
to the BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE ·and Communications Intelligence
Controls. No action is to be taken on any commu11ications intelligence
,,
I
which may be contained herein, regardle.-1s of the advantage to be gained,
if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence and natul'~
of the source, unle'ls such a~on is first approved by the appropriate
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' BYE-44232/ 67

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' BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Mis,sions

' 31 May - 15 August 1967

'
'
' DST-BS/BYE/67-1

'.,
22 September 1967

'
',. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Science and Technology

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C05492929
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' BYE-4423Z/67

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PREFACE

This report i1;> the first of a series of resumes of the

I BLACK SHIELD reconnaissance missions flown over North

Vietnam. This first resume spans the period from 31 May
1967 to 15 August 1967

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BYE-44232/67

' CONTENTS

' PREFACE . . . . . iii

' SUMMARY . . . . • .
MISSION ANALYSIS.
BSX-001 . .
1
3
3

' BSX-003 .
BX6705.
BX6706
4

8
5

' BX6708
BX6709
BX6710
10
11
13

' Cancelled flights . 16

' I.
APPENDICES

BLACK SHIELD Operational Missions Alerted

' II.
III.
Between 31 May and is August 1967
Date and Mission Number . • . . . . . . .
Radars Signals Recorded by BLACK SHIELD
17
18

' Mis.sions, 31 May - 15 August 1967 . . . . . . 20

'I 1.
2.
3.
4.
Map
Map
Map
Map
FIGURES

BSX-001
BSX-003
BX6705
BX6706
. .. .
..' ..
3
5
6
9

' 5.
6.
7.
Map
Map
Map
BX6708
BX6709
BX6710
. .. . 10
12
14

' 8-11. Photos Mission Photography 22

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' BYE-44232/67

I'
., BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions
31 May - 15 August 1967

SUMMARY

I'
Fifteen BLACK SHIELD high-altitude reconnaissance missions
were alerted during the period from 31 May to 15 August 1967.
Seven of the 15 missions were flown, four of which were detected
and tracked; there were no mission aborts. (Appendix I lists these
missions and related significant events.)

I'
The program's success in its primary mission can be measured
by the fact that the two BLACK SHIELD missions flown on 19 and 20
July provided clear photographic coverage of 80 percent of North
Vietnam and nearly total clear coverage of the primary SSM search
areas. This enabled NPIC to state, with 80 percent confidence, that

I .
there were no SSM sites in North Vietnam as of mid-July 1967.

The BLACK SHIELD program has also done well in obtaining

'
baseline coverage. There is now clear, interpretable photography
of all of North Vietnam except the Cao Bang - Lang Son area in the
northeast adjacent to the Chinese border. (See samples of mission

I photography at the end of this report. ) BLACK SHIELD photography

has also been invaluable in providing unique order of battle infor-
mation on fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

I Several missions have obtained simultaneous coverage of all or

nearly all the major airfields of North Vietnam and have made
possible some significant refinements in the current air order 0£

'
battle. The simultaneous covera1ie of SAM sites--more than 80
percent of the sites were covered by one mission~ -has given US
forces in the theater of operationsi a quick and fairly comprehensive

'
reading on which sites are occupied. It has also significantly
supplemented communications intelligence in determining the actual
number of SAM battalions in North Vietnam and the general level of

'
SAM site occupancy.

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BYE-44232/67

I .
I The program has contributed substantially to bomb damage
rssessment of point targets and to assessment of the interdiction

~
£fort .against .North Vietnamese ro.ad'. rail, an~ wat~r. trans--
ortat1on. The BLACK SHIELD m1ss1ons have 1dent1fa:ed new
otential targets ·for US air strikes, and have also provided· . :1
;valuable information on Chinese military activity in North Vietnam!·
~nd along the southern and western coasts of Hainan Island. Based 1·
J'.'n photography from back-to-back missions BX6709 and BX67 lO. ·
Fhe North Vietnamese rail inventory is now estimated to be :
~pproximately three times larger than previously believed. Photo-i
kraphy of field artillery pieces at the Ping-hsiang, China, trans- ·
'shipment point has indicated the probable forward movement of .
fhese guns into North Vietnam. .
l .
I rnitia1 detection and track of a mission vehicle occurred ·on the
~hird mission flown--BX6705. The Chinese tracke_d missions
jBX6705, BX6706, BX6709, and BX6710. Comint did not giv~ any !
'ndication of North Vietnamese trac,king; however, the Chine:se did:

t ass a portion of the track of BX6710 to the North Vietnamese. Wit:j::l.

he exception of mission BX6710, the ·BLACK SHIELD vehicle was i
hot detected by the Chinese Communists until their radars ha.d the /.
.:

henefit of the vehicle 1 s broadside radar cross section. The 'accu~alcy

I '
bf tracking in general has increased with each mission tracked. l
1
.Appendix III,lis.ts_the number and type of radar signaJs reco'rded.by
. !
he SIP and System 6 Elint collection systems. )
1
I : .

i There were no known weapons reactio.ns to any BLACK SHIELP

tnissions despite .the fact that the SAM environment overflown is
tnown to be th_e densest in existence. .. . · -!
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MISSION ANALYSIS

'I BSX-001

BSX-001 was a single-pass reconnaissance mission flown over

North Vietnam on 31 May 1967. The mission aircraft entered

I ·North Vietnam over Haiphong at 0313:46Z and exited over the

demilitarized-zone (DMZ) at 0421:45Z. Figure l shows the flight
route.

'I lQO
Chlang·cheng •
I
108

CH IN A

I
' • Luane: Prabang
,.,,.
r
/
.../ ·.. ·.
.

.. .

I'
L }NO~TH •
c'VIETNAM.
'
Vlnh•\, .

-~
\?
''-..

'I MISSION BSX-001

-
31May1967

Mission route
THAILAND
''\.-·-,,. .

Hue•
-.._.,,
\.f-1.,
~-;.>

'·~
\.·SOUTH ..

' All tin•• are GMT (Zulul.

50
'--..~.VIETNAM

\
'
NAUTICA\. MILES
\_
~
\
~t)U

68049 .9-67 CIA

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Mission photography did not give any evidence of offensive

I surface-to-surface missile equipment (SSM} or facilities. There
I were 190 known North Vietnamese SA-2 sites before the mission;
j. Seventy of these sites were photographed by BSX-001, as was th~
l Chinese Naval Base at Yu-lin. Nine of the 27 COMIREX Priority
I I targets in North Vietnam were covered by this mission. ·
I There was no indication of Chinese or North Vietnamese
tracking. SIP, an Elint collection system, did not record any ,
FAN SONG signals. There was no indication of a weapons·reacti~n
while the mission aircraft was over hostile territory.

The Department of Defense (DOD) strike/jamming operations'

during the mission flight period were light. No EB-66B or • ,
EB-66C jamming aircraft were operational during the reconnaiss!ancei
mission.
i
i BSX-003
i
i' BSX-003 was a single-pass reconnaissance mission flown ove!r
! North Vietnam on 10 June 1967. The mission aircraft entered ·
I North Vietnam over Haiphong at 0410:52Z and exited at 04i9:41Z.'

I Fig:.:i:: ::~::g:fa:: ::h::o;t:~ evidence of offenSive ss¥

any
i equipment or facilities. There were 193 known North Vietnames~
SA-2. sites before the mission. Ninety-seven of these sites were:: ,
I.
, photographed by BSX-003, including four previously unide~tified ~itei?~

I
0£ the SA-2 sites photographed, 18 were occupied. Thirteen of ~e · ·
27 COMIREX Priority l targets in North Vietnam were covered o* ·: 1.,.
! .
I this mission. ·

There was no indication of tracking or a weapons reaction by i

system, did not record any FAN SONG signals. The DOD operat~onaJ,!
:

.!
either the Chinese or the North Vietnamese. SIP, an Elint colle~:tion: !
.!,
; :

strike/ jamming activity was heavy during the overflight period. Four;!
EB-66C and:one EB-66B aircraft conducted barrage and spot jamnp.ng::
during this period, affecting numerous early warning and £ire co:Qtrol i
'!I
radars. :: i;

.'
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,:,
4 .j : i
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I lOO
Chlang-chong.
CH IN A

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I 0403 36

I
I lb
MISSION' BSX-003
10 June 1967
THAILAND

I
- - Mission route

All ti11u ore GMT (Zulu).

0 DO

I NAUTICA'I.. MILl'S

wa
I

I
68050 9-67 ClA Figure 2

BX6705

I BX6705 was a double-pass reconnaissance mission flown over

North Vietnam on 20 June 1967. The mission aircraft penetrated

I and exited over the Dl\:fZ at 0342: 17 Z and 06.41; 58Z, respectively.
Figure 3 shows the mission route and associated events.

I 5

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BYE-44232/61 · ·:1
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Chlang•cheng•:
....
- ·.c · CH IN A
'i
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•Luana Prabang

I.

Ml~SION BX 6_705 .. :.··

J20 June 1967 THAILAND
-t-- l st Pass
-+-2nd Pass
--'--Exit

ti
Chinese track All timu or• GMT (ZoM.
0
·- mu\IJs affected by NAUTICAL MILl:fi
mmmgfmm an
I unknown source
·.·'

!OP SECREf-TRINE OXCARl Flgu, e ~

-·~'l mentMission
:1 '"
r. :. !
photography did not give any evidence of SSM e.quip- ; ·l
or facilities in North Vietnam. There were 200 known Nor~ : i·
Vietnamese SA-2 sites before the mission. ·One hundred and thirfy .·;
three sites were photographed by BX67 05 including two pre:viousl..0 ·!
unidentified sites. Of the sites covered, 20 were occupied. Seve~teeP.j
of the 27 COMIREX Priority I targets in North Vietnam were covEfred;i . : ': i

;j

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BYE-44232/ 67

There were no known hostile weapons reactions to the mission

aircraft. SIP, an Elint collection system, did not record any
FAN SONG signals. The pilot did exercise the Big Blast""' manual
I jam override while adjacent to Hainan Island on the return leg of
the route.

I The first known tracking of BLACK SHIELD aircraft occur.red

on this mission. It was reported by Chiang Cheng, a Chinese

I Communist radar facility located at 22°45 1 N, l01°50'E. This

radar facility passed eight position points and eight altitudes from
0518Z to 0522Z. The initial detection range and the final radar-
_t_~-v:ehicle distances were respectively: '86~nautical miles and

' 82.: ,nautical miles. The known equipments for this radar station
consist of a MOON FACE radar and a ROCK CAKE radar. Chiang
Cheng reported jamming from an unknown source on its MOON

' FACE radar at 0509Z on azimuth bearings from 075-080 degrees.

Jamming from an unknown source also affected the ROCK CAKE
heightfinder radar at 0513Z an azimuth bearings from lOS-115

' . degrees. These azimuths, relative to the heightfinder, bracket

the second leg of the mission flight path and are indicated in
figure 3. The ROCK CAKE radar operator was probably influenced

I'
by this jamming activity and, in searching these azimuths to identify
the originator of the activity, detected and subsequently tracked the
mission aircraft. The fact that altitudes were reported with each
valid plot position supports the tentative conclusion that the mission
was tracked by the Chiang Cheng ROCK CAKE heightfinder radar.

' No DOD operational reporting available accounts for· the above

jamming activity. No BLACK SHIELD aircraft jammers were
operated during this period. SIP, an Elint collection package, was

I'
inoperable during the tracking period and thus it was impossible to
correlate the tracking data from the radar stations and the Elint
data.

•:'Big Blast, an on-boar·d defense mechanism, will transmit S-

' and C-band noise energy for approximately 90 .seconds.

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BYE-44232/67

The radar facility also rebroadcast the track informatio~ to

Kun.:.ming .some 14 hours after the mission flight. There. w~s
.,:.,
no indica~ion of North Vietnamese tracking or the passage of ~ :
!
::':.,
; !
1 .
tracking data to the -Vietnamese. DOD strike activity was very : ; .

!light during the mission overflight. . · ··

!
;. 1 •
; :
IBX6706
'i
I

i BX6706 was a double-pass reconnaissance mission flown over .'

lNorth Vietnam on 30 ..Tune 1967. The mission aircraft ente1'ed
lvietnam north of Haiphong at 0415:45Z and exited over the DMZ
jat _0644:41 z. Figure 4 shows th.e flight route and associateq
!events.
I
l
.
.

Mission photography did not give any evidence of SSM equipme:i;it

lor facilities. ·There were 20.5 known North Vietnamese SA-2 sites)
,.
.,
.:1
..
jbefore the mission. One hund:red and nine sites of these. were
jphotographed by BX6706 including three previously unidenti~ieq
;
i "i :ii
!:'::I
!sites. Sixteen of the sites which were photographed were oc;:cupied,. ~ ~

jTwenty-one of the 27 COMIREX Priority I targets in North Vietna:tj:i

!were covered. · . .. · , ""

; ;

There was no indication of a hostile weapon reaction. Sy.stem ~.

an Elint coll.ection pa:ckage replacing SIP, recorded si~ FAN ! ~ ;
SONG signals during the mission overflight. None of these signal~:
Isuggested.tracking of the mission.aircraft. No defensive systems/
lwere activated as a result of this activity. Haikou, a Chinese air i
!defense zone f~cility located on Hainan Island at zoo oz 'N, q o 0 17 ':¢,
1
reported mission track information thirteen and a half hours late. '
The reported aircraft track times were from 0405Z to 0413Z <(1-S
shown in figure 4. No altitudes were reported and the tracking
radar sta.tion(s) were unidentified. Considering the region in wliicp
i.
,. I.

':'
the mission was tracked and the fact that all radar tracks on Hainah
Island report informati.on to Haikou for rebroadcas_t, it seerps mo~t
l
jprobable that the tracking radar was located on Haman Island. Th~re

~
. s no indication .that this track information was passed to th~ Nor~.
Vietnarne~e. An ;8A3B,. ~lint collection platform,. in orbit ~urii;g !
he overflight period, did intercept ROCK CAKE signals em;;tnating;

'
jfrom the Huang-Hu area of Hainan Island. The time frame and j
jduration of the intercept signals compared favorably with those of ! .

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I the track period. This may hav~ been the radar station tracking
the mission aircraft. In the time period from 0530Z to 05402,
I System 6, an Elint collection device,. recorded a probable BIG
MESH V-beam S-band radar changing scan modes from circular
to steady to circular. This may be an indication of possible radar
I operator interest in the mission aircraft or interest in the volume of
space in which the mission aircraft happened to be. Comint doe·s not
give any indication of North Vietnamese tracking during this period.
I There were no known DOD strike/jamming operations being
conducted during the mission overflight period.
I Chiang·cheng •
CH IN A
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I
I MISSION BX 6706
30 June 1967
--1st Pass

I - -2nd Pass
---Exit
- - Chinese track All times ore GMT (Zvlu).
0

I
NAUTICAL MILU

figure 4.
I
68052 Nil CIA
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BX6708

·: :BX67 08 was a single-pass, high-altitude reconnaissanGe

mission "
flown over N<;>;rth
:-- . . . . " : - . . .· ... "
Vi.etnam,pn
.-. ; . -. .
13 July • 19.67.
.
The
.
m,ission;
. 1·
air..cra.£t en~ereq N,'o:r;:th Vie~n~qi.south <;>£ Haiphq~g: at 033.l:~?Z,: ...
i:Lnd. e~ited.·~·ver'.the. )).M'.Z. ~t '6442.i ()3$.. Figu:i:-e 5· is· a .mall: oft.he ..
~i.~sfori ~~ute"and.i:ihows associated events. . . . . . ~ ~'

I
103
CH IN A

I
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I
I
•Luana Prabana

l.

I
I!
Ml SION BX 6708
IUuly 1967
.THAILAND
I
+
I
Missionmte

.I
Airaalt P!Sitioa
at lime of siflal
inlett.tpt . All ll10H or• GI.IT (Zulu).
I
0

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I
110
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I Mission photography did not show any evidence of SSM

equipment or facilities. There were 214 known North Vietnamese
SA-2 sites before the mission. Seventy-one were photographed
I by BX6708 including one previously unidentified site. Of.the 71
sites covered, five were occupied. Eight of the 27. COMIREX
Priority I targets in North Vietnam were covered.
I There was no indication of a hostile weapons reaction.
System 6 recorded four FAN SONG signals during this mission.
I These signals did not appear to be tracking the mission aircraft.
None of the defensive systems were activated as a result of these
signals. There was no Comint intercept evidence of mission
I tracking by either Chinese or North Vietnamese radar facilities.
Analysis of System 6 records indicate that two probable BIG
MESH, V-beam, S-band radars changed scan modes from circular
I to manual to circular. Although these changes in scan mode may
indicate an interest in that volume in space in which the mission
aircraft was located, there is no Comint evidence that would
I indicate tracking by either the North Vietnamese or the Chinese.
Figure 5 indicates aircraft position at time of intercept.

I There was little or no DOD strike/jamming activity while the

mission aircraft was over North Vietnam. One EB-66C, an Elint
collection active jamming platform, was orbiting the area during
I the mission overflight period. Overall signal density was light.

BX6709
I BX6709 was a double-pass, high-altitude reconnaissance
mission flown over North Vietnam on 19 July 1967. The mission
I aircraft entered North Vietnam over Vinh at 0424;31Z and exited
over the DMZ at 0654: 12.Z. Figure 6 shows the mission flight
route and notes significant events.
I Mission photography did not give any evidence of SSM equipment
or facilities. There were Zl5 known SA-2 sites in North Vietnam
I before the mission. One hundred and sixty-six sites were photo-
graphed by BX6709 including two previously unidentified sites. Of

I the 166 sites photographed, 12 were occupied. Twelve of the 27

COMIREX Priority I targets in North Vietnam were covered.

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BYE-44232/67

~r---------r----.----____,.......;~--'---~
m« ibs
Clllan11•chen11.
I
:.1
'•1
: .

:I
• Luang Prabang

l.

Ml~SION BX 6709
I.
! 19 J11I y 1967
i
THAILAND
-+-- 1st Pass
-f- - 2nd Pass
-l-- Exit
-+-- Chinese track All 11111.s ore GMT !Z•I•).
0

I
68054 9·67 Cl Fig' ,re~

There was no indication of a ho.stile weapons reaction~

System 6 recorded nine FAN SONG.radar signals during this 1
mission. These signals ·did not appear to be ·tracking the rriission!
aircraft. None of the defensive systems were activated as a resuit
of these signals. Chiang Cheng, a Chinese rad?-r' station. loc.ated I

at 22°4S 1 N/ 101°so 1 E, was reflected reporting track inf(frm~tiori ·

on the· mission aircraft. The initial and final plot distances to th~

I
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I radar station were llO and.2"3-0nautical miles, respectively. Initial

and final plot times were respectively 0552.Z and 0559 Z resulting
in seven minutes of continuous tracking. The track plot is com-

I patible with the mission flight route, but reported altitudes ranged
from 8, 000 to 11, 000 feet higher than the actual mission aircraft
altitude. The type of radar generating these errors was not

I identified. There was no indication that this track information was

provided to the North Vietnamese.

I DOD strike/jamming activity was moderately heavy during the

mission overflight time period. United States ECM aircraft in
operation in the area during the mission overflight period were:

I two EA3B's, three EA1F 1 s,. one EB-66C, and one EB-66B.

BX6710

I BX6710 was a double-pass, high-altitude reconnaissance

mission flown over North Vietnam on 20 July· 1967. The mission

I aircraft entered North Vietnam north of Haiphong at 0367;00Z and

exited over the demilitarized zone at 0628;33Z. Figure 7 shows
the mission route and associated events.

I Mission photography did not give any evidence of SSM equipment

or facilities. There were 219 known SA-2. sites in North Vietnam

I before the mission. Eighty sites were photographed by BX6710

including one previously unidentified site. Of the,°80·: sites covered,
five were occupied. Nineteen of the 27 COMIREX Priority I targets

I in North Vietnam were covered.

A reassessment of North Vietnam's rail inventory from the

I photography of back-to-back missions BX6709 and BX6710 indicates
that the Vietnamese have a rail inventory approximately three times
larger than previously believed. On the basis ot' this photography
I North Vietnam is now estimated to have 2, 000 to 3, 000 freight cars
and 100 to 120 locomotives. Photography of the P 1ing-hsiang, China
(Z2°06'N, l06°44 1 E) transshipment point from missions BX6709 and
I BX6710 showed that approximately 100 to 130 field artillery pieces
of unknown caliber were on a nearby railroad siding. These
artillery pieces are enough to equip two to three regiments and are
I most probably destined for use in North Vietnam.

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•!1
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MlSSION BX 6710
!lo July 1967
i:1'. !
! :

-4-- lst Pass t : t

r ·:··I
-16
-t-: 2nd Pass .'
-,--'Exit .~
; - - rhlnese track i~.
~HURCH DOOR
" :;:
All tl•u or• GMT (Zulo),
·: C237C ~ •o
HAUTICAL Mil.as
JLUE SPRINGS
~SQ-190-V638
, -
d8055 9./iJ Cl!!i TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART
I
I There was no indication of a hostile weap~ns reaction to th:e '
i mission aircraft. System 6 did not record any FAN SONG ~ignalsi"
Iduring this overflight. Two other high-altitude reconnaissance . .I
/missions were operational during the BX6710 oyerflight. Th.e flig*
l routes of C,hurch Door C237C and Blue Spr.ings BSQ-19P-V638 are, .,I
'!
j shown in figure 7. Mission C237C was tra~kedalmost continuously
!while in the South China area. BSQ-190 was tracked continµously •
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' while over North Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin. Chinese air
defense facilities reported track plot times on BX6710 of 0347 z

'
to 0410Z, 0507 Z to 0518Z and 0520Z to 0527 Z. The reported
altitudes were compatible with those of the BLACK SHIELD air-
craft. Two Chinese radar stations reported track information.

'-
Huang-chu-shih's (19°Z9 1 N, ll0°22'E) initial plot occurred at
03492 at a range of lZO nautical mies and the final plot occurred
at 0351 Z at a range of 130 nautical miles. Ping-uan-cheng 1 s
(23°42iN, l03°50 1 E) initial plot occurred at 0524Z at a range of
110 nautical mies and the final plot at 0527 Z at a range of 210
nautical miles.

' At approximately 03462 the BX6710 mission path crossed the

path of the continuously tracked C237 C flight. The Chinese broad-

'
cast facilities reported an initial plot point of the BX67 10 vehicle
at 0347 z. A similar phenomenon appears to have occurred over
the Gulf of Tonkin where the Chinese Pei-li radar station

'
p9°08 1 N, 108°43 1 E) was reflected reporting track information on
Blue Springs Mission BSQ-190. At 0507 Z, BX6710 appears to
have entered the radar region in which the Blue Springs vehicle

'
was being tracked. The initial plot point of the second pass was
reported by Chinese facilities to have occurred at 0507 z. It appears
at least in these two instances that a path crossing with an identified

'
tracked vehicle enhanced the initial detection capability of the radar
operator. In the past, initial radar detection appears to have
occurred at about the time the radar station has had the benefit of

'
the vehicle 1 s broadside radar cross- section. Hanoi Bae Mai
(21°02 1 N/ lOS 0 53 1 E) reported t:r:ack plot times of 0455Z to 0511Z
on the receding vehicle of mission C237 C. The Chinese pass~d

'
BX6710 track plot time data of 0507 Z to 0518Z to the North Vietnamese
via the Kuang-chou-DRV liaison link. Hanoi Bae Mai reported
BX6710 track plot time data of 0511Z to 0518Z. Considering the

'
sequence of events it seems unlikely that the Hanoi Bae Mai hostile
broadcast was a reflection of Vietnamese radar tracking, but rather
that U:e broadcast was a rebroadcast of Chinese· BX6710 tracking.

'
In any event, this is the first known instance of actual North
Vietnamese knowledge of a mission vehicle flight.

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DOD strike/ jamming operations were light during the mission

bverflight period.
:.,
..

':''
!
Cancelled flights
lj During the period 31 May to 15 August 1967, the following
BLACK SHIELD reconnaissance missions were alerted but cancelled
~ecause of the poor weather in the target area: BSX-002, 6 June;

'
f3X67 04, 10 June; BX6707, 30 June; BX67 ll, 29 July; BX6712,
30 July; BX6713, 13 August; and BX6714 and BX6715, both on
l4 August.
!

' ~,

:,,,'
... .
; !

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. .

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~
. ;

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I APPENDIX I

I BLACK SHIELD Operational Missions Alerted Between

31 May and 15 August 1967

I Mission No. Date (1967} Remarks

I BSX-001

BSX-002
31 May

6 June
Ffown (Rt. 4)

Cancelled due to weather (Rt. 4)

I BSX-003 10 June Flown {Rt. 10)

I BX6704 10 June ·cancelled due to weather {Rt. 11)

BX6705 20 June Flown (Rt. 8)

I BX6706 30 June Ffown {Rt. 14)

I BX6707 30 June Cancelled due to weather {Rt. 19)

BX6708 13 July Flown {Rt. 19, modified}

I BX6709 19 July Flown (Rt. 9, modified)

I BX6710 20 July Flown (Rt. 14, modified)

BX6711 . 29 July Cancelled due to weather {Rt . 14)

I BX6712 30 July Cancelled due to weather (Rt. 19)

I BX6713 13 August Cancelled due to weather (Rt. 20 A+B)

BX6714 14.August Cancelled due to weather (Rt. 20 C+D)

I BX6715 14 August Cancelled due to weather (Rt. 20 A+B}

I
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I
APPENDIX JI
::1.
Date and Mission Number
:,1
31 10 20 30 13 19 20!:
COMIREX May Jun Jun Jun Jul Jul J U,i
No. 01 03 05 06 08 lOi

1J37 x
2Cl84 x x x x Xi
2.Cl85 x x x x x X!
2Cl86 x x x x x x
ZC187 x x x x x Xi I '
2Cl90 x x x x 11:
2C2Zl : x Xi
2C367 x x x x X!
ZC954
2C967 x x
x
x x
x
x x
ii
1! 1 2C968 x
** ** '
4C28
4Cl10
4Cl llA
x x x x
x
x
Xi
Xi
ii
4Cll1B
4C11~ x·
x I'
5E09 x
x
x X
I!
i-
:I
7A1596 x Xi

x x x
ii.
x x x x; ;·1·
:

·;,

~
'
.

'

7C3 x x x '

x x x x
7C6
x x
x
x
Xi
L ii
X!

x
x
x x.
Xi
Xi
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I APPENDIX, 11 (cont iflued)

I COMIREX
31
Max:
10
Jun.
20
Jun
30
Jun
13
Jul
19 .
Jul
20
Jul
Item No. No. 01 03 05 06 08 09 10
I 31 7C9 x x x x x x
32 7Cl0 x x x x x x
I 33>l:
34::< ):<>:<
7 Cl2
8A46
x :x;
x
x
x
35>:< 8A48 x x x x x
I 36>l:
37 >!•
8A49
8A50 x x
x
x
x
x
38>:•. 8A51 x x
I 39*
40>:c
8A52
8A407 x x
41* 8A414 x x x x
I 42>:•
43*.
8A415
8A416 x
x
x x
x
x
44~!c *)}: 8:8353 x x x x x x
I 45>:c
46•:<
*'l<
*'):
8B366
8B367 x
x
x x x
x
47* *'l: 8B368 x x x x x
I 48':' >l:>:c 8A423 x
•l:Indicates Priority I Targets in North Vietnam.
I **Indicates SSM Indicator Targets

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APPENDIX Ill I
Radars Signals Recorded by BLACK SHIELD Missions
:I
31 May - 15 August 1967

Mission No. of Signals Radar Type I

B$X-001
SIP recorded radar signals

0 FAN SONG
.I
31 May 1967. 6
5
Possible SPOON REST A .
Possible TOKEN/ BIG MESH : I
BSX-003
10 June 1967
0
3
FAN SONG
Possible TOKEN/ BIG MESH : I
BX6705
20 June 1967
0
1
:fAN SONG
Possibie CROSS SLOT
·1
1 Possible TOKEN/BIG MESH ·

System 6 recorded radar signals

:1
BX6706
30 June 1967
6
6
FAN SONG
BIG MESH
:1
10
2
7
ROCK CAKE
TOKEN/ V-BEAM
CROSS SLOT
::1
~ :
1 FIRE CAN
2 FLAT FACE
·I
BX6708
13 July 1967
4
4
4
FAN SONG
BIG MESH
TOKEN/V-BEAM
:•1
l;
' .

3 SPOON REST A
4
1
FLAT FACE
MOON CONE
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1 ROCK CAKE
1 FIRE CAN
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I APPENDIX Ill {continued)

I Mission No. of Signals Radar Type

9 FAN SONG
I BX6709
19 July 1967 I
3
BIG MESH
TOKEN/V-BEAM
ROCK CAKE
I 9
4
7
MOON CONE
FLAT FACE
2 MOON FACE
I 5
I
FIRE CAN
CROSS LEGS
4 CROSS SLOT
I BX6710 0 FAN SONG
BIG MESH
I 20 July 1967 0
4
11
TOKEN/V-BEAM
ROCK CAKE
FLAT FACE
I 9
6
16
MOON CONE
MOON FACE
CROSS SLOT
I 7
4
4
FIRE CAN
WHIFF

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PANEL,
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
 C05492938
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I DJEL'-·----~~--
I
I DIRECTORATE OF

I SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

I
I BLACK SHIELD
I Reconnaissance Missions
16 August -31December1967
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• Handle 11ia lop Secret
l ()

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Byeman -Comint
OXCART
Channels Jointly BYE No. 1296/68
DST- BS/BYE/68-1
31 January 1968

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WARNING
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This document eontains information affecting the national security of the
United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title Hl,
Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the reve-
I
lation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as
its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United
States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the
I
United States. It is to be seen only by personnel espeeiall}' indoctrinated
and authorized to receive information in the designated control l'hmmds.
Its security must be maintained in nccordance with regulations pertaining
to the BYEMAN and Communications Intelligence Controls. No action is
I
to be taken on any communications intelligence which may be contr.incd
herein, regardless of the advantage to be gained, if such action might have
the effect of revealing the existence and nature of the source, unless such
I
aelion is first approved hy the appropriate authority.
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BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions
I 16 August - 31 December 1967

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I DST-BS/BYE/ 68-1
31 January 1968
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I CENTRAL lNTELLlGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Science and Technology

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I PREFACE

I This report is the second in a series of resumes of the

BLACK SHIELD reconnaissance program flown over North

I Vietnam. This second resume spans the period from 16 August

to 31 December 1967.

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CONTENTS

Pa~e

PREFACE • • • . . . iii
SUMMARY • . . . • • • 1
MISSION ANALYSIS . • 3
I BX6716
BX6718 •
BX6722
3
5
6

I BX6723 •
BX6725
BX6727 ••
. ... . .. . .
8
10
13
BX6728 14

'I
BX6729 • 16
BX6732 18
BX6733 . 24
BX6734 25
BX6737 •. 32
BX6738 35
BX6739 36

_,'
BX6740 • 36

APPENDICES

I. BLACK SHIELD operational missions alerted between

I'
16 August and 31 December 1967 • . • . . , · • • . • • • • 45
II. COMIREX targets covered by BLACK SHIELD missions
16 August -31 December 1967 • . • . . · • • . • • • • ~ • 47
Ill. Number of radar signals received by BLACK SHIELD
missions 16 August - 31 December 1967 • • • • • • • • 82

_,'
TABLE

Chronology of events associated with Mission BX6734 29

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CONTENTS (continued) . I
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FIGURES

Peige
·3
I
1. Mission BX6716, flown 21 August 1967 • •

',,
2. Mission BX6'718, flown 31 August 1967 ••• 5
3. Mission BX6722, flown 16 September 1967 7
·9
4. Mission BX6723, flown 17 ~eptember 1967 •
5. Mission BX6725,
6.
flown 4 October 1967 ••••
Activity environment during attempted launch,
mission BX6725 • • • • • • . • • • • •
11

12
;13
I
7. Mission BX6727, flown 6 October 1967 •
Mission BX6728, flown 15 October 1967 ••• .15
8. '17
9. Mission BX6729, flown 18 October 1967
19
10. Mission BX6732, flown 28 October 1967
...
11.
12.
Sequence of events on mission BX6732 •
a. Missile smoke above site VN 133 • •
b. Missile and missile vapor trail • • • • • . . • • • •
.21
22
-22
I
13.
14.
Plan view of SA-2 launch windows against Oxcart
Mission BX6733, flown 29 October 1967 • • • • • • • •
:23
·24 ., I
Mission BX6734, flown 30 October 1967 • • • • • ·26
15.
Sequence of events on mission BX6734 • • • • • • 27
16.

'
17. Probable missile trajectory derived from L-band
signals. . . . . • . . . . .. . . -· . . . . . . . . . . . 27
BLACK SHIELD photography of missile vapor trails. 30
18.
32

'I
19. Fragment impact analysis • • • • • • • • • • • . •
Mission BX6737, flown 8 December .1967 • 33
20. .35
21. Mission BX6738, flown 10 December 1967
Mission BX6739t flown 15 December 1967 37
22. 39
23. Mission BX6740, flown 16 December 1967
Samples of mission photography • • • • • 40
24-28.
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BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions

16 August - 31 December 1967 ·

SUMMARY

Twenty-six BLACK SHIELD high-altitude reconnaissance missions. were

alerted during the period from 16 August to 31 December 1967. Fifteen of the
26 missions were flown. two of which were fired at by enemy SAM units. Eleven
missions were cancelled, mainly due to weather conditions. (Appendix I lists
th.ese missions and related events.)

Through 31 December 1967, BLACK SHIELD coverage .showed no evidence of

surface-to-surface missiles, equipment, or facilities. The coverage continued to
be of special value for investigating reports of missile deployment derived from
other sources. For example, coverage of the Haiphong harbor area was obtained
.(BX6723) follow.ing the arrival there of the Soviet freighter Partizanskaya Iskra,
which a clandestine source had.reportedtobecarrying SS~N-2 (Styx) cruise :t.ni·s-
sile crates. A search of the ship and port area ,photography dkl not reveal .any
such crates.

. The BLACK SHIELD program has obtained good baselinecoverage. There now
exists clear, interpretable photography of all of North Vietnam except for a. s.mall
area adjacent to the Chinese borderinNortheastNorth Vietnam. BLACK SHIELD
photography continues to be invaluable in providing unique order 9.f battle infor-
mation on fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. A number of missions
have provided total coverage of nearly all of the major North Vietnamese air-
fields. The simultaneous coverage of a large number of SAM sites has given US
theater forces a quick, comprehensive listing of the occupied SA-2 sites. It has
also significantly supplemented communications intelligence in determining the
actual number of SAM battalions in North Vietnam and has aided in predicting
with some degree of certainty the SA-2 occupancy status for tomorrow's strike
operation. As an example, back-to-back missions BX6739 and BX6740, flown 15
and 16 December 1967, photographed 221 of North Vietnam's 226 useable SA-2
sites, including six new sites. Twenty of these SA-2 sites were occupied, including
five of the six new sites. (Appendix Il provides a listing of the COMIREX targets
photographed.)

The program continues to contribute substantially to bomb damage assessment

of point targets and of the interdiction effort directed against North Vietn~m's

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roi:·d, rail, and water transportation systems. BLACK SHIELD missions h~ve ' i
id ntified new targets for US air strikes and have also provided valu~ble infqr- , !
m tion on Chinese military activity, both in· North Vietnam and along the southern
anf: western coast of Hainanisland. In addition, BLACK SHIELD missions BX6737
an BX6738 were flown over the border areas of Cambodia, Laos,, and South
Vi tnam to provide information on the North Vietnamese infiltration $.nd s~p*·'Iy
ro tes and on the major North Vietnamese/Viet Cong troop deployment areas. : .
l ' 1:
~.ll of the North Vietnamese missions as well as Cambodian BLACK SHIELD
m~· sion BX6'737 (whichextendeduptheNorthVietnamesepanhandle) wete trac~ed
by Chinese and/or North Vietnamese air surveillance facilities. North Vietnam~s.e
ai defense reaction to the vehicle was first noted in related SAM communicatitjns •!
1
tra fie during mission BX6723 (17 September). Subsequently, during mission '
B 6727 (6 October), air surveillance trackingofthevehicle by North Vietnamese
facpities was also confirmed. BLACK SHIELD defensive mechanisms were ao#-
va,d on missions BX6716, BX6725, BX6732, and BX6734. One surface-to-dir

fi;'
missile was launchedatthevehioleonmissionBX6732. Nine to eleven SAMs were
d at BLACK SHIELD mission BX6734, A change in the North Vietnamese SA;M
Iau oh tactics was observed on missions BX6732 and BX6734, when for the fit1s.t ·'
ti e missile firings occurred with the Fan Song guidance radar in low PRF (pulse ; i i:
re etition frequency) in an attempt to cope with a Mach-3 ftarget; :use of the lo*- j
PR mode permits an earlier missile launch against very ast targets. (Appen<1:ix ,i
lll lists the numbel,' and type of radar signals recorded by the System 6 Elfut ·:
col ection device carried by BLACK SHIELD vehicles). i

orth Vietnam air defense facilities were forewarned of the 6 October and ~5
Oc~ober missions (BX6727 and BX6728), apparently as a result of intercepting
trapsmissions from the South China Sea refueling area. A more secure oommuni.-
catl~·>ns posture has since been employed, and no additional forewarning :piessag~'s
haT been noted. . '

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•I MISSION ANALYSIS

•
• BX6716

•
BX6716 was a double-pass, high-altitude reconnaissance mission flown over
·North Vietnam on 21 Augustl967. TheBLACKSHIELD vehicle eµtered and exited
North Vietnam on its first pass at 0504:27Z and 0515:36Z and ori its second pass

•
at 0619:14Z and 0628:28Z. Figure 1 shows theflight route and associated events .
I
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!08
CH IN A

• CH I NA

•
•
•
•
•II
THAILAND

2t August 1967

--ht PO$S
--2nd Pa$$
--chinll$e Track
JAMMER ACTIVITY All 1;~., ••• GMT (Zolv}.
• • • "Big Blast"
- ~slue Dog"

"•
- l-Band Guidance

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/Mission photography did not give any evidence of offensive surface..;to-surf!l-Ce •

i:.
m~ssile (SSM) equipment or facilities. Hanoi was covered in good clear phtjto-
gl'japhy; however, the ability to interpret photography of Haiphong and some otp.er i.
a*as was limited by some clouds and haze over North Vietnam and China. ';rhe.
m~ssion aircraft photographed 156 COMIREX ta~gets plus fiv.e additional b?h .. us , , .'
targets. Of these, 108 were SA-2 sites. including one previously unident1f1ed ·:

•:.
si~e. Fourteen of the SA-2 sites photographed were occupied. · ·
I

'
jThe BLACK SHIELD mission provided good bomb damage assessment phQto-
g1aphy of the Hanoi electric power plant, enabling analysts to estimate prob~ble :
da;mage to two turbine generators·~ Photographic coverage of 18 bridges and 11.

:.
r~il yards yielded current information on the status of the transportation ~et- ·
w~k. · '
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!There was no indication of a hostile weapon reaction directed against the ~is-··
si~n vehicle; however, on-board warning/ defensive systems were activated du~jng :
th,e first pass of the overflight at 0506:34Z. (See figure 1.) Activity indicative of '
a !missile launch and subsequent guidance was noted on the following systeµis: • (;. . ; ,,

i:.
l '
• a) System 6. an on-board Elint collection device,
f b) Blue Dog, an L-band guidance jammer,
I c) Big Blast, an S- and C-band noise jarnmer, and
d) the missile launch indicator lights.

:•
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jHowever, analysis of the System 6 tape indicated that none of th~ seven J.i'an:. 1
Sqng signals collectedappearedtobetrackingthemission vehicle. System 6 ta;l:>es: i
a]so indicated that the L-band guidance signal came up before the mission 4ir- . '.
cf aft was in the Fan Song sector; the Fan Song was in high PRF. The :duratiop of.' I
tl1e L-band signal (20 seconds) would indicate a missile flight to art altitud~ of, j
1$,000 to 20.000 feet, an altitude compatible with the operational tactics of scpme i
o~ the DOD strike aircraft operating in North Vietnam. Analysis o"r the Blue Dog ! :
t$es indicated that the missile was not fired on a path that would interceptJthe ~
B~ACK SHIELD vehicle. Comint gave no indication of Fan Song tracking or a •
l'.
:··
..

[i '
issile launch relative to the mission vehicle; however, Comint did show that:: ' .
veral missiles had been fired at numerous str. ike aircraft operating in the ~ep·.··.·;
1111
H
i··
a d Lang Son areas during this time period. Thus. it seems most likely that the 1:
dar/missiles that activated the on-board systems actually were :directe;d ·at-:! '; .

Dpt> strike aircraft. ' ;. ;

l ~ ~· .:: ;
: No on-board systems were activated while over North Vietnam during the
si·cond pass, Air surveillance tracking (see figure 1) was carried out:by Chi11ese i
a r defense facilities; there is no indication that the track information was pa~sed. i
o to the North Vietnamese. Thetrackingofthe mission vehicle was liµiited. pro- i
b bly because of the heavy DOD strike/ jamming operations being condu.cted dufing : !
:Lii

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the overflight period. Five EB-66B, two EB-66C, arid one EAlF aircraft were
I actively engaged in jamming. Overall signal density was also heavy.

I BX6718

• BX6718 was a double-pass reconnaissance mission flown over North Vietnam

•I
on 31 August 1967. The BLACK SillELD vehicle entered North Vietnam on its first
pass at 0402:22Z and exited on its final pass at 0645:46Z. Figure 2 indicates the
flight route and related events.

l < 108

Chiang-cheng CH IN A
0

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CH IN A

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I •Luong Pro bang

l.

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I MISSION BX 6n8
31August1967

--1st Pass
......,
8camera Malfunction
F~camer~
I
& INS
--2nd·Pass
Malfunction
---Exit
All 1lmu •••GMT {Zulu).
- - Chinese Track
NALITIC::AL M1L[S

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69281 1-68 CIA

Radar Station

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Figure 2

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:$LACK SHIELD photography gave no evidence of SSM equipment or faciliti~s .
caµiera malfunctions occurred on both the first and second passes, as indicat'ed
in ~igure 2. A malfunction in the inertial navigation system (INS) also occurred
..'
:.

'.·.··
on Ithe second pass. As a result, only 13 COMIREX targets were photographed.
Three of these targets were unoccupied SA-2 sites. :' i;•
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'fhere was no indication of a weapons reaction to the mission vehicle. System
: l
;

6 ~ecorded eight Fan Song signals during the overflight period. However, none! of
th11se sites appeared to be tracking the BLACK SHIELD vehicle, and no on-boaird
defensive systems were activated as a result of these signals. Chinese air stir"".
ve~llanoe facilities were noted tracki~g the mission vehicle from 0347Z to 0410Z
an~ 0536Z to 0548Z. Two Chinese radar stations were reflected reporting tr~ck ·,
information. The plot from Ho-lo-shih (18°55'N, 110°30'E) began at 0347Z, when
th~ aircraft was at a ground range of 185 nautical miles. and ended at 0359Z!at
a IJadar-to-airoraft ground range of 140 nautical miles. Chiang-cheng•s (22°45'iN. • i. ! . •I

10:j.°50'E) initial plot occurred at 0539Z at a ground range of 134 nautioill mil~s.
wi1lh the final plot occurring at 0547Z at a radar-to-aircraft ground range of 215
nattical miles. The Kuang-chou Sino-North Vietnamese liaison facility was ~~­
fleeted passing track information on the mission vehicle to the North Vietnam~se i. : .

Tls
frqm 0356Z to 0410Z; a rebroadcast of the same information occurred at 0419z.
was the second* noted passage of track information by the CIW'!ese to ~he
No th Vietnamese. Analysis of the tracking data of BX6718 indicated: that frQi'n
hi e to eleven minutes elapsed between initial detection by the Chinese Ho• lo-sijih '!. ; !

;,.•
ra~ar station and the passage of the report to Hanoi. Significantly t this report~~g
time delay enabled the BLACK SHIELD vehicle to complete the first pass oV,er
th~ SA-2 threat zones prior to th~ initial air surveillance early warning.
l : l '

~trike/jamming activity by US aircraft was very light during the· overflight

petiod. with one EB-66C and one EB-66B operating in the vici:r:iity from 040:2z
to :0505Z. ·

,,.•
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BX672.2
I'BX6722
~
was a double-pass. high-altitude reconnaissance mission flown oyer ; i

,,.•
N rth Vietnam on 16 September 1967. The BLACK SHIELD vehicle entered and
e ited North Vietnam on itsfirstpassat0412:57Z and 0423:52Z and on-its sec9nd
p1'ss at 0524:04Z and 0534:20Z. Figure 3 shows the mission route and associsited.
e ents. ;
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j*The fi.rst occurred on BLACK SHIELD mission BX6710 flown on 20. July 1~67. :
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The weather in the target area was much worse than anticipated, with most of

I the target area under heavy cloud cover. The mission aircraft photographed 45
COMJREX targets in the North Vietnam/China area. Seventeen of these targets
were Vietnamese SAM sites. four of which Were occupied. Photography gave no
evidence of SSM equipment or facilities.
I There was no indication of a hostile weapons reaction. System 6 recorded two

•I
Fan Song signalsduringthismission.butthesesignals did not appear to be track-
ing the mission aircraft, and no defensive system was activated by these signals.
Chinese air surveillance defense facilities reported track plot times on this mis-
sion of0409Zto0418Z,0423Zto0431Z.and 0537Z to 0553Z. The plot from Pai-se
(23°56 'N, 106°37 'E) began at 0417Z at a radar-station-to-aircraft ground range of
128 nautical miles and ended at 0418Z at a ground range of 105 nautical miles.

I I
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CH IN A

•
Chiang-<hen90
CH IN A

•
• • Luan9 Prab<l!19

•
I.

•
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THAILAND
MISSION. BX 6722
16 Seplember1967

•
-l6 ·-1s1 Pass
- - 2nd Poss
- - Chinese Track
All tlau on GMT (Z.uht),

•
o Rodar Station

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TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART B YE-1296( 68 . :I
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Thej initial plot from Chiarig-cheng occurred at 0428Z at a· radar-to-aircraft
gro'1nd range of 140 nautical miles, and the final plot occurred at 043.lZ at ja 1
;
11
gro~nd range of 160 nautical .miles. North Vietnam's host.He broadcast facility ~t
·I
•..•
Han;oi was again noted :i:-eflecting the Chines~ air surveillance plot information ~f
the /BLACK SHIELD vehicle. . :.
I :.
qne EB-66B and one EB-66C active ECMplatformswere in operation over the '
Gul~ of Tonkin from 0254Z to 0502Z. •
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. BX6723

, LACK SHIELD mission BX6723 was a double-pass, high-altitude reconna!s-

ce mission flown over North Vietnam on 17 September 1967. The BLACK
S; ELD vehicle entered and exited North Vietnam on its first pass at 0353:4'.lZ
,. ;

. '

.! •.
anif 0404:08Z and on its second pass at 0511:57Z and 0520:11Z. Figure 4 depicts
tht mission flight route and significant eve~ts.
'
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Hanoi, Haiphong and the Chinese border area were covered in clear photo- ,,
grkphy; only about 10 percent of the target area \,YRS cloud covered. Mission pho~o-
' gr~phy gave no evidence of SSM facilities or equipment. Even thoughthe SoV:iet
'
..•
;:.
fr¢ighter Partizanskaya Iskra, an alleged carrier of SS-N-2 (styx) c~uise m~s­
si~es, was noted berthed and with all five hatches open, a search of the ship !/-nd
;;.
~ ~ . .
th~ port area failed to detect any ss.. N.. 2 crates or equipment. Mission pho to- ·
1
grllphy also proviped bomb dam0rge assessment of the port areas and land tra~s­
portation network. The BLACK SHIELD vehicle photographed over 200 COMIR;EX
tatgets of North Vietnam and China. Approximately 150 of these were No!rth ' '

Vietnamese SA-2 sites, including four newly identified sites. Nineteen of the sA-2
siies photographed were occupied. ' i
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!There was no indication of a hostile weapons reaction; however, Ne>;rth
v~·etnamese SAM communications did revealahostileintent. At 0352z a SAM ~ite
(p ssibly located. at 21°05'N, 106°19'E) was instructed to go to a "condition oiie,, ;··
•••
b his regimental contr.oller. ("Condition one" in Soviet/Vietnamese terminolpgy
defines the highest readiness state of a SAM site,) Comint indicated that the f?i~e
tr~cked the vehicle with its acquisition radar but was unsuccessful with its :fan :

:!.
f .;
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S9~i~~nc~ r~~a.!'.!.J!e~~rences. to the v:~~ic~~~-s .. ~.~-Y~ry ~ast" speed, a;nd al!_i!P-~~"'· ' .
-01r2s,ooo meters (82,000 feet), were notedmthe North Vietnamese SA~ co~u- ;
· ni9ation. Comint indicated that a second site (located at 20°59'N, 105°34'E) was • ; I

unjsucoessful in its attempt to pick up the vehicle on its guidance or acquisit~on . ''
. r~~ars. The firstmentionoftheBLACKSHIELDairoraft by the North V·ietnam~se :
'j
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.•
S1M air defense system occurred on mission BX6723. . '. , '
bystem 6 recorded five Fan Song signals during the overflight, no~e of w~.?h ' .
adi>ea:red to be emanating from sites tracking the BLACK SHIELD vehi?le;; no · !

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defensive system· was activated as a result of these signais. This i's the first
I BLACK SHIELD mission with complete, unbroken air surveillance tracking of
the vehicle while over North Vietnam. This air surveillance tracking was carried

• out by elements of the Chinese air defense system and passed to the North Viet-
namese. Three Chinese radar stations were reflected in this exercise: Chia>;l.g-,
cheng, Hsin-hsing (19°55'N, 109"32'E), and Tung-1.ruan-shao (23°18'N, 101°22'E).

•I
The Chiang-cheng radar station' a· initial detection of the vehicle occurred· at
0513Z at a radar-to-aircraft ground range of 108 nautical miles, and the final 1
plot, at 0517 at a ground range of 218 nautical miles. ·

There was no indication of any DOD strike/jamming activity being conducted

durin~ -~h:e overflight period.

I !o Tung.kuan-shao ·
(231BN/10122EJ
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MISSION 8X 6723
17 s.,ple'!'ber1967

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-15 - - 1st Pass
- - 2nd Pass
- ·- chinese frock

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o Radar Station
1 SAMSite

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BX6725·.·
.
'X6725 was a high-altitude, double-pass. reconnaissance mission flown ov~r
:
;,. i:I··
; '. .

N? th Vietnam on 4 October 1967 •.The mission aircraft entere~ and exited Nor;fu
Vi~ nam on its first pass at 0342:34Z and 0348:50Z and on lts second pass ;at
050l1:41Z and 050"9:28Z, It intercepteq two Fan Song signals on the first paS,s.,
whi.bh activated the on-board defensive systems, but there was no indi~ation o~ a
mi~sile launch. No threat signals were intercepted during the. second paS,s. Figu~e
. 5 iidioates the mission route and other significant events,. '
;.,J.
BLACK SHIELD mission BX6725 obtained clear photography ofover ·40 percent : :
of the country, including the Hanoi, Haiphong, and Thai Nguyen areas aJ.ld the k~y
Pin!g-hsiang and Dong Dang transshipment points on the Chinese/North Vie'.t"."
:I
.1.:·1
narfiese border. Mission photography revealed for the first time the pl".esence iof ';
artjiored vehicles on flatcars at Ping-hsiang, China, where combat ~quipment
had; been limited heretofore to field artillery and AA guns. Mission photography
gav!e no evidence of SSM deployment. The BLACK SHIELD vehicle photograph~d
18~ COMIREX and 16 bonus targets. Of these, 154 were SA-2 sites, inc?luding 18 ~ ;. .
thaf were occupied. · '
I .
1.! 0335Z, the Kuang-chou District bro~dcasttheinitialdetection of t~e BLAGK
SH:.~ELD vehicle with a first~plotreporttimeof0333Z. The Hanoi Bae Mai hos~le
brQadcast, upon reception of the Kuang-chou transmission of 0335Z, began r~­
tr · itting the track of the BLACK SHIELD vehicle. At 0338Z a SAM battalion,
m t probably the one located at site VN 64 (21°09 'N. 105°45 'E), alerted the senior
,.I
•
re imental SAM controller to the approach of ahigh-altitude, "very fast,, target
at a range of 108 nautical miles. (This detection range is compatibl~ with the
·Sp on ·Rest .A radar, one of which is collocated with the battalion af-si~e VN 6•• )

•
Sh rtly after entry into North Vietnam. (0342:34Z), the BLACK SHIELD vehiqle ·•
int roepted Fan Song signals (0343:39Z), which in turn activated the Mad Moth .
jan).mer. !
I . i
1ccording to Comint, two SAM battalions located in the Hanoi area at sites
VNI 64 and VN 142 (20°58'N, 105°57'E) were actively tracking the mission duripg
th~· time period. A message interc~pted two days later on 6 October, reflect(3d
•
•
the SAM controller at site VN 142 conversing with his regimental contr~ller. The
for er stated, "Several units picked up the target, the SR-71 .•.. We oould1!1't
pie it up because it was too fast ••. • Those that picked it up lost it withi11 3

•
m · . utes." These statements of 6 October coincide with the events of 4 Octobt:lr,
Pi~ Peg warning/OF lights located in the cockpit also indicated threat activity
emiinating from the Hanoi, Phuc Yen areas. Comint. Elint, and photography .11 ··
su~gest that site VN 64 was attempting a missile launch. T~~ .. i.!litia~ Fan Sopg

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I IowO:-:P:tfF <le.iection railge cit 57· nautical and miles

lrifu. ancfouf-of high the ·switch
PRF at 32 and 30 nautical miles are compatible with known SAM operations.
I Although the SAM battalion at VN 64 tracked the mission vehicle in the high-PRF
mode for approximately 60 seconds,asshowninfigure s. it did not launch a mis-
sile. As apparent from the plot of ground range versus time in figure 6t the off-
·I set range betweenthemissionflightpathandSAM site VN 64 was 24.7 nm. Hence,
had a missile launch been attempted by this unit, no possible threat to the BLACK
SHIELD vehicle would have resulted.

I Tracking ·of the BLACK SHIELD vehicle was reported by Chinese and North
Vietnamese air defense echelons from 0333Z to 0401Z and from 0501Z to 0601Z.
(The.q~n.ese air_.su~.~~llan<?e auth:o~iUes ~ve apparentl:y given position pl~~~ of

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I MISSION ax 6725
'4 October1967
- - 1 s t Palll

I --2nd Pon
--Chinese Track

o Radar Slalion
Ari 11,.es .,. GMT (Zolo).

I l SAM Site

Flgure 5
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~VfU 1-411 "'"
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Ii Figure 6. Activity Environment during Attempted Launch, Mission BX672,5
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•
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thej 'BLACK SHIELD vehicle a special "trinome" and designated the tr1nome fpr
pribrity passage. This high priority for passage of special trinome messages h;:ts
enlbled the Chinese to reduce positionplotroutingdelay times by 4 to 6 minuttis.
Th elapsed time from initial detection by a Chinese facility to rebroadcast '!Y
Ha. oi is now on the order of 1 to 3 minutes. This of course gives the Vietnamese
SA 2 system more time to prepare for an engagement.) There was no indicat~on
of racking by North Vietnamese air surveillance facilities on this mis'siop. TWo
lb.

:I;
Cmnese radar stations. Hsi-chi (21°34'N, 108°28'E) and C,hiang-cheng (22°451N,
IO 0 50'E) were noted reporting tracking on the vehicle. The Hsi-chi rad;ar stat~on
ini ially detected the vehicle at a ground range of 138 nautical miles and trac:t<~d
it tjo 140 nautical miles in the period from 0340Z to 0346Z. Chiang-cheng initia~fy
tranked the vehicle at a ground range of 128 nautical miles and carried it outjto
254 nautical miles.
I
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•1•
,•.
I

~
should be noted that seven DOD strike/reconnaissance aircraft were active ;
du ing the SAM activity of the first pass, while 57 strike, four ECM~Iron HS:nd
ai 1craft were active during the tracked but uneventful lj!econd pass. : · !· . 1.

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I
BX6727
I BLACK SHIELD mission BX6727 was a single-pass reconnaissance mission
flown over North Vietnam on 6 October 1967. The mission vehicle. entered North
I Vietnam at 0233:36Z and exited at 0~51Z. Figure 7'"shows'"the route anifasso-
ciated events. .

•I Mission photography gave no evidence of SSM facilities or equipment. Overa1i

photography was good although scattered clouds covered approximately 40. per.,..
cent of the target area. Thirty-six COMffiEX tar.gets were photographed by this
single-pass mission. Nine of these were SA-2 sites;> but occupancy could not be
determined•

• CH IN A

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MISSION 8X 6727
60ctober)967

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- - - Chinese/N. Viet.
Track
- - Chinese Track

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SAM Site

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$ystem 6 recorded seven F·an Song signals duringthe mission overflJght. Ndne
of !these signals appeared to be tracking the vehicle, and no on-board. defens~ve
!I
sy~tems were activated as a result of these signals. At 0128Z the SAM battal~on
at !VN 142 was informed, "From 0210Z on, there will be an SR-71 •• ~.·Be· re~~Y
to! battle." This warning message was pass~d 51 minutes prfor to,the ini:t'ial
detection of the mission vehicle by Chine·se radar facilities. (Action w~s taken! to . !
determine the ·original source of this forewarning, but results were negatite.
Such a forewarning is significant in that it provides the North Vietnapiese w~th
a~ple time to ·prepare whatever defenses they might choose: to use against ~he
.:.
..

BI1ACK SHIELD v~hicle.) Four SAM.,battalions·were noted in Comint reacting: to

;!··:
. ;

th~s mission aircraft, ·but there was no indication of launch activity by. ant: of
th4m. The mission· flight path was well north· of these SAM sites (see figure i7);
tw~ of the battalions, located by Comint at sites 142 and 148, were offset 60 ~nd
65jnautical miles from the mission vehicle,s track. · !· .
; :.:.
.

bhinese and North Vietnamese air defe:qse facilities were noted report~g
tr4cking of the BLACK SHIELD vehicle from 0219Z to 0253Z. Bai Thu~rtg
(1!? 0 52'N, 105°23'E) is the first North Vietnamese radar station where a traok•
in~ report of the BLACK SHIELD vehicle was intercepted. Bai Thuon'g detected
:

•. •••• ~

•.
.,
: ! .
the vehicle at 0237Z at a ground range of 156 nautical miles and continued . i . -
tr4cking it out to a range of 172 nautical miles. Three Chinese radar •station~--:
Sa~-pao-ohi (23°05'N, l04°33'E) and Chiang-cheng in China and Dien Bien 11.hu
::

;,··
(2t°l8'N, 103"0S'E) in North Vietnam--reported initial detection and final traqk- ~ l

. inq; ranges respectively of 56-248 nautical miles, 142-~29 nautical miles, ~nd
18p-64 nautical miles. The reported tracks and altitudes were in general coin-
pafible with those of the mission aircraft,
! . .
.' ''

•••
puring the overflight period one EB-66C and one EB-66B jamming,platfortns
w1re active. Strike activity was very light during this time frame. 1
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1- . . :. . . . .. ~X6728. -· ;
!BLACK SHIELD mission BX6728 was a double-pass, high-altitude :reoonna;i.s-
i,
•••
i

:•.•
. sapce mission flown over North Vietnam on 15 October 1967. The miss~on vehi~le
e'°!tered and exited North Vietnam on its first pass at 0312:32Z and 0324:10Z *nd
o~ its second pass at 0424:47Z and 0425:55Z. Figure 8 is a plot of the miss~ort
flirht route and other associated events. J

. r
~:rtensive clouds limited cl.ear coverage to about 10 percent of the photo~~p!\led
\

!.;;.
ar ea.. Mission photography gave no evidence of SSM equipment or fac1llt1~s.
'' .
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I
:.• BLACK SHIELD photographed 19 COMIREX targets, seven .of which.were SA-2
sites. One new SA-2 site was identified, but none of the sites photographed was
occupied.

In the period from 0025Z to OlllZ, warningmessages were passed from au-

•• thoritative Chinese echelons to Chinese radar stations. These messages informed

tpe stations, ''Today there will be a high-altitude, high-speed situation; complete
preparations." BX6728 was the second BLACK SHIELD mission to be preceded
l;>y forewarning. Correlation of the time of intercept of the BX6728 warning mes.:.

•
sages with those of BX6727 indicated a probable tip-off from the South China Sea
:refueling area. A more secure communications posture has since been employed
in · the refueling area,· and no more forewarning messages have been noted •

• I
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MISSION BX 6728

,. . 15October1967

•
- - ht Pass
- - 2nd Pass
- - Chinese Track
All timu or~ GMT·(Zvlv)•

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~ecorded Th~ sig~l
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s;.stem 6 one Fan Songsignalduringthe overflight period.

did lnot appear to be emanating from a site tracking the' mission vehicle, a;ikf nb·
defe1nsiv·e mechanism was ·activated as a result of this intercept. · . i· :;
:.1
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I , .. ~ ..
Chinesie and North Vietnamese air de~ense facilities were noted r:e~ect1tfg
''
1;
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tracking data on the mission vehicle from 0323Z to 033$Z. The latter nionitore\!F
the /Kun-ming sector .. broadcast and'·rebroadcastthe BLACK SHIE'Lb tra'~k ove'.:r;·
the lHanoi Bae Mai. facility.
. · .. ., · · · .. .. :·· ...·· ,, n1
~ '.

;.
!
A~a'~lable
information .indicated little or n~ strike/jamm~g operat1onifdurirlg ;.;i • .
'. ~ :.

the overflight period.

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BX6729
-.'··•'
! :

~x6i29 was a double-pass re~onnaissan~e ~is~ion flown ove~ North Vietnahi ii;
on !18 October 1967. The mission vehicle entered and exited North Vietnam 6n
its !:first pass .at 0346:432 and 0355:562 and on its second pass at 050~:23Z. at>.4
051)3:47Z. Figure 9 is a display of the vehicle flight route and air sui-veillanee
trafking.
I .
'
,
;. ~ . .

01~1~t~~e:!n~~t~;~~!lp~C:go:;:~~~d~:e~18!~~! ~~~::::x:!~!tt~~ ~~u:!i~~~i: ·; 111

to-~'urface missile search area, but there was no evidence o:f SSM deploymetlt~ · :;
Co stru.ction activity by Chinese engineer. s. of Yep. Bai airfield was noted in mi~­ i ~ ,

•
sio photography. The mission aircraft photographed 193 COMIREX targets. 1~3
of }vhich were SA-2 sites. Sixteen of these SA-2 sites were occupieddncludibg .. ill;
:
o:i~ newly identified site. Dummy SA-2 missiles were noted oooupying;one SA~2 · ~ .

Slj· .
. .
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~ystem 6 recorded one Fan Song signal. This signal was not tracking the air- . '
'
crtft, and no on-board defensive systems were activated during the overfligr..
'I
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hinese and North Vietnamese air defense facilities were noted reporting trao).t-
in of the BLACK SHIELD vehicle with inclusive plot times from 0334Z to 040~Z
an from 0503Z to 0533Z. The Chinese radar station Chiang-cheng de~ected ~nd
tr eked the vehicle from 0355Z to 0404Z and from 0504Z to 0512Z. The cor~­
;.. ;.
;

:,
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sp. nding radar station vehicle to ground ranges for these times were reapectiv~ly
I ; .
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161 :. : !

!!
- . TPl? ..SmG~E'f TRm~J?:~X~;RT
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I
I 100-240 nautical miles and 124-253 nautical miles. The North Vietnamese radar
station at Vinh (18°45'N, 105°43'E) was noted rebroadcasting the track of the
vehicle from 0400Z to 0425Z.

I No .strike/jamming aircraft were noted in operation during the first pass. Two
EB-66· active jamming platforms were inopera.tionduringthe second pass. Over-
all signal density was light.
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. (IS05N/!!210f)
THAILAND
I MISSION BX 6729
l60doberl967
-16 - - 1 s t Pass

I - - 2nd Pass
- - .., Chinese/N. Viet.
· Track AU timu or• CUT (Zulu).

- - Chinese Track

I. o Radar Station

69189 1-68 OA. TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART Figure 9

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• BX673~_
.. . ·:, ; . I
!BLACK SHIELD mission BX6732 was a double-pass, hlgh-altitude reoonnais-: t
s~'nce mission flown over North Vietnam on 28 October 1967. The first pi:\.ss ·
1:
e tered North Vietnam at 0353:25Z and exited at 0406:12Z; the second p~ss . ; :
;

e tered at 0503:53Z and exited at 0511:44Z. A missile was fired at the vehi.cle ·
dqrtng the second pass at 0508:36Z. Figure 10 portrays the BLACK SHIELD fl~ght :
route and associated events.
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iBX6732 photography gave no evidence of SSM deployment. A probaij1e rail~to­
r ad transshipment point was shown under construction near Ho-kou, Chlna,
a ross the border from Lao Cai, North Vietnam. BX6732 provided good cover~ge
o I all six major airfields in North Vietnam. With the exception of Haiphopg/pat
B~ Airfield, all appeared to be serviceable. The mission aircraft photograpP,ed ·
167 COMIREX targets and seven bonus targets. Of these. 120 were North V~~t- ;
I
;
ntimese SA-2 sites, 14 of which were occupied. ·. : ·•
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jSystem 6 recorded four FanSongsignalsduringthe first pass of the overfli~ht.
:
;
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These signals did not appear to be emanating from radars tracking the vehicle;
nd on-board defensive systems were activated because of these sign~ls.
I
!During the second pass, System 6 recorded three Fan Song signals, two of · ·
. : .. I
w~oh were tracking the vehicle. Correlation of all information of thifl overflight ·
sllowed that North Vietnamese SAM site VN 133 launched a single, albeit unsho- ..
c~ssful, missile at the mission vehicle. This was the first known missile fi~ing ·
; I
at! a BLACK SHIELD vehicle by the North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile lair · ! :

d~fense system. Comint indicates that site VN 133 and an unidentified site w~re. '
I
ti ; :
tr~king the vehicle and that the former launched one missile. Figure 11 sh~ws . ;
;

active environment during the overflight. Analysis of Comint and Systetri 6 ·

ta es gives evidence of a missile launch while the Fan Song radar: was in !the
lo~ -PRF mode (1,200-1,265 pps). Prior to this mission, all known i~unches by
S -2 systems occurred when the Fan Song radar was in the high...PRF mpde
I
:
(21'400-2 1530 pps). The low-PRF launch mode would require some modification
inl the SA-2 system; such modification probably was performed in the-field. 'lthis :
cliange in procedure was an attempt to cope with a Mach-3 target. (The SA-2 i ;
.'
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sYistem was designed for a maximum target velocity of Mach 2.) · ;

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IFigure 12 shows two photographs from this mission: one of mis'sile sm~ke
;
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al)ove site VN 133 and the other of a missile (with missile vapor trail), wlltch ·' :

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I was probably fired by site VN lSS at the· BLACK SHIELD vehicle. The s"tecond ·
photograph also shows the missile flight path was then down and away from. the
BLACK SHIELD vehicle flight path.
I
The low... PRF launch mode extends the launch window of the SA-2 system (see
I figure 13.) However, even though this tacti~ maximizes system capability against
a nonjamming Mach-3 target, the kill probability with the ECM equipment now on
board the BLACK SHIELD vehicle remains essentially unchanged. The ECM equip-

I ment appeared to perform well against this first firing at the mission aircraft.
While the lo_w-P_RF l_~unoh mode allows missile firings at ranges greater tha": ..~he.

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!(!!)

Chiong-cheng
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MISSION f:\X 6732
280<1ober1967
- - h i Poss

I --2nd Pass
- - Chinese/N. Viet-
Track

o Radaf Station

I ,.,.... SAM Activity

...
Figute 10
69290 l-<18 CIA

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105 105 30 106 106 30 Figure 11

I _ \_
'P.~ Sequence of Events
BX6732
2130 -

I
'"-" 28 Odober1967
"~:-:,~~;

'\Jl"\
I 1

I o.soa,02.s \
I

I \'\,_ .
0508')6.8
Oj•«.2
. ). r-~
I -'-~

- - INS plot
- - - Blue Dog

I -:---- Mad Molh

- - Fan Song Lo PRF
- - - Fan Song Hl PRF
- l-Band signal

I -
1 Occupied SAM slle
SAM track
- - Target 02imuth
TOP SEERET

I TRINE OXCART - - - Missile firing azimuth y

o,
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I normal high-PRF launch range of 32 nautical miles, this particular missile launch
occurred at a range of 25.2 nautical miles. The regimental controller criticized

I the SAM battalion controller for launching late, especially after the regimental
controller had ordered a firing at 32.5 nautical miles.

Air surveillance tracking of the vehicle was carried out by Chinese and North
I Vietnamese air defense facilities. The tracking was in general complete and
accurate. ·

I DOD strike/jamming reports indicate that 23 aircraft were conducting opera-

tions during the first pass overflight. During the missile launch of the second
pass, three DOD strike aircyaft were conducting operations.
. . ....

I 21

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!figure 12a. Missile ·smoke Above Site VN 133 Figure 12b. Missile and Missite:Vapor Tr'oil
!69292 SECRET ..
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Figure 13. Plan View of SA-2 Launch WindQws against Oxcort

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!FOP SEORET TRINE :OXCART BYE-1296 68
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Ii BX6733
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CBLACK SHIELD mission BX6733 was atwo-passreconnaissancemission flown
o~er No:rth Vietnam on 29 October 1967. The vehicle·entered and exited Ndrth ·
V:iletnam on its first p~ss at 0335:02Z and 0346:42Z and on its second pas$ at··
o;9:48Z and 0458:52Z. Figure 14 presents the mission flight path and associ~.!ted .
e ents. .. ;.
I :
I 10 I l 10&
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Chiang•c!'teng
CH IN A
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MISSION ex 6733
THAILAND jl: : .
290claber1967
1• - - ht Pcm
-"""'.'2nd Pass rl
- - Chinese Track
All ti••• 01• !lf,IT (Zul•l.
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SAM Slte.
'l-...::....,o==--111••

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I
I Mtssion photography,gave no.ev:idence of.SSMequipment.or :facilities. Continuing
.construction ·bY ·Chinese engineers .of North Vietnamese Yen Bai Airfield was the
first sign .of ;progress since 20 June 1967. 'The mission aircraft .Photographed 120·
C0MlREX targets. Of these., 74 were SA ..2 sites, 16 of which were occupied. One
I ·new unocc-µpied SA-2 Site was ·ident:tfied.

:System 6 reeorded ;eight Fan Song signals while the aircraft .was over North
I Vietnam. :'.None .of thes.e signals appearedto:betrackiQg the BLACK SHIELD vehi-
.c'le, and no on.;board defensive systems w:e:r:e activated as a result of these
s:tgnals.

I DU:rlng the first :pass, there was no indication.0'f air surveillance tracking by
either the North Vietnamese or .the Chinese. Norwere there any .reported strike/
jamming operations.
I The Chinese air smw:eillancefactlitiestracked the BLACK SHIELD vehicle con-
tinu0usly duringthesecondpass. Therewasnoevidence of air surveillance track-
I ing by the North Vietnamese.; however, the Chinese did pass the BLACK SHIELD
·track to .the North Vietnamese. Moderately hea:vy strike/ja:mming operations (38
aircraft) ·were ~beingconductedduringthispass.Chin-eseradar stations at Chiang-
cheng and Ho-lo-shih wer,e 'b.0tb netedpassing missionplots from ·0446Z to 0455.Z
I a:nd 05.10.Z to·0522Z. The initial detection and final tracking ranges for the Chiang-
cheng rada:r station were '80 :and228 nautical miles., respectively. The Ho-lo-shih
r:adar stationt·s detection and final tracking ranges were 175 nautical miles and
I 265 nautical miles. Correlation of System .6withthe final positi0n plot of the Ho-
lo-shlh radar station indioat€s the tracking radar to be a Moon Face VHF radar.

I The Phuc Yen regimental controller and subordinate SAM site VN 234 were
·noted in ·communications r.efer.ring lo the BLAC:K ·SHIELD v:ehic1e, which was
over the Gulf of Tonkin at the time·; it was never in VN 234'.s firing zone.

I
I BX6734

I Mission BX.67.34 was a :high-altitude, double--pass reconnaissance mission flown

over North :Vietnam .en .ao October 1967. The first ipass of the mission vehicle

I entered North Vietnam at ·0343:58Z and :exited at :appr.oximately 0353:00Z. The

second pass was.over NorthVietnam from appr0ximate1y·0445:QO,z to.0459:23Z.
F-igurre 15 shows the mission a.lrcr:aft' s flight route and associated air surveil~
lance events.
I 25

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The BLACK SHIELD vehicle photographed 118 COMIREX targets, 92 of which
we~e North Vietnamese SA-2 sites. Thirteen of these sites· were occupied, ih. ·-
1

olu ing one newly identified site. BLACK SHIELD photography gave nd eviden¢e
of SM facilities or deployment. . ·.
j . ' . . :-

$rface-to-air missile reactions were noted on the first pass from 0340Z.to ··
04q2z and during the second pass from 0420Z to 0501Z. Figure 16 shows the
re1ction area and related events during this time period.
l . .
J?uring the first pass, two SAM battalions located at sites VN 234 a~d V.N 1~2
. :.' ;
I
we:rre reflected attempting a missile launch. Neither of these sites launched apy ·
mi;siles, both being out of the required range limits for a successful launch.
Analysis
I
of System 6 tapes indicates that a low-PRF· launch, similar to the one
,
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MISSION BX 6734
300ttober1967
THAILAND

ll
-I> I - - h t Pass•
--2nd Pass•
--Chinese/N. Viet.
~1
I Track lill ti•H .,. GMT (Zulu}.

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TOP.SECRET TRINE OXCART
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Handlo via BYEMAN Control Sy$1em Only
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I 105
Sequence of Even ts
105 36 106
I
IO& 30 Figure 16

·I BX6734
30 October 1967 2130 ·-

I Mod Moth
Slue Do;
Lau11c.h lndfcatar
0451, 19
1~·

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I 0457.13

Tracker Camero plot

I Blue. Dog
- - Mad Moth
Fon Song. Lo. PRF
Fa.n Song HI .PRF

I -
-
1
Multiple PRF
L-Bond signal
Occupied SAM site
Nam Dinh•

I TQP &E.CRE'f Probable missile trajectory

Probable launch azimuth 0 10
T_RINE OXCART
01 10

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du~ing missi~n BX6732, did occur. Signal analysis coupled with the ~,issile qy.. 1)1
outt characteristics indicate the possible launching site to have been VN lp7. ~ !

(F gure 17 shows a probable missile trajectory from VN 167.) The pilot did p<>t . ,
re ort sighting a vapor trail or missile, and it is possible the site fireq at · ;
anpther aircraft. The intercepted Fan Song signal was weak; thus, the Mad Moth · !
ja*1mer was active for only a short period of time, · I
~orrelation
and analysis of all available data on the second pass shpws thai at
le.,st six SAM sites fired from eight to ten missiles at the BLACK SHIELD .ve~cle
inj the 2.. minute period from 0456Z to 0468Z. As might be expected~ the de~e
sir.al a
environment during the multiple engagement makes complete delineation
of events difffoult. Table 1 presents the probable sequence of events and identifd.es
th, six SAM sites involved as numbers2841133, 244, 169, 142, and 19. Figure/.16
depicts. six active Blue Dog channels which tend to indicate a minimwn Qf six m!is-
s~e launches most probably carried out by these six SAM sites. BLACK SHIEiLD
p1>ibtography ·shows vapor trails of six missiles (see figure 18). The pilot a~so ._;I
.
sa!W these vapor trails and witnessed three SA-2 detonations.
i .·
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S~
JTable 1 shows missile launches at ranges of 36, 38, and 41 nautical
1
ce these launch ranges are beyond the high-PRF acquisition rangeiof the tan
mi~es. '_11
! ~. .
S radar (32.6 nautical miles), the launches might be construed to have been
::•1
lo -PRF launches. The ECM equipment (Mad Moth and Blue Dog) appeared. to
tion normally. Mad Moth and Blue Dog replied to the signal environment and ~
e type of interference on S-band was experienced by operators 'at thre~ of . '
th SA-2 sites. The degree of jamming evident was not reported, but the ~act
the aircraft did not sustain a hit by a warhead pellet in an eight-riliss~le­
nch environment would appear to be a measure of the ECM configuratio~' s
'"I
effectiveness.
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l.Postflight inspection of the BLACK SHIELD vehicle revealed that a piece of

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metal had penetrated the lower right wing fillet area and lodged against the . ''
suP,port structure of the wing tank. The fragment is not an SA-2 war~ead p · et ·
~t apparently is of Soviet manufacture. ltwaspossibly a part of.the debris m
o!'e of the three SA-2 missiledetomttions observed by the pilot. Figure: 19 ts
th possible fragment path, the ·fragment. and a portion of the penetrated ng
p , el. Spectrographio and other measurements made on the fragment and various ..
cd,mponents of an SA-2 MOD I missile have to. date shown no correlation. Effo~ts
aJ.ie continuing to identify the source of this fragment. I ; :

i i
Phinese and North Vietnamese air defense facilities continuously tracked :the ·
m}ssion vehicle over North Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin. ! :~ · 1

I
I
!DOD strike/jamming activity was lightduringthefirstpass. In contrast. mf>d- . i
!
:

e~a.tely heavy strike/jamming operatio~s (62 aircraft) were oo~duote~ during )the . 1
:.1
::
second pass. These operations were being conducted in the Haiphong area. hqw-
e~er, while the SAM launches occurred near Hanoi. ::I
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--• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68

TABLE 1

Chronology of Events Associated with Mission BX6734

SEARCH DETECTION LAUNCH DETONATJON

PARAMETERS PARAMETERS PARAMETERS PARAMETERS
Site Vapor
No. Trail• Remarks
Time** Range Azimuth Altitude' Time Range Azimuth A1titudel Time_ Range Azimuth Altitude' Range Azimuth Altitude
(run) (deg) (ft) (nm) (deg) (ft) (nm) (deg) (ft) (nm) (deg) (ft)

FIRST PASS
234 0341Z 161 90-180 82,020 0344Z 81 Aircraft to radar tlli.nirnum
range: 32 nm; no launch.

142 034SZ 81 100•140 above 0346Z 32.S 120 Aircraft to radaT minimum
65,000 range: 32.5 nm; no launch.

167 0346Z 36 HO 83,000 Only possible launch para-

meters: no indication of
launch other than Elint.
SECOND PASS
234 D 0429Z 167 270 82,025 273 83,000 0455Z '38 268 82,000 22.5 180 1 missile, lead angle,
jamming on S-band.
244/ AB,BC, • , •• 0455Z 18.9 180 2 missiles fired (error
159 EA great)

159/ A,B, 0426Z 270 78,740 280 78,700 0457.Z 40.S 275 78,700 19.0 265 78,000 l missile, lead angle,
244 E jamming on S-band.
133 c 0426Z 0457Z 270 75,700 0459Z 35.2- 270 75,700 20.5 240 82,020 l mis,.ile, lead angle,
jamming on S-band.
142 10.8 60 2 missiles fired !ate.
19 F Photography indicated F
v11por trail may have been
fired from site 19.
•<Refer lo Figure 18.
**All times are G!'E!enwich Meridian times.

NOTE • Data in table derived from Cotnint, E!int, and photography.

TO'.P SECRET TRINE OXCART

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C05492938
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ro.:p SECRE'F TRINE OXCART B YE-1:296./68
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I Figure lBb. B'L.ACK SHIELD Photography of Missile Vapor Tra.ils

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Vie amese border areas on 8 December 1967. The mission entered Southea§t ,,! i ! 1 ! ·
Asi at 0340:15Z and exited same at 0506:41Z. Figure 20 shows the flfght roufe :11 ~ !11· ·
and associated air surveillance tracking. ! . .:I f i I
S ven specified priority search areas in northeastern Cambodia, southeaste~:n
· ) i I: j ·1!:1 'c.
La s, and· adjacent South Vietnam were covered for evidence of Viet Cong d'r ·1i ~ i ·:
Nori Vietnamese activity. BLACK SHIELD photography provided evidence of :; E ! !: :« i
exp nded supply transshipment facilities along the To~_e Kong River in Gambodfa ': [ !·1:1 · ~
32
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I
near the Laotian border. Several troop encampments served by numerous trails
I extending north to Cambodian Route 9 7 were detected. A probable new storage
area and water-to-road transshipment point were also identified.

I No threat signals were recorded on System 6. No defensive system was active

during the overflight.

I Air surveillance tracking lasting approximately 10 minutes was carried out by

Chinese radar facilities. There was no indication of North Vietnamese awareness
I of the mission,

I 10<

CH IN A

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THAILAND

I -16
MISSION BX 6737
8December1967

- - Mission Route

I - - Chin&$1l Track
AH ti•es. aro CMT (Zul1.1).

NAUTICAL font.CS.

I :ca
508 41
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69301 1·68 Cllo, Figure 20

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BYE-1296/68

I
I BX6738

BLACK SHIELD mission BX6738 was a single-pass reconnaissance mission

I flown over the Cambodian, Laotian, and South Vietnamese tri-border area on
10 December 1967. The mission entered and exited over South Vietnam at
0334:02Z and 0455:37Z. Figure 21 is a plot of the mission route.
I Mission photography detected a new probable transshipment-storage facility
on the Tonle Son River iri Cambodia near the South Vietnamese border. Photo-

I· graphy also showed a heavily used trail extending from Cambodia into the north..
western corner of Darlac Province in South Vietnam. Two automatic weapons
positions were observed ·near the trail just inside the Cambod.ian border.

I CH IN A

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CH IN A

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THAILAND

I -1•
MISSION BX 67 38
10Decemb•r1967

- - Mission Route

I All ''"'" er• GMT (Zvl•).

I Figure 21
69302 1-611 CIA TOP S·ECRET TRINE OXCART

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 TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/,68
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There were no threat signals recorded nor defensive system activated duriµg
thej overflight. There was no evidence of afr surveillance tracking by either t~e
C~nese or North Vietnamese. L
ii
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~
j BX6739 . . ' . :
X6739 was a double-pass, high-altitude mission flown over N9rth Vietnam on
15 ecember 1967. The vehicle entered and.exited North .Vi~tnam on its. rirst pa~s ·1
..
~ ;
at 421:42Z anc:i0430:23Zandonitssecondpass at 0529:49Z and 0540:47Z. Figtife
I
22 is a plot of the mi;:ision route and associated air surveillance:traok~g. ;ii
;

~ission photography obtained from this twO-:.pass mission was clear~ l;nt~rpr,e~..: :
.'
'"

abl~. and generally cloud free. No 'evidence of surface-to-surface mtssile d~­

plo¥ment was noted. All of North Vietnam's major airfields, except Haiphong/
Ca1i Bit appeared to be serviceable. The mission aircraft photographed 195
i'I
COMIREX targets, 142 of which were North Vietnamese SA-2 sites. Eighteen bf ... ! :

there sites were occupied. • i

!ll
.
~stem 6 recorded three Fan Song signals during the overflight. None of the~e
;

;;
sigµals appeared to be tracking the vehicle, and no defensive mecha'nism w*s
act+vated by these signals.
i
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'lfhe BLACK SHIELD vehicle was tracked by Chinese and North Vietnamese air
def~nse facilities from 0416Z to 0437Z and from 0525Z to 0557Z. Bai l'huong,i a
Nol{_th Vietnamese radar station at 19°56'N, 105°28'E, reported two position plots
i;I
r 1

of qte vehicle at 0530Z and 0531Z. The radar-to-aircraft ground ranges for these
tim:es were 180 and 148 nautical miles, respectively.
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~OD strike/jamming operations were conducted during the overflight perio~.

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1 BX6740
I · . :
aX6740 was a double-pass reconnaissance mission flown over North Vietn~m ·
on 116 December 1967. The mission vehicle entered and exited North Vietnam on
itslfirst pass at 0257:51Z and 0309:21.Z and on its sec~nd pass at 0405:00Z
04*:03Z. Figure 23 presents the flight route and air surveillance:tracking•.
I .
apd
I
I
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~
ssion photographs obtained about 60-percent cloud-free coverage of tjie
t area. No evidence of SSM deployment was noted. The missio~ aircr~1t ..
tar
ii
ph9 graphed 86 COMIREX targets, 74 of which were SA-2 sites. Two of theS,e.
sit~s were occupied. Missions BX6739 and BX6740, flown on consecutive day.~,
pho1tographed 221 of North Vietnaµi's 226 useable SA-2 sites, including six nEjw
sit~s. Twenty were occupied, including five of the six new sites.
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I TQp··s:sCRET TRINE OXCART B YE-1296/ 68

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System 6 recorded six Fan Song signals, none of which appeared to be track-
I ing the vehicle. No on-board defensive system was activated.

Chinese air surveillance facilities tracked.the mission vehicle from 0251Z to

I 0258Z and from 0403Z to 0430Z. A Chinese radar station at Pa-ka (22°25'N,
101°00'E) was reflected tracking the aircraft from 0403Z to 0411Z at radar-to-
aircraft ground ranges of 134 and 234 nautical miles, respectively. There was

I no indication of North Vietnamese awareness of the mission vehicle.

Moderate DOD strike/jamming operations were being conducted during the

overflight.
I
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CH IN A

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11728N/11350E}

THAILAND

I -1•
MISSION BX 6739
15December1967
- - 1st Pass
16·-

--2nd Pass
- - Chinese/N. Viet.
Track All limes aro GMT {Zulu).

o Radar Station

I 0405 16 ~-o..
(1351Ni11150E)

Figure 22
69303 1·68 CA TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART

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16Dec..,,b.,J967
THAILAND

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C05492938
I TOP SECRET TRlNE OXCART BYE-1296/68

I APPENDIX I

I BLACK SHIELD Operational Missions Alerted Between

I Mission No.
16 August and 31 December 1967

Date Remarks

I BX6716
'
20 Aug. 1967 Flown

I BX6717

BX6718
25 Aug. 1967

30 Aug. 1967
Cancelled due to weather

Flown

I BX6719 31 Aug. 1967 Cancelled due to weather

I BX6720 5 Sept. 1967 Cancelled due to

..·.
··
w~ather
'· .., ....
BX6721 10 Sept. 1967 Cancelled due to weather

I BX6722 15 Sept. 1967 Flown·

I BX6723 16 Sept. 1967 Flown

BX6724 1 Oct. 1967 Cancelled due to weather

I BX6725 3 Oct. 1967 Flown

I BX6726 4 Oct. 1967 Cancelled (Ops decision}

BX6727 5 Oct. 1967 Flown (1 pass flown}

I BX6728 14 Oct. 1967 Flown

I BX6729 17 Oct. 1967 Flown

BX6730 19 Oct. 1967 Cancelled due to weather

I BX6731 25 Oct. 1967 Cancelled due to weather

I 45

I TOP"SECRET TRINROXC'ART

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 !'
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TOP SECRET TRlNE OXCA:a.T

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BYE..;1296/q;a
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APPENDIX I (continued) I
ission No. Date Remarks
1~
BX67'32 27 Oct. 1967 ·Flown
"
I
j.

BX6733 28 Oct. 1967 Flown

'i;

I
h
BX6734 29 Oct. 1967 Flown f1

!
Cancelled due td weath:e·i;
BX6735

BX:6736
l Nov. 1967
.;.. .

Cancelled due t~ weatli!e·r ··

.
::
•. J.
•i •
'

:1;
1:·
BX6737
(Cambodia}
6 Dec. 1967 Flown
F ;
I.
BX6738
(Cambodia)
8 Dec. 1967 Flown
·I ' '

BX6739 14 Dec. 1967 Flown

I
BX6740 15 Dec. 1967 Flown

BX6741 22 Dec. 1967 Cancelled due to weath1!.er

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APPENDIX II

COMIREX Targets Covered by BLACK SHIELD Missions

16 August - 31 December 1967

COMIREX Mission Numbers"~

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Hai Kou Airfield x.

Ling Shui Airfield x

Meng Tzu Airfield West x x

-
~ Haiphong/ Cat Bi Airfield x x x x x x
M
If')
ff')
.-4
Haiphong/Kien An Airfield x x x x x x
0
~
...
.-4
Hanoi/ Bae Mai Airfield x x x X· x x x x x
><:
0
If') Hanoi/ Gia Lam Airfield x x x x x x
-
Phuc Yen Airfield x x x x x x .. x x

Lang Son Airfield x x x x x

Kep Airfield x x x x x x x

:!cin this appendix, mission numbers are shortened .to the last two digits.

'f'OP SECRE'l' TRINE OXCART

 TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68

I 3 APPEND~.I~.J~.Q.~ti~_2:.L________________________···-·---····-·-------------
···- ·50Xt,-E.tr.B52V -··---------·-----··--·----------------
COlvHREX Mission Numbers
Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Ning Ming Air£ieid x x. x

.
Chia Lai Shih Airfield x x

Ping Yuan Chieh Airfield x x

Tien Yang Airfield x x x x

Yen Bai Airfield x x x

Hoa Lac Airfield x x x x x x x x

Bai Thuong Airfield Q.,__ ___.. b I SOXl, E.O.l3526 x x x

Tho Khoi Helicopter Dispersal

* . Area x x

Kep Ha Airfield x
*
Hanoi Helicopter Dispersal
* Area x

. Hoa.Lac.Helicopter
Dispersal Area x

.. .. ' ' ' . . ' ...... . ....

_
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APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number . Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Pei Hai Naval Facility x x x

Hsin Hsing Naval Facility x

Port Wallut Naval Base x x x ;x x x x

Haiphong Naval Base and

- Port Faciliti~s x x x x x x x
\C>
N
ll'l (;am Qha Port Facilities x
('f')
~

0 Pai Lung Port Facilities x x

r..i
~ "'
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0
ll'l
~

Hon Gai Port Facilities x x x x x x x x

Ha Tou Shipyard x x x x x x x

Ben Thuy Coastal Transport

Point x x

Pei Li Port Facilities x x. x

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~w-~----·-~----' -··------------------ -AP..P-ENmX-1!-(-G-Ontinued-)-----------------------------·-··--·--··----·--------------

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Lan;:i. Dong Nav.al Dispersal

Facility x

Swatow PGM-Hanoi Area x

*
Thanh Hoa BW I CW Research
· Facility x

Lai Chau Complex x

- Ma Li Po Supply Depot x x

Mengtzu Military Comple.x x

. Ping Hsing Ammunition Depot x x x x

Ping Hsing Army Depot " x x x x x x x

-
Ping Hsing Military Storage
. East x x

Ping Hsiarig Storage Are·a

·- .... North:··· x x- X-

*Unnumbered.

·-·-·-·""''" ____ ,,,. ..

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APPENDIX II (continued}

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 ZS 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40
Chin Ping Infantry Division
Headquarters A ;sarracks x

Ban I:;ot A Barracks x x

Ha Giang Military Area x x x x

Van Hoi Military Areas x x x x x

-
\,0
N Wen Shan Army Barracks
I/)
('<') West x
0""" Ho Kou Army. Barracks North
r.S x x x x x x x
"
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~
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I/)
~
a:nd Storage Area x

Lang S?n Army Barracks x x x x x

Y Son Ammu.nl.tion Depot x x x

Xom Hau A Army Supply Depot x x

Ngoc Thi. Barracks Supply Depot x

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coMiREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 Z9 32 ,33 34 37 38 39 40

Tai Xouan .Axmy Barracks,

Nam Vu x

Loe Bi~h Army S-q.pply Depot x x x .X

Yen Bai Ordnance Depot x x

- Tbai Nguyen Army Supply

x x
Depot North x

:Bae Ga:p. Barracks A Supply

Depot x

Bae Giang Mili1;al.".Y. Areas x x x x x x

- Tung .Chia Army Barracks x

Ba Binh Special Area 2009 x x x

Ben Than Special Area 2013 x

Vinh An Special Area 2014 x x

Vit Thu Lu/NVN Special Axea x

.. ' ...... -··.

·--·-··.---- ....
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APPENDIX II (continued)
"°OJw
COMIREX "Mission Numbers
NUI'nber Target 16 18 22 23 25 'l.7 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40
Tai Ti Pao Road x :it x x x

Wu Pu Chieh Road Construction x x x

Hanoi/ Lad Cai Railroad

Segment 2 x x x
Hanoi/ Lao Cai Railroad
Segment 1 x x ~ x x x x x
IC
N
l/) Hano.i/Lao C:ai Railroad
t"l
..... .Segment 3 x x x
d
~ Hanoi/ Ping Hsiang Railroad
~ Segment 2
Ii< x x x x x x x
0
l/)
'-- Hanoi/Ping flsiang Railroad
Segment I x x x X· x x x ·x x

Hanoi/ Ping Hsiang Railroad

Se~ment 3 x x x x x x x x,
Hanoi/ Lao Cai Railroad
Segment 4 x· x x x x x x x
Hanoi/ Lao Cai Railroad
Segment 5 x x x x x x x x x x

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'FOP BEC:RE'i' TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68 '°cow

APPENDIX I! (continued)
---------·-----·---
COMIREX Mission Numbers
Number Target . 16 18 22 23 25 21· 2.8 Z9 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

An Cap Railroad Hanoi Thai

.. Nguyen x x x X.

Ping Hsiang/Hanoi Railroad

,Segment 4 x x x x x x x

Ho Kou. Highway Segment,

·Route 24A x x
-
ID
M
ll'l
Uong Bi Transformer Power
('f'j
...... Plant x
0
~ Tien Pao Hwy. Sec. Route 25A ·x
......"'
;..<: x
c::>
ll'l
Chin Nan Kuan Hwy. Sec.
.___

Ping Hsiang Complex x x x x x x

Wen Shan Complex x x

.. ...
Dong Dang Railroad Yard x x x x x

Bae Giang· Complex ··X·"··· x .. x .. :X. .x. .. ., .. X .

..... u

·······-'-·-:·-·····. ·----:::--~··=:·...-:::~19=:::-~·~::::~-=~~~:-..--~··:~-·::.:.~,=:::·::~:~-··:.·.~:,.:::: ii·:·::·.-~:::·

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APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Cao Bang Military Complex x x x x x

Lai Chau Complex x :x x :x x x x x

Lang Sort Complex x x x. x

Mon Cai Complex x x x x x

-
\C Tien Yen Complex
M x x x x x x x
II)
('<')
~
Binh Lu Area x :x
0 x
r.l~

~ Tuyen Quang Complex x

~
=
II)
'--- Yen Bai Complex x x x
Dien Bien Phu Complex x x x x· x x

Kep Coniple:x' x x x x x x x x

Lao Cai Coll'lplex x x x x x x

Haiphong Railroad Station

Classification Yard x

TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART

 'POP SECRE'f' TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68

-fsoxi,.E.O.us...26,,_._._ APPEND!X II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number . Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Haiphong Railroad Station

Classification Yard and Shops x x x x x x

Viet Tri Railroad Yard x x x x x x x x

Yen. Vien ·Railroad

Classification Yard x x x x x

Thai Nguyen Rail Activity x

*
Kep Railroad Yard x

Highway Segment I OE x

Haiphong Highway Bridge x

Van Diem Battery Plant x

Hanoi Railroad - A Highway

Bridge· x x

Haiphong Warehouse Area Port ·.x

•" .. ..
, '"'" ... , .. " ~.. •• • ' " ... <' • ' H' ,, .. ......
Van Diem Vehicle Depot x

. '

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BYE-1296/68

APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Hai Duong Railroad ·

Siding West x

Hai Duong Rallroad Station x

Hgoc Kuyet Railroad Station x

Ta Xa PPS North x

Loi Dong Warehouse Area x

Railroad Segment R-3 -A x

....,. Ping Hsiang Railroad Trans -

port~ilg Yard Station and.
Shops x x

...
"· Ho Kou Vehicle Park x

Hsia Shih.storage Areas x x

Ping Hsiang Storage Area

* x x

':<Unnumbered.

TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART

 TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68

APPEN!?!1f II (continued)

COMlllEX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

* Thai Nguyen Unidentified

Construction Activity x

Hanoi/Haiphong Railroad x

Hanoi/Haiphong Railroad x x

Hanoi Transformer Power

* Plant : x

Haiphong Transformer Power

Plant East x

Haiphong Transformer Power

* Plant West: x

·.Viet· Tri 'Transformer Power

Plant x

Hon: Gai Transformer Power

* ·p1ant x

Bae· Giang· Transfor·mer ·Power

Plant x

·····c·····-··········-·····················~···-·
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APPENDIX !I (continued)

COMIRE.X Mission Numbel."s ·

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 .. 32 33 34 37 38 39 40
Hanoi SAM Search x x x x ~ x

Lao Cai SAM Search x x x x x x

Dien Bien Phu SAM SeaI'ch x x x x x x x x

Vinh SAM Search x

- Cao Bang SAM Search
\C
x x x
<'I
Ill
!'f'J
'I-I
Dong Roi SAM Search x x
d
r.l ~
Fo Lo Probable CD Site x x lt x
'I-I
><
Q Cat Ba Coastal Defertse
ll'l
'-- ~Hes land 2 x x x x x x

Dung Fang. Suspect Coastal

Defense Site · · · x x

Chang Chiang Coastal Defense

Site (Suspect) .X X

Yai Cheng Probable Radar Site x x x

TOP' SECRET TRINE bXCART

 TOP SECRE'l' .TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68

APPENDIX II (continued)
...-------.:...... ...._.. _____ ~~----·----------.. ------....... ~----------··--------- -------·-·----···~--- ..
COMIREX Mission Numbers
Number . Tt;trget 16 18 22 23 ZS 27 ZS 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Hanoi SAM Site A-10-2 x x x x

.:H~noi SAM Sit.e A:-19-2 x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site A-29-Z x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site B-04-2 x x x

-
Hanoi SAM Site B-12~2 x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site B-25-Z x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site B-29-2 x x x x

Han:oi SAM Site B-30-Z x x x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site C-29-Z x x x x x x x .x:

Hanoi SAM Site C-30-Z x x x x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site D-19-Z.

·',•· ,. ". ' ...... ; .

•··· ...
'" ,, •. ,_,, ......... "''"" •..•..- ...,. .. ~ .. :··-···~··· ·»·•~-~·.<,-•• ..... ,,. -·-~····-· ............_,_._ •. _.,. ~ ................... ~.........._... ···-··-··~~ .......... , .... "''"'... .• . .-...·• ............. -- ... ~"··-~·-· ••••. ,.,., ____ ~··· ,............... ~--·· -·~- .. ,, __ ···~- ....... - ...• ,.• "'··
--· .............. , .. ,. .. "".

-.-~ ~~-.----··--.-- ~-C- ~~-----····----·---······

""""" '"'"-··~-··~-·~·-···~ ~·-~··· ·-·:----~-~·--~-------··~---·-

· · · - · · · · · · · · · - · ..- -. . - - .. . . . . . • • . .- • •
r . •
•• • • • •••• • • • • • • . .
TOP 8ECRB'l1 TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68

APPENDIX II {continued).

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Numbe.r Target 16 18 zz 23 25 27 28. 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Yen Bai SAM Site B-lZ-2 x x x x

Yen Bai SAM Site C-10-2 x

Yen Bai SAM Site B-11-Z x

-
\C>
Yen :8ai SAM Site C-03-2 x

-
N
lfl
('f')
Yen Bai SAM Site C-07-2 x
0
~
-
lfl
'---
~
Q
"'
Yen Bai SAM Site C-09-Z

Yen Bai SAM Site C-09A-Z

x

Yen Bai SAM Site C-17-2 x x x x x

Yen Bai SAM Site B-06-2 x

Yen Bai SAM Site C-04-2 x

Yen Bai SAM Site B-05-2 x

'! ,· ..

TOP. SECRE'f TruNE OXCART

 ~l
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TOP SBCRE:T"TRlNE OXCART BYE-1296/68 w
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APPENDIX II (continued}

COMIREX Mission Numbers

'
Number Target 16 18 22 23 2s 21 2a 29 32 33 34 37 3a 39 40

Yen Bai SAM Site B-10-2 x x x

Yen Bai SAM Site B-llA-Z x

-

... Ha.np;i..,Sa.M .. Site .:S.--: . U ::.2. x ·x

' ..... , ,, .... ,.
x x

........ ··-••• o , . . . . . . , ......... , • ' ' " " ' • • · • - . . . _ , .... _ .............................. - . . . . . . . . . . . - ......... r . . . . . . . . . . . , ..... , .... _ .. _ . . . . . . . . ~ .......... - - , - · - · · · - • ' " ' .. , . , .. , , , .. , , _ . _ . . __ . . . . , , , , . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ , . ' ' . _ , . , , _ . , , , , , , , •••'•••<•>/•>"••~•<•' ~ .............. .,,.,~ .. •o < ••• ~••!O•~•<«• .. ,.,_,_..,_,., >><> -----•-''"'~'"' - - · - · ... , •P .. , - · - - • • • ... •>"''•''"'' -~~- ... ··-· ~ .... - '"'"'~ ..... _._.. __ ,,, .......

-:--~----;·:.. ____ ,.,.... •.-... --·--··-··-""":'·----;-;·-:··--~-.-"-:-----··-·-----------:---:-;.··~-~·-..:_-....-:-:····--·;---·····-~---:;-:---:--7:~--~:-··"":"'--··- ...... ·-···--:--···-~-~-···:-::--···---;-:--~ .... - .. ···-.-.. ~,.,.-.,:-·--·--:--~-:··...:.....:.,~--.-~·-·---..:···-·---·-~- .........-~---·--~-·----
• • • • •• • •
• • • • • •• • •• an 0
(.51
.!::>

TOl.? SEGRE'!' TR,JNE OXCART :aYE-1296/68 '°

!\.)

'°cow
APPJ!;:NDIX II (continued)

CQMlREX Missio:p. Numbers

Number Ta+ get 16 . 18 22 2~ 25 27 2R 4.9 32 33 34 n 38 39 40

Hanoi $AM Site B-.21.,.2 x x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site C-28.,.4 x x x x x

Hanoi SAM $ite P-3 l. ..,2 x x x x x x x

Hanoi $.AM $ite A,. 11-.2 x x x

~

\0 Hanoi ~AM Site .A,-24-2 x x x x x

N
ll'l
('f")
~ Hanoi SA.M Site p.,.31J\, .. z x x x x x
0
~ }!anoi SAM Site D-16-2 x x x x
~

~
Q
ll'l Hanoi SA..M Site l)-.36,..,2 x x x x x

Hanoi S.A,M Sit~ C-06-? x x x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site C-07.,.z x x

Hanoi SAM Site D.,.3 lB-2 x x x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site E07 -2 x x x x x

TOP SECR#i'F TRINE OXCART

 ()
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('\,)
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.WP SECRET TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68 w
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APPENDIX II (continued}

COMIREX Mission Nmnbers

·Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Haiphong SAM Site A-29-Z x x x x x x:

Haiphong SAM Site A-20-2 x x x x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site A-17 -2 x x x x x x

Haiphong S.AM Site B-01-2 x x x x

- Haiphong SAM Site A-Z9A-2 x x x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site B-33-2 x x

Haiphong SAM Site B-06-2 x x x

Haiphong SAM Site C-32-Z x x x

- Haiphong SAM Site C-32A-2 x x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site B-28-2 x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site B-3()-2 x x x

x x x

••.••..•••• ·-· • - . • ••__. -

____________________________
"·--·-
. . . 1. ;..._;....._;..._..;__
• -• • • • • •••• • -• •-• TOD SEC.BET. TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68
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N
'°
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APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Haiphong SAM Site A-23-2 x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site A-31-2 x x x x x

Haiphong SAM·Site A-33-2. x x x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site C-30-2 x x x x

- x. x x x x
~ Haiphong SAM Site C-28-2 .
N
l(')
~
..... Haiphong SAM Site A-02;.;2 x x x x x
d
rA Haiphong SAM Site A-17 A-2 x x x x x x
~
"'
~
=
l(')
'--
Haiphong SAM. Site "D-35-2 x x x x x

- Haiphong SAM Site A-33A-2 x x x x x x:

Thanh Hoa SAM Site B-28-2 x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site C-02-2 x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site B-01-2 x

!I'OP SECRET TRINE OXCART

 TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68

APPENDIX II (continued)
·---··-------·---------------·---------------·
COMIREX Mission Numbers
Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Thanh Hoa SAM Site B-02-2 x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site

Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-04-2 x

Thaxih Hoa SAM Site C-03-2 x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site C-OZA-2. x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site A-17 -2 x x x

.Thanh Hoa SAM Site C-04-2 x

-
Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-OZ-2 x x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site C-Ol-2 :x:

Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-03-2 x x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-03A-2 x

'··--·····
·-·~--·~----

____________________________________ _;._ ________

• -• - - • •••••• • • • - •.
TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART B YE-1296 I 68

APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Thanh Hoa SAM Site A-19-2 x x

.•
Thanh Hoa SAM Site B-28A-2 x x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site B-27 -2 x x

\C
Thanh Hoa SAM Site A-14-2 x
M
Ill
('f')
~

0
r4 Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-20-2 x x x
....r
~
<:::> ',I'hanh Hoa SAM Site D-20A-2
Ill x x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site A-17A-2 x x x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site A-13-2 x x

Hanoi SAM Site D-04-2 x

Hanoi SAM Site C-30E-2 :x:

'POP SECRET TRINE OXCART

 O'
(X)
TOP SECRET TRlNE OXCART BYE-1296/68

APPENDIX II (continued)
.. ., ..• ·-··· ....
~'.
..
----·---------~-----------·---<'•••·- -·-···-·--------·----·~-~----~-·R--

CQMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Hanoi SAM Site B-30A-2 x x x

Hanoi SAM Site C-30A-2 x x x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site D-03-2 x x

Hanoi SAM Site D-04-2 x x x x

-
\0 Hanoi SAM Site A-l?A-2 x x x x x x
N
Ill
~
Hanoi SAM Site C-30C-2 x x x x x x x
0"""'
~ Hanoi SAM Site C-01-Z x x x x
~
~
c Hanoi SAM Site C-05-Z x x x x x x
Ill
..__

Hanoi SAM Site C-04-Z x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site C-02-2 x x x x

Hanoi SAM Sit~ C-04A'."4 x x x x x

Hanoi SAM. Site C-0 lA-2 .....

,,, ..... ......
., ' ~,, , ' .. '
x x x,, .. x x
..
*"'

.:. . :.·.:;;_:__·::_-_·· ---·--·_. :.. :.:::.. _______ ._._____ '

,.;:.:....:::~.:.:_ __ .: .:.: : .: -: .:. :.: .:.: . : : : .: : : : : .
' ..... ' .... ·' .
~· . ' .
::.-'roJ>-~8ECirii¥·=t:RIN:E;::oxcAli'f .: ._:_._. : : .;. :.-: . . . .
' ' .' . .....
'
·~.-.- -.:.:.~ .:..~:.::.::.:.:::::.:::::::.::.:.~:.::.:
.
___
::.:::.::.::.:_:~--.:. . ·.:. :. :._,::.:::__ ....:..---·----·

...................... ••••••• •••

••••••••••• .. • • • - • •o 0
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'I.'QP SEOFtET '!'RINE OXCART BYE-1296/ 68 N
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APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 3 2. 33 . 34 37 38 39 40

Hanoi SAM Site B-33'-2 . x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site D-35-2 x x

Hanoi SAM Site· C-06A-2 x x x

Hanoi SAM Site C-13-2 x x x x x

'.(>
M Hanoi SAM,,Site C-11-2 x x x x x
I.I)
('f"i
..... . - .
0 Hanoi SA:M: Site C-12-Z x x x x x
~
~ Hanoi -SAM Site C-30D-2 x x x x x x
~
Q
I.I)
'--- Hanoi SAM Site B-07-2- x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Sit~ n-06-2 · x x

Hanoi SAM Site C-30E~2 x x x -x x

Hanoi SAM.Site B-34:..;i x x x x

Bae Can SAM Site C-22-2 x x x

. '·
 ~I
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APPENDIX ll (continued)
-----·--------- ---·---··------·-·-----------·-------·---·-----------------------·---·--
COMIREX Mission Numbers
N~rnbe; Target· 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Bae Can SAM Site B-20:--2 x x

Bae Can SAM Site C-20-2 x x x x

Bae Can SAM Site C-19-Z x x x

Hoa Binh SAM Site A-19-Z x x

- Hoa Binh SAM Site B-Z0-2 x

Hba Binh SAM Site B-22-2 x x x

Hoa Binh SAM Site B-17-2 x

Hoa Binh SAM Site C-17-Z x

Hoa Binh SAM Site B-19-2 x

Hoa Binh SAM Site D-27 -Z x

Hoa Binh SAM site D-28-Z x x

Hoa Binh SAM Site A-04-Z x x x x x

•.• ·•··:··· ······•· •.•••..••.•• - ..

• • • • • • • • • • • • •• •
'f'OP. SElCRE'F. TRINE OXCART
--
BYE-1296/68

APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX · Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Hoa Binh SAM Site B-08-2 x x x x

Hoa Binh SAM Site C-27-2 x x

Hoa Binh SAM Site B-02-2 x x

:Hanoi B-08-2 x x x x

Hoa Binh SAM Site B-04-2 x x x x x x

Hoa Binh SAM Site B-03-2 x x

Hoa Binh SAM Site B-08B-2 x

Hoa Binh SAM Site B-10-2 x

Haiphong SAM Site D..:35A-2 x x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site B-07-2 x x x

T6E.SEC.RET. TRINE OXCART

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APPENDIX II (continued)
. . . . <' _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ •

---------·------------... ----~---·-·---·~----------------·-----------···------------------···-·----

COMIR EX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Haiphong SAM Site A-27 -2 x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site B-34-2 x x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site B-OlA-2 x x

Haiphong SAM Site A-06-2 x x x

-
IC Haiphong SAM Site A-14-2 x x x x x x
N
Ill
('<")
~
Haiphong SAM Site B-06B-2 x x x x
0
~ x
Haiphong SAM Site D-22-2 x x
~
><~
Ill Haiphong SAM Site C-21-2 x x
-
Haiphong SAM Site D-23-2 x x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site B-27 -2 x x x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site A-3 lA-2 x x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site A-14A-2 x x x x x

. ,, ..... ... "

••..•.•.•. - ....... - •••.•.•

• -• -• • • • • • TOP SECRET TRlNE OXCART
-• •• •• • BYE-1296/68
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APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Haiphong SAM Site C-29-2 x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site C-27 -2 x x

Haiphong SAM Site C-2.6-2 x x x x

Haiphong SAM Site B-25-2 x x x x

~

\C Haiphong SAM Site A-29B-2 x x x

N
II')
tf')
Haiphong SAM Site A-26-2 x x x
0"""'
µ;l
....r Haiphong SAM Site A-22-2 x x x x
~
=
II') Hanoi SAM Site B-01-2 x x x x
~

Hanoi SAM Site C-33-2 x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site B-OlA-2 x x x

Hanoi SAM Site A-33-2. x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site D-36A-2 x x x

TOP. SECRET TRINE OXCART

 ~I
"° '
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B YE-1296/68 "°w
00

APPENDIX 1I (continued)
----------------·---------------------··--------------
COMIREX Mission Numbers
Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Hanoi SAM .Site C-OlB-2 x x x x x

..
'
Hanoi SAM Site A-01-2 x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site C-03-2 x x x x x

' Hanoi SAM Site c..:o3A-2 x x x

-- Hanoi SAM Site A-14-2 x x x x

·Hanoi SAM Site C-32-2 x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site B-3Z-i x x x x

-Hanoi SAM Site B-07 A-2 x x x x x

-
Hanoi SAM Site C-17.;.2 x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site A-31-2 x x x

Hanoi SAM Site C-17 A-2 x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site B-16-2 x x x x x

•• • • - - - •••••• • • - •• .'POP SECRET TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68

APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Hanoi SAM Site E-22-2 x

Hanoi SAM Site C-17B-2 x x x x x x

Vinh C-19·2 x

Vinh C-32-2 x

Vinh B-i6-2
'°
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x
-4
Vinh
d
~
...; Vinh
:><
Q
Vinh
-
Ill

Vinh C-32-2 x

Vinh

Vinh D-32-2 x

Vinh A-07-2 x

'l'OP ·sBCRE'F TRlNE OXCART .

 'POP SECRET TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68

APPENDIX II {continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbe.rs

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

. Vinh

Vinh C-32A-2 x

Vfnh C-30-2 x

V1nh C-32B-2 x

Vinh B-21-2 x

Vinh B-29-2 x

Vinh B.:.32-2 x
. .
Vlnh A-01-2 x

Vinh A:..36-2 x
. '
Vinh A~ll-2 x

Vinh C-31.:.2 x

Vinh A-OlA-2 x
••••••••••• - • • • • • •g
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TOP SEGRET TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68 . ~
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APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Vinh D-35-2
x
Vinh C-31A-Z x x
Vinh

\C
Thanh Hoa SAM Site C-03A-2 x
N
Iii
""'> Thanh Hoa SAM Site B-OlA-2
""'" x
0
~ Tha~h Hoa SAM Site C-OlA-2
~
x
""'"
~
0
Iii
Thanh Hoa SAM Site C-04A-2 x
-
Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-21A-2 x x
.,
Th.anh Hoa SAM Site B-OlB-2 x x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-21B-2 x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site A-17B-2 x

TOP. SECR:ST' TRINE. OXCART

 · . .TOP SECRET TRINE -OXCART BYE~ 1296/68

APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 ZZ Z3 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Ha~oi SAMSit~ C-16-2 x x x x x

Hanoi' SAM Site A-05-2 x x x x

Hanoi SAM. Site B-36B-Z x x x

Hanoi SAM Site C-03B-2 x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site D-31C-i x x x x x x

Hanoi~ SAM Site C-05B-Z x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site B-27 -2 x x x

Hanoi SAM Site B-13-Z x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site B-28-2 x x x x x x x

Hanoi SAM Site B-04A-2 x x x

Hanoi Prob. Site A x x

___
... ,___ _. .....Hanoi
" .......
·•·
Prob. Site B
...... x

·- .... ---·---------------------------------_; __
••••••••••••••• TOP .SECRE_'P TRINE OXCART
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BYE-1296/68
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APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 2.7 28. 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Hanoi SAM Site C-OlD-2 x x x

Hanoi SAM Site C-OlE-2 x x x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-2.9A-2 x x x x x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-34A-2 x x x x
~

I:> Harioi SAM Site A-15-2 x x x x

N

-
Ill
ff")

0
~
Hanoi SAM Site A-34-Z x x x x

-
~
Q
Ill
~
Hanoi SAM (A-29A)

Hanoi SAM {A-34-A)

x

Hanoi SAM Site D-35-Z x x

Vinh SAM Site A-OlA-2 x

Vinh SAM Site A-25-2

Hanoi Probable SAM

Equipment Training Area x x x

'POP SECRET TRINE .OXCART.

 OJ · . 'FOP SEC~E'f. TRINE OXCART BYE-1296/68
0

APPENDIX II (continued)
-----------·-----
.COMIREX Mission Numbers
Number ·Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

N~n· San SAM Site A-12-Z x x

Nan San s.AM Site C-13 - 2 x

Nan San's.AM Site D-13-2 ·X

Hanoi SAM Site x

* . .
Hanoi SAM. Site A-OlA-2 x x x x
*
Hanoi SAM Site A-35-2 x
. .
Hanoi SAM Site B..:.z3_z x
*
' Hoa Binh SAM Site D-27 -2 x

...
,,,
Haiphong SAM Site A-25-2 x x

Haiphong SAM Site B-36-2 x x x

*
· Haiphong SAM Site A-16-2 . x x

x x x
•' ., ... ,, ..

•:<Unnumbered.

- - -___________________________
•..•••. . ....•. -____. .. -
-~--:---------~-. ---···---·-

______
...- - -----·-:---:--:;--:-;---."":"":";--:-

,
...
••- .-:---:'..-.- . - · - _--'...-;o-...
•-• - , ······-'::"::::-. ---·~·- .. ---~ .. -~ -::--:·-··-·--:-·~~~···---------:---,,

:
' -·~-:---;-···---·-- ... ·--·-.:.....----:------

:
.:___.;,._..;,._
. . . ---·-··--·---~----__;:_;__:':":. ___ _

, _____ __
~.;__;..:....:.... , ,_,
 .. • - • •..•... - • • • - . BYE-1296/68
TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART

APPENDIX II (continued)

COMIREX Mission Numbers

Number Target 16 18 22 23 25 27 28 29 32 33 34 37 38 39 40

Haiphong SAM Site x x x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-31B-2 x

*
Ban Xom Lorn SAM Site x

Chin Chou SAM Site (China) x x

·~Unnumbered.

00
......
'POP SECRE'f TRINE OXCART
C05492938
ii i, i
TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART BYE-f29~Vi6~ I
1.11! :11
1: . '
APPENDIX III l l' l .

/:
;:.
J
I
111.,.
INumber of Radar Signals Received by BLACK SHIELD Mis~ion.s r ;; ·: i

'I
!
I
I 16 August - 31 December 1967 :

I !i 1;1
Radar _16_ _1_s_2_2_ _
Mission Numbers · i ;!
21_ _2_s_2....;9~..;.;,3.;.:..z___.;3;,..;.3_.:..34;;:__·_.:;.l~·1_3...::s:....;.:..:·.:.39.:. .:.'.;.i. ;. . :4;. :;:. '0
z_3_2_s_ _ ! ,l'I ;
i ··

Fan sfng 17 8 2 5 4 7 1 1 7 8 12 I 3: I ;6 I

Big Mfsh 1 2 3 1 1 1 3 r.
I ,I:. 1 ·i! II ~! !,:1.
I
!· i i
Side Nrt 1 1 1 1
i1.;
1
· 1 !
I .
1:1· '
f .
Rock rake
6 6 10 15 6 8 7 15 14 11 16' 4 i. 8 !. l~O '
I· I ·.1.»1,.
aI'
Cross Legs 2
i i I
I
II
1
I
Tokenj 6 5 2 1 1 1 4 2 1 i l1· 1·!1 'l
j
Cross !Slot 1 14 2. 1 1 2 2 3 3, (! 7 Ji I .

Bar Ltck 1 2 6 1 4 3 5
I: 5n10
!
fl ·1'·1·,;
~· •
·1

~ .

Fire 9an 4 5 3 3 1 6 2 : 3 :.,:'Ii, S 11 ·

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Spoon est 1 1 2 5 1 2 1 i: 4 i l l .
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Moon 11 5 16 2 4 10 9 4 1 " I~ II,

Moon
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rat-2 1 1 1
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r :1 ll 1
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Moon ?one l 2 1 6 1 1 4i !:-·

.q:I ill.,
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I D/SA____~p_ ____
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DIRECTORATE OF·

I SCIENCE &. TECHNOLOGY

I
I BLACK SHIELD
I Reconnaissance Missions
1 January - 3TMarch 1968
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Byeman .comint OXCART
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BYE No. 1330/68
DST-BS/BYE/68-2
30 April 1968
I Copy No. ·10
C05492938

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WARNING
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This document contains information affecting the n<!tional, sec\irity of the
United States \Vithin the meaning of the espio11age laws U. S. Code Titfo 18,
Sections 793, 79·1 and 798. Th<! law prohibits its transmission or the reve-
I
lation of its contents in any mum1cr to an uuauthorized person, as well us
its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United
States or for the benefit of any foreign government to tlic dettiment of the
I
United States. It i.s to be seem only by personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive information in the designated coutrol diaimels.
Its sc,>curity must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining
.to the BYEMAN and Communications ·Intelligence Controls. No action is
I
to be takeri on any communications intelligence which may be contained
herein, regardless of the advantage to be gained, if such a<:tion might have
the effect of revealing the existence and nature of the source, unless such
I
action is first approved by the appropriate authority.
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C05492938
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.I BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions
t January - 31 March 1968

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I DST-BS/BYE/ 68-2
30 April 1968
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I CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AG~N<.:Y

Directorate of Science and Technology

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PREFACE
I This report is the third in a series of resumes of the BLACK
SHIELD reconnaissance program. This third resume spans the
I period from 1 January to 31 March 1968 and includes missions
flown over North Vietnam and North Korea.

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I CONTENTS

Page

I PREFACE . . • • .
SUMMARY • . . • • .
MISSION ANALYSIS •
.... .... .
iii
1
3
BX6842
I BX6843
BX6847
3
7
8
BX6851
10
I BX6853 • • . .
BX6856
11
13

I APPENDICES

I. BLACK SHIELD operational missions alerted between

I 1 January and 31 March 1968 . . . . . • . . . • . .
TI. COMIREX targets covered by BLACK SHIELD
19
missions over North Korea 1 January -

I 31 March 1968 • . . . . . • • . • . . • . . . • • . .
Ill. COMIREX targets covered by BLACK SHIELD
missions over North Vietnam 1 January -
20

31 March 1968 . . • . . • • . • • • . • . . . • . . •
I IV. Number of radar signals received by BLACK SHIELD
missions 1 January - 31 March 1968 • • . . • . .
27

54

I FIGURES

1. Mission BX6842, flown 4 January 1968

I 2.
3.
Photography of missile launched by site 267
Signal and vehicle flight environment . . . •
3
5
6
4. Mission BX6843, flown 5 January 1968 . 7
I 5.
6.
Mission BX6847, flown 26 January 1968 .
Mission BX6851, flown 16 February 1968
9
10
7. Mission BX6853, flown 19 February 1968 •. 12

I 8.
9-11.
Mission BX6856, flown 8 March 1968
Samples of mission photography
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15

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I
BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions
I ·1 January. -·.31 ·March. 1968

I SUMMARY

I F.ifteen BLACK SHIELD high•altitude reconnaissance misslons were alerted

during· the period from 1 January to 31March1968. Six of the 15 missions were
flown, four over North Vietnam and two over North Korea; Eight missions were
I cancelled due to weather conditions, and approval for one Korean mission was
not obtained. (Appendix I lists these missions and related events~)

I BLACK SHIELD photography of North Vietnam through 31 March 1968 revealed

no evidence of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, equipment, or facilities.
Mission BX6843 photographed two suspect surface-to-surface (cruise) missile
sites near Thanh Hoa. One site was unoccupied, and the second contained a few
I small unidentified objects.

The BLACK SHIELD program provided initial baseline coverage of North

I Korea on missions BX6847 and BX6853, with readable coverage of 70 percent
of the country. These two missions supplied current photography of North
Korean industrial and transportation systems and updated the existing order
I of battle. The ability of the BLACK SHIELD program to react rapidly is
demonstrated by photographs of the USSPuebloatanchor in Wonsan Bay obtained
on mission BX6847. This mission was flown on 26 January, three days after
the USS Pueblo was seized and one day after approval was granted. (Appendix II
I is a listing of the COMIREX targets photographed over North Korea.)

The BLACK SHIELD program has continued to supply good coverage of North
I Vietnam, particularly order of battle information of fighter aircraft and surface-
to-air missile defenses. The program has contributed substantially to bomb
damage assessment of point targets and of the interdiction effort directed against
North Vietnamese road, rail, and water transportation systems. BLACK SHIELD
I missions have identified new targets and provided information of Chinese military
activity, not only in North Vietnam and the border areas, but also of the periphery
of Hainan Island. The tri-border area of south Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
I has also been covered well by BLACK SHIELD photography. BLACK SHIELD
mission BX6856, flown over Khe Sanh and the border area of South Vietnam,
provided strategic information of the hostile troop build-up, supply, and

I infiltration routes. (COMIH.EX targets photographed over North Vietnam are

listed in Appendix III.)

I 1

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 TOI? SECRET TRINE OXCART BYE-1330y68 · I
1An of the four North Vietnamese missions were tracked by Chin~se andVor ;
N~rth Vietnamese air surveillance facilities. One unsuccessful surface-to~air ,
m~ssile (SAM) was launched at the vehicle of mission BX6842. The missile fi~ed
dtiz-ing the overflight was launched with the Fan Song radar in low'.PRF (fti'st
:
'.
I
ol?served on missions BX6732 and BX6734). This was the first known instaP,ce ::
ofj a Soviet SA-2 missile's having been guided by information derived from jthe
F$.n Song guidance radar operating in the low-PRF mode. !
:[
: I
b~ radar~
!Missions BX6847 and BX6853 over North Korea were tracked of··'
th~ Chine.se Air Defense System. Soviet air defense radars tr.acked the BX6S.47 ,
vehicle for approximately five minutes. The init.ial evidence of. EW:traoijing : i
I
bYi the. North Koreane; occurred on BX6853 when the Maryong-San ra~ar sta~~(>n ' i
r~orted position plots of the .yehicle during a nine-minute period. (AppendiJ4IV ':
li~ts · the number and type of racia;r. signals recorded by the System 6 Eiint ·• i
I
c9llection device carried by BLACK SHIELD vehicles.) . [
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MISSION ANALYSIS
I BX6842

I BLACK SHIELD mission BX6842 was a single-pass, high-altitude reconnais-

sance mission flown over North Vietnam on 4 January 1968. The BLACK SHIELD
vehicle entered and exited North Vietnam ato358:28Z and 0407:14Z. The mission
I vehicle encountered a SAM reaction at approximately 0405Z. Figure 1 shows
the mission route and associated events.

I There was no indication of surface-to-surface missile (SSM) activity in the

photographed areas. The BLACK SHIELD vehicle photographed 176 Chinese
and North Vietnamese COMIREX targets plus 16 bonus (non-COMIREX) targets.

I iC..:
i=igure J

Chiang·cheng CH IN A
I CH IN A
0

I (
(
.,
·,,

I /"
:~.... i.·

;Hai-kou··-·--.r,.,,·-\ ,.
I
; ,/'' ";'

I )NORTH _,,. HAINAN r

/VIETNAM 0 ·."
'\" . r··Ho·la·•hlh
"
I 0426
(1718N/11410E}_

0423 20- -

I MISSION BX 6842
4 January 1968
THAILAND ( J712N/1120BE}

·. .j~-
- VehicleTrack

I
,;,
' ..
\:'~
- Chinese Track
' SOUTH
o Radar Station
. SAM Site
..">VIETNAM
.All limo• or• GMT (Z•lo).
\.
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pf the 176 COMIREX targets :Photogr.ap.hed, 139 were North Vietnamese S. . A...2
~ites, 12 of which were occupied. The mission vehicle also photograpt;ied a
~mber of probable cave defense sites near Hanoi and Haiphong. . i - ; 1

I Three S-band and one L-band Fan Song B radar signals were recorded d~ringi
the overflight The third S-band signal qualified as a valid threat ~nd acttyate<;ti ..~,I
. '
1:he Mad Moth and Blue Dog BLACK SHIELD jammers. Correlation !'J.lld ana~y.si~ i
of all available data indicate - that SAM site 267 (21°05'N, 105°44':m) launched a
:ftlissile at the BLACK smELD vehicle at 0405:02Z. FigurE? 2 presents.1Jh7ee
V,hotographs:. · one of smoke over site 267; a second of the launc~ed m1~s1le; •
· friissile vapor trail an<i: missile burn-out; and the third of missil~ detoIUi;tion;'
"fdissile trajectory analysis from photography indicates the missil~'s appr;oach:
to the mission vehicle was no closer than 8,000 feet and probably was :r;nuch!
feater. ;. •1 •-

• , r •
\ A departure ·from the normal Fan Song B launch/guidance technique~ was,
hoted on this mission. Normal operational procedures specify launch/guiqancef I
to occur while. the target and missile are under the influence ofth~ Fan Sqng -8!
~adar operating in the high-PRF mode (2,400-2,530 pps). Intentional atypical:
p:iissile launch sequences were observed in October 1967 during mis*ions:
\BX6732 and BX6734,* when missiles were launched while the radar was ill-low:
I
\PRF. The Fan Song was switched to high PRF in two of these firings approxi""!
fn.ately six seconds· after launch, and missile _guidance was provided the .i
(l'he missile fired at the v_ehi:.cle o~ BX684? was launched w~ile the rad:a: , wa$!
I
iJ.tt thelow-PRF ·mode, and m1ss1le guidance (high-PRF) information was com:tJute4:
with the radar operating in the low-PRF mode. This atypical la~c~/~iqanc¢!
~equence may have been an attempt by the Vietnamese to reduce: the -effect ·ofi
~he BLACK SHIELD jammers while suffering only a small loss in capa~ility)
I
jiue to the lower data .rate. Figure 3 is a pres~ntation of the signal and ve;hiclei
right environment during the missile launch/fl~ht phase,
I ·
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• •
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l . The situation geometry as depicted in figures l and 3 tends to ;indicat~ thatf
~e launch occurred in anticipation of a· BLACK SHIELD path offi~et amehab~ei
to a successful missile intercept. This prediction was apparently gene~ate<Ai I
~ia erroneous EW tracking iilformation which· projected the tal'.get fligh1fpatlti
~o within 4. nautical miles of the SA-.2 site. Tl).e actual vehicle fl~ght pa:tJli was!
~pproximately 20 nautical miles from site 267 and too distant for :a suoc~ssful!
dntercept, The erroneous· EW ,tracking data coupled with the ~ffects.~f the;
I
jBLACK SHIELD jammer·s resulted in a late and probable hasty launch, a l*unch:
at could ·not have been successful because of the large offset range.!· The: I:
S
1
issile continued to automatic destruct wbi?h occurs approximately 62 se~ondsi
ter launch. This was also the approximate duration of the LO· band ~igna~!
/(see figure 8).
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figure 2. Photography of Missile Launched by Site 267

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I SA-2 launch

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I Flight & Missile Burnout

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I Warhead burst
5

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90200 ~ -68 CIA

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•..... ·---------~---·--------------------------·---··-··--·-------------------·-··--··------------------------------------------·------------·--·---·····---------·---·--··--·-··----------------·----·-

Figure 3. Signol & Vehide Flight Environment

0404:40 0405:02 0405:10 0405:26 0405:32 0405;46 0406:01 0406:03

_J .t_
I I

---------------·-- VEHICLE FLIGHT PATH

__ .....,______
Ml:SSILE
LAUNCH
27.S n.m. Slant Range
-·--
BROAD SIDE
ASPECT
20

i '"'3
-
:z
~

----- z
w
0
20N.M. z t;J
10 <I;
a:: 0
- - - - -... _ _ p~ECTED EW F

--------- -- ~
0
8 z
- - - - LIGHT PA 'rH ::J
0
a::
>
~
<!) '"'3
4

SAM SITE NO. ~67,

------~i..-~----'--------~"'""!' ____,,______.....______......______.....______....____________...l 0
40 35 30 20 15 10 s ()

·GROUND R'ANGE {NM) fOP Sl!Cltff TRtNE OXCART

Handle >lo BYEMA.N-TALENT-KEYHOl.E-COMINT Control Sys!•m1 Jointly
f01't 4"*Ct.\ •

·-·· . ,, -····
,, ... ~--···---------···---·------·-··- ·-•·»··--·-------···-·-·-·-·-···--·--· .. ~-·-----·------~---·------~"'--·--------- -··-- -

•• • • • • • • • •
·-----·-----·· ·~--···-- .. -·- ·-··--··· ·-·.. --·-·-·---···-· ··----·- ---~ """'"''" " " " " " " " • · ·

--• • • • --
-··· ............. '",._ -·· u • M•H
··;•- ...·--·-·
C05492938
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I Early warning track was apparently first established by the Chinese radar
facility located at Chiang-cheng. Other radar stations at Pu-kao and Ho-lo-shih
supplemented and maintained track of the vehicle. The initial detection and final
I track radar-to-vehicle ground ranges for these three stations were 67 and 246,
91and136, andl37and239nauticalmiles, respectively. There was no indication
of North Vietnamese radar tracking of the vehicle; however. it is likely that the

I Vietnamese broadcastofthevehicletrackwasbasedupon reception of the Chinese

plot information. · ·
Strike/jamming activity during the overflight period was moderate and

I restricted to the Haiphong area.

BX6843
I This BLACK SHIELD mission was a double-pass overflight of North Vietnam
flown on 5 January 1968, The vehicle entered and exited North Vietnam at
I fl ure 4

CH IN A
I Chlang·che';,g

CH I NA

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r!vJETNAM

I 0550 .
(l751!Nlll217E!h

I MISSION BX 6843
5 Jonuory 1968
THAILAND
055D oif-
c1mN1u221Ei

I · - 1 $ 1 Pcm
- - 2nd Poss
- Chinese Trock
·SOUTH
VIETNAM
o Radar Station All tiftes are GMT {lvlv).

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 'FOP SECRET TRINE OXCART BYE-1330:/68 •.
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0112:56Z and 0425:56Z on its first pass. and at 0524:00Z and 0535:03 on its ·
l)I,
; ;

s+cond pass. Figure 4 is a presentation of the flight route and· associ~.ted .·

.
• ! •
eyents. : !
j '. .
Two suspect SS (cruise) missile sites near Thanh Hoa were photographed, :

t
o e containing a few small unidentified objects and the other unoccupied.
T e BLACK SHIELD vehicle photographed 233 Chinese and North :Vietnarn;ese •
CpMIREX targets plus 10 bonus (non-COMIREX) targets. Of the 23~ COMIU;EX :
[il1
ta;rgets photographed, 182 were North Vietnamese SA-2 sites. 1 : FifteeP. of:.
tl(ese sites were occupied. This mission also provided photography of five : · :ii
,
o~ North Vietnam's majorairfieldsandcoverageofalmost all of the rail network. ;

' .
I
IElevenFan Song B S-band signals were recorded during the overflight.
Npne of these signals appeared to be tracking the mission vehicle, anc;l. no. ; :
d¢fensive system was activated. Initial EW tracking was accomplished by. i
Chinese facilities, and this track information was subsequently btoadcasfby : i
ttje North Vietnamese. There was no. indication of tracking by North Vietnam:ese
,I
r~dars. Initial detection and final track ranges of Chinese radar sta~ons
during the first pass were 109 and 217 nautical miles fer Chiang-cheng ;and ,
9~ and 237 nautical miles for Pu-kao. Chiang-chengts ranges for the secd,nd- · .
i:I
. '

..
. '
p4ss track were 117 and 325 nautical miles. · · ·
I

!IThere was little or no strike/jamming

. during the overflight period.
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BX6847
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l BLACK SHIELD mission BX6847 was a three-pass, high-altitude reconnais.:. .
sf'nee mission flown· over North Korea on 26 January 1968. The mission veh~cle·
w s over the North.Korean land mass on its first pass from 0217:53 :to 0222i05; •
o. the second pass from 0244:09 to 0248:36, and on the third pass from 042Q:21
·I
tq 04~5:07. Figure 5 presents the mission flight path and asspciated !air:
slllrve1llance
l
. events. . '' ··
! I
j The BLACK SHIELI> vehicle photographed 82 North Korean ind Chinese·'
CbMIREX targets and 837 bonus targets. The mi!!lsion obtained comprehen+ive ·
I
~
seline coverage o:f most of North Korea's armed forces and i~dustry as 'Yell
a large portions of the transportation system. The USS Pueblo and three hew
ided missile patrol boats (Komar PTG) were observed on photography of ~bis
Ii
~
ission. A BLACK SHIELD photograph of the USS Pueblo at anchor in a !bay
n rth of Wonsan is included in the examples of mission photography at the :end
this report. .
iI
IThere
w~s
was no indication of a hostile weapons reaction; no defensive system· i
activated during the overflight. The majority of the air surveillan~e tracipng '.
•I i

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SSR
Figure 5

c
I 42°
H N A

42°
•Mukden

I SEA OF
JAPAN

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•
38
0235 20

SOUTH

I KOREA
0
~·

I YELLOW
HONSHU

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•0441 51

MISSION BX-684 7
I 26 ·January 1968
- - 1 s t Pass ==Chinese Track 30
All t.inios orct GMT {Zulu).
- - 2nd Pass

I - - - 3rd Pass

124°
0 Chinese Early
Warning Radar

1 a• 132'

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wa~ accomplished by Chinese rada.:r facilities at'Ma-t'a Point (33°12'N, 122°37't), ~ :

Tupgt~ai (32°52'N, 120°20'E), Mu-yeh Island (36°55'N, 122°3l'E), Hai".'"yang Isla.lid

(39i 0 20'N, 123°10'E), and Hunch'un (42°50'N, 130°20 1E). · I ,
~nalysis
'

of System 6 Elint indicates that Soviet Bar Look, Tall King, apd
Siqe Net radars, subordinate to Uglovoe (43°21 'N, 132°40'E), tracked the vehicle
.in fthe time period from 0228:30 to 0233:30. The Soviets broadcast one posit~on
1. . '
!
j

pl~t of the vehicle at 0232Z. There was no indication of any North Kore'an ' .

I
i ;

sutveillance tracking. ' I

; :

I BX6851
!
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~LACK SHIELD mission BX6851 was a two-pass mission flown over Notith
j I
: i

''
Vi~tnam on 16 February 1968. The vehicle entered North Vietnam on its fitst l
I !

r1&tire6 I
: [
; l

CH IN A
.I
; ,

,,
._.:·· ..~ ·:

I
,
...
~ ·
Pel-hal l'·(' ;·.,. . i:.
(t ~.han-•h1a~g
i;
i<
-·;··

b
':Pel-Ii
HA/NAN .;·
.,
c' I
I
MISSION ax 68 51
16 February 1968
THAILAND
I
- 1 s t Poss •
. --Exit
- Chinese Trock
I
o

I:
Rodar S!otion All tlmu •re GMT (Zulu),

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10

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I
pass at 0416:45 and exited at 0424:49. Overflight of the DMZ occurred from

I 0520:50 to 0521:46. Figure 6 is a plot of the mission route and associated tracking.

A rapid deterioration of weather over the target area resulted in little useable
I photography.

There was no indication of a hostile weapons reaction, and no electronic

I defensive equipment was activated during the overflight. Air surveillance
tracking of the BLACK SHIELD vehicle was maintained by Chinese radar
facilities at Pei-li (19°08'N, 108°43'E). Pei-haf (21°27'N, 109°E), and Chiang-cheng

I (22°45'N, 101°50'E). Initial detection and final radar-to-aircraft track ranges

for these radar stations were 39 to 228, 126 to 286, and 169 to 233 nautical
miles, respectively, Although there was no indication of North Vietnamese
radar tracking, track information probably was obtained by monitoring Chinese
I broadcast facilities.

There was little or no strike/jamming activity during the overflight

I period.

I BX6853
BLACK SHIELD mission BX6853 was a two-pass reconnaissance mission
I flown over North Korea on 19 February 1968, The mission vehicle penetrated
and exited the North Korean land mass on its first pass at 0306:01 and 0309:50,
and on its second pass at 0451:30 and 0456:51. Figure 7 is a plot indicating

I the mission route and related events.

The BLACK SHIELD vehicle photographed 84 North Korean COMIREX targets

I plus 89 bonus targets. Scattered clouds covered 20 percent of the area

photographed, concealing the area in which the USS Pueblo was photographed
on mission BX6847. One new. occupied SA-2 site was identified near Wonsan.

I There was no indication of a hostile weapons reaction. Air surveillance

tracking of the vehicle was accomplished by elements of the Chinese Air Defense
System {ADS) from 0300Z to 0332Z on the first pass and from 0448Z to 0516Z
I on the second pass. This mission marks the first tracking of the vehicle by
the North Korean ADS; the North Korean Maryong-San radar station (37°56 'N,
-i25°Sff'E) reported-track and altitude information on the BLACK SHIELD veihicle
I ·from 0458Z to 0507Z of the second pass. Initial detection and final track ranges
'for I the Maryong-San radar station were 54 and 237 nautical miles. There was
[ rioindication of tracking by Soviet radars.

I 11

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TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART
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MISSION BX-6853.
19 February 1968
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•. NaOl;_cal Mile$ ~
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O Eorly Wa~ning Radar
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I
BX6856
I This BLACK SHIELD two-pass mission wa.s flown .over North Vietnam and
the Demilitarized· Zone on 8 March 1968. The mission vehicle .entered North
Vietnamese airspace on its first pass at 0415:14Z and exited at 0428:01Z.
I On the second pass it overflew the DMZ area in the time period from 0526:14Z
to 0527:10Z. Figure 8 is a presentation of the flight route and associated
tracking.
I Good quality photography was obtained of Khe Sanh and the Laos, Cambodia,
and South Vietnamese border areas. No useable photography was obtained of
North Vietnam due to adverse weather conditions.
I There was no indication of a hostile weapons reaction, and no on-board
defensive systems were activated. Chinese Air Defense radar facilities
I I
•(·.
Figure 8

CH IN A
I CH IN A

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I ,,~NORTH
<VIETNAM
Y·,
,, HAINAN
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I 0537 55
(1706Nlll2J~~

I MISSION BX 6856
8March1968
THAILAND
0533
0538 -
(170SNll 1238E:}

n-

I - hlPass
- - Exit
- Chinese Track
SOUTH
VIETNAM
All tiHs .,. GMT (Zulo),

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 TOP SECRE'f TRINE OXCART BYE-1330/;68
::1
trdcked the mission vehicle from 0422Z to 0434Z and from 05S3Z to 053SZ.
::1
Th~re was no apparent tracking of the vehicle or indication of knowledge: of
the\ overflight by the North Vietnamese. A change in normal route penetrati,on :1
ap~arently hampered detection of the vehicle by Chinese/North Vietname'se
raqtar facilities. . ·
j
Little or no strike/jamming activity was conducted during the :overfli~ht
pe;bod. •1
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 C05492938
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I Figure 9.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM 15
I TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART
90199 4-68 OA

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·I 'l'OP SECRE'l' TRINE OXCART . BYE-1330/68
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Figu e 10. Cave Defense Sites ':
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NO FOREIGN D.ISSEM .
90198 4-68 CIA .
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• • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • o
Figure 11. Vinh Airfield
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SECR.ET
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90197 4-68 CIA
 C05492938
I TOP SECRET TRlNE OXCART BYE-1330/68

I APPENDIX I

I
BLACK SHIELD Operational Missions.Alerted
.I Between 1 January and 31 March 1968

I .
MISSION NO.
BX6842
DATE
3 Jan. 1968
REMARKS

Flown
BX6843 4 Jan. 1968 Flown
I BX6844 6 Jan. 1968 Cancelled
weather
due to
BX6845 19 Jan. 1968 Cancelled due to
I BX6846 20 Jan. 1968
weather
Cancelled
weather
due to
BX6847 25 Jan. 1968 Flown (3 Passes)
I (Korea)
BX6848 29 Jan. 1968 Cancelled due to
weather
I BX6849 9 Feb. 1968 Cancelled due to
weather
BX6850 14 Feb. 1968 No Approval

I (Korea)
BX6851
BX6852
15 Feb. 1968
16 Feb. 1968·
Flown.
·cancelled due to
weather
I BX6853
(Korea)
18 Feb. 1968 Flown

BX6854 27 Feb. 1968 Cancelled due to

I BX6855 5 Mar. 1968
weather
Cancelled due to
weather
BX6856 7 Mar. 1968 Flown
I
I
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APPENDIX II
..... _. ___________ .______.COMIREX Targets Co:v..ere.d._hy_..BLACL.SHIEIJLMiss.ions..-0llel!.-Norlh.-Kor..e.a____.___,____··------------··------
l January - 31 March 1968

COMIREX Mission Number

Number Target 47 53
Nampo SAM Site C-24~2 x
-·
Hungnam SAM Site A-25-2 x
Pyongyang SAM Site C-33-3 x x
Sariwon SAM Site A-21-2 x
Wonsan SAM Site A-10-2 x x
- Sinpo SAM Site A-09~2 x
Nampa SAM Site B-30-2 x
Hungdogi-Dong SAM Site C-22-2· x x
Pyongyang SAM Site B-17-2 x x
Pyongyang SAM Site B-23~2 x x
Pyongyang SAM Site C-29-2 x x
Pyongyang SAM Site C-12-2 x
··· Pyongya~if SAM Si t"e.· ·c-os.:...2 .. x JC
Pyongyang SAM Support Factory x x
. ',, . .. . -··."" . ·- . .

- •..• - ............... -
----~-·-n.-•-••••••• -•e ·•• • _.,., - ••• ••--·---•-••···-~-•--•-· -- ·-- •-·•'""' •-··- ··-•••-•"-••·-··--••••••'>· ,_,._•••·••••••--•~•·· ••• --·---•-· ·••••••---·-· ·•- .,,, -·--· ·-•-·•
---- •• • . - . • •••• . - •
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APPENDIX II (continued)
COMIREX Mission Number
Number Target 47 53
Nampo Cruise Missile Launch Site #1 x x

Py.ongyang Airfield East x x

r--

\C)
N
II) Sondong Ni Airfield x
M
,..;

d Sunan Up Airfield x x
~
~ Pukchang-Ni Airfield x x
~
i::>
II)
'-----

Wonsan Airfield x x
Hwangju Airfield 2 x x

Pyong Ni Airfield x
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·APPENDIX II (continued)
co:M:f :REx Mission Number
·--·~er Tariet------··--·---·--·---·--·----------------4-r----sr-··----.

Qnc~on-Up
·-:,.·,
Airfield
:_ '·
x x

Taechon Airfield x
Nampo Naval Base x
Munchon
. .
Naval.·: ..Base
.• ;
Wonsan '
x

- Changjon Nayal. B~se x

. ~ •.

Haeju.Naval Base x x
Piva-Got Proba~le_Naval Dock Yard x
Wonsan Port Facilities x x
Nampo Naval Base x
Nampo Port Complex x x
Nampo Ship Yard Myonghyop x x
Hungµam Port Fa_cilitie~ x
·· Pyongyang· B~·-·J;nsti·tute· ........... ·::X·
..
Hwang-Chon Al,'Dly Supply Depot x·
....... ·····-·~---··- . _., ... ,.:Origji~'-c~~pie':;;?· ·:··- --·······r-~·: ,--,-~ _c,/;-,,-~,-,, ...
'----.,..-----'
-·· -· ..: . . .... ...
- - · - · · · - · - . - - - ___ .,,,.,, __ • __ ,,.,.,,,, ____________ _. ____ ~--·---- .. -----·····~----- _,. ___ •••••-••·----.. -~.-- ----- .. ------·-~····-·--·••• -~-•-•••"
... .:. . ·- :... ' .. ' .. ·-· ............ : - ..
.-

- - · - · - - - - - - - - - - __________ ,,.. ···~·---·" -••«-•»

-' .'
~ 00 M•-<•O
'
···-~-
.... "". - - .. ..
·-··•<•<--'<- ··--·-····- ·-•••• 0
. . .,
·-· ·- • • •• - · · - - - · · · - M• -~···---·~· " " - ..•
........________ ,,.,. ..... .,,~ ............
...
~·······-· . ·~

••• ··<· ···•··· - .: •••.•• - • ·•

• • •• ....... - •.• • • • •o
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APP~N.DIX II (cpntinued) 00

COM I REX Mission Number

·Number ·Target .. 47 53
Hoeyang Headqtiarters First Army Group x x
Hoeyang Army Barrabks x
Hungnam Military Activity x

Hungriam Military Barracks Area x

'Kangdong·Army Barracks East x

Koksan. Mi1..itary Activity ' x
Kok:san Army Barracks/Storage Area x
Koksan:· Amy Barracks x
Kumchon Army Barracks Area E. x
Pyongyang Airborne Training School x
Pyongyang ··.Army Barracks/Storage East. x x
Pyongyang Depot x

Ningye Military Depot South x

Yangdog-Up Military Complex x x
 TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART BYE-1330/68
: ' ,'

APPENDIX II (c_ontinued)
COMIREX ________ _ Mj ssj on Numbex...___________
Number Target 47 53

Chon-g·nong Army Barracks/Training x

Ktimsong · Army Barracks • x

Sangjok Tong Army Barracks West x

S.angjok Tong Army Barracks Headquarters x x
- Masan Ni Army Barracks Headquarters 12th x
Changdo Ri Army· Barracks Headquarters x x
Changdo Ri Army Barracks NE x x
Changdo Ri Army Barracks NE x
- Sowon Dong Barracks Headquarters 8th Infantry x
Ousil Arniy Barracks x
Wa Dong Arm~ Barracks Headquarters
Ichon Army Barracks NE Headquarters 5th
·1cho.n·Arm.y-·narracks·ssw·
Pyongsan Army Barracks/Storage Depot x
~. _--,--........... .... : : ... ·
Siksadong-Ni Army Barracks/Storage x x
•• •• •• • -·•-•-•-•••••••••• ..••••---··•~

.....................
----~•••-~·~- •-rn-•--••--.-•-•-~•-~·•-•- •~··-••- •••>•••-•-•••••••~-"•'-••-•»••• -•-•• _ _ _ _ _. •-·--"'"-"•-••••••-•••••- •••••-••••••.-•-»-··--••,.•-•••¥>••-••-<••••••·-•••• •-• •• ' ' ' ••• ' • ••••• •• ••·~--~ ''"

• ·=~'"'''-'"'"-~'=A~;.~« .; 1• ;~ ~~i :• . .: ;.:,:!~~r;~~JM:•.•:t;<·,,:·,_. .:: ~.o:....:;.:,1: '•.;,~.'('',, ;;,::•..::;; :· ,,;,: :

... . ... --··-'"··· ·--· ........................ ···-·- -~ ............................ l'OP. . .SBCRE.'I'. TlUNE..OXCART .

, ..
• - - • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • •o
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APPENDIX II (continued) \..0
w
ro
COM I REX Mission Number
Number Target 47 53
Sibyong Ni Storage Area x
Sari won Headquarters 46th Infantry Division SW x
Yung Ni Army Barracks x
Pyongsan Army Barracks x
Pyongyang Railroad Yard Taedong x
x
\C
N

-
Ill
~

0
Pyongsan Railroad Yards
Pokkye Ri Railroad Yards Shops x.
x
x
-
~
~
Q
Ill
'----
~

To song Ni Railroad Yards

Nampo Railroad Station Yards & Shops
x
x
Kowon Railroad Yards x
Sariwon Railroad Yard x x
Pyongyang Railroad Yards x x
Pyongyang Railroad Station & Yards x x
Pyongyang Railroad Yards Sopo-Dongsgon x x
Pyongyang Railroad Yards x x
Sari won Complex x
t>:>
tr!
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APPENDIX II (continued)
COMIREX.· · ·
·-·----·--------·-'i'irg-e-t--·-----------·----·-~----·--·---------------------·----w-------
. .· · Mission Number
53 -----------~
Number
Kaesong Complex x
Wonsan Complex x x
S1:1nchon Complex x
- Haeju Complex x
Yonan Complex x
Kosong Complex x x
Hwangju Complex x
Sariwon Complex x
-
Ongjin Complex x x
Nampo Complex x

Yonan Complex x

',.,. - ..... ' '; "' ...·.'' : ·-·- ;_, '"~ " .. -- -· -·- .: ... ' - .. ····- . --- .. _,_
- ........... ___________ , _______.............. ,.,._______ ...

....................
" • • • "" --••-•• """ --•··----·---··~··•·•-""' ••••-•- --••••-<> >• • - - - - · · - - · · ~ -·-••-•·•-•••- .. --•-.•••·•-·--·-·---•••••••••-,.•--•-••rn•-••••-•H-n~•-••-•·•-·• '""'""-'''""'"" __ _.,,, "'-• • ·••· ·-····••·rn••-"'' • ·····•- ----•···••- •
• - - - . - - . - .....•. - . .TOP SECRET .TRINE OXCART BYE-1330/68

APPENDIX III
COMIREX Targets Covered by BLACK SHIELD Missions over North Vietnam*
1 January - 31 March 1968

COMIREX Mission Number

Number· Target 42 43
Hanoi SAM Search
Lao Cai SAM Search
Dien Bien Phu SAM Search
Vinh SAM Search
-
Cao Bang SAM Search
Dong Hoi SAM Search
Fo Lo Probable CD Site x
Cat Ba Coastal Defense Sites 1 and 2 x x
- Dung Fang Suspect Coastal Defense Site
Chang Chiang Coastal Defense Site (Suspect)
Yai Cheng Probable Radar Site
Hanoi SAM Site A-10-2 x x
*Bad weather precluded photography of targets on BLACK SHIELD Missions BX6851 and
BX6856.

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APPENDIX III (continued)

COMIREX Mission Number
·····--···---..-·-·--N-ttmbe-r---··---------··-··------·--·--·--Ta-rg-et--------·----------·----------·--·-·-·-·---·--····-····-·--·-·----------·---42·--·--··-··-------rr--------· -----

Hanoi SAM Site· A:...19-2 x x

Hanoi SAM Site· A-29-2 x x
Hario£ SAM Site·B~0~2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site ·B-12-2 x x
Hanoi "SAM Site S..:25-2 x
Hanoi SAM Site ~29-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-30-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-29-2 x x
Hanoi SAM·Site C-30-2 x x
Hanoi SAM·Site D-19-2 x
- Hanoi SAM Site B-17-2 x
Hanoi- SAM :Site B-21-2 x
Hanoi SAM Site C-28-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site D~31-2
x x
. Hano.i.. SAM ..Sit.e ...A-.11-2 . x. . x
Hanoi SAM Site A-24-2 .x x

-·-·-·· ..... ....... _. .. -------- --·· '' ..... "" ..... - ....... '
---•••••••••••·•········•-''-•>>••••-•• ..............
. ,,.. . .... ..

. . . . . - •........... -
·~-~ -~---··· ,,. ----·---·~---··· > •'H'>>>>•>->»"0'-- >··• >•·-,•-• ,., _ _ _ _ _ _ +•>·•·,+•

......... ~... " ............................................... ,. '. ····· ...... ............ .... .. ., ....... ......
,. ., ~ ~ -·· --··~· .....:-. .... ~"·--···· .. ~·· ._:.:, ., .. . ..
·-·~·~~.: ~,."
• - • • • - • . - . - - ••• - • •
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APPENDIX III (continued)

COM I REX Mission Number
Number Target 42 43
Hanoi SAM Site D-31A-2
Hanoi SAM Site D-16-2 x
Hanoi SAM Site D-36-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-06-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-07-2 x x
- Hanoi SAM Site D-31B-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site E07-2 x x
Yen Bai SAM Site B-09-2 x x
Yen Bai SAM Site C-09-2
Haiphong SAM Site A-29-2 x
Haiphong SAM Site A-20-2 x
Haiphong SAM Site A-17-2 x
Haiphong SAM Site B-01-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site A-29A-2 x

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APPENDIX III (continued)

CQ.IREX. Mission Number
··--- ....__________lhunb...er_________________J_a_r_g_t;tt___________.___________.________._______________________1..2_.__ ~--------------~
Yen Bai SAM Site B-12-2 x x
Yen Bai SAM Site C-10-2· x x
Yen Bai SAM Site B-11-2 x x
Yen Bai SAM. Site C-03-2 x x
Yen Bai SAM Site C-07-2 x x
Yen Bai SAM Site C-09A-2
Yen Bai SAM Sit·e C-17-2 x x
Yen Bai SAM Site B-06-2 x x
Yen Bai SAM Site C-04-2 x x
-
Yen Bai SAM Site B-05-2 x x
Yen Bai SAM Site B-OSA-2 x x
Yen Bai SAM Site B-10-2 x x
Yen Bai SAM Site B-llA-2 x

"" . . . . . .,..... ···-·· ·-•-••><••· .. ,. ·-··· ...........'".. _ ... ,, ... _ .. ___ '' "'''
, •·-·-••·-•-•-m•••---··••·•"•--• ·-··-•••·-•>-.•• ••••·---•• ••• «••-•••-•• '"'" o.r••--••••••••• -••·---•·••·- - • •••<>•-

- .. - •.•..•• - . - .••.•••• -
••••~·-•••--•--••--••••-•••--•••-•m• ••••••---··-·~·-•-rn•-•-·-"·~-- '"'"'""""""''-•~••• ••••-••-+.• " ' " ' " " ' ••••

• ••• - ••• • • - : - - · " ' : - " ' - - - - : - • • ••-••*- ,._, .. .,...- •••-7-----•·;-•-:-·----· -:--··-·--~~-"-:'""""'";"";· .. ----:--""-':"''-;"""_"_"_'•'.~' •••--•--:--•~#--• ~-·:;---·~~~-- •·~-"'"'-"~' •• '*" -•••·-·---·-•,.•-•--:"'~:-- - ••• _, • ., .. • '" ••• ----• .. ,._!""--·•-•• '--:'"- .. •·-•••••rn -•••••.,•-•••••' -•••••• ----:••-:• •••: ·-·~-• ""'--•••» ••·•---·-·•-
-- - . - - • - - .. - •••TOP SECftE'f TRlNE OXCART BYE-1330/68

APPENDIX III (continued)

COM I REX Mission Number
Number Target 42 43

x
~

Haiphong SAM Site B-33-2 x

\0
N
l/'l
~ Haiphong SAM Site B-06-2 x x
.-i

0 Haiphong SAM Site C-32-2

~ x
...
.-i

><
0
Haiphong SAM Site C-32A-2 x x
l/'l
'----- Haiphong SAM Site B-28-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site B-30-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site A-07-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site A-23-2 x
Haiphong SAM Site A-31-2 x
Haiphong SAM Site A-33-2 x

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. ·----····--··------- APPENDIX I I I__j_gopt !_~g~Q)-----·--·-·------··-··----~---------·-------·----·-

COMIR.EX Mission Number
Number Target 42 43

Haiphong SAM Site C-30-2 x x

Haiphong SAM Site C-28-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site A-02-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site A-17A-2 x
Haiphong SAM Site D-35-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site A-33A-2 x
Thanh Hoa .·SAM Site B-28-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site C-02-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site B-01-2 x
Thanh Hba SAM Site B-02-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site
ThB.nh Hoa SAM Site D-04-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site.C-03-2 x

Thanh Hoa ·SAM Site C-02A-2 .X

. Thanh Hoa SAM Site A-i7-2

~· -· •·-··· ·~-·- -· • <'>- ••»•••"''''''''·~··-·····-!~•·•••°' - .•.,,,~ .~,. •..,' ........~ ....~., ... ,, ·---· m --··-···-~'0-H""' ... ~ .. •O• .... ''4' .... .,.,_,,.................. ~ .... - - . - · • . , . - · ... , ••••~· 0 •0 ................ ~"·~ '' ••• • -·· , •..,. "~- ··~~·· >" • ' ' ' ' ' " " ' ' . " ' ' " ' " ' "··-~·- • •••>••• < > < .0 ··~ ,,,,, ••0 <W< .,,.,., .. •• '<'! !•' •0. 0 ,,,,, 0 ••·•· --~· .. • ... _,,~,>< <, • ''', ·~ '"'··~·~ '~ _,,, ·~-·-··- •<
- - - - • - - - • - - - •• - • - - •o
'fO'.P SECRE'P TRINE OXCART BYE-1330/68
0
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APPENDIX III (continued) '°
w
O')
COMIREX Mission Number
Number Target 42 43
Thanh Hoa SAM Site C-04-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-02-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site C-01-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-03-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-03A-2 x
~

Thanh Hoa SAM Site A-19-2 x

l,C)
('I
l()
r"l
,-;
0 Thanh Hoa SAM Site B-28A-2
~ x
....;
~
Thanh Hoa SAM Site B-27-2 x
C>
l()
'- Thanh Hoa SAM Site A-14-2 x

Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-20-2

Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-20A-2
Thanh Hoa SAM Site A-17A-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site A-13-2 x
Hanoi SAM Site D-04-2

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APPENDIX III inued

COMIREX . I Mission Number
Number Target 42 43

Hanoi SAM Site C-30E-2

Hanoi SAM Site B-30A-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-30A-2 x x
. Hanoi SAM Site D-03-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site D-04-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site A-17A-2 x x
-
Hanoi SAM Site C-30C-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-01-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-05-2 x x
. .
Hanoi SAM Site C-04-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-02-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-04A-2 x
..
Hanoi SAM .Site C-OlA-2 x x
Hanoi· SAM ..Site-·B-3·3-2 ·X x
Hanoi SAM Site D-35-2 x x
Hanoi sl\M~sif~- ~-06!~2 · ·-· ·: · ·: ·.:- · x
~·-··-~·---~ ... · · - · - - - - - · - • • · - · · • - > - · · - - - " - " " · - • - • - - --··•·--H•~·--...",__,_.
. ... . '. ' .. ". '
___ ,_____ _.,_ ___________ ,,.~-- .. "',. • •• - '" '"' _. •. • ,.... .. ,_
.-~ --·-~·
... ' .
·-··· .,, _ _,, ···- ••-•"••·~- •-••-• '" --·. ••••••M••·--·""-•··---- ' ... -- --·-•-"•"- "

•. - - . - - - - . - - - ., - - - - -
.-. .. ·.._:_:~~----:.:..:.:.:. ___::::::...:.~:. :. ~:::~:.:.::::~:.:·:.:::.::::::.:. :..:.-::.~~:.::.:.~:~.:.-:..:~.. :.::.:~::.:..~::· . 'fOlLSECRE!l.!-~'.:OXCAR,T..:.:...:.:...: ..:

-----------·----·"·•---·
. ·.:: ..:.·......: ...:..:::..::.:_:... . ::.::_::..:.::..·...: ·. . . ---··--··----·:..:.: :~.:..·.. :.::.. :....
- - • - - - • . - . - - ••• • . -
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APPENDIX III (continued)

COMIREX Mission Number
Number Target 42 43

Hanoi SAM Site C-13-2 x

Hanoi SAM Site C-11-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-12-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-30D-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-07-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Si~e D-06-2 x x
-
Hanoi SAM Site C-30E-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-34-2
Bae Can SAM Site C-22-2 x x
Bae Can SAM Site B-20-2 x x
- Bae Can SAM Site C-20-2 x x
Bae Can SAM Site C-19-2 x x
Hoa Binh SAM Site A-19-2 x
Hoa Binh SAM Site :S-20-2 x
Hoa Binh SAM Site B-22-2 x
Hoa Binh SAM Site B-17-2 x

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.'.'.</APPENDIX III
:: ..
COMIREX Mission Number
Number . Target 42 43

Hoa.Binh SAM Site C-17-2 x

Hoa Binh SAM S~te B-19-2 x
Hoa Binh SAM Site D-27~2

Hoa.Binh SAM Site D-28-2

Boa Binh SAM Site A-04-2
- Boa Binh SAM Site B-08-2 x

Hoa Binh SAM Site C-27-2

Hoa Binh SAM Site B-02-2 x x

Hanoi B-08-2 x x
Hoa Binh SAM Site B-04-2 x x
Bo.a Binh SAM Site .B03-2 x
. .. . . ... · Hoa ·Binh SAM .-Site. B-OSB-2- 'x-
Hoa Binh SAM Site B-10-2
:·11a11>11ong ''.s'AM:~,·s·ite·:n:§5.A~·2':··
.... .. .. ....... --····--· ... _,..... _,_. ,,,.., .
-••·•"'- """"' ••-u•--••~-· ---·-··-'"·-·••-·•••••··----·- • •- • ..... ~----•••••• •••.-•·- -•··••··-•····----.--.-•••••·-'"'*""-·-• •-.•••---•-••~•- ·---···-~"--•--··-·· '"' • •• -~·· ''" ' --···· . ------ '" -- --- - ---·-----~ --

-
•••• .. • •••••• ••• • •• •o
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0
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APPENDIX III (continued) w
CJ:)
COMIREX
Number Mission Number
Target 42 43
Haiphong SAM Site B-07-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site A-27-2 x
Haiphong SAM Site B-34-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site B-OlA-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site A-06-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site A-14-2 x
Haiphong SAM Site B-06B-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site D-22-2
Haiphong SAM Site C-21-2
Haiphong SAM Site D-23-2
Haiphong.SAM Site B-27-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site A-31A-2
Haiphong SAM Site A-14A-2 x
Haiphong SAM Site C-29-2
Haiphong SAM Site C-27-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site C-26-2 x

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.APPENDIX III (continued)

------------
COM:rREX Mission Number
Number Target 42 43

Haiphong SAM Site B-25-2 x

Haiphong SAM Site A-29-B-2 x x
Haiphong SAM Site A-26-2 x x

Haiphong SAM Site A-22-2 x

Haiphong SAM Site A-25A-2 x

Vinh C-19-2 x
-
Vinh C-32-2
.. - .~
,~ . '

Vinh B-16-2

Vinh
,..... '

.Vinh
Vinh

···-··· ...... ,...... '-··· '"' " .. ., .. ••" .... '·-·-· .- -- . . . '" .. .. . . . ... . . ,; . - .. ". - . . .. ·. '""' .. ... ... -
-·--···-·-~---··--·-·-- - . ~ •'"··-·-----· --·-·····--- ~-------·-- ------·-----------····-----·-- --- .... -·---· .. -··--·-·-----..·-- ~---~-------------.- .. ---·-···- --·-··-·-·· .. - ...... .... ·-·· ..... --~----····-------··............... ······--·-·· »•·------·-·--------·-..···..····· --······--- ··-··. ---------·

•·•··• •·•·•·• •••.•..•• •.•• - -

:~~~~..:.~~~::...:.::.:..=,=:.:=.::.::::=::.-...:.::=····::··~·~:.-:·· . _· .=:~~-=:~=·~····--:::::::-- .. ~:-..::_:::::~··;TOP::B.Ef;J.J;Jq'~:·~..::.O.X.C~T::.=...:.:. :::::.:.~:.: . ...:.:.~:::::.:.._:::..:. ..-...:::~;=~=:=~:::.::.:.:.:::-:.~: ::~::::..::.~.- -~::....::~.- --~· ~·:::.:.:::..

,
. - ... - - . - .. - •.•• - . •oTOP SECRET TRlNE OXCART BYE-1330/68
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APPENDIX III (continued) w
(X)
COM I REX Mission Number
Number Target 42 43
Vinh
Vinh D-32-2
Vinh A-07-2 x
Vinh
Vinh C-32A-2 x
- Vinh C-30-2 x
Vinh C-32B-2 x
Vinh B-21-2
Vinh B-29-2 x
Vinh B-32-2 x
Vinh A-01-2
Vinh A-36-2
Vinh A-11-2 x
Vinh C-31-2 x
Vinh A-OlA-2 x
Vinh D-35-2 x

co
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APPENDIX III (continued)

--h···~···.,··---.. ~----------~----------:_:_ __.. _.-·-·----------;-·~·-----------.-----·--------------·---·----·-------~---·----··------·-------~------·-------·-·----·--·--~---
COM.I REX Mission Number
·Number Target 42 43
vinh c-31A-2 x
Vinh A.;,.25-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-01-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-33~2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-OlA-2 x x
-
Hanoi SAM Site A-33-2 x x
Hanoi SAM·Site D-36A-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-OlB-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site A-01-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-03-2
Hanoi SAM Site C-03A-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site A-14-2 x x
,'

'Hano·i· SAM Site C-32..,;.2 x x

. Hanoi ... SAM . .Sit.e . B:-32~2 ... . X·· ..
Hanoi SAM Site B-07A-2 x
· · ····· ··.":"' --··-.. 'aan:o-f~··sA'M"'"Site:' :·0::11=~2·:.· x
.... ><• H••• < • . . ,• • , • "< ._ . . . . ' '
"'" """""
---~-··-·-·---·-·-·· ----- '*·····----· •-n•••·~~·•••••-••'"' •-•-.•-.-• -·· .. -~- •• •-••"''' ' " ' •-••'"""'-"'" _., ___ ,. ' ' -•-·••••""''''"'' -'"•••••••-••• •• ._ •<·• ''"' ••• """ ,,., •·« <<>•••••• "" " ••••••<<•MO<••••<<•

.
.. •····· ... •···. -.•• .. - . -
. :. .
=~~ ~: :.....:..:::..:.~:::.: ::~~··::.: · : :· · :--···:::~~~:,..::;:.::~::.:~:..::···-. =~,::.,.:.:~,·~··'.···· .:::::::::::.:..:::·:.::·::.:::::~.::~~RE:'l'..:...'TRIN.E::.,.OXC'ART:.:~::·:::..::~::::::.:.::..:.::~.:~·-::::..::: .
,
_........._:.:.:-.::.::::::::.~_.:::=:~.:::..~:~::.~:::::::::
•• - • -: .,
- • - • • • • • - • - - •n
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0
(.J1
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APPENDIX III (continued)

'°
N

'°w
CD
COl\UREX Mission Numbe.r
Number Target 42 43
Hanoi SAM Site A-31-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-17A-2 x
Hanoi SAM Site B-16-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site E-22-2 x
Hanoi SAM Site C-l 7B-2 x
-
\C
M
1£)
Thanh Hoa SAM Site C-03A-2 x
~
,...;

0 Thanh Hoa SAM Site B-OlA-2

~
~

,...; Thanh Hoa SAM Site C-OlA-2

~
cIf)
Thanh Hoa SAM Site C-04A-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-21A-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site B-OlB-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-21B-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site A-17B-2 x
Thanh Hoa SAM Site D-21-B x·
Hanoi SAM Site C-16-2 x

~
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COM I REX .·. . Mission Number

Number T3.rget · 42 43

Hanoi SAM Site A-05-2 x x

Hanoi SAM SITE B-36B-2
Hanoi· SAM Site C-03B-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site D-31C-2
Hanoi SAM Site C-05B-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-27-2' x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-13-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-28-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-04A-2 x x
Hanoi Prob. Site A
- Hanoi Prob. Site B
Hanoi SAM Site C-OlD-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site C-OlE--2 x x
<nano± ·SAM· ·Si:te · c-.:'29A-2 · ,, x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-34A-2 x x
•..
·· · · · · - ·,·- o·-·····~,,.,,.-:.,ii;~~-t-s.AiF·srf~· ·:n:.;·35:;2·· · .· · · · · . ,

:.·,:_ .. ". ··-" . --· ... .. _..:, .... .. .. -· - .... --·· - . -· .... - ........ .. -·
··-- ·-·- ··-· ----- ...
. . .
,. ·~·-
'"
·~-·· ·-- --··-··--·---~ -·---·-·-- ----·-- ·-···~···-~- .. ··----------···----·· -~---·--------·-·--·-··--·---· -··-· ·~·-·· -----~~----- .. ····-······~·· •• •••·-·--·--·••••p·<•••··---- ·-•"~-- " ° " ' ' ' < • • • •••--••H"'• ,_,,,,_,,,_.,,,,,,,,_,,_,_,_,,, ····- ---- ........-............ -~-----·-··· ___ ..

~-;:;.-.• u-~·;~---. ~;.- ,_-~·"'"'"'"-'"-''";·,,,,._,,,,~,.;,,•,-'-'· •,.-;~,-,-;::~«~1

'. .
;~:.;::~·:;--.•,,,.::;n: ~I' : ' • "' =•
. ....
.~::,;) ... _,_.:;.":." ·~.·.,,:::',
••••••••••• - •• • • • •
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APPENDIX III (continued)

BYE-1330/68 - 0
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COMI REX co
Mission Number
Number Target 42 43
Vinh SAM Site A-OIA-2

Hanoi SAM Site A-15-2 x x

Hanoi SAM Site A-34-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-36-2 x x
Hanoi SAM Site B-30B-2 x x
~

Hanoi SAM Site A-29-A x x

\0
N
I.()
("f) Hanoi SAM Site A-34-A x x
..-(

0 Hanoi SAM Site A-22-2 x x

~
.-c"
><: Hanoi SAM Site A-15A-2 x x
Q
I.()

- Hanoi SAM· Site A-32-2 x x

Hanoi SAM Site A-30-2 x x

Hanoi SAM Site A-24A-2 x

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APPENDIX III (continued) ·

COM I REX Mission Number
Number : Target· 42 43

v;nh SAM Site A-25-2

Hanoi Probable SAM Equipment Training Area
Nan San SAM Site A-12-2
Nan . S~n . SAM Site C-12-2
Nan San SAM Site D-13-2
Hanqi S.l\~Site

* Haµo~ SA¥ Site A-OlA-2 x x

. H~noi SAM Site A-35..,.2

* Ha.no~ SAM Site B-23-2

* Hoa Binh SAM Site D-27-2

* Ha.iphon~ SA¥ Site A~25-2

* Haiphong SAM Site ~36-2 x x

*" Haiphong SAM Sit~ A-16-2
. . _,,..... Jlaiphong .SAM ..Sit.e ..A-02A"."".2 . x:.
·. * H~iphong SAM Site

.., ..
....:.::.: .:.. m ... • : : . : :• • • : • .:.:.:::::::~.: ·*tlnnumbered ;:.:::.::........ --~.::-·: ..............~.:..::..~..:......~:...::.... .. _; ~- .-----··· .....:. .:. . :.: .....:............. .. . -- . ---- - ...:..:...::: ........ .. •·•••- • -•M-m•·-·-·--·--•"><M>••.,••-••••
 • - . • . -- . - ••.•• - .
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BYE-1330/68

APPENDIX III (continued)

COMIREX Mission Number
Number Target 42 43

* Ban Xom Lom SAM Site

* Chin Chou SAM Site (China)

Hai Kou Airfield
Ling Shui Airfield
Meng Tzu Airfield West
Haiphong/Cat Bi Airfield x x
- Haiphong/Kien An Airfield x x
Hanoi/Bae Mai Airfield x x
Hanoi/Gia Lam Airfield x x
Phuc Yen Airfield x x
Lang Son Airfield x x
Kep Airfield x x
Ning Ming Airfield
Chia Lai Shih Airfield
Ping Yuan Chieh Airfield
Tien Yang Airfield
*Unnumbered.

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.I 50Xl, E.0.13526 I APPENDIX III (continued)

--------·----h------·------~~--···----··----·--···--·-·~-----·-~---··-··-~··---~--··---··--·-·---~~--··-----·······-------~~·--~--···---·--····-·-------·-·~-~-·----~-·-··- . -·------· . .
>. ·.
COM I REX 1

Mission Number
Number Target 42 43
Yen Bai Airfield x x
Hoa Lac Airfield x x
Bai Thuong Airfield (2C0987) x x
Tho·Khoi Helicopter Dispersal Area
*
Kep Ha Airfield
*
Hanoi Helicopter Dispersal Area
*
* Hoa Lac Helicopter Dispersal Area
! ••
x x
That Khe Air Facility
. '

Pei Hai Naval Facility

I:Isin Hsing Naval Facility

Port Wallut Naval Base x x

Haiphong Naval Base and Port Facilities x x
Cam Qha Port Facilities
· Pai· Lung Port-Facilities x ' '

•• • •
 •••••• . . . . - . ••• •••
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I 50Xl, E.0.13526 APPENDIX III (continued)

Mission Number
Target 42 43
Cam Pha Port Facilities x x
Hon Gai Port Facilities x x
Ha Tou Shipyard x x
Ben Thuy Coastal Transport Point x x
Pei Li Port Facilities x x
* Lam Dong Naval· Dispersal Facility

* Swatow PGM-Hanoi Area

Thanh Hoa BW/CW .Research Facility
Lai Chau Complex
Ma Li Po Supply Depot
Mengtsu Military Complex
Ping Hsing Ammunition Depot x
Ping Hsing Army Depo~
x
Ping Hsing Military Storage East x
*Unnumbered.
I 50Xl, E.0.13526
'POP SECRE'I' TRINE OXCART
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APPENDIX III (continued)

, ____ ,___ ,.. ..·--··-----------r----·. - ..
-,~ ----·-·---~-----·-··----·---~~--·--·-----~-~~-~----------------·-·-·~-~-----~~~~·-~-····---------···-·----·-------~·~·-·-------·_..---~----
. - . .
COMIREX Mission Number
Number ·. ~arget 42 43
Ping Hsiang
.. . Storage
. . Area North x
Chin Ping Infantry I)ivision Headquarters x
A· Barracks
' '

Chin Ping Supply Depot NW x

Ban Lot A Barracks
Ha Giang Military Area x x
-
Van Hoi Military· Areas x x
Wen Shan Army Barracks West
Ho Kou Army Barracks North x
Yen Shan: Military Barracks and
Storage Area
Lang Son Army Barracks x
Y Son Ammunition Depot
Xom
.
Hau A Army Supply Depot
~ ' '
x
. Ngoc T.h.i. Barr,aeks . Supply Depot
Tai Xouan Army Barracks , .i~~m Vu
--,.--------,-- --, •:to-c;-·'rHilli·xrm:f~··su:J)P'IY::~n~:Pot:· :-'·- . , ·-------·-- x
•• ·:. ' ......... ' ''"' , ••• ' • • • ,. • ' • .. • • • ..,. • ¥ ... •• •• : : ' · · - . ', • ' • •• .. - · • - .. • • •• • ...... " .. .

>T-•-••- ••••-·• .. - · - · · -··- o ·-~---------~·-··· " " -'••-•> ,,, >•• ••-•••••--""' ·-····--· ___ ,_,._._ UO•••·····- .. -·--·~··,,. •••• ••"•··-·--·-•••••--" .... '"""""-••••- > 0 < •• ................... OM,. __ ·-------····,.-- .. 0 • •••--••» -
-- • • • • • ••••• .... ••• TOP SECRE'P-TRlNE OXCART BYE-1330/68

APPENDIX III (continued)

COM I REX Mission Number

Number Target 42 43

Yen Bai Ordnance Depot

Thai Nguyen Army SUpply Depot North x x
Liu Tiao Pan Army Supply Depot x
Bae Can Barracks A Supply Depot x
Bae Giang Military Areas x x
Mai Li Po Supply Depot x
Tung Chia Army Barracks
Ban Tchepone/NVN Special Area 1916 x x
Ba Binh Special Area 2009 x x
Ben Than Special Area 2013 x x
Vinh An Special Area 2014 x x
Vit Thu Lu/NVN Special Area x x
Ha Huang tien Highway U.C. x
Tsi Ti Pao Road
Wu ~11 Chieh Road Construction
Hanoi/Lao Cai Railroad Segment 2 x x

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·--·AP_.PEND IX ~I I (cont !nl.!ed )_______ .·---------···---·-·-----------·------

· COMIREX
~. ' ....
Mission Number
Nuinber ~a,rget 42 43
' •.-
~anoi/La? Cai Railrpa~ Segment 1 x x
;.. I.

Hanoi/Lao Cai Railroad Segment 3

' • ."; ' ' • •.' •I
x x
Ha!loi/Ping Hsiang Railroad Segment 2 x x
~noi/Ping Hs_iang Railroad Segment 1 x x
Hanoi/Ping
.. -
•' .
Hsiang Railroad Segment 3
. - ' x x
- Hanoi/Lao
.•. . ..
Cai. Railroad Segment 4 x x
Hanoi/Lao Cai Railroad Segment 5 x x
An C?tP. Rai~road Hanoi Thai Nguyen x x
Ping Hsiang/Hanoi Railroad Segment 4 x
. H.o Kou B,:ighway Segment, Rou.te 24A x x
.Uong. Bi
. Transformer
.. . Power Plant . '

Tien Pao Highway Sec., Route 25A

. . . • i. . .

Chen.Nan
·. . .. . Kuan. Highway
. .. : :
Sec. '. ~ : ~·: . .- . x
·Ping ·Hsian,g "C.omplex · ·x·
Wen Shan Complex
.
,~.-~ ,-,b;;~g:- ]};~li'"R~i1f·b~a'-y~;ii·":~-··
0
·.
... . .... . .. . ..... -·
.. _...__.._ .. ........ .
--•••-----•-·------~-•· - ·---·""'""••-,.-•- -••••-,.•---··-·-·-·---·---•-••-·•• •- --·--,.··-•-•••-·------.,.-•-•••--- •-••••--• ------··r•• ••-••'<•• ••••••-•- •····-• _,_, -~-•~•" •M·•·•·-•,.•-w• •• ••• .. •••-•»•·-••• ••--·· .. ·-•···•-•••• ... -~-~~·--

·---·"---·~---·-··~···--- ··-····-····-·---.----···-" ·- ----··-·--·,.·-··· ··-~·· .. ·-···~-~-·

---------~~-----,~-~~--..C-~--,,-----,-~ •.•. ·111: . . . .

·,.. · · ·~ · . . . · ....... ·-····- . . ._----· -·· ·-·- -·· ··~~. . . . . ~........~·· -·-·~- ~.-.......-....-.. ~ . -·-· . ~............... ~··-~ ..·--··---~·-··-~-:s.ECRRT~~OXCAR-~- ... ·---.... · -
~---~
~--~-=:=~~::_-~~-~~::_~_.:...::=:~~::_~:.:_~~:.:~::::~'"'-==--~~~-~=-~~::~~=-~~

•• - - •
• .. • - - - • . . . - - ••• • • •
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APPENDIX III (continued)

COM I REX Mission Number
. Number Target 42 43
Phu Lang Thuong Complex x x
Cao Bang Military Complex x x
Lai Chau Complex x x
Lang Son Complex x x
Mon Cai Complex x x
-
Tien Yen Complex x x
Binh Lu Area
Tuyen Quang Complex x x
Yen Bai Complex x x
- Dien Bien Phu Complex x x·
Kep Complex
Lao Cai Complex x x
Haiphong Railroad Station Classification Yard
Haiphong Railroad Station Classification Yard
and Shops x x
Viet Tri Railroad Yard x x

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_,_J SOXl, E.0.13526 APPENDIX III (continued)

COMIREX Mission Number
Number. Target 42 43

I Yen Vien Railroad Classification Yard x x

* Thai Nguyen Rail Activity
Kep Railroad Yard x x
Highway Segment lOE
Haiphong Highway Bridge
V~n Diem Battery Plant
Hanoi Railroad - A Highway Bridge
Haiphong Warehouse Area Port
Van . Diem Vehicle
. Depot
Hai Duong Railroad Siding West

Hai Duong Railroad Station

Hgoc Kuyet Railroad Station
Ta Xa. PPS Nort"h
.. Loi ..Dong . Wa~.ehou~e .. Area
.; . ·.•

Railroad Segment R-3-A

·' . .:f..soxt,--E~O;l-3526:. '.:~:::::.::::.. ................. --- .... -.:.............._ ..:.:. :.:. . ::..:.:. . _ . ·-.:::.::.......::·:::..:.::: ..........___ :::. ::.:.::.... .... :...:. · · .... :. . ·.......... r n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

.. •···• ...... - - •.•.• - . -

--- . _. . . . . ::~--~--~-. .: ·:~~~:=~~~. -·. . -~~ . :~::~: . ~'. -~.:·:~:~·_·"· .~.·. ·.·:~:::~-~~-~-:_:.,~~-·:.·::·=·.:....·--·-~~io~-9au~T..~T.ii:NE:::.oxcAiiT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. •. ._. '.·~. ~-· ,. . . :·. . ~-~-·.: . . . -•~-·-·.:.:·~
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APPENDIX III (continued)

COM I REX Mission Number
Number Target. 42 43

Ping Hsiang Railroad Transporting Yard Station

* and Shops

* Ho Kou Vehicle Park

Hsia Shih Storage Areas
*
Ping Hsiang Storage Area
*
Thai Nguyen Unidentified Construction Activity
*
Hanoi/Haiphong Railroad
*
* Hanoi/Haiphong Railroad
Hanoi Transformer Power Plant
*
* Haiphong Transformer Power Plant East

* Haiphong Transformer Power Plant West

Viet Tri Transformer Power Plant
*
Hon Gai Transformer Power Plant
*
* Bae Giang Transformer Power Plant
*Unnumbered

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APPENDIX IV
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N*mber of Radar Signals -Received by. BLACK SHIELD Missions I:. I

Rajar 1 Janu::Y - 31 March 1968
Mission Numbers
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j:
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43 47* 51 53*' 5Qi

Fa Song 4 11
2
::
!:
f.
I
Bi Mesh 5 7 l·:l'
l

Si e Net
Ro k Cake
Ri e Cake
10 17
2
9 4
l
10
·1
3 !:.•

1-!f·.:· '·
~ . ~
I
{
Cr SS Legs
~~1::Lock
Slot····.
3
2
2
11
13
2
1
1
9
6 4.
•,

1·
Ba . ·1 3 ··s 2 1··· ·1

Ta 1 King
Sp on Rest 2
2
1
·2
···.1 2
1 l'

l.
~::
.!: ·•
I
Fl~t Face.· 2
Mo?n Face
Moc1m Mat. II
Mo?n Cone ·
2

.2
8
·: 1
1
7

1
2 5

2
)·.,.
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Whtf f
Fife Can .
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·2 8 7 1 ..:I,. I
l*North·Korean Missions
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DIRECTORATE OF

I SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

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BLACK SHIELD
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Reconnaissance Missions
I 1 April - 9 June 1968
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.I Handle via Tep Secret
Bzeman -Comint OXCART
I Channels Jointly
BYE No. 1367 /68
DST-BS/BYE/68-3
7 August 1968
I Copy .No. iO
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WARNING
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This document contains information affecting the 1mtional security of the
United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18,
Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law prnhibits its transmission or the rev.e-
I
lation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized pc-rson, as well as
its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United
States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the
United States. It is to he seen only by personnel espc'Cially indoctrinated
and authorized to rec:dvc information in the designated control channels.
Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining I
to the BYEMAN and Communications lntelligencc Controls. No action i~
to be taken on any communications intelligcn<!e which may be contr.ined
herein, regardless of the advantage to be gained, if .such m:tion might have
the effect of revealing the t:'Xistcnco and nature of the source, unless such
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action is first approved by the appropriate authority.
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I BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions
1 April - 9 June 1968

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I DST-BS/BYE/68-3
7 August 1968
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I CENTRALINTELLIGENCEAG~NCY

Directorate of Science and Technolo~y

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I PREFACE

I
This report is the last of a series of resumes
I of the BLACK SHIELD reconnaissance program flown over
North Vietnam and North Korea. This final report spans
the period from 1 April to 9 June 1968. Only North

I Korean missions were flown during this time period.

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CONTENTS
I PREFACE . . . .
Page
iii
SUMMARY . . . . . 1
I MISSION ANALYSIS.
BX6858 . . .
2
2

I APPENDICES

I I. BLACK SHIELD operational missions alerted

between 1 April and 9 June 1968 . . . 5
I II. COMIREX targets covered by BLACK SHIELD
missions, 1 April - 9 June 1968 . . . 6

I III. Number of radar signals received by BLACK

SHIELD missions, 1 April - 9 June 1968 . . . 8

I
FIGURE
I Mission BX6858, flown 5 May 1968 . 3

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I
I BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions
1 April - 9 June 1968 ·
I
I SUM~ilARY

Two BLACK SHIELD high-altitude reconnaissance missions

I were alerted during the period from 1 April to 9 June 1968.
One mission was flown over North Korea. Approval was not
granted for the other North Korean mission. (Appendix I
I lists these missions and related events).
Photography of BLACK SHIELD mission BX6858 flown over
North Korea on 5 May 1968, although hampered by clouds and
I heavy haze, revealed no significant changes in North Korean
military posture or disposition. Coverage of the DMZ, trans-
portation, and infiltration routes disclosed no significant
I troop build-ups or logistic movements. (COMIREX targets
photographed over North Korea are listed in Appendix II.
Appendix III is a listing of the number and type of radar
I signals recorded by the System 6 Elint collection device).

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MISSION ANALYSIS
I
BX6858 was a double-pass, high-altitude reconnaissance
mission flown over North Korea on 5 May 1968. The BLACK
SHIELD vehicle entered and exited North Korean airspace on.
I
its first pass at 0206:27Z and 0210:57Z, and its second
pass at 0346:48Z and 0350:50Z. ·Figure 1 shows the flight
route and associated air surveillance tracking. I
Interpretab:Lli ty of mission photography was severely
hampered by cloud cover and heavy haze. The mission air-
craft photogr:;t.phed 68 COMIREX targets plus 30 bonus targets.
I
Of the targets photographed, 15 were SA-2 sites. Three of
the SA-2 sites were occupied, one was unoccupied, and eleven
were identified only. A possible SAMLET coastal defense
I
cruise misstle site was tentatively identified on the east
coast between Wonsan.and Ham hung. Existing weather con-
ditions in the target area did not permit the photographing I
of the USS Pueblo.

There was no indication of a hostile weapons reaction.

Air surveillance tracking of the mission vehicle was accom-
I
plished by elements of the Chinese Air Defense System (ADS)
from 0200Z to 0233Z of the first pass and from 0342Z to
0402Z of the second pass. Initial detection and final track
I
ground ranges for the Chinese radar station at Mata Point
were 118 and 264 nautical miles, respectively. There was
no indication of tracking by either the North Korean ADS
or the Soviet ADS.
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I 91561 8-68 CIA TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART
HondJe via BYEMAH-COMINT eo.t10l Sys1em.1 Jolntly

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APPENDIX I
I BLACK SHIELD Operational .Missions Alerted Between
1 April .. and 9 June 1968.

I
Miss ion No. Date Remarks
I BX6857 27 Apr, 1968 (Korea) Cancelled-no approval

I BX6858 5 May 1968 (Korea) Flown

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APPENDIX II

COMlREX Targets Covered by BLACK SHIELD Mission BX6858

I 5 May 1968,

I
COMIR~X NO. TARGET
; '.
Nampo Coastal Defense Site, 1
Nampo Cruise Missile Site
Sinpo Possible Cruise ~issile: Site , i;
;:1
Pyongyang Airfield, East ·
Sondok Airfield
Hwangju Airfield 2
Onchon UP Airfield
<;I
Mayang Do Naval Base
Panja Ri Naval Facility
Pipa-Got Naval Dockyard
Chinnampo Port
Nampo Port Facilities
Nampo Shipyard.
Chaho Nodongjagu Port Facilities
: ' "
.:,
ii
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Hungnam Port Facilities

Pyongyang Biological Research; Inst~tut~
Hoeyang Hq First Army Group '· · . :1·1:
'. .
; ;
Hoeyang Army Barracks E .
Hungnam Hamhung Military Activity
Hungnam Military Barracks Area
:

, ;'.I I
;
'
;

Kangdong Army Barracks East

Koksan Military Activity . ! ·
Koksan Army Barracks A St·or Area SS.W
Koksan Army Barracks A Hq Inf· Div :
I;
Kumchon Barracks Areas ,
Pyongyang Air.borne Training School
,
Pyongyang Army Barracks A·Stqr Area!E
Pyongyang Ord Dep N Tongpo RI;
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Singye Military Activity
Yangdok Military Complex
Chong Dong Military Installation
·
:I
Kumsong Army Barracks .
Anhyop Army Bks A Hq 45th Inf Div
.j .·

'i·
:1·
Sangj ok Tong Army Barr a.cks W '·
Sangjok Tong Army Bks A Hq 5th Inf porps
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I COMIREX NO. TARGET

I Masan Ni Army Bks A Hq 12th Inf Div

Changdo RI Army Bks Hq 2nd Inf Div
Changdo RI Army Barracks N
I Changdo RI army Barracks NE
Sowon Dong Bks A Hq 8th Inf Div
Nasan Ni Army Barracks N
I Wa Dong Army Barracks A_Hq Inf Div
Ichon Army Bks NE AHQ 5th Inf Div
Ichon Army Barracks SSW
Koum Dong Army Barracks A Stor Opo
I -
Soksadong Ni Army Bks/Hoejong Dong
Sam San Ni Military Installation
~ Sibyong Ni Storage Area
I M
in
"">
.....
Sariwon Hq Inf Div
Inchon Hq Infantry Corps
0 Kaesong Complex
~
I .....
~
0
Yonan Complex
Kwangju
Koksan Complex
in
Sariwon Complex
I -
Nampo Complex
Pyong~ang RR Clf Rd Taedonggang
Pyongsan RR Yards
I Pokkye RI RR Yards
Tosong Ni RR Yards
Nampo RR Station Yards A Shops

I Kowon RR Clf Yards

Sariwon Railroad Yards
Pyongyang RR Clf Yards
Pyongyang RR Station and Yards
I Pyongyang RR Clf Yard Sop.o-Dong
Hamhung Railroad· Yards
Pyongyang RR Yards
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APPEND IX I I I

I Number of Radar Signals Received. by BLACK SHIELD Mission BX6858,

5 May 1968
I
I Big Mesh

Side Net
2

I Rock Cake 4

Cross Legs 1
I Token 3

I Cross Slot

Bar Lock
2

11

I Moon Cone 9

One Eye l
I Long Talk 1

I Moon Face 3

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·.1
·I ','' ..

. BYE 2417-67, Rev. 112.

.1 .
Copy r ..('oi 2.8
... 2.9 May 1967
--
1··
I
·. MEMORANDUM FOR: Int~rdepartmental Contingency Planning
:,I ··Committee · · ·

SUBJECT: . Contingency and Cover. Plan for. BLACK SHIELD

Operations.

l. Attached is Revision 1/2 to BYE 2417-67 .. This is the

final ve1•sion of the Interdepa1·tmental Conting.ency and Cover Plan
I .£or BLA,CK SHIELD operations, as approved by the Interdepa~tm.ental
. Committee.
Contingency i:'°la.nning . . ~

I · 2.. This supersedes a.11 previous ·versions of BYE 2417 .. 6.7

which should be remove'd £rom the files and destroyed.
. . . .. - . . . . . .
·:1. '.
' ' ' ; '
_. -.._, .....
·.. .. .... -

·. . . QP. . ·'P~:-:1~
... :,

- , ·. : :_ . ~ •
....
1· '.
:• ·,
-._;
... .': ,·

-- .·· · .. ~HN PARANGOSKY

· · Acting Direc~or o~ Special Activities
' .... ···:.· . <·-· ...,._: : ,.' -:·

, .. . .:-·

.
1·.
·. ... ·
- '
.
-

.:
,:-
- - ·:
. .. .' ....
~ ' . ~-
--._· .:. :; . ;.· -.
'.·
...
l • .,

..· ....
': . ,: :
,-: .. .-, .. ':. ·~. ..
..
\ ::: ~~~~-- .:. .
-.: " : .
, ., ._.: ~ : ':.:. i .: .• . ., '•' .

1. ··.:.

' ... . ··. :·

. .... ·: :: ·:.

1· .. ...
'.',
':.·
..·

... ·,

I
. OXCART
I
.:1
flondlo Vlo
. llYfMAN /.
. -. ··~ . TO~.SECRET:·· :.··
.. -.:.;:·.:
Co11tfol $y~t.ell'I .Only . ·. :. :.-·: .-- :. ..::.:··- : . .
. ·~ :. . '
' . .· . ; ··•. . '..
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.. BY.E 2417-67, Rev. :/;2·

. ·29 Ma.y 1967
...·.·
·
Page 2 ·

I ·sA/D/SA/.EFRoth:!d (2.9 Ma.y 1967)

·.·'

·.Distribution: '·
#1 - Dr. Alexander Flax, D/NRO ·.
· 112 .. Dr. Alexander Flax, D/NRO ·
· 1!3 - Dr. Alexander Flax~ D/NRO :
I #4 - M.r. Peter Jessup, Exec. Office of th~ P:i;-esident · .
· · fs - Col .Clason Saunde:rs~ AFRDR · ·• · · .. ·
. #6 - Col Clason Saunde:r.s, AFR.DR . · . ' ·. . • . ·,:.:
:.1. #7 - Mr. Thoinas Hughes 1 • Dept. 0£ State~·:<·:.·
if 8 - Gen Ralph D. Steakley, JCS ~> > ·. .

I 119 - Col William Ha.ll1 DIA '. . .. , .

·.~. · jflO - DD/S&T . · ·...... · ~.,, ·
.. ill .. D/SA . · ·
·1········ .·· · 1112 - OXC/ O/OSA ·. . ·; .. ·: ..
.
>· :··
.
· '//13 -· D/ 0/ OSA . . . .. ·. ..
#14 - D/R&D/ OSA · ..· <: . .. .
·1 ins . . SA/D/SA
. 1il6 - SS/OSA'
. ' .·....

.. 4fl7 - SS/OSA
4il8 .. KWCABL.E
#19 .. Lockheed, Mr:· C. L. Johnson '(To be Ha.nd Carried)
.... ·
.·1· #2.0 - Hughesa Gene Peters and Marc Hava.':rd-(To be Hand Carried}
#2.l - Pratt & Whitney,. Williar.o. Go:r:ton a.nd Leona.rd Mallett (To be Ha.nd . · ·; ·
·. ··, ...-.· #ZZ - RB/OSA.. •. .
23 ~ 2.8 ;. SA/D/SA · .•.· ; •·
. ·. ··~·- . ··. . .. ·:·::,:.. ca.:r:ried)"' . .
. . , ··
<·..: .. : . ··..·... ·. ·.·....
.1'.· .
.• · "1•,.
. - : •. ,··
·... ·.
: ,· ·: -

. •·.

1~
..
·_·!\" · •.

1. .
•
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-.
..
••
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t•
:·

; ~ <
..
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·. ·-
-.: :,

. ~"
.. ' ·•....._; .·
;_· ....

:1.
:.:.<.'. .·.·
·· ...

. ~" " "

. . •.·
1~ . ·,
'
.

··.
- .. ·· .
-,
'

oxc.t. .RT- Handle Via Byema.n

I. TOP SECRET·
.
·. '
. .
:::
Control System

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' Attachment to

I :'.·.I ·v:o.··. BYE 24l7M67

Revision .fl?.
Z9 May 1967
I
INTERDEPARTMENTAL CONTINGENCY PLAN .FOR ..
BLACK SHIELD OPERATIONS .

, . x. MISSION:

To obtain high resolut.i:on photographic cove:ra·ge of priority

.1 targets in North Vietnam by utilization of OXCART (A-12) a.i:rcraft ..
stagin·g from KadeJ:?.a. AB •. Okinawa. The proposed operation does ..
not include overfll.g:ht of Mainland China. ·
·j n. OBJECTIVES:

··1. A. To conduct overflight operations with the least a.mount oi

publicity and to protect the true nature of ·the mission.

·1 · :B. To conceal intelligence community (particularly CIA.)

participation in the development and utilization of the A-12.

I· C. To provide herein guidance and procedures to be a.dh.ered · · ·

·to should the .following situations. occur: " · · .:" ...
• # • •

·I ..
'. 1. P:i;otest without incident ..
... :...

•·. ·.·.··-.··

~.1 ~ ,. 2.. · Loss. of aircraft in Communist. Bloc: country.

·. .;"
. . 3. Emergency landing or ·bailout·in hostil~ neutra~-~;;eas. .......·.'· .· .....
·
L-~- ---'-~4.·· :__ Landin~ at· a.lterna.te ·air ba.se.
. . . . .
. ·. · ... _.... .... . ,
.
.

I D. To provide. instruction.a
' . . .
to the
.
pilot .
for..
contingency
.
situations •..
·. ·.

·I Ill.
GENERAL:

A. ·For purposes of·this contingency plan Mainland China# .

l':forth. Vietnam and Laos .will be considered ~emmunist 13loc· countries.
I ....· ~ .. .
·.. ': . ,.·.

I .. \ .·

·--::_·.;··
. "
"
- '. ~,: .
. ,. : '

I Kond;o Via OXCART.. · ... /·n" ..

." .
BYEMAN
, Conrtol.·
. :.·
$y&ro111 Onl>' · · · ..
. , ·.:-· "• .!.9 ~ :~.~C:~~T :; t/1;~y~ . '.
C05492938
(~-.\ . q~o~> al::cn*~':l?
·I O.:X:CAR'J.'
}, l.l.;i.,:h1iH!nl. l.o
HYB 2.'11"/-f..'"/, Rey. /}2..
:I · ''/fi'J.:. . ;·:. i.: .. ..... I .
29 May 1967
Page Z

.I Burma and Cambodia are considered' to be hostile neutrals.

B. On operational over.flights the BLACK SHIELD aircraft

I will carry no :markings other tha.n tail numbers." ,;.

POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES: ' i

; .
A. Presence of 'OXCART at Kadena.~

I: In the event of a formal (i.e., press or qu.asi-officia.l}

inquiry as to the identity of the vehicles at Okinawa or the
I . nature of the mission, the Kadena. Public Information Officer
· will state that they are expei·imental test bed versions of the ..
·,

YF-12A and SR-71 family which are at Okinawa to undergo field : :. : ·:: .,.
. tests. He will further state~ ii n.e.cessary, that any additional ·
·I. inquiries will have to b.e ai'lswered by the Office of the Secretary ·::
...·
·_..: •·.·
of the Air Force. Other than that stated above no additional
I information will be released at Okinawa regarding the mission."
~he Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, if queried, will ...,.·,
verify the information released by the PIO,' ·Ka.dena without
I. ·.....
further comment or details. · • ·

B. Protest without incident. ....

,.:.
.,

I· 1. Should a successful overflight evoke a protest or public

:·. ::
...
. denunciation by the opposition, the aircraft being described :

as an SR-71/YF-12.A or Mach 3 type, all personnel in the field

'. , .. :: _:·::
will disclaim any knowledge of the overflight. Such disclai;ner
will not be volunteered but will offered only in :response to pe
I . . ·.:· direct query. An exception to this procedure is considered · · ...
appropriate in the case of queries directed to U.S. Ambassado'rs: · · .. <.
1:.- They will neither disclaim nor acknowledge awareness of any
overflight and refer such queries to th.e State Department.
. .

·,.
1·· z. If queries are directed to the goverrunent officials in·
Washington, D. C., the initial response will be 11No Comment".
·After reviewing the ~ircumstances of th~. situation the 303 Committee·.· .

I . .. . .

OXCART . Handle Via Byema.n · ·

".

I . . ·· ....
.•
TOP SECRET ·. Cop.t:t"ol System

., . ··~ ·; ..
. ~ .. :···.·: .. . ,·. . . .. :: '.· ...
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OXCART BYE 2417-67, Rev. 4JZ ·
{ 29May1967
··_.,.:'.
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I:·
. '• ·...
·. n-1ay dctc:i.~mine tl1.at a .further r_esponse i~ required. This would
consis.t of an approp1·iately worded statement acknowledging
.. ·. ,\

the use 0£ an. unai·IJ1f14 reconnaissance aircraft for essential

I surveillance of No:Ji!f{ Vietnam milita:i.•y activity. Details concerning

.. ,:· C.
the operation,. spo11sorship and ha.sing of the aircraft will not be
divulged. The Committee will designate the appropriate- spokesman •

Loss of Ai:i:craf't in Communist Bloc Country.

I l. I£ a BLACK. SHIELD airci•af't is lost in Communist Bloc

·. territory~ whethe1· from·hostile action or other cause> n~ sta.1;ement.
:·

will be volunteered until;there has been a :full evaluation by the

1.· ~03 Com.m.ittee of the circumstances surrounding the incident and the
political :ramifications. ·

·1· .
.

, . .
. ·. 2. News media queries generated by opposition statements will
. ·be referred to the State Department. The latter. through a_ properly
designate_d spokesman~ initially will· state only that the alleged ·
·._,
.
,.,
:.. ..
.

·:·,"···

.
·..... , .

.....
incident is under investigation.

3. After evalua:tion the 303 Committee will authorize an appropriately

. wo1•ded statement. The sole spokesman for the U. S. ·Government will
be the Department of State. The Committee will initially consider the
... ._;

.
'
. .
.•.
adequacy of the following suggested responses in light of the 'circum.sta.nces.··
. . . .
.
.
.
. . ' .. . ' : .

Loss of Aircraft in North Vietnam: .. ·

·1>
.. .
r£ pilot fate uncertain or known dea·d: No Comme:o.t 11 • 11

:1:.
If pilot alive. produced and identified as CIA employee:
11A reconnaissance aircraft was lost during operations
....
. -. '
over North Vietnam. The matter is still under investigat~on
and ·no further details a:re a~ilable a.t this time. 11
'.1 Loss of Aircraft in China or Laos:

I "A reconnaissance ai:rc:raft was_ lost during a mission

intended to reconnoiter North Viet.."'.l.am. It now appears
•. ·,

possible 'that the pilot may have strayed off course due to
I· ··. ·:.
mechanical difficulties and crashed. in Communist China.
. (or Laos~ as appropria'te}. No £urther details are available.
a.t this ti:xne. 11
.~ . :·:· . . '

OXCART. · Handle Via Byeman ·

'.·TOP.SECRET.·· Control System·
.' ' '' ...;.· . :::~· :·~· ....:...
....:·:.
:
 C05492938
Atta.chm ent to
1· .·. : ·. :'.
. ··.. ~.:.
OXCART r''-...
'· ' ) ' .
nYE 21.17-67, Rev. /12.
29 Ma.y 1967
Page 4
I ...~

I 4. Depending on the cfrcumstal).Cet;i, the 303 Committee

will fur the l. consider: ·

·1 a. The necessity 0£ ackno·wledging the pilot's identity

.· . and CIA a££iliation •

·I"·
.,.
i
b. The· necessity of making some statement as to the t !
.. ·,
. '
place of :mission o:t'igin. · .. . I
~

I
.

' • !

c. The necessity of making some statement to refute ;-

possible allegations that mission was 'intended to reconnoiter
. 1. ··. ·Communist China. · · ··
i

.,.'.
·, .'.': ..
d. The necessity of identifying
aircraft. .
a particulci.r type
'
of
. ..·
!.

-:, ...
D. · Landin.g at altern~te air base.

If, du:ring:\ttie course of an operational ~ission, the aircraft.·

should be requ-:f:l·ed to land at an alternate air base, in response
:1 to query the airc:raft will be desc.ribed ·as an experimental test.
bed version 0£ the YF-:-12A/SR-7l family on a routine field test
flight. Further details concerning the aircraft and the field test j'.
I.· program are ·classified. . ·
I'
1·
i
I

V. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PILOT

I. '

A. If the pi_lot·is ft):rced down in Communist Bloc territory,

.
. ~ .
. ._.:._ !
he will adhere to the provisions of Headquarters Directive 50-1055-24, i.
"I"·.
. .. ..~ ...
dated 27 October 1965 {approved by ·the 303 Committee 16 Decem~er 1965. ·-_
·.·· ··. S~e BYE 3066-65; 'dated.26 November i965) which_i:>ta.tes, .iri. essence,· .
that he will give: . . . . ·.. : · ;. · ··.. .:·_: -·
·I":" .... _. : i .• ' • . ~ ..:_ •..•.: .

. . ·.::··;. :_ ~. : ·....
•'
. •.·. . ":'.·. j . ~ ..: ~

1. Name : . . ...·. .: ::
.... ··:· ..
. ....... : . ··.... .. .. . ..
~

·1· ·.
·;·
2. Date and Place of Birth
.
. ... . .... ·.:: ....·:·.. ·..
-~ .. .

·'.
. . ·.\'

I· 3. Add:ress in United States·

4. CIA·A:ffi.lia.tion (Civilian}.
.I: ' ' . . .

Handle Via Byema.n

..Control System
I··· ... .
OXCAR'I' .···
; ·::, J\.'f_OP s~_Gl~'l.'-::·;;:~~~:.!;::-s
. . .
~ : .

. ·.t.
, C05492938 'J.1 0P SEGRE'£ Atc11.eh1nent to
/'
\
.............
\1
'
OXCARr.r
..: ··. ·~:
.r·•'"\...
' .... ~
) BYE. 'l.tJ.17-67, Rev. //2 ,,
2.9 May 1967
Page 5
1·
.· (NOTE: All project pilots have been thoroughly

I : ·.··
. ~. ' ... :
indoctrinated in the procedu1·es prescribed in the
referenced Headquarters Directive, including
res:i.stance to interrogation training. The :foregoing
.I ..
instructions a.re consistent with the psychological
preparation they have undergone throughout their
,·
assigrunent to the Program.)
I
.. ... _.-:
_
';•.
B. In the extremely remote possibility that the pilot should be
· · forced down in Burma or· Cambodia, he will not disclose his CIA
I affiliation. He will state. that he is a civilian test pilot fe?r.rying the
aircraft from Okinawa to Thailand. His overflight was inadvertent.
and due to mechanical malfunction of his Inertial Guidance System.
f}\' A dummy map of the alleged ferry-flight will be ca.r:ried to backstop
his story. He wil~: request:tha.t the American Consulate be notified
I'. . oi the situation. . ·

,:, · .· • · · • VI •. COORDINATION

.. ,
.':
.. : :.., ...
.::: ..

.....'
·:· .-.·

.·.. · ..
A. Washington, D. C. Area

l. The :following named individuals are being furnished a

copy 0:£ this document :for purposes o:f in~ernal coordination with
cleared personnel within their respec.tive depa.rtments;
....

,• >

·1.:; ..
,.,
····. .-·.: :.
..

... , ..
·. · ..
..
··
::; :··: .
. ..

,· ·. •. .

·1.: B. Outside Washington, D. C. ·

. l. Officials a.t Lc;>ckheed (C. L. Johnson), at Hughes

(Gene Peters and Mal'c Havard) and at P:ratt &: Whitney
1·' (William Gorton and. Leonard Mallett) have been briefed
on this contingency plan and the handling of inquiries . ·
'.

..
. should they be made. . . •. ·.
.I ·,
._.·:: ..
Handle Via Byeman
Control System
I . ·-~-.:
·: ..
TOP SECBET
OXCART. _·;. '

,.,, ','•····· .··

.. ;. ··r." ·.
 C05492938 • • .:.-.;-i•••-•• ~ •. ;..·,~-;'l:·"'·~~:•'·'l"'..-m;.n°""'"'"' ._.._..,,, '·•·•" ... ..,. ·•·· ···--~ ·· "··:~··•

. ,.·..........., l"O'.P SECHE'i.,

. ,...:·"\ Att<LchaH;nt co
,. .··· '!"».\' f
' ..·..-'~·"
·.f BYE 2417-67, Rev. JIZ
. .; ·... ·.~ ~ ·. ·z.9 May . 1967
Page 6 I
r'.
., 2. Con1mande1· Detachment D, Col Hugh C. Slatel", has
.· l
. '
i

been b1·ief'ed and furnished a copy 0£ this plan ..

1··
. l .

. .
Vil. It is recommended that each· Agency maintain a list of all clea.red
. :':,
personnel within their respective organization who have been briefed
·on this cover p~_an.

The Central Intelligence Agency will notify each Agency of any

change to this plan and in turn requests that any alterations be
coordinated with th~ CIA prior to implementa~ion: ·
..·· . · ..:.· ;

'I: GIA CONTACT: . James· C. Johnson, Security Of:ficer ; .

.:: ·: ...... ·. ;:
' . OFFICE TELEPHONE: CODE 143 or 351-4397
----~-,-------~~~---~--~---~~--~----

I C~ CONTROL CENTER: CODE 143 or 351-5771 .

..: .- i'. .
. i
. j.
I~ HOME TEL:E;:P~ONE:·_·_ _.3_5_4_-_33......8_7_
. ... _-.- - - - - - - - - -
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.· · · ·.·.·-· ... · OXCART. -·. ·.··. .•'.·
.
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C05492938

I
-I
I
·. Qs·py 1··et
U000 :. ·~: !., '.1 "~
:·.. '· ::
I
~~ ~

. ·}[s l.vff issing · ~-:·.".1.·f

........ ·~ ~·; ·t
.:
.' :·'
.•j
...
..... '•.

Over Pacific ..,"''

I
~ ' ; • : • j

· .• ;1
j.
·,.
_);
NAHA, Okinawa, June 5 · .:·
(UPI)-A U.S. Air Force SH.- .... ·' : :·

I ,.
71,. fastest plane in the world, : ,., :•.• '
is. missing and· presumed • . ·: •
crashed in the Pacific, Ameri-. :; @
. ··•:
;·\

can; military· spok.esmen said ·1· t>:.1

I · _: .. _ tod~y.
...
·
The t(\!st version
. : ~
the high>. ~
altitude reconnaoiss·ance jet-,:i g:!
of .f

successor to the U-2 spy plane. 1 '.%

I '
used ov·cr the Soviet Union.· ~
and China~was repor.tcd over- . o
due yesterday during a "rou~·. · ~
:.··.·:·.

ti-ne · traiiiing flight" fr<>m the ; "'d :·.,

I £.
;
local air force base. ·
~: . . . . . : .J ['l'he . SR-71 also has been~; 1-3 '::

flying out o! Thallancl's Takhli .

fighter base, George Wilson of· : "'!
f
I "'°· .·
'The Washington Post reported ,..:
from , Saigon May 22.; The ,.; g.. · :_:
plane was believed ·to be keep. 'f, • :;< ·
ing track of North. Vietnainese: 1·,·: ;;- ....
.. .. :_;.
•''

-~·' . ; •. ·.... ·.,: r;

military traffic and monitor- .·: :i:~ :.··
~1
• - ·.!.,"· ' . . '·.~. ! ·.•.

ing China's border. . ·· .. : $" :;-: .!.'·,: .···.'.:_'·.: :r.. .·.··

[Wilson r~ported \ that then' ::o . '
· · ' CIA is involved Iri the recon- · · ~
.... ~- •naissance flights . from Thai- :-'·
:('.i;/:'J :·!Di'::i\ '\.

>
I .. la11d, and. that the SR-71s ro- ::
, ' tate between Takhli and Ka-.: ei.:i
,_,·., dena Air Force Base on Oki·.:·:~
nawa, ·apparently for security,:,'.::.
'.·

1· I
reasons.] ·

1 dle-nosed plane sent a .fmal , ..,., ..,

< :v
The pilot. o! the black, ~ee- _: r,._ ;·;.
(message from a spot about 600 .· .,,.,:,., ·
· miles. south .of here and 500 ...·.;·;,!,·'. .. ;
.,
I
:
miles east of , Manila, · the : :·;· . : ~- :\_
spolcesmen said. · '..'.•!·:: .· ;·,.:
American military official.s · ,._., ... ; ···::
i ';
ha've. lau·nched a search opera-:-.~; ,., '-· ;'
tion. - · ;:::._,i• · ..: ..

I '..\. ·i.\ \ .! ~ i:
'.
\.
·1
:··~
'. ''...
1·

.. !·
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'1.
.. : .
·.l.

I ,·
' ; . .,
... •.

!·
.. ·.
I .•.. !•'
....: ::·

:,. -.. ·_.. 1.··. . . . ;:·

 C05492938
I
,;. le· l • I '.'

.::.I Good Mornings Begin: with The

'·

" .

I
- .,.

I·
t .
.
.

E NUMB5R 099-(399)·5155 .MONDAY, JUNE 10, 1968 STAR PHONE

·1.
I
I ·Missing .l<AFB · ·"
Piloi ·1.dentijied · \f!
I ·WASHINGTON, June 9 (UPI).~ i:
i .... The Air Force today iden~i· · ·/
· fied the pilot of a supersonic 1
· test aircraft reported missing bi : ~

I · the Pacific since June 4 as ·Ja<;k ·.:

· W. Weeks of Los Angeles,. an · ~,
· emplbye of the Hughes ·Aircraft:.··;
· Corp. · · ·,r

I The plane was last heard from .;·j

about 600 miles south 'of Kade·
· na, Oldnawa,. and' 500 m.iles ·
· east of 'Manila .. The Air Force ·

I
described the plane as a1 ".YF·
· 12A/SR·71 type test airer~ft~"' .'
' . Only a few prototypes of the
2,000-mile an hour 'interceptor
have been bulf t, and it· current·

I · ly is' not sclieduled for . mass

· production. . ..
The missing plane was a ..re·
.
. eonnaissance model which has

I • been operated for s&me time .by'

the Strategic Air Conimand.
·A "test bed" aircraft is one . ,
. being .used to test ·equipment.:)
: The Air Force said · the plane :;

I '
was engaged in "field testing!', }'.
i But it would not say what kind. o'
·•. • • ' • .. ' . .~."f

I
 C05492938
'fO:P SECRE'f
I
I AIRCRAFT LOSSES

A~12
I Aircraft:
experienced during
Four A-12 aircraft losses were
t~st/training phase, and one

I aircraft was lost during operational phase while

on a fl,l.nctional check flight.
I · (1) Aircraft No. 123:
(a) 24; May 1963
I (b) Pilot: Kenneth Collins (Project pilot)

I (c) Location: 14 miles South of Wendover, Utah

(d) Ca~se: Materiel failure - pitot system

·I . (e) Successful ejection at 36,000 feet

·1 (2) Aircraft No. 133:

(a) 9 July 1964

I (b)
(c)
Pilot:
Location:
William Park (LAC)
Area 51

1. . (d) Cause: Materiel £ailure - Elevon. Servo valve

· (e) Succ~ssful ejection at 200 feet
I (3) · Aircraft No 12£:

{a) ·28 December 1965

,,
=1
(b) · Pilot:
· .· (c)

(d)
Location:

Cause:
Mele Vojvodich (Project pilot)
Area 51

Maintenance error - st~bility aug~

I· mentation system pitch and yaw rate gyros

·1 (e)
connected in reverse.
Successful ejection at 150 feet

I Ran~\g '.!~a B\'i.tlU\N ·

>1 . contrn\ System
;.
r. . «•··
t·. ·.·~".:.·, ~~J· ·.,<; :
 C05492938 TOP SEC:tmT
I
I (4) Aircraft No. 125:
(a) 5 January 1967

I (b) Pilot: Walt~r Ray (Project Pilot)

(c) Location: near Leith, Nevada

I (d) Cause: Fuel depletion - probable fuel

I (e)
gage error
Unsuccessful ejection - fatality

I (5) Aircraft No. 129:

(a) 4 June 1968
I (b) Pilot: Jack W. Weeks (Project pilot)
520 N . .M. East of Phillipines
I (c)
(d)
Location:
Cause: Unknown, Probable catastrophic

I engine failure
(e) Ejection: Unknown - Fatality
I b. F-101 Aircraft·: Two F-101 aircraft losses were ex-
perienced as follows:
I (1) Aircraft No. 56272:

I (a) 1 June 1967

(b) Pilot: Lt •. Col. Welton King (USAF detailee)

I (c) Location: Kadena AB, Okinawa

(d) Cause: Materiel failure - aircraft tail
I section separated in fligh.t.

I (e) Unsuccessful ejection at low altitude - fatality

I
I
'FOP SEiCREl'i'
Handle via BYEMAN
I Control. System .
I C05492938
, I .. .
. i •

. .
.

. :,•.

C 0 M M A N D E R ,.. S MONTHLY

,•
.
.
,. '
''·:·:..

...
ACT.IV I 1' I ES REPORT
I~ .
. ..
. .·:.
.

I '·'
·sTATION
" . .:: ·.···-.·
.·.....' ··:'.::. .··:'
; .: «· ... "· (, ::
. ··..":.

. ~ ' .

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..· :,

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Control System
.C05492938
... ...
I ' ,..
·-

·.I
....

·1
~: '
....
.1: . • . '·
·•.·

IN!PEX·
. . . . : . . .

TAB· 1- Deputy- Comm.a:nder i'Olt' Support

TAB 2 - Deputy Comma::nder for Ma.teria:I.

TA? ·3 - Deputy Commander. for Operations

· Tn.B 4 - Dire...."rtor, Ba.se Medical Service .

TAB 5 Chie:f"; Of.i'iee ot Communications i.

·.
TAB 6 .Chief",· Office. of. Seeu:pity
•·. _. .
..

;.,,-..>>·.·.
~

.• i'•
' .·:
;.·;, -':
·.•··.

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·1:: Handle via BYEMAH

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.
1: '· ..

• . J. -. • : · ' •
 C05492938 ' . .. . . . .
. . . ~.

SUPPO~T .ACTiviiIF.s.
IMILITARY
· . THE FOLwWlNG
. IS A
PERSON~IEL:
.

·.
SUMMARY
. OF THE BASE
.
'

.
. ~
FOR THE MONTH
.
OF AUGUS'I:t
. .

·1 .·~;,;,~ .
is as follows;
Th~· \otai ··~~r~~~h-;: :aiJiia~·. fuld ~ttached ·for. thi~. petacbment as of. 31
. · ·· . · · · · ·· · .
August,
·
I ·. . . :-. ... AIRMEN TOTALS
. ~: . ..
:AREA - BLq ~-Bl~
ssigned ' '.

i
; et 1, 1129 USAF s.As., 28' - .12 178 - 46

·f Attached
e~ · ·1 si 2nd Wea Sq 14 2 '
.·:.fl'
Attached ·· · ·"·. · ·
: let 11 ~ 1_~00 Spt .sq, . :.. ,-

'q
> Attached

~O
'..,.· ·.·· 2; ·The following
.

TO~AI.s
:per~oDnel 'departed
_g_ -.JL ',. ·... ·.
35 - 12
this.· station during this period tor the
>". :

'. · .. 1.92...
~
....... ~ 0-

- ....9....
38
:
- -.
2

227
- 0

:... 50

' ea.son indicated; .. ' · - -

· . · · · - .· ·-. · . ·
........
. ·
.. '

SECTION REASON
. ~
COL Burton So Barrett... COMD · '•
' ..
Reassignment
GT . Douglas F;, I?uie Acf't Ma.int · Reassigr:unent

E
.
TSGT
GT
GT
Frank Vo Derby-
Robert A. Fernandez
. James t. Sa.nf'ord · . ·.· ..
Acf·t; Ma.int
Operations
Acft Maint ·. ,,
.. '

-.- .
Retirement
Reassignment.
Reassignment
' .

·. t
· . SGT - . . 'Leamon E., Sm.i:'Gh · ,
SGT
CMSGT
·· Westley L.. Brees
William: R. Hufhand
-: ·. Fil-e Dept
Acf't Maint
· AFCS
.
...
Retirement
· Reassignment
.' Retirement
.~GGTT · Olga C., Lytton· . AFCS ~e.ssignme:nt
9MS Ronald E...Pletsch ,: Weather.· .. Retirement
'•

ISTAFF PERSONNEL: " . . '· .. ' . . .... '

.··. . 1.; The number 0£: S~r:r·
Personnel decrea.sad.one (1). dur~g the Month of Augu.s~
. • ,with the departure of Ml"~ Je::mes H. F.oss~ . ·
· . CONTRACT PERSONNEL: · · . . · . ..
: . . . ' . . . . . . . .

:1•:.
.· . .
1,. Contract
-.
Security.Guard . ..Strength remained
.
the.same ·as July•. .' . .

1··. ::. ·..

..
·1 .. · .·. ·"

'PAGE 1. or 3 ' Handle via BVEMAN .·

.. ,-· ... .Control System ·
"

;~ ...
 C05492938
·I }1,91'0~. POOL; . . . . . .

. .. ·. 1 o · During this period there were:

1•· 97'J9 Gallons .of gasoline issued to USAF vehicles and equipment.
· 701 Gallons·o~ gasoline issued to !EC.vehicles and equipment.
857 Quarts of ·oil issued~ .· . .
·1·.· .
597S Gallons of. diesel issued to USAF vehicles and equipmento
45 Requ-.1.sit:t.ons submitted thri1 ll'EECO. . .
... ·:.
. .· . . ....· 1 lt6 Requisitions subm:itted th:r.u base euppJ.y on 1150 •
···1···::
::: ..:·· .,
....• ~
41 Requisitions submitted thru base supply VVP. · ·
702 Items issued on recap sheet.at.part!'! warehouse.
92 Work orders written. . ··
'.I 31 Trips -l!ickets issuedq
20 Drivers license issuedo

~ere was one ( 1 ) vehiale received during this perioq 9

:1·
' .. ..
·2.
3. There was two (2) vehicles turned in dtrring this period'o
.•( 1 ) . Sveeper Rotary.
(1) Fork Lif't 6~000LB.
(1) Tractor:Wareho~se 4,000LBo DBP. .
4o There is one (1) vechile deadlined at this time.
I BASE FIN~CE: ·~ . .. .

/1·:· 1... Expendit~~s obligations of FY-68 station tunds during August totaled ·and ·
: $114,:350.00o This we.s an i.i."1.creaso of.~~25,774.00 over FY-67 'i'ulids for the same period··

. ·.
: .. ·last yearo In addition· we expensed and obligated $30,600 .. 00 against ·Headquarters
> f'unds for- travel of contractor personnel in si...,:iport qf BJ.ack Shieldo This is an . .

'', •
1
·. :increase of $28:>675.00 over FY-67 :f"!,mds for the same perj,od last year. A total of ?23 · .•.
: . indiv:l.dual V'ouchers were proce·ssed during the Month.. . . ·
2a Persarinel strength, assigned and attached, decreased from 440 in August to 386 '
'.

··1t~is Month, a decrease·of 54 (12.2%). . >. . . . . : . . . . . ·~· .

. : BASE CIVIL ENGJNEERS:. . . ... .

·:I .·. : 1 o _Construction: There was no· construction started ·or cornpleted. in Augusto .... .

:.·
.. . 2q Y.ia.intenance:. 14 Work Requests (~ Form ~32) .from various base supported
activities were processedo 9 ·maintenance woi•k orders ·were completed.. '307 emergency · ·
· ;·

· 1
; work requests ( service calls) were received and processed. . .
3. Utilities: 4, 106;600 gallons of wa·te:r were consumed, for a daily average of .... ·
· 1.32 1 460 gallori:s 0 18 1 132 gallons of fuel were used . to operate the base heating plants .. >·.
'.;l:BASE FIRE DEPARTMENT:. .. , .. . .. . ~: : ;. . . . · . . ..

:•. ,.·. 1. Emergency Responses: . Responded to £our (4) airborne emergencies and three (,:3)
: grotm.d responses. during the Month. .
· 2. Fire Pz-eventtt.on Inspection: There were a. total o:r 604 inspections me.de of
'• 1 ·· housing f'acili ties o The:re were 205 inspections made of hangars~ shops 1 and other ..· ..- •.
· working facilities o · .

..
.· . 3. Extinguisher l'.iaintenance: 14 C02 extinguishers repaired, 10 15LB C02
extinguishe:rs weig1lted ~d checked, ·5 002 extinguishe~s rep;:J.i;.ced, 4 new extinguishers ..
.

1
.
installed.. ' · -; ~. .. . . . . ·
. 4a .Hll-4.3B Section· .ActiV:ities. i One hot drill fire 6 man hours l' 12 special missions , .
·I
.
· 12 man hours, 2 miss:ion"'supports 6 man hours, .3 special projects 6 man hours, One TSGT · .· ·

.
received sta.nboard check. . .. · • •·· · · : · ·
5. ·Tr-aning: B-52 Rescue Procedures, 1~0 man hours ...·
· ·
. Handle
·
BYEM via
-1~.WlIJ,IAM M. FAIRHALL P.NDASSOCIATES: .' . .·:·· , . .. . ..
.Control System ·
· · Attached is .Vi.ra Fairha.11.'s Area 51. Activities l'eport for the Month of August 67,,
. . ~ .·.· '.... ..·:'::-::J -.~~- ·._··.:-:·;.: .. :~:·.~.·: .:·:: .. <.· ..·.... ·.. · : ... ::.... _.-_..:···:.·'.__·.·.:.:.._. : ·:·...:: . ...... ·-.:. '··: .. :-:· ·....• l . .· : -~ ' . . ·. . . .
 u 'J,j '
C05492938 ..
:Q t;i Jifi .)!i

·1 .
~- F9!f0WING rs· ~rJ.E 8.~GTH
.
BREAKD?tVN FOR THIS. STATION AS OF :31 AUGUST 1967:
CONTRACTOR ~., ·, " KP.DENA TOTAL
-l~cof /':?'' :·· ·· : · ·· · :. :-. .. : ·. , .._:
Construction 0 0
Maintenance. ··
I . General 0£fice
Culinary·- Kitchen .
~ Supervisor
0
1
0 45
75
17
01,lli:o.a:ry - Sanitoria1 and Housing ·_g_
~-
1· LOCKHEED:· , .
1 . 180

, - . ·. Engineers/Ma:Ulte~anoe/SuppJ.:r/ . .-XJ:L
377
I CONTRACTORS:
·. · Mn/MINN 11 .. ·· 3 14
.· ... · · RYCON . 8 '' 0 8·
. MH/FLA 2"/ '.•:.. 12 39
I. EG&G ~~
2B
' •6
. . . 1.3 :., ' ·.• 11
0
1 7
.24
28
I·. . ... ~1 FL"FmWEL
STAND.
. . . . ····.
.... 44
~z·-
' :3 . ,
•. .
8
o .·
1
52
2
4
DAVID CLARK . 3 1 4
COLLINS RADIO . •._ ":3 3· 6
MAGNAVOX ·. '•3 3 ·:6
. AIRESEAROH •· ;_ 4 .3 .. 7
.. ·. · BAIRD ATOMIC "' ·1 1 2
UNIVAC .·. ·2 0 2
. : .. -~
SANDERS ·1 . 1 2
EDL 2 2 4
SRL "··2 2 4
RCA '2 0 2
P'..AC. 8 ... •..:-." .. 4
t ;,, '
12
TRW ·.. :-o .• ' .:
.:.J_: ...1..
TQTAir-i-17f" . . ' . : · 57 '
~30
; ..•

I .. .
BASE 'STAFF COMPLEMENT;
· Civij,:t~;
1. Staff . 22' < •, 18 40
1· · . ,. . Statt TD!: Admin/Security
·.?:n..~ra.ct: ·'. . · : · . ·· · . ·.
·> ·"1·"' •"<.: .· •. 1
. '
.. 2 ·.
.. ~- . ' . ~· ·" · Security ~:eds _,.1 :· 22 53
•' · · Other Contracts . . ·...· 6 ..· · . 2 S
Drive.rs : · · :~ : __L ~- .
.·. TOTAL-.;... 63 . :• : ..· 46 . . 109

lllILI'J'ARY~ffioers Ass~gned .• • . .. ··. · • 28 ·> .· 12 40

. ' · . Of'i'icers .Attached (WEA/AFqS) · ·. · · : 5 . ' 0 .. · .· 5
· ··. · Officers Attached (SAC)' · ··. 2 0 2
··1··
• . ·
·. Of'.f'icers TDY Tagboard ·
. Airmen TDY '.I'agboard
· 6
15 · ·
0
0
6
15
· Airmen Assigned •. . · 150 .34 184

;I · ;
. Airmen Atta.ched
TOTAL~-
·~·
248 . .
_..it_
.22._ ..
_iii_
~ .
e· crRANp<~'.l'A~ swnman1As· oF ~, AUGUST ;267=-:--~~~ 93a· :2.56 ~-· ':. 1ir194 ......... A
 . ·..
. ~ .(
ACTIVITIES REPORT .. ... · ..
. ·.....
~

FOR .··.
;

:!'.
. ·:· WILLIAM N[-)'AIRHALL .
.AND- ' ..·..
..
..·.1 · ...;,.
•'
ASSOC lli.TES
· ·.·
CONSULTINCi _:iN_QfNEERS ."

,1,~
.: .··
u (AREA •51)

•"
·. ··.

· .. ·
·,.

....
"'

. PERIOD: August 1 to August 31, 1967

·.; ·.·
..
.:1··'.:./\·:; A. ·. ENGINEERING OFFICE ~ { .'.

·. ·~. ~\.:~ '.:•:.<· '[.·· ··~

(1) Final Plans and Specific~tions:i6r'New Construction
Activities at Beale Air Force Base were· completed
and delivered to the Base Engineer on August 2, 1967. '··. •·.· .
. At the present time, the work on this Project is
waiting fo~ firial allocation of funds~ prior to the ,: :·«··
:further ·action by the Procurement Officer. • ... t

·. -.

TRAVEL
·,..
Dave Welles of this' Office, delivered the Plans and .
Specifications on the Beale Proj~ct on Au~st 2 1 1967 ..,

·~ . . .. :: .. ~ .· ·....
. .: ..

......
·:·".·.
·:-.
..:
·: /· .... ·..
.....
··.·•
·.·.· ··.; ....
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. ':''· . .·

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.
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. ·....... ··

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.
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,.

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.·'.:1·_:.. ·_ -. ....
.. ....
.. . ....
. :- .
.= . ~. . : . .. ·:· . . . .-· . : ~.. ·..
.: . .· .
....
•': . ; ... .'. · Handle uia BVEMAN
. .. . "·: ' '
: ........
:.:.,·~-.:.... ' .-
~ ·~
... " ·'.
: .. :·
· · :;control system
~ :
.. . . : I _' . • . • ; .'

. .......
........ ·.··,
·.·.: .. :
 C05492938·
·1 ". · :~ . . .
.. ·_ ·-

. .. ·
. MA 'fE.lUEL ANNEX TO MONPHl.Y ACTIVITY REPORT
"''i'; .' .... ·. · PROJECT AmC~~iT HA.!NTENANCE
l:l. Sorties and .tl;y;ing t.ilne.: (Ooes not inclµd.e deplO!l!!,ent .flights l
Aircraft 124 5 Sorties . 10:20. total .fly;ing hours
Aircra£t 128 .i sortie· .l~~o .total. rlying hours
I~· Aircraft
Aircraft
)JO
132
4 Sort.ies
... 2 Sorties
9:00 total
, . 9:45 total
i'ly:i..ng hours
flying hours
}~ . · TOTAL: 15 Sorties . 30: 25 to ta~. tlring hours
'
I'" : ... ,•

SUPPORT·A!RCRAFT MAINTENANCE
.,;•

..
' .. -
.Auth:, 47 ·. O/H:. 49·. ' .. Due ln: 0.
. : _-, : - .- ·. ·. -- .
. . ·:; ,... " '.- '.,: .' I . ''

., .'. ·.. -
•'.FJ.:Xing Tiu!~
c:...130B. ·.... ·
.. ~ : .
. 119.5 ...·.
r...:101 110 .. 0
UH-lF : 32.2
T.:..33 75,,4
U-.)B .... 20 •. ~"
. TOTAL ;,67~9 ..

···.13~ Maintenance~

.··~. . ':.· '· ·

1
:. a.o T-3.:3 .ll 58-670 - Output· .from. Hill - Phase Inspection•

.. , ..
.... 0 ·The C-130 .airlifted 12.5 .. ;» tons o.f cargo

- · ... l. · Pers o:rmel g. Auth:

-

2s·
.',
..;?QL.
.......,_.
·

· O/Ht . 21.
d~ng
. . this
...
period
. •..
..

1 ·2•. Se:rvicJ~g: 77 project a:ircrart_' were refueled/d~fueled.

',. ·:

3. ' §:!:2.re:g~:

.
1. . · "
a.; Du.ring this period, .'.39 commercial · carriers were of'i'1oa.ded.. ·

·1,
.
. I ...
:. ..: -~. .
'
. '· .

... . ..· •.:

.1.· i •

l .

...,. . . . .· ..
..
"
·. :--· '
' . .
.·./>~"-{.·< :::~-- :. __ ·....
 ~ c 0 5 4 9 2 93 8 ' ' ' , . ' ' . O:=E=4().-f?-a-B- w..
••. (\; ';b;1 '.ritEJ~~e'rage storri.ge lii~el.B;· 'total ;•o•iptS and 1:ssuo• tor the period
.. · a.re. as t'ollows: ... · · · · ~

':Ix-· . ·.~·
.. .
.AUG LEVEL .·
.. · ..-:·'

.·. · . 'IOTPl.. RECEIPTS TOTAL ISSUES.

..
·.
: ' 972,214 .'
', ro.,324 199,l)J.71
167,41.~0 . " .. 24.3,,8.;frz · 257,816
' ' ;,250 .•·. '' ' 4;700 5>292
-:,,6?5 .. ' ' . . . . .io, ao:o . · s,2so
'4,075.'
' '

' 7:/)00 J.,350

' 54 '' 'p ' 18
206 .· ·O '" .. 102
. ··'; .·.
'. '.· ··- ·.-·: .,.
SUPP.LY
a ,..,.,. ·• · ' .
. Personnel: Auth: 55 · · . "··0· 1H... .· u:: ·: '.:. ·. "
~ 'I tt ~,.,, .: . .. . ... ,

:· . •.".
.. ,··,,
. . . ..
·Storage: '·,
'
'

~ . :; ·,

·.. 30.,128 Sq Ft Inside (net) 9..5% u~ilizedo. · " ·

" .. :· .... , -
·: ?0~230 Sq Ft outside (net) 48% U;tilizedo
;:,1··i: }• -~~quisitions ~o Depot . . ·.·. · 1,274
.~ . . · .i;..l.ne Items :Processed \~ · . l2,65T. ·.· ·::·
.: .·:·:,:: · ·Line Ite!lis Issued or Shipped· · . · 4,.458 · .
. . , .• '/." ·• . · .A.ctive Stock .Records Malntaine~ - · · 28, 922 ''. ·:.
· ::·· ·Freight Received · . · 356,221. ·•

?,. .: : 4.
~:. ··

·,
.: .·:
·Freight Shipped ...·· ·

'·· .. ';:
·Inventory:
.... 305,766 .....

. ·..
Cycle 0
;.,, ·1··.·.·::' ·: ' . Special 0 ··...
" '
•,. l ..
....: ,:
Bench stock:: ·.' .• : '.
..
· ,·. .·; .
. ' : . -~
. Fl.?-1" rate to organiza.t~on . .... .. «··. '·. "

,
Federal.· ·
·1.>,~e:, '·.·.·. ' '' Prime ·' ..
.·.·· .· .
..· ".·

Fill rate by·Depot t·.·

.··.. · ·.
... ... ·.·
. ·· .·...
.. . . .
. ').

. ., ·. -: . ; . . .. . ''' .
. Federal·· , . '84% . ;•
Prime S5%
- ' J .· .
;: ....
: '
··. : ... ''

"'
._,;_ .··:- .· ... ·

. 1·. . .·'.·
··

, ·
· · Line Items Requisitioned :
L:lne Items Turned In · · · ·
. Line Items Received .· .
... "·.

. "' ~ . ·. . :: : ·.' . ~ ..

f Randle via BYEMA~

1·: ·.,• . :... ; : •• <
.ttmtrol System
·"r·.
''" .··-~ .
. • ..·.
 . ' S::E-e=-11>-B ~e '. .
.. i. \·.·'.:~:·'.~~:.~:

7.:· P-~S ~:

·I : Accumulative t~tal. ot P-4~S funded items. requested :f'rom depot is $104,692 37 0 0

I e,~. Ma.chine Roolll::

;•

Utilization JCei[. Punc_11 Re:erod~ > ,tape ~:t!. · · Sorter· 1.nterptr

1: . · Breakdown Hours 140 38 (. 75
'-·!
;. .....
~
. 20 45

·Hours. 101
::.~ I had
Tape .. Sy::ite.m: Had motor replaced~· power ·roller:·repla·ced~ · .Rea·s_on .tor ·delay~
to· be ordered .from company. · · · ·
parts

_.··•·1 . . ".
·.···
'·
·:" ·,:.. -
...... . ·.·.:.. . ·:·

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.
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··
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. .... ·.. ·.· .
·.'.·

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·.··
·Handle via BYEMAN:
· co·ntrol System·· -. ·
.·,·.
:_·;.

:,.·. ·.-:.·:'.:
 C05492938
·1
.
·1 . .
.:

·,
.

...
.
,

OPERA:TI'ONS' "ll:N'NEX 'TO ·MONTRL'Y '.A:CT!V'.tTY: 'REPORT

I· .
(ATJGUST . 1967).
' - . .

lo AIR. T'RAFFJ:C:
·1 ... .....: .
ao A-12
..
. · ·SCHEDULED: FLOWN

.·1· ·. '··· Detachment/Ai~craft PilotsJ 20 14

.. ·..•
.. ..... ' . -. ·'.
. .: l . ·.l
Lockheed/
. .
Aircraft:
·. ., .
:Pilots.:
.

1.· .· bo
.. >
D-etachment Chase:· ' .. ,_., . 16 .·

I .... ·. · · Lockh'eed Chase 2

B-52 Chase l l
····.·
Prof.icie.ncy (In~i~d.es. FCF)f · 11 .. 68

.103. . 87

·Co
. ".~· .
Air Reftieling:
. KC-135 '.·' . '..· 22 18
.. :·.... · 14·
A-12 21

F-101 ... 14. ,, .; ·•..· . · 11

. OPERATIONS AND'·TRAI·NI:"NG"·DiViS"!ON~ · ; ' ·. -

. .i .. '... . ~- .. . ·.. ·. ·...
. . : ·. . : ...
'

;.·. UH-lF S~pport: · . ·-··

.... .·'I :.1 · ...
. ..
·.1·: ... (l.) Training
'
Accqmpii~hnie.nts:.
. .
.
. ,I ,
. . . ··.. . I
'
. ..
·"
'

Proficiency-· Fl·ithts: ,· 17. sorti.eep. is:4o'. hours .. ,.

·1.· (a) . .

Flight Checks: : Annual lnstrume'l\t ·(Capt Pinaud)o. ·

. ' ,. .

(b)
..
I:
,,,
(2) Support Flights: ; ·.

/" ·.
(a)- ·.:Parachute Search'. &"Pick•up: (EG. :& G): . 6 sorties~- . .
..
time~ 4:55 hourso ·· ... · . · .
.. '
~ . ' .
(b) t>arcicliu'te drops::, '·4 eorties,....:time: · · lilO hours.·
..·.·

I.·
:.,. . Randle :vta ·. B~EMMt ·
.. ... ,: . . . .. ·.· .
-· . . ,. ..

· ··. _Control System · ·

;

'f .
•.
.. ·. · .
.. ,-..:.·.·. · ....: ..
 ·C054 92 938. . 1'·,·, ..

•••··
.

. . : S"".'.E™O It E l!,

. ..
(c) Scramble· Missions:.· Dutch eme.rgencies .
:;. 3 sorties, 1:00; Precautionary orbit aft~t:major maint (Dutch) -
>. 1 sortie, 0:10; Pxe~autionary orbit, B-52 takeoff & landing -
I .· · · ·
. .· sorties 11 2: 25; F'.""105 emergenc.iei;(- l. sortie., · Oi 20<>.
.· ....
5
. (3) Miscellaneous Fl!gbt~·and Act~vity:

:1·: sorcies,·3t30o · ·
(a) · Baldy, 7 people and 6 drums of. fuel - 3·

··1· (b) Functional. t~st. flight:. l .sortie 11 0:10

. . (c) Capt Pinaud completed testing & . test report

,
on URT-21 install~tion in Dutch, parachutesc- ·
I. ·bo · . Survival
.
'.!raining
' .
·Sec. tiori":<
. •,. ·.
. ' :·,

. '· .·.:
.·,.
'·
,• . '
•• I •

. ....:·· ...
. . · (l) EG&G Test ~roject~ '.·; :. ... ~

. ·.· .
I,
(a) Total m,iss.ion~: 10

,...
1. ...
..
(b), Tota'i .·h~gh'altitude
.. . drops: . 2
.. :

(c) Total low . a-ltitude

. . . ' drop~: 20 •...
.. ...
(2)
. 1· .· ..·;
.. . . . ·~
.• .
(3) . Survival
.
"tra.ining:
. . . : .: ·. ... :/.
. ·· •,.
'. ~,
•. I

"··

·· (~) bve:rwate~ bail~ut 'procedure~ and use of

·.:,, ...
equipment:; · 11 .. sA.rj·:· P~rson~el ·: .'. • · · · · · ·· ' ··

: · : ·· · (bY'. New treeietdo~n'.i·d·~vice. and ehe nelf .:mod on.

I . J ~ ~~ ~!~~ins. ~ 0
f · tit~ ,·URT72 l/~~t.1~; ~~ ~he; c!~ p& r a ehu W . 3 Pro j ee t

I....:<·: : ;; .(
4
) . ::~d:~~:::~:!•t:s~in~
Teport Che .
URT-21 ·Z:radio 'ins.talla. t ion '.~..n .·the .cygnus ·pilots parachut~o
.and. ~ad·~ on
.·1,.- . -·. (b) .MS gt. Staggs 9 "Project Rqs, m~t··.with Cap~ ~assett
ar+cl..~·v~i;r.~;ci.:t~~;·on 10 .August on ·tlte :tnstal,iation of ~ battery pack in ·
:;· J. : . ·,'.: ..
~·1(·.:,.:,·.~~e .cygnus pilots .par~chut.e,o:. . O~e.!ievi;~e yas s.el~~ted for use 0 ·

·" · · (c) Tested ·outer garment tha.t. ha;d .la~g~r,i.floa.tation.

·• · ···cells and the autOmat~.c inflalt~~dev·iee ' . · . ·." " · • · · .·
.,: .. . . •."·: :· .... ·:. ·.\

'
:~-1:.:·:.:•I·
'
. .Handle via' :BYEMAN
......... :: . ·:··.
.~· .. '
.. control ·system
,..·. .-: ··,

.·: ..
 ... CQ5492938 ·.· ... ··
.•·

I . :-:,~ ·::; ·:. .. .

·. s.WE~c-~ ... :E-I
.
..
:1·· ..·.: .·.
.

*. •. ~ '
.~· (5) .. 'Pers.onnel:
.. .;
(a) ~MSge Bai~et returned from TDY a~ Color,
departed again 16 Aug~st t~~~tterid.~ two •onth Project Hqa
I . . special schoolo ·

on
.I .:· . · (b) TSgt Schpe:tde:r departed 23 Augst to
·:color for Approximate.ly 2 weeks. 'T.D)!' ·to give, ;r.aining to P 0 :p 0

Miscellaneous;

(a) Comp;Leted the six mo? th inspectiol'l. of the ... ·

survival kitso ·. ~·

(.b) Received two tree l~t~own devices for

useo ·.· ..
·.· .

•~:,.):'.'::.Vegas 16 Augu~~~· ~~ ~:~·\1~;I 1 ~~~·g~~ 0.~:~\1.~~~tM; 1 ~!!e~r;:~

:'.: >, '. (Mr A.rnd is in. charge· of the parasail boat.a) concerning_
t
:1:·· ·'paras ail training Mr-. ·~:aylor wanted to se·e tl1e site presently o
: ·.: .. for paras ail traini'ng and to· survey. the· lake for other.
:,;lls~ed
;~- ~'·siteso The return of the bo~ts a~d~~~~w~ and ·next _yea~s parasail'
'~l<~::·'.:training program was also. disc.u~~·~d 0, .·· · ·

:. /.-: , ~3 o MISSION SUPPORT 'DIVISION:. .: : .

·: ·:.· ,·· ..

';:1:· ao Missio~ Planning:

. :···:
...

-~, (1) Three new r~utes (mnp(film st~ips and pilot maps)
·;1 ·:.·.have been C?nstructed in supp.o'.!=''t o~ th!!! current testing. and·
· · ."validationo · · · _ ·. : ·

....,··. ,,·: (2) :Procedures £o:z: the c:on.trol '~n·d timing of flights
~.~~~has ~eeri.coordinated.with ~he~FAA-~~~· P~oject Hqso ~
-·
;:-:·_:.:·.c:• · b Performance: Revision l_' to . the Bl'.ack Shield Operations.
···•I S:'·}:',order
0

nscope. Heavenvt'p Sl~-67 ...;01 ;· 'and .f'Sup.;rj Maid~n·~·p: 53-6 7-01,°

.• .·· ?:::· have·.been ·completed and transmitted-.to P~oject Hqso. · .
·.,
. • . . . . . . .· I
.;.·.:;· . I · .. · .·

•..:·.··•.:1.·:.•..:·.•.·,:····:::·;····· co Personnel: MS gt Robert Ao

station on 16 .August PCSo · ·
·Ferxi~nd'e~
· ·· :
··departed this

··':1:·'·<. : ; · · do . Automa t:ton g Mr J'ohn Go·· 1004. Programiftmer / ;~:;a~eorg~,:

;. ·: . - Operator~ arrived on station TDY from '!>rofect Hqa "·>.Continued
· :, :',' ,· , with normal re~ortin,s o · · .... · . : ·. , ,
. : ·,.\".
~.,. eo Per.~scope .. secti'on.: ~· >. , '. .j . ··,
.·.:
; :.·:·:.

-.:·,(·~r···. i
. nstruct
(Ml) TYMirkW 0°iW .- ·hstrikleir. _arr:fv.edf · frh.
r n c s n-t e a gnmen~~o t e
om ~p~
.thei·· .holme plant to
ca. s~st~mo
.. . :.. .

.. ' .- . . . <· 1\and\e via BlHAAR .·

I\ ' s-E G ~-'J:. . : .. .. &ontto\ ~~stem: . .
··-i
. . '•
: '~-. . ·:·.·' :·
:·.cos4 92 93s· ,..
:; I·. ;~:.:t,,..'ir:;.-~-..,,<'Yfr.·
,,
. ·: :.~. ·.·
S"."' :e:...c R . JE!":"'f .
:·>·:,~~ . .!
.,

.·
. . {3) Alignment ~f·periscope system is currently
~n ""p,rogresso

4d ·.· LIFE SUPPORT nrVI§l:..Q.N.: ..

ao A total of 20 flight proc.edtu:es' were supported for, i!1:t'e.

...
m~nth of August b~ the Life Support D~vtatono .·

,
~ : :,.. •, ; .

":~ :.
1\'..:Y.. . 11 Proj~ct Suit Flights
,·, .. ··,.
......
. . .
·.·
.
.

-· -·: .. :'

9 Project Low Fligh~s

"

... ...
.. . -
' ·.·"·
0 Hangar ~l.ights · ... :· . '\ :

.··. ·_.

·..·1···
: .......:-:' ,'· ..... ·
2.0 Total

. :. · b. A tota.1. of seven low pressure cha~ber flight.s were

. . .. .

1
·
.
·
. .: ..
.
· · accomplished 4
..
· · · · ·• '·: . · · , · ·· · ·

No further ~est~ng of .'the constant· flow thermal'. protective·

,I . :· . ·~elm.et. Co
has been done to· dateo ..
....
do ·Problem Areas:
(1) Visor reflections remain a probl.e?llo. . '•

..,. ·:·:
eo· Suit. ·status:
'.• .·
, :... (1) 1049-1 is at Ed~ards AFB on hand receipto
··1 · ·
.•. < • :
(2) 1051-3 and. i0.5.4-4 have· been. returned_ to the. factory
·for zipper replacemen.tso· • · - ·· · · · ·
. •.

-.
1 ··· 1052-4 are
(3). 1046 (7.-3)
TDYo · · .
0 _1046-3.
··
19so-~,
·.. ·•
ios.o."'.'.~I) . 1052-311 ·and .~.: .

·1 , '.· .· .

All ·Other suit .i:onf_~g_urations' a.re in, service and

. .

,
(4)
.; sat·isf ac tory ".
.. · .. ··
.
. .· .
·, :
..
-.,.,...... . ,. ' '
.._

, ·.

.
.

,
. , : - .. >
' :· :,...~. ..
. .. .

.. ·

... '
. .S K 0. R 'E• ":£
·Handle via BYEMAN
.

·. Control System.
.
 :; C054 92 938
:.1
. .
..:, '•
·.. -·
.s-E"".'ei..~-E i"
~·:. ; . l · .. ~ :" .
....
... : !
;

if' ' OPERATIONS EVALUA,TION DIVISION:::.

. · a~ · St:andardi~:ation/Evaluation ;.flight ~heck actii'ity

i .~ '. ~. . ·. ,._: . : ·.
·:.
. .
• •• • ~# • • •

.. . . : .
, •I

for August: consisted of ·written a11d, flight .exam:tnati6n as ..

indic.ated below by type sirc:r~ft:.L . .; ·.. ] .
. ·;
·A~l2 ----~~----~~~~-~.2
:1:::· ~' .·:· . · . .. ·..·
l .
~"' ·.::. ~· :
. . ...
:·,··
F-101 --------------- S
...
... .. <j.
,.,.·~, -·-~- ~.· -~ ~.:·T-33· ----:----------~--"- ...... - 4:····.•.
..1 •• > . ~.-
'; .. !·

··: ' .. . ~;.

c-130 ·~-~--------~--- 4 ,.
" .• I 'I'. : • • :

'.I:).'::.'::· ·.:, ·;.;· ~. ~-u~s:s --~--.;...~-~-~.r~---. 3 ...

:

". ···""
·.:I;. ,.
::: .··,
.~:

-------------~~ .l
Totai: · 19 ...
,,,
. :
.
~.-
· · b.,
·.....
'' '

Pondueted a condensed ground sch'ool t.o qualifY..

Lt General' Martin .for .·front cockpit ·• flig~t
. .
in; ';,A-12 ai~craft
.. ...
...

.···
":_

c., DCOE met -.w:Lth LAC repJ;"esentativ.e~ to. coordinate a

.1. maj o:r: revision to A-12 em~rgenc;y procedures .. · · ·
. . .. . . .. - - . '~ .. . ~- ~" . .

1· · . :
.. :.

·I>
. I .... -: .·
·...
' •..
. ·,,. . . _ ....
·._. ··.'. ··"
:.1·~<·:>.·'
'·.. ', ·.·.·

.,.. :·,··
. :·· . ...
~

·.··
.. .
> : :~ •

· ...

...
.,._

.•:
'· ... ·.

,
... -

·.··I ·.· ..
.
·· ..

...
Handle via BYEMAR ·
I control system ··
... '·,,.·
,]'•" ,"r•, ··.·.· ·"
 . C05492938
SECRET
"'•···.· :"::

. ·.~ .·. ·. ·•...

.. ·AEROSPACE MEDICINE REPORT .

AUGuST
\ . . 1967
.
,\ ,!:
SECTIO~ I FLIGHT ~ICINE . ~. • J .

... ,I
...

.
..

...
1. Health o:t Flying ..Ee.rsonnel:
a.

; .. 2. . Fl~g Sa.fet~
tt
.
Col S~on
.:

aild I-Sjor Gugin pla.ced on.DNIF tor 2

and Equipmept
.
•

. . £.
1'

.. .
.

. ...
'
' •
was placed on DNIF. for 1 weeJ,t with gastroenteritis;
•

wae~a
.

.for hemor:rhoidectomy •

.I .··:.
.,

·. a •. .. ~i:tl!LP.hyslhl.ogical.....Tr~ Section.~£. nco ~onthly. report·•.. ~« .- .. ·,.

• '
I

:' :··
:. ' ;I. '

·I .
. , ..
b. Flying &!.fety
. .
meeting

·.. ·sgt Gerholt

a. . Dr.. Nichols and .
.
twas.

depS:rted
-· ·.
iio.t• held
•: f

Trainirig, Admirls'tra.tion ano.":R~;seit1.rcfi:,

'l'.DY.
. .·
.. . .

· b .... Dr: ·J.?iike on lea~e from 7 August., to :28 A.uguet_

this month.: . . . .

. · ...

1967.
. ~ ...

:I c. MSgt Os~m.it reenlisted during tr.is ·repor'~irig period.·

. . . . . .
.· . . . . .

d. Dr. Dake made 3 parachute~ jump~ during the month o! Auiul9t.

. . . . . . '. . . . . . . .. ;. . . . . . ~ .
e •. Dr. Flickinger visited the .a,_rea on· 28 Aug 67 ~o .coo~te. . .· ..
· medical ma.ttt;1rs. · ·. · · · ···. ·
I · SECTION II PUBLIC HF.AtTH
.. · ·.
·.· .. .
..f.:........·

:.1: : A. Sanitary inspections of various facilities .·w.e.~ .made d'llii.ng thirs .Peric:d ·.
with satisfactory results.. · · ·

·--1~·.
··.
B. Ont\ ~:1-nna.n "~s hoeipitalizad.·_·&.'lt N~llis~ AF~ f!ospita~ :~th ·a diagposis, :.'.: ~ ·
of ~fyocardial Infarction.. · :..
. ._:,· .· . ·..

~I SECTION IIISTA.T!~TICiL ~Ul~MARY: -~- . ...... ... .... . . . . ' .. " ....

· ··· 1. During this reporting period there ~"are 719 patient vis.its recorded·; .
,_, ... . at the a.res. medic:tl facility ...490· w0re for medical caro accoiding to
·.·.the. following bre2.kdoim; USi\F-146, DAFC - 50, HEECo - 96, Military ;..
..

.. ·.
: bependents. ·- 59 (at. USA.F Hospital, Nellia AFB) 139 other civil..\a.n and
··:"..·
: contractor personnel. 8 Flying and 8 Non-flying physical cxaminstions ·• .·
,I . ~· l\iere per.formed~ 44 Food H.!'.mdler e;t.;"3.minationa were .pa~formed. A tota.l
· C?f 1~:35 ... shots t-1a~, ~a.ministered tq JW.1 categol_'ies o! personnal.o. _;A' . .
··.:· .
~ .

·.... . tota.l o.f 46 other tQ._sts/an.-ninations lro:re_ per!or.ined. , ···· · · · ··

,,.,
..
I
...
..

.....
. 2. . A t.ot8.l~·9f' 299 patie~ta wore. see;q ?t: the forward. area.· eocordirig to th~
: .follo"t:ing brs!lkdo".lm.; USAF - 139; DAFC ..., U, Civilian contract pGrsonnel ..·.·
·. - 119 •. Thoro wer~ 172 inununizllt;\ona .e.dm.iniste~d to all categolti.e3
'. · o.f .personnel. · .· · · ..· · ·

Flight Lino cov-erage w.o.s provided.for all flying activl.tiesand the

~
....
...
medical departrnenJc responded to I+ crash .ca.us. .. . . " .·. "Randle via BYEMAN
.,_, ,. ·.. . . .. :... : . S '.a: 0 R:~ 'f!'. ':' ·, · . . . . :. nf:.~:\; .
 · COMMUNICATIONS ANNEX TO MONTitLY ACTIVITIE.S REPORT
. . .· ·. ·" .
·... AUGl)ST 1967 · .... '.

·:.-. . .··:: .

I'
.•• •.•,"::

llJ.-. Conley Marcum deparled tor Kadena fuy on 2 August.

· . Mr., Harry Gillum departed for K'andena TDY on. 9 Augusto
.i::~Mr~· John ~c~linto?~t re~urned f'rom Kadena T~! •on 11 August~.·
. · ·· Mro Jam.e::i Bodnar returned tram: Ka.dens. T.OI ·on 11. August,. ....
:1 ·:·Mro David Stevens del?a~ted for.Kadene. .TD! o~ 23 Augu~t .. \ . ·:
~·'·l.\\Mro Barry Gowan ret~e~ fro~ Kadena TD! o~, ·2.5, Augus.;~ ..

1,COMMUNIGA~ONS ~,:·:~~?:Jne~~:, ·:;. i > ···•·. ·. Signal••

.•.. .,....:
.. ·.:·
· ·. · : · .· .·. ' Officers
; .....
:· . . . & Techn.icS:l · = · .· ·' · Operations : <; . ·.·. Center · ·Total·
. ,•,.

::. ·~
. s.· .•... : ...· '

25
.····'.
'..·

.· :. 10 25
·".:· .: . ·.·· . . .
. ._·::·. · ..
11·:~:. TDY to Area :. :.: ... .... .::, •f· •. ·~. .· . ·:·. ~
···: ... :·.:· 0 . . ..
.
·; · Ma.nfi>ays . 0 •
-~"
f'.
. ·... '· '. ·.·· •··.. 0. 0

111> ~~; Area

,_. '
. ·.· ... , .
.....
.
~ .
: ....
,. •'
.... ·. . .. . . . ·..
. 30 ·. 120 .· ... · ·. ·: . .70· . 124 .·. 344
. ·.
~ . .
: t : •

rl:':,·~~?a C~~cators '1to~ked.~· total.of .50.hoursovertime.during Augusto

' • ". •:. • ' I .r~·. • • . ' • '•. • ' ',,• •,, •
.,
..· .. i·! ..
ct :
1 . . •

SIGNAL CENTER AGT.IVITY.& . .~ -..

>· : -. ., 1 .. ·.·Th~ following is a summary of'. cable t~~ffi~ ·volume!! ·for .the past three Months;
':.I · ·- .· . INCOMING OUTGOING . TRAMSMISSIONS.:lN <. TRAN~ISSIONS OU~!:' . . . . .
•. ~,· MON'I'H MESSAGES ·~sAG"ES . (JliC~ P~LA~~L.· .· . (nmt .RELAYS). . .··

,~·.I>· JUNE . · 1791 s61 ·· w~6 · .. 4838

: ' ·.· JULY . · 1448 595 4:314 4320·. ·
. , ; AUGUST . 1672 ·· · 644 4730 ·4996

·. 2., Telecona with PW/Fla: ·. l'bere were 28 T~lecons las~ing a .total o'£ 9 Hrs & 35 Min .. : ·. ·
·I. . .

,'. PAGE 1 of 2 .... ·.. <"

. ..~ .... ..· . .- :

.. 8 :S G R fl'f
Handle via B''EMAN ·
.... ··: ·' :··._ Cnntr~\.Sys~an1
.. :- . , ....
 C05492938
13~· During the i~giist 1
Center Command Post ~clll~r;r.:Signal ~.the. ~s manned for.· .
.. . :.31 hrs & 54 M:tn .. ·Time spent there is broken down a.a f'ollo'l>rs: ·
':I ·n.A.TicoM'. .32 transmissions ; ·
29 conversations
'lasting 11 Hrs & 5$ Min., ·
la:stin~ 19 Hrs & 59 M.:tn~ ··
... HY-2 . -
I· . SYSTEMS:.
. .-
:·1·. :, 1 " fil]!Q~TQ.ll}·~-~3 Cormnunioations pe:t"sonnel. opera.tad the. Birdwatoher grotmd readout
·.·. ,,'system for a total of 23 Hrs & 35 Min covering 10 missions 'With 3 Cygnus aircraf'to
p • . • ' •

. .,,.· . 2 HF S:INGLE SIDEBAND; No problems were· encomi.tered vith the HFSSB equipment .
0

. during the Montho Routine.adjustments and line checks.were made on the ·

· ~- ... ir.ansceiyers .. a..'ld .re:mot:ing equipment during .the Montho · · · · · . .

J.:· OPERATIONS: The .Com:rmm:tca:tions annex· portion 9t the He.adqUe.rtera Operation Plan
.· · · 54-67 Revision One (Scope Heaven) was reviewed .and .revised for inclusion in Area
,.::. Operations Order 54-67-01. Revision Oneo .· ...•.• > · ·' ... .~ . . , ... · . .. .·.
. . . . " . ' .. - ,. , ' '

11.·
··: .: . \ ...... : ! •

COLLATERAL SERVICE'3t

··I · 1 ... TELEPHONES~

4uri."lg the Montho
A total
···
or 9 seperate work orders for service :were haJ:ldled
· . . ..· . .. ·. · : · ·
. ,•· ;~ ·. m~.'EVISIO:\:J.~ Area ~eoh:nieians ·undertook the realignment of the Are~:~.s,~F
tc::i VHF zy. tl"ell.sle:tors in an effort to provide better. ·qua.lity service., ·
···1 ..:'._;:. . . ..
...... ,_,,.
...
h-•H

I' ... ·.'

.I ..·
~ "' ..... .1·

. ..' .· '· .. ::·

.. t ..

. .:
~
. ,
I:.-..
. -:.:·· .. _.·
..

,··.
. . . '

I ...
.. ·
.·, :-.
.:· ·"· .

.. ... :.'·
. . ,.·· ..
' • O• ·:,,•

' .

.....
..
·. · ·.

'

I ··._.

I: ,•, ... "

.. ·-..PAGE 2 of .2
' . ~ .
.· ..... ···
.... ·.. ·.·

. ....... .
·'«..;..,..4;.;..:.oi.,;...++..++-~-
. :'
. ..., : ~: .Handte: via: BlEMAR.
/:~> '. ·. ; . :·: ·..
.•: :: ·~ control s;ste.m.
.. ; i~~.
· ....
.. / . .:. .
. ·:·:: ~-- '.:': ., .. -.~.-. :>·~ ~
 . ,·_.:_,
. C054 92 938 :· ... .· ; . :"'.
~· _.; ... ·

,.
· ...: . .·

·I.
.
,_·.
'
-...·· .
.. .......
_
,: .. -. . ... :·::_:. .· ..·,·..

.... .... ·
- _, ... .. '.·. ·:. ·. •'.. . .
: .,·:.·
;. . :.;

. ·..· SECURITY ANNEX .TO .MOI~THLY REPoRT ..

;·1· .::

· · ··. The following is a resume of s6cW:-ity actiyit.ies during the .

~- I\···:.·.·• period .1 August - .31 August 1967.. · .. ~·.· . · · · ·
SECTION ·I. - Security .Violations .. • · · ·· .

:(I ·/_. . . There were 1two Sectirity' vio.la_tions' repo~ted to. Project Head-.· ....
quarters o ·. ._ , : · ·

.·1 ·SECTION II - Brief'ingsLD~briafi~g~

. ;,··

·
.

.·." · .
,· ,..·
..
; ·.
-
BRIEFINGS . . ··. DEBRIEFINGS .". .: . · ·

I ....
. '\. . ~ ·.
·, .·

". ..._·.. : '.., . · .. ·.'

· OXCART . .3
4 .. . '·. OXCART . .3 . . :. ·13
: ·..... OXCART · 9 ·. ·2 .·· .:. ; :
. OXCART 2 : · ·. -~-
TAGBOARD 7.
::1·::,·:·i. ··.•. -·UP-GRADE 02 :t'O ·0.3 .39 . ·.
.... ·... · .
..... . ·:-·:

·~'.' . SECTIO::::-t:xa~: :::~::~AN was r~portod activated and

· ·· recoveredo Security coordinated transmit and cover times to all
:1:> ba.s.a.activitieso ·The base was secured during ASHCAN. coverageo
>-·-·
:.~·: .'
SECTION ·rv - Operational· Support . .. ~- ~

.·1.··. . . The security staff .expanded the following in connection with

· ·. . · . liaison·, courier service a.nd . operational support:
,·.;:·
4 •• •

.; ·. . . ~. ,·.

.....
SJ..~ MILF.S FLOWN 'fQY.. MILEAGE. MA.NHOURS EXP.I<~NDED .. · .. '
~--.·.·: ..... :. _·_ .

. 1.39010 :O 105

.·1::.'.< .
ao ·On 2 August 1967 Mro Zubori, Security traveled to Of~icer,
·1··. · · . .
.. ·Bea.lo. AFB to brief personnel 0-.30 · .
Manhours .Expsnded · · 8
., .
VJ.lea Flo'Wll 720
bo On 4 Au~t 1967 Michael Sullivan, Shift Capte.in, traveled
.· . .. ·: :.· · . to Beale AFB and Moffat AFB as courier with Project m.a.terialo
:·.-, .....
Manhours Expandod 12 ·· · Miles FloIDi 950

Co On 16 August 196? Thomas ~o Hallam, Security·Guard,

· traveled to Andrews AFB as courier with Project materiaL
Manhours Expended · · . VJ.les FloYn .3700 · · ·

•.
OE ORE~-· ...

Handle via BvtMAN ·.

·.. ·..
: :-- ..· .
....·.. _.·.·.· .....:
-Contrnl. syste~
::;-·
· ..
......... ·... .
·:·
. ·'·"
•''A.'• '• ., . '
 C05492938 .. : .~:
·1·· ..
.·::.. .... .',· <". .
.. '.··

. .. .

f S ·El C .R E 'f
.:_.·.

do On.21 Aug~t 1967 Warren Solheim, Shift Captain~ trav0led

.· .. ·to. Burbanks, Calif o ·as courier with· Pl•oject'· material .. · ·
::.'I'.··,;·· Manhou.rs · Exp.ended 5. ,•. Miles Flow.a. . . 480

eo On 22 August 1967 MicMel Sullivanj Shift Oaptainj traveled

to Hill AFB and Norton AFB as courier with Project' materi:alo

Manhours Expended . · . 6 ·· V.ailes Flown ·· 420. ...

go· On 28 August 1967 M.1.chael Sull:hranj) Shift ca·ptain,. traveled
:.1. ·. ;... ·.to Andrews AFB as courier with Project matsrialo:
..· . . . Ma.nhours Expended 12 ·.· ·. Miles Flown ~ · .3700 . ·

·1. ho On 29 August 1967 Raymond. Schell, Security Guard,· traveled

to Moff'at:NA.S as courier with Project materiB.lo · · .... · ... ·
0

. .·1-··.0: :. · •· . M9.nhours Expended · · 6 . l1iles Flo'Wl'l · 6oo ·

. · SECTION V - Genora.1

·.. . . ao l'.iro Zubon brief_ed s6veral persona on T~:progra.m per request

<>.f Colo. Hartley o
· bo Mro Zubon assisted 3 USAF personnel on ;personna). problems ...
Co Thomas Brown III 9 Security OffiMr, TDY from Bos·ton Field
Officl!l arrived and sent to Okinawa to assist the Senior Security
·"I
. . -. : .:; :~
.. .. . ' ..
Officero .

d.. M~eting with Air Force Communication Ser;vice at Nellis AFB

.··1·". --. re secur.. communication procoei;tureso
, ... · ·.·:
·'· .. ·.. ··.'
eo Meeting with William Ada.ir 9 AEC Sec\lrity Chief for Nevada
Opera.tiona, concerning a special shot to be f;i.red in lfovernbero . The
shot will vc,i;-t. :::.nd will r~l©ase P, ra.dioa.ctivo oloudo Area 51 will· be .
in standby alert for possible evacuationo .

r o S6)voral inspections ware made in the T-:program area to.·

assure zood physical security and personal security control

,
proce~dures o · · · · · ;

·:· ... ·.
. ...: ..
.. 2
; ~

SECR E9?.
:···
':

If··· .. ' ...

•••• ··t
... .·
.... ·. . ..
.: . .. ::: ~- .·. ..
. .. - :.
·.·.·
· ..
;.·, .. • •
.
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S E 0 RE ~ · ··
G., Initiat® survay on document.control proceedures between
Area and I.ll.C plant in Burbank toa.ssure-mrud.mizing aecurityduring
documant movement botwoon both places ... ·Results indicated proceedures
....:_. ... ara... socurc ..
•···. • l

,,.. <; ·· .
h ... Gave assistance. to· the. West Coast. Security O,fi'ice: through. .. :
,. << ·use o.f. .. OSI/AF :f'a.cilitios in searching for. Kenneth ·Eo· Vfnits in the. !As..
· ~ .: > . · Vegas ar~a .. · White, LAC employee was on extended absence .frOlll :work and.
'·1\//: / ~ wa.s repor_ted to be in Las Vegas.. White was not found in Las Vegas,. . . ,·
;:: :)' .. nor.did th<9 QSI investigation uncover any bad checks or other debts .. ·.
:>·. :. ": ~ ~ite turned up la·ter in NYC and established contact w~th his .. plant..... ·,: .

._.:., .. ·. . ·•.: .... · . io Mra Zubon briefed. JO pereonnol at Beale AFB on T-program !or.".
:. ~uthority of'. AFRDRo . ·

j .... Security Staff ~rticipatcd ·~ CPX ..

11·,,······
··.. : .-r·.:· . k.. Mro Zubon traveled to Salt Lake City, Utah~ to debrief Stuart.•

. 1'.: .· ·Halsey whQ departed the SLC and briefed .0-3 William ·caasun who replaced

... ,, ..
H~laoyo

lo Renegioted access proceed-urea with US Public·Health Service' •

to assure 11!8.ximun sec-urity and yet provide access to Area 51 during
detonation of AEC devices by radiation ·safety.engineers ..
. ..
. ·:..

., .. " mo Attended a meeting with Stan Ra.tomski; FM,DCA; David

.'' >Candland, SLC; William Ca.ssun, SLC; Capt. Arnold Williams, Detoo
· ·. .i · AFCS area re SOA. prooe~du:res ..

.:I · n.. Several me~tings were hold with Lt/Colo Richard Baldwin,
Detco Baker 52 concerning flyi.'lg prooeedu.res and cover story in event
..·· ..
: of difficult in different parts of the SW USo

....,
'f·····.
.......
Oo Discussed at length Yith EG&G aOcurity, las Vegas, concerning · ·
a second bomb threat to the Main Las Vegas plant received from (it is
assumed) an ex-employee who complained of unfair employment practic6a
within the companyo . T'.ae letter from tho crank mentionl!ld unfair
practices both at La.s Vegas and the Nevada Test Si~oo. As or this
.. ..
·
...,_ -~:.-

···.·· .
-:- ·

·1·:·
.:
·. . . ....
: -~· writingj two waeks after the incidont, no bombs were.round nor has
anything furtl:ier been heard· from tho crank.. ·.. . ,

,._ po }II"e Zubon met with Colonol Nelson, SR-71 Commander at Beale
· AFB in regards to T-progra.:m seourityo . . · . .·
. .

Soveral meotinga w~re held with;membera

. ·q.. the.security force of
·1: ,. ~
ro-em.phasizing codes of conduc·i; and atandarc1s. both in .Area .51 and .
. Blackshield deployment locationo
·. .. . . · .....
. · ·-:
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..
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So Total ·paasonger ~raf.:f'ic .rrom Las Vogae t.o .the. Al"e&···!W!'f.B:

f.A.SS. Ff..T. fl1. . g4ss, FLT li.2·. . . , TOTAL

. :
'··.
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796 .0 : »
· . ..:=.,.'

... '

A detailed report ia at·tachod. ..:.': .> ·

... ...

, ..:/ ..

.. ASSIGNED.· STATUS
···~····
~I

Staff 9 8 -1 .. :..

...
:_:..
.,. ·.·
·.:
Staff Contract
Contract. Guards
2
65 -
3
54
+1
<=>11

Out of' the Fifty...f our guards available tp Station "D" twent.y
. ar~ stationed at.Blackahield staging ar~ao In addition to these
» :1··. <· guards, ono Senior· S~eurity. Officer and two Seeuri ty Officers ar.e ···:
. in .place ·:providing. soourity
'
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 C05492938. S E C R E If'
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C05492938
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11
I
. 'f 0 P S E C ft. E T

/I!~ November 10, 1965

....
"
·1 TO: The Director

FROM: Military Division and International Division (W. R. Thomas 3d}

SUBJECT: High Altitude Reconnaissance Systems_

The accompanying memorandum on the A-.lZ (OXCART) and SR-71

has been written in such a way that it can be_ shown to persoi:is who
a.re cleared only for these aircraft. In reading it you should bear
in mind that the requirements referred to a:re requirements for
specialized reconn~iasance of denied areas which. have sophisticated

I defenses. 11 Specialfaed reconnais.sance 11 means .reconnaissance which

cannot be accomplished by satellites becaus·e of timeliness (North
Vietnam). amount of clou.4 c.over (North Vietnam, South China}, or

I geography (Cuba. the Sino-Indian border·). nsophisticated defens.est1

mean those equipped with the Soviet sA .. z missile~ Although tl:).emem-
orandum includes projections out to 1975. these are higl'lly pro.blen:iati-

I cal. They are not valid if the Russians develop and deploy a better
antiaircraft miss.He. and we: cannot counter it electronically .. Th.ey
are also not valid if the Russians deploy a sprint~.type ABM around

I the major target areas. The A•lZ.and SR-71 would both be vulnerable
to such a miSJ!ile.

I Reconnaissance of unsophisticated areas (e.g •• the Congo) is not an

iasue here. It can be accomplished more covertly and economically
by using U-Zts. · ·

I
I
I
I
I Handle via BYEMAN
TOP SECRET Control System.

I
C05492938
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TOP SECRET
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,,~. ~
I November 10, 1965

1· ., TO: Director.

11 FROM: International Division (W. R. Thomas 3d) and·

Military Di Vision (S~ · B. Lea:ch)

I• SUBJECT:· High Altitude .Aircra:!t Reconnaissance Syst.e:i:ns

' . ·, . _. ' ' ' ' . . . . '

I The purpose of this memorandum is to. discuss the current status of,
an.d to recommend alterna.tives to the proposed programs for tb.e.
A-lZ (OXCART.) and SR-71 aircraft. By the end of this fiscal. year
I we will have sperit som~ $2.· 5 billio~ e>n these two aircraft. The
programs proposed .:for FY 67~71 wotild add another-$Z. l billion ... We
believe it is time to .reView the overall di~ectlon of the programs
I and their relationship to ea.ch other. ·

·.. "rhe A~J.i and the SR-7l.

I · ~a.ck.ground: The. A'.:.;1i ·was conceived and .designed as a successor to ..
the U-2. It made .the treniend'c:>us_.technologieal breakthrough to.
I Mach 3; Z~ 'Procured and operated by CI.A. it is.a single seat aircraft
and its principal sensoi- is a cam.era. which: will cover a _60-niile wide
. swath alOng the entire .lllght 'path with a peak·! foot rese>lution. It .
I also will have an infrared capahiiity. The SR-71 is successora
·aircraft designed aad being p~ocured {or SAC.· 1t is· a heavier.

I Z· seat-aircraft which carries a .pilot'and a sens9r .eontxol officer.

.It will ha:ve a greater variety ~f sensors, with varylng combinations
selected £roni: 3 diffei"ent cameras with c.overages and-resolution
to
I ranging do'\lll'll a sp6ttlif.g ·camera with a peak S inch resolutiQn.
COMlNT /ltLINT systems, side'looking radars. and infrared cafl:leraa •
. The programmed flight capa~ili~ies of tb.e two at:rcra~t are so similar
that they can be t1".ea.teci as i.ntereh~ngeable. ·Pertinent fligh,t cap(!.;.
I b{lity data are:
· ·
· : A .;;12
.. SR· 71 Planned!! Plann~ Achlevec:tto date

I Range between re£uelings NM · .· 3, 800

Crutse sp.eed (Ma.ch)
Maxi.mum a,ltitude (feet)
3, 2
·90, 000
4, 000
3. 2
· · 86, 000
3. OOQ
. 3. Z
86, 000
I . l / Data on _actual SR-71 per!():ttnan.ce are riot .yet available,

I T 0 F_ . S E 6. R E T Randle '1lti B~DA~N.

·&ontrc\. ·system.
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C05492938
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T 0 P ·s EGRET
!1
i .
! • "
In a typical fli.ght profile either ~ircraft would enter denied territory
11·
I '
at an altitude of 75, 000:"'80, 000 ft. , flying at Mach 3. l or 3. 2. It
would c:r:uise at this speed steadily climbing until it. exited at maximum
I
altitude. Range ove:r denied territory would be about 15% leas than
iil maximum range to allow ascent and .descent and enough fuel reeerve
to reach an ·emergency landi:ng field;

ll
l
l
In addition to tll.e A ..;lZ ·and the SR.· 7l there are two 0th.er existing
versions. the YF... l2A, an experimental intel'cepto:r. and the Tagboa.rd:
a.n A -12 e onfigu:red to carry a'Q.d launch the Mach 3 Tagboard dl."one.
11 Ther~ are 3 .YF·lZA 's and 2 Tagb9ards. The number of A ..;lZ's and
SR..-7l1s are:.
Authorized and l?roduced
I . c:tr in Production
A-lZ SR.-71.
.. Additional Requested
A-12. SR-71
Total 0- 31 0- 15
I Test aircraft -
1/
z
. -,..--

6
-
T:ra.ihel"S 1 2
I Operational ai.rc~aft
Lost
8
z
23

Attrition Repla.ceµient """·· 15

I 1/ One A-lZ and four SR.·71 test abc:raft are proposed for conve:rsion
- to e>perational coitfigu~ation in later yea:rs.
I The s:a .. 71 will be based at Beal~ Afr Force Ba$e in Caiifo;n.ia. The A ...12
. · and Tagboard are based at Area si. a classified facility in the w~.stern
I U.S. op~rated.by CIA. The YF .. lZA is based at Edwards. Air Force Base
in California.

I Proeoaed Utilization: The.Ai~ Force requirement for ZS operation.ally

co~igured SR-7l 1 s is bas,ed on the planned capability to .simultaneously:

I ... conduct suetai'Q.ed operations of one $or.tie per day in each of

two theatres, e.g.'· the M.iddle Ea.st anQ. Southeast Asia.

I -"':conduct· 7 missions per month ov~r Cuba •

.. .i.ma.intain 6 SR-7l1s o:n hard alert for crisis reconnaissance of .the

I USSR •. or of China if the theatre aircraft were otherwise·engaged •.

I TOP SECRET

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 C05492938
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11··.
1·
- -support 66 crews in training. · ·
I
I,·
I.
.. •a.a an additional benefit. not a primary mission. pl'ovide a
post SIOP reconnaissance capability.

.The projected employment of the 10. operational A-lZ 1 s is essenthilly

I
the same except £or a "lesser sortie· rate. The !ull. planned operational
II capabHity would p:roVi.de~ ·

/1
I
..... one permanent ove:rseas detachment, e.g.,

~-a
South~ast

capability to. ~eploy to another area at the same time, e.g.,

Asia.

I
. the Middle ·Ea.st. ·
ll of the ability to conduct reconnaissance
! .... continued mi,:Lintenance
·1 over Cuba,

.... the ability to provide crisis reconnaissance of the USSR from

Area 51.
I .... continued c~ew training.

I The only distinction between the proposed uses of the two airc: raft i$ the
Claim that the A:..1z alone ca.n conduct. "covert 0 overflights. How 11 covert 11

I they would redly be is debatable. CIA is currently preparing to deploy

three A-lZa for two sixty-day periods to J.{adena Ai.r Force Base on
Okinawa against th~ contingency that they may be required for overflights

I of China or North Vietnam (the .£light$ have not yet been authorized). In
preparation for these two 60 .. day deployments, special construction has
been required at Kadena. one milU.on pounds of equipment have be.en .

I shipped by sea, 15 c ..130 sorties to Kadena Will be required, and specially

. con£igured KC-135 tankers will have to be deployed to the Far Ea.st.
This seems to be stretching the definition of covert q,uite a bit.

I It appears that the real distinction between th.e aircraft is

that. if one
were shot down. anA-1z .could be blamed on CIA while an SR-71 would

I be a SAC plane. The important point is whether the other country would
believe it was being 9ve:dlown by SAC and not who actually conducted .
the overflight. Because the SR-71 has surfaced. a downed A~l2. would

I .3

I TOP SECRET
r~2m~fr~ nT(0~f-H~
~nfftrn1 ~yswm
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 I C05492938
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surely be labeled an s.a-71 by the aggrieved cotint:ry. CIA operational
plans. partly to offset this. and partly to profit from the u .. 2 .experi-
ence. call for a downed pilot' fo ide:r,i.tiiy himself and the plane with
CiA. Th~s simple declaration w()uid pi-obably not be convincing, and
i I.
:.
we might well be put in the posttio.n of :trying to prove publicly that
there ~two differe.nt types of planes. Indeed this question may

i•
I
arise even if there is no shoot down. Both planes emit a cont\nuous
sonic boom. A country subjected to
so:O:i~ boom. by a plane flying over
80, 000 feet at about Mach 3 would surely connect it with the SR-71, the

11
I
only i·econnaissance aircraft of this capability known to them. Thus,
vigorous foreign accusations of warlike action by SAC may re suit from
any overflight ..

'1 If there is a policy distinctiP?l between an o_verflight 'which can be. attrib·
uted to 'those spies up to their d.irty tricks again 1 ,. and one which. is the

I warlike act of oui- military forces,. one important question remairis: .. ·Is
this distinction worth an expenditure of $500 - $700 million over the
next five years?

I The costs: The costs of the A~l2 a'n.d SR_.'.71 programs through 1971 are
as follows:

I TOA (in millions of dollars}

I sa.. 11
-1965 - ·.----
1966 19.67

479. 8 . 45Z. 3
1968

312. 1
1969
-.·

227.8
·• 1910

210.3
-
1971

197. 2
Total

z. 330.6
451. I

izz .. a.
I 137. I 111.6 147.6 169)0•:• T
153.2 151. .7 933~ 0

Total 588. 2 591.4 599. 9 481. 1 381. 0 362. 0 320. 0 3, 323. 6

I . .. . . . .
The costs ln the above table are based on the amounts currently being
. ·.

requested for the two programs. rather than the currently approved

I p:rograms •. We expect them to be .reduced somewhat during the budget

review process o:n str~ightforward budgetary issues. e.g .• contract·
priees. time bet~een overhauls.· etc. These reductions_are not included

I he:re because the details of the programs al."e still being reviewed.' They
would not affect the basic e~onomics of the alternatives which al'e dis- ·
cussed below.
I 4

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C05492938
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There is an implicit issue aa~oclat~d .with the SR .. 71. , The proposed
procurement would keep the production llne. open against the contin ..
gency that the F-12 is approved next year. We do -not believe the
potential savings are sufficient to warrant doing this .. The F-12 can
I . stand on its own merits when th~ time comes.

ALTERNATIVES
I
I Alternative 1
. . . . .

I Do not procure additional s,R ... 71•s and.phase out the A-lZ program
by Se;etember 1966. From an analysis of the requirenients for addi-
tional SR-71 aircraft (Attachment) we do not belieye the procul'ement
I of ae,\diti.onal SR-71 'e is justified. (The Systems Analysis Staff·in OSD
agrees and will soon forward a Format B which recom:mends no addi-.

·1 tional SR-71 procurement.) Based on the ath·ition experience of the

B•58 program, the presently au~horlzed number 0£ SR-7l's will be
adequate to meet a realist~c estimate of requirements thl'ough fiscal
1975, ·which are the same as the requirements postulated for the A-12.
The only thing that will be lost is. the A ..:1v s cl.aimed distinction of
covert overflights.· A$ indicated in our Cliseussion above, we do not
.· believe this dist.inction is meaningful. · It ls certainly not worth the
I cost of ma.iritain~ng the A ..;12 program.
.. . ·. . ... . ._-
· ·
. . .

Upder this alternative we would lmmediatel_y halt fu~ther upgrading ~f

I the A.12 1 s a.nd phase doWn the program during FY 1966 to the three
aircraft now becoming £u1ly ~perational. These wo~ld remain opera·
tional ilnt~i September 1966, two months after the first SR..;.7l's unit
I becomes operational. We would then phase these last three out. We
would dispose of the A ..12 airc::i-a.ft with t~e p.ossible exception of on~
which might b,e retained as ·Ci ba.ck•upaircraft for Tagboard.
I 'ifo would also close down Area 51. · This ~ould require transfer of the
Tagboard program to Be;;1.le AFB ·This· shc:)uld present no di#iculties.
I Tagboa1'd is an Air Force progr;un, and security coUld be as good as ·
that of the CIA U-2'.s which are curre~tly b~se4 at Edwards AFB. Our

I 5 ..

SEC~ET
I TOP
~-~a::C:0 rL: r:'{EMt\¥{
.c~~-~rn~ ~Jstm~1 _
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 C05492938
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11 'fOP SECRET

.estimated TOA based on~ December 1 decia_io]+ £or this alternative is:
I '' TOA (in millions. of dollars)

I SR-71
1966
-- 1967.
,....__

479.8 255.9 220.5

·1968
_......,..
-
1969 1970.

ZlS.8
1971
- Total 66~71

I. 549. 5 !./
198. 3. 179.2

I A-12 85.0 40.0 ~ . - - 125'. 0

Total 564.8 295,9 zz.o. 5.. Z.15.8 198.3 179.G 1,674.5

(Difference from. propoeedprogra:rn)

SR .. 71 -196.4. ~91.6 -12~0 ... 12~ 0 -18. 0 -330.0

A-12 -26. 6 -i07. 6 ... 169. 0 .. 153; 2 -151.7 . -12.i. 8 . -730:. 9 a/
Total ... z6.·6 .. 3·04. o ,..z6o. 6 -16s. z .. 163. 7 ·-140. 8 ... 1. Q60. 9

1/ Subject to further budgetary adjustments. .

Z/ This is based on the program directo~•s r·equest.. On the basis
of the DN'R0 1 s p:r:()posed p:rogram. which assumes that the larger
34K engines will not be procured in later. yea:rs. the savings woµld
be about $180 million leas. ·

Alternative 2

Do not procure a4ditional·SR-.7l1 s. transfer 6 A-lZ's to the Air ·Force,

and cancel the balanc~ of the A .i.JZprog:ram: Th.is would pl'ovide 6 A ...12'8
against .the contingencies of unexpected ,attritiOJ.1. of :requirements. lt
would have the dtsa.dvantage 9f leaving SAC.with a mixed fieet of ab·•
craft, but the problems would be no
greater than thOSe caused ·by the
differences between the B'...SZG and H's and ea:tlier B..,Szts. It would
I provide the advantage of ·:retaining an. option for covert overfUght. ·Two .
or three civilian crews eoµld be kept proficient fo the A ..12 eo ttiat we
could publicly make the same clai~s of a Cl.A crew and pla.n4' that we·
I can make wider the present programs. . .

TOA
I The additional TOA required for this a.lt~rnative is difficult t~ gauge
·without tlie· benefit of detailed. estil:nates by the· program operator.s.
I 6

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C05492938
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· 'f' 0 P. S· E C It E 'f
I
• The additional costa would result from maintaining separate stocke
I
• <
of parts, eepa.rate training programs~ separate contractor support.
etc. We estim.;,\te that they would .add $20 - $is million per" year
(1966-1971) to the TOA shown under Alte~tive 1. There would a.lso he
I a potential addition of $54 million to put the new 34K engines in the
· 6 A.-12's which a.re retained.

I Alternative 3

Proc\;lre 6 additional SR .. 711s and phase o~t the A-lZ. ,ero~~a.m by

I Se;ett;im.ber 1966. The 6 additional SR-7ls would provide insurance
against attrition rates in excess of those we have forecast or to
meet sustained requirements beyond those which w~ forecast.
I TOA
._.,,_

I ·This alternative would add the following to the TOA requir~d under
Alternative 1.

I TOA (i.n tnilllona of dollars)

1968 1969' 1970 . .!.21l Total

I ·6.0 li.o. · 12.0 18-.o .· 111.6

I Sum:na::y

Under the preseJ.'l.tlY proposed programs we wUl have spent well over
I . $4 billion on the SR-11 and A·lZ ·by 1971. .Whi~ it is partly hindsight,
we do riot belteve that the intelllgence we will get and the conti.ng.ency
. capability will be worth thi~- amount of money •. It seems clear now.
I that we should have rec<:m.ciled·the two p:r;ograms before we launched
into the SR-71. Not having (}one so. the time has co:r;ne to cut ou.r
losses..· We do not believe there is a .real distin.etion between the
I purposea or possible uses of the two aircraft. -We recommend that
~e A-lZ pt'ogram be phased out. Nor do we bel\eve that additional.
s:a ... 7l's are.a-equirEid to meet the combined requirement.
I mend that nP additional plan.ea be ,Procul."ed•
We recom ...

I 1.

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C05492938
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T 0 ·p S ~ C R E 'f'
I
If you wleh to explore the alternatives set out iri this memora,ndum,
I•· '
we suggest th.at you arrange .a meeting with Sec:i/e,tary McNamara
and Mr. Raborn~ .. (You might prefer to discuss the additional SR-71 1s
with Secretary McNamara first and th"n hold a. joint :meeting. ) ·We
I have provided copiee of thi~ memorandum to Dr. Flax (the DNRO),
Dr. Samuel Koslov (the .Director of Defense Research.and Engineer-
ing's Special Assistant t_or· Reconnaissanc:e.lt and Mr. John Bross
I (th~ Deputy Director of Central bitelligence .,.. NIPE)~ This w~U per- .
r.nit Sec:i;-etary McNamara. and Mr. Ra.born to be informed of our

I proposal in advance so that it ean be dtl!Jcussed readily.

I Attachment

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I 8

I TOP SECRET

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C05492938
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TOP. SEC:R:'ST
I Analys~a of Att~ition Requirements S~:...71

'
I
The Air Force has submitted a program change proposal which
. ~equesta approval of the purchase of 15 a~ditional SR ... 71 aircraft
( 9. in FY 6 7 and 6. in FY 68) for attrition replacement~· The
requested .TOA to support this p~rchase is:

I TOA. (in missi:or.i.s of cio~lars)

I -
196·7
-1968· 1969
-
1970
-
1971 · Total ...
..through 1971

196. 4 101. l 32.8 .· 39. 3 . 41.9.

I . . ' ' '

The stated Air Force requirement for the 15 aiTcraft ie premised

" .
411.; 5
..

on a req'\1i~emer.1.t for 25 operational (U: :E:!~) aircraft and l~s.s rate a

I o! l~ 5 aircraft per year. · The proposed procurement :would provide
fQr losses .through FY 1975. The two issues tnvolved in.the procure•·
~eut.center on the required U. E. aircraft and the.loss rate •.
I The Air Force's proje~ted. loss ratefs based on the number of
B-SSts lost per year (2. 75 t':rom an inventory of 97) ~d the number .·
I of SAC u .. 2 tra.ining loss.e1;1 per yea;r,(l. 6 frc:nn·an inventory of 35) .
. By interpolation. they fore<!aat a; loss rat~ of l,. 5 SR-7lts .per year~
be
more appli~able to a sophisticated
I The. B-58 experience appea,rs: to
· ai:rcl,:.'a.ft like the SR-_ 71 than the 9' ~i ape:rlence. The B •58 is super··
sonic and represented a m.S;jor tec}ln.ologicai step forward. while ·
the u-z is a subsonic a.tr¢raft which ~:rates at the margin of us·· ·
envelope and is tricky and dange:roqs to fly~ .

·. A straight e~ension of the ;8 ... 5~ lo~ses tn relation to

inventory would· ·
produce a. pr<:>,jeeted Slt-71 loes. rate of ._9 P.el" yea:t'. Howeve;t.", .loss
rates al-e mare properly (and histo~t.cally)base..;f on fiying hours.
'the following table· cOi'npares the Ail- Force p~.ojoction ~d a revised
p;roj~ct\o~ based on the B .. 58 atti:tuon pe:r thousand flying hours •.
(The developmen:ta1 losses pdor to 1961 b.a:ve been exclud.ed because ·
I similar losses have already·be.en metby the A ..1z program.)

I
. .

I TOP SECR.E'f "Handle via BYEMAN

· Cqn·t:rol System.

~ \
 TOP SECR;E'f·

SR ... 71 iosses projected

Revised projection based
Air Force erojec:.tion · on B•58 exEerience
·cumUl.atl.ve · Loa·s rate Cumulative · ,J..oss rate
Cumulative losses per 1, 000 .losses per. l, 000
FY Flying hrs. a/c flytns hl"s. a/c £lyins hrs.
1966 1 l 1. 00 .. .zo
1967 5 3 .60 l. .19

1968 11 5 • 46 1 • 13

1969 17 7 • 41 2 • 09

1970 Z4 8 .40 2 • 09

1971 31· 10 • 3Z 3 • 09

197Z 38 . 11 ·. • 30 3 • 09
I The second issue is whether the zs· U, E~ ·aircraft ·are needed. Baaed
.. on a 70% in ct;>mmission rate. 'z5 aircraft would provide 9 aircraft .
I deplo~ent as two theatres and 16 aircraft based in the u. S. Nine
aircraft will give each theatre the ability to conduct regularly one
8-hour mission per day (i.e •• one 16~ 000 mile sortie). This .
I capability far exceeds any requirement we have experienced to date.
The peak U .. z requirement ha~ bee~ for 27 missions pel'. month over
North Vietna.m, 7 missions per month qve_r Cuba (not a theatre
I requirement) plus sporadic: (perhaps 3 p_er month) misslons el~ewhere.
This equates to less than thirty ~ .. hour missions by SR-7l's •. Three
airci~a(t deployed to each theatre would provide a recurring capability

I far l;>eyond these past requirements and the ability to peak up to one.
8 .. bou.r mission a d~y fo~ short periods.

I The 16 a.ii-craft based in the. U.S. would provide for proficiency

training and 7 missions per month·over Cuba (tota.110 aircraft)
plus 6 aircraft on ha.rd alert for cd&is reconrtidssance of the USSR.
I The 6 would c.over the 265 targets oil SAC•s crisis indlcator list.
This latter requirement is open tQ serious question. In a major crisis

I z
TOP SECRE'F
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•.
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 C05492938
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'f'OP SECRE'f'
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,-.
•
• >

•
such as the Cuban missile c·risia. would t}ie President authori~e any
action as provocative as the launchfog of 6 supersonic aircraft to fly
ovel' the Soviet Union? It .seems too unlikely to justify maintaining
6.aircraft on continuous hard alert fot this purpose. If a crisis
ti
I
reconnaissance capability seems desirable. it can be provided by
standing doWn proficiency training whe~ a crisis begins to build.
i Thus, a U. E. of 16 SR .. 7l9s would provide a.. deployed capability
!I
I
in two theatres far in excess of past requirements~ a Cuban ove:r-
fiight capability, p.rofic:iency training. and the ability to provJ.de

'I alert aircra.ft for crisis management by standing down training

temporarily.

Alternatives:
I The above analysis offers :several co~binati~ns of. losses and require-
ments. The following table shows the number of U. E. aircraft available
I tUl.der the differentloss rate.a and the alte:rnative U. E. requirements.

Aircraft Available for U. E. U. E. Requirements

I Based on B .. 58 Based on
losses per B-!'58 losses
Based
Air Force
on Air Foree
P~rs(>nnel
Alter-
native
1000 flyin~ hrs. ~r ~b-craft loss rate
I 1966 11 . 10 10 25 16
1967 22 Zl zo 25 16

I 1968
1969
24
Z3
22
21
20
. 18
25
25
16
16
1970 23 2.0 17 25 ..
16
I 1971
1972
22
zz
20
19
15.
14
ZS
25
16
16
1973 21 18 12 25 16
I 1974
1975
zo
20
17
16
11
10.
ZS
ZS
16
16

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TOP SECRET
C05492938

-I Alternative l
T.OP SEC.R:ST

I:·
't
Do not procure any additional SR.. 7l's. This will pro'Vide sufficient .
aircraft to mef:;t a, realistic U. E •. of 16 through 1.975, regardless of·
whether losses oecur at the ;rate per flying hour or the rate per
I ait-craft experienced by th.e B ... ss.
' . . . . . . . . . .

TOA .. Aiternative J (as$U:ming lowest loss. rate}

I · (millions tif dollars) ·

I
1966

.....
-1967 ~· 12.lQ 1971 Totai

9.5 .zo. 8 27.3 23.9 81. 5

I Alternative 2

Procure 6 additional SR;.;.71 1s. This will provide sufficient aircraft

I to meet Air Force's U. E. requirement through 1972 if losses occur
at .the B·58 rate per aircraft. Even if losses reached the Air Force
rate, sufficient aircraft will be available to meet a more realistic
I U. E. of 16 th:rough 1975.

TOA ... Alternative Z (.using middle loss rate)

I . {millions of dollars)

I 1967
-1968 -
196.9

32.8
19-70

·39. 3
.!111..
41.9
.Total

199. 1
69.6 15/5

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I 'POP SECRET

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C05492938
 C05492938
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OXCART·.

:.~,· .; 1.i~,.· .· ·.· ·,.··.: OXCART Phase-Out . ,,

.. .
.; ··:~· . . :(
.. \ . ..;.

·.·1 l.
,:. 1· ·
. ·· Mr.
Nitze ·state4 that of this meeting was to review ..·
th_e status of the.SR-71; to ~ete_rmine what problems may have arisen ."· .. ·
th~ p~pose
::,·:.~~. · : from SR-.71 Category III Tests, and to recommend ·actiop.a for the
··· :::{ ·.: future on OXCARi:r: ph~sedo'rn.and SR.:.71. deployment • .

.fd .~·. Dr. Flax pape3:s ·referr~tj'.l;';i~fly to·t~~

to the.:.._..: ··.:. "·.
0

h~ had'.dist~ibuted
·~1'. ! members,. pointing out that ~hey summ·arized a.bout two-thirds of the · ·
· .r: j information availabl~ from the SR•.71 Category lII Tests (y;nioh would
-~ '.t;\ ;.:>~" i' .. be of'ficiala.y concluded abo)lt·October 1, 19.67), ~estated that, in
·•l:l
'.. ·:~.'J ·;~.: ,.: ,.:..~{..
.,.:.:«
.
general•. the SR;71.wa.s in!a satisfactory state and it was the.Judgment · ·
of op,.erational experts that· the .Air Force co.uld assume th.e North Viet
.

~
.· 1·j · ;:·:·:~. ~ ~t::":l:.:-:~:. i~
: · ~ ···.: . .' '.;;-.;:,\~·:.:,;
Nam.missions· on Decembe_r.1,; 1967 •. '.]?his judgment was also reflected
a .Toint Chiefs of ·~ta.ff statement t~at the SR-'ll is ready for. opera-
tional employment. '. · ., ..
··

~~-,~~.i!.~F/fY::~:~:?~1/.· . ·. . · .. ·. . . ., . . .. ..
::1~.i·";;.;:<·:.;;':\"::.:.:, Dr. Hornig referredt<> th~ documents-furnished to the ExCom and,
• :.i.j1 ·· ~~':; .>2: J'.~,;:.:· in p,articular, t'o data 'dealing with the vulne.rability of. botn the OXCART
·\:J. 1 ,-_.·:::~ ;>;~!: . and SR-71 ~ircraft .. He. pointedd~t that, from his assessment of the . . .,
_::1·~·1 ·.~:, ·.data, the s~-71 appeared to be two to· four· times·more vulnerab~e than . , .
··. ;j' the OXCART, based on tb.e . . listed equipments,· statistical .factors, and . ..
)-\: : · performance curves, The:i;e followed a detailed discussion on vulner~ .. ::· .:::··: .·.
~.:l;'i bility studies, cperationa:l techniques ...,and impact, · ECM systems and · ( ·. •'"·
:,.. },.
,·.:··1j.·:
...
capabili.tie~.
·future. th. e pres.ant activ.i~y.·of th. e. .~~.ne.rny, his int~n.:ion.s in he
and the outlook for future operations. : Dr. Hornig then com-
'.
-.::
t.

.,.'} par~d the payload voll.ii;nes.. ~f the aircraft and _the photographic swath '··
· ·Y· widths of their sensol-s. . He believed the' committee should not be too ·: ·
... ~{;! · .: hasty in reaching a decision to d~·ploy the· s:R.-71 •. ,: • . ·, "· ;.
'1~~
,. .:~ .··
. DX'. Fiax stated that ·a simpl~:compari~on of sensor swath widths : . ·
not, in his view. a 'Va.lid W'ay--to compar.e the mission c;:overage . . . . .
:·.,<L~l, . ... capabilities.of the aircraft .and that· a factor of tv10 invulnerability .. · ... . ,,
·~ •1J ; which might be assumed on this· basis did not reflect 'mission require- .
:_ Vi~ , : ·: m.ents .in any event,· since complete area coverage ~t North .Yi~t Nam ..':. :'
_, : .f . ::: was not being sought or a~h1eved; . . . ,\·:. '. ''. . .. . .
:.,.;(! .;,::S · · ..... ;, ··· ' · .· ...· • . ,.
•;;_"· .• ' .. •~ • . :- ' ~ ; ;:'. : • • .-<-· . .-"' . • ' . ••.
· :''·~ outlined tne.'iollowing options.for ·consideration:
I{; .(t)"clelay 'Nitze
.. 1Mr.·
tp.a transition ,(rqn;i OXC,ART to:th.e'.SR'~7.1•:..C2) ~ecommend. a

·;~ oxcART~· i:'.Ji~;·0~~:~;;~~~i~·1[':'. <· ··: .f... . ·.;~~l1t"~~~'l~f;~f .EL .·~YE:

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 C05492938
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OXCART· : : ·'
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. .. . .~·

t·1·~:; ...
F '.4 "· .
! . ::::! .. · .' ... / · . .

r r I reversal of the December 1966 decision,· or (3) adhere to that decision.

. '. : ,: The discussion turned to the :Hrst .. option. Asked the desirability of
( .,:.·(\.... :.~!·,=>this option, Dr. Flax stated.that if there were no economic restraints
':
•.·. \
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r,r .ti·.·. ,' .:..·:./.•. ,., ··:

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: .:!:.: .... · •
:,. :; '.
whatev·e.r he wourd prefer to retain th~ total fo~ce. H~w.ever, economic
':~;: l const:ra1:its,.:were ver~ real and he beh~:ed .a fa.rm dec1s1on w_as called
~ fo~ at this. time. A ~ix-months': d~lay, :m 11?-ak1_ng the tra~sitlon, hi:; .
·:· po1nted out, could coat $32. 0 .m1ll:!.on. A quest:i.on was ra.1sed as to the

.· SF :... o \;...
!,I' ~: ~ ~ cost of :reclaim~ng O'.X;?A~T.: a,.il·.craft frqm sto:age,. if required. 11 ....
q · •~ :. i.' . . ~ : I . !stated that th+s. w~uld· involve approximately· $300 to $50~
I; /j;· ·~ :... : thousand pex- aircraft,· if done within the first year. I jalso

1
!" '-~.:j ,:. l . ': ~ '.<.pointed ou~ th.at the pres~nt .financial plan provid~.s some. OXCART over- ·. ,. :·;
I :..;1,. · ....; • : lap by providing for contmuea operation at Area 51 during December.
><: •. ·. . ; .
l~ ·\;··· 0 ~!
'"I :• :.
. " '· •

I l.f'l .. Mr. Nitze observed that the additional $32. 0 million required for
1·1·.:1 · · ··: : a delay in transit.ion from. the OXCART to the SR-71 was extremely
t .··!· .. ; critical in today 1 s bu<;lgetaryenvironment. Dr. Hornig favored.a delay

rl
t· ·
1:
j. ;., j
·.• '· ;.,... of six months. Dr.... Foster·agreed with the concept of delay but recom-
. ' : ; :::... mended a shorter period::. somewhere betwee~ three and six months.
..... ·: .'.~ .· ·. Mr. Hoffman stated that tl~e- origirial decisio.n of last December should
. ·.:
-··

1 ; i _'::-1:.. be followed unchanged. ·Mr., Helms favqred a delay. Dr. Flax agreed
r1· :il! ',·:•• ::.::;:(.:. that a delay would provide"'a highe.r. degree of confidence ,in assuring .
. , :· .: :; ;:·,c. :· continued operational effectiveness in the face of possible improvement
1 1
v· '·<l · · ,·"':;':':· · · of North Viet Namese defens'es, ,which .were just no:w beginning to be
I'.'!,,.'~.i~.·.· ·. :,, '· · brought to bear on the OXCART. aircraft. 'The cost of this insuran9e ··
.
t ... ,,
I would of course be related to the lengt,h of delay in phase-out. He
i .; ;·, ·: . > ~L believed that the SR-71 deployment should not be .held u~til the very
f..·:1'';:~ . ,i' , last qay of any· agreed-to ~elay period; if a three-~onth ·4elay were
l. ' .l · · " . . !.;;".·"·recommended, the SR"'.'71·'deployment should be. scheduled for mid-
l ".~ .: ·.·:·. ".:,:.':-.,-.'February1968. · 1'· .· · .·· · •· ;:~-:- ·
t' ~· :~ .: .'· ;.•.·
f:·lt.~ .\.~:?:L'.~:~~ Mr. Nitze asked for a.memora11dum spelling out (1) what the deci- :
! . m~a . .:./.·.'/.,:·} . 'sion fo:r« a three;..month delay wo~ld d<? for the program., (2) the associ-

J'lr'.
'~~ .
>'·'.: ·:;.~ .~' . ated costs and (3) what is intended for the interim. Dr. Flax was asked
'~l . :· .,"'.>\;\~ t~ prepar~ ·s.ucp. a pape.:i;:. · ~~· Nitz~ stat~~ that he wou_ld confer with the
~.:·:;:.~
. '.
:,. :v.:: · Sec':etary of pe!:~se",?.n,t~is mi::~t~I_".~~~1!- in the follow1~g we~k.

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· .·}IBMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRE'.rARY OF DEFENSE t'
SUBJECT: OXCART Phnse Down Extension and Related Slt-71 Considerations f
t
On December 23, 1966, the President directed the phase out of. Project tf
·OXCART by Januar.r 1, 1968., primarily since the SR-71 was schedu1ed to be !'
o:perationa.lly ready before that :time, and a· speci8.J. study indicated that l
. the total numbers or SR-71/A-12 aircraft could be reduced without degradation f
to mission requi:rements. l·

·On Yiay 16, 1967, approval·was given to deploy three of the OXCART A-l2 1 s f
to ii:adenD. to·perform a surveillancel]lission over North Vietnam. to guard f
againGt a SUl'prise introduction or Soviet sur£ace-toMsurface missiles in thi~ ./
area. There h~s been no evidence of surface-to-surface missiles in North ./·.·.·.·
Vietnam but the simu1ts.neous coverage of large areas 0£ Vietnam by the A-12
has been very useflll to U.S. commanders in the field. · ~ '

On September 19, 1967, and upon recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of ·\

. s~atf, it was reaf~ir::;;.ed that Project OXCA?.? should be phased out in December \
1967 a.~d that the Strategic Air Cott.m.and should be prepared to conduct the .
North Vietnam overflight mission on December 1, 1967, operating out of
Kadena Air Base. ·

Srt-71 operationaitesting is now complete and 'While final reports have t

not hee.n subl::d.tted, sufficient data are available to arrive at an evaluation f
of the readiness of the SR-71 to take over the North Vietnam overfly missiono f,
.Although it is the DOD view that the SR-71 is now essentially ready to take T
over t.lie OXCART mission at Kadena, the view was generally expressed at the !·
Sa~te~ber 29 meeting of the ExCom that the OXCART/BLACK SHIELD operations J'
sh~Uld be extended for three months to a.110\.r better assessment of vulnera- f.
bility of the aircraft to the SA-2 and •-:;he relative adequacy of .the installed f
ECit. O:-l the OXCART and the SR-7+ in the light of operational G"-"-perience. At f
the pres!mt ·~ime there is no pertinent ~xperionco since no SA-2 ho.s success- f: ·
fully tracked tho OZ.CART and,. in fa.ct, only on on0 rocont mi.:::;oion WD.O o.n
e:.ttor:ipt noted. It.war.; consitlored that in tho liaht of vulnerability consid-
r
· i-
erations, further expooure of tho OXCART ovor tho hostilo onvironmont dui·ing ~-
tile 0xtcndcd period wou1d provide more experionco in coping with .an impl'oving f.
, defcnzive environment. It would appoo.r p).'Udent to clorive this lnfo:nM:t.ion f;
£ror.i a vehicle Yhich ia tU.reo.dy in position· nnd will 'De phased out w:i th .tho ·• ·. f-.·
e~ploy.ment 0£ the SR-719 .<\.dditiona.lly.the_ OXCAR~ has.two ECM devicos·againat

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1\.';e S~-2,
whil? the inieriin SR-7~ .}i~ieni
includes only one. ''hero io n
':.·'. ,',co;1~i?7::.·~ble. di;e:i.-gcnco of o:p.in:i.on as to t.h~ nbsolutc vnluos of SA-2 kill
·. r.
t . -....
r
:.\.I j'.lro::w.o.ll:i:liy :i..n vho fnce of e:.i.the)~ or both (l • vkos, since the cffcct:l voncc::> f"·' '·'
•.. -:of the SA-2 in the f'Ace of ECM d0per1ds on o. n.uin.b0:r.- of: undotorminod factoro t '.
·:.'., ; ·: facluding th~ skill, training 1 and experience of the. SA-2 crew. However I:
~· '

,:··1·' L.ests, simulations, and analyses, which give the SA-2 the benefit of doubt I.
~:
;: . indicate rele:tivcly small probabilities o-J:. kill against either the OXCART ' t
:•' . ,'",· o:::- the SR-71 ns long as the ECM techniques used rolT'..ain viable (i.e. net,
. ' - ' . - 7
: 0. countorod by spe<::ific ECM or techniques designed against thesG ECH xnea..Gu:res) .. ·· I
.;I: · Since 'tho E:x:Con1 meeting, a plan hu.s been developed :\thich would provide
:, ·.:·.the neccss~ll."Y degree of overlap o:nd insuxan<:e :i:"aquired to :protect ago.inst ·
.
i
f
r

t;,.

, .., the possi.bility that some prob.le.m.would prevent <lcploymEint. or .suc.cessful i:·
· · o'Oerntion 0£ the SR-71 1'rom. Ke.dena in the BL.fl.CK SHIELD role. ·Thie ·assumes r·.
. . that other conifingency situations .. (particularly Cuba} wili be covered 'rP.; !·
~' '

;'ih. other than OXCART. Basically, the pla:i.;, would be. to; · ·• · · f
'I f
Roto.:l.n ·tho throo oporo.tionnl. OXCART o.:l.-x-cra.f.t at Ko.dena. until ro-
1. "
doploymlml~ 'Lo Aro11 51 by Fob:ru14ry l, l9M, · E
r
"
:'1· : 2. R..1to.in two operationa.l OXCAR'r at J1:r00. 51 a.s bdck-up fo:r tho f·
·BLACK SHIELD mission. ~ '

•t'~·
"I 3. Upon redeployment from. Kadena, continue 'to fly the then five
.· . operational aircraft at krea 51 thru March .31 1968 to ma.intain proficiency,
1
then mothball all five starting in A:pri~ 1.968.
·T
/
r
-.1;. ail-era.ft
4. Mothball the one remaining test aircra.tt and ,on.e of the operatione.l ) ;~ f"':'::·r
in J a.""'l~
1968, as previously plan.."lad ... 'MQthba.ll the trainer .air- · { ...o: j

I
craft in January or Februa.:cy 1968.
5. The Strategic .Air Command would. deploy three SR-71 ail'craf't ·to
:;:,. Kadena, and be ready to assume the BLACK SHl~D operations by Febru.a:ry 15,
·· . · . · L.

r:
f
r~·.
•
'
.1. 1968: .. .. ~,
l ...
. . ..·.' :·. ·. The ma.x.imum. added cost to the NRP for this OXCART extension should be
$9:1 mllion ($2.7 million less "~ban if all eight current OXCART aircraft f
.
1 vere continued thru 1'18.rch) o Detailed implementation considerations will t,·
l. .·
· attempt to reduce this cost. The approp:riate funding will initially be
; :· .. cove::-~C. from a present fu.'ld reservatio~ ~ic1~~ ~~..? oi ~~;8 !1111li~n inte~~ed
".::I·· .··-.,o finance mothballing of the current ·. .t: wo - .s .nave een mo" -
f
t
· balled. to date), equipl)lent teard.o\.rn and movement, closing of Area 51, and f
related phaseout costs. Eitcept :to:c the costs of mothballing three aircx-ai't 1

:·I· · in je.,,.-i.;J.a:ry/February 1968, these phaseout costs :will now be dei'err.ed until . .
the J..pril-June 196.8 time period,.. l?el'iodic reassessment of the NRP total · ·
· · FY. 1968 fur.d reouirementa \4ill be made to identify whether there is an
{
{·
f

If
·overall i'und. deficiency and, if ao, ·:possible sowces ot i'u.'lding. ·

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Ji 1 - DDS&.T File Director'. f:
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fC054 92 938
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Ir-·
I
.TOP SECRET

I
NATIONAL RECONNAtSsANCE
· . Washirigtoni ri •.C. > .OFFICE!
.·
i OffiCe· of the Director . March 7, 1968
11
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SEC.RETA.RY .OF DEFENSE
I SUBJECT: Study of.Options for .Continuing Operation of the .
OXCART Aircraft·in Fiscal Yeai.",1969
I
,,: .·
In accordance with your request, a study of. th~ feasibUity and
cost of continuing op~t"ation of the OXCART ·aircrait bey0nd the
cur:rently programmed ph8.$eol.1t date of J:une 30, 1968 has been. .
completed .. Although a number o£ alternatives have been studied. .
I beli~ve the foliowing options are slgnl!icari.t for your constderatiOn: .
I · ·option l. The O:X:CART a.ll'craft would b~ trall:sferred
to the. Strategic«Air Commar#.d (SAC) by October 31. 1968~ ·
I SAC operation o! seven of these a~~craft (six operationally·
co!U,igured plus one trainer) at current l:'ate1 would begfo .

·I. by ab.out Janµa.:i:y l. 1969, with substitµ.tion of Air Force for

contractor aupport wherever poss,t.ble •• T~e eighth (teiJt)
aircraft would be sent to Palmdale for continujng c.ontractor
test operation. . ·
I , Option 2. The OXCAl.tT aircl"aft would be ·~ra:Qsferred .
·to SAC a~:in Option land the SAC SR•71 invento:ry would be
I reduced by eight SR":"7l's to be· stored at Palmdale, starting .
September 1, 1968. Flybig at current OXCART rates woUld .
begin by Novem.ber 1, 1968.. ·
I Optfon· 3.·:. The OXCART. aircraft .would be reta,ined

I under CIA operathmal control and·managemerit .. Area 51

·would be. closed and aircraft and Qth~r program assets would•
be transferred from Area 51 to'Beale Air Force Base by · ·

I Octobe·r 31. 1968. · Sul;)stltution 0£ some Air For·c:e maintenance

and o~her support for· contractor support is 8,ssum~d. Pr.es~nt .
. OXCART flying :rates would be res.Urned.by January l, 1969.. .

I BYE 12721-6$ .
. OXCART
~,
I Handle via
BYEMAN
·Con~rol ·Systern.
.. T 0 P . S C RE. T

I
 TOP. _SECRET

Option 4. · Current OXCART operations would be continued

at Area 51.. Thit;i is a bas.e line option against whkh the costs
of qther options rnay be me~sureci.

The coats of the options studled were de;rived for .FY 1968 and
1969 on the basis ·of the best currently avai.lable data. Th6)ae costs
were necessarily estimates, since details .of operating.·arrangements
and contractor support woµld ·need tO be worked out on the basis of
more complete planning for implementation of any of these options.
One factor affecting costs of Qptions othe:r than Option 4 {continuing
C!A operation at Area. 51) was the need for additional facilities at ·
·Beale Air Force Base,. including ah·craft shelters, hangars, .
t·railers and headquarters building.. For purposes of cost estimation~
it was assumed that the demountable units at Area 51 c::o~d be moved ·
to Beale Air Force Base and costs were included· for site preparation.

I £oundations and utilities required to accommodate these bµildin.gs.

On-base housing for additional military pereonn.el at Beale would.also
pose a problem in the long run, but this could not be resolved initially
1· in any event on the schedules proposed for the phaseover options. ·
Housing trailers from Area 51 could help to alleviate this sit"tiation for
·. either military or contractor personnel, a.nd· it was assumed these
.
I '
tra.iiers would be made ava.ilable.

The costs of the opthms are as follows:

l Additional
·FY °196.8
'To~l
FY 1969

I Option
Option
1
2
$2.789,000
a.s19,ooo
$62, 160,000
40,960.000
Option 3 2,789,000 72,240.000
I Option 4 2,789,000 1z.ooo.noo
These costs include c.onsidera.tion. of NRP costs for operation of tb,e
1: OXCART by the CIA, Ail" Force costs for operation .of the OXCART
{a.a approp:riate in ea.ch option), CtA and Air Force direct support
cQsts for each option. costs of closeout of A:rea 51 for Options l, Z
1- and 3, and costs of construction (including $5, 400, 000 for additional

,:. military housing) at Beale Air 'Force. Base fQr. Options l and l. ·Tho
cost for closeout· of Area 51 will be incurred as an NRP cost in any

I TOP SECRET Rann\e v\a BYEMAN

Ccmtrni ·S~stem
.I
 C05492938
1.
TOP SECRE'f
I I

event in FY 1969 under the current plan for phaseout of the OXCART.
II progr•m: after June 30, 1968. The OXCART a11sociated costs bi
Option 3 (SAC operation of the OXCART offset by remc;>Val of eight
SR.-71 1 s from: the inventory) ha.ve. been reduced by $Z0 1 900, 000 to

'11•
I
I
account for decreased SR-71 program cost. A more detailed break ..
down of costs is given in the attached Table 1. It should be noted
that the FY 1969 costs for closing Area 51 and for new construction
at Baal~ Air Force Base are "one-time" costs(ho~ever. costs for
year~ subsequent to FY .1969 cannot be derived by subtracting the~e
I
· one-tim.e costs from the total$. sinte Options 1. 2 and 3 involve cur•
ll
I
. tailn1.ent of OXCART operations to varying degrees during the perfod .
· . June 30, 1968 to January 1, 1969~
'
II
!
ln o:rder to pl'~vide comparative costs for these options corre-
sponding to a full year of operation without one .. time costs included,

l-1
I .
an estimate for FY 1970 costs is included in the attached Table IL
In summary. the FY 1970 costs are- estimated to be as foUows:

Opt~on 1 $57.600.000
I Option 2
Option 3
$39,800,000
$64,600,000
Option 4·. $67,000.000
I . The Air Force has reviewed the feasibility of options calling
for.operation of the OX.CART aircraft by SAC, from the standpoint
I of tr~ining, maintenance, :£acUities at Beale Air Force Base. and
contractor support and has cc;tncluded ~hat the options and sch~dules
described above a.re feasible. However, there are substantial dif ..
I . ferences in the configurations of the OXCART and SR-71 air·craft in
· the areas of cockpit. instr.uments. ser.iSOJ:'S. engines and airf l'ame.
If commonality in subsystems were to be sought l)etween the two
I aircraft, c.onsiderable expendltu:re of time and money would be re~ ·
· quired for modification. Therefore, 'the options considered contem~
plated only the operation of the OXCART aircra.ft in their present ·
I configurations. This would require formation .of specialized uniti:J
·within SAC capable of maintaining and operating the OXCART aircraft
as is. Conversion of as much of the roal.ntenance from contractor to
I · military personnel will require su]:>stantial improvements iil the·

3
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wo:e SECRET
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 C05492938
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TOP SECRET

· teehnlca.l data available· for the OXCA.RT aircraft; contlnuatton of

I essentially the current level of contractor maint.enanc~ and overhaul·
services would be required until the :;>AC unit were manned and

:I trained. However, because of the small number of OXcART ab.--

craft and their special subsy~te:ms. the continuing level of contractor
support would continue to be
greater than th.at utilized for the sa . . 11..
.

These fa.cto,rs were taken into account in estimating optlo~ costs.

1• . . '. .

Continuation of tbe OXCART program lnto FY 1969 under any

.

of "the options <liscuiased herein wtll ~ot only require f>..clditlonal

.

II
i
procurement 0£ spare$, AGE and·other equipment in the OXCART
program, but will impact the S~· 71 program. since up. to $5M of"
such items eommon to the S.R... 71 and OXCART p~ograrns have nQt
11 been procured for the s.a... 71 in FY 1968, on the assumption that
OX.CART assets would becmne available in FY 1969. How.ever. adoption
.of any of the options I.or the .continued opeJ"a.tion of the OXCART will call
I for adjustments of.the.alloca.tlon 0£ assets and fund reimbursement .be-
tween the OXCART aµd SR.. 71 progr~ma. Our current- asses(lm.ent indi-
cates ~at if such transfers of assets and outstanding reimbursement.
I liabilities be.tween prQgram.e are made, the net costs for FY 1968
and .FY 1969 for any of the options may .be reduced by between $5 mil ..

I lion and $10 million. ·

Se~urity would require special attention under all of the options

calling for transfer of th.a OXCART ai;oera:ft to Beale Air .Force Base,,
I The :i;nost difficult problems would a.·t-lse in connection wtth Option 3,
in which the ClA would continue to ope!'ate the aircraft at Beale Air
Force Base. This option hes not been reviewed with the CIA. and if
I implemented. might require additional butld{ngs. and other facilitt"es
a.t Beale Air Force Base, not included in the pre$ent cost estimates.
in the interest Qf maintaining security eeparation b.etween the OXCART
I and the _SR .... 71 program.sat Beale Air F(>:rce Base. Options 1 to 3 •.
howeve:r. all cali for development of a·ptausible e:n.planatlon for the
surfacing of th~se addl:tional aircraft. differing in configuratfon from
I either the YF .. 12A or the SR.. 71. These security problems have not
been addressed in· the eurrent study but would require detailed attention
.if implementation of any of Opti~s 1 through 3 were contemplated.
I (Signed)
.

Ale;ic:ander H. Flax
I . 2 A tta.chments
Director

I T 0 P SEC R-8 T

I
.c~49~8- - - - ·• - - - - - - - • - -
--
TOP SECRET TABLE I
Estimat~d Costs of OXCART Program Options (thousands)·

Option l . Option 2. Option 3 Option 4

a/ a/ a/
FY 68- FY 69 FY 68- FY 69 FY 68- FY 69 FY 68~_/ FY 69
OXCART Program
Operating Cost:

Air Force Funds $2.6,900 $41, 900

NRP ~ds $2.,789 9.800 $2.789 6,000 $2..789 $44,900 $2.,789 $62., 100

Air Force Support 7. 72.0 30 4,540 .,. 5,300 3,400

: :CIA Support
. - . b/
2,2.00 - 1,600 6,500 6,500

Closing of Area 51..,..

(NRP Funds) 7,900 7;900 7,900

Constructicn at
Be.tle AFB =.! 7, 640 7.640

TOTAL $2,789 $62.,160 $2..819 $61;940 $2.,789 $72.. 2.40 $2., 789 . $72.. 000

Reduction in SR- 71
Program Cost (2.0; 980)

NET TOTAL $2.. 789 $62, 160 $2., 819 $40.960 $2.,789 $72 •. 2.40 $2.,789 $72..000

a/· FY 1968 costs in addition to programmed costs to contin11e OXCART operations to June 30, 1968.

£! Thes~ closeout costs would be incurred in. FY 69 irl1t.ny event under the current plan fat· ·
phaseout after June 30, 1968. ·

cl Construction estimates incli:i.de $2., 2.40 for shop and mission support building.a ·and $5, 400 for
additfonal military housing at Beale AFB. . . Hanrlle vi~ BYrnAN
 C05492938
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I BY .E:-6441-68

18April1968
11
I MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Nttze

II SUBJECT:
Dr .. Ho:t<nig

Coiiside:rati.on~ Affecting OXCA.RT

!1
I REFERENCE:
Program Phaa~out

B YE-12948 ... 68 ·

II . .
l. · I have e:xa.mined the :£our .options for eontinuing. the
OXCART program. :which are discussed in referent memorandum. and
.1 feel it appropriate to eX:press some of my initial rP.aetions prior to.
the EXCOM meeting sche.duled :£or.23 .April 1968. ·

I I note that one option, the second,· involves storage of some

2.
of the SR;,. 71 fleet.t find it difficult to make a judgment on the

I overall size of the SR-71 fleet. · From the vieWpolnt of national intel·
ligence alone. however. we ~ve £o:r eeveral years considered that
requirements could be sa.ti,efied with six to eight operational aircraft
the
I of OXCAR.T.:.s:a... 71 type. 1 know that the SR·71 was designed to
satisfy other requirements whlch are of a purely military natU.t"et
but if in fact the fleet is larger than is :required for these military

I m.is.sions. I see no reason why the storage of eight SR ... 7l's cannot
be effected with the resu.lta.n.t projected savings in all of the 9ptions
li.st~d.

I 3. As to .the specific C:ost figures quoted for the various options.

I do not understand the ria.ti.onale involved in &+-riving at ·some of the·

I ·variations. For example. it is indicated that even if CtA retains

responsi'J:>Uity for ·the OXcART.Program and eontlnue_s tomaintain
the eur1'ent quick .. reaction capability. the cost could be substantially

I reduc(3d by.mo'vi:ng from an existing established operational base to

Beale Air Force Base. My Staff has examined thia question and feels.
that the cost would in fact significantly increa1'e for at least the first

I
Handle vla BY~MAN
I TOP SECRE1°'1'·
Control$ System only1.

I
C05492938
ii
Ir TOP SECRET

I11
,.
year or two. and at nC> time would they expect the operating
costiJ to be lower than those projected for Area 51. I do not
know the bas.is o~ the cost ·eatlmates !or SACoperatbig the
OXCART, but wt;.believe that with the· major emphasis given
I to efficiency in the last couple of years we have brought the
~xp~nditure$ for this Program ·to a vEfry nea.rly bare mi.nirnuni.
I have serious .doubts, therefore. t~t others r;:o'11.d operate_ the
I exis.ting OXCART fleet at .a lower cost than that we projected for·
FY 1969. Our latest estb:nates for ru:aintaini.ng th.e OXCART fleet
at Area 51 under CIA control is $l>8. 8 mlllion~
I 4. Option. 3, .which would move. th~· OXCART fleet to. Beale

I Air Foree B;;t.se but continue under CIA management. I consider

unacceptable from the viewpoint Of $eCU:t'ity. lf there iS reason
to continue the Program. under CIA management at a.11, it should
a
I be retained as truly civilian program; I do not believe· that cover
can be maintained by mixing the fleet with a. clea.:...iy ...tdentified
military unit.

I 5. Aside. from the eosts as projected in the four options. I

consider that ·the key question is the desirability of maintaining a

I covert civilian capability with all. advanced alrcra,ft syat.em and b<?·
lieve that the :requirement for this continues. In thi~ connection.
I ha.ve reviewed the history of the U .. z and OXCART overflight ex:..

I perlence from 1956 to the preeient. This reeo:t:"d shows that the
government has consistently chosen to exercise a civilian ovel'fiight
option. particularly in pPe-criais periods in such a.reae as Cuba and

I the Middle Ea.st or in Southeast Asia before our military build up

there in 1965. With the :tnan,y cur.rent oi' po~ential trouble spots
aro~d the world today it seems to me probable that we will face

I situations in the future where the option of a civilian capability

would indeed be ex.ercised if available. ·

I 6. I c0ntinue to belieye that tb.e OXCART represents a better

vehicl~ for general reconnaissance purpo!Se than the SR-71. par ..
ticularly because o:f what I believe t.o be. its superior ciunera sys ..
I tern. 1 would note, moreover. that in the one•year period since
deployment of the OXCART it has successfully completed tw.enty ....
eight overflights of denied a.reas, a~d t 'believe \Ve all agree has

TOP SECRET Ran~lQ vl~ n~DA~N

Contrni System
C05492938
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TOP
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·.. . .·.. . ..

demonstrated an ~usually high reliability-and has produced .valuable

I _·. intelligence. I am convlnc.•d that we should continue· the Program
a
. a.nd see no merit to changing from proven management system .
which in fact; represents a uniq_uf;joint CtA/Air F!Jrce undertaking ..
I I recommend that we select Option 4 and maintain the OXCART fleet
at Area 51 under CIA management. In this connection I believe th&t

I A:rea. 51 rep:resents a useful intelligence resource apart from: its use

in connection with the OXCART. We would, of course:, continue to
stress economy and ·believe that we_ ca);l.operate for an annual cost .
I somewhat below tha.t.projecte_d in. the NRO memorandum..

. (Signed)_ .
Richard· $elms
Director·

I
I . c~: Dr.· Flax .

I
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·t

·T 0 P S J.t. C P.. _;i: T

" .
C05492938
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I i

I TAlU.~:S II

FY 1970 Estimated Costs o~ OXCART Program Options.

I (thousands)

I Option i · Option 2 Option . 3 Option 4 ·

OXCART Program

I Operating Cost:

$47,600
Air Force Funds $54.800 $ $
I NRP Funds .... so.100 57.100

I Ai r Foree· Support 10• 000 10,000 7,400

6,500
3.400.

6,500
ClA Supp.Ort
I
TOTAL . $57.600 $64,800 $64,600 $67, 000

I Reduction in SR.. 71
· Program Cost (25, 000)

I
NET TOTAL $5.7,600 $39,.800 $64,600 $67,000
I
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I TOP SECRET

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 TOP SECRET BY EM AN
HEXAGON I I GAMBIT
OXCART/TAGBOARD

ExCom-M-14

NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Minutes of Me'eting Held April 29, 1968
Off ice of Deputy Secretary of Defense
Room 3E 928) The .Pentagon
3:30 p.m. - 4:50 p.m.

Members Present
Mr. Paul H. Nitze. Deputy Secretary of Defense .,
Mr. Richard Helms Director of Central Intelligence
Dr. Donald F. Hornig Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology ·

Others Present
Dr. Alexander H. Flax Director, National ·Reconnaissance
I Mr. James Q. Reber
Off ic~, Ex Officio
Secretary, NRP Executive Committee
Ex Of :f icio
.·I. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. DDR&E
Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor DDC!

.
I
, .....
Mr. Carl E. Duckett ·
Mr. John A. Bross
Dr. Donald Stein.inger
Mr, Fred S. Hoffman
Mr. C. William Fischer
CIA
Deputy· to the DCI
PSAC Staff
Assistant Director, :SOB
BOB
; .

1··.· Col. Franlt W. Hartley, Jr.

Col. Robert G. Welch
Director, NRO Program D
NRO Program D
Col. Bernard L. Bailey >NRO Program D
Col. Paul E. Werthman . NRO Staff
I·...
This meeting of the NRP Executive Committee was ·
I called specifically to ·review the situation and.develop-
ments since the deployment of the ~R-71 to Kadena where

I .·.
 OO•M I lliil
C05492938
1·· TOP SECRET BYEMAN
I 50Xl, E.0.13526 HEXAGON I . I GAMBIT
....
. OXCART/TAGBOARD
.
I ExCom-M..:.14

:I. the OXCART.has been on standby pending its planned return

to the United States and phaseout by June 30, 1968, and
to consider issues which might affect that planned phaseout.
I Operational Briefing on SR-71

.·1· Dr. Flax requested Colonel Hartley, Director of NRO

Program D, to brief. the Executive Committee on the deploy-
ment and operational status of the SR-71.
1·.··· Colonel Hartley reported on the SR-71· overseas
deployment which was cqncluded without incident. The

.,
total complement of personnel deployed is approximately
I· 400. To date there have been six operational missions
flown, totaling about 29 hours. Of these missions there
were thre'e aborts·, one ground and two air. The former
was caused by malfunction of the Astroinertial Naviga t:j.on ...
System (ANS) and the latter aborts were because of genera-
tor difficulties. The ground abort was flown one hour
I lnter and Mission S 010 which was an air abort had already
completed approximately one half of its mission. To date
there has been no requirement to use the'OXCART backup.
1· Of the six missions flown, the :film has been received
in the National Ph.otographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)
and a technical evaluation made on four. Two missions,
I S 010 and S 011, were made on April 28 and 29 but the pro-.
duct had not yet been received in Washington.

1· Colonel Hartley pointed out that the Aircraft in

Commission ·rate was 76. 9 percent which slightly excee'ds
the nnticipateq rate. He also indicated that the rate · .
I.· in Non-Operational Ready Supply (NOR.S) · 9f l. l percent i·s .
lwt t:o.1.· than· the avern.ge NORS rate :for the F-4. Century
Series, and B-66 aircraft in Southeast Asia.
·

1:·· Colonel Hnrtloy then reviewed for the members the

.c1·o::;s section of the· aircrl.\ft sh.owing the position of the
operational objective crunera, the technical objective
1.· cameru, the electronic c·ountermeasures gear; and the side-
looking radar equipment, indicating possible alternate
installations of the electromagnetic radiation recorder
system and tlle ECM. ·
I
·.I· OXCART/TAGBOARD
HEXAGON I I
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· iotA~Dl.lYl4 CO•lAO~NO BYE-13013-§8.

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I Colonel Hartley reviewed the routes of three of the

missions--S 002, S 007, an.d S 008. In each these cases of
I the reports showed tracking by the North Vietnamese.
However, there were no SAM firings and accordingly no ECM
response. I;n the case of S 007 there was virtually
DO porcont cloud cover. The first mission, s 002 1 woN
I evaluated by· NPIC technically as being from fair to poor;
and in the case of the best mission to date, S 008, it "
was rated as f~om fair to good. In the case of S 007
I there was side-looking radar photography acquired, samples
of which Colonel Hartley showed along with photographic
displays selected from the other missions •
.I In conclusion Colonel Hartley· reported that the
Deputy Director for Reconnaissance, JCS, has stated that,

-I weather permitting, it appears that the SR-71 can satisfy

and be responsive to.the national objectives.

Consideration of OXCART
·I The discussion of the Executive Committee centered
upon the options which ha.d been outlined with. costs in
.·1 the memorandum which. the DNRO ha.d prepared for tlle Deputy
Secretary of Defense on. March 7 (BYE-12721-68) and which
had subsequently been distributed to the ExCom as an

I attachment to BYE-12948-68.
The following summarizes the substance of the Execu- ·:
·,1 tive Committee' ·s discussion:

a. The differences in vulnerability of

the SR-71 and the OXCART a.s Dr. Flax pointed
.1. out are probably not significant a.l though the
formal simulation and analysis showed the
SR-71 ECM to give on.e·third the vulnerability
;I of the OXCART. However, Dr. Flax did not feel

.,, that the analyses and simulations could be

expected to give precise answers applicable to
the·operational situation.

b. The wider camera swath width of the .·

OXCART does provide a capability for coverage
·.I of SAM protected targets from outside the SAM

I · - OXCART/TAGBOARD
HEXAGON I I GAMBIT
~---E----~OHtAO••O BYE-13013-68 ':·

I
. ,
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ExCom-M•l4
BYEMAN

.1 ronge os indicated by an exh~bit p~eseneea by

Mr. Duckett. The.SR-7i, because of its narrower
1· swath width, would, if it covcired the same
targets, expose itself more to SAM attack.
Dr. ·Flax nnd Dr. ·Foster pointed out that this
mode of operation could only be us~d if the
I locations of occupied SAM sites were known and
if the other side did not react by relocating
the SAMs to counter the tactic. Except for
I .this point, however, the SR-71 could, by flying
more mission.s at some small cost, obtain the
target coverage required. A redesign of the
·1
,
SR-71 camera to obtain a wi<;l-e.r swath width
would be a matter of a year:and a half in time •
......
c. Option 4, which is the continuation
.._.·:.' of current OXCART operations at Area 51, and
. .. "' which the DCI preferred, would cost about .

,
$10 million more for FY 1969 than Option l
I.: which provides for the transfer of OXCART to
SAC at Beale AFB:
....
d. Option 4 would cost about $30 million
more than Option 2 which proyided for the trans-
fer of the OXCART to SAC and reduction of eight
·1 . in the SAC SR-71 inventory •
. e. Option 3, which provided for the
·1.:: .·· OXCART 1 s remaining under CIA management but
located at Beale AFB and which·would cost
approximately the same as Option 4, was·
unacceptable to Mr. Helms from a security

,.
I ...
point of view.
f. Dr. Flax stated that under any
"extension" option FY 1969 costs could be
reduced by such policies as limiting the
number of aircraft flying, reducing R&D and
improvement programs, or reducing flying hours
I and that if an extension were determined then
careful consideration should be given to logi-
cal approaches for lower costs.

,
I:
.. OXCART/TAGBOARD
HEXAGON I I GAMBIT
.
I 50Xl, E.0.13526 I
· co>1m~~o BYE-13013-68
· ·
. ..
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 C05492938
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1 ··
·. , ..
OXCART/TAGBOARD

ExCom-M-14
IH· g. . It was recognized that the TAGBOARD
had not yet reached operational status and
1·· could not it present be considered a practica-
ble alternative to the OXCART to accon'iplisl1
·1 · · · . -·
covert missions. Furthermore, dependinw· on
the number of missions required to accomplish
a given assignment, it could be considerably
....- .

..,..... more .expensive .

I h. In response to a query from Mr. Nitze

as to whether satellite reconnaissance could

1·· not be a substitute for aircraft reconnaissance,

Dr. Flax mentioned a study he had made of
South China in which, to some extent by fortui-
·

tous circumstances, the GAMBIT had obtained the "\.

1· most target coverage of the various photographic ·
reconnaissance systems during the winter months
when there was a high expectation of cloud cover
in that area. However, he emphasized that the ·
I lack of responsiveness of satellite photography
. :.•. makes it an unlikely prospect to accomplish the
kind of tasks which the OXCART and SR-71 could
.
I ·. ~ .. accomplish with particular regard to quick reac-
tion, frequency of coveraie, and responsiveness
to weather opportunities. ·
1· ' Mr. Helms stated that after giving the matter a great
deal of thought he felt that the question of the OXCART
really :hinged on whether·it makes a difference to the
President if indeed a reconnaissance aircraft comes down
i.n hostile territory'. The aircraft is so advanced that
it can only have come from one country in the world.· If
I the pilot is civili~n and if the plane is unmarked, then
that hostile country is not forced to make an issue of
the inci~ent. He al~o felt that it is highly desirable
I for the Government to retain the use of Area 51 for doing·
·exotic testing such as in the case of th~ recently acquired
Mig-21 which could not· have been done secretly at any other

,
1. base. Dr. Hornig noted that there are missions other than
in the Far East which the OXCART could serve •.

.. ·. The Deputy Secretary of Defense indicated that he did

not believe that the civilian pilot argument was compelling,

1··· ... OXCART/TAGBOARD . · 1 . I ·. ·....•

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 C05492938 TB? SECRET . -. ...
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. .: .

I·:. .feeling instead the central issue was a budgetary one.

His concern was whether what we buy with the additional
$30 million requi.red by Option 4 is worth it; and if it
1:· is~ he queried where the money for an option would come
from. In response to a question from Mr. Nitze, Mr. Helms
indicated that he could not reprogram CIA funds to meet
11.·..· . the $30 million additional required for Option 4 for 1969.
In regard to the NRO, Dr. Flax indicated that the funds
(up to $72 million for Option 4~ could re taken from
".

I . . but he believed. .
11····
I • ·. that this program should not be slipped and called atten-.·
tion to sortie views that the pace of this program was·
unsatisfactorily slow. If the money were taken from the
I .HEXAGON Program, Dr. Flax indicated that the impact would
be severe. Mr. Hoffman of the Bureau of the Budget said
.·. . that if there were an effort to change the present deci-
sion to phase out the O~CART the Director of the BOB
I ··.·· wished to present his case to higher authority. . '··. ·.

·....
'.
,
1:
.. ',·.
'

'
At this point, $ecretary Nitze indicated that he
would like to discuss the ma,t"ter further with Mr. Helms
and Dr. Hornig in executive session. All participants
·except the three Executive Committee members adjourned.

I ia11..t, l;? ~,,__ .

/Eames Q. Reber · ·
{ ,/ · Secretary ·
I \'/ .
· .

I
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~6~
; PANEL,
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.0.13526, SECTION S.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 16
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 19, 2016
·-C05492939
TOP S.EC.RET
·~···
. B YE-8-888 '."69

1·. IND E~.

I OSA History

I A :.. .... ,.

:.1 Accidents, aircraft:

Major U-2 accidents; 1956-68
Major A-12. accidents, 1963-68 .
Apiiex 57
Annex 158
·1· Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor W. Germany:
U -2 briefing 1.956 XI, 28-29
Aerial ·reconnaissance of Russia:

·I Det. A, 1956
Det~. B, 1957-1960
xr,.
xu·,
27-29
18-Z·O; 23.:.24;
25-29; 34-42

,
I . Det~
C, 1957•1958 'xv. 23-25
Halt~d
by public presidential decree Annex 89, 3-4
Recommended by -
Doolittle Committee r. z
Intellig.ence Advisory Committee II; 2·; Annex 7
Land Panel I, Z-3; Annex 1

I Aeromedical support:
A-12 program . xx. 158-16.9
· U -2 program.·· x, 29-34

I Agreements:
AEC/CIA, use of Nevada Test Site VIII, ·2-5; Annex 64
. Air Force/CIA on U-2 program III, 8-15; Annex 14
.1· Air Force/CIA on A-12 program
British pa.rticipation in U-2 program
Annex 127.·
. XIII, 3; Annexes 7 7; ·
78, 79 & 80
·I. Communications support, U-:2 program
GRC/ CIA joint U -2 program
VI, 1-3 .. · ·
XVII, 21-22; 70'.'°71;
·. Annexes 107.. & 114

,
,·

I ·. Nationai Reconnaissance Progr"3.m . IV,· 42-63; Annexes".

. 31-39
..
Security responsibility. special projects VII, 4-·S

}·. T 0 P S E ·a R E T.
. ' .

. ·Randle via BYEMAM ·

. Contro\ S~stem .
-
·C05492939

\
1. Air Fo~ce::
Funds administered by ClA/OSA Annex·46
Pi"ocurement for, by CIA/OS.A v. 20-26
1.. . . · SAC U-2: program, ·ops Plan
. Suppo.rt for joint U-2 program
: .:
··Annex 55
lll~ 15·-l~;IV. 3-8;
· A.niiex. 14
·1 · · Ai:r. Proprietary Branch, p.pn ·
Establishment,
. . .1..960 .
. XVIII. 33.,.35
.1 . . 'fr~nsfel,' of, to Domestic Ops.Division
Amalgamation of CIA Ai.r Activities
A·g.r.eement. on·
· XV!Ir,. 35
xvnr
XVIII, 6.:.7; 11-12; ·

I Organization Guideli.nes
:~mbassa<;iors{American): .
··Annex· 116
.·XVIII, 7~B;Annex 115

1. ··:.Policy re U-2 project briefing.

Ang:J;eton~ James,. Chief CI Staff:
. . VII, 42

Quoted:

:1 Exchange 9£ Rudolf Abel for

Fra.nds Gary Powers XIV, 46

:p· Apprc;rving Officer; U _.2 program:

Authorized by Project ·Outline
· Army Airways Communication System {AACS)
III, 5; Annex 10

Support to U -2 project . ·. VI. 6:-8

I ··
Ayub Khan, General, Prime Minister of Pa~istan
Quoted: ·
Reaction to May Day U-2 incident XIV, 6
I B

·I Bacalis, B/G Paul N .•. Director Sped.al Activities:

Quoted:.
for
Chinese U ... 2 ops poor record 1966. XVII, 69-70 .
I ....... Baird A,tomic, Inc., sextant ·contract .
Baker, Dr. James.G;, optics research .for U;..2
·. ,V,. 18
.I, 6-S;Annex 3
I I
50Xl ~ E.0.13526I I.
I' Quoted: . . .
·British participation in U-2 prog~am . xnr, 6-7 ·
. Bee.rli, Col. Stanley W.: · ·
I· First C/b, Detachment C
·Second· C/O, Detachment B
xv, l
XII# 22

·~· ...
TOF
ii

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control .system<•
.- ..
 C05492939
"'
T 0 P ·. 8 E .G R E T.

'~
,.
..
Bi rd:watche r
:BJssell, ~Richard M., Jr.:
.. Annex 43, p. 9

.~1·
Appointed U-2 Project Director by PCI III, 1-2.·
Biographic s:Ketch Annex 9
Designated approYing offi~er for obl~gation
of flinds · ·
I Designated ·DD/P
Quoted:
III, 5; Annex· 10
XVIII,· 6

.1 Air Force opposition tO deployment

of U-2 to Far East ·.xv. 5-6; 9.:12;
14~15; .Annex 102
XVIII~ i; s.:.6 .
I ·Amalgamation of CIA air activities
Appreciation of Office of Se·curity
support toll :2 project, 1955-56 VII, 11-12

I Approach to British.for U ._..2 base

rights in the U. K. XI~ 10-12
. B:r.:itish partici.pati~n in U -2 program· XIII, 9-10

,,
I . · BYEMAN System, s~t up in response .
to PF!AB recommendation ·
. Chinese participation in U-Z program
Clearances for U-2 project (USAF)
Col. Edward Perry's._!_ _ _ _ _ ____.
Delay in U.S. approval for
VII; 46-4i
XVII, 9-10
'vu. 8-9'
xu. 15-16
I China overflights · · XVII, 43
D.esign of new aircraft to succeed U -2 . XX, 3-4; Annex 121
Det. A 1 $ move to.Germany , XI, 22.-23
I Emergency procedures, U:-Z project.·
·Erosion of U-2 proje-ct cover
vu, 34
VII, ·37
Lines of command,. Taiwan U-2. Det. · ·X.VIl, 11
I Separation of responsibilities,
, U -2 project/NPIC XIX, 13

·1. 'i
SoViet Satellite coverage by Det .A.
State Dept reaction to Soviet protest
·XI, 26-27 •

of July 1956 U-2 qve.r.flights XI, 33-34

•Test .Site (Watertown) lin~s of command ·, VIU,, 16:..19·; 21 ·
:1· U-2 project - Continuance after· . ·
· first Soviet protest · . A:ruiex· 75 .
. VII, 1
I. . - Cover
- Opera tionai plan.s , ·
May 1956

iii

> T. 0 P "s:;s GR ET

· .....
Randle via BVEMAtl .
··control Sys·,em.
 .TOP SEGRE$
L
·~ .
·Irr, 9-12; ~ex 11-13 ··.·
:I - Participation of USAF
- Pilot recruitment ftom USAF X, 2-4
~ Pilot use of l_ethal ampc:mle x. 21-22
- Requirements, procedure for
1· determining ·
- Supply procedures
Ann.ex ll7
. IX; 3
. Resignation from CIA XVIll, 36
I Black Books, .presentation to Special Group Anne:ii:: 105

'..,. Bombing c;apability for U-2

British Air Ministry:
Quoted:·
. XVI, 6- 7, Annex 104

. Continuing British. r·ole in U -2 program XIII, l~; ZO

. Bl"'itish participatibn U -2 prograi;n: XIII
I Agreements signed with CIA Xlli. :3;
. Annex.es 77...:80 .
. Air Ministry cell XIII, 2-3; 8; 19;
22, 24
Background of joint program XIII,. 1-2
Continuation British participation,. 1961 onward XIII. 17-29
Cover Annexes 78 & 8()
Integration RAF pilots at Det G .. Annex 79
Operational Plan Annexes 78 &: 80
Overflights of USS.It ·XIII, 12-13
·Pilot training . · X:IIl; 3.-4; 19-20
· Political approvals XIII, 4-11
I ·RAF Liaison Officer at Project Headquarters,.
Washington . ' XIII, 14-17
Withdrawal of British unit from _Turkey XIII, 13
··1. Budgeting and Planning, U -2 program . IV
Initial funding .from special reserve . III. 2.--3

I· ·. First Budget hearing

Fiscal Years 1955-56
Fiscal Year 1957
IV, 1-3
IV, 9-11
IV, 11-15

I Fiscal Year 1958

Fiscal Year 1959
IV, 15.:..18.
IV, 18-23
Fiscal Year 1960 tv. 23-2:6
··1· Fiscal Yea:i: 1961·
Fisc.al Year 1962
IV, 26-28
IV, .28-29
Fi:scal Year 1963. IV, 29-34 .
.I Fiscal Year 1964,
Fis.cal Year 1965
IV, 34..;36·
IV, 36-37,

.
··f····
. ' .

••••
iv

.H~nfile via ·~VHAAN.

•• • •• •

Contrnl System · ·
"'-···
 . •.
!C054 92 939

TOP
.·~
SECRE'l'

·:1 Fiscal Year 1966

Fiscal Year 1967
·IV,· 3a·.
IV, 39
B·urke, Col. William. Acting Chief, DPD:
·1 .
Quoted:·
RAF Liaison Officer, Project Hq XIII, 15
Bj!".EMAN Control.System VII, 44--48
.1· c
··.-.-

.1 Carl:).era s.election and development:

A'.""12 systems xx. 26; 151-154
u,..z Systems V~ 4-8; XVI, 40-42;
1· . Camouflage paint, u -2.
Annexe~ 3,40 & 44
XVI:. 4-.5 . .
Carrier modification of
U-2 . XVI, 36~37 · .
I Carri~r ope.rations .of U-Z, Det G XVI,· Insert following
P·. 37
. Charyk, Dr •. Joseph V., first D/NRO . ·IV. 42.-58 .
.I . Chinese partkipatio:ti in U-2. program:
· Agre.ernents - GRC/ClA, 1961 xvn. 21.:.22, Annex 107

•I - GRC/ClA. 1967 .
Air Force initiation of U -Z program
Approval by· White House
·Background of joint GRC/CLA program
Cover story, Project TACKLE
Deployment of Det H to ';I'aiwan
XVII, 70-71, Annex 114
XVII, 1-7
. XVII, 8-13
XVII" 1-8
· XVII, l3 -16
XVII, 17 -18 ..
·I I I I XVII, 11; 19-21
·1 50Xl, E.0.13526
Downed U-2's displayed in Peking
El~ctronic countermeasures iµtroduced
XVII; 62 · ·
XVII, ·50-61
GRC approves program . XVII, 10-11
I Interdepartmental Cover Support Plan
Major aircraft accii;lents
Annex 113
Annex 110
. Ma:teriel support XVII, ·37.:.41, . Annex 111
I ~·
. Operations
· Ove;rflight missions. chronologic.al listing
XVII, 41-70~- 72-75
Annex 112·
1· Pilots: ·
·Death: benefits XVII, 30"'.'37
List of Chinese pilots Annex 108 ·

·I·•
..
.·Medical··arr~ngements
Training. ·
XVII,· 2s.:.30
xvn. zs·-za; Annex 109. ·

· ~· ·
v

Handle· via BVEMAN · .

.Contrnl System ·

·.. ·..;. ., ..
fcos492939
T 0 P S E C .R: E T.
ta··
:I Press releases on U-2 losses byGRC
Tao Yuan Air Base chosen for. Det H
XVII, · 4'(, 66 ·
XVII, 11-12
U-2 aircraft:. Initial two subject to repos-
I ses.sion by U.S •.
Export licenses obtained
XVII, 8-9
XVII,. 16-17
Export ackno'.vledged by u~s. XVII, 47-48-
I Yang 1 Gen. Shao-Hen, Chief of Staff!!' GAF,
Visits to Project Headquarters XVII, 61, 63-65
Clark Co.~ David, pilot pressure suit contracts :v., 18-19; xx, 166-·67
·I Clearances, system initiated for U "".Z program
Clearance statistics
VII, 8-13
· VII, 13-14
.

·I I· sOXl
·.Quoted:
E. 0 .13526 I s.
Deiay o: tJ. appro;ai for China·
. ' · .· Ma1nland overflights XVII, 43
I I
. CdMIN'"'"Tf---------------_.,..
I XVII, 19-20 ·

1· Collection by U -Z ··XIX. 20-21

.,,. NSA. support

Communications
Army-Airways Communications System
Cable traffic volume, special proj~cts
XIX, 19-20
VI
VI, 6-8
VI. S;..li. .
Special cornmunieations channel (HBJA YWALK) VI, 3-4; Annex 52

I U-2 Staging operations support

U -2 Test Site communications
Competitive bidding, OXCART components
VI, 11-13; Annex .53
VI, 4-5
Annex 126
· Comptroller
·I U-2 Project Comptroller appointed IV, 8-9
Contract.s v
1· Delegation of Contracting Authority v, 29-31
Developme.nt of Contract Staff v, 27-'31 .
Organization Chart. June 1957 · · Annex 48

I . Total contracts administered by OSA

·Contracts Management Staff as of
December 1966 At!-nex 49
I Cotter, William J., Project Security Officer
Quoted: ·
Continued use of knowledgeable
·1··· . u -:2 pilots in overflights X, 27-28

vi

· ·~· · · *
'i'OP S:ECR:ST
Promoted.to Dep. · C-in-C, CAR, 25 July 1967
•· .. Hand!e ·via BYEMAN :
. n+..,.,.,J ·(',.
·.~.
COm.:tiJi · ~J~~em .
.
 C05492939
v·

··~ TOP SECRET

.1 Cover: VII
Chief Cover Officer·s, 1956-68 vil. Frontispiece
.I · It;i.te:t""de.partmen~al Contingency Pla~ing
Cpmmi tte.e . . VII, 42-43
·Cover SupJ?ort, U .:.2 Program:
.I. Air Force at Test Site
Air Force, Overseas Phase .
viI, 25-26
viI, 2'6-33~
Air Force, upper air samplh:i:g (AFOA.Tfl) vu. 33
I Air Weather Service VII.· 30-33; 36-3.7;
·Annexes 59, 60 & 62
·Atomic Energy Commission· ·.vrr. 25-26
I NACA (NASA) .VII, 31-3.3; 35-36;
40-41; Annexes 59
.
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.
. ·& 60.
Cuban. coverage· by Det G:
Supporting Inva.sion Plan XVI, 13-17
C:uban Missile Crisis:

,
I . Agency U-2.role.
r-{e'1'Jsweek quoted on Agency role·
Cunni!).gham,. James A., Jr.:
· Appointed Administrative Officer for·

Quo.tea:
U-2 project; 1955
·
.

.
.XVI. 19-25
XVI, 24

Ill,· 7

I Amalgamation of .CIA air activities

.. Black Book pres_entations
XVIII, Z-3 ·
Annex.105
.1·. British U-2 program continuance .
Command structure U -2 detac.hments
Annex 81
. XI; ?-3; 36
Communications support .VI, 13-14
1· · National Reconnaissance Office
· OSA Procurement Authority
IV, 56
v, 29-30.
R..e.connaissance of Cuba, Oct~ .196~.~ Xvi,· . 22-24

I .U-2 cover plans.

CunniI,lgha~, Robex:t R., ·. Dep. Dir. Security:.
· Support to U -Z project' ..
VII, 26-27, 32-33
'

1··· D
vil. 10-12

·-.·

I DeGau.lle U-2 briefing, May 1960

Dependents acc9mpanying .overseas .
. XIV, 18-19
nr, zs..:.z6 · · .
Dependent h.ousing ;tII; 26.; xu; 21-22
. · X\f,;. 2:}.:.. 22 · ·, .
•••••• ••• ••••• . vii.
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§
. Depots:
.··.--1 ----ii. IX~ 1-:2·•: 4, 6•7
IX~ 6-8
0~ ·_Nort.on (:SM.AMA) ·-IX~ S
Warner-.Robins : IX, 7 ·
Deputy Director. for Research, established Annex 17 ·
Deputy Director for Science & Technology,
. DD/R' renam~d .. . . Annei 17
D.eputy Project Director (U-2)
.1· Gibbs, Col. Jack A.
Ritland, Col. Osl;llond J.
.. III, 23
. III, 3; _9, 11
Detachment A (WRSP I): . XI
I Activation
Approval to begin overflights
' ' .. · xr~ 1 ·
XI, ··23; Annexes 72,.73
Commanding Officer named·· XI. l.
·1 Command. structure . xr. 2-3,. 6-7, 36-37, ·
42. 44
Deactivation, 1957 · XI; 44,.:.45
I
, Deployment to the U.-·K.
Frogman Incident
.Middle East Missions
. Morale problems
. Overflights of Satellites
· Ove.rflights of Soviet Union
. XI, 17.
XI, 17..;.20
.. XI, 39-40
XI. 36·37
XI, 27-28
XI~: 29-30
I . Overseas operating bases:
German facilitie$ ·investigated XI, 14-15
Greek base survey XI, .9.;.10
I Turkish base survey
U. K. ba:se sought
XI, 8.-9 ..
XI, 10-15.

·1. Wiesbaden/Giebelstadt tenure

·Training period .
XI,. 21-23
XI, 3"°'.6• 1s·-16.
Detachment .B (WRSP II)(Det 1010 TUSLOG): . XII.
··1 .. : "'; .
Activati_on
B-ri:tish unit arrival at Incerlik
XII, 2
·XII, 30 .
·British operations from Turkey/Pak~stan XU:, 30, 31, 33 ·
-C~mmand problems.
I Deployment to Incerlik
· XI~, 3-5, 14-16
.. XII, 7-10.
XII,· 30, ... 31 ·.
ELINT:Missions ··.

·I Launching Mission GRAND SLA.M .

Loss of .GRAND SLAM. at-Sverdlovsk
· XII,· 41-43
. XII, 43~46

viii

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M.iddle East missions XII,. _12-14, 17-18

Organization and t~aining . XII, 1-3
O~ersea~ operating base; T-u:rki'sh approval· ·XII, 5•7;.Ann~x 76 ·
·I Phata·e·•·out of Det B
Presidential approval for May Day niissian·
XU, ·46-52.
XII, 35-41
.

Second to.ur change of command · XII, 21-23

'

I '
Staging:· .
· Norway, Spring 1958 (postponed)· XII,. 25-27

.1 Norway, Fall 1958

Norway, Spring 1960 ·
Paki,s tan~ 19 5 7
XU, 27:..29
. XI!, -34~44
XII~ iS-20
Pakii;tan, 1958 (canceled) XH, 2·3-24
I Pakistan, 1959 (.British)
Pakistan, 196'0
..xu, 33
XII, .34-44 .
Support problems XU; 10-12. ·
I Third tour chang~ of command.
Detachment c (WRSP·III)
x:n, 32"733
xv '.
xv,
1· •. l-2..

,
Activation and training
Air Force o osition to FE deployment xv, 4-16
50X1, E.0.13526 . ·xv, 2s, 33.
Bas.e for overseas operations sought xv.. 2-16
China Mairtland overflights .xv. 27, 29-33. '
'Command structure .XV, 18, .21-22
xv, 16-17
I· Deployment to Atsugi, Japan
Theatre Command relations.
USSR overflight draws protest
· . xv·. 11-:19. 20
·XV, 23-25
xv, .33-36·
I Withdrawal from> Japan
Detachment G (WRSP IV)
Activation
XVI
XVI, 1-2
.. I I 50X1, E.0.13526
I Carrier operations
Construction at No:tth Base Edwards
XVI, 16.
XVI, 36-37 et seq,
XVI, .39-40 . . .

·I·· ·'J· <;:;uban overflights

· Dual staging capability
. XVI, ·13-16; 17, 19-25
XVI; 30,..3·9
· · Missfon:S· flown, chronological1i,'.;sting· Anne:x 106
1· R_eorganization, September 1960
Sino-Inqian Border ·coverage 1962.:..64 .·
XVI; 10_-11 ·
XVI, 26-35
Te:st progr1;1.ros · . XVI,· 2-12, 40-43
·I
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., Vene,~uela/British Guiana cove:ra:ge. 1963 ·
. Vietnam coverage, 1961~64. .
XVI. 35-'36
..
I Development· Prdjects Division · . . .
. Announcement of establishment Of DPD
XVI,· 11-19·
x.vru
Annex 26
· xvur. .35-36
I . Aircraft Inventory Septemhei" 1961
. Air Force (AFXPD) Tab 6 support. to QIA
Amalgamation of CIA air activities: ·
•XVIII, 7, 10~ 14

·I ·. Agreement. ·

·orga,ni:zation Guidelines
· · XVIII, 6.-7, 11.-12;
• Annexll6
XVIII, 7-8; Annex 115.
1· Cuban operations (JMWAVE).
Air National Guard recruitment
..xvur~ zs-33
. XVIII,. 27-28
. Air National:Gua.rd casualties XVIII, 29-31

I "Birmingham Widows" ·
Mop-up operations
XVIII, 31
XVIII, 32.-33
XVIII', 29 zs . .
. Pre-strike base, Puerto Cabezas ·

,
·.1· . Det .1, 1045th OETG, Eglin: .
Establishment by DPD . XVIII, 8-10 '
Support of Cuban operation· XV1II, 2.5-33.
Far East air support:
Det 2 established XVIII, 20-25
Laotian operations .XVIII, 22-24
I STBARNUM; STPOLLY
Vietnam operations .
.. XVIII,
XVIII,
11-19
24-25
·Functional Roster of DPD~ Jan.:- 1961. ·XVIII, Frontispiece

.,
., .
I Reorganization under DD/R 1962 ·
Director,, CIA Reconnais_sance.Programs:
XVIII, .36-39 . .

..
..App~intment of . Annex 3 9 ·. .·
. "
· . Rescission.of appointment IV, 63
Dqnovan, James; Attorney for Col. ·Rudolf Abel:

·.1 ~;.
Negotiation of Powers/Abel .Exchange. XIV, 4Z-51;
· Annexes 94 - 100
·. Dullei:;, Allen W ~ , Di rec.tor of .Central Intelligence:

1· Agrees t9 joint CIA/USAF U-2 program

.Appoints R. M. ·Bissell,· Jr~ Project Pii"ector III,
R,ecor:qmends ·U.-Z project to P~esident ·
II.·

.. II~
I
·i.. 2 .
3-4, Armexes·6 .~ 7·
USAF support df project acknowledged· XI, .18
Dulles, J9hn Foster, Secretary of State:
Approves Soviet overflights (June 1956). · . XI, 26
Opposes further u -2. overfli.ghts pf R.w;sia . . . XI, 40~4~ .

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Eastman Kodak Company:
I ·Negotiation of.' original contracts·
Special Pro.cessing Center ...
V., .17-18
.XI, 35; XIX,. 5;..9
Eden, A~thoriy, Prime Minister, U. K~: .·
Reneges ·on U. K. base for Det A . f{I, 18-Zl
· ·Edwards 1 ·Col. Sheffield, Director of Security

:I . · Support for spec\al projects·

Eisenhower, President Dwight D.
Accepts sole responsibility for U .. 2
VII, 1. 11-12.

overflights of USSR . XIV, 15-16;Annex 87

I Approves ove~flight .reconnaissance
program in principle II, 3-4.;Annexes 6 &8
Approves m.~ssion flown 1 May 1960
I· .,Postpones decision on renewal ot.
U-2 overflights .
XII, 35-4i

XI, 4~-42; 43-44

,.
I.·. ·' . Summit Conference Speech, 25 May 1960 · XIV, 20-21; Annex 89
Electronic equipment:
Development and testing, Det G I XVI, 7-8
.. Annex· 43
Listing of U-2 systems
Procurement for U -2 v. 9-16
Systems developed for A-12 xx, 147-151
XDC 18~19; Annex 120
I · ELINT Missions, U-2
·Emergency Procedures:
Loss. of U .-2 aircraft·in foreign territory · VII, 34-35
·1 U-2 pilot instructions X', 21°-26; Annexes 68 ·
& 69
Watertown Test Site VII, 20.:.21
Engine development {Pratt & Whitn.ey)
J-57/P-37.& P-.31 (U-2) VIII, 12-15;. XI, Z6
J-58 (A.:.12) xx. 2.4-25; 36-:-39;
. 55-58; 64-69; and
Annexes 12.8 & 129 .· ·
J-75 conversion of U/2 aircraft XVI, 8-10
European A{r Ops Base, Wie~baden {~OB).·
.Relocated at Eglin,. 1045th OETG, Det.1 . XViII, 8-10
· . ·Ev:ari.g, Col. , · Norwegian Intelligence Chief
Approvals given by, for use of Bodo XII:, 25-:29, 34-42
...Involvement ill. May Day Incident XIV, ll-i2; 3Z-33.
EXCOM (NRP), .establishment . . ··IV,. 62; Annex 38

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I Firewe:r c;ompan:y, pilot equipment contract·

First. flight, A-lZ
v, 18-19.
XX, 61-64
First· flight, U-:2
I Fischer-Bennington-Parangosky ·Report
Flax, Dr. Alexander, Third D/NRO
VIII, 7-9
Appendix II
IV, .62-63; Annex 39

:I.· Jrlickinger; B·rig. Gen. Don D •• ·us.A,:r (MC}:.

· Chosen·to. head U-Z aeromedi~al progra~ x, 29-34
r 1 sox1, E.o.13s26 1 . 1 ..
·1.·. Quoted:·
· Cove~. l3upport for ·u -Z program by .GRC XVII, 67
French Atomic Test, Tuamotu~ covered by U-.2 · XVI, 36-37 et seq.

I · . 'Frogman Incident. (U, K. ):

' Det A forced to redeploy to Germany
·

,.
I a.·
: ·· . Gardner, Trevor, Assistant to the Secretary of
the Air Force for R &: D:
. Moving spirit in launching U-2. project · ·~·
. Sµpports joint CIA/USAF U-2. program .
III, 2
II, l

I ·Supports signing U-2 contract with· Lockheed

Gehleri,. Gen ... Reinhard, Chief W. German
Annex 19

InteUigence, · U -2 briefing XI, 28-29 ·

I General Precision Lab. Radan contract
Gibb~>, Col. Jack A .• Deputy Project Director
v. 19

Quoted:
.1 Budgeting for U-2. follow-on program
U-Z project staffing -
IV, 18-19
.III, 24
GilpatriC., Dr. Rosweil L .• Dep~ .secty of. Defense:
I . Signs agreem~nt to set up NRP ·
. Goodpaster·, Brig. Gen,. Andrew J., ·Special ·
IV, 42

. ' . · .Assistant to 'President Eise'nhower~

I. Attendee at first White House U .:.2 briefing·
Other princ~pal meeting.s. _arid memoranda
. II,. 3
xr,· z3"'.24; z1-ze.
41-:-42; xn. 35-36,
I 40; xtv, 1-10; ·
. Annexes 72 &: 73

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. Government of the Republic of China {GRC):
Approves joint U-2 program . XVII, 10"'.'11
Approves use of Tao Yuan base · XVII, 11-12
.
Press releases by re U-2 losses . XVII, 24, 47, 66
c. •

I Hagerty, James, White House Press Secretary:

Involvement in U-2 May. Day Incident XIV, 8-9
·.·1 HBJAYWALK.Comrno Channel:
Activation by Office of Communicatfon·s, CIA VI, 3-4
Listing of stations in network, 1966 Annex 52

I Volume of cable traffic

·.··Hornig, Dr. Do~ald, Special Asst. to the President
·. Houston, Lawrence R., General Counsel, CIA:
VI, 8-11
IV, 61.

I ·Quoted:
. CIA Subcommittee of House Appropria-
tions Committee reaction to

I DC! briefing on U-2 incident

Procurement by special project
mechanism; legality 0£
XIV; 16

V, 20-25; Annex 47 ·
··I.
I Indian operations, 1962-64:
Approved by President Kennedy · XVI, 26-27
Charbatia Base activated XVI, 30-35
I Nehru briefing on b_order coverage XVI, 29

.• ,, . Indonesian coverage by Det C 1958

lnflight refueling modification of U -2 . ·
·. Intelligence acquired from U-2 program.

Intelligence Gap ·
xv,· zs-26
XVI·, 11-13
XIX, 21-23;
Annexes 118-120
I; 1
I· Interdepartmental Contingency Planning
Committee (ICPC} set up by NRO ·.VII, 42-43

I J .·

.·Johnson, Clarence L .• (Kelly), Lockheed I; ·.5; II, l; V, l; 3~

I Airc:raft Corporation 4; .VIII, 1, 2; · 3 , 6,
9,14, 2.0, 2.1; XIV,

1· 39; xvr,· 6; s, 44·;

XVII, .14;XX, 20,.
27' 28, 52; 64, 94·
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·.I. Joint CIA/USAF reconnaiss.ance program (U.-2)
Approved in: principle by m~AF II, 1-Z; Annexes 4,& 5

I Text of .agreement signed August 1955 ·. Ann~l4

I Kucera, George F., Project Contracting Office:i:-,

later Chief of Develol?ment &.Procurement . v, 27-29
·I· L

I Land, Dr. Edwin H., President, Polaroid Corp •.

Advisory Panel, U-2 follow-on aircraft xx, 5, 7-9. 13-16·, .
26•27
I Technical Capabilities Panel rec om-·
mends U -2 program I, 2-4; Annex 2
.I.,edford, Brig. Gen. Jack C., DSA: ·
I.
, ·Quoted:
Reorganization of Office of Special

. Lethal ampoules:
Activities

Use ·recommended by Security

.
Annex 18

Procedure' for handling and use by U -2· pilots· x, 21-22.

x> 21
< .

I : Life support equipment, A-12

Lockheed Aircraft Corpo;ration:
:xx, 158-169
A-12 delivery schedule delays . · xx> 51-54
I . A.-12 design wins OXCART contrac;t
·CL-28~. (U-2) proposal
.XX- ,l9-.ZO·
:t; 5-6; Annex 2
xx, s-13, 16, 18-19
1· . Competition of OXCART design· .
Contracting for additional improved·U-Z's v, .31-36.
Negotiation of initial U -2 contract V, 1 ...4,. A~exes 41

I . . . . . . . ~Q
New t~chniques required ln A-12 fabrication·. XX, 3z.:;,34
Lovelace Fouf.!,dation: ·
.. Contract'. for medical ,services v, .18 .
·I . Pilots I records. retrieved fiom)after
May Day Incident XIV, ·15

I Lundahl,. Arthur C~ , C}).i~f ·Of NPIC ..

Originator o:f photointe~pretation
• .
11
:p9g and Pony" display of U:-Z photogrFphy .XI,. 35

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·.1 Mc
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1· ·. Mc::;Coy, CoL Frederic E.,. C/O Det A: ·
· ·. Nominated by SAC XI; ·l
· Problems, line of command and.morale XI, 2, 6 .... 7, 36-37
I McMahon,. John·N·., Executive Officer, DPD:
Quoted: ...
;(,,egal Defense of FranCis Gary Powers Anne~·90

-I .. · RAF Liaison Officer in Project Hqs·

·McMillan, Dr. Brockway, 2nd D/NRO.
. XIII, 16
IV, 58-62

·1· M

Macy, Robert M. , Chief, International Division,

.I . ·Bureau of the Budget . .
Marr~ William H .• 1st Project Security Officer::
IV, 1-Z, lO-ll, 20-22
VII, 1

·1 · Loss in shuttle crash

Materiel:
SAC support to U ~2 proje.~t
VII, 18-20
IX·
IX, z;.6; Annex 65 ·

-I Staff
May Day Incident 1960:
British Unit removed from Turkey
Congressional CIA Subcommittee briefed.
Congressional leaders briefed 9 May 1960
. Damage· Assessment, initial, May 1960
, IX, 2"'.3, 9.;.].0

XIV,.11
XIV, 16
XIV, 12-13 .
· XIV• 14; Annex 86

I· Events«:>£ i"".11May1960 in Washing.ton

IQ>.;rushchev statements
NBC White Paper
XIV, 1-18
X1V, 7, 10; Annex 83
XIV, ·. 39 -40; Annex 93 ··

I Powel~S qualified un.der Missing Persohs Ae;t

Powers testimony before Senate Armed
Services Committe,e, 6 Ma~ch 1962 .
. XIV, 14-15

XIV,·. 51;' A~ex 101

I ..
:; '
Powe.rs Trial:
Ad hoc committee· on Power~ case
Det:ense preparations..
XIV, Z9-32;. 44 ..
XIV. 23-29. Annex 90-91
1· . Post-trial security reappraisal
Powers' final plea
XIV, 37-38
. XIV. 34.-35 .
Transcript of proceedings · XIV1" 34.;.·36; Arin.ex 92
:1· Powers 1 wife
Press announcement of mis~ing 'u :.2 ·.
. XIV, 4-;5; 29.:..31, 40-41
XIV, Z-4
Propaganda Guidance to :Field .Stations · . XIV, 17-18; Annexes 87

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Russian popular reaction to U-2 incident

Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
XIV, 22-23.

I
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,. .
. Briefed by DCI 31 May 1960
State Department Press Releases 5-7 May

Middle East operations

XIV 1 22; Annex 87
XIV, 8, 10; Annexes
84, 88
XI, 39-40; XII, 12-14,
17-18; 21; Annex 120.

I · Miller, Herbert I., Executive Officer

. Appointed to U-2 project staff ·
Quoted:
m, z

I · Establishment of film processing plant

Weight reduction of camera and film
. Mission planning for normal U-2 mission
XIX, ·6.
. v, 6-7
Annex 105

I . Mixson, Col. Marion C. : .· ·

C/O, Detachment A
· C/0, Detachment C
. XI, 44 .·
xv, 21-22.
·I· N

vu,
I ·NACA (NASA) cover support 31-33;. 35-36;
40-41; Annexes 59, ·
60
Nation~l Reconnaissance Organization :
I. Background to establishment of
Budgeting by osA under .
IV, 40-41; .Annex 31
IV, 34-39

.I Joint agreements signed

. Land Panel for overview of

!V, 42-60; Annexes.·
34-39
iv, .61-62
.I . . Monthly :forecast of activities of .initiated
··Navy, U.S.,. procurement for by CIA
IV, 61 .
v, 23..;24
XVI, 36-37 et seq~
. Navy, U.S. , support for U-2 carrier operations·

I Norway:. (see also 11 EvangH).

Diplomatic exchanges on U-Z incident Annex 88
XIV, 11-12, 32-33.
Involvement in May Day U-2 incident

.I 0
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Office of Special Activities (OSA):

· Establishment of Annex 17
Possible abolition of - - pro 1 s and. con's · .Annex 29
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.· ': Orga.riization, OSA and its pr'e.dete.s·sors:
' '

·I; ,_6.:.$; Annex·3

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First.organiz~tion meeting,· U-·'2 .prq.fect

,·-1- Organizational concept proposed to ·
III,. Z

Air Force, March 1955 . . ··Annex 11

I· Oi•.gal'lization and Delineation of.

.Responsibilities. (joint U-2 project) Annex 14 ·

.-, Organization under DPD /DDP

OSA/DDR establishedl96Z
. XVIII, 6-Si 11 ... 1?
Annexes us & 116
-·Anne~ 17
OSA reorganization, July 1966 Annex 18
' "I· '
OXCART.
_ Accornplishm.ents
.xx
XX. 12-8; Annexes
.·. 153..;155.
I Advanced Reconnaissance Aircraft
Study {Fischer, Benington, Paran:gosky) · ·Appendix II .
Advisory P;anel {Land} . ·· XX:. 5, 7-9.: 13-16,
I Agreement1 USAF/CIA
· 26-:-Z7; Annex !Z3
XX,. 45; Annex 12.7

p · Air Force participation in joint program:

Agreed by Secretary Qriarles
Supported by Gen. Thomas White
XX. 4; Annex IZ2
~x. Z4

-I
Air Force procul'.ement of interceptor ver~ion xx. 46-47, 70-72'
Approval to initiate program xx. 4.-5; Annex 125
Approval for Far East deployment Anne;,ces 151.& 15Z
Area 51 activated · xx, 47-48 ,'
Area 51 construction 78 xx.
Automatic flight control system. xx •. 155-156
BLACK SHIELD Missions AnneJCes 153-155
J ' '

Came:ra selection· and development

Canadian airspace use .
'

xx, z·6, 151:..154

XX, 1.00; Annex 142

~I , Co~petitive bidding on com.P'one:q,ts

· Contj.ng-ency Plan·
· Annexl2.6
._xx. 125-126; -Anne~ 156
·Cuban program p~·anned (SKYLARK) XX, 80-83;. Anne,X 134 .

.;I Cuban program postponed·

·.Design selecti.on-.of air.craft , . .. ·
D'et ,1, llZ9th (USAF) Special Ac ti vi ties .. ·
.
XX,; .112-13, AillJ,ex 149
xx, 19-20
xx. - 5'8....:59'
I Squadron activated
Det 1 Comma.nding Officer; letter of :
instructions ·Annex 130
. ' '

Det l Monthly Report ·..· · Annex i59..

F :-, ' ,'' ''

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1:.1 Development and testing; 1966 . xx~ ll3-ns

Ear!y development of U -2 suc·cessor XX; 21-38 ·
II Elect·ronic sy:stems
Engines: .
.xx, 147-151

Developme.nt of J -58 "(Piatt & Whitney} xx;

1.1·.· Price ·overrun
24-25~ 36~39,
55-58, 64-69
. Annexes 12_8-129
l!:Xperience Data -and Systems Reliability Appendix L
II Far EC!-st operations: · ·
BLACK SHIELD planned; political c:ielay ~x. s9..;_97, io1-104, ·

11· Deployment approved

110-113_; Annexes.
13.5-141 & 144-148
XX, 119-121; Annexes

.I North Vietnam reconnaissance m.is sions

151-152
Annexes 151-156
North Vietnam coverage assumed by SAC·· xx, 125-126

I Fil:'st fli"ght of the A-12

Flight testing, 1964
¥X, 61-64 ..
xx. 78-80 .

•1·
. ~light test achievements . xx, 84
Funding the program xx. 28-29; 34, 55,
130-133; Annexes
124 & 128
- Inertial Navigation System xx. 155
Inflight Refueling . xx, 99-101
Life support equipment xx, 158-169 .

1~;
Losses of A-12 aircraft xx, 69-70, 80-_81,
··97-98. 115-116,
_126-127; Annexes 13i,
150~ 157 & 158 ~
Mission planning xx. 101-103
I. -~;.
Operational capability of A-12 achieved
Organization and Delineation" of Responsi- ·
bilities, agreed with ~ir Force
xx, 85-89
Annex 127

•I
Phase-out of OXCART. . XX, i30-14(?:; Annexes ·
160.:.165_; Appendix II
Pilot se1e·ction XX~ 48-SO;Annex 143
Cover :xx. 76-77 .
Training· xx., 77-78, 107-:110;
Annex 14.3

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II · ··. P~oposed Advanced R~conn~issance ~ystein

. (U-2 follow-on aircraft) Arinex 121
·xx, ·15~6-iss
1:1 Side "."fooki.ng radar
Supplier relatfons .
Surfacing of A-12 by President ·Johnson·
xx,
xx.
30
72-76;
· Ann~xes 132 & 133.
J.I Test site at Watertown reactivate·a
. ZI airspace procedures (FAA .. & ADC)
xx,.. 39..:45
xx, 60.;.61, 104;.;1'07
r1. P2v· Program: ··
Amalgamation with U -2 project proposed XVIII, 3, 5-6 .
Assumption of P2V program "by DPD XVIII. 12-19

11 Budgeting by OSA for STPOLLY (under NRO) ·. XVIII, 39

Reversion of ST POLLY to SOD XVIII. 36-38
Unilateral cancellation . XVII, 69.
I" I..-------, ;;.-..
Pakistan:
Diplomatic excha,nges on U-2. incident Annex 88
g Reaction to U -2 incident · · · xrv. 5-6, 33
11
.<])

j ~£ ~§: · P~rkin-Elmer Corporation, initial _camera

~ ti <i> ::D' ·
u-A ·u '-'
contract
/
.· v. 4..:s

I..
...... 'Ej § ~ Pe.rry; Col. Edward A., C 0 Det B:
;::i ~ lf r2, Nomination by SAC ·xn, ·..1
0..
~-- ~~~~~~--'-~~~~~~~----.

. s£~~
8 .g::: I :::i Personnel: {U -Z program)
I ·.XII. 3-5, 14-16

( I ~ -~ ~
"5
..8 .g <l> ;::::::
Early staff ·appoi~tments
. First Table of Organization
III •. 6-7
III, 16·-17' Annex 15
Ii ."': :
~~uo
S <]) µ;.
·
Full complement achieve
. d III, 23
... ~ ;:; Later cutbacks and increases, 1959-66 III. Z.7-30
. o . Military personnel, initial recruitment III. 18-20
.;;.._. PCS/TDY basis .for field assignment !Ii, 24-26
II .P.hotographic Interpretation Ce_nter (PIC", NPICi
Advance planning (Project HTAUTOMA T) ·.XIX, 9-12
· · PIC established XIX,: .12-14
Pilots,
. . OXCART:
.. . .xx,.- 48-50
. Equipment . xx. 15 8-16·9
·Pilots, U:--2: x
· Additional recruitment 1963:_64 · . x, 28
British OLDSTER/ JACKSON pilots · _xiII, 2-4, 12-13, 1.9-20,
29; Annex 79
· Chine.se pilots Annexes 108 & 109

xix.·

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I Contract terms X, 13-18, Annexes
~~·· Cover·
66, 67
·x, io-11
Emergency procedures X, Zl-26; Annexes
1· Equipment.
. 68, 69
x, 32.-34
Foreign vs. U.S. pilot recruitrrient. x, 1-2; .10
I I Insurance andI death
. . benefit$ (U.•.S.} · . x, .7-9
x,. 18-2.0
··Morale . X; 12-13
I Recruitment from USAF Reserve
Roster of pilots (1955-1968)
x, 5-6
. Annex 70·
Training in escape and evasion, and
:1: :resistance to interrogatio!l:' x, 2.3-2.6
. Use of lethal ampoules · x, 2.1-22
Postal c;ommunications system:
I . •.
Domestic mailing p.rocedures initia~ed ·
. _for special projects, 1956 ·· VII, 2 :-3
XIV, ,42.-51; Annexes
I Powers/Abel Exchange

Powers, F-ra:ncis Gary, U-2 pilot

94-100 .

I ($ee 11 May Dayl960 Ind.dent,'' ChaptXIV)

··. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB}:
Re.commends tightening security on .·
·1 sensitive projects VII, 46-47
Recommends U-Z photo reco:nna'.issance

I · of China Mainland (1961}

President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) .
. _President's Special Asst. for S&T · ·'
XVII, 44
IV, 61-6.2
rv, 61

I Pressure suit, development of by David Clark ·

Co. for OXCART Program
Processing U-Z photography,:
xx, 166-167

I Eastman Special Processing Center

·. Field processing ·
·xr, 35; XIX, 5-9
XIX, 14-15; xn, 14
.Project Headquarte.rs:
,I Initial set-up
.Relocations, 1955-56, 1962
III, 3
III, 7-8 .
III, 4-6; Annex 10

,.
Project Outline (U-2 P·i-oje,ct)

.l
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Protests; USSR:
De't A July .1956 ove rfl,ights XI. 32.:.33; A,n,nex 74'
:1 · De:t· C Mar:ch 1958 mission over Ukrania
May D~y 1960 mission .
XV, ·23·-2~; Annex 1.03
Annex.SS·
·Publicity

II Erosion of cov.er, U-Z program

Japanese press activities
Surfacing of A •12 ·
VII, 37-40.
xv.
. . ..
30-31; Anne:x: 63 ·
XX, 7l-76; Annexes
11 . . Putt, Lt. Gen. Donald L. , Deputy Chief of
132 & 133

Staff, Developm<!:)nt, USAF:

,:, Supports joint U -2 program· II, l; Annex 4

,., Quarles, Donald A., Deputy Secretary of D'efense,

11 .. approves Air Force s·upport of OXCART XX, 4; Annex 122

,_ Raborn, Admiral William,· DCI

Quoted:
Procurement c>f additional U -2's. 1965 v. 34-35
11 Radar camou£J.age
Application to U-2 XV!, 2-4
Experience leads to iiew aircraft design
II· study for GUSTO/OXCA.RT
Development contracts
xx ..1-3
v·. 19-20
Ramo-Wooldridge, initial electronics contracts· v.
d Reber, James Q. :
Chairman Ad Hoc Requirements Committee·
·
iqx.
·9-16

3-4

I Chief, Special Requirements Staff, DPD.

Deputy Director, NRO.
L--~-------' Proj.ect Cover Officer,. 1956:
XVIII. ·12-13 · · ·
IV, 60-61.

••I
Quoted: . . . ..
. U-2 pri°ject .c,ver ;planning· . · VII, 26-29
. . . Use of . pilo~sl SOXl and 6, E.0.13526 I x, s-9
Requirements:.
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee .(ARC) XIX, 2-4 ·
Committee· on Overhead Requirements .
(C(?MOR, later COMIREX). . XIX, 3
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ELINT requirements for U -Z
PhotQgraphic requil,'emerits for U-2 ·
XIX,. 15,.iS
XIX~ 1-4
·;::: o Ri:tlanci, Col. Osmond .J. · .
1:1 ; C
o-
.S ...(
.
Appeinted Deputy Project Direetor (U-2)
Quoted: ·
III, 3

~ ~ Morale problem ·at Watertown test si~e VIII, 19-ZO

11 :; < ,..._ Personnel shortages· III •. ·20
== -
!!~
~ ~ "'!!'
<II
t.> M
t:ll)
· Project logistics activities '
~~~~~--"-'-"--.
I. Spec. ·Ass. t. to.DSA:
IX,. 3-4.

11· -=--
·-=ii =
=
~
"'O
.$:
~
Quoted:
British continuing parttcipation
- ::: "1
in U-2 pro~ram . · XIII. 27
1:1
~
-= u<II (;!!

-=~ =
Q.l~.
I.

.·
..... u);;;) s
(-1 SAC Training Unit at Watertown, 1955-57
· Saunders, Col. Clason B~ , USAF: ·
II._ Role in initial Chinese pilot training
·.Saunders, Edward, CIA Compt:i:oiler:
XVII. 3-5

Quoted: ·

~ .
Ramo-Wooldridge .contract
Scoville, Dr ..Herbert, Deputy Director, Research.
Quoted: · .
V, 14-15

iJ Equipment reliability U -2. Indian ops

Nationa,l Reconnaissance Office
·· XVI, 28

•I
organization IV •. 45; 48-50
Security ·VII
Chiefs of Security Staff, 1955-68 VII, ·Frontispiece ·
Clearance .procedures established· vri, s-13
Field security support, U-2 program VII, 21-2?.
· Headquarters security support, U. -2 prog.raro VII. 22-25

•••••
·Jettisoned cargo incident· V~i, 24
'$. Plant secu.rity of project suppliers· VII, 3-4, 8-10
Security staff . · VII· 1, 10, 14·
Test site se.c.urity VU, 14-Zl
Shuttle aircraft, Burbank to Test Site:. · VII, 17; XX, 43
·Mt. Charleston crash 1955 VII, 18-20 .
Speci;;i.l Operations· Diyision,:. DDP: ·
II · Assumption of air s~pport.activities of DPD
. Special proje.ct concept a~reed for U -2 projed ·
XVIII.· 36-38
III. 6

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I ·Steininger, Dr. Donald H. IV, 62

I Sterilization of U-2 equipment
·. SummitConference collapse June 1960 ·
XIV~ 13-14
XIV, 18-21; Annex 89
·1 . Suppliers' release of technical knpwledge.
developed on U-2 project Annex 58
· Surprise attack I,. 1

I T.
·-

;1 .TACKLE (see 11 Chinese Participation in U-2 Program 11 )

TAGBOARD, Summary of A-12 drone program
· Talbott, Harold E., Secretary of the Air Force:.
. · Annex 28

I · Approves CL-282 (U-2) proposal

·.Technological Capabilities Panel (Land Panel)
Techreps, contracts for
. II, l; Annex 4
I, 2; Annex 1
III, 21-22

·I .· • ···~.·Test Site (Watertown):.

· Activ.ation
Agreement with AEC for use of
· · VIII, 5..
vm, 4-6;. Annex 64
I Construction 1955
Deactivation 1957 ·
Reactivation as Area .51 for OXCART
VIII,· 6-7, 10-11
. VIII, 22-24
xx, 47-48; vru,· 24
I . Twining, Gen. Nathan F., Chief of Staff, USAF:
Approves joint CIA/USAF reconnaissance
program II, Z; Annex s·

I· Canberra progiam recommended by '·

Negotiations on initialjoint agreement
II, 1; Annexes· 4,. 6

between USAF and CIA on U-2 program III, 9-15 .

·1. Quoted: · . ·
RB-57 vs •. U-2 ·aepfoymen,t to Far Ea.st xv, 8-9
. Typhoon coverage, Det C. VII, 36-37; XV, 26:..27~
·.1· ·Annex 62

u
I · U-2 mi~sio~s flown, 1956-1966,
..
.chronological
'

listing · Annex 120

I U-2R additional procurement
U-2 ·staging operations:
V, 31-36;· Annex 50

Alaska {Eiel son}, Det C xv, 20.

I .· . India (Charbatia), Det G .

Korea (Kunsan), Det H .
XVI~ 30-35
XVII, 49
·Norway (Bodo),. Det A XI,. 44-45
I Norway
.
(Bodo),· De.t
.
B. XII, 25-29; 34-44

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9ktnawa (Naha),. Det C . ·XV~ 27 -2·8..

1·1:. · Pakis.tan (Lahore). Det B ·
·Pakista·n (P~shawar}, Det B
XII...18-20
·. xn. 32,. 35::::42
.· .• Pakistan (Peshawar). aritish XII~ ·33

I.I Philippines (Cubi Point),· Det C· ·

Philippiiies ( Cubi Point), Det G ·
Philippines (Cubi Poi~t), Det H(Chtriese)
xv. 25-26; 29 .
XVI, 17.:.18
XVII, ·54_55
1·1 PUerto Rico (Ramey AFB), Det .G ·. ·
Thailand (Ban Takhli), Det C
XVI .. 35.,.36.
.xv, 29-32 .
Thailand (Ban Takhli), Det G. XVI, 18, 27-28,

II u. K. {Watton RAB:' Base), Det B (Briti'sh)

UK base rights for U-2 operations:. ·
31-32, '38-:-39
.· xn, 3o, 31, 33

I.I ,App~oach to Air Ministry and MI..;6

Approac.h to Prime Minister through
XI, 10-12

.. XI. 12-15; Annex 71

11 · the Foreign Office . .
Prime Minister Eden reneges on base use XI, 17-20 .'

IP . VU!nerability studies, U-·Z: ..

Soviet tracking capability, 1956 . XI, .30-32
...

ll . Viability of Chinese· U-2 overflight program XVII, 68-69

w Withheld 1,mder statutory authority of.the

••• I ~~~~~~~~
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g) ·

••
'----=Ex,,.._e_c_u....,.t.,..iv-e-..,.O""'ff·icer, Det A :·XI, 42
.Executive Officer, Det C XV, 22
Westinghouse, APQ-56 contract. · V, 16

·~·
Wheelon 8 Dr. A. D.,. DD/S&T
Quoted: .
British participation. in t:r'-2 program '

•I
XIII. 22-23 · .
CIA. withdravva.1 from. NRP . . ·. .·rv. 35-36; Anri.e:X:
·"
29 '..

y
Chief of Staff>
Yang, Gen. Shao-lien. Eep. c i ta C~ GAF:.
·Quoted:·
Derp.oralizi.ng effect on GRC ·o.fU:-2;lo.sses ...
. (July 1966) · . .· X'vII~ 67.-68. .
Vi~~ts ·to P~oJect' Headquarte~rs, Was~ing~on. . '.Xv'r~ .. ·61, 63-:6s. ..
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national security of the
United States within the meaning of the espionage faws U. S. Code Title 18,
I
~·
Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or tho reve-
lation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as
its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United
States or for the benefit of any fornign government to the detriment of the
United States. It is to be seen only by personnel c.~pedally in<loctiinated
anc1 authorized to receive information in the designated control channels.
Its security must be maintained in accordanc(; with regulations pertaining
I
to BYEMAN Control System.
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I BYE-8725-68

I
I INTRODUCTION

I
This document contains experience data of the OXCART
I A-12 as of 31 December 1967, including its BLACK SHIELD

,
I deployment and operations conunencing in, and continuing since,
May 1967.

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I TABLE OF CONTENTS

I 1 A-12 Fact Sheet

2-3 Experience Record
I 4-5
6
7
Flight Development Stages
Function of A-12 Inlet
Inlet Picture
8-9 A-12 Sorties and Profiles Above Mach 3.0
I 10-11
12-13
Cumulative Time at Mach 3.0 and Above
Detachment Aircraft Average Mach 3 Hours Per Flight
14-15 Detachment Flights Sortie Effectiveness
I 16-17
18-19
Inlet Sortie Reliability Trend
Engine Sortie Reliability Trend
Navigation System Reliability Trend
20-21

,
I 22-23 Auto Flight Control Sortie Reliability Trend
24-25 Hydraulic System Sortie Reliability Trend
26-27 "Other" Systems Reliability
28-29 SuI111D.ary - Premature Terminations
.30 Camera Systems
31 Camera Performance
32 Electronic Warfare System
I 33
34-35
EWS Reliability - BLACKSHIELD Operational Missions
System Reliability
SCOPE CROWN "E" (2 Air Refueling Mission)
36-37
SCOPE CROWN "F" (2 Air Refueling Mission)
I 38-39
40-41
42
A-12 Aircraft Accid.ent Reliability
Engine Reliability
43 J-58 Engine (Abort) Reliability for Engine Cause
I 44-46 Deployment and Operational Summary

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I
I A-12
I
I
I
I

,
I

I
ENGINE DATA PERFORMANCE
I 1.
AIRFRAME DATA
LENGTH: 99 FEET l. TWO P&W JT11D20A (STANDARD DAY)
2. SPAN: 56 FEET AFTERBURNING TURBO- 1. SPEED: MACH 3.2
I 3. WEIGHT (BASIC)
52,700 LBS.
.JET WITH BYPASS
2. MAX. THRUST:
I
(1860 KNOTS)
2. ALTITUDE: 87,000+ FTi
4. WEIGHT (FUELED) 32, 500 LBS. · 3. RANGE: 3600 NM
I 122, 500 LBS. 3. OPERATING LIMIT:
MACH 3.2 @ 100,000FT.
W/O AIR REFUELING,
(CURRENT OBJECTIVE)

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BYE-8725-68
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i EXPERIENCE RE.CORD
'
l AIRCRAFT I
' '
J.,rst Flight
1JPtal Flights
T.otal Hours
26 April 1962
2610
4438:00
: I:·
I
.,..
Tptal Flights at Mach 3.0 900
Tptal Hours at Mach 3.0
I..pngest Flight at Mach 3.0 .
571:06
3:50 Hours
l'
i
II
:
Lbngest Mach 3.2 Time on a Single Flight
. :I
~
3:30 Hours - !.
ngest Single Flight Duration
I

7:40 Hqurs .. i
! l··
'
'
S eed - Max Mach 3.29 ; I
A titude - Max 90,000-Feet
~ :

l'
I J-58 ENGINES
T~i tal
T tal
Engine Flights
Engine Hours
9412
19 ,,738 •
T tal Engine Flights at Mach 3.0 4294 . .

a t al Engine Flight Hours ~t Mach 3.0

. i
tal Ground ·Test Hours
tal Mach 3.0 Environmental Ground Test
Tqtal 150 Hour Qualification Tests
!
Hours
2690
26,135
6497
6 i)I·
I
I
I INS
11·:
T~tal
T tal
Flights
Flight Operating Hours
1616 i. :

i,.
.
3715
T tal Operating Time 45,739
li SAS ~ AUTO PILOT
11.
! .

Td,tal Flights 2669

Total Flight Hours 4437
T4tal Operating Hours 42,850

I . CAMERAS

I IV ! ·.
' 1
To~al Flights 262
To~al Flight Operating Hours 194
Tofal Flights Above Mach 3.0 159.
To~al Hours at Mach 3.0 94
LOfgest Flight.at Mach 3.0 I. 5
I.
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PILOTS .• (6)
I
Average Pilot Experience 15 Years
I Average
Time in
Time in
Total Flight Time (All Aircraft)
A-12 (Least/Avg/Most)
Project
4110 Hours
14.4/ 4·13/ 483 Hours
1..3/5 Years
I Average A-12 Flights 257

LIFE SUPPORT
I
Total Suit Flights (Detachment) 1751
I
EWS
I Total Flight Tests . 110
fj DETACHMENT

I Activated
Time in Training as a Unit
1 October 1960
60 Months*
Average Time in Project (Personnel) 46/50 Months
I
*Detachment 1, 1129th began training as a unit coinci<;lent
I with delivery of first aircraft (trainer) in January 1963.
Prior to that it had been supporting LAC flight test effort.

I OXCART A-12 AIRCRAFT

INVENTORY

I Operational Aircraft 6

I Two-Seater Trainer 1

Flight Test Aircraft l

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FLIGHT
DEVELOPMENT STAGES I
l -;:· :.
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·· The single most important problem pacing the flight ·
d elopment (opposite page) of the A-12 has been· the.air .
i
t
et and its control system. This system ·which provides : .
proper amount of ram air to the engines at all flight ! 1·
co. ditions must minimize shock expulsions (unstarts) 1 !
auitomatically recover (restart) when shock expulsioni;; do . ,
ock::ur, and at the same time operate at optimum effic;.t.ency !
inl order to maximize engine performance and aircraft: rangel.·
I
Thb notations under development stages I through· IV·A 1
I
al~ refer to problems and components of this system. · Raso~
luEion of these has lead to a reliability commensurate witp
' .

:I
th~ operational readiness established in December 19(;)5. ;
I
l Fuselage Station 715 Joint Beefup (Stage IV B) involv~d
strengthening fuselage structure at the wing joint because)
i
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of! heavier electronic warfare systems payload weight 're- :..
qu~rements. · :
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I FLIGHT
DEVELOPMENT STAGES

I I. Mach 2.35 (To July 1964)

A. Duct Roughness at Mach 2.4

I B.
C.
Unacceptable Restart Capability
Inlet Instability and Unstarts

I II. Mach 2.8 (July 1964 - March 1965)

A. Inlet Mice Corrected IA

B.
I C.
Aft Bypass Incorporation Corrected IB
Inlet Instability and Unstarts Still Encountered
III. Mach 3.0 (March 1965 - August 1965)
I· A. Spike Static Probe and nJ" Cam Inlet Control
Improved IIC But Did Not Correct Condition
fj IV. Mach 3.2 '(26 August 1965 - 20 November 1965)

A. Retrofit to Lockheed Electronic Inlet Control

I B.
Corrected IIC
Fuselage Station 715 Joint Beefup

I V. Operational Alert (December 1965 On)

A. Operational Capability
I B. Aircraft Performance Optimization and Envelope
Extension

VI. Phase out (December 1966)

I A. On 29 December 1966 a decision was made by higher
authority to terminate the OXCART program as of

'~
31 December 1967. An orderly phase-out program
was implemented to carry out this decision.

I VII.

VIII.
Operational Deployment (May 1967)

Operational Deployment extended through 30 June 1968

(December 1967) .

~ ':FOP SECRET HANDLE VIA BYEMAN

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BYE-8725-68
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FUNCTION OF THE A-12 INLET
j.,
'...
A supersonic inlet or air induction system is de~signeJ
/! /. ·1 .r,·
to provide best possible aerodynamic perform~nce over; a ratj:ge!ii 1
of supersonic Mach numbers with a stable and steady flow of'. Iii !
,i
to the engine. However , due to constraints impos'.ed by 1:. :ii
ersonic aerodynamics, truly optimum performance with an 1· !; i
al shock pattern and an inlet airflow exactly matched t& lii ,r·
1
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engine airflow requirement can only be provided a,t oner Iii ;
ght condition. Since the OXCART air era.ft must cru:ise fqr
siderable periods of time at a Mach 3 speed, maximum J· 1!i l.·'i'·
sible range is realized by providing this optimum inlet h· !!j
formance at the Mach 3 cruise condition. The basib geo1*et1Hy !j I
airflow characteristics of.. the inlet are then varied td Hf ! i
vide a minimum compromise of aerodynamic performan'ce and: iii jI
iciency at lower flight speeds. Some of this needed (. i!l · f HI
is
ot
xibility is provided by varying the position of th:e inlel.t 'li '
ke. Since the airflow which can be admitted by the inlet 1: ! i
in excess of that which· can :be accepted by the engine at· !ii
er than the design condition, this excess airflow is i;: ill
i,_
i J.
l! .

.:!...
1

:.
du ped overboard through a series of forward bypass ·doors <),~ Ii! .1
pa sed down the nacelle airflow passage around the engine : j;
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th ough a series· of aft bypass doors· . ;: jj j
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ac
In addition to those. airflow passages shown on the
ompanying sketch, a system is also provided fo;r bleeding :Ji! f lT .·
of
su
the low energy. boundary layer air which forms along th~;
face of the spike. This improves inlet efficiency~ by
!! i ~
! iii ~,-i: ~.'~ 1.i:._
ing the entire main inlet flow passage available tb the j: • iii
.• ·
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ma
hi h e~ergy ,. high velocity air. , j!I ·~ !'
A rather complicated automatic electronic control sys~~m..t!I ll
se1ses aerodynamic envi.ronment to provide the proper. i;ched~;liifF;
of spike and ·forward bypass door positions at all flight : i!j
l
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co di1;io::is. Aft bypass door positions are selected m~nua14r 1
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by the pi lot. · · · · · · , . l d1 ! I1
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SHOCK TRAP BLEED

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BYE-8725-68
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At 12 SORTIES/PROFILES ABOVE MACH 3. 0 DETACHMENT A.IRCRAFrr
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soLti~ 1 ~1~~~r;~~=l5~~t::~~~¥i·;~~tiih~~u!~ 0 ~~· ~:~:~~=~~i967 . •.•. ;ii

'
i i'

wh~rein the A-12 airc1·aft flew.above Mach 3.0. The prof11(:3s :;

co!lumn lists the number of times. the aircraft accomplished! • . i
.th~ high/fast operational profile during the sorties; flowni
inl the period, i.e. , high and fast after· takeoff,· descend L . i 1
for air refueling, climb back up to high and fast again, ere. :I :,.·I_
! The A-12 major/minimum mod:ifica~ion program got. under~." i 1

wa~ in the latter part of August 1965. Sorties flown duri:Ug.~il ,,

thf period outlined in Section A were in non-modified airc:.af4. •. ; J I
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- -.- .. ,- - - - - .. - - - - .. -r
A-12 SORTIES AND PROFILES ABOVE MACH 3.0 - DETACHMENT ACFT/SORTIES
(Through 31 December 1967)

Sorties· Profiles

A. 25 Mar 65 - 31 Aug 65:

Total Sorties................ 52

Total Profiles. • . • . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . .. 57

B. 31 Aug 65 - 31 Dec 67:

Total Sorties .....•.•.•. ·. . . . • 600

Total Profiles •.••...••....•...•.....••....•... 920

C. Summary (25 Mar 65 - 31 Dec 67):

Total Sorties. • . • . . • . . . • . . . • . 652

Total Profiles ................................ :977

First Detachment A-12 flight above Mach 3.0 on 25 March 196.5 by

Aircraft 128.
 'POP SECRET I

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'l. ;!

I CUMULATIVE TIME AT MACH 3.0 AND ABOVE

I .. ·:
I
j The rate of accumulation of Mach 3. o time as .shown by (,
thetslope of the curve (opposite page) began to substantialJ.y 1:1
inc ease in March 1965. Prior to this time, Mach ·3.0 !. ~ ~ .
fli ht was confined to the three flight test aircraft only.(
Aftfr March 1965 each of the. seven detachment (operational)! .
air raft as they completed necessary modifications began toF.
fly at Mach 3.0 and above on a routine basis. : /
I
I
I The significance of this data is that during the past
thirty-three months since 25 March 1965, 571 fligbt h~urs
!
:··I •!
i

at Mach 3.0 and above have been accumulated as compared to

onlr 15 Mach 3.0 hours accumulated during the th,ree years i
fror first flight in April 1962 to 25 March 1965. i
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- -·-- ------~---­
\ . , CUMULATIVE TIME AT MACH 3.0~D ABOVE - ALL AIRCRAFT

01
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MAY-11=--~--~~-r-"-~-'-~~.--.~~---~~---~~--..ii..-----..i..___............____.______._~--.a-----t

JU (HOURS)
..... ALL MA H 3.0 TIME
~SE
O')
PRIOR 25 MAR 65
. ·~NOV CONFINED TO FLIGHT
TEST AIRCRAFT
MACH 3.0 EFFORT BEGAN
MA
SKYLARK· II MODIFICATION
_ _ _ _ _ lst. DETACHMENT MACH 3. 0 FLIGHT
........
MA M.AJOR AND DEBUG '"3
~
MODIFICATIONS ::i:i
BEING COMPLETED g
SEP. g
BLACK SHIELD VALIDATION
NOV. - - - - COMPLETED - OPERATIONAL
(...)
......
JA CAPABILITY ESTABLISHED t::I
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BYE-8725..:.as . i. :; ..
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DETACHMENT AIRCRAFT
~ 'J
AVERAGE MACH 3 HOURS PER FLIGHT

II
. :

The chart opposite shows the average time spent at

MEtch 3 and above for each flight. It is bas.ed upon all
iii·! !'

~ch 3 flights of detachment aircraft for the period.

;; i

;:.. I
::. !

e~amined including the relatively short Lockheed and'

d tachment operated functional check flights as we11· as
t e longer multiple refueling training flights and simu- ;;
i
:
!

Prior to 25 March 1965 there were no .

1 ted missions.
M ch 3 flights on detachment aircraft. The peak of 1.28 ; . !!·:I.
M~ch 3 hours per flight during the fall of 1965 reflects tihe :~ . ;
vilidation or demonstration period wherein three refueling· ; L , ..
~ ~.

s·mulated missions were performed. During Janua~y 1966 '. ;

; .
.
f ight activity was substantially curtailed during the :
ir}vestigation of aircraft 126 accident with only some of
tl'j.e short functional check flights lasting a very few .i ·
m:i!nutes< at MaGh. 3. This is normal procedure after a·
p riod of inactivity wherein it is necessary to recheck ,
a 1 systems during short periods at Mach 3 prior to '. ,.
r suming the longer Mach 3 training flights. By spr~ng
1 66 a normal level of training activity was resumed:
r fleeting about 3/4 hours at Mach 3 per flight. Th~
p riod between January and July 1967 reflected training . .; I
f~'ights with usually one or sometimes two refueling(s) i : :
r ther than the longer and more costly three refuelip.g !
si·mulated missions performed during the fall of 1965;. Th~
s ight increase in average Mach 3 time per flight for the !
c rrent reporting period reflects the BLACK SHIELD a~tivi~y.·
ii
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I · BLACKSHIELD
IMPLEMENTED
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to maint'ain pilot pro-
ficiency and operational
alert.status. Mostly
SEP
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Aircraft 126 accident

Demonstration Period
--------
I zE-1 Maximum effort
9 Flts with Min
Mach 3 time each flt
BLACK SHIELD - - - - - - - - a t 2 :00 Hrs.
~ validation. _j_
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No Mach 3 Flights, Aircraft in Mod.

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~CH 3.0 HRS PER FLIGHT

I '±'OP SEC:!iET HANDLE VIA BYEMAN

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. BYE-872~_:68
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DETACHMENT FLIGHTS
SORTiE EFFECTIVENESS ;: I
l ; ,
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! The chart opposite shows the.trend of sortie effectivet

from a low of 25% in 1964 to the low eighties during I
. Each flight or sortie is rated either effective or ..
notjeffective on the basis of all subsystems performing i .·
prof erly such that all planned objectives. of the sort:le were····.
sat· sfactorily accomplished. The total sorties flown :are i:
div·ded into the number rated effective to arrive at the L

•ii.,
per ent effective figure •. The sorties rated not effective ,: ·
do hot mean that all such sorties were prematurely teDminat~d
or ~borted •. Certainly all premature terminations or ~borts.( .
whiph· did occur are included in these data as are those : .
:
.,: ;
'.

sorties which were fully completed but on which all plannedi ·. 1· l;.
: ..
.· obj!cti ves could not be accomplished. Prema tur~ termina tio.n.,.. s
ass gnable to each subsystem are. reflected subsequently
und r Subsystem. Sortie Reliability. Hence the difference i .
i f: ·I
i:n ~ortie Effectiveness and Sortie Reliability.
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CONTROL SYSTEM!.
14 L

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 .. ...
- --- - - - - - - - - - - -r . 111111 In I
0
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DETACHMENT FLIGHTS SORTIE EFFECTIVENESS \.0
w
\.0
(THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1967)
100%
96

88
BLACK SHIELD
VALIDATION
80 FLIGHTS ONLY~
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PROGRAM COMPLETION
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1964 1965 1966 1967
C05492939
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i BYE-8725-68
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INLET SORTIE RELIABILITY TREND : .. '
i
: .
J
: :

. The chart opposite presents the inlet sol:'tie reliabili ~Y

trerld and indicates a general improvement of inlet reliabil~ty .;
For !the period 21 November 1965 to 30 April 1966, only three,· · ..
··I
of ~11 attempted sorties were prematurely terminated due to : :
proQlems with the inlet system. These three flights were
pre~aturely terminated due t.o inlet unstarts or other probl~)lls
i . II :

assqciated with actuation or scheduling of the inlet spike i

andAor bypass doors. A slightly less reliable rate obtaineq
oveil the period 1 May to 31 August 1966 during which six : I :

sorilies were terminated out of 110 initiated, all for reason~

sim~lar to those mentioned for the period 21 November l965 ~o
30 4pr·11 1966. The rate remained almost constant through l 1·
the 1 September to 31 December 1966 period·when six sorties i
1
wer~ terminated out of 111 initiated, again for the same : .. I
: '

i,;
rea11ons as cited ear lier. There was considerable improveme11t · .
' :
in ~nlet perforll\ance between 1 January 1967 and 31 Dec~mber : . : .
196, when only eight sorties were te.rminated out of 28f5 ini ~ia.t.~d.
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r cos492939
I 'i'OP SECRE'f
BYE-8725-68
! ..
PERCENT SORTIES COMPLETED
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BYE-872 5-68 ! 1
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ENGINE SORTIE RELIABILITY TREND i. ; :
I
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I
j The facing chart presents the engine reliability trJ.rid ·•
~nd indicates a generally very high current level o~ ! · i
·I 1
1:
' .
~eliabili ty for the engine· with an overall average ievel ;of · 1
~eliability for the time period covered on this chart of , .i 111
*i
})etter than 98% (779 flights successfully completed; of 79!5
tiated). O:f 653 sorties attempted in the period; ! '
; i

2jl November· 1965 to 31 December 1967 which represents mor~

t~an 24 months of operations, only twelve sorties w~re , . ·1 ;

Pr~· ematurely terminated due to a problem with the engi.ne. : .·

O e engine problem occurred as a result of a failur~ 'in t'1.e :
s stem which i.qjects fuel into the afterburne.r, specifica~ly ·. .
al loss of an afterburner· spraybar threaded-end plµg .. · The: · : • '
:: I
olther premature terminations due to engine problems \were !· ; i , '·
cj:t.used by an inlet guide vane failure which caused a; compf~sS,br;
I
iplet temperature sensor failure, an independent co~press~r ·.· \ :; i •
iplet temperature sensor f~ilure, exhaust gas tempe.l'!ature i : ·
a~· d RPM fluctuation, two engine electrical harn.ess ~efici'i:Jnci~s;, \
:'I
l ck of abi~.i ty to trim exhaust gas temperature on a;n eng:f.ne · ! . : '
d e to a burned out trimmer motor, and two afterbur~er fuel : :
c. ntrol malfunctions. Design changes have been deve).oped ;·to ·'
c!rrect .the hardware problems which caused the first six . :,
:.
. .
1·.
d scribed. failures. The other six failu~es are cons~dered · 1: ·
t be of a random -nature. . ; ; ,
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C05492939
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I TOP SEGRE'!' HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
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 TOP SECRE'I'
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NAVIGATION SYSTEM RELIABILITY TREND .. I
i :

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.
During this reporting period, two sorties were'pre- .
m~turely terminated due to apparent INS malfunctions. on~·
I
off the termina~ions resulted from a bad steering mc;>tor inl:

.·· 1
tpe repeater circuit. The other, upon more extensive : ; .
.
g~ound checking, was due to a broken wire on Phas~ A of ; ;
' .
tpe number 3 inverter and was, in.fact, an interfac~ mal-.
f~nction. Although the in-flight reliability of the INS :
h s remained at a very high level, the mean-time-between-;
f ilure hours have been decreasing steadily, primarily :·
b cause of th·e very large number of operating hours ialreaay
o. the systems. On rare occasions even diligent ground l · ,, I
mfi!.intenance is unable to prevent an air abort. U~der ·
p~esent OXCART phasedown ground rules no funds have ·been .
miJ.de available for an INS IRAN program which is necessaryito.
r~ise the mean-time-between-failures up to the origfnal
lfvel.
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I TOP SECRET -HANDLE VIA B~MA~

CONTROL SYSTEM . !
ii
. 20 ' !' '
... ' :

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C05492939
• 'POP SECRET
•
I 0
0
rl
0
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PERCENT SORTIES COMPLETED

0
00
0
t-.
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BYE-8725-68
0
If.)
I
I 1111111111111D1i1l11ur1111uun111unnt1i1mu1111111uu111nnt1i1tnnnlb i ~~~ ~~
I
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I ""'
I
I 11111111111111uu11i11uuuui11uuin1i1iuun111u11f1u1on11ilt1iunn1 b~ ~~~ ~;
.1
111111111llu11ur1111uufl111nnnt1iu""'''"11uu11tuni1ttiunn1tg :~~ ~~
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I TOP SEGRE'!' HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
19
·I
 -
C05492939
TOP 81?.CR"R'f
•It PERCENT SORTIES COMPLETED
BYE-8725-68
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 O'l 00 ~ .to I.(.)
11111111111111olUU1ilUUf1tUU11f1IHDUUOiU11flf111U1IOii1iUHl1i1li11rbi ii~~ ~~
I
11111111111111olUl11HUlii1iOH111UHHl1iffiitt11i1i11UHll1iiftl1i1iili1i11b ~ ~~~ ~~
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I
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l-1 ~
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. z
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r-1 I i1111111111111111i11iu11n11111uui1111unnttiMlu1uuu111a1rr1t1i1iuu11111gg ~~~ ~~
l-1
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I. 1111111f11nnr1r1tun11111uuui1ruu1111f11fin11t11uot1u1nu11L ~ ~:~ ~;
·I
soruut1i11Hf1Mdill1U1HfudR11~fHOUnfWft11~g ~:~ ~~
24
·~
'I '!'OF' SECR:E'f HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
11 21
 -
C05492939
TOP 81?.CR"R'f
•It PERCENT SORTIES COMPLETED
BYE-8725-68
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 O'l 00 ~ .to I.(.)
11111111111111olUU1ilUUf1tUU11f1IHDUUOiU11flf111U1IOii1iUHl1i1li11rbi ii~~ ~~
I
11111111111111olUl11HUlii1iOH111UHHl1iffiitt11i1i11UHll1iiftl1i1iili1i11b ~ ~~~ ~~
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24
·~
'I '!'OF' SECR:E'f HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
11 21
 'POP SECRET
·1

BYE-8725-68
ii
;;.:i
<.1111
AUTO FLIGHT CONTROL SORTIE RELIABILITY TREND ,:,
1
i
l
During this reporting period only one· sortie was •!1··
"

!
;
:

p~ematurely terminated due to a flight control system

! ;;I
m~lfunction. Specifically, a roll transfer valve iri the ; ! :

)
rbll channel of the stability augmentation system opened
i
i~termittently with bot oil applied. This was a random
:1
: i

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"bne of a kind" malfunction. ;! .

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'l'OP SECftE'f HANDLE.VIA BfEMA!N

CONTROL SYST:f}M
22
-
C05492939
TOP SECRET
It PERCENT SORTIES COMPLETED
BYE-8725-68
I o.
o. 0 0 0 0 0
"'
.-! m 00 ....... tO IC
I
I 11111111111111nnu1«nnnt1tu11unin1tnru1f11uu11t1fnl1t1nt1iuni1i11li ~~; ~~
I
fa 1111111111111101iu1111ruuuor1111nuntuullu111u11l1inl1t1111nun1m1t~ ~:~ ~;
I
I
~
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0
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~
I. 111111111111111111uu11i1lunt1t1i11unin1tum1i11uuu11lu6ut1i1lnu11111b~ ~~~ ~;
I
1111111111111111i1uu11i1tuuutm1uuin11nm1t11uun11lut1i1luui1f11111tg ~~~ ~~
~
I 'l'OP SECRET HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
23
I
 i1·.
!
i
. .
.

TOP SECR:ST '

•,,
l.1
l
BYE-8125-68

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM SORTIE RELIABILITY TREND.

•·; ·.,:
. ~· . " : .. " ..... " ': ,~
:I
The aircraft hydraulic system sortie. reliabili:ty 1e,re1 ·
I
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24
CONTROL SYSTEM ;!
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I C05492939
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BYE-8725-68
PERCENT SORTIES COMPLETED
I 0
0
r-i

0
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0
00
0
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0
~
0
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I I
149 sorti es comple ed of 15( ini tiatec
l Jul 67
I lllllllllllllll 11111111111111111 1111111111111111 1111111111111111 1111111111111111 31 Dec 67
I 151 sorti ed of 15~ initiate•
Jan 67
Q
111111111111111 Hltllllllllllll iu11rt1unui1 1111111111111111 11111111111111111;:30l Jun 67
I ~
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120 sorti es initia· ed and cc
I >i
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Sep 66
1
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~ ~
May 66
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f1i 107 sorti ed o:f' 10~ initiate<
21 Nov 65
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71 sortie e ini tiat• d and con plated
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tl.l ·11111111111111 II 1111111111111111 1111111111111111 '111111111111111 11111111111111111
26 Aug 65
20 Nov 65
~
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36 sortie s initiati d and co11 !Plated
l May 65
I. 11111111111111111 1111111111111111 1111111111111111 111111111111 Ill 11111111111111111 25 Jun 65
I 35 sortie s ini tiat~ d and coll plated
15 Mar 65
11111111111111111 1111111111111111 11111111111111111 111111111111111 1111111111111111 30 Apr 65
~
I TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
25
I
 '!'OP SECRE';f

BYE-8725-68

! "OTHER" SYSTEMS RELIABILITY

iI

l "Othe:rtt systems referred to cover a wide varie'.ty of I

!
~ystems and events. A detailed listing is containe.d on
the page following the facing chart. There was maiiked i: I
fmprovement in the number of premature terminations durif:_g :~
the period 1 July through 31 December 1967 when only elef.en·:
I
flights out of 150 initiated were terminated for "other"i
I ·. '
I
fystems or events. Special emphasis is being placed on : ,
~igher quality control and closer supervision to atjhie·ve !.
I r. .)
:; I
rntinued imp~ovement. . ; <1
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HANDLE VIA $YE~NI
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11·
l 26
CONTROL SYSTEM ·'I 1
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-
C05492939
TOP SECRE'f
'
BYE-8725-68
PERCENT SORTIES COMPLETED
I 0
0
0
m
0
00
0
~
0
(!)
0
l.O
..-I
I
139 sorti~ ~s complet ed o:f 150 initiated
I Ill 11111111111111111 !1111111111111111 u11111111111111 1111111111111111 ' 11 Jul 67
Dec 67
I
I ,.....,
'1'

142 sortii
111111 11111111IJ111111
ed of 152 initiated
1111ufliD1tnr 1111111111111111 11111111111111111 3OI Jan 67
Q) Jun 67
I :;:....
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< Sep 66
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Ill 1111111111111111 1111111111111111 1111111111111111 111111111111111113 11 Dec 66
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~
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1111111111111111 1111111111111111 11111111111111111~ 1l May 66
Aug 66
f5 Ul
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92 sortiE s complet ed of 109 initiated
I 1111111 1111111111111111 1111111111111111 11111111111111111 30 Apr 66
21 Nov 65
I
I 61 sortiE s complet ~d of 71 nitiated
11111111111 1111111111111111 1111111111111111 11111111111111111 20 Nov 65
26 Aug 65
i
I TOP SECRE'f HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
27
I
Il TOP S:EORET
i
I
I BYE-8725-68
i
Il
l
i SUMMARY - PREMATURE TERMINATIONS
~.;
Ii
I .
l ':

I The opposite table first summarizes the prematurely!

terminated sorties assignable to each of the foregoing ;, .. I
Subsystem charts for the latest period examined fro)ll l ··
i July 1967 through 31 December 1967. The number of i .
orties initiated for.each subsystem may differ because 9.·nly I
l
: !
he sorties on which that particular subsystem was used ~s ,
.. I
: !

ounted. The engine, being used on every sortie, reflec~·s ·

he total number of 150 sorties initiated during the i · ~ ;
eriod. . : ! ;

~ . L .
I "Other" includes all other premature terminations
4ssigned to the indicated problems or components which
~re not part of the foregoing major subsystems examined.
I
I
I
I Total premature tern1inations for the period 1 July , :
.I
i :

967 through 31 December 1967 are 24 out of a total· of H~O

1
•:

~.
orties initiated. 1
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CONTROI! SYSTJilM .: [
11
28 l :i
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C05492939
i'OP SECRE'!'

•
I BYE-8725-68

SUMMARY - FOREGOING
I MAJOR SYSTEMS AND OTHER
PREMATURE TERMINATIONS
OF AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS
I 1 July Through 31 December 1967
Major Systems:
I 1. Inlet Unstarts, Spike, Fluctuations 4

I 2. Engine ENP, Fuel Flow Nozzle Fluctuations

and Oil Pressure Fluctuations
3
Due Engine Harness Problem*
I 3. AFCS SAS Pitch Control, SAS Roll 3

,,
I
4.

5.
Hydraulic:
INS
Left System Failed
Large Terminal Error and
.Bad Steering
1

13
11
0ther"
I 1. Faulty Fuel Pressure Indicator 1
2. Roll SAS Malfunction, Due Faulty Servo's 1
I 3. INS Failure, Due #3 Inver~er Inoperative 1

I 4.
5.
Autonav Steering Error, Due Pilot Error
HF/SSB Inoperative
1

I 6. ARC-50 Failure 1

7. Camera Failed 1
I~
8. SAS Yaw Transients and Rudder Oscillations, l
Due Power Interruption
I 9. Fillet Panel Loss 1

Pitch Trim Malfunction

~
10. 1

11. Fuel Leak l

11
I *See Para 13, Page 45,
BX-6727 TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
I 29
C05492939
I.
TOP SECftE'f
!
I . :;'
"

BYE.... 8725-68

I :I
.: j

Il
:1
.,I
CAMBl\A SYSTEMS 'j

~
1
pe I cameras are built by Perkin-Elmer. There are five 1' ·i
pe I ncn series in the inventory. With the phi:l,se-down. i. ::
the OXCART program the two Type I "A" series were· plac~d :!
storage. · , !. ;
Tfpe IV cameras are built· by Hycon. There are three. qf . (: ·. i
tb.ese in the inventory. Two of these have been validated 1: 'i
ai,lid declared operationally r.eady. The third is sche:duled:: . :. ::1.
f~r prevalidation and validation flights on or about' ·· , li
i
.
llp January 1968. · · i . l
ie first summation (opposite page) includes only te,st \. '.l
11·
h
!'
.
. .
ights at Mach 3 and 80,000 feet altitude plus the twentt- ·'1

H
t o operational missions. The second summation inc.ludes l. '.
! «j ii
..
a 1 flights including operational missions since the·
btginning of the program. d

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30 !· lI
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C05492939
• TOP SEC:ltET

~ BYE-8725-68
I
CAMERA PERFORMANCE
I (As of 31 December 1967)

I
Test Flight Time at Mach 3 and 80,000 feet
I Type I "An Series Type I "C" Series

I 980 Min. 5667 Min.

I Type IV
1903 Min.

,,
I TOTAL FLIGHT EXPERIENCE

Type I "A" Series Type I nc" Series

I 98 Flights
· 75 Hours
6 Failures
164 Flights
119 Hours
9 Fa·11ures

I Type IV
67 Flights
I 37 Hours
11 Failures

I
I
I
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I TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
31
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 !;1·
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TOP SECRET ?i "
!i.
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BYE-8725-68 : '

·i1!
1
: !

r:
ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM
)i·1:.
i l ·.

I A brief functional description of the Electronic

Sfistems follows:
;;I
. :

I
D~FENSIVE: ;I
. i
; i
: !

! BIG BLAST - Denies target range from SA-2 radar: t.o ' '

.1 force the missile into a three poi'nt guidance mode

1 and early arming of the fuze.
I
I, BLUE DQG - Recognizes missile guidance activity' and. :
I actively transmits false commands to the SA-2 missil~
I guidance systems. ·
j PIN PEG - Passively intercepts SA-2 radar frequency
1 signal. Locates and positions SA-2 radar site in
I azimuth within vulnerable zone. . .
I MAD MOTH·- Denies SA-2 tracking radar accurate angle:
j information resulting i.n large missile miss distan,ce~·.
·I . , .
A_tredundancy exists between the recognition and jamming i· ·•
s>!stems employed, .thus givi~g a lower de~ee P.f .vul~erabiJi·ity
tq tb.e aircraft and accounting for the hJ.:gh degr~e (100%) · ·
o~ total system reliability. · ·
EfINT COLLECTION:
I
I SIP - Signal Intercept Package - A small unattended
ELINT collection system which covers the frequency ;.
spectrum from 50 MHz to '11, 000 MHz. It was used on "
I three operational missions and all were successful.
System 68 - An advanced ELINT collection system
capable of signal monitoring over a frequency range
of 50 MHz to 12,500 MHz and providing analog · '
recording of the signals. It was successful on 18 ofi
19 missions. The one unsuccessful mission was due to
a drive belt failure. !.··
J ••

'
.1
TOP SECRET
32
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I
HANDLE VIA BY/EMA~
CONTROL SYSTF.lM .:
]:
:

:
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,! I
- --- - I- - - - - --- - - - - - -r.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM RELIABILITY
BLACK SHIELD OPERATIONAL MISSIONS

TYPE SYSTEM MISSIONS SUCCESSES PERCENT

DEFENSIVE 22 22 100%

ELINT COLLECTION 22 21 95. 5%

 ii.I
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':PGP SECRFl'f ; '.

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BYE-8725-68 :!
i
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,
SYSTEM RELIABILITY i
!' - ~
ii
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J :I
L The chart opposite summarizes· three levels of relia.b~·lit.iy·
f1.::'r each major system from 26 . August 1965 through 3 ~ DeceJribe:i:'I : I:
lf)67. The first (red) barometer for each system reflectsj the! :' ,
p~rcent of sorties co1!1p~eted safely by that system re la.tire : ! '
tp the total sorties 1n1tiated for that system. The secop.d · ! . .
1 I
olt' green barometer reflects the percent of the sorties in!iti*-ft~di
w~ich were not prema~urely terminated or aborted be¢ause :! :
t[;at system. The third (black) barometer reflects 1,;he percen;'t ·
pf I
o~ sorties initiated during which that system operated ! 'l .
cpmpletely satisfactorily. Numerical figures used in thei ·
p~rcentages are shown below each barometer. t .,
i ; !

I "Interface" refers to the system listed to the left ~f :!

I
"jin~erface" and accounts for malfunctions which a:e :not ,
a· signable as a fault.of the system itself but which affected

stems. · :
:
t e system's over a 11 opera ti on. Typica1 examples ax·e air~ :: I
aft generat~d electrical ·power or coo~ing air intel'~upt~Onfi>!
such systems as the cameras, navigation and ~tab:i,lity :: ;:
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;! I ,
- --- - I- - - - - . _ - - - - - .. - r SYSTEM RELIABILITY

ALL FLIGHTS SINCE DEBUG MOD WITH DETACHMENT AIRCRAFT 26 AUGUST 1965 - 31 DECEMBER 1967

60
SORTIES FLOWN 270
- SAFE FLT RETURN 692 * 661 724 715 715 715 724 724 * 676 270 270 270
n; II NOT ABORTED
SYSTEM SATISFAC-
692
692
637 711
590 690
712 712
652 689
715 719 720
678 701 705
676
660
269 269
248 250
270
268 ro
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BYE-8i25-68 j · . i:I
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SCOPE CROWN "E" (2 ·AIR REFUELING MISSION);

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j This mission was develop,ed as a camera pac~age; eva1Jati~ni ; '.I ·

,oute. Resolution targets at Phoenix, Arizona, and; A)'ea Jin ;! ' [ i.··1 :!.

re covered. The route a1so incorporates an over-water

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efueling .450 N.M. off the coast of California.. Rokte w~s·
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SCOPE CROWN nEn (TWO AIR REFUELING MISSION)

H.OJIK.

HE9fl.

KANS.

OllLA.
T£X, ARI<.

DISTANCE: 2872 NM
TIME ENROUTE: 2:36 HRS
 11
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BYE-8725-68
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SCOPE CROWN "F" (3 AIR REFUELING MISSION):

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I This mission was developed from SCOPE CROWN "E'.'. · AnJ, I.
afditional air refueling and cruise climb leg was ac;lded tF
s~mulate an operational mission for pilot traini.ng. Miss~on.
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w~s first flown in June 1967.
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SCOPE CROWN "F 0 (3 AIR .REFUELING MISSION)

NEB!f.

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OKLA,
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DISTANCE: 4050 NM
TIME ENROUTE: 3:46 HRS
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BYE-8725-68

A-12 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RELIABILITY

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wh
,ichThe chart opposite reflects the four aircraft accidehts , '
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have occurred during the program through 31 December 19~>7.
;·
' : "! : ..
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I Of interest is the fact that not any of these accide~ts' .· ·
·· I
ipvolved the high Mach number-high temperature regime of • ''
f~ight in which this program has spearheaded the state-of+
tpe-art. Also of interest is that two of these accidentsi .
oycurred in the local home base area within feet of the r¥n- ··
w~r· All of these accidents involved traditional problem$
itiherent in any aircraft. ·
I
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l Aircraft 123's accident occurred on 24 May 1963 away
ftom the base on a routine training flight. It in'volved L
:
I,
al plugged pitot static tube during icing conditions Tesulting:
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I
erroneous cockpit instrument indications of air speed. ·
pilot was ejected safely. .
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d~ring
Aircraft 133ts accident occurred on 9 July 1964
landing· approach. It involved a malfunction of
the flight control surface actuating system resulting in
:-a
al continuous and uncontrollable roll. The pilot was:
ejected safely. : . .;
l
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I Aircraft 126's accident occurred ·on 28 December: 1965!: · !
diring take-off climb-out. It involved a human erro:r whe~.ein
t e flight line electrician co.nnected the wiring for· the y:aw . i
!.

·I
a d pitch gyros of the stability system in reverse. · This !: .· :i
rtsulted in complete uncontrollability of the aircra~t. '!'he ·i
p lot was ejected safely. :_ l . ; I
I Aircraft 125's accident occurred on 5 January 1~67 i:-. ·:
d~ring descent about 85 miles from the base. :i
It involved
alfuel system gaging malfunction resulting in a higher th~n
aqtual indicated fuel quantity reading. Because of this, i
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t~e aircraft was out of fuel before reaching the base. The ! ;!
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lot was killed on impact with the ground because of a ' ··

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om the aircraft.
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- --- .....- - - - - .. - - - - - - -..
A-12 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RELIABILITY

It Sorties Initiated It Sorties Returned

(Sorties Returned - Cumulative) 100

Aircraft 126 Aircraft 125

Crashed Crashed
28 Dec 1965 5 January 67
99.9
Aircraft 133 =1702 ~
Crashed tt:I

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=1704
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=.:
-2666

---
9 July 1964 = =2075 0

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24 May 1963
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 TOP SECRE':F

i BYE-8725'--68
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!! ENGINE RELIABILITY . '
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I The accompanying chart presents J-58 engine abort t !.
reJiability. A differentiation is made between aborts
which occurred at any time during a flight (complete ;f l.ightD
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an4 those which occurred after climb. The aborts which i:· ..''.:
! ;

oc4urred after climb are considered_ to be more representat~ye

of J~hose. which might occur. over d~ni7d territory. The abo1it .
i!.I
retiability on an after climb basis is better than 99%.
Th~s level of reliability is computed on the basis of' 8022
r
J-~8 engine fl.1'ghts which have taken place since the develo,p-
meqt of an op·erable aircraft inlet system on all programs i
inruding the A-12, YF-12, and SR-71. l'
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J-58 ENGINE (ABORT) RELIABILITY FOR ENGINE CAUSE
CUMULATIVE THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1967)
100
T
AFTER CLIMB
I _. ....,.
~
98

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96 ...... ~
OMPLETE FLIGHT .INCLUDES EXPERIENCE ON
A-12, YF-12, SR-71
94

92
NUMBER OF ENGINE FLIGHTS EXAMINED
90 I I •I • I I

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0

10
9
R NUMBER OF ENGINE FLIGlfrS EXAMINED
7' I
6
5
4
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""COMPLETE FLIGHT

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1964 1965 1966 1967
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BLACK SHIELD i.,.:
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DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
I
Al. DEPLOYMENT
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1. 22 May 1967 ACFT NO 131 flew non-stop from

I Area 51 to Kadena AB, Okinawa in 6: 10 hours.'.
The flight required top-off and 3 aeria'l re~
I
I fuelings and attained 79,000 feet during cruise
I
at Mach 2.9· for two legs and 3.1 for one leg. ·1
I 2. 24 May 1967 ACFT NO 127. flew non-stop from
Area 51 ·to. Kadena AB, Okinawa in 6:00 hours ..
:: I
The flight was similar to that of ACFT NO 131 : j
above except an altitude of 81,000 feet was· ; f

I reached during cruise.

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3. 26 May 1967 ACFT NO 129 flew from Area 51 to. l
Wake Island in 4:30 hours. Landing at Wake:Islana :1 j
!
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I was pr.ecautionary due to a malfunctioning ' ,f'
navigation system. The flight was ·made a·t ·Mach 2·l9
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I at 76,000 feet altitude. The aircraft proceeded ( ·J ·if

·t uneventfully to Kadena on 27 May 1967. · i·
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Bf OPERATIONAL SOR'J'IES L. . l
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(All missions employ~d the Type I camera.) {alti ttides. a~d :I
I . Mach numbers. represent maximum attained_ duringy~1s~ifn).j[
. . ·. . I
I 1. BSX-001, 31 May 19.67. Miss~on was flown at ;Mach.~. Iii
I
and 80,000 feet for a durat·ion of 3:45. hour~. I~~ger,y
quality·:· Good. . I JI
I 2 ·. BSX-003 , 10 June 1967 • Mission was f lovm .at Mach ,;_g . l [
and 81; 000 feet :for a duration of 4 :30 hours. j: .~ l
.I
Imagery quality : Good. ·· , .·. , I

: J;'. ;;
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3. BX-6705, 20 June 1967. Mission was :flown at Machia.}!
and 821000 feet for a duration of 5.:30 .hours... ::!; r
4.
Imagery quality: Excellent. . (
BX-6706, 30 June 1967. Missi.on was flown at.. Mach
.
·:.
l
,,3. l,.
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and .81,000 feet for a duration of 5:00 hour~.
Imagery quality : Good.
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'-I BYE-8725-68

I 5. BX-6708, 13 July 1967. Mission was flown at Mach 3.15

and 82,100 feet for a duration of 3:40 hours.
Imagery quality: Good.

I 6. BX-6709, 19 July 1967. Mission was flown at Mach 3. 17

and 82,600 feet for a duration of 4:58 hours. Imagery
quality: Excellent.
I 7. BX-6710, 20 July 1967. Mission was flown at Mach 3.16
and S2,450 feet for a duration of 4:55 hours.
Imagery quality: Good, despite haze problem.
I· BX-6716, 21 August 1967. Mission was flown at Mach 3.2
8.
and So,ooo feet for a duration of 3:55 hours.
I Imagery quality: Good to Excellent.
9. BX-6718, 31 August 1967. Mission was flown at Mach 3.20

,,
I
. 10.
and 81,000 feet for a duration of 5;12 hours.
Imagery quality: Good until camera malfunctioned.
BX-6722, 16 September 1967. Mission was flown at
Mach 3.15 and 80,000 feet for a duration of 4:01 hours.
Imagery quality: Good.

I 11. BX-6723, 17 September 1967. Mission was flown at

Mach 3.16 and 81,000 feet for a duration of 4:00
hours. Imagery quality: Excellent.
I 12. BX-6725, 4 October 1967. Mission was flown at
Mach 3.14 and 81,000 feet for a duration of 4:09
hours. Imagery quality: Excellent.
I 13. BX-6727, 6 October 1967. Mission was flown at
Mach 3.19 and 81,000 feet for a duration of 2:20
I hours. Imagery quality: Good. Mission was
prematurely terminated due to a faulty oil pressure
indicator.
I ....
14. BX-6728, 15 October 1967. Mission was flown at
Mach 3.19 and 81,000 feet for a duration of 3:41
hours. Imagery quality: Good.
I 15. BX-6729, 18 October 1967. Mission was flown at
3.21 and 81,000 feet for a duration of 4:01 hours.
Imagery quality: Good.

t TOP S:SCRE':F

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BYE-8725-68 i
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16. BX-6732, 28 Oct.ober 1967. Mission was flown: at 1·
Mach 3.15 and 83,500 feet :f.9r a duration of ?.:49 i;:
hours. Imagery qua 1 i ty : . Good.~ ..·. .
. ;:.
17. BX-6733, 29 October 1967. Miss±on ·was f lowni"-at
Mach 3.23 and 82,000 feet for a duration of 3:56
· hours. · Imagery quality : · GoQd; -·
18. BX-6734, 30 October 1967. Mission was·flown1at
I
: i

Mach 3.20.and 85,000 feet for a duration.of 3:44 d

Il . ·hours. , Imagery quality:. Good. . ·_.
,. '
i.
.

/ 1e.
I
was :frlowri •at
BXc67.37, 8 . December 1967. ·' Miss.ion
Mach 3.20 and 82,500 feet for a duration.of 3:59 '
'
!.· .
!.I
!.
i
I .. . hours; Imagery qtj.ali ty·; · Good. .·. · .. '

I•I i
;-.
;1
;J
l 20. BX-6738, 10 December 1967. Missi·on was f lowri at Ii : !
Mach 3. 17 and Bl, 000 feet for a duration of 3: 51 .i •
·!i
hours. Imagery qu~lity: · Goo.d'o · · :

,. ,
1
'

21. BX-6739 ,· 15 December 1967 ,' Mission was 'flown at i ·

I. ..
'i
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! Mach 3.20 and 86,000 ~eet for a duration of 4:09 hpurM.

r.,
! : tmaJtery" q~a li ty: Good~ . .. . .' . r ,' !
. i ·: · · r ·i !
. ·1· 22. BX-6740, 16 December 1967. Mission was· flow1i at !. . ::
Mach 3. 20 and S6, 200 feet for a d.ur~ ti on : of ~ : 56 hpurs1.
I . I.m.agery quaii ty: Good~ .. .: .· .. _·;· ' 'j, q
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Withheld from public release

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of the Department of Defense
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(4)
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WARNING - This document contains technical data whose

export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (TITLE 22,
U.S.C., Sec 2751 et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of
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FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(4)

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export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (TITLE 22,

~'
U.S.C., Sec 2751 et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of
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FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(4)

WARNING - This document contains technical data whose

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U.S.C., Sec 2751 et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of
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under statutory authority
of the Department of Defense
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:I WARNING- This document contains technical data whose

export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (TITLE 22,
U.S.C., Sec 2751 et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of
,
I 1979, as amended, Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq. Violations
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of the Department of Defense

!1 FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(4)

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WARNING - This document contains technical data whose
export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (TITLE 22,
U.S.C., Sec 2751 et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of
1979, as amended, Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq. Violations

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WARNING This document contains technical data whose
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.lR.~.ft!§A ..... OXCART

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WARNING
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I
I
I ADVANCED RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT STUDY

I Novemqer 1966

I
I

'-I
I
C. William Fischer,

I Bureau of the Budget

· ·. Herbert D. 'Benington,
...
I Department of Defense

John Pa:t"angosky.

I · Central Intelligence Agency

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I
I Introduction

I This report is submitted by the study group designated by the

Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
. and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to make an appraisal of

I the A-12 (OXCART) and SR-71 aircraft fleets. The report includes
a discussion of: (a) the characteristics and capabilities of these
fleets; (b) the requirements for planned and potential missions of the

I fleets; and (c) five alternative configurations of the two fleets including
consolidation of the assets and storing some aircraft.

I The report is organized as follows:

I. Highlights

II. Resources

"
I III. Mission Requirements

IV. Evaluation of the need for a separate· OXCART fleet~

I V. · Alternatives

I Appendices

(a) Fleet characteristics

I (b} Costs

The findings of the study group in each of ·the 'main sections are

I summarized in a Highlights section of the report which is supported

by th.e more detailed sections.and appendices.

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I I. HIGHLIGHTS

I The purpose of this section of the report is to set out the general
findings and conclusions of the report with regard to the

I II. Resources

III. Mission Requirements

IV. Evaluation of the need for a separate OXCART fleet

I V. Alternatives

These major areas make up the main sections of the more detailed'
I body of the report and are supported by the Apf>endices.
. j

~
Resources

This section of the report addresses the relative technology, the

I operational capabilities, plans and schedules, support facilities and

the costs of the A-12 and the SR-71 aircraft. The general conclusions
are presented here.

I 1. The Aircraft Systems

I The two aircraft systems, the CIA A .. 12 and the USAF SR-71 are
almost equal insofar as general aircraft performance is concerned. The
A-12 flies two or three thousand feet higher at any point along the flight

I profile for a particular range, although the altitude of both aircraft will
vary five to ten thousand feet during the course of flight over denied
territory. Intelligence gathering potential is.. similar in the two systems.

I The SR-71 has a capability for simultaneous operation of several sensors

responding to different parts of the spectrum; the A-12 has a number of
interchangeable single-sensor systems. The A-12 is the predecessor

I program; it is further along, having been declared operationally ready by

the CIA in December 1965. The SR-71 is a later model and has the
slight advantage of more standardization and slightly greater growth

I potential. .The SR-71 currently offers an interim· operational capability

for Cuba, with 45 days prior notic·e, and Southeast.Asia from

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I: Kadena, Okinawa with 90 days prior notice. SAC has informally fore-
casted· that the SR- 71 fleet of aircraft will be fuily operationally ready
I by August 1967.

2. Costs
I This table summarizes the total programmed costs including costs
for tanker supp~rt, cargo and support aircraft sorties, Air Force supply
I issue. Figures are in millions of dollars by FY.

I FY65
& prior FY66 FY67 FY68 FY69 FY70 FY71 FY72

I A-12

SR-71
6io

579 461
89

147
97 110

187
102 95

. 148
93 88

157 140 132

"
Engine R&D 270 64 57 45 35 25 15 5

I Total l~ 459 614 301 342 .294 268 248 225

The total from FY 1966 through FY 1972 for both programs is 2, 292

I
Mission Requirements

I This section discusses the requirement for the advanced aircraft and
compares current and projected capabilities of the advanced aircraft with

I those for satellites and unmanned drones. For the purposes of this study,·
we have found it useful to consider four basic mission requirements: {l) .

I 1. Strategic reconnaissance is peacetime reconnaissance, primarily

I (1) This cat~gorization does not have formal approval by either USIB or
the Department of Defense. ·
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I of the USSR, China, and, their allies. It provides routine intelligence on

I technical, military and economic developments and capabilities. To a much

more limited extent, this reconnaissance is also conducted against neutral
powers.

I 2. Force mobilization reconnaissanc-e would be directed primarily

against China and the European satellites in case of indications that'

I preparations were under way for attack against other nations; This
reconnaissance might also be needed against neutrals.

I 3. Reconnaissance for general war crisis would be directed against the

Soviet Union (and in a number of years against China} in case of a very
intense crisis or of intelligence warning that the Soviet Union might be pre-

I paring for strategic attacks against the United States or Europe.

4. SIOP reconnaissance would be aimed at the .Soviet Union, after a

\-1,
general war broke out, and be against targets that were planned fo be struck
by U.S. strategic forces.

Although these categorizations are useful for analyzing the role of the
advanced aircraft, there is no sharp dividing line between them, Rather
each successive mission requirement reflects reconnaissance under in-

I creasing international tension, broadening conflict, a growing readiness

to take risks, a lessening need for covert reconnaissance, a growing need
to cover more targets simultaneously and to provide results more quickly,

I and an increasing requirement for reconnaissance to support both national

decision-making and tactical commanders.

·1. In terms of these four mission requirements we have reached the

following conclusions:

I 1. Strategic Reconnaissance. The ·advanced aircraft can play at best

a minor role in strategic (routine peacetime} reconnaissance of the
Soviet Union, China, and their allies. Satellite capabilities now exceed
the normally required amount of target coverage for a' given time period,
and the KH-8 and KH-9 systems can greatly increase this capability.
Because of their current acceptability as reconnaissance vehicles, satellites

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I present the lowest risk of incident. The major weakness 0£ the satellites
is their relative inability to provide efficient coverage of a small number
I of isolated targets or events. After mid-1968, advanced drones will
·probably provide this capability for well defended areas. At present,
losses of unmanned drones are· high un,less they are limited to use in areas'
I without sophisticated air defenses. ·

The advanced ail'craft would be useful in strategic reconnaissance of

I areas outside of the Sino-Soviet bloc where SA-2 type defens_es had been
deployed. Cuba and pal'ts of South America. or the Middle East might become

I such areas.· In the absence of sophisticated air defense the U -2 provides

s or.ne capability.

I If the Soviet Union or the Chinese should attempt to neutralize or destroy

reconnaissance satellites, then the OXCART and the SR-71 aircraft do not
promise to be attractive substitutes. The level of technology and the effort

~
required for anti-satellite operations are greater than would be required
against the Mach 3 aircraft. In fact, one of the roles of the Tallinn type
defensive system may well be air defense against the advanced aircraft.

I· In summary,· for peacetime strategic reconnaissance, there does not

seem to be a stl'ong requirement for the high performance aircraft. A

I small fleet of less than half a dozen would be sufficient. ·

2. Reconnaissance of Force Mobilization. For the mission of detecting

I . and reconnoitering mobilization and fol'ce buildup, ·the advanced aircraft

can play a much greater role. The aircraft systems can provide intense
coverage of large border areas and this intense surveillance can be

I maintained almost indefinitely. The satellite systems are now very limited
. in their ability·to be launched on short notice, in their effectiveness for
reconnoitering small or oddly shaped ge;ographical areas, and in the

I timeliness of their return. The KH-9 system will provide much greater
potential coverage with high resolution but current plans will not provide
a capability with rapid response time that endures for more than two months.

A MOL system or a real-time readout for the KH-8 system would provide
additional capabilities. · For this mission, we ha.ve not analyzed the cost
tradeoffs between these advanc~d satellite systems.and the OXCART/SR-71

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I aircraft; however, the need for a large fleet of OXCART and the SR-71
aircraft will be somewhat reduced to the extent that such systems are
I deployed. ·

The unmanned drones currently provide useful intelligence but only

I about 60 percent survive and are recovered. The future drone programs,.
particularly the TAGBOARD drone, will be significantly less vulnerable

I than the current drones.

In those ·situations where conflict has already escalated to the point

I that tactical reconnaissance is under way {such as in North Vietnam today),

then this reconnaissance can go far to s;upplernent the advanced aircraft.
Also, there could be situations where the need for extensive reconnaissance
1· would force escalation to tactical reconnaissance (and it would therefore
be available for national needs) even before other tactical air operations
were undertaken.. Cuba was an example.

'-
I
In summary, we conclude that the force mobilization mission will
. continue in the early seventies to be an important mission for the advanced
aircraft no matter what developments ·are incorporated in the satellite
programs. .The size of the fleet should provide for this type of recon-
naissance in two theaters· and should be able to support the intelligenc.e '

I needs of both national decision authorities and of U.S. and allied tactical
commanders in the theater. In the worst case· as many as a dozen aircraft
could be needed for these missions.
'

I 3. Reconnaissance for General War Crisis. For brink-of-war

reconnaissance of the Soviet Union· in the next several years, the collection

I capabilities of the advanced aircraft systems are much superior to

satellites or drones. Six aircraft cquld cover hundreds of targets in the
Soviet Union and return their product within a day •. Current satellites are

I limited in their response time. and current drones in their range and .
survivability. In the next several years, satellite51 will become more
competitive for the brink-of-war reconnaissance role if quick readout is
I developed with the KH-8, or if an enlarged quick reaction capability is

I
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I .. provided for either the KH-8 o:r the KH-9, or possibly i£ the MOL .
is deployed. Similarly, the TAGBOARD drone will have the range of
I· the advanced aircraft and may have somewhat better survivability.
Finally, the future of the advanced aircraft and_ drones is clouded"by
potential current or future developmei:its fn ..Sovie't air defense. ·
I As yet, there has been no thorough analysis or conclusive evidence
that indicates how useful or feasible crisis reconnaissance would be
I against Soviet strategic forces. There is no data base that allows a
comprehensive comparison of the normal and crisis appearance of these

I forces, of the degree to which such changes can be detected photographically,

and Qf the frequency and time urgency of these flights.

I Current plans call for six simultaneous sorties over the Soviet Union
in a crisis situation. Since these sorties might be interpreted as an
attack, they might present a high risk of escalating the crisis. The extent
of this risk would depend heaVily on the previous conduct of the crisis

·'I - and on other indications by the United States at the time the aircraft were
commit.:ted. ·

In summary, for brink-of-war reconnaissance of the Soviet Union, the

aircraft systems have considerable. value at present and in the immediate .t.

I future. This value will become somewhat less as advanced drones become ;
operational, or if quick reaction capabilities are incorporated in advanced
satellites, or if it becomes apparent that the Soviet Union or the Chinese

I have deployed defensive systems that are especially capable of dealing

with manned aircraft. Finally, the numbers of aircraft planned for this
mission requirement should be conditioned by possible enemy reactions.

I 4. SIOP Reconnaissance. For the SIOP reconnaissance mission, side-

looking :radar is the most useful sensor bee-a.use it is unaffected by weather,

I lighting conditions, and clouds produced by nuclear detonations or fire

storms. The SR-71 fleet carries such a radar; the OXCART will have a
three aircraft capability;' and the earliest satellite capability could only be

I available in 1970.

However, a satellite system, with side-looking radar, appears to compete

I
•I
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I very favorably with the SR-71. Pre-launch and initial penetration

I capability of the satellites appear significantly higher than for the

aircraft system and its tankers. For both the satellites and the aircraft,
there would be a serious problem in recovering the data, interpreting

I results, and transmitting the finished. intelligence to decision makers.

There needs to be further study of the relative capabilities of satellites,
aircraft, and other sensors in assessing SIOP strike effectiveness. If a

I satellite capability is developed for the SIOP reconnaissance role, then

the main value of the advanced aircraft in a general war might be post-
attack. photographic reconnaissance after diminution of the disrupting

I effects of the early nuclear exchanges. ·

In the worst case, three of the above-mentioned requirements might need

I to be satisfied simultaneously: reconnaissance of force mobiliza.tion 1 crisis .

·reconnaissance of the Soviet Union, and maintenance of the SIOP 11 hard

-.
I
alert 11 force. This would require a fleet of about thirty aircraft. However,
in a crisis situation, aircraft could be diverted from routine strategic
reconnaissance missions. If the fleet of advanced aircraft were reduced
(for example, by attrition), some aircraft could be diverted, at a time of
cr~sis, from force mobilization reconn;;tissance to the crisis reconnaissance
of the Soviet Union.

I Finally, during the·next several years, the advanced aircraft are

uniquely capable in all four of these mission areas subject to the deploy-
. ment of improved Soviet or Chinese air defenses. However, the develop-

I ment of certain satellite and drone capabilities could supplant some of the
aircraft capabilities by the late 1960's. In particular, the .future
satellites and drones may play an increasing role in surveillance of the

I Soviet Union during crisis or general war;

Evaluation of the Need for a Separate OXCART Fleet·

I This section considers the need for and value of the special covert
and civilian characteristics of the separate OXCART fleet. · The most
I significant aspects of the question are:

l. lf the fleet is under military sponsorship the President may be

I
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more reluctant to approve its use initially in peacetime or a potential

eris i's.

2. One of the greatest potential difficulties ~f maintaining a

separate fleet and dual management is that in an escalating situation,
principal advisors to the President may be required to resolve detailed
questions of schedules, targeting and support associated with the need

I to coordinate the resources.

3. If the military sponsorship of a detected overflight is established,

I :the Soviets or Chinese might consider the flight :more provocative. These
reactions may be minimized by the use of civilian crews ·and unmarked
airc:raft, under military sponsorship.
...\"

I Other relevant considerations are:

!'9 4. The value of the covert characteristics of the separate OXCART

fleet is limited by the officially exposed SR-71 military aircraft with a
very similar configuration so that the risk of incident through public

I declarations by the Soviets or the Chinese is not reduced to any_.gFeat

extent by maintaining the separate fleet.··-·-~· ·---··-·
•·...

5. lri the event of an incident using the aircraft,. established military ··

sponsorship would probably reduce the ability and disposition of friendly or··
neutral governments either to avo~d comment or to support the
United States need for the reconnaissance.

6. The command and communications channels would be equally

11
!
responsive and rapid under either an all military or a CIA command
structure.

ii 7. The CIA intelligence channels for dealing with foreign govermnents

are more r~pid and direct in matters of basing and. aftel."-the-fact cover
stories. However, these probably could be used in arrangements for
~1 11 black11 flights under a military command. ·

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I ·Alternatives

I This section discusses a number of alternatives for the future of the

OXCART and, the SR-71 programs. Specifically, the section provides

I a general analysis of ( l) possible actio!ls to curtail the combined programs;

(2) factors affecting the size of both fleets; and (3) costs of alternative
fleet structures and sizes (including combined basing). This section also

I identifies three principal alternatives for decision including: (1) continuing

both fleets at the currently approved levels; (2) mothballing the OXCART
aircraft but maintaining a separate fleet by sharing SR-71 aircraft between

I SAC and CIA; and (3) terminating the OXCART prograrn and transferring
mission responsibilities to SAC.

I Principal conclusions of this section are as follows:

1. The major decision issue is whether or not the projected total number

·~
of aircraft in the combined fleets will be needed once the entire SR- 71 fleet
becomes fully operational in the fall of 1967. Storing all the A-12 aircraft
and maintaining only the SR-71 fleet will reduce five-year costs by 2.6. 5 to

I 18. 3 percent or $365 to $252 million, and only siightly reduce the numbers
and types of reconnaissance missions that could be conducted simultaneously.
The higher savings result from using a single SAC-operated fleet for all '·

I missions; and the lower, by alloq:i.ting eight SR-71 aircraft to the c'IA and :.x·
retaining the separate base and covert characteristics of the OXCART fleet.

I 2. The four major factors that most affect fleet size are: ( l) the
attrition rate from normal operations of both aircraft; (2) the need for the
types of manned reconnaissance missions for which these aircraft are

I ~rnit:ed; (3) the probability of ha.ving to conduct these missions si.multancously;

·and (4) the ability 0£ sa.tolHtes, U ~z a:ircra.ft and drones to po:rform some of
the various missions now and in the future. ·None of these factors can be
I precisely determined without much more study or experience.

3. If both the OXCART a.nd the SR-71 aircraft types are to be continued,
I it is very questionable that the size of either or both fleets should be re-
duced at this time since sa.:v:i:ngs achieved by fleet :r:eduction tend to be
small in relation to the resulting reduction in activity.
I

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I 4. The five-year savings from. any form of base consolidation

I are small -- less than five percent of the five-year costs. Compared
to more conventional aircraft programs, base support for the OXCART
and SR-71 contributes relatively little to the over-all expense of the

I program. Also because of current .crqwding at Beale·, consolidation

there at this time would incur high one-time costs.

5. If the size of the combined fleet is to be reduced at th{s time

it would be wi.se to store rather than to destroy aircraft. As pointed
·out in (2}, there is still significant uncertainty as to the factors affecting

I. fleet size. Mothballing costs little and provides an important hedge

during the next several years at least.

I 6. Five alternatives with variations were considered by the study

group and are described in the de_tailed narrative,. but due to the findings
stated above, the group has identified three principal alternatives for

.~
decision:

( l) Maintain the status quo and continue both fleets at the currently

I approved levels. This provides for two bases and:

.·Total approved aircraft 41

I Less: ·Training and test aircraft

Aircraft under major overhaul
-6
-3
Assumed attrition thrbugh 1970 -3

I Available operational aircraft through

the end of 1970 29
I Costs; ($ in millions} FY 1968 FY 1969 FY 1968M72
$341 $295 .$11377
I
I
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·I Possible Mission Operational Aircraft

I Cov'erage.

A. Strategic Reconnaissance
OXCART . SR-71

3*
Total

2* 5
I B. Force Mobilization
Reconnaissance 5* 9
C. General War

I D.
Crisis/Brink
SIOP
-7
. 7*
8
7
8
22"' - -z-9
I :i.:cThese aircraft could be used interchangeably between
the three missions {A, B and C) as priorities dictate.
I (2) Mothball all A-12 aircraft but maintain OXCART capability
by sharing SR-71 aircraft between SAC and CIA; make primary

\ assignments of missions A and B to the. OXCART fleet and missions

C and D to the SR-71 fleet. This provides for two bases and:

I Total approved aircraft

Less: Mothballed A-12 1 s
41
-11
Training and test aircraft -4
·I 'Aircraft under major overhaul
Assumed attrition through 1970
-2
-2

I Available operational aircraft through

the end of 1970 22

I Cost Savings: ($ i.n millions) FY 1968

-$28
FY 1969
"".$64
. FY 1968-72.
-$252 .

Percent reduction of.costs 18.% .·Percent reduction of activity - 26%

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Operational Aircraft
Possible Mission OXCART
Coverage {SR-7l 1 s) . SR-71 Total

A. Strategic Reconliaissan.ce 3* --0- 3

I B. Force Mobilization
Reconnaissance 5* -0- 5
I c. General War
Crisis/Brink -0-* 6* 6
I :D. SIOP -0- 8 8

I 8 14 22

*These aircraft could be used· interchangeably between the

\ three missions (A, and C) as priorities dictate.

(3) Terminate the OXCART fleet in January 1968 four months

I after the SR-71 fleet becomes fully operational, and assign all
missions to the SR-71 ·n~et. This provides for a single base and:

1· Total approved aircraft

Less: Mothballed A-12 1 s
41
-11
Training and·test aircraft -4
I Aircraft under major overhaul
Assumed att:r:ition through 1970
-2
-2.

I Available operational aircraft through

the end of 1970. . 22

I Cost savings ($in millions} FY 1968

-$45
. FY 1969
-$88
FY 1968-72
-$365

I Percent reduction· of costs .i. 27% Percent reduction of activity - 26%

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l'OP SBCRE'F
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 •(-. 1'-1 •. •' • • . ..
~ .· -' ... ' ..·
•

C05492939
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I
Possible Mission Ope:rational Ai:rcraft
I Coverage SR-71

A. Strategic Reconnaissance
I B. · Force. Mobilization Reconnaissance

I C. General War
Crisis/Brink ,

I D. SIOP 8

zz
I *These aircraft could be used interchangeably between the
three :missions (A, B and C) a,.s priorities dictate.

'9 Although it is difficult to equate sortie rat.es to numbers of

aircraft, the following table displays possible rates fo:r the three
1 decision alternatives. The rates shewn assume: (1) one to two
$Orties per week. f'.or a three aircraft deployment; (2} one sortie
per day for a four to five aircraft deployment; and (3) one to one
I and a half sortie.s per day for a six to eight aircraft deployment.
'
:
.

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".. :.. ·.,
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 C05492939.
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I
Possible Sortie Rates

I I - Status Quo II·-· Share' SR-71"III - Terminate . ·,,

OXCART
I A. ·Strategic
Reconnaissance
-A/C
5
Sorties.
l per
day
-
A/C Sorties
1 - 2 per.
A/C
- Sorties
1 - 2 per
3 week 3 week
I B. Force Mobilization 2 per 1 per
Reconnaissance 9 day 5 day ·5 1 per day
I c. General War 1. 5 per· 1 .,. l. 5'
'Crisis/Brink ' 7. day 6. per day 6 l - 1. 5 per
I D. SIOP 8 6 one time 8 6 one time· 8
day
6 one time·

·t.
I
f·• .
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I II. RESOURCES

I This sec·tion o:f the paper addresses the re la ti ve technology

operational capabilities, plans and schedules, support facilitie~,
and the costs of the A-12 and the SR-71 aircraft.

I The two aircraft systems, the'~IA A-12 and the USAF SR-71
are almost equal insofar as general aircraft performance is con-
cerned. The A-12 flies two or three thousand feet higher at any
I point along the flight profile for a particular range, although
the altitude of both aircraft will vary five to ten thousand
feet during the course of flight over denied territory. Intelli-
I gence gathering potential :is similar in the two systems. The
SR-71 has a capability for simultaneous operation of several
sensors responding to different parts of the.spectrum; the A-12
has a number of interchangeable single-sensor systems. Finally,
I the A-12. is the predecessor program; it is somewhat further
along, having been declared operationally, ready in December 1965 .
.
. The SR-71 currently offers an interim operational capability for

'-I
Cuba, with 45 days prior notice, and SEA; from Kadena; Okinawa
with 90 days prior notice. SAC forecasts that the SR-71 fleet of
aircraft will .be fully operationally ready by August 1967.
BACKGROUND
The A-12 (OXCART) was conceived and designed as a successor :
I to the U-2. Developed, procured and operated by the CIA, it is
a single seat aircraft. The SR-71 is a successor aircraft de-
signed and procured for SAC. It is a heavier, two-seat aircraft
I which carries a pilot and a reconnaissance systems operator.
The programmed flight capabilities of the two aircraft are so
similar that they can be treated as interchangeable.

I In a typical flight profile, the aircraft would enter denied

territory at an altitude of over 76,000 feet, flying at Mach 3.1.
It would cruise at this speed, steadily climbing until exiting
I at maximum altitude, above 84,000 feet,
The SR-71 is based at Beale Air Force Base in California.
I The A-12 is based at Area 51, a classified facility in Nevada.
Kadena Air Base, Okinawa bas been provisioned for the A-12, for
use in operations against Southeast Asia; some of this provision-
ing would be usable by the SR-71 if it were to be deployed to
I Kadena. Common fuel dumps have been establi~hed at five U.S.

•I
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· ·Cf'O~ SE ORE T
: . -. . ·· .
. · :•·, .
 -...... .............. ........... -··· ...·-··--··-·· ---·· -···-·--· .. ··•·· ............ ..
c 0 5 4 9 2 9 3 9 ---~ ....... ~ ~ ~·---·

-----·
··-·····~·····-·-- ·;

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I and five overseas locations for operational and emergency use.

There ~s about 60% commonality in AGE and base facilities.
I AVAILABILITY
Readiness of the A-12 for reconnaissance operations with
I defensive EWS for operations over Cuba (from Nevada) and over
Southeast Asia (from Okinawa) has been established, The SR-71
also can accomplish such missions with an interim operational
I· capability for Cuba, with 45 days prior notice and Southeast
Asia, from Kadena, Okinawa with 90 days prior notice. .Specially.
developed EWS equipment for the SR-71 ·H;-· scheduled :for test
I within six months and forecast ready for operational use in
about a year. Meanwhile, if a decision is made to use A-12
or U-2 EWS on an interim basis, a limited number ot·sR-71 air-
·craft probably could be so equipped within two to. six months.·
I An Okinawa deployment of the SR-71 would partially use pre-
positioned assets of the A-12 program. The table below indicates
the current sta.tus of the various equipments:

.'9·
I
I
I
I
I
I
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?='OP. SECJXET
: :... ~· :· ·. ,. ·. _., .·
·····
 .. • •
··-,·~-- --······-~ ... I
~--- ....... __
•
~· ·~- ...,..... ,,,. ......
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I AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

I · Planned Ready 10/1/66

Ready
·5/l/67
Ready
8/1/67
A-12 SR-71 A-!2 SR-71 SR-71 SR-71 ·L

I Operational Aircraft 8 26 7 8 18 23
Technical ~bjective
I Camera 13 18 7 9 18
Operational· Obj.

I Camera

Terrain Objective
0 18 . 11 18 18.

Camera 0 18
I Infrared Sensor l 8
16
2
18

7
18

8
~. · Side Looking Radar 3 24 9 19 24

~
0 1
I . 1.-,.l_ _ l_s_ox_1_,E_.o_._13_s2_6_I_ ___.I
0 o(3)
;
Electro-Magnetic Recording r
I or Signal Intercept
Package 8 8 8 0 3 '6

I Maintenance Recording
System or Birdwatcher 14 35 14 8 12 23
·R~tab
.I .Electronic Warfare System 8

System XVII 2
·8

o<4)
I In the above table, the. three different types of
A-12 cameras are lumped as "tech.nica1· objective~' cameras.

I (1)
(2)
(3)
Available
Available
Available
Apr. 1967
Jan. 1967
Mar. 1967

I (4) Available Oct. 1967

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. ' ..
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. ..... · .
~-C05492939 ···-· .. , .............,. . ...............
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' .

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ii
.,

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I Capabilities

I 1. Sensor Systems: The A-12 is essentially a single

sensor technical reconnaissance system; the SR-71 is a multi-
sensor system with capability for simultaneous collection of

I photographic, high resolution radar, and infrared intelligence.

Both aircraft can carry auxiliary'ELINT/COMINT collection systems.
Sensor Parameters
I System Specif Reso Achieved Linear ..
Lateral
-,:·..:~

feet Resolution-ft-"'"'"~-coverage Mi Coverage Mi

I Tech Obj
A-12

1.0-
SR-71

0.63ft.0.9- . *l. 64
A-12
-·- SR-71 A-12

1600
SR-71
·2140
A-12
39-63
SR-71
2@5*
1.5 1.25 to
I "(3 diff
Sys.)
3400

~
Oper Obj 1. 75 3.0 4000 .,.. 26
Ter Obj 16.5 16.5 ·8500 21
I Infrared 40 85 60 not
meas
4250 10,200 20 28.

I Radar 10x20 50
30
12x21 50
30
1500 4000 20 20
10

I *Expect 0.63 ft. resolution by April 1967

**Two 5 run swath widths located up to 19.5 run on
either side of .track.

I With the SR-71, hotp the Technical Objective (TO) Camera and the
SLR can be operated atmrious range offsets, under the control
of the Sensor Officer on board the aircraft. .The A-12 has three
I different cameras, equivalent in mission to the TO camera, any
one only of which can be carried on a photographic mission as
needed. Detailed performances and modes·of operation and
I interpretation of the photography from these cameras are different,
and the choice will need be made on the particular needs of the
mission. The A~12 has the capability of carrying a gamma
spectrometer and particulate samplers as auxiliary equipments.
I
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I 2. Range: Planned original objective range for the

A-12/SR-7T aircraft was about 4000 nautical miles. Both air-
I craft are expected to achieve, in near term (within 12 months),
an unrefueled range of 3200 nautical miles, with an eventual
(2-3 years) extension of 3600 to 3750 nautical miles, extrap-
olated from a range of about 3000 µautical miles currently
I demonstrated in both programs with :flight test aircraft. The
extrapolation considers improvements planned in equipments and
flight techniques. The A-12 has demonstrated a range of 2580
I nautical miles on a simulated operational mission profile; the
SR-71 llas not yet attempted such demonstration in operational
aircraft, but is expected to have a similar capability when-
ever operational mission simulations are exercised. The total
I range of both aircraft can be extended by aerial refueling.
The A-12 has a capability for five refuelings and has currently
demonstrated four. The SR-71 has an equivalent potential
I capability but current1y is being limited temporarily to -~'­
three ref_uelings because of nitrogen depletion and wing fuel
tank sealant problems. The A-12 aircraft does not have wing

~
fuel tanks .. A new sealant is under development and is to be
tested between now and June 1967. Tentatively, it is planned
to:in.corporate the improved tank sealant in the SR-71 during
IRAN 1 s, expected to commence- in the second half of 1967.
I 3. Altitude: At the current maximum-range :flight opera-
tional mission profiles for the A-12, the. altitude varies from {
I 76,000 feet to 84,500 feet during the Mach 3.1 cruise. With
higher gross weight, the SR-71 generally will be about 2,000
to 3,000 feet lower in altitude during a similar range profile.
I It is expected that long-term developments will give the A-12
a maximum altitude capability of about 94,000 feet at the end
of cruise and the SR-71 about 91,000 feet. The maximum altitude '·
demonstrated on flight test aircraft to date has been 90,000
I · feet .
.VULNERABILITY
I 1. Non-Soviet Areas of Operations: ~oth the A-12 and the
SR-71 aircraft are considerea to be virtually invulnerable to
I current known .d.eployed fighters, AAA, and the S-band SA-2.
The mor~ advanced C-band SA-2 has a very low probability of
success against the A-12 equipped with its current EWS and a
limited capability against .the SR-71 or A-12 . aircraft without
I . .

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~1
its EWS. It is expected that the SR-71 will have at least an
equiva~ent EWS for operations by the end of 1967 unless a
I decision.is made to use A-12 or U~2 EWS sooner on an interim
basis.

·1 2. Soviet Union Area of Operation: With developing

improved "SA-2 and advanced' fighter systems within the Soviet
Union it is expected that the Soviets have a higher but as
1
yet,undefined probability of success against both the A-12
I and the SR-71.in case of attempted overflight. As hard
evidence becomes available, particularly about .improved Sk~2,
vulnerability assessments'will be updat·ed~-"--··· · ··
I COSTS
This table summarizes the total programmed costs including
I costs for tanker support cargo and support aircraft sorties and
Air Force supply issue.. Figures are in millions of dollars.
by FY.

'-I A-12
FY 65
& Prior. FY 66
610 89
FY 67
97
FY 68
110
FY 69
102
FY 70
95
FY 71
. 93
FY 72
88
:
SR-71 579 461 147 187 157 148 140 1'32
I Engine R&D 270 64 57 45 35 25 15 5

I Total
Program 1459·. 614 301 342 294 268 248 225

I SUPPORT
1. Base facilities: About 1500 persons, including military
and CIA civilian employees, support the OXCART project at Area 51,
I Nevada. Of these, 650 are in direct support of launching opera-
tions and 850 are in indirect support such as logistics, fire-
fighting, guards, etc. A total of twenty-one million dollars
I has been invested in Area 51 for runways, buildings, housing,
navigational aids, water supply, etc. This base is now self-
sufficient and no further investment is planned.
I
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I . TS~ SE ORE'!!
.....
···,:' ..
';.·.
C05492939
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I
,. The SR-71 aircraft are assigned to the 9th Strategic
Reconn~issanoe Wing at Beale Air Force Base, California.
This wing has 1,300 persons assigned for direct support of the
aircraft. Indirect support consists of .400 personnel at
Edwards Air Force Base and 333 in base support augmentation
at Beale AFB with activation of the SR-71 program there.
I Fifteen million dollars has been invested in construction of
additional facilities to support the SR-71 wing.

I Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) investment is $47 million

for the SR-71 and $30 million for the A-12. Approximately 60%
of AGE and base facilities are common or interchangeable.
I 2. Training: The A-12 pilot .is fully responsible for
operation of aircraft, sensors, and navigation. His basic
· training consists of a ground school course and 21 sorties
I in the A-12 for a total of 56 hours. Continuation training
in the A-12 consists of 18 sorties per quarter; collateral
training is in a F-101 aircraft.· He also has 148 hours of

~
academic and field training annually.
The SR-71 is operated by two officers: a pilot operates
the aircraft, and a reconnaissance systems operator is respon-
·I sible for navigation and systems operation. Training consists
of 13 weeks of ground school, nine simulator rides, and 13 SR-71
sorties. Aircrew proficiency t~aining continues with a minimum
I of 12 SR-71 sorties per quarter. Collateral flight training
for the pilot is in a T-38. Simulator training is available
at Beale AFB for both A-12 and SR-71 aircrews.
I 3. Tanker Support: The 903rd Air Refueling Squadron
with 20 UE KC-135 modified aircraft stationed at Beale AFB is
responsible for tanker support to both the SR-71 and the A-12.
I Each aircraft requires the support of one tanker for each
training refueling. Deployment to Kadena, by either aircraft,
· would require three refuelings enroute; Each dep+oyment of
I operational air refueling is supported by a primary and an
air-spare tanker.

I Fifty-two·tanker sorties per month are required for A-12

training, 283 tanker sorties per month for SR-71 training.
Each tanker aircraft is capable of 11 refueling sorties per
month.
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. ·. - . :~ .. . . .. ' ..
:.: '
<.:: '· ... .·.··•
 ' ,,.. . . ... ...... ; ~~·
; •• • • ··• ................. , .. ~. f"' • • • ... • ........... ,_ • .. .. -~ .. .
•;•··., . ·.'
C05492939
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I '
The planned tanker complement:
Beale AFB, Calif.
I 20 UE aircraft - 15 for support of
A-12 and 5 UE for support of SR-71
McCoy AFB, Fla. 20 UE aircraft primarily for support
I of the'SR-71
Little Rock AFB, Ark. 15 UE aircraft primarily for
I 4. Film Processing and Interpretation Support: A-12
support of the SR-71

sensor films would. be processed at Eastman Kodak Company in

I Rochester, New York. This facility is staffed with 211 people
and is presently. being used for other NRO programs; readout
. would be at NPIC.
I The SR-71 program has a processing and interpretation
squadron attached and in-place at Beale AFB. Manned with 400

~
personnel, it has a capability of deploying detachments to
overseas bases. Coverage ca~ be provided in six hours and
initial photo interpretation reports can be provided by this
unit 12 hours after a landing at Beale AFB. Similar timing
I capability is available for the A-12 at Eastman Kodak Company
or the 67 Reece Tech Squadron Unit at Yakota AFB, if deployed
to Kadena.. ·
I In general, photographic product from either program could
be processed at the SR-71 facility (at Beale or where deployed).
at Eastman Kodak or at the 67 Reece. Tech Squadron. Timin·g :for.
I initial and final readout is dependent-··upoti- location of the .
SR-71 facility, operational aircraft landing base and/or flying
time to transmit product to Eastman Kodak Company and to
I Washington, D.C. ·
5. Support Aircraft: The A-12 program uses eight F-101
I aircraft ~or pilot proficiency training and A-12 chase. A
C-130 aircraft is provided for personnel movement and classified
cargo such as cameras, etc. An H-43B aircraft is used at Area 51
I :ror search and rescue and paramedic jump training. There are
two 'I'-33 ai:t'c:eaft for rapid tr:.tnsportation and jot qualification
of pilots. One U-3B aircraft is available for emergency air
evacuation, search and securi.ty patrol o:f the area.
I
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COMINT Cori.trols

I The SR-71 wing has six T-38 aircraft in direct support of

pilot proficiency training. Two T-29 and two T-33 aircraft
I plus base assigned aircraft are shared by the SR-71 program.
Both programs use MAC aircraft as needed for additional logistic
support.
I 6. Kadena Support:The A-12'program has pre-positioned
l,000,000 pounds of equipment at Kadena Air Base. Construction
necessary to support operational missions is completed.
I Nineteen persons are in place to maintain equipment and
facilities :Eor immediate us'e.

I A-12 operations from Kadena would be commanded and con-

trolled from Headquarters ~.:!?- Washington. Operational missions
can be flown from Kadena t~ days after mission approval.
I The A-12 program plans 225 persons deployed to Kadena
during operations. The A-12 program can support t:w.o±vePwE
operational missions per month with three deployed aircraft.
\ Use of these facilities by the SR-71 would require small
extension to the hangar and pre-positioning of some additional
supplies and AGE. The SR-71 program would have one .sortie
I per day wit:h 4 aircraft or one sortie per week with 2 aircraft.
SAC estimates an operational capability about 90 days after
. I
notice to deploy. The SR-71 is programming 363 persons to (
l

I
.
Kadena (for one sortie per day rate of operation) for support
of the SR-71 and photo lab, ·

I
I
I
I
I
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I III. MISSION REQUIREMENTS

I This section discusses the requirement for the advanced aircraft and
coinpares current and projected capabilities of the advanced aircraft with

I those for satellites and unmanned dron.es. For the purposes of this study,
we have :found it useful to consider £our'basic 'mission requirements:

I 1. Strategic reconnaissance is peacetime reconnaissance, primarily

of the USSR, China, and their allies. It provides routine intelligence on
technical, military and economic developments and capabilities. To a

I much more limited extent, this reconnaissance is also conducted against

neutral powers.

I 2. Force mobilization reconnaissance would be directed primarily

against China and the European satellites in case of indications that
preparations were under way for attack against other nations. This

\.
reconnaissance might also be needed against neutrals.

3. Reconnaissance for general war crisis would be directed against

I the Soviet Union (and in a number of years against China} in case of a very
intense crisis or of intelligence warning that the Soviet Union might be
preparing for strategic attacks against the United States or Europe.

I SIOP reconnaissance would be aimed. at the Soviet Union, after a

4.
general war broke out, and be against targets that were to be str~s:1:__by

I U.S. strategic forces. -~---""---•·----,._

A. Strategic Reconnaissance

I Strategic reconnaissance is the routine collection of intelligence

data during peacetime on technical progress, industrial and.urban.
I development, military force deployment, and military readiness of foreign
nations. The principal target areas .for this mission are the Soviet Union,
China. and their allies. Currently, the strategic reconnaissance mission
I against these areas is being conducted pl"imarily by satellites with unmanned
d1·one s and. U -2' s being .used against China.

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I In the table below, we compal.'e the relative capabilities of the·

I a.dvan·ced aircraft to.conduct strategic reconnaissance against central

China. The USSR is the other primary area where there is an extensive
strategic reconnaissance requirement, A comparison for the Soviet

I Union between the high performance aircraft and satellite and drone
capabilities is. essentially the same except that the following additional
factors favor satellites over the aircraft:
····1· I. The area of the Soviet Union is almost twice that of China.

I 2. The more northerly location of the Soviet Union favors more

rapid coverage from satellites in polar orbits.

I 3. There are currently more than ten times as many intelligence

·targets in the Soviet Union as in China.

·~
4. Soviet air defenses are a generation ahead of the Chinese.

5. The risk .of incident tnr·ough loss of an aircraft over the Soviet

I Union is high.

6. The USSR has tacitly acquiesced to satellite overflights.

I At Present, USIB has established ~40 high xesolution targets in

central China to be covered yearly with 50% coverage required every·

I · 6 months. On.a ~onthly basis, the requiremen~ and current and pro-
jected coverage are as follows: ·
Targets

I Target Looks/Month Accessible ·

Current USIB requirement 28

I ·Current satellites (norm.al operation)

Current drones (10 flights/month using 147H)
32
·260
100%
about 80%
Current U-2 {4 flights/month) 400 100%
I Advanced ~atellites (normal operations in 1969)
Advanced drones (5 flights/month in late 1968)
300
280
100%
80-90 %
'oXCART/SR-71 (4 flights/month) . 240 70-80 %
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I For current drones a.nd the U-2, the above represent estirna.ted capabilities,

I not the results of. actual operations.

Use of the OXCART or SR-71 aircraft over China for strategic

I reconnaissance in the next several ye~rs seems to b.e contingent upon:

1. A many-fold increase in the required rate of target reconn~issance;

"I or
2. An unwillingness to use the more vulnerable 147H series drones
or the U-2 aircraft over the Chinese Mainland; or

I 3. The need for the spot targeting capability of the aircraft to cover
small areas and special events; or

I 4. Confidence that the advanced aircraft are almost invulnerable

against current defenses.

~ Beyond 1969, additional factors will probably argue against use of

the aircraft:

I l. Satellites with improved coverage and resolution;

i.

·1 2. Drones with increased range and survivability; !"

3. Improved Chinese air defenses.

I· Accordingly, the requirement for using the aircraft for strategic
reconnaissance seems limited to two situations: ·
I 1. Reconnaissance of Communist or neutral naoons outside of the
Soviet or Chinese Bloc (such as Cuba or, for example, in the Middle
I East.)

2. High priority spot targeting in China.

I .Neither of these uses creates~ high d.emand fo1{sorties.

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I B. Force Mobilization Reconnaissance

.[ This requirement is to detect and survey the mobilization and the

build-up of conventional or nuclear forces in major areas other than
the Soviet Union itself. Areas and sit~tions that might .be targeted
l include:

I. South China and North Vietnam if there were indications that

a massive intervention were under way by the Chine$e;

l
I
Z. Manchurian China and North Korea if a threat seemed to be
developing against South Korea and U.S. forces stationed there;

.l ·3.. Cuba if current reconnaissance indicated that the Soviets were

,
introducing new weapons;

4. East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia if there were indications·

'
of a Warsaw Pact build-up, or if there were an East German uprising and
Soviet intervention;
] 5. Sino-Indian border at the request of the Indian Government for
!
both warning and tactical intelligence; , ·.

.I
~· '

. 6. Middle East or South America .

.I A requirement for such reconnaissance could be char.acterized as

follows:

I. 1. In the early phases of the reconnaissance, the collection would

be targeted against national needs :for broad situation assessment and
strategic warning. !£the conflict continued or escalated, the tactical

I intelligence requirements of U.S. or allied commanders would be added

so that coverage would need to become more frequent, to be directed at
additional targets, and to produce more detailed data on most targets.
I For example, after the initial detection of offensive missiles in Cuba,
s
the preponderance of reconnaissance in Cuba. {from high level U-2 1 and
froro low level TAC and Navy aircraft) supported planning of air
I.
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I interdiction and invasion. Similarly, most of the current reconnaissance

·. in Sm.~theast Asia is used by MACV, CINCPAC and SAC. In sliort, a

I situation requiring CIA missions for national intelligence such as

BLACK SHIELD using three aircraft for nine sorties a month could.·
develop into one requiring a six aircraft SAC effort for both national
I and tactical needs providing 30 sorties .a month.

2. The area to be covered is liable to be oddly shaped and smaller

I than continental areas for which satellites are most efficient.

3. Reconnaissance may be· needed suddenly (initial coverage in a day

I or two), frequently (daily), and up-to-date (only several days at most
from an event to an informed decision maker).

I 4. The target system will be ill.-defined at first and dynamic

..I
throughout the period. There will be a constant need for both search
and spotting .

5. The area may be defended by quite sophisticated air defenses

that would argue against using U-2 1 s or current" unmanned drones, It may
b.e very much in the U.S. int~rest to avoid losses of reconnaissance ·
vehicle.a.
, ..

I 6. In the early stages of the crisis, tactical intelligence might be

necessary but use of the advanced aircraft to satisfy this need might be
!

preferable to tactical aircraft which might disclose U'·. S. intention.@~.'

I •.:..w.,~•••

One typical situation is the South China - North Vietnamese area.

The following :table compares the advanced. systems, satellites and ·
I drones against the current USIB list of 1 78 targets with respect to
three criteria: . · · · · ·

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..
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,,,_":" ~. ~ .
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Target Looks/ Endurance Minimum. Re spons

Day {Mos} Time (Days)*

OXCART/SR-71
{one sortie/day} 32 indefinite 1

Cur rent Satellites

(one KH-4 and one KH-8
I continuously aloft) 4 1 - 2 3 - 7

·I ·Current Drones
{one sortie/day) 30 6+ l

ll Future Satellites
(one KH-9 continuously

:'I-
aloft} 15 2 2 - 3

Future Drones
(Whltehawk, l sortie/ day;
TAGBOARD, 1 sortie/week} 20 12+ l

•:•Time from order to national intelligence product. Assumes ..

I ·that the aircraft and drones are deployed and satellites have
20 days of warning before order.

I For the other areas against which this type of reconnaissance might be
needed, the numerical comparisons are somewhat different since weather,
latitude, target composition and area all vary. However, the major

ii conclusions are about the same:

1. Today, the advanced aircraft are unique because of thefr-..high.

:1 ,
survivability, short response time, a:id long~·endurance~ The drones
come next close st to meeting the needs but are currently very vulnerable
against sophisticated defenses.
I 2. The future drones will match or exceed the aircraft in surVivability,
At that point, the main disadvantages of the drones will be less reliable
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I recovery and somewhat shorte.r range (although this is not a major

.,
I problem in peripheral areas).

3. In those situations where conflict has already escalated to the

point th::.t reconnaissance by tactical a~rcraft is underway (such as in
· Norfo Vietnam today), then this capability can go far to supplement .
the advanced aircraft.

I 4. Current satellites fall far short of the manned aircraft except

for survivability. The future satellites will provide much improved

I target coverage at high resolution. If additional quick reaction capability

is provided in the KH-8 and KH-9 programs; or if a real-time readout is
developed £or the KH-8 system, or if MOL is developed, the satellites

I will be more competitive but still fall short of the flexible, intense,
rapid, and enduring capabilities of the advanced aircraft.

·~
C. General War Crisis and Brink

This is that requirement situation in which there is an intense inter-

I national crisis or strong warning that the Soviets (or later the Chine1;1e}
are alerting their strategic forces for a possible atta.ck.

I A major justification of the SR-71 fleet at the currently approved

level has been its capability to overfly the Soviet Union in such a situation
with six or more aircraft simultaneously and on very short notice. The

I Cuban missile crisis could have become an outstanding example of such

a situation if escalation had proceeded several more steps. Although
our information on activities within Cuba and adjacent waters was almost

I ·complete, we were virtually ignorant at the time of the posture of Soviet

strategic offensive and defensive forces, ground forces, nuclear weapons,
and in-port naval activities.

I The. specific targets to be reco~noitered in such brink-of-war situations

would depend upon the particular cause and nature of the crisis. If at a
I time of relative calm intelligence indicated the strong possibility that the
Soviets were p;reparing to .launch a "bolt out 0£ the blue 11 attack, then the
reconnaissance targets would probably be limited to long~range air staging
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~ ".,.
C054 92 939··· . . .. ··~ •• _:.... . ; ....::,,, .... ~ ....... ··-··: ......__ •• •···~·- •.• • :··.·:..:.:.-:.·:·-~. ~.:•••-:-.:..·: ::•::·~ -~ '!...• ~····.·:

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I bases, fighter dispersal bases, submarine ports, nuclear storage sites,

I soft niissile sites, and similar targets. However, if the need for crisis
·reconnaissance of the Soviet Union stemmed from a major international
crisis, such as a Berlin crisis accompanied by -threats of Warsaw Pact

I aggression against NATO, then some oyerflight reconnaissance_ capabilities

would be diverted from the strategic target system and applied to tactical
air, ground forces, and transportation and marshalling centers. The

I value of such reconnaissance would depend on many conventional factors

such as weather and survivability. Most important, for many of the
targets, the value of cloud free, high resolution photography would

I depend on developing beforehand a data base that correctly predicted

the existence and meaning of different activity indicators.for different
classes of targets.·

I In one representative SAC analysis of this type of crisis reconnaissance,

87 targets in the Soviet Union are used. si~·sa·--71".sorties launched

~
simultaneously from Beale have access to about 80 percent of these
targets using their photographic and IR systems. These missions use
three aeriai refuelings (assuming a 3300-3600 mile tanker-to-tanker

I range} and require about 10 hours.. After completion of the mission,

first complete readout can be available 12 hours after landing. This yields
a national intelligence product in about 38 hours or 1 l I 2 days after the

I order to 11 go 11 is given.

Because of the somewhat limited range of the SR-71 1 s, some areas.

I of the Soviet Union are not readily covered. The area west of the Urals
can be covered by north/ south flights that are refueled on entering and
departing the Soviet land mass. The eastern quarter of the country can

I be reached by aircraft refueling over Alaska which then either penetrate

and return or continue on to the Sea of Japan for additional refueling.
The central third of the Soviet Union is not practicably accessible.
I However, the primary crisis targets in this sector are ICBM sites and
heavy bomber bases and these can be sampled with overflights of the
east and we st USSR,
I Brink-of-war reconnaissance of the Soviet Union by the OXCART or
in conjunction with the SR-71 is possible. · High resolution photography

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I would be the major product of such sorties (COMINT and ELINT would
be less valuable; side-looking radar would be much less useful except
I in providing a view of undamaged targets for comparison in case of
general war). The important point is that the OXCART possesse·s~·the

:1 brink-of-war capability without any develOpments-other than those

currently planned. ·

·SAC has estimated that it will have a limited operational capability

I to generate six brink-of-war sorties by May 1967. This estimate assur.nes
that SR- 71 aircraft are not being maintained on SIOP alert and it provides
a limited recycle capability. By late 1967 these limitations should be
I eliminated. ·

With regard to the availability 0£ other means of overhead reconnais·

I sance for the crisis or brink situation, the following points should be
·noted:

•'I - The limited range, high vulnerability and uncertain recoverability

of current drones virtually disqualified them for this role. However,
the future TAGBOARD will have a range almost equal to that of the
advanced aircraft and a somewhat higher survivability. Accordingly,
this vehicle can play a useful role in brink reconriaissan.ce if reliable

I recovery can be achieved.

Using current satellites; the most competitive capability would be

achieved by launching one or two K.H .. s satellites in orbit such that each
I satellite covered the entire Soviet Union in two days. !£ one satellite
were used, it could sample half the targets in one. day and return its

I casette. (After the .KH-8 has a two bucket capability, the second half
of the targe.t could be covered on the second day.) If two satellites were
used, all targets could be covered within one day. However, development

I of a two-satellite, quick reaction capability for the KH-8'would require

more than· a year since an additional pad is necessary and ground station
capacity r..:iust be increased. Resolutions o:f 3-4 feet should be possible.

With cur rent KH-8 capability using one satellite and one bucket
for example, half the SAC targets would be covered and intelligence

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-.I produced in 48-60 hours versus the SR-71 covering about 80 percent

~I
of the targets in less than 24 hours. If two satellites were used, all
of the SAC targets could be covered in about 30 hours.

I Future satellite capabilities can '):>e improved by:

1. Obtaining two-bucket, two launch-pad capability for the KH-8.

-.I 2. Putting real-time readout on the KH-8 so that response time is

reduced to 2-10 hours (assuming favorable lighting conditions) for one

,I hundred targets per day.

; 3. Using the MO~.

.:1 We have not performed the trade off studies that support the development
or adaptation of any of these capabilities for brink-of-war reconnaissance.

!~
The investment has been made in the OXCART and SR-71 aircraft--it has
not been made in these additional capabilities. However, the size of the
fleet of the advanced aircraft that is needed in the future will depend on

11 the extent to which these capabilities are developed,

A potential added advantage of the satellites relates to vulnerability

:1· and lower provocation in the current political environment of .satellite
acceptability. Depending on the.particular history of the crisis including
' the role of reconnaissance and the use of signals, the simultaneous
·1 penetration of six aircraft would probably be extremely provoc.ative and
risk much greater escalation. Sudden launching of one or two satellites
should be less provocative. Similarly, the aircraft may well be more
11 vulnerable.

D. SIOP or General War

A major· role planned for the SR-71 is reconnaissance during a general

war with the Soviet Union. Operational concepts for this role are currently
ii
.
being developed in detail and being reviewed by the Air Force and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, operational capabilities must be
developed and tested for maintaining these aircraft on.a 11 hard" alert
.I
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I (ready for take off within fifteen minutes) and for operating with tanker
aircraft at dispersed bases also on a 11 hard 11 alert. Accordingly, the
I capabilities detai~ed below represent best estimates at this time. The
feasibility of providing a 11 hard 11 alert capability has not yet been .
demonstrated.
I The specific targets and timing of the SR-71 fleet during and after
execution of SIO,P forces will depend upon a number of factors. Under
I current plans, a basic force of six aircraft will be maintained on 11 hard 11
alert at Beale with 18 tc,inkers supporting this force on alert at four

I overseas bases. If strategic warning is received and if additional SR-71

aircraft are available at Beale, then these aircraft will be dispersed to
. Edwards, Palmdale and Area 51 as a back up force; 18 associated tankers

I . will be dispersed to up to eighteen secondary bases overseas.

The post-SIOP reconnaissance by the SR-71 serves both national and

tactical needs. It might provide national authorities with the only hard

"I
intelligence on how well ~he SIOP is being executed, how w~ll weapons .
systems are performing, how effective are Soviet defenses, what damage
is being inflicted~ As such, the SR- 71 can validate other indirect £o rms of
situation and system assessment. Tactically, the SR-71 data would
;
primarily be used for retargeting.
'
I
I
I I soxs, E.0.13526
I
I ..._...~~~~~~~~~~~~.,..-~~~~~~~~-,-~~~~~~~~~~----'
Ahnost
80 percent of .these are a~cessible to six SR-71 sorties (even though, as

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1·
discussed above, the central third of the Soviet Union is not reconnoitered). ·
The optimum use of the six primary alert aircraft is launch under positive
I control upon receipt of tactical .warning or in case of pre-emptive execu-
tion. · The SR-71 would then overfly the Soviet Union from the third to

I the sixth hour after execution. This tactic provides the earliest possible
reconnaissance and laces the hard alert force o er
SOXS, E.0.13526
·et Union at
(Even this

I 1£ the primary alert force is used in this way, the side-looking radar

I . will provide the most valuable intelligence. This radar can provide
intelligence independent of lighting and weather cpnditions and it would
be only slightly affected by the heavy clouds caused by nuclear explosions

I and fires. Its 50 1 ·resolution would be adequate to pinpoint to within 150'

actual ground zero of surface burst weapons. This resolution should also
be adequate to indicate major damage to soft installations that have been

~
attacked with airburst weapons. The photographic camera would provide
much less information during this first wave of reconnaissance; the value
of the CO MINT and ELINT collection would be somewhat greater.

I The information collected would b~ returned to the ZI with the

aircraft landing at one of a number of pre-planned bases, · A number of i ·

1· processing centers might be used. The Air Force is currently considering

a proposal for a survivable reconnaissance data processing center to be
(

\Q located in a hardened TITAN missile complex. near Denver. Also SAC's

M

I I/)
!'f".j
~

q
current operational concept calls for dispersal!
L....,,......-----,,----..,..--------..,----:-----..:-'
upon receipt o:f a strategic warning
{assuming these centers have not been deployed overseas during a
r.:i
I If}
;ii<
<:>
I/)
preliminary crisis)~ Finally. it is possible that a number of soft pro-
cessing and interpretation centers will survive Soviet ~trikes.

I The time required to process and transmit finished intelligence from

first wave aircraft will depend on where the aircraft are recovered and
what processing capability survives. In the best case, this time is

I probably about 12 hours after initiation of the SIOP for first flash reports.·

If the secondary back up SR-71 force had survived, it could be used.

I either on pre-planned missions reconnoitering t?-rgets not covered by the

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first force or it could fill in for those first wave aircraft that had abort'ed

·I .• or not' survived. Six to fifteen aircraft might be available at Beale or the

three dispersal bases.

I With regard to other means of col~ecting SIOP intelligence data, the

following points should be noted:

I Although there is general agreement that a satellite-borne side-

looking radar is technologically feasible today, no satellite system is
· under development. There have been numerous studies that define such

I a system, describe its performance~ and establish its likely cost, There
have been no detailed studies that compare satellite radar systems with
the SR-71; that analyze the cost-effectiveness of different levels of SIOP

I reconnaissance; that compare radar reconnaissance with other systems

such as 266, TAPS and MSR; or that evaluate differ·ent satellite systems
including ground-launch-on-tactical-warnin • sea-based launch after
initial exchanges, or launch SOXl, E.0.13526

"I
during crisis. Satellite side-looking radar will not be operational before
1970. ~

Those studies that have been made of satellite capabilities suggest

several factors.

I 1. The satellites would be somewhat more survivable than the

aircraft as surning no concerted anti- satellite defense aimed at these

I vehicles (rather than at other satellites used for .reconnaissance, com-

munications, navigation and weather). The aircrift have support tankers
which must survive. In both cases,; there are similar problems in

I recovering data, processing it, and transmitting finished intelligence

to decision makers.·

I 2. The satellite system could cost a billion dollars over five years.
After a large initial·investment yearly operating costs would still be ·•
significant in order that training and proficiency launches could be 'made
I yearly.

I
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;I
3. The response time :for significant target coverage in the satellite
·1 system would be several hours faster than the aircraft.

4. The satellite could provide a dual capability for strike assess-

1ttent against both the Soviet Union aw;:"! the United States. The domestic
capability would be virtually free- ~only iI:nproved ground handling
. would be required. ·

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·1 •.

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I
IV. NEED FOR A SEPARATE OXCART FLEET
I One of the principal questions that must be considered
as a. part of this study is the present and future need for the
special covert and civilian characteristics of the separate
I OXCART fleet. As the ana.lysis o:f a·l terna.t·ives demonstrates,
terminat].on of that fleet and closing its base would produce
the greatest cost reduction both absolutely a.nd relative to
I the decrease in possible mission coverage.
The special civilia.n and covert cha.racteristics of the
I OXCART fleet affect:
(A) the foreign relations-of the Uni~ed States;

I (B) the management of fleet operations.

.'- The study group does not presume to have the overview
necessary for a full analysis of the value of these character-
istics of their effects. However, in the course of this study
these matters have been discussed with persons who have been
I closely associated with both the OXCART and the U-2 programs
and the £ollowing material has been gathered. It is presented
to identify the question and to provide whatever assistance it
may in the decision process.
I A. Characteristics Affecting Foreign Relations

I The covert chara.cteristics of the OXCART fleet are those

which have the major affect on the foreign relations of t'he
United States with friendly, neutral or hostile nations.

I In order to discuss the need for a covert fleet of manned

reconnaissance aircraft, that covert capability must be defined
by its present characteristics .. The characteristics of the
I present capability are:
(1) An unknown. 0perational aircraft recenna.is.sance 1
I ca.pabili ty at. a ,highly secret and secure desert base. · This
must be qualified a.s follows:

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I (a) The presence of the base is probably known to

the Soviets through their reconnaissance satellites as
I well as the purpose of the. base as an operational site;
(b) The fact that the U.S. has a·substantial
,,

'I
f.:
number o'f aircraft with the necessary.. speed a.nd. a.1 ti tude
I
I
. :I
capabilities for ·reconnaissance under a military command ·i
is a matter of publicly confirmed record; ·
)
I (c) The "exposedu military aircraft and the "covert"
aircraft a.re of essentially the same configuration, es- ·::f
l·
<,

pecially at the level of public discernment (except for i

I the single versus dual cockpits);
(d) Overseas deployment of the 11 covert" fleet a.t
I

I
t.

Okinawa (planned deployment site) would generate press i

I inquiries and increase the number of individuals who
L

._
I
would learn about the existence of the special aircraft r
!
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fleet. ·l
r
~-
(2) Civilian sponsorship of the aircratt. f.leet which
minimizes the chance of a,n overflight being, labelled asan
I aggressive military act and permits: ·
(a) The pilot and the. Government to legitimately
·maintain an assertion o:f civilian status and character in :
I the event o:f capture (a.s in the Powers/U-2 case);
(b) The U.S. Government to maintain 11 plausible denial"
I in the event o:f an accident or ushoot-down° in which.there
is no survivor; and
(c) Friendly or neutral governments to assume a
uno comment" posture.
The plausibility of denial is seriously limited by the
fact tha.t i:f the general configuration of the of;fending aircraft
becomes known, the system will probably be identified as the
latest known U. s .. mili tarY. aircraft asset. Also, in the Powers
case, the fact that the CIA pilots are converted Air Force
officers was a matter of public declaration by the Soviet~~

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:I These same conditions limit the 11 no comment" option for U.S.

response to a. foreign charge. However, civilian sponsorship
:I does provide a better ba.sis for friendly and neutral nations
to maintain a 1'no comment 11 posture or to· support the activity
if it becomes a matter of serious internatipnal debate.
,I . .
Other Covert Possibilities - Short of a Separate Fleet
and Base. Under the alternative fleet structures, the character-
·1 istics discussed above would be lost or compromised by either:
transferring some of the OXCART fleet to Beale Air Force Base;
or assigning the SR-71 aircraft to perform covert peacetime
reconnaissance missions.
·1 There are some steps which could be taken to maintain as
' much of the existing cover as possible. For example, it would
;1 be desirable to retain some .of the civilian crews as flight
test crews to fly the covert missions.
The key factor in .. weighing the value of (and, hence the
·.;~
"~

!
.
. need for) the existing covert chara.cteristics .of a separate
fleet and base is to decide what will be lost in:
' .

:1 (a) Penetrability of the existing cover;

(b) The ability of the opponent to exploit politically.
U.S. sponsorship (military or civilian);
;I (c) The likelihood that the Soviet or Chinese leader-
ship would subjec,tively react with more alarm to a military
;1 '
pilot than to a civilian pilot in the event of capture; and
(d) The ability and disposition of friendly or neutral•·
.I nations to avoid reacting publicly to an incident or to
support the activity by the United States.
'The probable loss in these areas of foreign relationships through
\I
I
·terminating the OXCART fleet is limited by the following fa.ctors;
(l) The general. aircraft configuration is reasonably
.I attributable to the U.S. military alone;·

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I (2) The deployment of the covert fleet to advanced bases

·(as planned for some missions) exposes and establishes the use
I of a military base and involves many more people;
(3)
·
Civilian pilots reporting t_o __ ll'l;il.itary superiors·-"could
be used (as has been true in the ~ase of the U-2),. This should
I minimize, to the extent possible, ·subjective reactions o:f alarm
on the part of Soviet or Chinese leadership. However, it would
not be plausible in this case for the U.S. to assert that the
I opera.tion was a civilian undertaking.
B. Characteristics Affecting the Management of Fleet
I Operations
~.i'he civilian management and contro;i of the OXCART fleet
has the major effect on fleet operations both outside and inside
I the United States. The civilian character of the OXCART fleet

. ._ management structul'.'e must be quali:f ied by the fact that many

of the key personnel in the OXCART operating program are
military, although on detail to a civilian agency.
The CIA has a unigue ability to deal with forei~n
1.

I ~overn.~ents through intelligence.channels in matters such as

basing arrangements and a.fter-the-fact cover stories. For
· example, in the event of foreign deployments certain foreign
governments would be apprised of CIA sponsorship. There is
I little reason to think that the CIA could not exercise its
unique abilities to arrange for the use of aircraft under a
military command if the covert nature of the mission was
I reta.ined through the use of civilia.n pilots in unmarked air-
craft. However, it would be more difficult to secure foreign
basing for a progra.m under military sponsorship.

I 2. The degree of command authority and control by national

leadership may be more direct and less diffused in the case o:f
the civilian-management structure• · ·
I 3. The channels for the flow.of.intelligence to the·
decision-makers may be more direct and timely_ in the case oi:
I a civilian command structure.

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I Concerning the last two points, the relative degree of

control· and timely communication between the highest national
I · authorities and the two military a.nd civilian command structures
fn question (CIA and SAC) can only be assessed by persons who
have been directly involved in those processes. However, the
I 11
303 11 committee would probably be the approval channel for
rilearing the use of both of these aircraft. Once the Presidential
approval has been granted, either command structure would be

I equally responsive.

4. The CIA-contractor management relationship is re-

portedly more capable of responding quickly and with greater
I flexibility to the need for "quick fixes" and design changes
which have been legion on what has been a development aircraft
in an operating deployment. Military command structures are
I usually more "standards" bound. This "quick reaction capability"
should not be as necessary in the future as the fleets become

..I mor~ operationil. Also, the fact that the reconn~issance ·

satellite programs, which have the same development/operational
characteristics, have been placed under military management
and control indicates that the military are capable of unusual
administrative arrangements.

5. The CIA-contractor management techniques have permitted

the maintenance of the aircraft ·with contractor crews which have
I the value of a high level of experience and continuity on experi-(
mental-type aircraft in general. and with specifi~ flight vehicles.
in particular. This could be achieved to a large extent in the
unique SAC Wing through the selection and retention of Ai-r--Force
I ma.intenance crews with the highest qual·ifica.tions. ·This would·
take exceptional orders from the normal military personnel
system in the fact of other operational demands. However, some ·
I specia.l arrangements have been made already.

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I V. ALTERNATIVES

I In considering the possible alternatives for merging the assets and/or

reducing the programs of the two aircraft fleets, this section of the report
provides:
I A General Analysis of:

I 1. Actions to Curtail the Combined Progranis

2. Factors Affecting Fleet Size

I 3. Costs of Alternative Fleet Structures

I Alternatives for Decision including:

1. Continue the Currently Approved Structure

'-I 2.

3.
Mothball OXCART Aircraft and Share SR-71 Fleet

Terminate the OXCART Fleet

General Analysis
I Actions to Curtail the Combined Programs

I Three approaches to curtailing the programs have been considered.

. .
I 1. The fleets can be consolidated at one base. They can be operated
under separate management, or with varying degrees of common manage-
ment, or all aircraft can be assigned to SAC to serve both covert and

I military requirements.

With regard to the economic advantages of consolidating the full

I or reduced OXCART fleet at Beale, estimated savings are small--$30 to

$40 million over five years. Three factors contribute:

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. . .:·
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I a. In moving to Beale, there are one-time construction and

moving costs of $15 to $20 million. Beale is currently overcrowded
I and growing.

b. Savings are not achieved in tanl<:e'f'-operations since tanker

I · · support is already consolidated at ·Beale.

c. The OXCART and SR-71 aircraft are sufficiently different

I so that only minor savings are realized in consolidating maintenance;
extensive costs are required to train blue-suit personnel and a high
. turnover of these personnel is assumed.
I 2. _Tho te.n:1po of the j'>l:ograrn c.:~n. be f:dackoncd. Flying hours can be

I decreased. Flying at high mach numbers can be curtailed. Flight test

activities can be reduced with concomitant reduction in aircraft modifica-

..I tion and overhaul frequency. Development and supporting programs (such
as sensors, navigation systems, or processing) can be reduced. And,
in the case of the SR-71, the crew-to-aircraft ratio can be reduced.

The economic advantages of these steps are very questionable

since the programmed flying hours are reduced by Z8% while costs are
reduced only 9%. Also, reliability, proficiency, and endurance would :·

I suffer since the aircraft are modernized at a slower rate and since there
are fewer trained crews.

I 3. The size of the fleets can be reduced. Aircraft can be destroyed

and cannibalized, or stored in 11 mothballsll. or grounded and maintained
in near flyable condition, or assigned to other programs ..

I We have considered four ways of reducing the size of the fleet.

I a. Dispose of aircraft. There does not seem to be any require-

ment to utilize OXCART or SR-71 aircraft in the YF-12 program or to
reconfigure some of the aircraft as manned bombers. ·NASA and FAA

I have shown some interest in utilizing one or two of the aircraft but
this use would have a very minor effect on costs. A strong dis- .
advantage in destroying aircraft at this stage of the program is the

I
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. ,.c.6549 2 9 3 9 .•. ..
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I uncertainty as to future needs and attrition and the possible political

repercussions in Congress or in the press.
I b. Cannibalize aircraft and utilize spare parts. We estimate
that about $3 million one-time savings could be achieved per
I aircraft if they were used as a source of spare parts, These
savings are low because of two factors. First,· spare parts for
the aircraft are already very expensive since there is low demand
I for these rare parts. If additional spares are generated by can-
nibalizing aircraft, then the already high unit costs would increase
even more due to the reduced volume. Second, the operational
I aircraft and engines are still undergoing fairly high rates of
modification since the programs are still in an early stage and

I are on the :forefront of the state-of-the-art. Many of the spare

parts made available through disposal of aircraft become obsolete.

~
Considering the small savings in utilizing the aircraft for
spare parts, and the low cost of 11 mothballing 11 aircraft, we
recommend against either destruction ox spare parts use and have

I not included aircraft destruction in any of the specific alternatives

below.·
'
j

I c. Maintain aircraft in a 11 grounded-but-flyable 11 status. Under

this alternative, some aircraft would be maintained at a near
operational capability but not flown. Savings would be realized

I in fuel, spares, and overhaul costs. Modification kits and ·-'-"-

occasional overhauls would be needed t~ .keep these aircraft
abreast of the flying fleet. The grounded aircraft would be con-

I verted to flying status if attrition of the flying fleet became

excessive or if requirements grew. The savings per aircraft year
average 12-14 percent; for example, cost of one SR-71 plane-year

I is $5. 08 million and this is reduced by$. 72 million if the aircraft

is maintained in a grounded-but-flyable status.· Since comparable
savings can be achieved by flying all aircraft at a lower utilization

I rate, none of the alternatives below include reductions by plaCing

aircraft iri the grounded-but-flyable status.

I
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.. .. . . . -··· ::: :;::.·.:·..: -~·.:.... ·.;·::..-.;::.·::;..~.... -:-. ':".:-:-.:.:·-:-...;~-;::;:::..::..:::~..:::.::..:·. :.... :~·- ·-·:·..;......:.....:.::....:.. .. ~.::..:. ....•~ - . ~.:·."': ... - --:-: .
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I d. Store aircraft. The cost of storing aircraft (including security

and inspection) is small. For example, the five-year cost of
I mothballing ten aircraft is less than $1 million per year.· on: the
other hand, the cost of removing one aircrci.ft from storage and
making it operational increases at about $1-1 1 /2 million per year
I (at least initially) so that by 197-2 it costs about $7 million to restore
a mothballed aircraft to the fleet. This cost assumes that the 'other
aircraft are being flown, that modifications are being developed,
I and that the ·operating fieet·is being improved so that at the time
of demothballing, the removed aircraft must be extensively
·overhauled and updated.
I There is a risk associated with mothballing that the afrcraft

I and parts will deteriorate over tirne so that demothballing may prove
m.uch more expensive than anticipated. Also, if a block of aircraft
are demothballed, it will become increasingly difficult over time to

~
assemble engineers and technicians to update and check out the
aircraft.

I In the alternatives below where we reduce the size of the fleet,

we have mothballed aircraft rather than destroying them or maintaining
them in a 11 grounded-_but-flyable 11 status. However, considering the

I costs and risks of remo'ving the aircraft from storage, particularly

in the out years, we conclude that mothballing makes sense only if
there is reasonably high probability that the mothballed aircraft will

I not be brought back into the fleet. In other words, mothballing is a

hedge against unanticipated increases in requirements or unexpectedly
high attritioh.

I Factors Affecting Fleet Size

I By July 1967, the combined fleet assets will be 11 OXCART aircraft

(including l test aircraft and 1 trainer) and 30 SR-71 aircraft {including
2 test aircraft and 2 trainers). This estimate assumes no attrition

I between now and July 1967. Aqcording to an informal Air Force and
SAC estimate, all SR-71 aircraft and sensor systems will be fully
operational by August 1967.
I
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I There are four major factors that determine the. size of the fleet
requfred: (1) attrition; (2) requirements; (3) feasibility of satisfying
I requirements with other vehicles and {4) advantages and inefficiencies
related to maintaining separate fleets.

I 1. Attrition. It is impossible to p·roject with certainty the attrition

to either fleet during the next five years. The initial aircraft have been
operational for only a year ?-nd the program represents an extremely
I advanced and unique technology. Current plans assume that three
SR- 71 and two OXCART aircraft will be lost .by 1972 so that the total

I fleet of operationally configured aircraft will be reduced from 35 to 30

at that time. These estimates assume an attrition rate that is about
the same as that experienced by Air Force fighter aircraft over the

I past ten years. If attrition should unexpectedly double or triple, then

the SR-71 fleet might drop from 26 to 14-18 operational aircraft and
the OXCART fleet might drop from nine to five. However, we consider

~
it very unlikely that the·se high losses will occur.

2. Requirements. Ohv:iously, the size of the fleet depends on the

I nu:mber of different types of missions that must be flown, th~ number 0£

operationally configured aircraft that must be available to support each
mission, and the probability that a number of these missions would have i.

I to be simultaneously conducted under the worst case~ These factors are

discussed in the Requirements section and under Alternatives for Decision
below.

I 3. The Use of Other Vehicles. As pointed out in the requirements

section, satellites and drones can perform some reconnaissance in place

I of the OXCART and the SR-71. We expect that the ability of the satellites to ·
substitute for the advanced aircraft will increase during the early
seventies as new systems are introduced. For example 1 any~ of the

I . following systems could have a significant effect on.the need for the ,
advanced aircraft in situations short of general war: increased numbers
of satellites and launchers maintained for quick reaCtion, real time

I readout of photographic intelligence, the MOL, quick reaction capability

with the KH-9, or TAGBOARD. For SIOP reconnaissance,. satellites.
with side-looking radar appear especially attractive ..

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1vlaintaining a Separate Fleet. The advantages of a separate,

civilian, and covert fleet are discussed in Section IV. If a separately
m.anaged covert capability is maintained, then the total number of
available aircraft will probably be less effective than if the fleet had
been operated under a single management. This would be particularly
true in. an escalating situation where r·e·connaissance targets and procedures
were changing rapidly. OXCART aircraft and crews can be turned over
to SAC u,~der a condition of high tension or war. But if the OXCART
capability is really going to be effective, the OXCART pilots must have
trained for their missions before the crisis arises. And even with good
cooi·dination and planning, when the fleet is turned over, it will still
possess some specialized capabilities and have been trained for some
unique functions. Accordingly, in order to make the best coordinated
use of both fleets at that time, there will probably have to be some
readjustment of aircraft assignments and concomitant degradation
in fleet effectiveness.

Costs Comparison of Alternative Fleet Structures

vVe have costed five basic alternatives:

Table l compares the costs and activity levels for each of these
alternatives . . The costs include estimates of cost fo:r support aircraft,
tank.er support and basing. The activity levels .are based on numbers of
operationally configured aircraft except in Alternative V where flying
hours are used. In cases where aircraft are mothballed, the costs include
security and inspection costs for the stored aircraft but do not include
any costs for removing the aircraft and updating them. This cost is
estimated to be about $4 million per aircraft if the aircraft is removed
in three years and about $7 million per aircraft if removed in five years.

Table 1 compares percent cost reduction witlt percent fleet reduction.

These reductions are commensurate in Alternatives .III and IV~ where
the OXCART aircraft are stored. In the other cases, the cost reductions
are relatively small for two reasons:

1. The ratio of fixed costs in both programs is high; and

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Page ·49

TABLE I

COMP.ARISON OF ALTERNATIVES

Dif£. Percent Percent

No .. of No. of Opera- Costs.($ A'lillions)l/ in 5-Yr Reduction Reduction
Stored A/C tional A/C 2/ FY68 ~ FY68-7:;! -. Costs of Costs of Activityf
Alternative

I.- Status Quo

0 35 341 295 1377 -0
a. Separate Basing 1335 -42 3.1 0.0
0 35 346 287
b. Consolidate at Beale

II.-Reduce OXCART
323 276 1302 -75 5.4 14.3.
a. Separate Basing 5 30
30 339 270 1272 -105 7.6 14.3
b. Consolidate at Beale 5
296 207 1012 -365 26.5 25.7
:11.-Mothball all OXCART 11 ~/ 26

IV.-Mothball OXCART and 18.3 25.7

I.
Share SR-71 's 11 y 26 313 231 1125 -2.52
t r!
0 35 314 264 1247 -1'30 9.4 28.3 4/ - .,
~
.
V.-Tighten Belt . i--
J
/ Costs include estimates of support aircraft, tankers, and mothballing.
They do not include costs for removing from mothballs. ·
V As of l July 1967 assuming no aircraft, lost before then. Numbers do not incl;ude
l OXCART trainer, l OXcART test, 2 SR-71 trainers and 2 SR-71 test. j:
V Include OXCART test and trainer aircraft. f
~ ',

~/ Based on flying hour reduction. l c

R.;

:!!l'.l'•
. . . ; ;

·Handl~-~. YEMAN, TALENT-KEYHOLE, COMINT Con,ls/9?0P S!EiOGR:i:TtIDE.ALIST/OXCART/CORONA,EX.t...GON :i

cw "'M'~
•
- - - - - .. - . .... ·'-·····' ...... : ... ~-- ,- ... -~
- - - - ............,...... , ,., ....... :.. '"."·
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I 2. The volumes entailed in variable costs are so small and

the items so unique in the industry that a reduction in volume of
I purchase is substantially offset by an increase in unit cost.

Alternative I - The status quo. Under this alternative, both fleets

I would be maintained so that by July 19.67 there would be about 35
operationally configured aircraft; and, assuming planned attrition,
about 30 in 1972. Two variations of this alternative have been developed.
I I-a. Current basing arrangements are continued at Area 51
and Beale.
I I-b. Area 51 is closed in July 1968, at which time all OXCART

I aircraft are transferred to Beale. As soon as possible thereafter,

the OXCART is placed under SAC management and some aircraft ·.- ·
maintenan.ce ·becomes 11 blue su.it 11 • Ail"j)iaj6j7-air:fratne and. engine

'-I
overhaul for the SR-71 and the OXCART continue to be contracted.

Ii the OXCART were.placed under SAC management at Beale, it

would still be possible, at little difference in cost, to train and use·
civilian flight crews for 11 covert 11 missions.

I Alternative II - Reduce the size of the OXCART fleet. Under this

alternative, five OXCART a.i:rcraft would be stored by July 1968. During
FY 1968 flight activity would be reduced by almost one-fourth. Two

I variations of this alternative, similar to those for Alternative I, have

been developed. Under Alternative II-a, separate basing would continue
for the OXCART~ Under Alternative II-b, Area 51 woUld be closed by

I July 1968 and the remaining operational OXCART aircraft would be

transferred to Beale and consolidated under SAC management. Similar
to Alternative I-b, unde.r Alternative !I-bit.would be possible to maintain

I civilian crews for the OXCART aircraft at little difference in cost.

Under this alternative, the SR-71 fleet would be maintained as

I currently planned.

I
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I The major reason for selecting Alternative II would be to maintain

an austere cption for employing 11 covert 11 reconnaissance. If only one or

I two of the remaining OX<::;ART aircraft were lost before 1970, then the
mothballed aircraft would not be withdrawn. If the attrition of the re-
maining OXCART aircraft should be much higher than planned, for example,

I if three or four of the remaining aircraft were lost, then the mothballed
aircraft would be withdrawn. As indicated above, this cost would depend
on when it was incurred. In 1970 it would be about $14 million for three

I aircraft; in 1972 this cost would be $21 million. However, we estimate

that the likelihood of such demothballing is less than 10-15 percent.

I Alternative III - Store the OXCART fleet. Under this alternative,

by January 1968 all of the OXCART aircraft would be stored and Area 51
would be closed. The OXCART capability would start being reduced in

I July of 1967 so that by October 1, 1967, the capability would be reduced

to five operational aircraft with termination of the program by
January 1, 1968. This would produce the maximum net savings of
$365 million including $45 million in FY 1968.

"I The rationale behind Alternative III - store the OXCART fleet
·follows the analysis in the requirements section and assum.es that aircraft
. will only be removed f:i;:_om mothballs in large blocks--say five aircraft--
in one of the following cases:

I I. The requirement for SR-71 capabilities remains about the same

as today b~t the fleet suffers high attrition so that, by 1972, more than

I six aircraft have been lost and less than 20 operationally configured
aircraft remain.

I 2. ·The attrition of the SR-71.fleet remains as currently projected

(with 3 aircraft lost by 1972) but the number of aircraft available to per-.
·form currently defined or newly assigne,d missions is judged inadequate.

I If it were planned that one OXCART aircraft would be removed from

storage for every SR-71 aircraft lost, it would probably be preferable to
mothball only about half of the OXCART fleet, to transfer the remaining
I aircraft to Beale under SAC 1 s command, and to fly the transferred air-
craft as little as possible until anticipated attrition of other aircraft

. .I developed .

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: .' .. -~.. . .·.···.'···.··,.
 ~ • .;... . . . . . . . . . .' " " ' ~ ~ . . . . .- ~··
•' '·•' ·'··•.: ....... # ... , ...... ... • ..._:. _ . . ._..
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I
TB.is alternative is a hedge against high SR-71 losses or increased
I requiren~ents. Under these conditions, the expected cost of demoth-
balling six airci·aft is $24-40 million but we estimate that the likelihood
of incurring this cost is only 10-15 per~ent.
I Alternative IV - Mothball OXCART Aircraft and Share SR-71 Aircraft,
Alternative IV is a variation of Alternative III. Under this alternative
I the operational SR-71 fleet would consist of 21 aircraft (including two
test aircraft and one trainer). Instead of closing Area 51 in Fiscal

I Year 1968, eight operational SR-? l's and one SR-71/B trainer are
transferred to CIA control and maintained at Area 51. The total flying
time on .ill SR-71 1 s was assumed to be approximately 6, 000 hours per

I year (,4, 500 hours per year at Beale AFB and 1, 500 hours per,year
at Area 51). It was further assumed that the SR-71 test program
would be maintained at Beale AFB under SAC management. Modifica-

I'-
tions resulting from this program would apply to all SR-71 aircraft.

Under this <!-lternative, a separate fleet would be maintained at

Area 51 with the principal advantage being related to the retention of
the separate fleet. {See Section IV.)

I Alternative V .- Maintain both fleets but reduce the tempo of the

program. Under this alternative, all OXCART and SR-71 aircraft would
be retained and flown but the program. would be curtailed by such means

I as:

1. Reduce SR- 71 flying hours by 30 percent and reduce the. ,

I crew-to-aircraft ratio from 2: 1 to 1. 5: 1.

2. Reduce the flying hours for the OXCART program by

I 20 percent.

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I
I · 3. For both programs, reduce the level of flight testing and
consequently the frequency and extent of major overhauls.

I 4. For both programs, do not :procure additional sensors.

Under this alternative, the aircraft· would remain separately
based at Area 51 and Beale.

I A major motivation for developing Alternative V was to indica..t.~.

that, as long as both fleets. are maintained.,..·.. savings. achieved by

I reducing activity levels are as great as the savings achieved by

mothballing aircraft.

I The operationo.1 impact of this alternative is much more difficult

to express. Since the number of aircraft would remain as high as.
in Alternative I, The status quo, it can be argued that the four basic

~
missions could still be undertaken simultaneously during the time
of crisis or general war. However, reliability, proficiency, and
endurance would surely suffer since the aircraft are modernized

I at a slower rate. and since there are fewer trained crews.

I /

I
I
I
I
I
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, c.6 5 49·2 ·9 39 · · ··: '-- · · :... :.......,,,.~,,-:-.. . ;~.~,:~.;. .~·.:-:-:.;;\:. ··.:: ·:-::~_;-:::.;:.::.::.:· :~:·;;;_~,.__... . . . . .;. ;.--·; ·.;. :.--.;:· .;_.·; .;_;- ~"'---"'""----=~~.
I
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I Alter:; ·~aves for Decis-: -.)n

I In light of the general " ;,:1lysis above, thi!: following three

alternatives emerge as th•:.i inost relevant options in the major policy

I decision to be made at this time.

I. Continue both fleets at the currently approved levels.

I IL· Mothball the OXCART aircraft and share the SR-71 fleet
at separate bases. (In the general analysis this is discussed

I as Alternative IV.} ( •7

III. Terminate the OXCART fleet at the time the SR- 71 fleet
I becomes fully operational.

Each alternative with its costs and possible mission c.overage is

~
described below. General argumeJ?,ts for and against continuing the
presently approved levels of aircraft are presented first followed by
.the two reduced fleet alternatives with arguments for each.·

I Alternative I

I Maintai:i;l the status quo and continue both fleets at

the currently approved levels. This provides for two bases and:
!

I Total approved aircraft

Less: Training and test aircraft
41
-6
Aircraft under major overhaul -3
I Assumed attrition through 1970 -3

Available operational aircraft through the

I end of 1970 Z9

Costs: {$in millions} FY 1968 FY 1969 FY 1968-72

I $341 $295 $1,377

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f. c 0 5 4 9 2 9 3 9 .: - .. ·.~:_: __ ~_ ..:...:.:.:.·~-·-··-.::::~. .. . . . .... .• . .. . . .. . . .
.~~-=--~-------"'-'-'--""-'--------·
.- . . . • . _ ............. I"·;::•~.,.!.;.~:~ ~·
--·-·-·--~· ··~·.·...... . .. , .

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I Possible Mission Operational Aircraft

Coverage. OXCART. SR-71 'Total

A. Strategic 2* 5.
Reconnaissance
I B. Force Mobilization 4~~ s~:c 9
Reconnaissance
I C. General War 7';:( 7

I D.
Crisis/Brink

SIOP 8 8
--·
I 7 22 29

'I-·· ~:<These aircraft could be used interchangeably between

the three missions (A, B and C) as priorities dictate.

For the SR-71 fleet,. some variations on the mission assignment

above are possible.

I 1. Deploy six aircraft to a third theater with the result that the
crisis or SIOP-alert capabilities are significantly degraded.

I 2. In order to generate more crisis sqrties, use the strategic

reconnaissance, force mobilization or SIOP fleets for a second wave
of crisis reconnaissance with the possible result that a SIOP posture

I could not be resumed until the crisis aircraft were recycled.

3. Generate a second-wave, dispersed SIOP capability by dispersing

I the crisis alert aircraft or by recalling the theater deployed aircraft. If

the comb.ined capabilities of the OXCART and the SR-71 are included, then
any one of these three additional capabilities can be achieved without the
I full restrictions or degradations that are indicated.

The major arguments. in favor of the ·currently approved

I fleet size are:

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I I. The presently planned fleet will insure a simultaneous

capabUity for:
I a. Strategic, force mobilization and tactical reconnaissance in

I at least two theaters.

b. Crisis reconnaissance of the Soviet Union with at least six

I simultaneous sorties every three or four days for at least .several

weeks.
' .

I c. At least six aircra:ft continuously on SIOP hard alert for

SIOP access.

I We feel that the strongest argument in favor of a larger fleet is that if

both the Soviet Union and the U.S. continue to preserve their capabilities
for as sured desti-uction, then crises can become more intense and pro"'.

'-I
longed (as there is less inclination to escalate to a general war}. The
global, prolonged, intense crisis may require simultaneous reconnaissance
capabilities of the kind indicated above.

2. The presently planned fleet presents a more readily available

hedge against sudden, unexpectedly high attrition. If such attrition should

I develop, ·and if the requirement for manned reconnaissance by advanced

ah-craft is still high, the additional aircraft will be needed to compensate
for losses only after three years. (This argument assumes that aircraft

I stored as a hedge against high attrition would take tpo much time to re~
constitute. )

I Fleet Reduction Alternatives

The two fleet reduction alternatives whieh follow are both supported by

I the following general arguments in favor of reducing the total numb.er of

operational aircraft. In the first part of this section, we examined ways in
which the fleet size could be .decreased. In the two alternatives which

I decrease fleet size the aircraft removed from the operating fleet are roothballe
rather than destroyed. Also~ in b.oth alternatives a five month overlap is
·provided between estimated full operational capaQility of the SR- 71 .fleet and

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I ·mothballing of the last :::ve A-lZ aircraft.

I The general argument.:; in favor of decreasinj4 the fleet size are:

1. At present, and increasi:p.gly in the coming years, satellites and

I unmanned drones, U -2 1 s and tactical aircraft will be able to perform
many of the strategic, force mobilization and tactical support missions
as well as being able to provide a more limited capability in the crisis
I reconnaissance functions for which the OXCART and the SR-71 were
developed. . ___ ....... _.,_' ··-~··- :,;, ,

I Z. While some advanced aircraft capability is needed for the purpose

of crisis or brink reconnaissance, it is very questionable whether six

I ail·c1·aft would ever be launched against the Soviet Union at a time. of

intense crisis. Such a launch would be extremely provocative and might

..I be interpreted as an attack.. Also, there has been no conclusive

demonstration that such reconnaissance would produce meaningful in~
telligence.

3. Interchangeability of aircraft between: missions A, Band C is

possible so th~t it cannot be argued that it is necessary to provide
maximum possible aircraft for coverage of all missions simultaneously. ,

I There is no need for an expensive capability for simultaneously conducting :

covert and military reconnaissance. If a crisis or a conflict becomes
sufficiently intense so that most of the SR-71 capabilities are needed,

I then covert missions will no longer be required. Conversely, if covert

missions are required at a lesser level of crisis, then SR-71 resources
could be used for these missions.

I Alternative II (Discussed as Alternative IV in the General Analysis)

I Mothball the OXCART aircraft and share the SR"'.'71 fleet

by transferring eight operational aircraft and one trainer to Area 51
under CIA management. This provides for.two bases and:

I
I
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I Total approved aircraft 41 .

Less: Mothballed A-12 1 s -11
I Training and test aircraft
Aircraft under major overhaul
-4
-2
Assumed attrition through 1970 -2
I . Available operational aircraft through
the end of 1970 22
I Cost Savings; ($ in millions) FY 1968 FY 1969 FY 1968-72
-$64
I Percent reduction of costs - 18%.
-$28 .

Reduction of activity - 26%

-$252

I Possible Mission
Coverage
Operational Aircraft
OXCART SR-71 Total

'-
I
A.

B.
Strategic Reconnaissance

Force Mobilization
Reconnaissance
3>:<

5*
-0-

-0-*
3

5
:

1· c. General War
Crisis/Brink -0-* 6*' 6
!

I D. SIOP -0-

8 14
8 8

22
I >:•These aircraft could be used interchangeably between
the three missions {A, Band C) as.priorities di:cta.te.
·1
I
I
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.- ' . . ·•·. ~
 ..................: ..

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I Arguments for Alternative II

I 1. The covert and civilian characteristics of a separate fleet

would be retained.

I 2. The proposed division of primary mission responsibilities woul9.

be essentially in line with the planning and use patterns as they now
exist.
I 3. This would provide flexibility of use between SAC and CIA due to

I essentially single aircraft configuration.

Alternative III

1. Terminate the OXCART fleet at the time the SR-71 fleet

becomes fully operational and assign all missions to the SR-71 fleet.

'-I
This provides for a single. base and:

Total approved aircraft 41

·Less: Mothballed A-12's -11
Training and test aircraft -4
Aircraft under major overhaul -2

I Assumed attrition through 1970 -2

Available operational aircraft through

I the end of 1970 22

Cost Savings: {$ in millions} FY 1968 FY 1969 FY 1968-72

I -$46 -$88 ~-$366

Perceiit reduction of costs - 27% Pei:ceri.t reduction of activity - 26%

I
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I Possible Mission Operational Aircraft

Coverage SR-71
I A. Strategic Reconnaissance 3*

I B. Force Mobilization
Reconnaissance

I C. General War
Crisis/Brink

I D. SIOP 8

I 22

. ):<These aircraft could be used interchangeably between

I'-
the three missions (A, B and C) as priorities dictate.

Arguments for Alternative III

l. The cost savings are higher than .Alternative II. ($365 million
as against $2.52. mil.lion.)

I 2. T.he operational flexibility of switching aircraft between missions

should be somewhat higher under a single command.

I
I
I
I
I
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I Appendix A

I Fleet Characteristics

I. Introductiot1
I II. Airborne System Characteristics .
A. Range and Altitude (Table 1)

I B. Fuel Load
. C. Engine Thrust
D. Crew Size
E. Navigation.Aids
I F. Payload Capacity
G. Sensor Systems (Table 2)

I III. Experience and Status

A. Milestones
B. Component Availability (Table 3)

t. c. Flight Experience
1. Supersonic Time
2. Mach 3.0 + Sorties
D. Aerial Refuelings
I E. Attrition
F. Reliability
.. ...
~::.:; ~ ..

I IV. Support
A. Base Facilities
B. Maintenance
C. Engines
I D. Crews
E • Tanker Support
F. AGE Equipment
I G. Command Control and Communications
H. Fuel Storage
!. Sensor Processing
I J. Support Aircraft
IL Kadena Support
L. Commonality and Interchangeability

I
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~ -·~· ...
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I FACT ANNEX

I I. Introduction to Annex

This Annex is intended to present factual data about the

I A-12 and SR-71 programs. Only areas in which the two pro-
grams or their respective vehicles.are significantly different
will be highlighted. No attempt is made in this Annex to
discuss the relevance of these differences; for this dis-
I cussion the reader is ref erred to the summary of this Annex
contained in the main section of this report.

I II. Airborne System Characteristics

A. Range and Altitude.

I Table. 1 gives altitude and range parameters for

various profiles. Ranges are given in nautical miles and ~
are unrefueled range from tanker to tanker in a refueling

~ mission. Two altitude figures are given in thousands of

feet. The first altitude figure indicates the beginning
of the cruise climb while the second figure indicates the
I .end of the cruise climb. The figures in columns entitled
"long range" are for profiles designed to maximize range.
The figures in columns entitled "high altitude" are for

I profiles designed to maximize altitude. All of the data

are based on an assumed fuel reserve of 6000 pounds at
se.J0nd refueling.

I B. Fuel Load.

A-12 69,800 lbs.

I c.
SR-71
Engine Thrust.
78,200 lbs.

'
I A-12
SR-71
32,000 lbs. or 32,500 lbs.
32,500 lbs. or .34 ,000 lbs •

I
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I co"s49293·9 ,. .,: :f... I "' .,. •••' " • ' . ·••.-. ' • ' ,. • ••• ''"' • • ••• • ••

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.1 Table 1

I Demonstrated as of l Oct 1966 Future Objectives

·1 Test Conditions Opera~ional Cond. Operational Cond.
Long Range High Alt. LongJRange High Alt.

I A-12
Range (nm) 3080** N.A. 2690 2450 3750
Altitude 75. 4-81. 3 N.A. 76-84.5 79-85 76.7-87
·1 (000 ft)
SR-71
Range (nm) 3031** 2880 3725 3048
* *
I Altitude
(000 ft)
74-84.5 80-85
* *' 74-85 81-91

·~ *Not presently flying missions which can be categorized as

11
operational". .,
;I **Corrected for no turns and standard day conditions.

'.I
,I
;I
11
:I
!

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I D. Crew Size.

I· A-12
SR-71
One (l); pilot
Two (2); pilot and reconnaissance systems
operator

I E. Navigation Aids.
A-12 Inert.ial navigation with demonstrated error
I SR-71
of 1 nm/hour .
Inertial and Stellar updatable with average
performance of: .75 nm Stellar-Inertial Mode
I F. Payload Capacity.
2.0 nm/hour Inertial Mode

I .A-12
SR-71
2500 lbs. and 84 cubic ft.
3400 lbs. and 98 cubic ft.

'-I
G. Sensor Systems.
Table ~ gives the sensor systems and their specifica-
tions for each of the two programs.
The A-12 is essentially a single sensor technical
reconnaissance system having the capability to carry on a
I mission one of three high resolution cameras, or a side
looking radar, or an infrared sensor.

I The SR-71 is a multiple sensor .reconnaissance system

having the capability to carry on a mission s'imultaneously
the following sensors: three photographic cameras of
varying resolution, a side looking radar, an infrared'
I sensor and an electromagnetic recorder f'or COMINT and ELINT
collection.

I III. Experience
A. Milesto)les.
I neJ.ow are milestone dates :for bo'l:h programs:

I
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Sensor Syst'..,m. Linear Coverage Lateral Coverage Resolution Resolution

Specification Achieved
in Nautical Miles in Nautical Miles in Feet in Feet
Tech Intell Camera I (A-12) 2500 63 1. 0 o. 9
· · .'I'ech Intell Camera II {A-12) 3400 56 1. 5 1. 25
· Tech Intell Camera IV {A-12) 1687 ·39 1. 5 1. 07
Tech Objective Camera (SR-71) 2140 10 • 63 1. 64
1/
()peration Obj Camera (SR-71} 4000 Z6- 1. 75 3.0
Terrain Obj Carnera {SR-71) ssoo 21 16. 5 16. 5
Infrared Camera {A-12) z. 5 hours zo 40 60
. Inf~ared Camera (SR- 71} ·6 •.0 hours i8 85 y
.Side Looking Radar (A-12.) 1500 zo 10-ZO 12-Zl
3/
Side Looking Radar (SR-71) 4000 10-.zo 30-50 30-50
4/
·• Signal Intercept Package {A-12)
::::1 I
{A-12) . - - - - - '- - - - - - ,
.:I l(A-12) I
SOX!, E.0.13526
System XVII (A-12) ~ ~LINT .;.. Covers .50 MCS to lZ GC
..::·.
i :Electromagnetic Recording (SR- 71) - COMINT - Records 100-400 MCS
ELINT - .Collect and record 30-40, 000 MCS
·. Location Find 116-12, 400 MCS
I/ Two 5 nmswa~ ~idths located up to 19. 5 nm on either side of track.
Z/. No targets tested to date. .
'::., °?:! Located up to 40 run
outboard left side of track,
-~ Located up to 80 nm. outboard either side of track.

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.I A-12 SR-71

I F;irst Test Flight

First Supersonic Test Flight
Apr 62
May 62
Dec
Dec
64
64
First Mach 2.0 Test Flight Nov 62. Jan 65
I First Mach 3.0 Test Flight-
First ·Mach 3.2 Test Flight
Ju1 63
Nov 63
Feb
Feb
65
65

I First Detachment Mach 3.0 Flight

Validation Operational Capability
Mar 65
Dec 65
Jul 66

I B. Availability of Components.
Table 3 gives the number of components planned and
I the number of components rated as operationally ready
as of 1 October 1966 for both programs.
C. Flight Experience.

'I-· l. Supersonic Time.

Below are the number of hours as of September 1966
at or above various supersonic points for both programs.

I Time, in Hours, at or above Various Mach Numbers

2.6 2.8
:Mach 2.0 3.0

I A-12
SR-71
832
453
531
289
416
249
269*
179*

I * Total Test a/c Operational a/c

A-12 269 39 230
I SR-71
2.
179

Supersonic Sorties.
147 32

I Below are the number of .sorties for each program

with a given duration at or above Mach 3.0. These data
are as of September 1966 .
.1

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Table 3
I Availability
Planned Operational
I Test Aircraft
A-12
1
SR-71
3
A-12
2
SR-71
6
Training Aircraft
I Operational Aircraft
l
8
2
26 7
1 2
8
Flight Crews 8 50 6 10
I Cameras
Type I 8 5
I Type I I 2 2
Type IV 3 0
I Technical Objective 36* 0
Operational Objective 36* 21*

'-I Terrain Objective

Infrared
Side Looking Radar
1
3
18*
8
23*
.o
0
16
2
9

I
8 SOXl, E.0.13526 i--~--__,
1
1
1
0
EWS/ECM Syst~ms 8 ** 8 **
I Electromagnetic Recorder
Signal !ntercept Package 8
8·
8
0

Maintenance Recorder System· 35 8

I Birdwatcher 14 14
System XVII 2
I * 2 cameras = 1 set
** Numbers not established.
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I Sorties above Mach 3.0 by Duration

Duration A-12 ·SR-71.
I in Hours Sorties . Sorties
0 - 1.0 374 200
I 1.0 - 2.0
2.0 3.0
3.0 - 4.0
55.
9
1
43
0
0

I D. Aerial Refuelings.
Below are the total number of sorties flown by·each
I program. This total is then displayed as number of sorties
having 1, 2, 3 or 4 aerial refuelings.

I The data for the A-12 are for the time period from
1963 through August 1966. The data for the SR-71
Jam,l.ary
are for the time period from April 1965 through September 1966.

'-I A-12**
SR-71
Tota.l
Sorties
1872
624
1-AR*
Sorties
549
275
2-AR
Sorties
71
40
3-AR
Sorties
18
l
4-AR
Sorties
4
0

I *AR - Aerial Refueling

.**Since August 1966 the A-12 has flown two sorties with four (4)
aerial refuelings

I E. Attrition.
To date the A-12 program has lost 3 vehicles:
I Numbers 123, 126 and 133. To date the SR""-71 has lost l
vehicle: Number 2003.
--.....:...:.,,. ..
,,,,.r·

The pla.nning factor attri tion.... ra,te.... for- the .A-12 and
I the SR-71 is .1 aircraft per 1000 flying hours~
F. Reliability.
I Based on 373 A-12 operational type sorties rated from
March 1965 through August 1966, all systems examined indicate
I sa.tisfactory performance on 85% or more of the sorties. Data
not available for the SR-71.

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I IV. Su:;)port

I A.' Base Facilities.

The OXCART aircraft program is based at Area 51, a

restricted area in the Nevada Test Site, which has the
I necessary facilities and· staff.ing to support the test,
training operations and operational deployment of the
A-12. There is an average of 1500 persons, including
I military and CIA civilian employees, on station to
support the OXCART and TAGBOARD projects. About 650 of
these are in direct support of launching operations and
approximately 611 are involved in indirect support such
I as logistics, firefighting, guards, etc~ Most of these
people are under contract to Lockheed Aircraft Company
or its sub-contractors, and are on permanent duty at
I this area. The military personnel and CIA civilian em-
ployees are on a basic three year tour.
The SR-71 aircraft are assigned to the 9th Strategic

'
Reconnaissance Wing at Beale Air Force Base, California.
This wing has 1,278 persons assigned for direct support
of th~ aircraft and 56 contractor representatives to aid
I in their systems maintenance. Indirect support consists
of 400 personnel at Edwards Air Force Base, and 333 addi-
tional persons specially authorized at Beale AFB with the
I activation of the SR-71 there to augment normal base support.

A total of $21 million has been invested in Area 51

I for runways, buildings, housing, navigational.aids, water

supply, etc. This base is now self-sufficient and no
further investment is planned. Base support and main-
tenance is supervised by CIA personnel. Reynolds En-
I gineering and Electrical Company, a contracting company
from Las Vegas, has 239 persons engaged in base maintenance
work. Total cost per year for salaries and necessary ·
I equipment is 5.SM.
At Beale AFB approximately $15M dollars has been in-

I vested in constructing additional facilities to support

the SR-71 wing. There were also 333 additional base
operating support personnel assigned upon activation of
.the wing, in addition to the normal base facilities and
I services. ..

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I B. Maintenance.

I OXCART aircraft are maintained by contract personnel

who follow the maintenance·philosophy expressed in Air
Force Manual 66-1. They are supervised by military

I maintenance officers who are detailed to CIA and who are

directly responsible to the Commander, Area 51.

The SR-71 is maintained under similar organizational

I .and field maintenance concepts by Air Force enlisted nien.
Their training is acquired through a course held at
Lockheed Aircraft Company with continued on-the-job
I training at Beale AFB.

C. Engines.

I The A-12 is powered by a J-58 engine, w·i th 32, 500 lbs.

'-. of thrust. It is presently rated at 100 hours (military

time) between overhauls and has a growth potential to
150 hours between overhauls.

The SR-71 engine an improved J-58 with 34,000 lbs.

I of thrust. ·it is presently rated at 100 hours (military
time) and has a growth potential to 200 hours between
overhauls. It should be noted that these are effective
TBOts based on assumed flight time for return to over-
I haul for all causes whereas scheduled TBOts would be
expected to be somewhat better.·

I D. Crews.

The A~l2 is operated by one pilot who is responsible

I for piloting the aircraft, using sensor & EWS equipment
and navigating to his destination. His training consists
of a ground school course at Lockheed Aircraft, followed·
by 21 miss ions in the A-12, for a· total of 56 hours.
I This gives him an operational readiness status. His con-
tinuation training in the A-12 consists of 18 sorties
per quarter and includes a minimum of seven aerial re-
I fuelings. His collateral training is accomplished in a
F-101 aircraft. ·He also has 148.bours of academic and
field training annually.

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I The SR-71 is operated by two officers. A pilot

operates the aircraft, and a reconnaissance systems
·1 operator is responsible for navigation and reconnais-
sance systems operation. The crew's training consists
of 13 weeks of ground school, nine simulator rides, and
13 SR-71 sorties. Aircrew pr9ficiency training continues
I with a minimum of 12 SR-71 missions per quarter. Col-
lateral flight training is in a T~38, Simulator training
is available at Beale AFB for both A:...12 and SR-71 aircrews.
I E. Tanker Support.

I The 903rd Air Refueling Squadron with 23 KC-135

modified aircraft.stationed at Beale AFB is responsible
for tanker support to both the SR-71 and the A-12.
Basically, each aircraft requires the support of one
I tanker for each refueling in the ZI. A. deployment to··-
Kadena, by either aircraft, would require three air re-
fuelings enroute. Each deployment or operational air
refueling is supported by a primary and an air-spare

"I
tanker. During operational periods, the tanker· support
would be dictated by mission frequency.
There are 52 tanker sorties per month required for
A-12 aircrews. The SR-71 plans 283 tanker sorties per . ;

month for training, plus necessary tankers for deployment

I and operational missions. Each tanker aircraft is
capable of 11 refueling sorties per month, but main-
·
tenance and varied mission assignments preclude a division
I. of sorties required, by 11, to determine numbers of air-
craft required.
The ultimate plan for tanker support is as follows:
I Beale AFB, Calif. 20 UE aircraft - 15 for support
of A-12 and 5 for support of
I SR-71.
McCoy AFB, Fla. 20 UE aircraft primarily for
I Little Rock AFB, Ark.
support of the_S~-71.
15 UE aircraft primarily
for support of the SR-71.
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I F. AGE Equipment.

I ·Each project requires a myriad of AGE support

equipment for the aircraft, the sensors and the pilots.
Estimate of the dollar value of this equipment is· $47
million for the SR-71 and $30.million for the A-12.
I This equipment is in being, and approximately 60% of
it is interchangeable.

I G. Command, Control and Communications.

Targeting, flight planning and command of the
I OXCART vehicle is centered at· CIA Headquarters in
Washington, D. C.
Flight plans are prepared at Headquarters and
I transmitted via the 1004 high-speed secure digital

..I
data circuit to Area 51 or Kadena, as required. Coor-
dination with the necessary ground facilities and tanker
aircraft is accomplished.through high frequency single
sideband radio, UHF radio links, KW-26 secure teletype
circuit and secure telephone and hot line telephone.
While airborne, the A-12 is monitored by a high fre-
quency B1RDWATCHER system with the capability of
flight following and recall if desired.

I Mission preparation time allows for aircraft,

sensor and crew generation and requires approximately
24 hours. If a canned mission were pre-planned, and
I. aircraft .and crews were in the countdown stage, a
shorter generation time would be required.

I The SR-71 has a similar command and control system.

The Joint Reconnaissance Center and the SAC Reconnais-
·. sance Center· command and control the aircraft through
their land and radio facilities. ··Flight plans are
I prepared at Headquarters SAC and transmitted via high
speed data. lines. Current planning calls for a 16~
hour ·generation period to launch a m~ssion. If canned
I routes are used a shorter generation period is en-
visioned.

I
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'POP. SECRET .
.
.
·.:..
. .
: .. ·. . ·..
:· .. . ,
.. CQ5 4 9 2 9 3 9 ·-..·--··· _;,. ····--····-·--··--....:-.~-------...:..:i •. '- :•.•L. ··'""···,·-"'· :: ,.......

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I H. Fuel Storage.

I Storage facilities for PF-1 fuel 1 which is used by

both the A-12 and the SR-71, have been established at
selected points in the ZI and overseas. U.S. facilities

I a1~e at Beale AFB in Californi?-, McCoy AFB in Florida,

Edwards AFB in California, Are·a 51 in Nevada, and
Palmdale, California. Overseas storage facilities are
located at EielsonAB in Alaska, Kadena AB on Okinawa,
I Thule AB in Greenland, and Adana AB in Turkey. These
sites are stocked with fuel and facilities adequate to
support either training or operational missions.
I I. Sensor Processing.

I Present planning is that OXCART sensor processing

will be accomplished at Eastman Kodak Company in Roches-
ter1 New York. This facility is staffed with 211 people

'9·
and is presently being used for other NRO programs.

The 9th SRW has a Reece Tech squadron attached and

in-pla.ce at Beale AFB, It is manned with 400 personnel.
I It also has a capability of deploying detachments to
overseas bases. An initial photo inte~pretation report
can be provided by this unit 6 hours after a ianding at l
Beale AFB and final readout in 12 hours. In general,
I
;

take from both programs could be processed either at

the Reece Tech squadron or Eastman Kodak, with the timing
for IPIR and final readout being dependent upon location
I of the Reece Tech squadron, on .flying time to Eastman
Kodak Company and NPIC in Washington, D.C.

I The Reece Tech Squadron presently a.t Beale has a

.complete automatic system in operation with the fol:-
lowing capabilities: ·

I l. Fixed and mobile facilities - 10. aircraft -

24 hour operation

I 2 .. Fixed only - 6 aircraft - 24 hour operation

3. Mobile o·nly - 4 aircraft - 24 hour opera.tion

I
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I J. Support Aircraft.
·-.:-.-:..--..:.··~~--·-.

The OXCART program uses eight F-101 support air-

craft for pilot proficiency training and chase of the
A-12. A C-130 is provided for personnel movement and
classified cargo such as camer_as, etc. An H-43B is
used at Area 51 for search and rescue and paramedic
jump training. There are two T-33s for rapid trans-
portation and jet qualification of pilots. One U-3B
is available for emerg~ncy air evacuation, search and
security patrol of the area ..

The SR-71 wing has six T-38s in direct support of

pilot proficiency training. Two T-29s and two T-33s,
plus base assigned aircraft, are shared by the SR-71
program. Both programs use MAC as needed for addi-
tional logistic support.
K. Kadena Support.

The OXCART Project has prepositioned 1,000,000

pounds of equipment at Kadena Air Base. Construction
of the operations buildings, hangars, and the POL fuel
farm necessary to support operationa·1 missions is
completed. There are 19 persons in place to maintain
equipment and facilities for immediate use.
OXCART operations from Kadena would be commanded
and cont.rolled from Headquarters in Washington.
Operational missions can be flown from Kadena ten days
after mission approval.
These facilities are available for use by the SR-71.
A small ext0.1sion to the hangar and prepositioning of
peculiar pieces of supplies and AGE to support the SR-71.
will be required. ·The OXCART program can support nine
operational missions per month with three deployed air-
crart. The SR-71 concept envisions one sortie per day
·with 4 aircraft or ~ne sortie per week with 2 aircraft.
SAC estimates an operational capability about 90 days
after notice to deploy. The OXCART plans 225 persons
deployed while the SR-71 is programming 363 persons

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iiiillllllli................._ _ _....;_;...;._....-..........~---....--__...;..;........_~_...;..;..:.........;.;;;·:..""-·""""-'-~__.::_~---'-"-···-...:·-~~- ....... _.... ~ .. ·...... ··'
 . C054 92 939 ...~.,.

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I
per 1 sortie per dayaud 231 for l sortie per,week

I
1
for support of the SR-71 and photo lab. Ta;nker support
for both Projects would be as required. OXCART com-
mui1ica tio11s facil:lties are in being and include a 1004
computer which could be used.by the,SR-71 program.
I Sensor processing for the.OXCART would be at Eastman
Kodak or the Reece Tech Squadron i·f deployed.

i; I
''

I
I

'-I
I
I
I
I
I
I
•I .. . .
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I
I
I
APPENDIX B
I
I COSTS

I Introduction

·~ This Annex is intended to provide more detailed costing

data than are available in the main body of the report.

I The Annex contains three majol" sections· and.five attach-

ments. Section ·One discusses the cost of the currently
planned programs. Section Two discusses various actions
I that could be taken and how they would affect program costs.
Section Three discusses specific pl"ogram alternatives. The
attachments provide more detailed costs.for the various
I alternatives. /

I
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•· ..
 C05492939 _.,_,_ -:.'...~--~·~~-~.....:.;...,;~.....:;;.
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I
I SECTION ONE:
·1 Attachment 1 to this Annex gives FY 1968, FY 1969 1 and

:I five year total costs by major cost category for both programs.
These data are the approved programmed amounts except for
aliocated categories. The allocated categories are best
estimates.

'.I The table below indicates the total cost of each program
as presently planned in millions o:f dollars.
!I
i

FY 68 69 70 71 72 Total

:":I SR-71

OXCART.

Total
186.• 7
109. 5 '

296.2
157.1
102.4

259.5
148.4

95.3

243.7
140.2

92.7

2.32. 9
132.4

87.5
219.9
764.S

487.4

1252.2

'I ·These co.sts are to support the following aircraft

inventories.

I FY 68 69' 70 71 72 Total Aircra:f t Years

29 29 28 27 27 140
I SR-71; 1

OXCART; 2 11 11 10 10 9 51 .

I /l Includes 2 trainers and 2 test.vehicles.

/2, Includes 1 trainer and 1 test vehicle·.
I
I
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C05492939

I
/, Handle via B YEM.AN,
TALENT-kEYHOLE,
COMINT Controls
TOP SECRET
IDEALIST/OXCART/ CORONA
HEXAGON/GAMBIT /DORIAN
BYE 2856-66
· Page_g_

I
I 'The above costs and Attachment 1 assume separate basing
of the two programs.

I A major cost not included in the above totals is the

J-58 Engine development program. The development program
supports both the SR-71 and the A-12. The programmed amounts
for tlle J-58 Engine development are:
I .... ··--· ·-·~ ·-·-~ ........._ ..
]·y 68 69 70 71 72 .Total
I Millions 45 35 25 15 5 125 (Al.ternatives I and II)
of 41 31 23 13 5 113(Alternatives III and IV)
I Dollars 40 30 20 12 4 106(Alternative V)

It was decided that because these funds support both

programs no attempt should be m&de to allocate them separately.

"
I
Thus, all attachments to this Annex show the J-58 costs
separately,

I
I
I
I
I
I IDEALIST/OXCART/CORONA. Handle via BYE MAN,
HEXAGON/ GAMBIT /DORIAN TALENT-KEYHOLE,

'I TOP SECftET

COM.INT Controls
1··cos492939·=···

I TOP SEC:FtET

r
AHandle via BYEMAN,
TALENT-KEYHOLE,
COMINT Controls
IDEA LIST/ OXCART/ CORONA
HEXAGON/GAMBIT /DORIAN
BYE 2.856-66
Page.1_

I
I SECTION TWO:

Using these status-quo programs as .a base-line case,

I various areas were investigated for. their affect on costs.
The following areas will be discussed briefly: reduction '
in fleet size, consolidated basing, and reduction of flying
I hours.

REDUCTION IN FLEET SIZE

I Three methods of reducing fleet size are discussed:
1tCannibalize1t planes, mothball planes, and ground planes.
I Cannibalization

'-
Below is the estimated savings to be realized over
a five year period resulting from salvaged parts.of ·one
OXCART vehicle. It is estimated that similar figures would
result from analysis of an SR-71. ·
I Engines $ 7·05,000
Airframe 1,840,000
I Other

Total·
400,000

$2,945,000

I Mothballing

The follow~ng estimates were developed in connection

I with mothballing:
Approximate cost to place vehicle into.mothballs in
I thousands of dollars.

SR-71 $300/plane

I OXCART $200 - $400/plane

I
•I
IDEA LIST /OXCART/ CORONA Handle via B YEMAN, ...
HEXAGON/ GAMBIT /DORIAN TALENT-KEYHOLE,·.
COMINT Controls

TOP.SECRET
' ·· ....
C05492939 · ·

I 'l'OP SJ:::CH:B'J'
, Handle via BYEMAN, IDEALIST /OXCART I CORONA BYE 2856-66
TALENT-KEYHOLE, HEXAGON/GAMBIT /DORIAN Page-1_
COMINT Controls

I
I Cost of inspection and preventive maintenance while
in mothballs in thousands of dollars.

I SR-71
OXCART
$60/pl.ane/year
$60/plane/year

Cost in millions of dollars to remove from mothballs

I alld update to current configuration.

Time Stored 6-9 months 2.5-3 years 4.5-5 years

I OXCART
SR-71
1.2 3.8 6.7

I Grounded

..I The concept of grounding vehicles was costed on the

following assumptions:

(1) All grounded vehicles would be periodically

overhauled and modified to current configuration.

(2) All grounded planes would be warmed-up

I periodically but not flown.

Several operational concepts were developed which

included grounded vehicles.
I For the SR-71 i t was determined that grounding 12
vehicles reduced the .five year costs by approximately $96
I million from the status-quo.

For the OXCART it was determined that grounding 5

vehicles reduced the five year costs by approximately $36
I million from the status-quo.

I
I
•I
IDEA LIST I OXCART I co.RONA Handle via B YEMAN,
HEXAGON/ GAMBIT /DORIAN TALENT-KEYHOLE;
· COMINT Controls

·TOP SECRET.
 C0549293

·I TOP SECRET
:, ·Handle via BYEMAN, IDEALIST/OXCART/CORONA BYE 2856-66
·: TALENT~KEYHOLE, HEXAGON/GAMBIT /DORIAN Page_§,_
· COM.INT Cm1trols .

·1
;.I The following comparison was made of grounding versus
mothballing:· The cost of operating an OXCART :fleet witb
five mothballed planes was subtracted from the cost of
operating an OXCART fleet with five grounded flyable planes.
I The difference· was divided by five to indicate th.e cost of
maintaining a grounded flyable vehicle.
·1 FY 68 69 70 71 72 Total

;1 Difference (in
millions of $)
9.8 10.G 7.8 9.3 7.9 45.4

·1 Cost/aircraft
grounded
1.96 2.12 1.56 1.86 1.98 *

I~ *Average yearly cost for :five year period;

45.4 = $1.8 million pel' aircraft.

25
I CONSOLIDATION ..
:
I All estimates of consolidation costs. were made under the
assumption that Area 51 would be closed and the programs
consolidated at Beale AFB.
I Two general comr11ents can be 'made about Consolidation:

I (1) Significant costs were incurred to construct additional

facilities for OXCART vehicles and personnel.· The table below
·indicates estimates of construction cqsts and one time moving
costs under various types of moves.
I
1.
I

.,•
IDEALIST /OXCART/ CORONA Handle via BYEMAN,
HEXAGON/ GAMBIT /DORIAN .TALENT-KEYHOLE;
COMINT Controls

·'.POP SECRE'.f'
.·,•.
 -~ ··~··-·~ •• ·~ . . . . . __ • • • • 4 • •

C05492939

I TOP SECRET
.,Handle via BYEMAN, IDEALIST/OXCART/CORONA BYE 2856-66
. TALENT-KEYHOLE, HEXAGON/GAMBIT/DORIAN Page_§_
COM!NT Co~trols

·1
I Type of OXCART
Program Moved
Construction
Costs in
Miilions
Transportation
Costs in
Millions

I 6 flying vehicles & 5 grounded

6 flying vehicles & 5 mothballed
12.9
10.2
7.2
5.5

1· 11 vehicles mothballed
6 g·rounded vehicles & 5 mothballed
5.4
5.4
1.6
1.6

(2) In the five year period operating savings offset this

I initial one time cost but by a small amount. Thus, total

savings relative to the status-quo programs were small.

I REDUCTION OF FLYING HOURS

Cost savings were anticipated in the following major

'-I
categories if flying hours were reduced: airframe support,
engine support, and fuel.

Below is a table indicating the status-quo costs of the

SR-71 program and the costs of SR-71 programs where the flying
hours were reduced by 10, 20, and 30 percent.

I FY 68 69 70 71 72 Total

·1 Planned
10% Reduction
176.0
173.l
146.3
142.8
136.9
. 132.8
129.6
125.7
122.4
118.6
711.2
693.0
20% Reduction 170.6 139.4 129.0 122.1 114.5 675.6
· 11s.o·
I 30% Reduction 168.l 136.6 125.l 110.8 658.6

I
I -- ........ _
··--·--··.......... -'.,,;.

I
IDEA LIST/OXCART/ CORONA Handle via BYEMAN,
p HEXAGON/ GAMBIT /DORIAN ·TALENT-KEYHOLE,
COMINT Controls

I ; ..
TOI'. SECMT
C05492939

...
., ,
I
Handle via BYEMAN,
TALENT-i<EYHOLE,
COMINT Controls
TOP SECRET
IDEALIST /OXCART I CORONA
~XAGON/GAMBIT /DORIAN
BYE 2856-66
Page-1..

.·I
I SECTION THREE:

,( Several alternatives were developed and total program

costs were determined for these ~lternatives.
Alternative I was the status.,,quo. The yearly costs for
I this alternative are presented. on page 1 of this Annex and a
more detailed costing of this alternative is shown in
Attachment l. This alternative provided '.for an·eleven air-
I
. '
craft OXCART program operating from Area 51 and a thirty air-
craft SR-71 program operating from :Seale. Attrition for the
SR-71 was assumed to be .1 aircra:ft per 1000 flying hours and
·I a flying program of approximately 6000 hours/year was assumed.
The OXCART attrition rate was assumed to be l aircraft every
two years and a flying program.of 1760 hours per year was
assumed,

It The table below compares the status-quo program with

separate basing to the status-quo with consolidated basing
I at Beale AFB. It was assumed that the move. was made at the
beginning o:f FY69 and both programs would be managed by SAC
from that date on. Also, Air Force personnel would perform

i field mai11tenance on both programs, however, contractors were 1·

maintained for·major airframe and engine overhaul and for

modifications. These figures do not include engine development
costs nor some of the allocated costs.
I
FY 68 69 70 71 72 Total
I Separate
Consolidated
285.6
291.0
248.7
241.0
232.1 222 •. 5
21 7 • 0 • 209 . 0
209.9
199~0·
1198.8
1157.0
Difference -7. 7 -15.0 -13.5 -10.9 -41.8
I +5.4
...

I
I
•
IDEALIST/OXCART/CORONA Handle via B YEM.A
HEXAGON/GAMBIT/DORIAN TALENT-KEYHOL
COMINT Controls -

I TOP SECRET

...
··---·--.
'•:. -:·;
~···
 C05492939
.·1 TOP SECRET
l ...
fr Handle via BYEMAN,
TALENT-I-<EYHOLE,
IDEALIST/OXCART/CORONA
HEXAGON/ GAMBIT /DORIAN
BYE 2856-66
Page.Ji..
COMINT Co.ntrols

·:1
I Alternative number !Ia called for mothballing five
OXCART vehicles but maintaining separate bases for the two
prog;rams. Al tern a ti ve II b called for mothballing five
·1 OXCART vehicles and consolidating both programs at Beale AFB
under SAC mana:gement. Attachment· 2 gives cost details on·
Alternative IIa and Attachment 3 gives cost details on
Alternative IIb. Neither attachment includes cost of demoth-
I balling aircraft, since this cost is a function· of when
vehicles are removed.

I In both of these alternatives the SR-71 program was

assumed to be the same as the status-quo.

··I.. In Alternative IIa it was assumed that the four remaining

operational vehicles, the test vehicle, and the trainer would
fly 960 hours per year. Attrition vehicles were not replaced
but the remaining flyable vehicles maintained the 960 hour

.~ program. ·It was assumed that this reduced program would begin
in July 1967.

·1 The same flying program was assumed for Alternative IIb,

however the mothballing costs .were incurred at the beginning
of FY 1969 when the move to Beale was accomplished. During

I FY68 it was assumed that the five planes to be mothballed

would not be flown.

Alternative III called for mothballing the entire OXCART

:1 fleet. The detailed costing for this al.ternative is shown in
Attachment 4. In this alternative it was assumed that the
OXCART program would be cut from 1760 hours to 420 hours in
FY 1968. The schedule for this decrease is as follows:

.. First Quarter FY 1998

1. Mothball five operationaivehicles.
2. Fly remaining four operational vehicles
45 hours each.
:1 3. Fly test and trainer 30 hours each.

·1
111 IDEALIST /OXCART/ CORONA
BEXAGO!~"/ GAMBIT /D.ORIAN
Handle via BYEMAN,
TALENT-KEYHOLE, ·
COMINT Controls

·I TOP SECRET
 TOP SE C:RE 'f
Handle via BYEMAN,. IDEALIST I OXCART/ CORONA BYE 2.856M66
TALENT-KEYHOLE, HEXAGON/GAMBIT /DORIAN Page_@_
COMINT Controls

I
I Second Quarter FY 1968

Mothball test and trainer vehicle.(2 vehicles)

·I Fly remaining ~ou~ operational vehicles
45 hours each.

I Third Quarter FY 1968

1. Mothball remaining operational vehicles.

2. Close Area 51.
I 3. Move useful assets to Beale.
It was further assumed that this major reduction in the OXCART
I program would cause the unit price of spares and overhauls to
increase in the SR-71 program. This cost increase in the
SR-71 was assumed to be approximately $75 million over the
five years. It was assumed that with the elimination of the

~ entire OXCART fleet the J-58 Engine development costs would

be reduced by ten percent.

I Alternative IV is a variation of Alternative III. The

assmnptions mentioned in the above paragraph hold for Alterna-
tive IV; however, instead of closing Area 51 in Fiscal Year
I 1968, eight operational SR-7l's and one SR-71/B trainer are
transferred to CIA control and maintained at Area 51. The
total flying time on all SR-7l's was assumed to be approximately
.

6000 hours per year. Approximately 4500 hours per year at

I Beale AFB and 1500 hours per year at Area 51. It was further
assumed that the SR-71 test program would be maintained at
Beale AFB under SAC management. Modifications resulting from ·

'
this program would apply to all SR-71 aircraft.

Alternative V was considered a reduction in tempo of the

I current program, but no reduction in.number of vehicles. No

detailed attachment was developed for this alternative, however,
the table b.elow indicates the reduced program costs by year.

I
I
IDEALIST/ OXCART/ CORONA Handle via BYEMAN,
It HEXAGON/ G_>\MBIT /DORIAN TALENT-KEYHOLE,
COMINT Controls

I TOP SECRET
,, C05492939

.I TOP SECRET
t; , Handle via BYE MAN 1 IDEALIST I OXCART I CORONA BYE 2856.:66
·. TALENT-KEYHOLE,· HEXAGON/GAMBIT/DORIAN Page_t_o
COMINT Controls .

'I
I FY
SR-71
68
178.8
69 70 71 72 Total
147.4 136.6 128.6 120.8 71.2. 2
I OXCART 95.9 86.4 85.7 83.3 78.1 429.4.

., I
J-58 Engine

Total
40.0

314.7
30.0

263.8
20.0

242.3
12.0

223.9
4.0
202.9

The reduced SR-71 costs were developed by assuming a

reduction of 30% in status-quo flying hours. The OXCART.
106.0..
1247.6

I reduced costs were developed by assuming a 20% reduction in

status-quo flying hours. It was assumed t.hat for both
programs additional sensor purchases were eliminated and.the
level of :flight testing was reduced.

"I
I
I
I
I
I
I
IDEALIST/,OXCART/CORONA · Handle via B YEMAN1.
It HEXAGON/ GAMBIT /DORIAN TALENT-KEYHOLE,
COMINT Controls·

I TOP.SECRET
 . .. , . ...
· ,. - . . . . . .. . . ......... · ..... - .
: C05492939.
~.. "';

I Handle via BYE MAN, IDEA LIST/ OXCART/ CORONA

TOP SECRET
BYE 2856-66
, TALENT.-KEYHOLE, ~XAGON I GAMBIT I DORIAN
COMINT Controls

I Attachment 1

I Alternative I; Status Quo - Separate Basing

I Fiscal Year 68
SR-71
69 68-72 68
k.1£.
§2 68-72

I Flying Hours 5233 5920 30,423 1760 1760 8800

I Airframe
Engine
55.4
72.2
54.2
45.9
17.1
258.2
221. 4.
37.9
·21.5
. 6.8
35.2
19.2
168.0
90.4
Fuel 15.6 88.3 6.8 34.0
.1 Guidance
Cameras
A/B Elec
11.0
4.3
10.0
0.7
45.0
7.1
4.9
8.6
5.6
3.4
8.3
5.5
17.7
33.7
26.4
Anti-Radar o.o o.o o.o 1.8 1.6 7.4

~ Others
Base Op.
Support a/c*
3.7
18.8
0.7
2.4
18.8
1.0
13.4
93.7
4.7
1.2
8.4
2.2
1.2
8.4
2.2
.5. 6
40.2
11.0
I Tanker*
Air Force Issue*
5.0
o.o
7.0
o.o
o.o
33.0
0 .o .
0. 0 .
1.9
2.2
6.5
'
1.9
2.2
6.5
9.5
11.0
32.5
Admin. Overhead* 0.0

I Total 186.7 157.l 764.8 109.5 102.4 487.4

I Totals: FY68 FY69 FY68-72

SR-71 186. 7 . 157.l 764.8

I A-12
J-58 Engine
109.5
45.0
102.4
35.0
487.4
. 125. 0

341.2 294.5 1377.2.

I *Allocated costs
Costs in millions of dollars.
I
I
It IDEALtST/OXCART/CORONA
HEXAGON I GAMEr T /DORIAN
Handle via BYEMAN,
· TALENT-KE:YHOLE,
.CO MINT Controls

I TOP SECRET
 "" ....., •. ········; t.. .. --• ........· .• -~- ..........._, ,_. ·-·· ...... , . ... ! ~·-·· .. ~#·
'.; C05492939
' , , . ,,.... ••

I TOP SECRET
:. • , Handle via B YEM.AN, IDE.A LIST/ OXC.AR T /CORONA . BYE 2856-66
.: TALENT-KEYHOLE, HEXAGON/ GAMBIT /DORIAN
· COMINT Controls

I Attachment 2
Al tern~l ti ve Ila; Mothball 5 A-12's - Separate. Basing

I SR-71 A-12

Fiscal Year 68 69 68-72 68 69 68-72

I Flying Hours 5233 5920 30,423 960 960 4800

I Airframe
Engine
30.3
..18. 7
27.S
17.4
141.2
82.3
Fuel . 3. 7 . 3.7 18.5 .
I Guidance
Cameras
4~2
7.7
3.0
7.7
15.9
30.S
A/B Elec 4.8 4.8 22.S
I Anti-Radar
Other
1.8
0.9
1.6
0.8
7.4
4.1
Base Op. 7.8 7.3 37.6

;\ Suppo:rt a/c*
Tankers>.'<
Air Force Issue*
Admin. Overhead*
1.2
1.0
1.2
6.5
. 1.2
l.O
1.2
6.5
6.0
' . 5 .o
6.0
32.5
I Subtotal 186.7 157.1 764.8 89.8 84.0 409.6

I :Mothballing
Inspection
o.o
0.0
0.0
o.o
o.o
o.o
1.0
0.2
o.o
0.3
1.0
1.4

I Total 186.7 157.1 764.8 .91.0 84.3 412 .. 0

Totals: FY68 ·FY69 FY68-72

I SR-71 186.7 157.1 764.8
A-12 91.0 84.3 412.0·
I J-58 Engine 45.0 35.0

276.4
125.0

1301.8·
322.7

I *Allocated costs
Costs in millions of dollars

I
It IDEA LIST/ OXCART/ CO.RONA
HEX.AGON/GAMBIT/DOR!AN
Handle via B YEM.AN; . ••
TALENT-KEYHOLE,
COMINT Controls

I .TOP SECRET
 ., ··--·
. .. . .
·····~
'' "
. -..'. ...........
~ ---·-...--~.
·~-·. :

TOP SECRET
. _,Handle via BYEMAN, IDEALIST /OXCART/ CORONA
TALENT-KEYHOLE, HEXAGON/ GAMBIT /DORIAN
. COMINT Controls ·

I Attachment 3

Alterµative IIb; ¥:othball 5 A-12's .,.. Consolidated Basing

I SR-71 kl.£
I Fiscal Year 68 69 68 . . . 72 68 69 . 68-72
Flying Hours 5233 5920 30,423 9.60 960 4800
I
Airframe 34.4 26.5 130.6
I Engine
Fuel
Guidance
;l.6.9
4.0
4.9
15.8
3.7
3.4
73.3
18.8
17.7
Cameras 6.1 28.l
I A/B Elec
Anti-Radar
6:.1
5.6
1.8
5.5
o.o
26.4 .
1.8
Other 0.6 0.6 3,0
Base Op. 8.5 8.4 40.3

"I Support a/c* 1.2 1.2 6.0

Tankers* · 1.0. 1.0 5.0
Air Force Issue* 1.2 1.2 6.0
Admin. Overhead* 6~5 o.o 6.5
Subtotal 186.7 157 .1. .764.8 92.7 73.4 363.5
I Close Area 51 o.o 6.o 0.0 o.o I. 5 1.5
Moving Costs o.o o.o o.o 2.8 2.8 5.6
I Const. at Beale
Mothballing
Inspection
0.0
o.o
O.O
0.0
o.o
o.o
o.o
o.o
o.o
10. 2**
1.0
0.2
o.o
o.o
0.3
10.2**
1.0
1.4 .

I Total 186.7 . 157 .1 764.8 106·~9 78.0 .· 383.2

Totals:
I FY68 FY69 FY68-72

SR-71 186.7 157.l 764.2

I A-12
J-58 Engine
106.9
45.0
78.0
35.0
383.2'
125.0
270.l
I *Allocated costs
338.6

**Includes $3.0 million.for TAGBOARD

1272.4

•I
Costs in.millions of dollars
IDEALIST/OXCART/CORONA Handle via BYEMAN,
HEXAGON/GAMBIT/DORIAN TALENT-KEYHOLE,
COMINT Controls
1'0P .SE CRE1'

: . ·.·.
 .................. ,.. ··:

C05492939
I q;Qp BE CRE ':P
Handle via BYEMAN, IDEALIST/OXCART/CORONA BYE 2856-66
, TALENT-KEYHOLE I HEXAGON/ GAMBIT /DORIAN
COMINT Controls
Attachment 4
·I Alternative III; Mothball all A-12's

I Fiscal Year 68
SR-71

69 68-72 68 .
A-12
·~·

69 68-72

I Flying Hours 5233 5920 30 ,.4~3. 420 0 420

I Airframe
Engine
Fuel 1.6
11.6
17.8
o.o
o.o
11.6
17.8**
0.0 l.6
Guidance o.o
I Cameras
A/B Elec
1.9
2.1
2.0
o.o
o.o
1.9
2.1
2.0
Anti-Radar 0.7 o.o ·. 0.7
I Others
Base Ou.
0.4
. ·-'~-d~·-"·"··-····3. 9.
o.o
o.o
0.4
~.9
Support a/c* 0.6 o.o 0.6

\ Tankers*
Air Force Issue* .
Admin. Overhead*
0.5
o.o
2.0
o.o
o.o
o.o
0.5
o.o
2.0
I Subtotal 186.7 157.l 764.8 45.l o.o 45.l
Const. at Beale o.o o.o o.o 3.0 o.o 3.6***
I Mothballing
. Inspection
o.o
o.o
o.o
o.o
o.o
o. o
4.4
0 .2.
o.o
0.6
4.4
2.6
Area Closing o.o o.o o.o 1. 5 o.o 1.5
o.o o.o o.o o.o
I Movement
Add-ons due to
Volume Reduction 10.0 17.9 73.6
3.6
o ..o o.o
3.6
o.o
I Total 196.7 175.0 838.4 57~8 0.6 60.8
Tot·als:
I SR-71
FY68·

196.7
FY69

.175. 0
FY68-72

838.4
6.6
I A-12
J-58 Engine
57.8
41.0 31.0
60.8
113.0
295.5 206.6 1012.2
·I *Allocated costs
**Includes approximately $10 million in unbudgeted termination costs.!

•I
***TAGBOARD program · ·
Costs in millionslDEALIST/OXCART/CORONA .. Handle via BYEMAN,
of dollars HEXAGON/GAMBIT/DOR.IAN . ·TALENT-KEYHOLE,
COMINT Controls
TOP SECRET
..
' · __ ._.__' ; ,. ,.
 • •' ,t, I

·co5492939

,I
Handle via BYE MAN,
TALENT-KEYHOLE,
COM!NT Controls
TOP SECRET
IDEALIST/ OXCART/ CORONA
HEXAGON/GAMBIT /DORIAN
. BYE 2856~66

I Attachment 5

Alternative IV; Mothball A-12 1 s and Share SR-7l's at Separate Bases

I SR-71 ~
Fiscal Year
I Flying Hours
68

5233
69

5920
68-72

30,423
68

420
69

0
68-72

420

I Airframe 74.l 74.7 354.4 11.6 o.o 11.6

Engine 81.4 53.8 258.8 17.8 o.o 17.8**
I Fuel
Guidance
Cameras
15.6
11.0
17.l
10.0
88.3
. 45. 0
1.6
1.9
o.o
o.o
1.6
1.9
2 .• 1 0.0 ·2.1
o.7 7 .1. o.o
I AB/Elec
Others
Base Op.
4.3
3.8
20.0
2.4
24.3
13.5
115. o.
2.0
1.1 .. o.o
3.9 o.o
2.0
1.1
3.9
Support a/c* 2.3 3.2 o.o
·'9
14. 7 ·. 0.6 0,6
Tankers* 5.0 7.0 33.0 0.5 o.o 0.5
Admin. Overhead* 4.5 6.5 30.5 2.0. o.o 2.0

I Mothballing
Subtotal 222.0 199.7 960.3 45.l

4.4
o.o
o.o
45.1

4.4
Inspection
I Total 222.0 199.7 960.3
0.2

49.7•
0.6

0.6
2.6

52.1

I Totals:
.FY68 FY69 FY68-72

I SR-71
A-12
J-58 Engine
222.0
49.7
41.0
199.7
0.6
31.0
960.3/,l
52.1
113.0

·I 312.7 231.3 1125.4

/1 SAC SR-71 169.1 126.6 636.2

I - Agency SR-71 52.9 73.1 324. l

*Allocated costs.

I **Includes approximately $10 million in unbudgeted termination cost

•I
Costs .in millions of dollars •
IDEALIST /OXCART/ CORONA Handle via BYE MAN
HEXAGON/GAMBIT/DORIAN TALENT-KEYHOLE
. COMINT Controls
TOP BE CR:E T
. ;>·.:· ·.• ...... ··
~05492892
TOP SEGRE~/B YEMAN /TALENT /KEYHOLE

~ BYE-8888-69
31 March 1969
I Cop>' I of 2

I
I
I
I.
I HISTORY

I OF THE

•
I
OFFICE OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

DD/S&T

I
I Prepared by:
-::·v # -v&"
I __ ;
. ?ft-Lt-;._~
--11
#. ".rte.o-0'-..-,
Helen Hill Kleyla ~ .

.~Jr~·
I
I Robert D. 0 1 Hern

Handle via BVEMAN

·1 Control System

• l'OP SECRE'ffBYEMAN/TALENT/KEYHOLE
 C05492892

I
•I
I
I
I
I
Annex 2, a report by Lockheed on

I the CL-282 High Altitude Aircraft,

is printed on an 8-1 /2 X 11 inch
format. Therefore,. for ease of

I binding this history, it has been

included _with the Appendices at

•I the end of the study .

·1
I
I
I
I
I
• ...........
Handle via B'fiMAH
Control System