2nd Sem PDF

RAJIV GANDHI NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LAW,
PUNJAB
(Established by Punjab Act No. 12 of 2006)
Bhadson Road, Sidhuwal, Punjab
(Accredited ‘A’ Grade by NAAC)
Teaching Schedule
of
English II
for
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)
2nd Semester
Session 2019-2020
Compiled By :
Dr. Tanya Mander
Dr. Navleen Multani
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SR. NO. CONTENTS PAGE NO.
1. PREFACE 1-2
2. OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE 3
3. SYLLABUS 4-5
4. TEACHING SCHEDULE 6-7
5. REFERENCE MATERIAL 8-10
6. TEACHING PEDAGOGY 11
7. LIST OF ASSIGNMENTS / PROJECTS 11-14
8. IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS 14
1. PREFACE
English – II Credit – 04
RGNUL offers English in the second semester of B.A.LL.B. (Hons.).
English is a compulsory subject for the undergraduates. The subject carries
an award of 4 credits with a requirement of 5 study hours per week
(Theory). The teaching schedule of the subject gives the students a clear
idea about the study pattern for the academic session 2019-2020. It
provides objectives and course content of the subject. The teaching schedule
of the subject follows a learner-centric approach. It supports the process of
active learning. The teaching schedule introduces the undergraduates to a
pragmatic approach of acquiring knowledge and attempts to facilitate
learning.
Different sections of the schedule elaborate upon the objectives,

syllabus, proposed lectures, additional recommended reading/reference
material, teaching pedagogy and assignment/projects. It also includes
important instructions for the students. The section on syllabus gives the
details of the prescribed curriculum and reading resources. Additional
reading resources enable students to grasp the topic and delve into the
content/topic for class discussion. The pre/post-reading of the study
material advances an active and participatory mode of learning. The
students can gain comprehensive knowledge about the topics by utilizing
these resources.
The syllabus comprises of four Modules: I/Literature, II/Writing

Skills, III/Grammar and IV Poetry of Law. Modules I and IV, (Literature and
Poetry of Law) introduce students to different perspectives, ideologies and
cultures. A comprehensive reading of literary texts will sharpen the cognitive
and communicative skills of the students. It will also enable the
undergraduates to develop critical reasoning and close reading. Modules II
and III will enable the students to improve their writing skills. The
competence in language learning at the undergraduate level will empower
the budding lawyers for success in their profession. The subject paper /
theory carries 80 marks.
1
In addition to the subject paper, students will select a drama for
Project Work. The section on Project provides a guideline to the students.
Project work is assessed on 35 marks. It comprises written submission on
the selected topic, presentation and viva-voce. Project Work will enhance the
reading, writing, researching and speaking skills of the student. It also
introduces the beginners to the use of ICT (Information and
Communications Technology).
The teaching schedule will facilitate the students to understand the

scheme of study at RGNUL. It will also motivate them to imbibe a regular
pattern of learning.
2
2. OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE
The compulsory course of English in B.A.LL.B. (Hons.) Course has been developed
with certain clear objectives in mind.
• To deepen the awareness of rhetoric, engage with like any works with
purpose and strategy.
• To improve oral and written communication skills, together with
critical, interpretative and analytical abilities.
• To hone analytical skills, better reading fluency, critical reading, and
interpretation skills, to enable them to learn law through literature.
• To enable students to construct and express coherent critical
arguments in writing.
• To enable the students to write coherent and cohesive text that
demonstrates precision and clarity.
• To develop understanding and ability to analyse structures in term of
form and function.
• Ensure standard academic level of grammatical correctness.
• Vocabulary development.
• Enable the students to look at language in broader context and
comprehend how language works.
• To enable the students to learn effective language learning strategies.
3
3. SYLLABUS
ENGLISH – II (2017)
PAPER – I CREDIT: 04
SEMESTER - II
MODULE I
LITERATURE
DRAMA
ANTIGONE — Sophocles
THE CRUCIBLE — Arthur Miller
PROSE
NO MAN IS AN ISLAND — Minno Masani
OF STUDIES — Francis Bacon
MODULE II
WRITING SKILLS
PRECIS WRITING
PARAGRAPH WRITING
REPORT WRITING
ANTONYMS & SYNONYMS AND IDIOMS & PROVERBS
ONE WORD SUBSTITUTES
MODULE III
GRAMMAR
VOICE
NARRATION
TENSES (SUBJECT – VERB AGREEMENT)
FORMATION OF WORDS
COMMON ERROR IN ENGLISH
4
MODULE IV
POETRY OF LAW
LEGAL REFORM — Thomas Gunn
THE HANGING JUDGE — Eavan Boland
PUNISHMENT — Seamus Heaney
THE RING AND THE BOOK — Robert Browning
HAMATREYA — Ralph Waldo Emerson
SUGGESTED READINGS
(1) Miller Arthur, The Crucible, Penguin Classics. (1988)
(2) Sophocles, Antigone (Translated by Reginald Gibbons), Oxford

University Press, London (2003)
(3) Bibu, Douglas, Longman Student’s Grammar of Spoken and Written

English, Lognman (2001)
(4) Bloomfield, Leonard, Language, University of Chicago Press (1984)
(5) Collins, Cobuild English Grammar, Harper Collins Publishers, London

(2002)
(6) Collins, English Thesaurus, Harper Collins Publishers, Glasgow (2001)
(7) Digest, Readers, Write Better Speak Better, Cape Town (2001)
(8) Eastwood, John, Oxford Practice Grammar, Oxford University Press,

New Delhi (2004)
(9) Greenbaum, Sidney, Oxford English Grammar, Oxford University

Press, New Delhi (2005)
(10) Kirkpatrick, E.M., Wordsworth Dictionary of Idioms, Hertfordshire

Publishers, Delhi (1993)
(11) Lewis, Norman, Better English, Goyal Publishers, Delhi (2004)
(12) Lewis, Norman, How to Read Better and Faster, Ravinder Goyal, Binny
Publishing House, New Delhi.
5
4. TEACHING SCHEDULE
Sr. Topic Number of

No. Lectures
MODULE I
1. ANTIGONE — Sophocles** 08
2. THE CRUCIBLE — Arthur Miller* 08
3. NO MAN IS AN ISLAND — Minno Masani* 02
4. OF STUDIES — Francis Bacon** 02
TOTAL 20
MODULE II
5. PRECIS WRITING** 02
6. PARAGRAPH WRITING** 01
7. REPORT WRITING* 02
8. ANTONYMS & SYNONYMS AND IDIOMS & 01

PROVERBS ***
9. ONE WORD SUBSTITUTES*** 01
TOTAL 07
MODULE III
10. VOICE* 02
11. NARRATION* 02
12. TENSES (SUBJECT – VERB AGREEMENT)* 02
13. FORMATION OF WORDS** 03
14. COMMON ERROR IN ENGLISH ** 02
TOTAL 11
6
MODULE IV
15. LEGAL REFORM — Thomas Gunn* 01
16. THE HANGING JUDGE — Eavan Boland* 01
17. PUNISHMENT — Seamus Heaney** 02
18. THE RING AND THE BOOK — Robert Browning* 02
19. HAMATREYA — Ralph Waldo Emerson** 02
TOTAL 08
Total Lectures Proposed to be Delivered 46
*Dr Tanya Mander
** Dr Navleen Multani
*** Students shall do it regularly
Note: The above teaching schedule is tentative and is subject to change as

per the requirements of the session.
7
5. REFERENCE MATERIAL
Module I
ANTIGONE
1. DeWitt, Norman W. 'Character and Plot in the "Antigone". The

Classical Journal. 12.6 (1917): 393-396. http://www.jstor.org/
stable/ 3288383.
2. Holland, Catherine A. "After Antigone: Women, the Past, and the Future of
Feminist Political Thought." American Journal of Political Science 42.4
(October 1998):1108-1111.
3. Markell, Patchen. 'Tragic Recognition: Action and Identity in
Antigone and Aristotle', Political Theory, Vol. 31. 1 (Feb., 2003): 6-38
4. Multani, Navleen. "The Subaltern Speaks: Revisiting Sophocles'
Antigone." The Vedic Path. Vol. XCIII 1 (Jan-March 2018): 73-88.
5. Segal, Charles Paul. 'Sophocles' Praise of Man and the Conflicts of
Antigone. Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics Vol. 3. 2
(Summer, 1964): 46-66.
6. Zappulla, Silvia. "Reading Antigone through Hannah Arendt's
Political Philosophy" Art, Emotion and Value. https://www.um.es7/
/Silvia- zapulla (2011): 111-137.
THE CRUCIBLE
1. Fender, Stephen. ‘Precision and Pseudo Precision in "The Crucible"’

Journal of American Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Apr., 1967): 87-98
[JSTOR]
2. Porter, Thomas E. 'The Long Shadow of Law: The Crucible', Myth
and Modem American Drama, 1969.[ Article will be uploaded]
3. Cohagan, Jerald. "Arthur Miller's "The Crucible"" (2005). Faculty
Scholarship - Communication
http://digitalcommons.olivet.edu/comm_facp/1
8
OF STUDIES
1. Edwards, Beverly Sigler, “The Therapeutic Value of Reading.”

Elementary English, Vol. 49.2 (Feb. 1972): 213-218.
2. Shrodes, Caroline, “Bibliotherapy.” The Reading Teacher. Vol. 9.1
(Oct. 1995): 24-29.
Module II
1. Fitzmaurice and Ciara O'Farrell. Handbook of Academic Writing.

Web.
Module III
1. Baldick, Chris. Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms. Oxford

Univ. Press, New York (2008).
2. Madan, Sabina. English Grammar. Spectrum Books, New Delhi
(2012)
Module IV
LEGAL REFORM
1. Miller, John. ‘The Stipulative Imagination of Thom Gum.’ The Iowa

Review Vol. 4, Issue I Winter.
PUNISHMENT
1. "The Irish History." https://www.theirishstory.com/2015/02/09/the-

northern-ireland-conflict-1968-1998-an-overview/#WnQ6VoHhXqA
2. "Were the Mysterious Bog People Human Sacrifices." https://www.the
atlantic.com/Science/archive/2016/03/were-europes-mysterious-bog
–people-human-sacrifices/472839/
3. "Iron Age 'bog bodies' unveiled." new.bbc.co.uk https://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/Science/nature/stm/4589638. 7 Jan 2006.
4. "World's oldest bog body hints at violent past." https://www.bbc/
news/science-environment-24053119. 24 Sept. 2013.
5. The Hindu. "What is the Kuthiyottam ritual and why is it in the
news?" 3 March 2018.
9
6. Adultery : SC asks centre why women should not be punished under
Section 497 IPC Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2017 SCC Online SC 1447,
order dated 08.12.2017 SCC Online Volume 5 Issue 318
7. "Should adultery be a crime?" The Hindu http:/ / www.thehindu.com /
opinion/ op-ed/ should-adultery-be-crime/ article 22180770. ece.
dated 22.12.2017.
8. 'I can't keep writing elegies' Seamus Heaney on C4News 1999"
https:/ /youtu.be/ 6dGrdTONFjO
THE RING AND THE BOOK
1. Peckham, Morse. Historiography and “The Ring and the Book”

Victorian Poetry. Vol 16. 3/4 (Autumn-Winter 1968): 243-257.
2. Rigg, PD. Legal "Repristination" in "The Ring and the Book". Browning
Institute Studies. Vol. 18 (1990): 113-130.
HAMATREYA
1. D. Pertinni. ‘Maitreya in Hamatreya: Religious Analysis on

Emersion’s Poem Hamatreya Source: academia.edu/34103163.
2. Nicoll, W. Roberston. "Ralph Waldo Emerson." The North American

Review. Vol 176.558 (May 1903): 675-687. https://www.jstor.org/
stable/25119398.
3. Underwood, Francis H. "Ralph Waldo Emerson." The North American
Review. Vol 130. 282 (May 1880): 479-498. https://www.jstor.org/
stable/25100856.
Note: Articles are available online/on JSTOR and RGNUL ERP LSA.
Access the articles on desktop or laptop.
Question Papers (of previous years) are available in RGNUL Library.
10
6. TEACHING PEDAGOGY
❖ Lecture Method
❖ Socratic Method
❖ Group Activity
❖ Discussion Method
❖ Projects
❖ Library Tutorials
❖ Presentation / Videos
❖ Role Play
7. LIST OF ASSIGNMENTS / PROJECTS
Guidelines for Project Work
The students in the second semester have to read an engaging play

/drama for the English Project. Drama is essentially fiction meant to be
performed on a stage for an audience. The Project must keep in mind the
performative aspect of a play and explore how the story builds out of
conflict and its journey to the last scene. The Project must expand and
elaborate the intersections between literature and law. It should explore
how literature can and does offer insights to the study of law and also in
what ways literature enhances our understanding of society and law. The
Project must be original piece of work.
The English Project shall be in the form of an essay (4000-5000

words). It shall be divided into five parts:
I. Introduction: This part must introduce the dramatist, text and age
in which the play was performed. The summary of the play must be
part of the introduction.
II. Characters: A detailed study of characters should be undertaken in

this part. If the characters are based on some real life characters,
mention and explanation must be covered in this part.
11
III. Setting, Symbols, Motifs and Themes: The part must elaborate on
the philosophical dimension of the work. If the work is based on
certain social setup / structure this part must talk about it through
illustrations. A detailed analysis of symbols, motifs must be
undertaken to support the philosophical dimension of the work. The
setting of the play must be discussed in detail and explanation be
offered on its impact on the play.
IV. Thematic Concerns I Exposition: The part should bring out clearly
the intersection between the play and law (Legal issues, norms, cultural
practices and customs). The research for this part may include the
author's interviews (regarding why the work was written in the first place).
Exposition must take on analysis of the work and situate law and its
ideas in the middle.
V. Critical Appraisal: This part shall be based on the criticism of the work over
the years. The shortcomings or the merits of the work must find mention
here. It should also talk about the essential questions that the works is
trying to raise and locate the work in history. It should clearly tell whether
the work is able to answer the questions raised by the author or they have
been deliberately left unanswered. It must also state the relation between
the work, society and law.
Note: 1. For research and resources students can look up articles on JSTOR.
(available online through University Library)
2. For formatting English Project students must follow MLA style Sheet.
* https:/ I owl.english.purdue. edu/ owl/ resource/ 747I 01
12
PROJECT TOPICS
Sr. Name of the Dramatist Name of the Book
No.
1. John Galsworthy Justice
2. Henrik Ibsen A Doll’s House
3. Henrik Ibsen Ghosts
4. Henrik Ibsen Hedda Gabler
5. Henrik Ibsen The Master Builder
6. Vijay Tendulkar Silence! The Court is in Session
7. Vijay Tendulkar Sakharam Binder
8. Girish Karnad Haya Vadana
9. Girish Karnad Tughlaq
10. Girish Karnad Yayati
11. Mahesh Dattani Final Solutions
12. Mahesh Dattani Tara
13. Mahesh Dattani Dance Like a Man
14. Nissim Ezekiel Nalini
15. Nissim Ezekiel Marriage Poem
16. Nissim Ezekiel Don’t Call it Suicide
17. Manjula Padmabhan Light Out
18. William Congreve The Way of the World
19. William Congreve Love for Love
20. William Congreve The Double Dealer
21. George Etherege The Man of Mode
22. George Etherege The Comical Revenge
23. John Webster The White Devil
24. John Webster The Duchess of Malfi
25. Jean-Paul Sartre No Exit
26. Jean-Paul Sartre Dirty Hands
27. Bertolt Brecht Mother Courage and Her Children
28. Bertolt Brecht Life of Galileo
29. Oliver Goldsmith She Stoops to Conquer
30. John Osborne Look Back in Anger
31. G B Shaw Pygmalion
32. G B Shaw Saint John
33. G B Shaw Man and Superman
34. G B Shaw The Apple Cart
35. G B Shaw Getting Married
36. Sophocles Oedipus Rex
37. Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus
38. Sophocles Electra
39. Euripides Medea
40. Euripides The Trojan Women
41. Ben Johnson Volpone
42. Ben Johnson The Alchemist
13
43. Christopher Marlowe Doctor Faustus
44. Thomas Kyd The Spanish Tragedy
45. Arthur Miller Death of a Salesman
46. Arthur Miller All My Sons
47. Arthur Miller A View From the Bridge
48. Samuel Beckett Waiting For Godot
49. John Galsworthy The Silver Box
50. Anton Chekhov The Cherry Orchard
Note: The List is suggestive. Students can select any drama of their choice. Student
will submit the project topic to the concerned Supervisor by 31st Jan 2020.
8. IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS
• Students shall carry the text (Antigone, The Crucible, Prose and Poetry)
on the days notified by the Teacher.
• The study material, if any, will be uploaded from time to time on LSA
Academia (ERP). Please take time out to read it for better
comprehension and for different perspectives to the work.
• Punctuality is appreciated and rewarded.
• Attendance and attentiveness in class carries credit.
• No Student should be without stationary (pens, pencils, writing pads)

in the class, ever.
• In the classroom try to converse in English.
• Respect the teacher.
• Class room discussions are part of teaching but these should not
become an excuse for shouting or misbehaving.
• Assignments are to be submitted on time.
• Mobile phones (messaging, looking, scrolling) are not allowed in the

class.
• Students are allowed to read the e-copies of the text in the class on a
tab, kindle or a laptop.
• Students must value and practise intellectual integrity while working

on project topics/assignments.
14
RAJIV GANDHI NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LAW, PUNJAB
Teaching Schedule
of
Law of Contract including Specific Relief Act
for
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) First Year
Second Semester
Session 2020-2021
Compiled By :
Dr. Sangeeta Taak

(Strictly for private circulation)
Table of Contents
Sr. No. Contents Page No.

1. Preface 2-5
2. Objectives of the Course 5-6
3. Syllabus 6-7
4. Teaching Schedule 7-8

5. Reference Material 9-15
6. Teaching Pedagogy 16
7. List of Assignments/Projects 17
8. Important Instructions 18
Preface/Outline of the Subject
Law of Contract is a civil remedy. It gives a compensation in case of breach. The contract
may be classified into Valid, Void and Voidable contracts. Since the valid contract can be
enforceable in the court of law. However, it does not mean that other contracts are illegal. As
it is commonly said that all agreements are contracts but all contracts are not agreements. It
means that the agreements which are social, or which are not following all the essentials of
the section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 it cannot be considered a contract under the
Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 1- 74 deals with the Contract Act-I and Section 124-175
deals with the Indian Contract Act II. It means that the second Part of Indian Contract Act II
deals with the special contract. It Includes the Indemnity, Guarantee, Bailment, Pledge and
Agency. It means that all the essentials mentioned under the section 10 need not to be
fulfilled before making a contract under the special Contract mentioned as contract II.
However, some of the essentials may be ignored also.
The Indian Contract Act, 1872 is divided into two parts. The first part is from section 1-
section 74 deals with the basic Indian Contract Act. It deals with the short title, Meaning,
Nature of Contract. It deals with the making of a contract, who can enter into a contract, types
of a contract, performance and breach of a contract. It also deals with the, impossibility of
contract, means the contract which cannot be performed. Section 56 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872 deals with the case laws jurisprudence to explain when a situation can be
considered as an impossibility and when it is just a difficulty and not an impossibility.
It deals with contract which need not to be performed. It is mentioned under section 62-67of
the Indian Contract. It also deals with the most important part i.e., quasi contract that is which
are similar to contract but are not contract. Section 68-72 explains it in a better way.
Second Part of the Indian Contract Act, 1972 deals with the special contract. It includes the
special contract like the Bailment, pledge, agency, indemnity and guarantee.
The Specific Relief Act deals with the specific remedy claimed by the plaintiff rather than the
damages or compensation. The court shall look into each case on the basis of facts whether
the specific remedy shall be given or not.
The student shall learn the remedies available in the law of contract and importance of each
remedy in case of breach of contract.
History of Law of Contract Act
The Indian Contract Act is an old legislation. Earlier in case of formation of contract the
English Law was applied to the presidency towns of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta by the
charter granted in 1726 by King George I to the East India Company. Then the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 was enacted.
The main issue was the Hindus and Mohammedans were having their personal laws in order
to enter in the matters of inheritance and succession. So it was decided that in the cases of
inheritance and succession their personal laws shall be applicable. For this the Act of
settlement was also passed by the British Government in 1781. In Presidency to
In cases where only one of the parties is a Mohammedan or Hindu, the laws and usages of the
defendant is considered. This rule was applied in the Presidency Towns. In places outside the
presidency towns, judgment was decided according to the justice, equity and good
conscience.
The Indian Contract Act, 1872 initially also dealt with Sale of
Goods, Indemnity and Guarantee, Law of Bailment, Agency and Partnership. However, in
1930, a separate Act on the Sale of Goods was passed. The Indian Partnership Act was passed
in 1932.
The modern Contract Law is mostly influenced by the Greek and the Roman Law. One of the
earliest mentions of Agreements was mentioned in The Laws by Plato. Though his work
made little mention about initiating an agreement, it did specific mentions about termination
of agreements on the lines of what we see even today.
The study of the History of Contracts can be traced by the developments in the Contract Law
as seen in:
English Contracts
European Contracts
Contracts as seen in the 20th Century
Changing face of Contracts in the Globalisation era
Indian Contract Act do not give specific remedy for that we have Specific Relief Act and the
remedies available under the Act are Declaratory, Permanent, Injunctions and Preventive.
The Law of contract is important and a base of all the business laws. No business Contract is
complete till it fulfils the essentials of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and it also deals with the
Objectives of the Course
The syllabi of the course is designed to understand the objective of the Contract Law. It
includes how to draft the contract. When the students join the law firms the main job is to
draft a contract without any iota of doubt. In order to do litigation, the legal intricacies of the
contract law need to understand. The contract Law is the basis of Business Law so very
carefully the provisions must be understood. To understand the general terms of law of
contract and the special contract so that the student must know which section is to be made
applicable without getting confused in the general provisions and the special provisions. The
main objectives of the course are as under:
To develop the skill of interpreting provisions of Contract Law and Specific Relief Act
To understand and apply legal provisions in solving legal propositions
To understand various remedies available in Contract Laws, Specific Relief Act, Sales of
Goods Act and Partnership Act etc.
To identify the problems in drafting the contract.
To identify the grey areas where the contract law has to be interpreted
3.0 Syllabus
This portion should include the approved Syllabus.

4.0 Tentative Lecture/Teaching Schedule
Tentative Teaching Schedule should be in the following format
Sr. No. Topic Number of

Lectures
Module I
1. Contract: Meaning, Definition and Types 2
2. Essentials of Valid contract 2
3. Proposal and Acceptance 3
4. Capacity to Contract 2
5. Liability for Necessaries Supplied to a Minor 3
Total Lectures 12
Module II
6. Consent and free Consent 2
7. Consideration 3
8. Doctrine of Privity to Contract and Exceptions 3
and Legality of Object Unlawful considerations
and its effect
9. Agreements Expressly Declared to be Void 2
10. Contingent Contract 2
Total Lectures 12
Module III
11. Discharge of Contract 2
12. Frustration 3
13. Quasi Contract 2
14. Breach of Contract 2
15. Damage for Breach of Contract 3
Total Lectures 12
16. Recovering Possession of Property 2
17. Specific Performance of Contract 2
18. Rectification, Recession and cancellation of 3
instrument
19. Declaration 2
20. Injunctions 3
Total Lectures 12
Total Lectures Proposed to be delivered 48
5.0 Reference Material
5.1 Module I
Statutes
The Indian Contract Act, 1872
Reports of Commissions (Law Commission Reports etc)
Law commission report to review the Contract Law available at

http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-50/Report13.pdf
Books
Avtar Singh, Law of Contract, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow (9th Edn. – 2005)
Anson’s Law of Contract, Clarendon Press, Oxford, (28th Edn. -2002).
R.K.Abhichandani (ed.), Pollock and Mulla on Contracts and Specific Relief Acts (1999)
Tripathi, Bombay
Articles
Judgments
Adhunik Steels Ltd v Orissa Mangenese Minerals (P) Ltd AIR 2007 SC 2563
 Allokam Peddabbayya v. Allahabad Bank, AIR 2017 SC 3069
 Balfour vs Balfour (1919)  Bengal Coal Co. v. Homee Wadia & Co. (1899)
 Bhagwandas v. Girdhari Lal & Co. 1996 SC
 Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Great Eatern Shipping Co. Ltd. 2008 SC
 Carlill vs. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893)

 CCE v. Grasim Industries 2015 SC 15
 Chinnaya vs. Ramaya
 Citibank N.A. v. Hiten P. Dalal, AIR 2015 SC 3523
 Allokam Peddabbayya v. Allahabad Bank, AIR 2017 SC 3069
 D.G. Factory v. State of Raj, 1970 SC
 Damodar Murlidhar vs. Secretary of State of India
 DDA v. Kenneth Builders and Developers Ltd
 Dickinson v Dodds
 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd vs. Selfridge & Co
 East India Hotels Ltd v. Syndicate Bank, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 29
 Energy Watchdog v. CERC (2017) 14 SCC 80
 Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corpn. (1955)
 Felthouse v.Bindley (1862) 6 LT 157
 Ghaziabad Development Authority v. UOI 2000 SC
 Hadley v. Baxendale  Harris v. Nickerson (1873)
 Harvey v. Facie (1893)
5.2 Module II
5.2.1 Statutes
Indian Contract Act, 1872
5.2.2 Reports of Commissions (Law Commission Reports etc)
Law commission report on Unfair terms of the contract available at

http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/rep199.pdf
5.2.3 Books
A. C. Moitra, Law of Contract and Specific Relief, Universal Law Publishing Co.(5th Edn.
2005)
5.2.4 Articles
(i) Restraint of Trade, Boon or Bane, available at manupatra,

http://www.manupatrafast.com/articles/PopOpenArticle.aspx?ID=a6cfd61d-d7de-48a7-a093-
3f14098affb5&txtsearch=Subject:%20Contract
(ii) A Critique of section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 available at

http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/article/section-65-of-the-indian-contract-act-1872-
with-special-reference-to-discharge-of-a-contract-by-frustration-888-1.html
(iii) Void Agreement, available at http://lawtimesjournal.in/void-agreement/
(iv) Doctrine of Frustration available at http://lawtimesjournal.in/doctrine-by-frustration/
(v) Consequential damages under Indian Contract Act available at
(vi) Review Article on Law of contract available at

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/lwtch21&div=20&start_page=212&co
llection=journals&set_as_cursor=4&men_tab=srchresults
5.2.5 Judgments
J.K. Enterprises v. State of M.P. 1997
 Jones v. Padavatton (1969)
 K. Nanjappa v. R.A. Hameed (2016) 1 SCC 762
 Kanchan Udyog Ltd. v. United Spirits Ltd (2017) 8 SCC 237
 Kedar Nath vs. Gorie Mohamed 16
 Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. 1969

 Lalman Shukla vs. Gauri Dutt (1913) 11 AQLJ 489
 LIC of India v. R. Vasireddy
 M.P. SRTC v. Manoj Kumar (2016) 9 SCC 375
 Mac Pherson v. Appanna 1951 SC
 Meritt v. Meritt (1970)
 Mohri Bibee vs. Dharmodas Ghose
 Mukul Sharma v. Orion India (P) Ltd, 2016 SC
 Nash vs Inman
 Orissa IIDC v. Mesco Kalinga Steel Ltd. 2017 SC
 Pharmaceuticals Society of Great Britain v. Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd. (1952) 2
QB 795
 Prema v. Mustak Ahmed 1987 Guj
 Puthukkattil Parangodan v. Puthukkattil Parameswaran, AIR 2002 Ker 221
 R. Rajashekhar v. Trinity House Buliding Coop. Society, AIR 2016 SC 4329
5.3 Module III
5.3.1 Statutes
The Indian Contract Act, 1872
Law commission report on section 28 availale at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-

100/Report97.pdf
5.3.3 Books
Chitty on Contracts, Sweet & Maxwell, London, Vol. I & II, (28th Edn. – 1999).
5.3.4 Articles
5.3.5 Judgments
Judgment on section 65 of Indian Contract Act, 1872
Mrs.M.C.Pankajakshamma vs M/S.Metro Space Developers on 5 November, 2019
M/S Acb (India) Limited vs Gujarat Electricity Regulatory ... on 18 January, 2019
M/S. Fortune Five Hydel Projects ... vs Karnataka Electricity ... on 29 March, 2019
Yashodhara Shroff vs Union Of India on 12 June, 2019
Google India Private Limited, ... vs The Deputy Commissioner Of Income ... on 11 May,
2018
Rajender Kumar vs Rama Bala Gupta on 14 January, 2019
Parveen Garg vs Satpal Singh & Anr. on 11 May, 2018
Maharashtra State Electricity ... vs Sterilite Industries (India) & ... on 9 October, 2001
Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. vs Delhi Paper Products And Ors. on 13 April, 2010
5.4 Module IV
5.4.1 Statutes
Specific Relief Act, 1963

Law Commission Report on Specific Relief Act, 1963 available at
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/101-169/report147.pdf
5.4.3 Books
Krishnan Nair, Law of Contracts, Orient Longman, Hyderabad, (5th Edn. – 1996)
Robert A. Hillman, Principles of Contract Law, West Academic Publishing, 3rd Edition
(2014)
Nilima Bhadbhade (ed.), Mulla, Indian Contract Act and Specific Reliefs, Butterworth’s
India, New Delhi, Vol. I & II, (12th Edn.- 2001)
5.4.4 Articles
Contract Law Review by H. Collins available on

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/lwtch21&div=20&start_page=212&co
llection=journals&set_as_cursor=4&men_tab=srchresults
(vii) International Direct Taxation and E- commerce: A Catalyst for Reform available at
https://login.westlawindia.com/maf/wlin/app/document?&srguid=i0ad6ada700000160742180
fccd77f473&docguid=I98F57D90916111E7B29AAD44C936D7CA&hitguid=I98F57D9091
6111E7B29AAD44C936D7CA&rank=9&spos=9&epos=9&td=369&crumb-
action=append&context=13&resolvein=true
(ix) Cases when specific performance of contract can be enforced under the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 available at
http://mja.gov.in/Site/Upload/GR/Sumarry%20Civil%20Side.pdf
(x) English contract problems in Indian Code and Case law available at
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/camblj1958&div=9&start_page=67&c
ollection=journals&set_as_cursor=3&men_tab=srchresults
5.4.5 Judgments
Ramachandran Nair v. Sukumaran, AIR 2002 Ker 394
 Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale AIR 2007 SC 2577 

Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co. v. Montefiore
 Rose and Frank Co vs. J R Compton
 Sandeep Cement (P) Ltd. v. UOI 1990 Guj
 Sasan Power Ltd. v. North American Coal Corpn. India Ltd 2016 SC
 SBP v. Ramesh Chander Kanoji 2004 SC
 State of M.P. v. Goberdhan Dass 1973 SC 17
 State of M.P. v. Ruchi Printers 2016 SC
 State of Punjab v. Om Prakash 1988 SC
 Vedanta Ltd. v. Emirates Trading Agency, AIR 2017 SC 2035
 Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. 1949
 Williams v. Cowardine
6.0 Teaching Pedagogy
The aim of the course is to make students understand the general principles of the contract
Laws and the Specific Relief Act in theory and in practice. The lecture method shall be
followed to make the students understand the bare provisions of the Bare Act. It shall also
help them to interpret the provisions of the law. However, the discussion method shall be
followed to understand the propositions. Keeping in view the requirements of the subject, it
is proposed to use a combination of various teaching methods. Accordingly, a combination of
following methods shall be used: Lecture Method, Discussion Method and propositions.
Lecture Method and case study method shall be used for the First, second and third module as
it includes the topics of meaning, nature and consideration and the privity to contract. The
difference between the English Law and the Indian Law shall be explained in detail with
relevant case laws. The history of contract laws shall be explained and the reason why barter
exchange came to an end shall be explained in detail.
The limitations on the contract laws like coercion, undue influence, mistake and
misrepresentation and fraud shall be discussed with the provisions of section 19-A that is the
remedy of all voidable agreements.
Fourth Module shall be discussed with lecture method and on the basis of the cases decided
by the courts to decide the contracts which should be specifically enforced or not? Critical
analysis of the cases shall be discussed in the class.
7.0 List of Assignment/Project Topics
Definition and Classification of Contract
Difference between valid contract, void and voidable contract
Definition and Essentials of a valid offer and acceptance
Definition and Essentials of a valid acceptance and revocation
Capacity of parties to enter into contract
Liability of minor for necessaries supplied under Indian Contract Act, 1872
Meaning, nature and essentials of Consideration and exceptions
Doctrine of privity of contract and its exceptions
Agreement with unlawful object and consideration
Agreement in Restraint of Trade
Wagering Agreement: Case Study
Communication and Revocation of offer and acceptance
Agreements without Consideration

Free consent under Indian Contract Act
Agreement in Restraint of legal proceedings
Effect of coercion and undue influence on Contract
Effect of Fraud and Misrepresentation on Contract
Ambiguous and Uncertain Agreements
Effect of Mistake on Contract
Agreements expressly declared to be void
Restraint of Trade
Restraint of Marriage contract
E contract: Legal issues
Case comment on Mohribibi v.. Dharmodas Ghose
Case Comment Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co. and Another
Quasi Contract
Remedies for the Breach of the Agreement
Impossibility of a contract
Grounds of Discharge of Contract
Contingent Contract
Injunctions under the Specific Relief Act, 1963
Rule in Hadley v. Baxendale
Specific Performance of Contract under the Specific Relief Act, 1963
Product Liability under the Law of Contract
Unilateral Contract
Types of Contract
Contract based upon Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law
Recovering Possession of Property under the Specific Relief Act, 1963
Concept of Declaration under the Specific Relief Act, 1963
Cancellation of Instrument under the Specific Relief Act, 1963
8.0 Instructions to Students
All students shall carry bare act of Contract Law or Specific Relief Act
Some Important judgments are listed hereinbefore, students are advised to download these
judgements and are further advised to prepare their shortnotes so as to enable meaningful
discussion in class
The above teaching schedule is tentative and is subject to change as per the need and
requirements of the session
The list of judgments recommended is only illustrative and new judgements may be added to
it during class-room discussion
Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab
Teaching Curriculum
of
Political Science
Western Political Thought
for
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)
Second Semester (Major)
Session 2019-20
Compiled by
Saurav Sarmah
Table of Contents
Part Contents Page Nos.
Introduction
● History of Political Science
● Branches of Political Science
● Interface between Political Science and Law
1 1-4
● Political Science at RGNUL
● What is the difference between Political Theory
and Political Thought?
● What is Western Political Thought?
Course Outline
● Syllabus
2
● Course Requirements 4-11
● Minimum Number of Lectures
● Project Topics
Study Materials
● Textbooks
● Articles and Book Chapters
3
● Original Works 11-14
● Databases
● News, Commentaries and Debates
● YouTube Lectures and Films
4 Detailed Lecture Plan

14-21
(according to syllabus)
5 List of Attachments 21-22
11 attachments of 162 pages
This teaching curriculum is tentative and subject to change as per the requirements of the
course.
WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Major Sem 2)
Part 1: Introduction
History of Political Science
Political Science as a separate academic discipline emerged in the 19th century, but the study
of political philosophy and statecraft had begun with the first written records. Ancient
civilisations, of the Greeks, Indians and Chinese, had profound knowledge of politics. They
developed their own systems of government based on the knowledge. We can divide the
development of politics into various stages:
1. Ancient Period: Greek-Roman philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Marcus
Aurelius, Indian philosophers like Manu and Kautilya and Chinese philosophers like
Confucius and Sun Tzu.
2. Christian-Islamic Period: Church fathers like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas and
Islamic masters like Ibn Khaldun.
3. Renaissance-Enlightenment Period: Modern thinkers beginning with Machiavelli.
4. Traditional Political Science: Foundation of the subject based on philosophical,
historical, legal and institutional methods, by mostly American scholars in the end of
the 19th century.
5. Behaviouralism: Domination of empirical, comparative, systems and other scientific
methods in the 1950s and 60s.
6. Post-behaviouralism: Reintroduction of philosophical and historical perspectives
1970s onwards.
7. Now: Domination of postcolonialism, subalternism, postmodernism, constructivism
and intersectionalism.
Branches of Political Science

Political Science is a large discipline, with numerous branches, the most prominent of which
are:
1. Political Theory/Philosophy
2. Comparative Politics
3. Public Administration
4. International Relations
Besides, there are many other interdisciplinary fields, with dominant role for Political
Science, e.g.
1. Human Rights
2. Gender Studies
3. Peace and Conflict Studies
4. Strategic and Defence Studies
5. Civilisational Studies, etc.
1
Interface between Political Science and Law
Political Science is closely related to Law. Important legal concepts and constitutional
principles originate in political philosophy. The founding fathers of the US Constitution
were influenced by the writings of John Locke and Montesquieu, the People’s Republic of
China was founded on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the Indian Constitution is an
amalgamation of political ideas, e.g. sovereignty, socialism, secularism, democracy,
republicanism, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity, from diverse sources.
Many renowned politicians in the world have been lawyers. Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
and Mohammad Ali Jinnah were lawyers before they became politicians. Even in our
times, former US President Barack Obama, former Finance Ministers Arun Jaitley and
P. Chidambaram had been lawyers and Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese
President Xi Jinping had studied law.
Public Administration provides the fundamental principles, on the basis of which

government, bureaucracy, industry and other businesses are organised. The laws
governing these institutions, are influenced by the fundamentals of Public Administration.
Civil servants and business executives can learn immensely from Public Administration.
International Relations is perhaps the most lucrative branch of Political Science. It provides
knowledge that can be useful to lawyers at the world stage. International Law emerged from
the writings of political philosophers and strategists and wars fought and treaties signed by
powerful countries. Hence, it is necessary to understand International Relations, in order to
become an international lawyer or a diplomat.
Thus, Political Science not only helps in understanding Law but also provides career
opportunities, in politics, administration, foreign policy, think tanks, business and of
course, academics, for law students.
Political Science at RGNUL

Our university offers Political Science as Major or Minor in BA, LLB. The Major students
need to study the subject for 6 semesters. They are offered 6 papers, one in each semester:
1. Political Theory
2. Western Political Thought
3. Non-Western Political Thought
4. Comparative Public Administration
5. India’s Foreign Policy
6. International Relations and Organisations
2
Papers 1, 2 and 3 are parts of Political Philosophy, Paper 4 is a combination of Comparative
Politics and Public Administration and Papers 5 and 6 are parts of International Relations. So,
the students get an opportunity to study all the main branches of the subject. Moreover, our
university goes beyond the Eurocentric approach to Political Science. Our students are
trained in European, American, Chinese, Christian, Islamic and indigenous Indian
thought.
The students, who opt for Economics or Sociology Major, need to select Political Science as
a Minor subject. The Minor students study the subject for 3 semesters. They are offered 3
papers, one in each semester:
1. Political Theory: An Introduction

What is the difference between Political Theory and Political Thought?

There are many terms starting with ‘political’, viz. political science, political theory, political
thought, political philosophy and political ideology. The word ‘political’ refers to social
relations involving power, i.e. ability to control human behaviour and its highest
manifestation, state. State is a sovereign entity within a territory; in other words, it has no
external master or internal challenger. Only rights can protect an individual from the tyranny
of state. So, political science is basically a systematic study of power, state and rights and
their many manifestations. Its theoretical part is called political theory. ‘Theory’ means
generalisation of some ideas. It explains and predicts about a subject matter. Thus, political
theory discusses the foundation and development of political science as a discipline and
theories of political concepts.
There is no obvious distinction between political theory and political thought. Theory denotes
a more scientific approach to concepts, while thought is more philosophical. In the structure
of the papers, there are certain distinctions:
(i) Theory is concerned with concepts. In each concept, a number of thinkers are
studied. On the other hand, thought deals with thinkers. In thought, different concepts
given by each thinker are studied.
(ii) Theory, normative or empirical, implies precise and coherent articulation of ideas,
while thought contains ambiguities, paradoxes and contradictions inherent in the
thinking process.
(iii) Theory is ahistorical. It applies across time and space. But thought develops
within a historical and geographical context.
These distinctions are arbitrary. Theory and thought are often used interchangeably. Political
philosophy is another term used for political thought. Political ideology is belief in a political
philosophy and commitment to implement it.
3
What is Western Political Thought?
The political discourse is dominated by Western ideas. ‘West’ refers to the civilisation that
developed in Ancient Greece and Rome and then combined with Biblical ideas. It was
dominated by the Roman Catholic Church, underwent Renaissance, Protestant Reformation,
Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution, abolished slavery and imperialism (after imposing
them on the non-Western people) and defeated Nazism and Bolshevism. The ‘West’ overtook
the ‘Rest’ gradually from the 16th century to the 19th century and controlled almost the entire
world in the beginning of the 20th century. It still dominates the political discourse, despite
non-Western people regaining their independence from the middle of the 20th century and
non-Western civilisations, like China, Islam and India, reasserting their identities and
interests in the 21st century. Hence, it is important to understand the Western political
thinkers and the dominance of their ideas.
Western Political Thought is the second paper in Political Science. It introduces the students
to the main political ideas from Ancient Greece (Plato and Aristotle), medieval Christendom
(Augustine and Aquinas) and modern Europe and America. Among the modern thinkers, we
shall discuss about Machiavelli, the social contractualists, the utilitarians, Hegel, Marx,
Lenin, Rawls and Hannah Arendt.
Part 2: Course Outline

Syllabus
MODULE I
1.1 Plato: Ideal State, Theories of Knowledge and Justice
1.2 Plato: Theories of Education and Communism
1.3 Aristotle: Classification of States
1.4 Aristotle: Moral Action and Best Constitution
1.5 Aristotle: Views on Property and Slavery, Theory of Revolution
MODULE II
2.1 Christian Political Thought in the Middle Ages: Augustine and Thomas Aquinas
2.2 Augustine: Theory of State in the City of God, Justification of Slavery
2.3 Thomas Aquinas: Classification of Laws, Justification of Monarchy
2.4 Machiavelli: Humanism and Republicanism
2.5 Machiavelli: Politics and Ethics
MODULE III
3.1 Social Contractualists: Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau
3.2 Bentham: Representative Government as the Maximiser of Utility
3.3 John Stuart Mill: Concept of Liberty
3.4 Hegel: Dialectics
4
3.5 Hegel: State and Civil Society
MODULE IV
4.1 Karl Marx: The State and Class Struggle
4.2 Karl Marx: Critique of Capitalist Society
4.3 Lenin: State and Revolution
4.4 John Rawls: Distributive Justice
4.5 Hannah Arendt: Totalitarianism, Human Condition
Course Requirements
1. Attendance: Minimum 85% (3 marks)
2. Class participation (2 marks)
3. Project: Written (15 marks), PowerPoint presentation (10 marks) and viva voce (10
marks)
4. Exams: Mid-sem (20 marks) and End-sem (40 marks)
Attendance: At RGNUL, class attendance is compulsory. The students are advised not to miss
even a single lecture; the loss would be irreparable. All topics, projects and possible
announcements are discussed in the class. Due to unavoidable circumstances, if anyone is
absent for a class, they are advised to meet the teacher in the office on the following working
day between 4 pm and 5 pm. However, only those who are interested in learning would be
allowed in the class; indiscipline would not be tolerated and the erring student would be
expelled from the class. If a student falls short of minimum required 85% attendance,
they are responsible and they are requested not to bother the teacher about it.
Class participation: Education is not a one-sided process. It is an interaction among various

elements - subject, teacher, student and technology. Only those students who are interested in
learning should attend the class. They are expected to participate in classroom activities, viz.
lecture, discussion, What’s New, Let’s Debate, Quiz, Assignment and Review.
The lecture will be delivered by the teacher, the students should listen to it carefully and
take down notes for future reference. After a topic has been covered, students should raise
their hands, if they have any question. If they have no question, the teacher would ask them
questions. In both cases, there would be a discussion. Besides the regular lectures and
discussions, other class activities would also take place:
1. What’s New?
Students are encouraged to read newspapers daily and become familiar with political
news happening in the world. Randomly, any 5 students would be invited to orally
report one news each to the class. If unprepared, that student has to submit a written
report in the following class.
5
2. Let’s Debate
One motion from the syllabus would be debated between 4 top scorers in the mid-sem
exams. There would be 5 rounds: opening statements, rebuttals, questions from the
class, concluding statements and voting.
3. Quiz
After every module is completed, there would be a quiz on that module in the class.
The entire class would be divided into three groups, A, B and C. There would be 3
rounds: (i) any random student from one group would be asked a question, 10 marks
for right answer, no negative marking; (ii) one group would be asked a question and
any student can raise the hand and reply, 20 marks for right answer, 5 negative
marking; (iii) each group would nominate one student, whoever knows the answer
should raise their hand, 20 marks for correct answer, 10 marks negative marking. The
total marks would determine the winner.
4. Assignment
Students would be given questions from the syllabus as homework. They are
encouraged to answer them according to the instructions and submit it to the teacher
in their office.
5. Review
Students would be given a Jstor article or YouTube video, related to the syllabus, to
review and make a presentation in the class. If unprepared, that student has to submit
a written report in the following class.
No electronic gadget, phone or computer is allowed in the class. Students should use
notebook and pen for taking notes and recommended reading materials for reference. Only
the teacher can authorise the use of other technologies and resources in the class. However,
beyond the class, students are encouraged to use the latest gadgets, applications and internet
resources for academic work.
Project: Each student has to complete one project for each paper. The students would be
divided into groups and each group allotted a topic for the project. [See Page 10] Each
ith the guidance of the teacher on the due
student has to make a separate written submission w
date. The project would be analysed for plagiarism by the teacher using URKUND, for
which the students need to send their projects to the teacher’s URKUND address
provided in class.
After the submission, viva voce would be held for each group separately on a fixed date. The
students have to make a PowerPoint presentation and participate in group discussion and
answer questions from the teacher and the class, on the basis of which they will be evaluated.
6
Those who do not submit the projects on time or appear for the viva voce should consult
the project co-ordinators and not bother the teacher.
Exams: There would be two main exams for every paper. The mid-sem exam would be held
for 40 marks, consisting of four compulsory short notes of 5 marks each and two long
answers each of 10 marks from two modules, out of which one from each module needs to be
answered. The students would be shown the evaluated papers before the end-sem, so that they
can learn from their mistakes. In the final marks, 20 marks weightage would be given to
mid-sem exam.
Section A (5 x 4)
1. Write short notes on the following:
a. X
b. Y
c. Z
d. O
Section B (10 x 1)
2. Long Q A
or
3. Long Q B
Section C (10 x 1)
4. Long Q C
or
5. Long Q D
The end-sem exam would be for 80 marks, consisting of four compulsory short notes of 5
marks each and two long answers each of 15 marks from four modules, out of which one
from each module needs to be answered. In the final marks, 40 marks weightage would be
given to end-sem exam.
Section A (5 x 4)
a. X
b. Y
c. Z
d. O
Section B (15 x 1)
2. Long Q A
or
7
3. Long Q B
Section C (15 x 1)
4. Long Q C
or
5. Long Q D
Section D (15x1)
6. Long Q E
or
7. Long Q F
Section E (15x1)
8. Long Q G
or
9. Long Q H
The students need to get 50% in project and exams and also in the final marks to pass the
paper. Hence, the students are suggested to consult the teacher on how to write an answer
before the exams. [See Attachment 1]
Minimum Number of Lectures
Topic No. of lectures
Introduction 2
1.1 Plato: Ideal State, Theories of

2
Knowledge and Justice
1.2 Plato: Theories of Education and

2
Communism
1.3 Aristotle: Classification of States,

1
Theory of Revolution
1.4 Aristotle: Moral Action and Best

1
Constitution
1.5 Aristotle: Views on Property and

1
Slavery
Total lectures in Module I 9
8
2.1 Christian Political Thought
3
(Fundamentals)
2.2 Augustine: Theory of State in the City

4
of God, Justification of Slavery
2.3 Thomas Aquinas: Classification of Law,

2
Justification of Monarchy
2.4 Machiavelli: Humanism and

2
Republicanism
2.5 Machiavelli: Politics and Ethics 1
Total lectures in Module II 12
3.1 Social Contractualists: Hobbes, Locke

3
and Rousseau
3.2 Bentham: Representative Government

1
as the Maximiser of Utility
3.3 John Stuart Mill: Concept of Liberty 2
3.4 Hegel: Dialectics 1
3.5 Hegel: State and Civil Society 1
Total lectures in Module III 8
4.1 Karl Marx: The State and Class Struggle 3
4.2 Karl Marx: Critique of Capitalist

1
Society
4.3 Lenin: State and Revolution 2
4.4 John Rawls: Distributive Justice 2
9
4.5 Hannah Arendt: Totalitarianism, Human
1
Condition
Conclusion 2
Total lectures in Module IV 11
Grand total number of lectures 40
Besides these minimum 40 lectures, there would be more classes for viva voce, debates,
quizzes, seminars, workshops and movie screenings. There would be compulsory
attendance for all class activities.
Project Topics
1. Adam Smith (Liberalism)

2. Aleksandr Dugin
3. Alexis de Tocqueville (Liberalism)
4. Antisthenes, Diogenes and Crates (Cynicism)
5. Antonio Gramsci (Socialism)
6. Ayn Rand (Objectivism)
7. Baron de Montesquieu (Liberalism)
8. Cicero
9. Edmund Burke (Conservatism)
10. Epicureanism
11. Ethnonationalism
12. Eurocommunism
13. Frankfurt School
14. Harold Laski (Socialism)
15. Hitchens, Dawkins, Dennett and Harris (Neo-atheism)
16. Immanuel Kant
17. Intellectual Dark Web
18. Jacobus Arminius (Protestantism)
19. Jacques Derrida (Postmodernism)
20. John Calvin (Protestantism)
21. John Wesley (Protestantism)
22. Jordan Peterson
23. Joseph Smith (Mormonism)
24. Leo Strauss
25. Liberation Theology (Catholicism)
26. Maimonides (Judaism)
27. Martin Luther (Protestantism)
10
28. Mary Wollstonecraft (Feminism)
29. Michel Foucault (Postmodernism)
30. Neoplatonism
31. Nicene Creed
32. Robert Nozick (Libertarianism)
33. Roy Bhaskar (Critical Realism)
34. Slavoj Zizek (Socialism)
35. Social Gospel (Protestantism)
36. Socratic Dialogues
37. Soviet Model (Socialism)
38. Thucydides (Realism)
39. Transhumanism
40. Zeno and Marcus Aurelius (Stoicism)
Part 3: Study Materials
Textbooks (need to read only the relevant portions from the syllabus)
1. Leo Strauss (1989), An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo
Strauss, edited by Hilail Gildin, Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
2. George H. Sabine (1973), A History of Political Theory, 4th edition, revised by
Thomas L. Thorson, New York: Dryden Press.
3. Subrata Mukherjee and Sushila Ramaswamy (2011), A History of Political Thought:
Plato to Marx, 2nd edition, Delhi: PHI Learning.
4. V. Venkata Rao (1997), Ancient Political Thought, New Delhi: S. Chand.
5. Diarmaid MacCulloch (2009), Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years, New
York: Viking.
6. R.P. Sharma (c. 1970), Modern Western Political Thought, New Delhi: Sterling.
7. O.P. Gauba (2011), Western Political Thought, Gurgaon: Macmillan.
8. R.S. Chaurasia (2001), History of Western Political Thought, Vol. I & II, New Delhi:
Atlantic.
9. Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch (2012), An Introduction to Political Thought: A
Conceptual Toolkit, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
10. Brian R. Nelson (1996), Western Political Thought: From Socrates to the Age of
Ideology, 2nd edition, Delhi: Pearson.
11. J.S. McClelland (1996), A History of Western Political Thought, London: Routledge.
12. Thomas Aquinas (1959), Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, edited by A.P.
D'entreves and translated by J.G. Dawson, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
13. Michael Evans (1975), Karl Marx, New York: Routledge.
14. Catherine Audard (2014), John Rawls, New York: Routledge.
11
15. Thomas Pogge (2007), John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice, translated by
Michelle Kosch, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
16. Michael Allingham (2014), Distributive Justice, New York: Routledge.
17. Margaret Canovan (1994), Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political
Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18. Dana Villa (2000), Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Articles and Book Chapters (compulsory reading for specific topics)
1. George H. Sabine (1939), “What is a Political Theory?” The Journal of Politics, 1 (1):
1-16. [Attachment 2]
2. Saint Augustine (2008), “The City of God”, Christian Book Summaries, 4 (24):
1-7.[Attachment 3]
3. Frederick William Loetscher (1935), “St. Augustine’s Conception of the State”,
Church History, 4 (1): 16-42. [Attachment 4]
4. Catherine Chambers (2013), “Slavery and Domination as Political Ideas in
Augustine’s City of God”, The Heythrop Journal, 51 (4): 13-28. [Attachment 5]
5. William S. Brewbaker III (2006-07), “Thomas Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Law”,
Alabama Law Review, 58 (3): 575-614. [Attachment 6]
6. Daniel A. Gannon, “Four Kinds of Laws According to St. Thomas”. [Attachment 7]
7. Jules Townshend (1996), “Soviet or Parliamentary Democracy? Lenin versus
Kautsky”, in The Politics of Marxism: The Critical Debates, London: Leicester
University Press, pp. 82-92.
8. Ralph Miliband (1970), “Lenin’s The State and Revolution”, The Socialist Register,
9. Rustam Singh (1989), “Restoring Revolutionary Theory: Towards an Understanding
of Lenin’s The State and Revolution”, Economic and Political Weekly, 24 (43):
10. Santosh Bakaya (2006), “The Great Debate: Rawls and Nozick”, in The Political
Theory of Robert Nozick, Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, pp. 211-249.
11. Eric Voegelin (1953), “The Origins of Totalitarianism”, The Review of Politics, 15
(1): 68-76. [Attachment 10]
12. Hannah Arendt (1953), “The Origins of Totalitarianism: A Reply”, The Review of
Politics, 15 (1): 76-84. [Attachment 11]
Original Works
1. Plato: http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/browse-Plato.html
2. Aristotle: http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/browse-Aristotle.html
3. The Ten Commandments: http://biblescripture.net/Commandments.html
4. The Nicene Creed: http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/
12
5. The Bible: https://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/
6. Augustine: https://www.augustinus.it/links/inglese/opere.htm
7. Thomas Aquinas: https://thegreatthinkers.org/aquinas/major-works/
8. Machiavelli: https://thegreatthinkers.org/machiavelli/major-works/
9. Thomas Hobbes: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/thomas-hobbes
10. John Locke: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/john-locke
11. Rousseau: https://thegreatthinkers.org/rousseau/major-works/
12. Jeremy Bentham: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/jeremy-bentham
13. John Stuart Mill: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/john-stuart-mill
14. Hegel: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/index.htm
15. Karl Marx: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/date/index.htm
16. Lenin: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/by-date.htm
17. John Rawls (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Belknap.
18. Robert Nozick (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books.
19. Amartya Sen (2009), The Idea of Justice, Cambridge: Belknap.
20. Hannah Arendt (1951), The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Schocken.
21. Hannah Arendt (1958), The Human Condition, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Databases
1. JSTOR: https://www.jstor.org/
2. Google Scholar: https://scholar.google.co.in/
3. Shodhganga: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/
4. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://www.iep.utm.edu/
5. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/
News, Commentaries and Debates (for class participation and competitive exams)
1. Philosophy Now, London: https://philosophynow.org/

2. The Hindu and Frontline, Chennai: https://www.thehindu.com/ and
https://frontline.thehindu.com/
3. Swarajya: Read India Right, Bengaluru: https://swarajyamag.com/
4. New Delhi Television (NDTV), New Delhi: https://www.ndtv.com/
5. World is One News (WION), Noida: http://www.wionews.com/
6. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), London: https://www.bbc.com/news
7. The Rubin Report, Los Angeles: https://www.youtube.com/user/RubinReport
YouTube Lectures and Films (for Review)
1. Yale Courses (Political Science), YouTube:

https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLp-cIkvQ88-3DJkwB4iUnoHP7mUG6jFsA
13
2. Ryan Reeves (Early & Medieval Church History), YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLRgREWf4NFWZEd86aVEpQ7B3YxXPhU
Ef-
3. Jordan B Peterson (The Psychological Significance of the Biblical Stories), YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL22J3VaeABQD_IZs7y60I3lUrrFTzkpat
4. The Passion of the Christ (2004), an American Biblical film directed by Mel Gibson,
Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Passion_of_the_Christ
5. Luther (2003), an American-German historical film directed by Eric Till and Marc
Canosa, Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luther_(2003_film)
6. La Révolution française (1989), a French-German-Italian-British-Canadian historical
film directed by Richard Heffron, Wikipedia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_R%C3%A9volution_fran%C3%A7aise_(film)
7. Hannah Arendt (2012), a German-Luxembourgish-French biographical film directed
by Margarethe von Trotta, Wikipedia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hannah_Arendt_(film)
Part 4: Detailed Lecture Plan

Introduction
No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Revise important points from last semester
(b) Revisit the rules of engagement in the class
(c) Introduce the course outline
Readings:
● Western Political Thought Teaching Curriculum
● Saurav Sarmah (2017), “How to write an answer” [Attachment 1]
● George H. Sabine (1939), “What is a Political Theory?” The Journal of Politics, 1 (1):
● Leo Strauss (1989), An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo
1.1 & 1.2 Plato

No. of lectures: 4
Objectives:
(a) Discuss the important influences on Plato
(b) Explain the Platonic concept of ideal state
(c) Explain the Platonic theories of knowledge, justice, education and communism
(d) Debate the relevance of Platonic thought
Readings:
● George H. Sabine (1973), A History of Political Theory, 4th edition, revised by
Thomas L. Thorson, New York: Dryden Press, pp. 48-94.
14
● Subrata Mukherjee and Sushila Ramaswamy (2011), A History of Political Thought:
Plato to Marx, 2nd edition, Delhi: PHI Learning, pp. 54-100.
● V. Venkata Rao (1997), Ancient Political Thought, New Delhi: S. Chand.
● O.P. Gauba (2011), Western Political Thought, Gurgaon: Macmillan, pp. 35-56.
● J.S. McClelland (1996), A History of Western Political Thought, London: Routledge,
pp. 16-46.
● Plato: http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/browse-Plato.html
1.3, 1.4 & 1.5 Aristotle

No. of lectures: 3
Objectives:
(a) Discuss the important influences on Aristotle
(b) Explain the Aristotelian classification of states and theory of revolution
(c) Explain the Aristotelian concept of ideal state
(d) Explain the Aristotelian concepts of property and slavery
(e) Debate the relevance of Aristotelian thought
Readings:
Plato to Marx, 2nd edition, Delhi: PHI Learning, 101-147.
pp. 48-64.
● Aristotle: http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/browse-Aristotle.html
2.1 Christian Political Thought (Fundamentals)

No. of lectures: 3
Objectives:
(a) Narrate the origin and evolution of Christianity
(b) Explain the doctrines of Christianity - Ten Commandments, original sin and Nicene
Creed
Readings:
● Diarmaid MacCulloch (2009), Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years, New
York: Viking.
● The Ten Commandments: http://biblescripture.net/Commandments.html
● The Nicene Creed: http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/
● The Bible: https://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/
15
● Ryan Reeves (Early & Medieval Church History), YouTube:
Ef-
● Jordan B Peterson (The Psychological Significance of the Biblical Stories), YouTube:
● The Passion of the Christ (2004), an American Biblical film directed by Mel Gibson,
● Luther (2003), an American-German historical film directed by Eric Till and Marc
2.2 Augustine
No. of lectures: 4
Objectives:
(a) Narrate the religious evolution of Augustine
(b) Discuss the sack of Rome and Augustine’s defence of Christianity
(c) Explain his concept of Two Cities
(d) Discuss his defence of slavery
Readings:
pp. 87-103.
● Saint Augustine (2008), “The City of God”, Christian Book Summaries, 4 (24): 1-7.
[Attachment 3]
● Frederick William Loetscher (1935), “St. Augustine’s Conception of the State”,
● Catherine Chambers (2013), “Slavery and Domination as Political Ideas in
● Augustine: https://www.augustinus.it/links/inglese/opere.htm
2.3 Thomas Aquinas

No. of Lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Discuss the re-emergence of Greek philosophy in Europe after the Dark Ages
(b) Aquinas’s synthesis of faith and reason
(c) Explain his fourfold classification of laws
(d) Discuss his concept of ideal state
Readings:
pp. 104-120.
16
● Thomas Aquinas (1959), Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, edited by A.P.
● William S. Brewbaker III (2006-07), “Thomas Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Law”,
● Daniel A. Gannon, “Four Kinds of Laws According to St. Thomas”. [Attachment 7]
● Thomas Aquinas: https://thegreatthinkers.org/aquinas/major-works/
2.4 & 2.5 Machiavelli

No. of lectures: 3
Objectives:
(a) Discuss the dawn of modernity in Europe
(b) Explain the core ideas of Machiavelli - self-interest and Centaur
(c) Discuss his ideas on humanism and republicanism
(d) Discuss about his separation of politics and ethics
Readings:
● Brian R. Nelson (1996), Western Political Thought: From Socrates to the Age of
Ideology, 2nd edition, Delhi: Pearson, pp. 137-160.
pp. 142-159.
● Machiavelli: https://thegreatthinkers.org/machiavelli/major-works/

No. of lectures: 3
Objectives:
(a) Narrate the political conditions at the time of the contractualists
(b) Compare and contrast the ideas of the three philosophers
(c) Discuss the impact and critique of the ideas of contractualists
Readings:
Thomas L. Thorson, New York: Dryden Press, pp. 422-440, 483-499, 528-548.
● R.P. Sharma (c. 1970), Modern Western Political Thought, New Delhi: Sterling, 1-52.
● R.S. Chaurasia (2001), History of Western Political Thought, Vol. I & II, New Delhi:
Atlantic, pp. 277-326.
17
● Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch (2012), An Introduction to Political Thought: A
Conceptual Toolkit, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 69-124.
pp. 165-262.
● Thomas Hobbes: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/thomas-hobbes
● John Locke: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/john-locke
● Rousseau: https://thegreatthinkers.org/rousseau/major-works/
● La Révolution française (1989), a French-German-Italian-British-Canadian historical
3.2 Bentham
No. of lectures: 1
Objectives:
(a) Discuss the main ideas of Bentham - pleasure principle and majority principle
(b) Discuss his views on rights
Readings:
● R.P. Sharma (c. 1970), Modern Western Political Thought, New Delhi: Sterling, pp.
92-104.
pp. 433-449.
● Jeremy Bentham: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/jeremy-bentham
3.3 John Stuart Mill

No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Discuss Mill’s refinement of Bentham’s ideas
(b) Discuss his concept of liberty
Readings:
109-119.
18
pp. 449-463.
● John Stuart Mill: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/john-stuart-mill
3.4 & 3.5 Hegel

No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Discuss Hegel’s political ideas
(b) Discuss his concept of dialectics
Readings:
140-149.
501-521.
● Hegel: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/index.htm
4.1 & 4.2 Karl Marx

No. of lectures: 4
Objectives:
(a) Explain the influences on Marx
(b) Explain the doctrines of Marxism - base-superstructure and historical materialism
(c) Discuss the Marxist ideas on capitalism, state and class war
(d) Discuss the different Marxist theories of state
Readings:
342-381.
Atlantic, pp. 510-563.Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch (2012), An Introduction to
Political Thought: A Conceptual Toolkit, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp.
130-150.
pp. 524-547.
19
● Michael Evans (1975), Karl Marx, New York: Routledge.
● Karl Marx: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/date/index.htm
4.3 Lenin
No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Discuss the innovations introduced by Lenin to Marxism
(b) Explain the main ideas of Lenin
(c) Analyse his book State and Revolution
Readings:
390-402.
pp. 580-591.
● Jules Townshend (1996), “Soviet or Parliamentary Democracy? Lenin versus
● Ralph Miliband (1970), “Lenin’s The State and Revolution”, The Socialist Register,
● Rustam Singh (1989), “Restoring Revolutionary Theory: Towards an Understanding
● Lenin: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/by-date.htm
4.4 John Rawls

No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Explain Rawlsian theory of justice
(b) Debate the criticisms of Rawls made by Nozick, Sen and the Marxists
(c) Contextualise him in the 21st century milieu
Readings:
● Catherine Audard (2014), John Rawls, New York: Routledge.
● Thomas Pogge (2007), John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice, translated by
● Michael Allingham (2014), Distributive Justice, New York: Routledge.
20
● Santosh Bakaya (2006), “The Great Debate: Rawls and Nozick”, in The Political
● John Rawls (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Belknap.
● Robert Nozick (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books.
● Amartya Sen (2009), The Idea of Justice, Cambridge: Belknap.
4.5 Hannah Arendt

No. of lectures: 1
Objectives:
(a) Discuss Arendt’s book Origins of Totalitarianism
(b) Understand her concept of banality of evil
(c) Discuss her book Human Condition
Readings:
● Margaret Canovan (1994), Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political
● Dana Villa (2000), Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
● Hannah Arendt (1951), The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Schocken.
● Hannah Arendt (1958), The Human Condition, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
● Eric Voegelin (1953), “The Origins of Totalitarianism”, The Review of Politics, 15
(1): 68-76. [Attachment 10]
● Hannah Arendt (1953), “The Origins of Totalitarianism: A Reply”, The Review of
● Hannah Arendt (2012), a German-Luxembourgish-French biographical film directed
Conclusion
No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Address any pending issues
(b) Clarify any remaining doubts
Part 5: Attachments
1. Saurav Sarmah (2017), “How to write an answer” [Attachment 1]

1-7.[Attachment 3]
21
(1): 68-76. [Attachment 10]
22
Comrades,
Exams are coming. You are busy with preparations. Some of you are approaching
teachers, asking how to answer questions in the exams. It is good to ask questions to
teachers, that is the process of learning. However, I observe that students are too
bothered with subjectivity of the teacher, what the teacher is expecting. It is not a
good thing, because such mind-set curtails your creativity, your style of expression.
Your writing should have two qualities: (1) absorbing style and (2) richness in
content. I don’t know of a teacher who doesn’t mark well an answer with these two
qualities. So, improve your style and content.
Subjectivity matters in case of illegibility of the handwritten answers. Write in a way

the teacher can read your answer. Bad handwriting and unstructured answers irritate a
reader. Your handwriting needn’t be decorative, but clean and well-spaced. There is a
standard pattern of answering questions in social sciences:
1. Introduction: half a page

2. Definitions: quote 3-4 renowned scholars
3. Features/Comparisons/Contrasts/etc.: points, sub-points, headings, sub-headings
4. Critical Analysis: positive and negative impacts, criticism and defence by other
scholars, your assessment
5. Conclusion: half a page
Within the pattern, give headings, sub-headings, points, sub-points, underline the
headings and use different styles of pointers to differentiate from question numbers
and between points and sub-points. That will make a well-structured answer. Give
definitions and criticisms of renowned authorities, discuss the comparison between
different scholars and cite some relevant examples. That will enrich the content of the
answer.
Time management is very important. You should know how many pages you can
write in 3 hours. Divide minutes and pages among the answers according to (1) marks
allotted and (2) your preparedness. Do the calculations before sitting in the exam hall.
Spend more time and space on the answers you have learnt well. At least, the
important points should be memorised and mentioned for answers you haven’t
prepared well, so that the teacher can give you some marks. But don’t waste too much
time writing irrelevant matter or scratching your head to remember a point you don’t
know.
Thus, some objective standards have been mentioned: (1) clean, well-spaced
handwriting, (2) well-structured answers, (3) headings and pointers, (4) citations of
authorities and examples and (5) time management.
As far as style and content are concerned, they vary from individual to individual, due
to difference of skills and learning. Those who read lots of good books and listen to
lectures attentively tend to score more marks in the exams. Compete with yourself,
improve your reading, read two good books every month, attend all the classes, listen
attentively, ask questions, and express your doubts and disagreements. Even if you are
bored or tired, sit quietly, at least something is going into your head.
Is there anything else that I would like to add? Don’t write boring answers. For
example,
Q. Discuss Karl Marx’s Theory of Communism.

A. Karl Marx was one of the greatest philosophers of the 19th century. He was born
on 5 May 1818 and died on 14 March 1883. He was born in Trier to a middle class
family. He was a philosopher, economist, sociologist, journalist, revolutionary
socialist, humanist, atheist, philanthropist, husband, father and friend. His best friend
was Friedrich Engels…
The purpose of an introduction is not to feed irrelevant data to the reader, but to
attract her to what you have written, build interest and expectation, so that the reader
appreciates your writing. Hence,
A. On 9 November, 1989, thousands of people marched on the streets of Berlin. They

approached the dreaded and despised wall that had divided their great city for 28
years. Some jumped across it, others tore portions down. It was end of an era, the
communist society was collapsing and by the end of 1991, nothing was left of it. The
Soviet Union had disintegrated and ceased to exist. We don’t know if communism has
any chance of resurrection or if it should be placed within the dustbin of history, but it
had inspired millions throughout the last century for making great sacrifices and
equally great brutalities, with a dream of a better future, a dream for a new man and
a new society, devoid of exploitation and suffering. That idea of communism was
theorised by one of the greatest brains of the 19th century, Karl Marx.
Before examining Karl Marx’s Theory of Communism, we should look at the diverse
definitions of communism given by thinkers of yore. Plato defines communism as “…
There are two principal elements in his definition: … Saint Simon differs from Plato
as he considers…Saint Simon states communism is “… Karl Marx’s idea of
communism comes close to Saint Simon’s. He defines communism as “… Marx
considers the ideas of earlier communists as utopian, while his being scientific. In his
Communist Manifesto, …
Similarly, the purpose of conclusion is not to simply summarise what you have
already written in the main body, but to suggest a futuristic scenario, leaving scope for
a sequel to your answer, giving the impression that you have more to say. For
instance,
Marx’s communist ideal was born in the infancy of Industrial Revolution and lost its
shine in a post-industrial, service-oriented, consumer and information society. But
with robotics, artificial intelligence and electronic networking, humans are being
replaced by machines and a post-proletariat society is emerging. What will happen to
the jobless? Capitalist society had triumphed on the promise of social mobility and
fair competition to everyone. When due to dearth of jobs, there would be no mobility
or competition; will the ideal of communism re-emerge as a panacea to the jobless
and impoverished? Marx’s genius may not have still breathed its last.
Sorry for such a long essay. Best of luck for your exams.
Saurav Sarmah
What is a Political Theory?
Author(s): George H. Sabine
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Feb., 1939), pp. 1-16
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2125628
Accessed: 02-08-2017 13:59 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Southern Political Science Association, The University of Chicago Press are collaborating
with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Politics
This content downloaded from 14.139.242.82 on Wed, 02 Aug 2017 13:59:19 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
The Journal of Politics
Vol. 1 FEBRUARY, 1939 No. 1
WHAT IS A POLITICAL THEORY?*

GEORGE H. SABINE
Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University
For many centuries the philosophy of Western Europe has

included as one of its accustomed parts a study of the nature
and well-being of civic societies, a kind of companion-piece to
its study, in psychology and ethics, of the nature and well-being
of the human individual. Like so much else in European phil-
osophy, this interest in the political community was, at the be-
ginning, a creature of Greek civilization. It began with that
humanistic reaction, fostered by the Sophists and crystallized
in the overpowering personality of Socrates, which so completely
changed the course of Greek philosophy at the end of the fifth
century before Christ. Political philosophy began in Athens at
the same time with the birth of social studies, such as linguistics,
the history and criticism of literature, the descriptive analysis of
political and economic institutions, and a critical as distinguished
from a merely narrative history. This humanistic relationship,
which dominated philosophy for many centuries, was not dis-
solved even when the rise of the modern natural sciences in
the seventeenth century restored subjects like physics and math-
ematics to a place of foremost interest in the minds of philo-
sophical scholars. Perhaps marginal, in the sense that it has
existed on the edges of the more precise and more technical
disciplines, political philosophy has still maintained its standing
as a subject of perennial philosophical concern.
It is usually unprofitable to argue, speculatively and a priori,
about the form or the purposes that a branch of science or phil-
osophy ought to have. The discussion of scientific methods,
*Delivered before the Philosophy Club of the Yale Graduate School

in February, 1938.
2 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS [Vol. I
like any other discussion, needs a subject matter, and in the case
of political philosophy, this must be provided by the history of
the subject. The question, What is a political theory, ought to
be answered descriptively, since in fact political philosophy is
whatever philosophers have thought about civil society and called
by that name. Evidently, any practicable description will not be
complete, for in the course of history political philosophy has
assumed many forms, has served many purposes, and has an-
swered to many conceptions of scientific and philosophical re-
liability. Still, the subject has to some extent been a unit
throughout its history, and some description of its salient char-
acteristics is possible. But though the description must depend
on history, the object of seeking such a description at all is not
historical. A person who wants to know what a political phil-
osophy is, if he is not an antiquarian, means to ask about its
truth, its certainty, or its reliability, and about the kind of crit-
icism that should be applied in order to test these qualities.
Obviously these are not historical questions, for the occurrence
of a theory says nothing whatever about its truth.
This essay, therefore, has a twofold purpose. In the first
place, it will enumerate some of the properties that political
theories have actually had. Though this involves selection and
concentration on a few properties that have recurred frequently
and that seem important, it is intended to be quite factual, de-
pending upon the analysis of what have figured as political
theories in the literature of philosophy. In the second place,
however, it is the intention to keep in view a variety of questions
about the truth or validity of political theories. How far can
they be described as simply true or false? In what sense can
words like sound, true, valid, reliable be applied to them? And
finally, the practical question, by what kind of criticism can
elements of truth in them be discriminated from elements of
falsehood?
When one runs his eye over the historical literature that be-
longs traditionally to political philosophy, he is struck at once
by the fact that this literature is not typically the product of
the study or the laboratory. Even when it is produced by
scholars, its authors have one eye fixed on the forum; and when
1939] WHAT IS A POLITICAL THEORY? 3
political philosophy is produced in quantities, it is a sure symp-

tom that society itself is going through a period of stress anid
strain. It is a remarkable fact that, in a history extending over
nearly twenty-five hundred years, a considerable part of the most
significant writing on political philosphy was done in two periods
of only about fifty years each and in two places of quite re-
stricted area. The first of these places was Athens, and the
period was the two middle quarters of the fourth century before
Christ, which saw the production of Plato's Republic and Laws
and Aristotle's Politics. The second place was England, and the
period was the half century between 1640 and 1690, which pro-
duced the works of Hobbes and Locke, together with the works
of a host of lesser figures. Both these periods, it should be
noted, witnessed changes of the most momentous importance in
the course of European social and intellectual history. The fiist
period saw the lapse of the Greek city from its place of cultural
leadership-surely the nmajor moral upheaval of the ancient
world-and the preparation of that amalgam of Greek and
Asiatic civilization which determined the whole future course of
European culture. The second period saw the formation of the
first constitutional state on national lines and the preparation of
those intellectual and scientific changes that governed the West-
ern World down at least until 1914.
These two cases are major examples of a quality in political
philosophy which might be illustrated almost without end and
which is indeed typical. Political theories are secreted, to para-
phrase a famous comparison of substantive and procedural law,
in the interstices of political and social crisis. They are pro-
duced, not indeed by the crisis as such, but by its reaction on
minds that have the sensitivity and the intellectual penetration to
be aware of crisis. Hence there is in every political theory a
reference to a pretty specific situation, which needs to be grasped
in order to understand what the philosopher is thinking about.
Always he is thinking about something that has actually oc-
curred and that has been the stimulus of his thought. To recover
this situation and its power of intellectual stimulation may, if
the theory belongs to a remote time and place, be a difficult task
set to the historical imagination. But to reconstruct, as nearly
as one can, the time, the place, and the circumstance in which it
was produced is always an important factor in understanding a
political philosophy. For it is one of the characteristics of such
a philosophy that it occurs as a part of or an incident in politics
itself. It is an element of the same intellectual and social life
within which politics is another element.
It is true, of course, that this reference to a specific situation
should not be overemphasized. Because a political theory refers
to the historical occasion from which it originated, it need not
be applicable to that alone. Political problems and situations
are more or less alike from time to time3 and from place to place;
what has been thought on one occasion is a factor in what is
thought on another. For obvious reasons the political philosophy
that remains alive is just that which can weave itself into the de-
veloping tradition of the subject. The greatest political theo-
rizing is that which excels in both respects, in analysis of a
present situation and in suggestiveness for other situations.
Judged by this standard, Aristotle's Politics was probably the
most important treatise on the subject that was ever written.
Rarely has a form of government been subjected to a more pene-
trating examination than the Greek city received in the Fourth
and Fifth Books of the Politics; probably never has a political
treatise written in one age played so great a part in another as
the Politics played in the fourteenth century, or again even in
the nineteenth.
Since a political theory depends upon a special configuration
of facts, it is to that extent turned toward the past. It is also,
however, turned toward the future, for the kind of interest that
produces political theory is in general quite different from that
of an antiquarian. Characteristically political theories are bred
of the interest that makes men want to do something about a
situation which they believe to be bad. But even the most vio-
lently conservative theory-a theory directed to the merest
preservation of the status quo-would still be directed, in the
mind of its maker, toward the future, since a policy of doing
nothing is still a policy. Quite regularly a political theory does
-contain or imply a policy. It commends some way of doing or
criticizes some other; it defends or attacks what has been done
and argues for the continuance or the reversal of a line of con-

duct. Examples might be multiplied at any length. Locke, as
everyone knows, wrote "to establish the throne of our great
restorer, our present King William," and to show the validity
of representative government founded in the consent of the
people. Quite regularly his version of natural rights served to
consolidate the gains of successful revolution or to defend the
legitimacy of revolutionary programs. With equal regularity
the great opponent of Locke's theory, the theory of dynastic
legitimacy or royal divine right, was used to commend the values
of political stability and national unity, or to neutralize revo-
lutionary propaganda. Very often, perhaps usually, political
theories have had some sort of partizan bias, revolutionary,
liberal, conservative, or reactionary. Even the most detached
philosophies have grown from some interested reading of the
facts, some estimate of what the facts signify for the future, and
some concern with the way events should shape themselves.
There is, then, no such thing as a disinterested political theory,
if that word be used to mean literally something that is bred of
indifference. For those who are genuinely indifferent about the
future do not take the trouble to make political theories, and those
who do take that trouble usually care intensely about something.
This attitude of regard for the future itself needs to be analysed
and divided. It always must include, either expressly or by im-
plication, both a judgment about what is likely and a judgment
about what is desirable. In short, a political theory includes an
estimate of probabilities and an estimate of values. It can
scarcely lack the former because any responsible attitude toward
the future must take account of the possibilities, or, more ac-
curately, the varying degrees of likelihood that belong to di-
ferent projects for action, unless indeed a theorist is the com-
plete doctrinaire. It certainly cannot lack the latter because any
interested attitude toward the future involves preferences,
choices, the sense of moral imperatives, the belief that one out-
come is better than another. The word policy is quite meaning-
less without some assumptions about what is desirable or obliga-
tory-however one chooses to name this act of evaluation.
A political theory, then, as thus far analyzed, covers three
kinds of factors: it includes factual statements about the posture
of affairs that gave rise to it; it contains statements of what may

be roughly called a causal nature, to the effect that one kind of
thing is more likely to happen, or may be more easily brought
about, than another; and it contains statements that something
ought to happen or is the right and desirable thing to have happen.
This analysis, it will be perceived, follows pretty closely the de-
scription of reflective thinking given by the pragmatists, par-
ticularly by Professor Dewey and George H. Mead. The prag-
matists, indeed, would generalize the description, asserting that
the joint reference to past and future, and the joint reference
to causes and values, are characteristic of every complete act of
thought, whether about politics or anything else. Any theory,
for the pragmatist, is a plan of action designed to adjust a
tension between actually conflicting but potentially harmonizable
needs, and this definition is defended on the still more general
principle that no concept could be meaningful at all except as a
factor in behavior. Whether this general psychological theory
of thinking is true or not, the description is reasonably accurate
so far as theories of politics are concerned.
Granting that political theories have characteristically con-
tained factors of the three kinds mentioned-the factual, the
causal, and the valuational-it still remains a question what
logical relation holds between these three types of proposition.
The pragmatist infers that because the three sometimes (or, as
he thinks, always) occur in the same psychological situation, they
must therefore be united in some logical form of synthesis. In
other words, what he calls a complete act of thought claims to be
complete in a logical as well as a psychological sense. The
validity of this conclusion is the philosophical problem (or one
current form of it) that this essay is meant to pose, because it
appears to be a major issue in contemporary thought. The con-
clusion herein defended is that logically the three kinds of prop-
ositions are quite distinct; in short, that the likelihood of an
event's happening and the desirability of its happening are quite
without any logical correlation. And this conclusion implies a
destructive criticism of pragmatism, in so far as pragmatism has
claimed to be more than a chapter in social psychology. This
general conclusion will be made a little clearer, and perhaps a
little more convincing, in the latter part of the essay, but at

present it will be better to finish describing a political theory.
The description so far given applies to what might be called
the logical structure of a political theory, the elements in it that
make propositions and that might, in consequence, be affirmed
or denied. Very often, however-perhaps usually-political
theories have, and are intended to have, psychological as well as
logical effects. Because they deal with practical social issues
and are created as incidents of conflict, they are intended to per-
suade as well as to convince. Even the most abstract political
theory probably never altogether lays aside some such purpose,
and even the coolest scholar can hardly be indifferent to the
adoption of courses that he believes to be wise and good. In
popular political theorizing the element of persuasion is usually
very much in the foreground. When Thomas Jefferson wrote
the famous second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence,
he set down the main axioms of the philosophy of natural rights
as a justification, to America and to the world, of the action that
the Congress had already taken in voting a resolution that "these
United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and inde-
pendent states." Years afterward, when John Adams testily
declared that there was not an idea in the document which was
not a generally accepted commonplace, Jefferson very reasonably
replied that he had not been deputed by the Congress to "invent
new ideas." He was to state the case for Congress and the
Colonies in a form that would carry conviction to all men of
intelligence and good will. The doctrine that men have inde-
feasible rights and are justified in protecting them by armed
resitance was persuasive just because it had a familiarity and an
emotional warmth bred by centuries of belief.
The project of persuading, however, opens up larger possi-
bilities than are immediately evident. In form at least, the
Declaration of Independence, though certainly biased, was still
essentially argumentative, possibly because it was addressed to
an age in which the love of rationality was itself a major
passion. But passion of any sort is inherently persuasive. It
generates its own belief in the fulfillment of its own wishes and
projects its own loves and hates into the perception of facts both
past and future. If the object of a political theory were merely
to generate belief, it would probably be a waste of time to spend

much effort on either facts or arguments. The obvious-and, it
must be acknowledged, the effective-short-cut is to generate the
passions and supply them with the psychological apparatus of
uncritical belief that perpetuates them and gives them effect.
The part that political philosophy has been made to play in the
modern dictatorships might be described as an elaborate experi-
ment in applied psychiatry, and they show that this art is not
only feasible but comparatively easy. One thinks at once of
the part that the conception of race has played in recent German
political writing. On scientific grounds no competent anthro-
pologist for a moment takes seriously the idea that any European
race is pure. Neither is it possible to believe that the perse-
cution of the Jews resulted from any of the actual character-
istics of that group in Germany, such as their greater prosperity
or their alleged inability to think, feel, or act like other Germans.
They were merely suitable-for emotional, not for actual rea-
sons-to be cast in the role of national scapegoat. The ideal of
racial purity has a strictly mystical significance. It serves as a
symbol, and object of veneration, to solidify a party, to release
its energies, and to foster that "more savage will to power" which
Hitler has described as the key to national greatness. Race is
a "myth," in the sense that Georges Sorel attached to that word.
In truth, however, it is not the dictatorships alone that have
discovered what might be called the folklore of political phi-
losophy. The Freudian psychologists, and indeed psychologists
of many other schools, have explored the influence that interests,
wishes, and desires exert upon belief and their tendency to pro-
duce "rationalizations" that can masquerade as valid theories.
As a mode of attacking an opponent's position this sort of criti-
cism has become a standard part of the modern controversialists'
equipment, witness the prevalence of a word like "ideology" in
our modern vocabulary of political criticism. There is no de-
nying that partizan interests do generate partizan beliefs, and
that partizan beliefs do claim the certainty of fact or the necessity
of logic. Probably it is true that no man, whatever his honesty
of purpose or his desire to be fair, can always weigh his own
interests on an equal scale with interests that he dislikes or dis-
trusts. -But it is one thing to say that political theories have
sometimes served the same purposes as folklore, and another to

imply, as enthusiastic psychologists and sociologists sometimes
seem to do, that they never serve any other purpose, or that a
theory is nothing but a tactical manoeuvre in the class-struggle
or in the national struggle for power. This game of ideological
criticism permits of any number of players, and when the game
is all played out and every view has been shown to be equally
nonsensical, then the serious business of politics as thus con-
ceived can begin, namely, breaking heads instead of answering
arguments.
It is true, of course, that every political theory is a fact, a
quite substantial fact that occurs in the gamut of facts that makes
up a particular political situation. As such, it had its causes
and may, no doubt, have its effects. Moreover, it has its effects
whether it be true or false, because in either case it exists in a
quite objective sense, as a thing that may affect men's conduct.
It is always possible that men behave differently in any given
situation, merely because they entertain some theory about their
own existence and the situation in which they find themselves.
This is a curious involution that occurs in all social theories and
that has no precise analogue in the theories of natural science,
unless it be in those cases, recently brought to light by the prin-
ciple of indeterminism, where the mere fact of observation op-
erates to change the very state of affairs which is under ob-
servation. Where this occurs, the natural scientist admits with
all modesty that he has reached a limit beyond which he cannot
conceive a refinement of his theory. And the social scientist
must surely, in all intellectual honesty, do the same. In so far
as theories figure as facts, standing in causal relations with other
facts, and in so far as they appear as the data of human behavior
which a theorist must himself count among the data of the situ-
ation that he is studying, they must of course be accepted as all
data are, simply as elements of the reality studied. Their effects
are in no way correlated with their truth, for even false theories
may influence men's conduct. Their causal influence as ex-
isting facts is simply irrelevant to their truth or falsity. But
in any given time and place one must make up his mind which
language he elects to speak. If he accepts a theory as itself a
bona fide effort to speak the truth, he must accord it that respect
10 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS [Vol. 1
which belongs to such an effort. He must meet it on the plane

of logic, must confirm or refute it on that level, by showing its
consistency or inconsistency and its ability or inability to explain
the facts. When he begins to discuss its influence, he' puts it
among existing things in the world of events and objects, and
events are not themselves true or false; they simply occur.
An example will make the meaning clearer. A critic may
deal in two quite different ways with the doctrine that Jefferson
wrote into the Declaration of Independence. It is possible to
discuss the validity of those propositions about inalienable and
indefeasible natural rights, to apply a rational criticism to the
assertion that all men are created equal, to analyse their meaning,
to show how they agreed with a prevalent conception of sci-
entific method, and to point out wherein they fall short of the
self-evidence that Jefferson attributed to them. But such criti-
cism is possible only so far as the critic is willing to discuss the
factual truth or logical consistency of the theory examined.
Quite apart from all such questions, however, it is still a fact
that Jefferson and his fellow-members of the Continental Con-
gress did believe in the theory of natural rights. It is quite
possible that they would not have acted as they did had their
beliefs been otherwise. It is credible that in so believing they
may have been unconsciously the agents of a militant middle-
class, intent upon rising to the political power that their economic
importance warranted. If such causal influences swayed their
action, it is of no consequence whatever whether what they be-
lieved was true or false. As Bishop Butler said, "Everything is
what it is, and not another thing," and beliefs may have their
effects however false they are. But surely no critic can apply
both criteria at once. He may be concerned to assess the cor-
rectness of a doctrine, and if so its consequences are irrelevant;
or he may be concerned with its actual effects and influences, and
then its truth is irrelevant.
Political theories, therefore, live on two planes or play a double
role. They are theories, or logical entities belonging to the ab-
stract world of thought, but they are also beliefs, events in
people's minds and factors in their conduct. In this latter role
they are influential (if they are) not because they are true but
because they are believed. On this plane they operate as events,
or as actual factors in historical situations, and as such are part

of the data which the historian of politics has to deal with. But
this historical reality is obviously not what interests those per-
sons who sincerely believe a theory to be true; such persons are
not interested in a theory because it exists but because they be-
lieve it to be a valid explanation of something else. What the
framers of the Declaration of Independence meant to do was
"to declare the causes" that impelled them to dissolve the political
bands which had connected the Colonies with England, an ex-
planation required by "a decent respect to the opinions of man-
kind." In this they set down as a major premise the claim of
indefeasible natural rights and as a minor premise a long list of
aggressions, which they attributed to the King of England and
interpreted as evidence of a settled determination to tyrannize.
For them these claims were not merely beliefs; they were parts
of what purported to be a correct statement of facts and a valid
inference from them. A rational criticism, as distinguished from
a study of historical causes, would have to take these claims as
bona fide, even though it might end with the conclusion that they
were utterly fallacious.
To return now to the beginning of this essay, it will be ap-
parent that the questions there raised referred to the rational
criticism of political theories, the question whether, or in what
sense, they can claim the logical attributes of truth or validity.
It will be remembered also that in the description there given of
poiltical theories it was said that they regularly unite two kinds
of factors. In the first place, there are elements of a factual
and causal nature: the apprehension of a state of affairs actually
existing, an estimate of the relative importance of different
factors in this situation, and a weighing of future possibilities.
In the second place, there are elements of valuation: an esti-
mation of importance, not in the sense of what is likely to happen,
but of what ought to happen, the discrimination of a better from
a worse way, the conviction that some courses of action are
morally obligatory, an expression of choice or preference growing
from an attitude of desire, or fear, or confidence toward what
the present holds and what the future may bring forth. The
question, then, is whether a theory uniting these two kinds of
factors can be rationally adjudged to be true or false; in short,
whether there is any common measure that can extend over and
validate the theory as a whole.
Now the only absolutely general standard of rational criticism
is the rule that a theory must not contain propositions that are
mutually contradictory. A person who thinks about politics is
under the same obligation to think consistently as one who thinks
about any other subject, and to be convicted of an inconsistency
is as damaging to a political theorist as to any other kind of
theorist. Moreover, the standard of straight, coherent thinking
is applicable both to thought which has facts for its subject-
matter and to thought which has values for its subject-matter.
A thinker can argue for mutually contradictory obligations as
easily as he can attribute mutually incompatible properties to
objects, and when he does the first he is as certainly wrong as
when he does the second, for the avoidance of contradiction is a
general principle that applies to all valid intellectual operations
whatsoever. Nevertheless, the mere absence of contradiction
cannot be regarded as equivalent to truth, except perhaps in pure
logic and mathematics. For even if a theory were altogether
self-consistent, there would still be the question whether what
actually happens is the same as what the theory contemplates,
and even if a theory of values were entirely coherent, there would
still be the question whether the values which it contemplates are
really acceptable as ends to be striven for and, if possible, at-
tained. After making every admission possible to the binding-
force of logical consistency, one must still agree that it goes only
a little way toward validating a theory of any kind, whether in
politics or any other subject.
If non-contradiction, though indispensable, is still not a sut-
ficient principle of criticism, is there any other principle that can
bridge the two kinds of propositions-allegations of fact and
ascriptions of value-that occur together in every political theory?
Apparently the answer must be, No. In combining these two
kinds of factor a political theory puts together propositions for
which there is no common logical measure and which all the dic-
tates of clear thinking require to be distinguished. In so far as
a political theory depends on the assertion, expressed or implied,
that some state of the facts is so and so, the only test applicable
to it consists in inquiring whether the facts really were as alleged
or different. In so far as it presumes that one course of evehtb

is more likely to occur than another, it can be tested only in the
light of the actual probabilities and perhaps in part by seeing
whether the event seems to justify the expectation. In either
case the assertion that an event has happened and the assertion
that it ought to have happened are simply different and there-
fore ought not to be confused. And similarly, to say that a
future event is probable is quite different from saying that it is
desirable, or good, or the reverse. The two kinds of propo-
sitions are logically disparate in the sense that any statement con-
taining such a copulative verb as "ought to be" requires the as-
sumption of a standard of value which is never present as such
in any purely actual situation or any purely causal sequence of
events. When the two kinds of statement occur in conjunction,
as they continually do in political theories, the beginning of
critical judgment is analysis, the discrimination of the two kinds
and the application to each of the tests appropriate to it.
Analysis and discrimination in this matter do not imply the
superficial idea that political theories can be made "scientific"
by the omission of references to moral and other forms of valu-
ation. This idea usually depends not at all on discrimination of
values as one element in a theory, but only on a simple-minded
unconsciousness of valuations that have become habitual. It de-
pends upon the kind of intellectual simplicity that Schopenhauer
once attributed to an opponent: he imagined, Schopenhauer said,
that whatever he had learned before he was fifteen years old was
an innate principle of human reason. In truth it is humanly
impossible even to describe a political or social situation without
at least implicit assumptions about the importance of the elements
that are to go into the description; the choice is between implicit
assumptions and the explicit avowal of what is assumed. More-
over, there is no objection, at least on the score of logic, to mak-
ing explicit assumptions about what is desirable; a policy or an
end can be discussed as reasonably as anything else. It is prob-
ably not true even that men disagree more about values than
they do about other matters. In any case there is no logical
reason why a social philosopher should not postulate any value
he chooses, provided only that he avows what he is doing and
does not pretend to prove what he is merely taking for granted.
14 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS [\Tol. I
What he cannot do logically (or even honestly, if he knows

what he is doing) is to pass off his valuations as if they were
inescapable facts.
The practical question, of course, remains, whether it is really
possible to perform this act of analysis, at least so long as a
political theory is still an element in a living situation. Looking
back to the past one easily perceives how often men's judgment
of facts is swayed by their interests or misled by the intensity of
their moral convictions, but in one's own thinking it must be
admitted that one does not, and probably cannot, always avoid
the same kind of error. The common usages of language con-
spire to make such confusions. The most ordinary words, like
is and must be, have regularly a twofold use, to signify indif-
ferently logical or moral necessity, existence or predication, and
the precise meaning must be gathered, if at all, from the context.
Thus, to refer again to the Declaration of Independence, when
Jefferson declared it to be "self-evident that all men are created
equal," he may have thought that the proposition was analogous
to the alleged self-evident propositions that stand on the opening
pages of Euclid. In the light of an exact analysis of those propo-
sitions, however, no one can imagine that he was merely giving a
rule for handling symbols. It is hardly likely that Jefferson
thought that all men are as a matter of fact equal; certainly the
moral effect of the sentence is spoiled if one takes it to be parallel
with some literally true statement about the way men are created,
such as, All men are created babies. As everyone knows, Jef-
ferson was really expressing a moral conviction to the effect
that, in some matters of vital human importance, it is wrong to
deprive men of their freedom of choice. One may accept or
reject this assertion, but he cannot intelligently do either unless
he sees what is really intended. In a sense the inevitability of
confusion or error is irrelevant, even if it is a fact. No one
wholly avoids inconsistency, but inconsistency is an error just
the same. If there is a confusion inherent in the conflation of
facts and values, it is still a confusion even if the whole world
conspires to do it. Of course, no one doubts that, in this as in
other respects, men do think more clearly when they try reso-
lutely to avoid confusion.
It would be altogether unfair, however, to imply that the coa-

lescence of judgments of value with judgments of fact or of
logical implication has only the' standing of a frequent, but ad-
mitted, popular confusion. On the contrary this coalescence is
undertaken systematically in certain philosophies which, together,
cover a considerable part of current philosophical opinion. A
representative of one of these views would enter an exception
against the statement made above, that propositions stating facts
and propositions ascribing values are logically disparate and would
hold that it is possible to include both within a single logical
synthesis. Historically this contention goes back to Hegel, who
believed that the idea of a self-developing totality in logic could
sublate the duality of rationalism and empiricism and refute at
once the revolutionary doctrine of natural rights and the con-
ventionalism or positivism implied by Hume's critique of natural
rights. This was the purpose which Hegel thought that dialectic
could fulfill. By means of dialectic he supposed it possible to
show that certain values must emerge in the course of history
and, conversely, that the causal processes of history are regu-
lated by an inherent tsndency to realize and conserve values.
The dialectic was at once, therefore, a causal exploration and an
immanent ethical criticism. However it may be formulated, the
belief that some such dovetailing of value and fact is a soluble
problem remains the best index of Hegel's influence over later
philosophy. It continued to characterize the English Neo-
Hegelians, and with all their differences it remains the funda-
mental claim of the M'arxists, whose dialectical materialism is
still in essence a claim that causal and moral necessity can be
synthetized. In a milder form the purposes, if not the apparatus,
of Hegel's dialectic perpetuated themselves in the pragmatism of
Professor Dewey and Professor Mead, already referred to. For
from the allegation that meanings can occur only in the fulfill-
ment of purposes and that reflective thought is only a directive
agency in behavior, it appears to follow that logical adequacy
must include both factual efficiency and the fulfillment of pur-
pose.
It would be silly to embark upon a thumb-nail refutation of
Hegelianism, with all its ramifications, at the end of an essay
already too long. The purpose has been to outline a problem and
2-Pol
to suggest a type of solution but not to offer a refutation of other

types of solution that have been attempted. Its intention has
been to suggest that here is one of the systematic differences be-
tween philosophical points of view, rooted as such differences
are likely to be in diverse theories of knowledge. Descriptively
one finds in human thinking about a concrete problem-say the
problem attacked by a political theory-what seems to be a
variety of factors answering to a variety of critical standards.
There are allegations of fact and cause; there are imputations of
value or obligation; there are the consequences, for human be-
havior, of believing or disbelieving the theory. Now must it be
the case that there is some criterion of truth large enough to
stretch over all these factors in the problem? If some such cri-
terion is proposed-say "coherence"-does it cover the ground
because it affords a really applicable standard for all types of
problem, or does it seem to do so merely because it is so vague
and ambiguous that no one knows with certainty what it means?
Or, on the other hand, is it possible that the drawing of dis-
tinctions is both the beginning and the end of wisdom? In short,
is it possible that truth is a word with several different meanings
and that no one can say what it means unless he is allowed to
discriminate at least what Leibniz called truths of reason and
truths of fact, and perhaps several other kinds beside? With
this reference to Leibniz it will be well to stop. For it suggests
the obvious line of criticism, namely, that this paper illustrates a
kind of philosophic atavism, the nostalgia for clear and distinct
ideas that was more typical of the seventeenth than of the nine-
teenth century.
An Encapsulated View of the Best from Christian Publishers
Volume 4 . Issue 24
August 2008
C L A S S I C S
COUNCIL OF REFERENCE
Dr. Richard Averbeck

The City of God
Rev. D. Stuart Briscoe by Saint Augustine
Dr. Paul Cedar
Public Domain
From the Classics Collection
Mr. Dave Coleman
Dr. & Mrs. Larry Crabb A Quick Focus

Mr. Roger Cross
The Book’s Purpose
Dr. Kenneth
Rev. SamuelO.Farina
Gangel
Clarify that Christianity was not to blame for the fall of the
Rev.Kenneth
Dr. & Mrs. O.
Lud Golz
Gangel Roman Empire
Dr.
Rev.Howard
& Mrs.G.Lud
Hendricks
Golz Reveal that even the most evil actions of fallen angels and sin-
ful man cannot thwart the unfolding of God’s eternal plan
Dr.Mr. OlanG.
Howard Hendrix
Hendricks
Propose that the fall of the Roman Empire was insignificant
Dr.
Mr.David Jeremiah
Olan Hendrix
in the context of the eternal plan of God
Rev.David
Dr. KnuteJeremiah
Larson Describe the choice we must all make~choose to occupy
Dr.
Rev.John C. Maxwell
Knute Larson either the City of God or the City of Earth~the consequence
Dr.John
Dr. Bruce
C.McNicol
Maxwell
of which is eternal
Mr.Bruce
Dr. DeanMcNicol
Merrill The Book’s Message
The year was A.D. 410 when King Alaric of the Vandals captured
Mrs. Elisa Morgan
Mr. Dean Merrill the city of Rome. The Romans thought the city would never fall, so
Dr.Elisa
Mrs. Luis Morgan
Palau the conquering of Rome shook them to the core and led to the col-
lapse of the entire Roman Empire. Those of pagan beliefs quickly
Dr. Dr.
Gilbert A. Peterson
Ray Ortlund blamed the Christians~the Roman gods had abandoned them because
Rev.
Dr. Wes
LuisRoberts
Palau
so many had forsaken them and accepted Christ. Augustine refuted
this idea. Using this historical moment as a springboard, he estab-
Dr.Rev. & Mrs.
Gilbert Jamie
A. Peterson lished that all of history is simply a record of the execution of God’s
Rassmussen plans. God set in motion a plan that included free will and choices~
Rev. Wes Roberts
Mr. Jim Warren the consequences of which are eternal. With the fall of angels and
Rev. & Mrs. Jamie the original sin of Adam, the earthly city was established. It was and
Dr.Rassmussen
Rick Warren is still occupied by those who strive for the glorification of self.
Mr. Jim Warren
Running parallel throughout time has been the heavenly
Dr. Rick Warren city~the City of God. It was and is still occupied by those who
Publishers strive to praise and glorify only the one true God. Every person
Catherine & David
Publishers
Martin
must choose which city to occupy and serve.
Catherine & David
Martin
Editors
Cheryl & Michael
Chiapperino
Editors
Cheryl & Michael
Chiapperino
22
was due to the virtue of the ancient
Book
Book I I Romans themselves, but ultimately
to the counsel of God~He reward-
Pagans claimed that Rome fell because the Christian religion had weak- ed their virtue by increasing their
ened it. In truth, the blessings and difficulties of life happened to good dominion even though they did
and bad alike~misfortune happened to everyone. In fact, the barbarians not worship Him. Totally ignorant
who stormed the city spared, for Christ’s sake, their adversaries. It was un- of the true source of the success,
usual that the conqueror would show mercy to the defeated out of respect the Romans boasted of their great-
for their gods. The Romans themselves, when conquering cities, did not ness.
spare the lives of the defeated. The cruelties that occurred during the cap-
ture of Rome were in agreement with the convention of war, but the acts In contrast, Christians know
of mercy were the result of the influence of the name of Christ. Although they must be far from boasting,
imprisoned and mistreated, the saints lost nothing by losing their earthly for they know the true source of
possessions. Even when subjected to violations during their captivity, their their success. All they do is for love
own will did not consent and their souls were not contaminated. of their eternal home, whereas the
Romans did all for human glory
Book II II and an earthly dominion. There is
Book a vast difference between true glory
and the desire of domination. Al-
Before the time of Christ, Rome had suffered hardships and tragedies. though they did not acknowledge
Although its people had worshipped false gods, they were not protected it, the Romans enjoyed a dominion
from misfortune. To the contrary, the Romans suffered the greatest calamity that was granted by Him from whom
of all~they became weak due to moral and spiritual corruption. Their gods all power emanates and by whose
did nothing to protect them; instead, totally devoid of holiness of life, their providence all things are ruled.
worship lead them further into depravity. This was not, by any means, a
unique event in human history. Since Christian beliefs result in healthy liv-
ing, and since history shows many examples of the unhealthy consequences Book VI
of paganism, it benefited Romans to renounce their pagan practices.
Book VI
Are the heathen gods to be
Book
BookIIIIII worshipped for the sake of eternal
life? Through the worship of these
Even when false gods were worshipped by the Romans, the world con- gods, are we assured eternal happi-
tinually suffered. Why did they not defend Rome in the past? Before the ness? Varro, the most esteemed
advent of Christ, Romans were subjected to calamities~physical and bodily writer on heathen theology, divides
disasters. Consider the adultery of Paris, the fratricidal act of Romulus, the theology into three kinds~mythical,
destruction of Ilium by Finbria, the wickedness of the war waged against natural, and civil. Varro himself
the Albans~actions brought about by their own moral and spiritual degrada- reveals that neither mythical nor
tion. Romans suffered incredible disasters during the Punic Wars~no pro- civil theology can assure happiness
tection was provided by their gods. Yet, these things are set aside in memory in future life. Other pagan authors
when considering the reason for Rome’s demise. It is effrontery to impute and teachers attempt to show nat-
the present troubles to Christ and His followers, since even when the gods ural explanations for their gods.
were worshipped, such calamities befell the people. But, once the vanity of these gods
has been exposed, it becomes ob-
Book vious that they are unable to be-
BookIVIV stow eternal life on anyone; they
do not afford help even with respect
The long duration of the empire of Rome is not to be attributed to the to the present, the things of this
worshipping of the heathen gods, who failed to defend Rome throughout temporal life.
a history abounding with disaster. Have earthly kingdoms been aided or
thwarted through intervention by these gods? Has the worship of these Book VII
gods been of service to obtain or extend Rome’s empire? Or, is there one Book VII
true God, the giver of virtue and felicity who held the past, present, and
future in His hand? Consider the kingdom of the Jews; it was founded by Can eternal life be obtained
the one and true God and preserved by Him as long as they remained stead- by the worship of Janus, Jupiter,
fast in their worship of Him alone. The times of all kings and kingdoms Saturn, or other select gods of civil
are ordained by the judgment and power of the true God. theology? Who are the select gods?
Book V For what reasons do they occupy
Book V offices above the commoner gods?
According to Varro, “god” is the
The power and increase of the Roman Empire, and all other kingdoms, soul of the world and is manifested
cannot be attributed to false gods. The cause is neither fortuitous nor does in various parts or “souls” whose
it consist in the position of the stars. In a sense, this power and increase continued on page 3
3
Book VII true worship of God, evidenced by
continued from page 2 their ascribing divine honor to both
nature is divine. Even Varro himself pronounced his own opinions of these good and bad angels, rather than
parts, or souls~whether named Janus, Jupiter, Terminus, Pecunia, Saturn, understanding that sacrifice is due
Mercury, Mars, Apollo, Diana, Neptune, Salacia, or Venilia~ as ambiguous. to the true God only. Angels~holy
He affirms Earth to be a goddess since that “part” of what he defines “god” angels~motivated by love, desire
to be encom-passes it. In reality, all of these things which the physical theo- that we not worship them but wor-
logists refer to as parts, or souls, ought to have been recognized as charac- ship instead the one true God. Un-
teristics of the one true God. Only by distinguishing the Creator from the fortunately, some Platonists, such
creation can the truth of one Author be acknowledged. as Porphyry, remain connected to
demon worship. True miracles are
Book VIII created by the one true God and
Book VIII are delivered through the ministry
of His holy angels. Men are to
Mythical and civil theologies are of no avail toward securing a blessed worship God for both eternal bless-
eternal life. Will the worship of the gods of natural theology secure blessedness ings and earthly prosperity because
in the life to come? To answer this question, philosophers of more excellent all things are ordered by His divine
wisdom must be consulted. Plato, uppermost disciple of Socrates, provides intervention. The purpose of holy
a useful foundation in his threefold division of philosophy. So, it is the angels is to fulfill the providence
Platonists opinions, in particular, that are preferred in this ongoing dispute of God. No holy angel will demand
concerning matters of theology, since they excel in logic and rational think- divine honor for himself but only
ing. Platonists also exude strength in moral philosophy, coming nearest of for God.
pagan philosophers to Christian faith, though the Christian religion is above As a fulfillment of the Ark of
all the science of philosophers. Even the Platonists, who often refer to one the Covenant, the promises, and
true God, continued to suggest that sacred rites were to be performed to the requirement of sacrifices, the
honor many gods. Concerning these gods, Plato defined them as good, as supreme and true sacrifice, Jesus
friends of virtue. Christ, the mediator between God
and men, was provided by God
The Platonist Apuleius discussed the manner and actions of demons. Himself. Only through Christ do
They were to be worshipped and employed in order to gain favor in the saints derive power against demons
eyes of the gods. What religion would believe such a thing? And, to the and true purification of heart. The
point of the gods using demons as messengers and interpreters, do they do Platonists state principles by which
so willingly or without their knowledge? In no way can men be reconciled the soul is purified, but there is
to good gods by demons. Demons are the slaves of vice. They delight in only one true principle that purifies
and patronize what good and wise men abhor and condemn~blasphemous and renews the human soul~the
fiction and magical arts. Regardless of the opinion of Apuleius, we must re- sacrifice of Christ Jesus. Men are
ject the worship of demons! The superstitions and idolatry must be abolished. justified and made pure by faith in
the mystery of Christ’s incarnation.
Book IX Porphyry, whose mistakes are
Book IX
even worse than those of Apuleius,
Among the demons, are there distinctions between good and bad? Are is weakened by his wavering be-
there good demons who can assist the human soul to reach true blessedness? tween the confession of the true
Apuleius ascribes no virtue to demons. He explains that it is gods who God and the worship of demons.
dwell in Heaven, demons who occupy the air, and men who inhabit Earth. How could he be so blind as to
Platonists suggest that the souls of men become demons upon vacating the not recognize the truth~Christ
body. Consider, since demons are not blessed like the gods nor wretched Jesus? The grace provided through
like men, can demons mediate between gods and men when they have noth- Christ has alone provided the uni-
ing in common with either? Christ Jesus is the only true mediator between versal way of the soul’s deliverance.
God and men, being both God and man. To obtain the blessed life and
partake in the supreme good, man needs mediation not by a demon but Book XI
by Christ alone. Though demons may make promises of godly intercession, Book XI
their true goal is to turn men from the path of truth. Christ alone provides
men with eternal blessedness. Herein begins the explanation
of the origins, histories, and desti-
Book X nies of the two cities~the earthly
Book X and the heavenly~formed by the
separation of the good and bad
The angels of Heaven want only God, whom they serve, to be given angels. First, let it be clear that
divine honor through sacrifice or “latreia.” The Platonists believe that God there is no knowledge of God but
alone can bestow happiness on men or angels, but it is yet to be decided through the mediator between
whether the spirits want sacrifice offered to them or to the one God alone. God and men, Christ Jesus. It is
Although Platonists have some knowledge of the Creator, they misunderstand not wise to attempt to understand
continued on page 4
4
Book XI we piously believe; but that the fall-
continued from page 3
en angels, who by their own default
the infinite ages of time lost that light, did not enjoy this
before the creation of the blessedness even before they sinned,
“There is no question, world nor the infinite reason bids us conclude.”
then, that if the angels realms of space. The
world and time had one Two different communities of
are included in the works beginning; one did not angels existed, signified by the
of God during these six precede the other. God names Light and Dark.
days, they are that light created all and on the
The wickedness of Dark is not
which was called ‘Day,’ seventh day He rested.
nature, but contrary to nature, and
and whose unity Scrip- “When it is said that has its origin, not in the Creator,
ture signalizes by calling God rested on the seventh but in the will. This was not a sur-
day from all His works, prise to God, for He uses for good
that day not the ‘first and hallowed it, we are even the evil committed through
day,’ but ‘one day.’ not to conceive of this in the will.
For the second day, the a childish fashion, as if
work were a toil to God,
third, and the rest are who ‘spake and it was “But God, as He is the
not other days; but the done,’~ spake by the spir- supremely good Creator of
same ‘one’ day is repeat- itual and eternal, not good natures, so is He of
audible and transitory
ed to complete the num- word. But God’s rest sig- evil wills the most just
ber six or seven, so that nifies the rest of those Ruler; so that, while they
who rest in God, as the make an ill use of good
there should be know- joy of a house means the natures, He makes a good
ledge both of God’s joy of those in the house use even of evil wills.
works and of His rest. who rejoice, though not
the house, but something Accordingly, He caused the
For when God said, ‘Let else, causes the joy.” devil (good by God’s
there be light, and there Although the Bible creation, wicked by his own
was light,’ if we are jus- does not record the exact will) to be cast down from
tified in understanding moment when the an- his high position, and to
gels were created, we become the mockery of His
in this light the creation know that by their very angels,~that is, He caused
of the angels, then cer- nature they are light.
his temptations to benefit
tainly they were created God, the good and
those whom he wishes to
unchangeable Trinity of
par-takers of the eternal Father, Son, and Holy injure by them.”
light which is the un- Ghost, is one God in
changeable Wisdom of whom substance and
quality are identical.
God, by which all things In this blessedness the Book XII
were made, and whom angels were created. Book XII
we call the only-begotten “From all this, it will Regarding the angels, is there
readily occur to any one in some a good will and in others
Son of God; so that they, that the blessedness which an evil will? The nature of angels,
being illumined by the an intelligent being both good and bad, is the same.
Light that created them, desires as its legitimate The difference between angels of
object results from a com- light and angels of darkness lies
might themselves be- bination of these two not in a difference in their nature
come light and be called things, namely, that it and origin, since God created them
uninterruptedly enjoy
‘Day,’ in participation of the unchangeable good,
both, but in a difference in their
that unchangeable Light wills and desires. Angels of darkness
which is God; and that were not content to continue in
and Day which is the it be delivered from all the eternal truth and love of God.
dubiety, and know cer-
Word of God, by whom tainly that it shall eter-
They, instead, became enamored
with their own power and in so
both themselves and all nally abide in the same doing, traded the dignity of God’s
else were made.” enjoyment. That it is so
with the angels of light continued on page 5
5
Book XII As a result of sin, two cities
continued from page 4 were formed~the earthly and the
heavenly. The earthly city is ruled
eternity for pride and vanity, which lead to deception and envy. by love of self; the heavenly city,
Regarding the creation of man, he is not from eternity, but was crea- by love of God and contempt of
ted by the one true God. “In this first man, who was created in the be- self. The first seeks glory from men;
ginning, there was laid the foundation, not indeed evidently, but in the latter from the Lord. The first
God’s foreknowledge, of these two cities or societies, so far as regards the delights in its own strength; the
human race. For from that man all men were to be derived~some of latter says,
them to be associated with the good angels in their reward, others with “I will love thee, O Lord, my
the wicked in punishment; all being ordered by the secret yet just judgment strength” (Psalm 18:1).
of God.”
“And therefore the wise men of
the one city, living according to
Book XIII man, have sought for profit to
Book XIII their own bodies or souls, or both,
By Adam’s original sin did death come to be. Unlike the angels who and those who have known God
cannot die, man was created to live by condition~if he lived in obedience ‘glorified Him not as God, neither
to his Creator, he would enjoy angelic immortality and blessed eternity; were thankful, but became vain
if he disobeyed, he would experience death. in their imaginations, and their
foolish heart was darkened; pro-
What then is death? First, there is the death of the mortal body, but fessing themselves to be wise,’~that
here the issue of death of the soul is addressed. The soul was created to is, ‘glorying in their own wisdom,
be immortal, yet can experience a kind of death in itself when separated and being possessed by pride,’~they
from God. “The death, then, of the soul takes place when God forsakes it, became fools, and ‘changed the
as the death of the body when the soul forsakes it.” glory of the incorruptible God into
an image made like to corruptible
And so, there are two deaths~the death of the body and the death man, and to birds, and four-footed
of the soul. “Of the first and bodily death, then, we may say that to the beasts, and creeping things.’ For
good it is good, and evil to the evil. But, doubtless, the second, as it happens they were either leaders or followers
to none of the good, so it can be good for none.” of the people in adoring images,
‘and worshipped and served the
creature more than the Creator,
Book XIV who is blessed forever.’ (Romans
Book XIV 1: 21–25). But in the other city
Through the original sin of Adam, all men would have been doomed there is no human wis-dom, but
to the endless misery of the second death had not God intervened, only godliness, which offers due
through His grace, by providing a Savior in Christ Jesus. This Savior is worship to the true God, and looks
needed by all of mankind for all are sinners. The sin of men is not caused for its reward in the society of the
by the flesh but by the soul. The misery contracted from sin is not the saints, of holy angels as well as holy
sin itself but sin’s punishment. Despite the falling of angels and the sin men, ‘that God may be all in all’”
of men, God’s will is still carried out. (1 Corinthians 15: 28).
“The sins of men and angels do nothing to im- Books XV–XVII

Book XV–XVII
pede the ‘great works of the Lord which accom- Throughout the Old Testament
plish His will.’ For He who by His providence we see the cities develop~the earth-
and omnipotence distributes to everyone his ly by the children of the flesh and
the heavenly by the children of the
own portion, is able to make good use not only promise. The parallel courses of
of the good, but also of the wicked … God was the earthly and heavenly cities were
not ignorant that man would fall, why should highlighted in Scripture, from
Abraham to the Old Testament
He not have suffered him to be tempted by an prophets, and then on to Christ.
angel who hated and envied him? It was not,
indeed, that He was unaware that he should be Book XIX–XXI
Books XIX–XXI
conquered, but because He foresaw that by the
man’s seed, aided by divine grace, this same devil Regarding the two cities, what
himself should be conquered, to the greater then is their destiny? The heavenly
city, the City of Supreme Good,
glory of the saints.” is destined for life eternal; the
continued on page 6
6
Books XIX–XXI
sacred song, in which I read or
earthly city, for eternal death. David predicted the end of the world in hear the words, ‘Blessed are they
his Psalms: “In the beginning hast Thou laid the foundations of the earth, that dwell in Thy house, O Lord;
O Lord; and the heavens are the work of Thy hands. They shall perish, but they will be still praising Thee’”
Thou shall endure; yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; and as a (Psalm 84:4).
vesture Thou shall change them, and they shall be changed: but Thou art
the same, and Thy years shall not fail” (Psalm 52: 25–27). He makes it The saints will want for nothing
clear that the earthly city will end, but the heavenly city will go on for and discontent shall be nonexistent.
eternity. Those of the earthly city shall be judged justly and receive their “But who can conceive, not to say
eternal damnation. Those of the heavenly city will also be judged justly: describe, what degrees of honor and
glory shall be awarded to the vari-
“And hence, when His saints have been gathered to Him and set at ous degrees of merit? Yet it cannot
His right hand in the last judgment, Christ shall say, ‘Come, ye blessed be doubted that there shall be de-
of my Father, take possession of the kingdom prepared for you from the grees. And in that blessed city there
foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and ye gave me to eat,’ shall be this great blessing, that no
(Matthew 25:34) and so on, mentioning the good works of the good, and inferior shall envy any superior,
their eternal rewards assigned by the last sentence of the Judge.” as now the archangels are not en-
vied by the angels, because no one
Book will wish to be what he has not re-
Book XXII
XXII ceived, though bound in strictest
concord with him who has received;
The earthly city shall end. What will be the future of the heavenly as in the body the finger does not
city~the City of God? There will be an eternal happiness of the saints~the seek to be the eye, though both mem-
inhabitants of the heavenly city. “There shall be a new heaven and a new bers are harmoniously included
earth: and the former shall not be mentioned, nor come into mind; but in the complete structure of the
they shall find joy and rejoicing in it: for I will make Jerusalem a rejoicing, body. And thus, along with his gift,
and my people a joy. And I will rejoice in Jerusalem, and joy in my people, greater or less, each shall receive
and the voice of weeping shall be no more heard in her” (Isaiah 65:17–19). this further gift of contentment to
desire no more than he has.”
The saints will experience the resurrection of the body~not just their
earthly bodies, but bodies made new, bodies with all blemishes that They shall experience abundant
marred human beauty removed. free will. “Neither are we to suppose
that because sin shall have no power
to delight them, free will must be
withdrawn. It will, on the contrary,
“Whatever, therefore, has been taken from the be all the more truly free, because
body, either during life or after death shall be set free from delight in sinning to
restored to it, and, in conjunction with what has take unfailing delight in not sin-
ning. For the first freedom of will
remained in the grave, shall rise again, transformed which man received when he was
from the oldness of the animal body into the created upright consisted in an
newness of the spiritual body, and clothed in ability not to sin, but also in an
ability to sin; whereas this last
incorruption and immortality. But even though freedom of will shall be superior,
the body has been all quite ground to powder by inasmuch as it shall not be able to
sin. This, indeed, shall not be a na-
some severe accident, or by the ruthlessness of tural ability, but the gift of God.”
enemies, and though it has been so diligently
scattered to the winds, or into the water, that there They shall carry no weight of
guilt for their past sins. “The saints
is no trace of it left, yet it shall not be beyond the shall forget their past ills, for they
omnipotence of the Creator,~no, not a hair of its shall have so thoroughly escaped
head shall perish.” them all, that they shall be quite
blotted out of their experience. But
their intellectual knowledge, which
The saints, clothed in immortal and spiritual bodies, shall be occupied shall be great, shall keep them ac-
by praising and worshipping God. “How great shall be that felicity, which quainted not only with their own
shall be tainted with no evil, which shall lack no good, and which shall past woes, but with the eternal suf-
afford leisure for the praises of God, who shall be all in all! For I know ferings of the lost. For if they were
not what other employment there can be where no lassitude shall slacken
activity, nor any want stimulate to labor. I am admonished also by the
77
Book XXII
not to know that they had been miserable, how could they, as the Psalmist
says, for ever sing the mercies of God? Certainly that city shall have no
greater joy than the celebration of the grace of Christ, who redeemed us
by His blood.”
The saints will throughout eternity carry out David’s words, “Be
still, and know that I am God” (Psalm 46:10). Volume 4, Issue 24
Publishers
Catherine & David Martin
“When we are restored by Him, Editors
Cheryl & Michael Chiapperino
and perfected with greater grace, Published on the World Wide Web at
ChristianBookSummaries.com.
we shall have eternal leisure to see The mission of Christian Book Summaries
that He is God, for we shall be full is to enhance the ministry of thinking
Christians by providing thorough and
of Him when He shall be all in all readable summaries of noteworthy books
from Christian publishers.
... This knowledge shall be The opinions expressed are
those of the original writers
perfected when we shall be perfectly and are not necessarily those
of Christian Book Summaries
at rest, and shall perfectly know or its Council of Reference.
City of God, written in Latin by
that He is God.” Augustine of Hippo in the early 5th
century, deals with issues concerning
God, martyrdom, Jews, and other
Christian philosophies. Public domain
CBS Available at your favorite bookstore
or online bookseller. It can also be
downloaded free of charge at a vari-
ety of websites, including Christian
Classics Ethereal Library
(www.ccel.org).
The author: Saint Augustine
(354– 430), Bishop of Hippo
Regius, was a philosopher and theo-
logian. Augustine, a Latin church
father, is one of the most important
figures in the development of West-
ern Christianity. Radically influ-
enced by Platonism, he framed the
concepts of original sin and just war.
When the Roman Empire in the
West was starting to disintegrate,
Augustine developed the concept
of the Church as a spiritual City
of God, distinct from the material
City of Man.
Summarized by: Bonnie Church
is a website content manager, edi-
tor, freelance writer, and avid gar-
dener. She and her husband, Doug,
are proud parents of six and grand-
parents of ten. She is a graduate
of the University of Minnesota.
Bonnie, Doug, and their family
live in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
American Society of Church History
St. Augustine's Conception of the State

Author(s): Frederick William Loetscher
Source: Church History, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Mar., 1935), pp. 16-42
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Society of Church
History
Accessed: 26-02-2017 11:23 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Cambridge University Press, American Society of Church History are collaborating with
JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Church History
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.3 on Sun, 26 Feb 2017 11:23:12 UTC
ST. AUGUSTINE'S CONCEPTION OF THE STATE1
FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER
Princeton Theological Seminary
In his celebrated lecture on the Confessions of St.

Augustine the late Professor Adolf von Harnack decl
"Between St. Paul the Apostle and Luther the Reformer
Christian Church has possessed no one who could measure
self with Augustine; and in comprehensive influence no
is to be compared with him."2 Not only was this North A
bishop the chief luminary of Western Christendom in hi
generation, but through his writings he fairly dominate
philosophy, the theology, and the ethics of the Middle
he stimulated the medieval mystics, alike those who acc
and many of those who rejected the traditional dogmas;
spired both the so-called forerunners of the Reformatio
the leading humanists of the Renaissance; and in large m
he moulded the evangelical faith and piety of the Luther
especially of the Reformed churches from the days of
founders down to our own times. But in no realm of tho
or life was his influence more potent or historically
significant than in that characteristic development of th
tions of church and state that marked the millenial peri
ginning, less than half a century after his death, with th
of the Western Empire in the year 476. He was the weig
authority to whom emperors and popes could and did ap
for support in their age-long contest for the supreme p
the former to vindicate their independence in secular af
and the latter to prove their lordship over all other ear
potentates, whether temporal or spiritual.3
Augustine wrote no treatise dealing specifically with
1 The presidential address delivered at the meeting of the Society in Wa
ington on December 27, 1934.
2 Monasticism: Its Ideals and History: and The Confessions of St. Augustine
(Crown Theological Library, xxviii), p. 123.
3 Cf. K. Mirbt, Die Stellung Augustins in der Publizistik des gregorianischen
Kirchenstreits, Leipzig, 1888. He shows the thoroughly partisan use that
both factions made of Augustine's often purely incidental and never fully
developed statements.
16
ST. AUGUSTINE ON THE STATE 17
subject, nor did he ever set forth his views concerni

in a systematic fashion. These must be gathere
casional references in his Letters and Sermons, fr
Donatist Writings,4 and above all from his De C
the greatest, and excepting his Confessions, the be
the most read of all his works.
The monumental City of God-the author himself calls it

a magnum opus et arduum-6 is unquestionably the ablest re-
futation of heathenism and defence of Christianity that the
ancient church has bequeathed to us. It was occasioned by an
event that shook the Graeco-Roman world to its very founda-
tions: in August, 410, the imperial capital-Roma aeterna,
Roma felix, Roma invicta-fell a prey to Alaric's plundering
hordes. Men were filled with amazement and terror; the more
so because for generations such a catastrophe had been deemed
a sheer impossibility. The pagans promptly charged this
calamity, as they had long been wont to do with every sort of
public misfortune, to the ever-increasing ascendency of Chris-
tianity over their own time-honored religion. And it was in
answer to this accusation that Augustine wrote this immortal
work, devoting to the task about fourteen of his ripest and
busiest years (412-426).' His apologetic purpose dominated
the entire treatise.8 Of the twenty-two books, the first five, as
he himself declares in his Retractations, "refute those who
fancy that the polytheistic worship is necessary in order to
secure worldly prosperity," while the next five deal with those
who "maintain that the worship of the gods is advantageous
for the life to come." The remaining twelve books, though
4 These are specially important for his doctrine of the church. Cf. H. Reuter,
Augustinmsche Studien, Gotha, 1887, p. 151: "Man kann die Staatslehre
Augustin's nur mit ausserster Vorsicht und selbst dann nicht vollstandig aus
den lib. de civ. schipfen. Sie ist korrekt nur unter Vergleichung anderer
Schriften, namentlich der antidonatistischen aufzubauen."
5 We use the edition of B. Dombart, Leipzig, (vol. i, 1908; vol. ii, 1918); and
the English translation by Marcus Dods in the Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers, Buffalo, 1887, Second Series, vol. ii.
6 I, Praefatio; xxii, 30 (ii, p. 635, ed. Dombart) : ingentis huius operis " ; Retract.
ii, 69 (i, p. 1): "grande opus."
7 The facts in regard to the origin of the work, the dates for the publication
of the several parts, the course of the argument as a whole, and such matters,
may be found in the introductory chapter of H. Scholz's Glalbe and Unglaube
in der Weltgeschichte: Ein Kommentar zu Augustins De Civitate Dei, Leipzig,
1911. Later writers have called attention to some misconceptions in this
"Commentary", but it is on the whole the most useful guide we have for
the study of the City of God.
8 Cf. the ancient title in Dombart, ii, p. 635: "De Civitate Dei contra paganos."
9 Retract., ii, 43 (E. T., p. xii); cf. De Civ. Dei, x, 32, at the end.
2
18 CHURCH HISTORY
by no means lacking in passages of polemic vigor, g

may be called his positive interpretation of Christian
ceived as the civitas Dei in contrast with the civitas
and presented in three groups of four books each
respectively, with the origin, the progress, and the
destinies of the two cities. Thus his original aim, that
ing that it was not the renunciation of the old deities
ruined Rome, was confirmed by a constructive theor
tory that purports to embrace the whole life of the r
the fall of man to the final judgment. No doubt, th
more magnificent in its conception than adequate in
tion! Augustine's learning, especially his exegetical
torical scholarship, did not equal his theological ge
may, indeed, question the propriety of calling the wo
osophy of history in the modern sense; but it was t
worthy attempt in this direction, an achievement t
more striking in view of the fact that for more than a
years nothing better or even comparable was produced o
tian soil, and that the essential features of his solution of the
problem have been adopted by many modern writers.10
We have said that Augustine nowhere gives us a systematic
presentation of his views concerning the state; and this, we
repeat, is true even of the City of God. But it was inevitable
that when the pagans took occasion from the fall of Rome to
defend their traditional polytheism, he should feel constrained
to consider that political event in the light of his own theological
principles as a Catholic Christian, and that in so doing he
should have to test the two basic historical realities involved in
the debate-the church and the state-as to their highest value,
their ideal significance, their relation to the spiritual world.'1
This is the explanation of that characteristic blending of
empiricism and transcendentalism that has given rise to such
varied and often contradictory interpretations of this work. On
the one hand, his whole discussion is conditioned by concrete
facts taken from the realm of ecclesiastical and political history;
10 See Flint, Philosophy of History in France and French Belgium and Switzer-
land, 1894, pp. 152ff.; J. Reinkens, Die Geschichtsphilosophie des heiligen
Augustinus, 1865; G. J. Seyrich. Die Geschichtsphilosohpie Augustins nach
seiner Schrift De civitate Dei, 1891; J. Biegler, Die Civitas Dei des heiligen
Augustirus, 1894; A. Niemann, Auigustins Geschichtsphilosophie, 1895.
11 Karl Holl, "Augustins innere Entwicklung," (in Gesammelte Aufsatze rur
Kirchengeschichte, Tiibingen, iii, 1928) p. l01f.; Hermelink, "Die civitas
terrena bei Augustin" (Festgabe von Fachgenossen und Freunden A. Von
Harnack zum siebzigsten Geburtstag dargebracht, Tiibingen, 1921), p. 311f.
on the other, his ethical judgments concerning t

uniformly determined by his habit of viewing th
the state sub specie aeternitatis. It is the clear re
this double truth that has convinced most modern
of the City of God that the fundamental contrast
is not, as most medieval expounders maintained
partisan purposes, that between the church and t
rather that between the civitas Dei and the civitas ter
transcendent organisms of which the ecclesiastica
organizations of this world are but partial and im
bodiments. It was thus that Augustine, in the
of his apologetic task, found it necessary to expr
concerning the state, and in doing so to relate his
doctrine of the kingdom of God.
We come, therefore, to the heart of our subjec
now raise the much controverted question as to t
of the term civitas terrena, with which Augustin
of his reflections on the state and on all sorts of p
taining to civil government. The name was obvio
by him as an antithesis to the familiar civitas Dei of
It may be well, therefore, to glance, first of all, a
more important traits that mark his use of this la
tion, especially in the work that forms our chief sou
In book xi, chapter 1, which may be regarded
troduction to the positive and constructive part of
the author refers to three passages in the Psalter
adds: "From these and similar testimonies, all of which it
were tedious to cite,13 we have learned that there is a city of
God."14 This earthly Jerusalem is later represented as the
"prophetic image" of the "supernal city of the saints,"'5 which
includes all-both angels'8 and human beings-who live "ac-
cording to God"l7 or "according to the Spirit."'8 In its widest
extent the civitas Dei becomes the universal and eternal king-
dom of God, embracing both the society of the holy angels
12 Psalm 87, 3; 48, 2; 46, 4.
13 Among these he may have had in mind Heb. 11, 10; 11, 16; 12, 22; 13, 14;
and Rev. 3, 12; 21, 2.
14 Seholz, op. cit., p. 71f., gives an extended account of some striking adumbra-
tions, amounting almost to anticipations, of the Augustinian antithesis be-
tween civitas Dei and civitas terrena, in Plato, Plotinus, the Stoics, Philo,
Hermas, Origen, Lactantius, Ambrose, and Ticonius.
15 xv, 1, xv, 2 (ii, p. 59, 60).
16 xiv, 13 (ii, p. 33).
17 xv, 1 (ii, p. 58).
18 xiv, 1 (ii, p. 4).
20 CHURCH HISTORY
that antedates human history,'9 and the commZunio san

as the company of the elect.20 In its earthly form the c
begins with Adam,2l "not, indeed, evidently, but acc
God's foreknowledge."22 From Seth the developmen
through the patriarchs and the prophets and, not wit
admixtures from the ranks of the ungodly, through
of Israel.23 Of special interest here is the inclusion, wit
society of the blessed, of the Erythraean Sibyl,24 "the h
wonderful Job,"25 and the Queen of the South.26
advent of the Saviour the civitas Dei enters upon th
stage of its earthly career, so that the church is now
identified with the regnum Christi.2 At the second
Christ, when the final judgment takes place, the eart
of the civitas Dei is exchanged for the heavenly, with t
fication of the saints and their enjoyment of the beatif
of God.28
Over against the civitas Dei Augustine places the
terrena. This binomial, it must be confessed, is no
defined. It is used with various connotations. Reut
ago referred to the unfortunate fact that German writ
monly employed the word "state" to translate civita
clearly showed that much of what Augustine says a
civitas terrena does not apply at all to the state as su
bach,30 indeed, is quite too optimistic in declaring that
error has since been universally admitted. But he an
Catholic writers, notably Seidel and Schilling,3 and m
19 xi, 28 (i, p. 502).
20 xx, 3 (ii, p. 556f.). How far Augustine's doctrine of predestination under-
mines the Catholic dog,ma of the church may be seen in Reuter, op. cit., p. 96f.
21 Not with Seth, as Reuter (p. 132) represents.
22 xii, 28 (i, p. 556).
23 xvii, 15 and 16, and the later chapters dealing with the history of the Jews.
24 xviii, 23 (ii, 285).
25 xviii, 47 (ii, 330).
26 xx, 5 (ii, 411).
27 xx, 9 (ii, p. 429, 431). Augustine gave up his earlier chiliasm and interpreted
the millenium as the present reign of Christ and his saints.
28 xxii, 29 and 30.
29 Reuter, op. ct., p. 130: "Die Wahl des Wortes civitas ist doch eine verhangnis-
volle geworden." Cf. p. 131.
30 Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, i, Freiburg, 1909, p. 332.
31 Bruno Seidel, "Die Lehre des hi. Augustinus vom Staate," in Kirchen-
geschichtliche Abhandlungen herausg. von Dr. Max Sdralek, ix, i, Breslau,
1909, pp. 5-14; Otto Schilling, Die Staats- und Soiallehre des hi. Augustinus,
Freiburg, 1910, particularly pp. 37-44, where he shows that Gierke (Das
Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, iii, Berlin, 1897) misinterprets the five pas-
sages from De Civ. Dei which he cites in support of his view that Augustine
denies all justification to the state per se.
Protestant authorities32 like Robertson, Scholz, Eckstadt,

Troeltsch, Hermelink, and Figgis, may be said to have secured
a fairly general recognition of the view that while an empirical
state may, according to Augustine, be an embodiment or form
of the civitas terrena, it is not proper to equate this term with
the essential idea of the state.
In trying to get hold of Augustine's conception of the
civitas terrena, it is natural to consider his use of the noun
itself, apart from any modifying adjunct. He defines civitas
as "nothing else than a multitude of men bound together by
some associating tie."33 Frequently emphasis is laid on certain
specific features of the unifying principle; such as "concordia,"
"than which," he says, "nothing is more useful to the State,"34
and the correlative terms obedience and rule.35 These char-
acterizations are helpful as far as they go, but they are not
sufficiently definite to distinguish the civitas from allied forms
of communal life; nor do they give any indication of the size
of the society to which they may be applied. As a matter of
fact, the word is frequently employed,36 as by other Latin
authors, to denote individual cities, city-states, and states in
our modern sense of the term-political bodies embracing rel-
atively large areas under a single governing authority.37 Civitas
thus becomes a synonym of the various words used in Latin to
denote the state as we understand it,-res pzblica, res populi,
regnum, imperium.
But it is only when we give due consideration to the relig-
ious and moral implications of the adjective "earthly," that
the distinctive traits of the civitas terrena become plain. It is
the special merit of Seidel's dissertation that he has so con-
vincingly proved that throughout the City of God the civitas
32 Archibald Robertson, Regnum Dei, London, 1901, p. 206ff.; Scholz, as cited-
though his judgment of Augustine s "state" is not as favorable as the
facets warrant; K. Eckstiidt, Augustins Anschauung vom Staat, Kirchhain,
1912, p. 7; Troeltsch, Augustin, die christliche Antikce und das Mittelalter,
Berlin, 1915, p. 12f.; Hermelink, as cited, p. 302; J. N. Figgis, The Political,
Aspects of St. Augustine's 'City of God', Lond., 1921, p. 50.
33 xv, 8 (ii, p. 73): "civitas, quae nihil est aliud quam hominum multitudo
aliquo societatis vinculo conligata". Cf. Quaest. ev. ii, 46 (Migne, P. L.
35, 1360): "rationalium multitudo legis unius societate devincta."
34 Letter 138, 11, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, i, p. 484.
Cf. De Civ D. xix, 24 (ii, p. 400): "Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis
rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus."
35 xix, 16 (ii, p. 384): "ad ordinatam imperandi oboediendique concordiam
civium. "
36 Eckstadt, p. 14, gives a list of instances.
37 xxii, 6 (ii, 563): "civitates positas sub iure Romano."
22 CHURCH HISTORY
terrena is essentially the societas impiorum. As in t

the corresponding civitas Dei, the spiritual factor is
decisive one. Hence fallen angels,38 as well as unre
human beings, may belong to this community. It em
who out of love of self live in contempt of God,39 all the
all "who in the uncleannes of their hearts mind earthly
The civitas terrena, therefore, is not necessarily an
state; it is rather a body of persons, whether angels
who center their interest in that which is purely transi
which, as compared with the substantial and perman
of the civitas Dei, is of far inferior worth, whatever be
under the conditions of the present temporal ord
"citizenry of the earth-born,"4 who "rejoice in th
felicity of an earthly community,"43 "who prefer their
to the Founder of the holy city,"44 who "live aft
flesh,"45 and "run riot in an endless variety of sott
sures."46 From these and other passages that might
it is clear that, contrary to Reuter's contention,47 it is
in the last twelve but also in the first ten books of the C
that civitas terrena denotes primarily "the society of
pious."48 The basal contrast is never that between the
church and some empirical state, be this more or less he
nor that between the church and the state as such, bu
tween the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena, as organic
of two opposite and indeed irreconcilable principles-
unbelief.49 Conscious of the peculiarity of his nome
Augustine says at the beginning of the twelfth book
38 xiv, 13 (ii, p. 33). Cf. xviii, 18 (ii, p. 277): "civitate, quae pro
angelorum et hominum societas impiorum est"; xii, 1 (i, p. 512):
potius civitates, hoc est societates, merito esse dicantur, una in bo
in malis non solum angelis, verum etiam hominibus constitutae."'
39 xiv, 28 (ii, p. 56): "Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam
scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero amor Dei usque
ad contemptum sui."
40 i, Praef.
41 viii, 25 (i, p. 363).
42 xvi, 17 (ii, p. 153): "'terrigenarum civitas."
43 xv, 15 (ii, p. 88).
44 x, 32 (i, p. 460).
45 xiv, 1 (ii p. 1).
46 i, 30 (i, p. 47).
47 Op. cit., p. 126.
48 There are, indeed, a few cases in which the "terrena" seems to be morally
colorless, signifying, simply, "on earth"; see Eekstiidt, p. 19f., and Seidel,
p. 13.
49 xx, 9 (ii, p. 431): "impia civitas . . . et populus infidelium contrarius populo
fideli et civitati Dei".
so far as I can, demonstrate that it is not incongr

suitable to speak of a society composed of angels
that there may properly be said to be, not four (t
of angels and as many of men), but rather two c
that is societies, one composed of the good, and the o
wicked, alike angels and men."50 Throughout th
is the governing idea.5' We shall cite only one mo
"And these we also mystically call the two cities,
communities of men, of which the one is predesti
eternally with God, and the other to suffer eterna
with the devil."52 As Hermelink says,53 the word
here as generally in Augustine, refers to the my
of holy Scripture and denotes a mysterious relati
cealed in the sacred text and not only justifying b
an allegorical interpretation. Essentially, therefor
terrena is just as much a metaphysical conception as
Dei. In the last analysis, it is the predestinated, t
the reprobate, that are designated by the two comm
There is, however, another aspect of the matter,
we now turn. The civitas terrena has always found
historic communities here on earth. While, theref
never, on the one hand, fully identify the whole wit
several parts, the civitas terrena with any given poli
zation, it is true, on the other, that states, whatever
may be forms of the civitas terrena. This isexpressly
stance, of Rome itself,55 the state with which hi
purpose required him particularly to deal. In th
the entire work, it is obviously the civitas terren
in the famous lines used by Virgil to set forth the
of the heathen Romans, "to show pity to the hum
crush the sons of pride."'5 We cannot dwell upon
50 F. Kolde, Das Staatswesen des Mittelalters, Teil 1, Seine Grun
Augustin, p. 6, misconstrues this statement, saying, "Dem ir
gegeniiber steht der himmlische, der sich selber weiter in zwei einander
entgegengesetzte Teile spaltete, den guten und den bosen." The error is the
more remarkable as Reinkens, to whom he refers, gave the correct rendering.
51 Cf. Bliemetzrieder, "Ueber St. Augustin's Schrift, 'De civitate Dei' " in
Theologische Quartalschrift, Tiibingen, 1913, p. 103.
52 xv, 1 (ii, p. 58).
53 Op. cit., p. 309. Seidel, p. 7, refers to the occasional phrase "secundum
scripturas nostras" (xiv, 1) as an equivalent, but this does not bring out
clearly the main idea-that of the more or less hidden figurative meaning.
54 So Troeltsch, p. 11.
55 v, 19 (i, p. 230): "quandam formam terrenae civitatis."
56 Cf. Holl, as cited, p. 100.
24 CHURCH HISTORY
of Augustine's history of the civitas terrena, but mu

ourselves with the mention of a few salient facts. O
interest is the first stage in the organization of this co
The civitas terrena enters the mundane realm throu
but Cain is the first to give it a social expression. Co
on Genesis 4:17, "And Cain builded a city," Augus
"Thus the founder of the civitas terrena was a fratricide."57
It is to be observed, indeed, that he does not say that Cain
founded "the state," a mistranslation frequently charged against
him;58 but while the remark contains no disparagement of the
state as such, it clearly shows that in his opinion the city founded
by Cain was a part of the civitas terrena. The terrene com-
munity, extending its sway from generation to generation, be-
comes inextricably mixed with its rival, the civitas Dei.59 After
the flood, which destroyed the wicked, the sons of Noah restore
the earthly city.60 In Abraham's time, says Augustine, "there
were three famous kingdoms of the nations, in which the city
of the earth-born ... chiefly flourished, namely the three king-
doms of Sicyon, Egypt, and Assyria." Of these the last was
much the most powerful, with Babylon as its head, the very
name signifying the confusion that always results from the
unbridled lust of power.61 When Assyria declined in the East,
Rome, like another Babylon, arose in the West.62 Augustine
is not lacking in appreciation of the old Roman virtues: many
of their wars, he admits, were just,63 and the people, if not saint-
ly, were at least less shameful :64 but he emphasizes the fact that
their city, too, was founded by a fratricide,65 and that its whole
history was stained with sinful excesses of every sort.66 One
after another, therefore, the great monarchies of the past are
pictured as exhibiting the characteristic God-defying spirit of
the civitas terrena. The state thus becomes identified, not in-
deed fully and absolutely but partially and relatively, with the
57 xv, 5 (ii, p. 64).
58 E. g., Eueken, Die Lebensanschaumlgen der grossen Denker, 1890, p. 282;
and Scholz, p. 99.
59 i, 35 (i, p. 51). Cf. xv, 22 (ii, p. 106), referring to Genesis 6:2.
60 xv, 20 (ii, p. 99).
61 xvi, 17 (ii, p. 153f.); cf. xvii, 16 (ii, p. 239).
62 Ibid.
63 iv, 15 (i, p. 165).
64 v, 13 (i, p. 218).
65 xv, 5 (ii, p. 64).
66 Books ii-v.
civitas terrena.6 From the historical point of vie

terrena works itself out in political states that em
that is contrary to the divine will.68 But in spite
we must, as Schilling reminds us,69 always take p
tain whether in a given context Augustine has in
we mean by the state as such, or whether-as will
be found to be the case-he is speaking of heathen
heathen state, or the societas improborum.
Augustine's conception of the nature of the sta
clearly set forth in two passages in which he d
length with the definition of a commonwealth given
of Scipio by Cicero in his De Republica. The first o
cussions is found in the City of God, book ii, c
Augustine here refers to Cicero's statements that
res populi; that "a people ... is an assemblage ass
common acknowledgment of law, and by a comm
terests;" and further, that a republic . . . exists o
is well and justly governed." And then Augusti
he intends in its proper place to show that accord
definition "Rome never was a republic, because tru
never a place in it." For, he continues, "true ju
existence save in that republic whose founder and ruler is
Christ." For the fulfillment of his promise we must turn to
book xix, chapter 21. Here Augustine, accepting Cicero's own
concession that a "republic cannot be administered without
justice," concludes: "Consequently, if the republic is the weal
of the people, and there is no people if it be not associated by a
common acknowledgment of right, and if there is no right where
there is no justice, then most certainly it follows that there is
no republic where there is no justice." But "justice," he says,
"is that virtue which gives every one his due. Where, then,
is the justice of man, when he deserts the true God and yields
himself to impure demons? Is this to give every one his due?"
According to Augustine, then, if supernatural justice, that is
justice in the sense thus indicated, were essential to a state,
then neither Rome nor any other pagan state ever was a true
67 Mausbach, i, p. 332f., gives three reasons for the fact: 1) political interests
and motives, if not restrained, lead to the sinful cupiditas and superbia of
the civitas terrena; 2) the ancient world monarchies reflected this tendency
in its heathenish character; and 3) the treatise itself was occasioned by the
defenders of the heathen Roman state.
68 Hermelink, p. 309.
69 Op. cit., p. 37.
26 CHURCH HISTORY
state. Many of his interpreters have, therefore, decla

he virtually deprived the state of all possible justific
ethical grounds.70 But Augustine gives the discussion
different turn. As Figgis rightly declares: "So far in
Augustine from saying that injustice destroys the b
commonwealth, that he uses the admitted injustice an
tion of Rome in the later days of the Republic as a re
absurdurn of Scipio's definition."7'
The fact is that our author specifically rejects the ide
vera iustitia must be an attribute of the state. He discards
Scipio's definition as too narrow to suit the historical facts, and
substitutes for it one of his own. It is this: "A people is an
assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common
agreement as to the objects of their love."72 Then he says:
"According to this definition of ours, the Roman people is a
people and its weal is without doubt a commonwealth or
republic." And he adds that the same is true of "the Athenians
or any Greek state, of the Egyptians, of the early Assyrian
Babylon, and of every other nation, great or small, which had
a public government."
What, then, are the characteristic traits of the state ac-
cording to his own definition of the term?
We need not dwell upon the requirement that citizens must
be "reasonable" beings, as distinguished from brutes. But more
significant is the matter of "agreement as to the objects of their
love;" for, as Augustine says in the immediate context, "in
order to discover the character of any people, we have only to
observe what they love . . . and it will be a superior people in
proportion as it is bound together by higher interests, inferior
in proportion as it is bound together by lower." Eckstadt73 has
been the first, so far as we have been able to ascertain, to give
70 See Seidel, p. 25, for an excellent summary of the various forms of this
basal error in the writings of Schmidt, Dorner, Reuter, Gierke, Kolde, Eucken,
von Eicken, and Sommerlad; the last-named going the length of saying:
"Einzig und allein die irdische staatliche Gesellschaft gewinnt fur den grossen
Kirehenlehrer Bereehtigung, die sich unbedingt und unbeschriinkt in den Dienst
der Gemeinde Gottes, der Kirche, und ihres Organs, des Klerus, begiebt."
(Die wirtschaftliche Thitigkeit der Kirche in Deutschland, i, p. 137). We
think that Seidel is justified in saying: "Alle diese den wahren Ansehauungen
Augustins widersprec'henden Behauptungen riihren von der verkehrten
Auffassung des Begriffs civitas terrena als Wesensbestimmung fur 'Staat'
oder 'nichtchristlicher Staat' her."
71 Op. cit., p. 63.
72 xix, 24 (ii, p. 400): "Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum
quas diligit concordi communione sociatus."
73 Op. cit., p. 29f.
due emphasis to this feature of Augustine's conceptio

larly as it pertains to the underlying concordia. We
allude to a few of the cardinal passages cited by h
community," says Augustine, "is nothing else than
nious multitude of human beings."74 Quoting Sallus
proval, Augustine declares that the "maxima conc
joyed by the Romans between the second and third P
was due to their "most excellent morals" at that time
later dissensions sprang from their discordia.5 With
of irony, he says that if the goddess Concordia, to
Romans built a temple on the very site of those sed
massacres, had been present in the city, "she would
suffered herself to be torn by such dissensions."76 A
already seen, Augustine, in his Letter to Marcellinu
the state as a "multitude of men bound together by
of concord,"" and adds that if the Romans had imit
quarrels of their deities, the state would have fallen to
There can, then, be no doubt, that concordia, to the
Augustine, is an essential attribute of the state. But
question emerges here, a question that still divides hi
ters into irreconcilable groups. It is the question of
relation between concordia and iustitia. We have seen that
Augustine was quite unwilling to deny statehood to the great
monarchies of the past, even though they lacked that true and
supernatural righteousness that gives to God, as well as to all
other persons, their dues. But can there be a state without
any justice whatsoever? Reuter78 was the first to insist that
Augustine makes a distinction between absolute and relative,
or what Reuter calls rational justice, and that Augustine main-
tains that every state, being in some sense an ethical community,
must have at least this rational or natural justice that admin-
isters human affairs with some regard to equity. Is not, then,
this concordia itself based on some sort of iustitia? The debate
turns chiefly on the interpretation of the celebrated passage in
book iv, chapter 4:79 "Justice, then, being taken away, what are
74 i, 15 (i, p. 27): "cum aliud civitas non sit quam concors hominum multitudo."
75 ii, 18 (i, p. 74). Cf. iii, 23 (i, p. 135): "discordiae civiles vel potius inciviles.'
76 iii, 25 (i, p. 136).
77 (See note 33).
78 Op. cit., p. 137f.
79 iv, 4 (i, p. 150): "Remota itaque iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna
latrocinia? "
28 CHURCH HISTORY
kingdoms but great robberies ?" Scholz80 says that th

pronounce a veritable sentence of death over the st
takes the ablative absolute as causative, so that th
is: "Inasmuch as justice (as a matter of fact) is lacking,
kingdoms are nothing but robberies." But Mausbach,81 Seidei,82
Bliemetzrieder,83 Hermelink,84 Schilling,85 and Figgis86 all take
the clause in a merely conditional sense. And unquestionably
the context favors this construction. Augustine is not here
speaking of that true justice that seeks the glory of God and
that only Christian citizens can exemplify, but of that sort of
equity or fair dealing which even criminals must practice among
themselves; for, as he goes on to say: "what are robberies
themselves but little kingdoms? The band itself is made up of
men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together
by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law
agreed on." Unless, therefore, there is this sort of natural
law, there can be no state at all.87 This justice may be rudi-
mentary and feeble-a vitium rather than a virtuls8--but
without it there could be no enduring society whatever. Justice
alone can secure the needed concordia. Augustine quotes with
approval Scipio's simile: "What musicians call harmony in
singing, is concord in matters of state, which is the strictest
bond and best security of any republic, and which by no in-
genuity can be retained where justice has become extinct."89
The state is thus, according to our author, a natural neces-
sity. No doubt, his severe condemnation of the civitas terrena
involves many a harsh judgment on those states, whether heath-
en, Jewish, or nominally Christian, that fall utterly short in
promoting the common weal even in temporal, to say nothing of
spiritual affairs. He is particularly opposed to the tyranny of
strong nations over weak neighbors. He allows that to a con-
siderable extent Rome built up her greatness by "honorable
80 Op. cit., p. 102. But on the very next page he admits that Augustine concedes
to the " Naturstaat" a certain "'iustitia civilis. '
81 Vol. i, p. 336f.
82 P. 20f.
83 P. IlOf.
84 P. 321. He thinks, however, that the possibility ought to be left open that
the clause may be both causal and hypothetical.
85 P. 40.
86 P. 60.
87 Scholz, and especially Troeltsch and Schilling, develop the historic ba
of Augustine's ideas on the lex naturae.
88 Seidel, p. 23.
89 ii, 21 (i, p. 80).
means."90 His own ideal, however, is that of grou

states, "rejoicing in neighborly concord;" and he
this ideal had been realized, "there would have bee
small kingdoms of nations in the world, as there are
small houses of citizens in a city."91
What has just been said suggests a further wor
to the origin of the state. Here, again, it is of prime
to distinguish between the underlying principle an
tion in history. The state, according to Augustine
ism that evolves naturally out of man's divinely
nature. The whole race was made to proceed from
we are told, in order that God might thereby show
He prized "unity in a multitude."92 Even more pow
other members of the animal kingdom, man is m
laws of his nature "to hold fellowship and maintai
all men, so far as in him lies."93 Marriage is the
the city;94 "the house ought to be the beginning o
the city."95 Like Cicero, Augustine makes the
organic link between the individual and the state
significant is Augustine's statement concernin
peace": "But in the family of the just man . .. eve
rule serve those whom they seem to command; f
not from a love of power, but from a sense of du
to others-not because they are proud of author
cause they love mercy."97 And this is precisely the
concord that ought to prevail in the state; for
"prescribed by the order of nature: it is thus that
man."98
But sin has disturbed what would have been the normal
relationships alike in the family and in the state. Augustine
says: God "did not intend that His rational creature, who
was made in His image, should have dominion over anything
but the irrational creation,-not man over man but man over
90 iii, 10 (i, p. 107): "Decenter his artibus Roma crevit."
91 iv, 15 (i, p. 164).
92 xii, 23 (i, p. 550): 'in pluribus unitas."
93 xix, 12 (ii, p. 375): "Quanto magis homo fertur quodam modo naturae suae
legibus ad ineundam societatem pacemque cum hominibus, quantum in ipso est,
omnibus obtinendam. '
94 xv, 16 (ii, p. 93): ' "quoddam seminarium est civitatis."
95 xix, 16 (ii, p. 383): "Quia igitur hominis domus initium sive particula debet
esse eivitatis.''
96 Cf. Schilling, p. 60.
97 xix, 14 (ii, p. 381).
98 xix, 15 (ii, p. 381).
30 CHURCH HISTORY
beasts. And hence the righteous men in primitive ti

made shepherds of cattle rather than kings of me
through sin came slavery as its just desert, together
lust of power'?? and the manifold evils of the civitas
But even so, not everything in a morally imperfect
essentially bad. Even godless citizens, as will be se
may do their part in securing and maintaining peac
though it cannot be the highest blessing of a comm
is nevertheless a real and valuable good.101 We may n
fore, regard the state per se as a direct consequence o
even if sin had not disturbed the normal development o
the organic life of the race would have found exp
communal forms. "For there is nothing," says Augu
social by nature, so prone to discord by corruptio
(human) race."'02 Occasionally, he speaks of a pac
cietatis;'03 but the emphasis lies not on the voluntary
of the action taken, but on the social instincts that d
the choice of ends. This entire natural order is groun
will of God, by whose providence all human kingdom
tablished.'04
Among the tasks of the state by far the most impor
that of securing and maintaining peace. And here, a
reminds us,'05 Augustine is an epoch-making thinke
modern man in his clear grasp of the inestimable cult
of peace. "For peace," we read, "is so great a good, th
in this earthly and mortal life there is no word we h
such pleasure, nothing we desire with such zest, or f
more thoroughly gratifying.""'6 Again, "Domesti
the well-ordered concord between those of the family
and those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concor
the citizens. The peace of the celestial city is the per
99 Ibid.
100 Augustine, like the earlier Fathers, accepted slavery as a historical fact; but
Mausbach, i, p. 327, goes too far in intimating, on the basis of xix, 14
(ii, p. 380), that he regarded slavery as "necessary."
101 Gregorovius, Rome in the Middle Ages, 4th ed., E. t., i. p. 169, says:
Augustine "considered the Empire of the Romans, with all its imperious maj-
esty, its laws, literature and philosophy, only as the accursed work of devils."
But Augustine says, on the contrary, that it was God who gave Rome its ancient
glory; v. 15f.
102 xii, 28 (i, p. 555).
103 Confessiones, iii, c. 8, 15; cf. De Civ. D., iv, 4.
104 v, 1 (i, p. 190): "Prorsus divina providentia regna constituuntur humana."
105 Op. cit., p. 51. Cf. H. Fuchs, Augustin und der antike Friedensgedanke, Berlin,
1926, p. 16f.
106 xix, 11 (ii, p. 372).
dered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and of

in God."'07 The peace that marks the blessedness
life is the secret of all happiness even in this life.
"the whole use of things temporal has a reference
of earthly peace in the earthly community, while in
God it is connected with eternal peace."'19
Peace in the state means, on the one hand, p
against external foes. Augustine is no pacifist. He
frightful evils of war, but at the same time he re
some wars are thoroughly justified. He says: "
victory remains with the party that had the juste
hesitates to congratulate the victor and style i
peace ? These things, then, are good things, and w
the gifts of God.""' In case of an unwarranted
without, it is incumbent on the state, in the very
peace, to defend itself.l' He praises the old Roman
real excellencies, even though they were not of the h
of merit, inasmuch as they were due to a love of e
and fame.12 Nevertheless, many of their wars
eous.13 He duly appreciates the benefits of the un
under Augustus."4 Even Christians may with
science serve the state in civil or military life."5 B
against the pride of dominion and the passion for
izement that have marked the expansion of some
vast monarchies, especially Assyria and-in its l
Rome itself.16
On the other hand, peace in the state means also the proper
regulation of internal affairs. The spirit of selfishness that
characterizes the members of the civitas terrena inevitably leads
107 xix, 13 (ii, p. 377).
108 xix, 10 and 11 (ii, p. 370f.).
109 xix, 14 (ii, p. 379).
110 xv, 4 (ii, p. 63).
111 xix, 7 (ii, p. 367).
112 v, 15 (i, p. 220).
113 iv, 15 (i, p. 164): "Si ergo iusta gerenda bella, non impia, non iniqua,
Romani imperium tam magnum adquirere potuerunt." Cf. i, 21 (i, p. 35),
concerning those who-in the biblical history-" waged war in obedience to
the divine command. '
114 xviii, 22 (ii, p. 284).
115 Ep. 138 (to Marcellinus), c. 15. Ep. 189 (to Boniface), e. 4: "Do not think
that it is impossible for any one to please God while engaged in active military
service. "
116 iv, 6 (i, p. 153): "Inferre autem bella finitimis et in cetera inde procedere
ac populos sibi non molestos sola regni cupiditate conterere et subdere, quid
aliud quam grande latrocinium nominandum est?"
32 CHURCH HISTORY
to dissension and strife, particularly with refer

acquisition and use of private property. Augustine
that earthly possessions are not in themselves evil
who live by faith understand the art of using arigh
that are necessary for this mortal life."' They m
propriety even pray for wealth, provided they purpos
it, agreeably to the will of God, for the benefit of th
men.118 But possessions involve legal rights, and w
give rise to litigation, only the state can determine
by securing "the well-ordered concord of civic obe
rule" through "the combination of men's wills to
things which are helpful to this life."'20 Reuter,'12 in
that Augustine had no firm conviction in regard to
value of private possessions. But Seidel 122 and Kold
pret him more accurately, when they say that while h
regard the ownership of private property under th
conditions of administration as an ideal system, h
cedes to it a divine origin and justifies it on the bas
rights. It is not the possession of material good, b
proper use of it, as if it alone were worth while,
evil into the world.'24 In any event, there is no ot
than the state for the protection of civil rights and t
ment of the mutual obligations of citizens. It is d
pointed to promote the common welfare by means of
and, when necessary, its judicial processes.125
Even, therefore, if the state had no further task t
of defending its inhabitants against attacks from w
of maintaining public order and tranquility within,
of inestimable value to human society. Dorner'26 m
the passage to which he refers in proof of his stat
Augustine condemned as sinful the seeking of eart
117 xix, 17 (ii, p. 384).
118 Ep. 130 (to Proba), c. xii, section 13.
119 Ep. 93 (to Vincentius), c. 12, sect. 50: "Every earthly possession can be
rightly retained only on the ground of divine right, according to which all
things belong to the righteous, or of human right, which is the jurisdiction
of the kings of the earth." Cf. xix, 17 (ii, p. 384): "legibus terrenae
civitatis, quae sustentandae mortali vitae aecommodata sunt, obtemperare non
dubitat. ''
120 xix, 17 (ii, p. 384).
121 Op. cit., p. 384.
122 Op. cit., p. 34.
123 Op. cit., p. 29.
124 Ibid.
125 xix, 5 and 6 (ii, p. 364f.).
126 Augustinus, 1873, p. 298.
for its own sake. For the context shows that the writer is not
speaking of the state as such but of the civitas terrena that is
guilty because of its "neglect of the better things that belong
to the superna civitas." He says explicitly: "But the things
which this city [the civitas terrena] desires cannot justly be
said to be evil, inasmuch as in its own human sphere it is itself
a good of a higher order."127
But Augustine does not confine the responsibilities of the
state to the sphere of purely secular and temporal interests.
According to his favorite analogy, the state is an enlarged fam-
ily and the magistrate ought to discharge the duty of "a pious
father."'28 The civil power must deal not only with matters
pertaining to law and order but also with considerations of
ztilitas and felicitas"2. But the secret of happiness, we are told,
is the same for the state as for the individual,'30 and as "those
who are true fathers of their households desire and endeavor
that all the members of their household, equally with their own
children, should worship and win God,"'8' so the state must give
due attention to the moral and religious welfare of its people.
As we have seen, the civitas terrena is blameworthy, not be-
cause it aims to secure material prosperity, but because it makes
this its chief and exclusive concern, and neglects the higher,
the ethical and spiritual values of life. Addressing its mem-
bers, Augustine says: "Depraved by good fortune and not
chastened by adversity, what you desire in your security is not
the tranquility of the commonwealth, but the impunity of your
own vicious luxury."'32 But in the ideal state the rulers will
promote the worship of the true God and exercise authority
"not from a love of power but from a sense of duty they owe
to others."'33 As Christians they will do what in them lies to
put an end to idolatry and obtain for their subjects the happiness
127 xv. 4 (ii, p. 63): "Non autem recte dicitur ea bona non esse, quae concupiscit
haec civitas, quando est et ipsa in suo genere melior." We follow Hermelink,
p. 315, and Mausbach, i, 339, in the interpretation of this difficult and much
debated passage. Cf. Scholz, p. 105, and Bliemetzrieder, p. 102.
128 Ep. 133 (to Marcellinus), c. 2 (ed. Goldbacher, iii, p. 82): "Imple, Christiane
iudex, pii patris officium.,'
129 iv, 3 (i, p. 149f.).
130 Ep. 155 (to Marcellinus), c. 7 (ed. Goldbacher, iii, p. 437): "Quoniam vero
te rei publicae scimus amatorem, non aliunde esse beatum hominem, aliunde
civitatem vide quam sit in illis sacris litteris clarum."
131 xix, 16 (ii, p. 383).
132 i, 33 (i, p. 50).
133 xix, 14 (ii, p. 381).
3
34 CHURCH HISTORY
of that people whose God is the Lord.'34 Accordin

author, "there could be nothing more fortunate for h
fairs than that, by the mercy of God, they who are
with true piety of life, if they have the skill for ruling
should also have the power;"'13 and "if the true God
shipped, and if He is served with genuine rites and tru
it is advantageous that good men should long reign both
wide."'36 Under these circumstances Augustine wo
be willing to abandon his ideal of a family of small sta
then the question of territorial size would be of minor
ance.137
From what has been said it is obvious that the state, ac-
cording to Augustine, has important pedagogical and disciplin-
ary functions to perform, and that in the discharge of
these duties it is necessarily dependent upon the church as the
divinely appointed teacher of pure religion and wholesome
morals. We thus come, in the course of our exposition of his
views, to the last phase of our subject, the relation of church
and state to each other. It is no doubt true, as Reuter reminds
us,"13 that the author of the City of God nowhere professes to
give us a special treatment of this problem in the sense with
which later historic usage has made us familiar. Nevertheless,
many statements, incidental though they are to his primary
apologetic purpose, and a considerable number of passages in
his Letters and especially in his anti-Donatist writings, enable
us to reproduce his ideas with a fair degree of accuracy and
completeness.
It is plain that Augustine writes as a Catholic Christian.
He accepts without criticism the authority of the emperor as
the head of a state that after centuries of conflict with Chris-
tianity had established the orthodox Nicene faith as the official
and only permissible religion. The civitas Dei, ideally con-
sidered, remains limited to the communio sanctorum as the
company of the elect, but it finds a real though imperfect em-
bodiment in the historic visible church which, so far as it con-
tains true saints, is even now to be identified with the regnum
Dei. And in like manner, when he deals with the given em-
pirical data, he either directly equates the civitas terrena with
134 Ep. 155, c. 2 (Goldbacher iii, p. 349).
135 v. 19 (ii, p. 230).
136 iv, 3 (i, p. 149f.).
137 iv, 28 (i, p. 181): "melius hic regnum haberent, quantumcumque haberent."
138 L. c., p. 151.
the existing empire or at least brings the two into such

connection with each other that it becomes imposs
to separate the idea from its concrete expression.'9.
Broadly speaking, the relation of church and st
termined, according to Augustine, by the principle
Jesus in these terms: "Then render unto Caesar
that are Caesar's and unto God the things that ar
But in practice the two spheres of activity and influen
be rigidly kept apart, and the Christian will be cons
vary his attitude to the civil power according to his
as to its conformity to his basal religious convic
those of his fellow citizens who may belong to t
improborum, he will yield obedience even to those
the realm that have no higher aim than the attainment
ervation of earthly peace and material prosperity. F
needs these benefits; and indeed he alone knows how to use
them to the best advantage as aids to the cultivation of the
spiritual life. He will do all he can to help even the non-Chris-
tian state to perform its legitimate tasks. But one thing he
cannot, because he may not do, and that is to obey any law that
conflicts with his obligation to render due worship to God. As
Augustine puts the matter: "This heavenly city, then, while
it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all nations, and gathers
together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling
about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby
earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that,
however various these are, they all tend to one and the same
end of earthly peace. It therefore is so far from rescinding
and abolishing these diversities, that it even preserves and
adopts them, so long only as no hindrance to the worship of
the one supreme and true God is thus introduced.14' In the
case of a Christian state-a state that regulates all public in-
terests, including morals and religion, by the principles of the
Gospel-the church naturally has a far more intimate relation
to the civil power and exerts a correspondingly greater in-
fluence upon it. In such a commonwealth Christians labor the
more hopefully for the recognition by all of the need of that
vera iustitia which, though not essential to the existence of the
139 Scholz, p. 1lOf.; Holl, pp. 101, 115; Robertson, p. 214; and Seidel, p. 44, note
1, as against Reuter's contention that the kingdom of God means only the
invisible communion of the saints and not the hierarchically governed church.
140 Luke 20, 25.
141 xix, 17 (ii, p. 385 f.).
36 CHURCH HISTORY
state, conditions its highest welfare by securing the s

of all its activities to the ideal purposes of the kingdom
By precept and example they will show that Christian
does no harm to civic interests but actually promotes
forging that bond "of concord, than which nothing
useful to the state,"142 so that, as Augustine says: "w
religion listened to as it deserves, it would establish, con
strengthen, and enlarge the commonwealth in a way b
that Romulus, Numa, Brutus, and all the other men of
in Roman history achieved."'43 Then would Christian
be truly happy, "not through ardent desire of empty glo
through love of eternal felicity, if for their sins the
not to offer to the true God, their own God, the sac
humility, contrition, and prayer."'44 They will be min
only in their private lives but also in their official co
the claims of the celestial commonwealth.'45 They w
their Christian subjects, be actuated, not by selfish m
considerations of worldly honor or power, but by a du
for the spiritual as well as the temporal welfare of th
are under them.'46 And in turn the principles of Chr
will promote loyalty to the state by making its citiz
ready and joyful obedience to all legislation that does
flict with the revealed will of God, and by disposing
bring their households into harmony with the civic orde
In general, then, the relation of church and s
Augustine conceived it, may fairly be described as one of
dependence and reciprocal obligations. Each needs t
and is bound to help it in the realization of its divinely
ed mission. But this broad statement falls far short
an adequate representation of his views. It throws no
the perplexing but important question that is sure to ar
divergent opinions lead to a conflict of authorities-t
tion as to which of the two is the superior power. So
142 Ep. 138 (to Marcellinus), c. ii, sect. 11 (ed. Goldbacher, iii, p. 136).
143 Ibid., sect. 10 (iii, p. 135).
144 v, 24 (i, p. 237), the justly celebrated "Mirror of the Princes". Cf. v, 26,
on the piety of Theodosius.
145 Ep. 155 (to Macedonius), c. 9, sect. 17 (ed. Goldbaeher, iii, p. 477): "ut te
appareat in terreni iudicis cingulo non parua ex parte caelestem rem publicam
cogitare. '
146 xix, 19 (ii, p. 388): "In actione vero non amandus est honor in hac vita
sive potentia, quoniam omnia vana sub sole, sed opus ipsum, quod per honorem
vel potentiam fit, si recte atque utiliter fit, id est, ut valeat ad earn salutem
subditorum, quae secundum Deum est."
147 xix, 16 (ii, p. 384).
olic interpreters,"48 indeed, assert that no such clash o

is possible, or at most concede that it can be due on
fault on the part of a representative of either si
stern facts of history made Augustine himself see th
tice his theoretical separation of the political and e
spheres could not be maintained, and brought him t
clusion that while the state had, to be sure, a limit
exclusive jurisdiction, there was a much wider real
ing both matters of policy and methods of adminis
which the state had to subject itself, for its own g
guidance of the church. We can only briefly ref
of the cardinal points in his treatment of this aspe
subject.
Writing as a member of that victorious church that had
not only destroyed countless idols but also witnessed "the high-
est dignitary of the noblest empire laying aside his crown and
kneeling as a suppliant at the tomb of the fisherman Peter,"'49
Augustine emphasizes the right and the duty of the civil magis-
trate to promote, by every means at his disposal, the moral and
religious welfare of the people.'50 In rather fulsome language
he specially commends Theodosius for the help he gave the
church in her fight against idolatry and against Arianism.l5l
It was his settled conviction that Christian emperors should
"make their power the handmaid of the majesty of God by
using it for the greatest possible extension of his worship."152
"Accordingly," we are told, "when we take into consideration
the social condition of the human race, kings, in the very fact
that they are kings, have a service which they can render to the
Lord in a manner which is impossible for any who are not
kings.",53
How far Augustine carried the idea that the state should
protect and promote the welfare of the church can best be seen
in his anti-Donatist writings. These are of prime importance
in this connection just because they reflect the development of
148 Seidel, pp. 50, 53; and, less explicitly and confidently, Schilling, p. 144.
149 Ep. 232 (to the brethren of Madaura), c. 3 (ed. Goldbacher, iv, p. 514). Cf.
Ep. 35 (to Eusebius), anno 396, e. 3 (Goldbacher, ii, p. 30): "Dominus . . .
qui iugo suo in gremio eius toto orbe diffuse omnia terrena regna subiecit."
150 Ep. 185 (to Boniface, "Concerning the Correction of the Donatists"), c. 2,
sect. 8 and c. 5, sect. 20 (ed. Goldbacher, iv, p. 7 and p. 18).
151 v. 26 (i, p. 240).
152 v, 24 (i, p. 237).
153 Contra Lit. Petiliani, ii, c. 92, sect. 210 (The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,
First Series, iv. p. 583).
38 CHURCH HISTORY
his teaching concerning the Catholic church and her sacr

As against the Donatists, Augustine holds that this
with her marks of unity, sanctity, catholicity, and ap
is infallible, indispensable, and permanent.154 There
heresies are to be condemned, because they are departu
the authentic faith of this church; and likewise all s
because they rupture that bond of love that condition
presses the union of her true members with Christ
one another. How, then, is the church to deal with these
foes of hers ?
In a tract written about the year 397, shortly after he had
become bishop, Augustine, addressing some Manichaeans in
his then customary tone of conciliation, says: "It is ours, ac-
cordingly, to desire . . . that we might attain our end in your
correction, not by contention, and strife, and persecution, but
by kindly consolation, by friendly exhortation, by quiet dis-
cussion."'55 And writing to Vincentius, a moderate Donatist,
he says: "For originally my opinion was, that no one should
be coerced into the unity of Christ, that we must act only by
words, fight only by arguments, and prevail by force of reason,
lest we should have those whom we knew as avowed heretics
feigning themselves to be Catholics."'56 With his profoundly
spiritual conception of true piety, with his frank recognition of
the freedom of the religious personality, and with his vivid
recollection of the difficulties he had himself experienced in
attaining the truth, he was in those early days content to be-
lieve that it was the divine will that "erring men," as he says,
"should be amended rather than destroyed."'57 But presently-
from about the year 408-having become convinced of the futil-
ity of trying to win his adversaries by peaceful methods, he
advocated, repeatedly and with increasing vigor and insistence,
the coercion of heretics by the civil power. He was, of course,
well aware that the Donatists had been the first to appeal for
aid to the emperor, that they had often done so, and that it was
154 Harnack, History of Dogma, E. t., v. p. 144f.; for the modifications occasioned
by Augustine's later emphasis on predestination, see p. 163f.
155 Contra Ep. Manichaei Quam Vocant Fundamenti, c. i (Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers, F. Ser., iv, p. 129).
156 Ep. 93 (anno 408, to Vincentius, one of the small group of Donatists called
Rogatists), c. 5, seet. 17 (ed. Goldbacher, ii, p. 461). Cf. Ep. 23 (anno 392,
when Augustine was still a presbyter), c. 7 (Goldbacher, i, p. 71): "cessabit
a nostris partibus terror temporalium potestatum; cesset etiam a uestris
partibus terror congregatorum Cireumcellionum: re agamus, ratione agamus,
diuinarum scripturarum auctoritatibus agamus."
157 Contra Ep. Manich., as cited, i.
only after such efforts had failed that they insiste

state should keep its hands off church properties and le
ious bodies unmolested.'58 He was also much influ
the fact that other bishops, who had begun to rely
were actually winning back into the church large n
Donatists, many of whom expressed their delight in
delivered from the terror of their own fanatical leaders.'5
Moreover, the violence of the plundering and murderous Cir-
cumcellions gave ample justification for the state to intervene
for the restoration of peace and order; though it is worthy of
note that even in the case of these atrocious crimes Augustine
admonished proconsuls to exercise moderation and under no
circumstances to inflict capital punishment.'6? But he wen
much further. He took Luke 23:14, improperly translated in
the Vulgate as "compelle intrare," as a sufficient vindication of
the use of force, even in purely religious and theological matters,
by the civil magistrate under the tutelage of the church ;1" and to
the same purpose, and with equally sophistical exegesis, he
exploited the account of Paul's "violent" conversion'62 and
other biblical narratives that seemed to him to prove the bene-
ficial effects of compulsion in the sphere of moral conduct.'63
It was under these circumstances, and by such questionable
methods of argumentation, that he developed his theory, as far-
reaching in its historical consequences as it is incompatible
with modern ideas of religious toleration, that the state, under
the guidance of the church, the divinely appointed teacher of
revealed truth, must perform a pedagogical and disciplinary
function that involves the use of the civil power for the con-
version of heretics and schismatics or for their adequate punish-
ment if they obstinately persist in their errors-a theory that
quite justifies Reuter's verdict, "Augustine is the first dogmati-
cian of the Inquisition."'"4
Taking Augustine's statements as a whole, we may say
that to him church and state are neither mutually exclusive nor
necessarily hostile to each other. They both have a divine right
158 Ep. 93, c. iv, sect. 12ff. (Goldbacher, ii, p. 456).
159 Ibid&, c. If., c. 17ff. Cf. Ep. 185, e. ii, sect. 7 (Goldb., iv, p. 7).
160 Ep. 100 (to Donatus), c. 1 and 2 (Goldb., ii, p. 535); Ep. 133 (to Marcellinus),
c. 3 (Goldb., iii, p. 83); Ep. 134 (to Apringius), e. 2 (Goldb., iii, p. 85).
161 Ep. 173 (to Donatus), c. 10 (Goldb., iii, p. 647); Ep. 185 (to Boniface), c.
ii, sect. 7 (Goldb., iv, p. 7); Ep. 93, c. v, sect. 18 (Goldb., ii, p. 463).
162 Ep. 173, as cited c. iii (iii, p. 641).
163 Ep. 93, c. ii, sect. 7 (ii, p. 451f.).
164 Op, cit., p. 501, n. 3.
40 CHURCH HISTORY
to be, and they ought not only to tolerate but also to

with one another. As regards the state, he certainly take
ing from it that is essential to its existence or prospe
does he question either its competence or its complete au
in the realm of purely secular affairs. Ideally, as any
would agree, its activities are salutary just in the pr
in which they enhance the common, and especially the
welfare of its citizens. From this point of view, ther
no doubt as to Augustine's real patriotism or even, in
some one-sided emphases on other-worldliness, of his
recognition of all those cultural values that depend f
realization upon the development and maintenance
righteousness without which there can be no civic con
peace.165 Though Christianity does not belong to the
of the state, the best commonwealth, Augustine woul
one that embodies the best principles and the highes
But this does not justify the assertion of Reuter,'66
state is a state only in the measure in which it subord
self to Christian norms, the true state the Christian s
generalization of Eckstadt'67 is much nearer the trut
cording to Augustine's own verdict, the state is the b
as much as the objects of its affection are the better.
Christian state is not the ideal according to its essenc
is the most valuable according to its content."
On the other hand, no fair reading of the evidence w
imize the importance of the many statements that fa
may be called the clericalist conception of the state.
of God must be supplemented by the anti-Donatist w
Letters, and other minor writings. It may be true, ind
in certain respects the church, according to Augustin
as much dependent on the state-for example, to take
cardinal instance, in the preservation of property rig
the state upon the church. Nevertheless, even in his
and in his own official conduct, the event clearly sho
civil magistrates were bound to take not only advice
commands from bishops; and though ostensibly this s
tion might be limited to spiritual affairs only,'68 yet pr
this spiritual realm was made to embrace not only r
165 Cf. Seidel, p. 26; Mausbach, i, p. 350; and Figgis, p. 67.
166 Op. cit., p. 142.
167 Op. cit., p. 40.
168 Seidel, p. 46, n. 3.
and moral issues but also, by the very necessities

all sorts of ecclesiastical, social, cultural, and hum
terests. Though Augustine personally was abou
hierarchically minded as any of the early Catholic
though in his latest anti-Pelagian works he dev
trine of predestination that really "destroyed the Ca
of the Church,""'6 nevertheless neither he himse
spiritual heirs during the next millenium fully
logic of his "evangelicalism." It was inevitable und
toric conditions that determined the growth of the p
his Pauline view of saving grace would be transfo
theory of sacramental grace that would harmoniz
dominant sacerdotalism of the age. Scholz,170 no
too far in declaring that "the whole program of
'priest-state' is contained in these deductions" fro
ciples underlying the City of God; but he is quite rig
"or at least it can be read out of them." For if th
Augustine holds, is dependent upon the church fo
natural iustitia by which alone men can fulfill th
obligations to God; and further, if the empirical c
kingdom of heaven, the civitas Dei, and the only t
wealth is that in which Christ is the ruler, and i
civil magistrate must use his influence, personal
and all his powers, military resources included, t
else to punish all whom the ecclesiastical authorit
termine to be heretics or schismatics, then certain
cratic state becomes an inevitable necessity, and it
will not stop short of regarding himself as king
lord of lords. We need not deny that Augustin
state more highly than did the ancient Christian
vindicated for it a considerable sphere of activity
had an independent right to be obeyed. But his vi
fication of the communion of saints, the city of G
dom of heaven, the numerus praedestinatorum, with
hierarchically governed church, was bound to ma
ecclesia in imperio give place to the later imperium
And looking beyond the Middle Ages and the R
169 Reuter, op. cit., p. 98. Cf. Harnack, History of Dogma, v. p. 166: "Thus the
thought of predestination shatters every notion of the Church." . "Not
only does the Medieval Catholic doctrine of the Sacraments go back to Augustine,
but so do the spiritualists of the Middle Ages, and, in turn, Luther and Calvin
are indebted to him for suggestions" (ibid., p. 162).
170 Op. cit., p. 108.
42 CHURCH HISTORY
we may affirm with Roberts

too much to say, we have in
theory of the Church as a S
equipped with all that is nece
politic, perfect not indeed in
bers, but in organization, ins
everything necessary to the c
171 Regnum Dei, p. 214
HeyJ
13 XLVIII
LIV (2010),
(2013),
KATHERINE pp. pp. 1–16
13–28
CHAMBERS DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2265.2010.00612.x
SLAVERY AND DOMINATION AS POLITICAL

IDEAS IN AUGUSTINE’S CITY OF GOD
KATHERINE CHAMBERS
University of Southampton, UK
The purpose of this article is to explore the meaning of domination and slavery in the political philosophy
of Augustine of Hippo (354–430), particularly in the major work of his later years, the City of God. It
offers an exploration of this aspect of Augustine’s thought in the light of relatively recent scholarship on
the meaning of these terms for political philosophy (in particular, the work of Quentin Skinner and Philip
Pettit). It finds that, in Augustine’s eyes, the nature of domination or slavery in the political sphere
differed from its nature in the domestic sphere.
The importance of the idea of domination in Augustine’s political philosophy is well-

known, but, as yet there has been no study exploring exactly what he meant by this term.
At the same time it is artificial to separate the idea of domination from that of slavery: for a
Latin author a master of slaves is a dominus; those who are enslaved are ‘dominated’.
Augustine used both terms of the political sphere.
One context for the present study is the work of Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit who
have highlighted the centrality of the concepts of domination and slavery for the history of
political philosophy and for contemporary political discourse.1 They have also proposed
a particular definition of domination and servitude – and of the injustice which these
involve – arguing that to be dominated or enslaved is to experience dependence on another
person’s will; in other words, to be vulnerable to an arbitrary power possessed by that
person. The essence of slavery is simply existing in a condition of such vulnerability, since
even a well-treated slave remains at all times dependent on a master’s benevolence for his
good treatment. The willingness of the slave to obey his master is not a relevant
consideration, since even those who willingly obey their masters are still in a state of
servitude.2
In Liberty before Liberalism, Skinner found that the seventeenth-century English
parliamentarians were inspired by the discussion of slavery and freedom in the Codex of
Justinian, and in the political writings of ancient Rome (in particular, the works of Cicero,
Sallust, Livy and Tacitus) leading them to define injustice in the political sphere as a state
of dependence on the will of a ruler: slaves existed in this state, and so, by definition,
freemen should not.3 By defining slavery as a relationship of dependence on another’s will,
the parliamentarians argued that when a king possessed any discretionary or prerogative
powers (even if these powers were never exercised), his subjects ceased to be free, and were
instead reduced to slavery. This allowed Charles I’s opponents to attack, among other
things, his claim to have the right to veto any legislation put to him by parliament: if the
king’s will was able to determine the law in this way, then his subjects were enslaved. As
Milton argued in Eikonoklastes, ‘If our highest consultations and purpos’d lawes must be
r The The
© 2010 author 2010.The
Author. Journal
Heythrop Journalr
compilation ©Trustees for Roman
2010 Trustees Catholic
for Roman Purposes
Catholic Registered
Purposes 2010. Published
Registered. Published by Blackwell
Blackwell Publishing
Publishing Ltd,
Ltd, 9600
Garsington
GarsingtonRoad,
Road,Oxford
OxfordOX4
OX42DQ,
2DQ,UK
UK and
and 350 Main
Main Street,
Street, Malden,
Malden,MA
MA02148,
02148,USA.
USA.
2 KATHERINE CHAMBERS
SLAVERY AND DOMINATION AS POLITICAL IDEAS IN AUGUSTINE’S CITY OF GOD 14
terminated by the Kings will, then is the will of one man our Law, and no subtletie of
dispute can redeem the Parliament and Nation from being Slaves . . .’4 The free were, of
course, subject to the law and to the powers of government; but when the king’s will was
effectively the law, or when the powers of those who governed were in fact discretionary
powers, then the free were not free at all, but enslaved.5
Pettit makes this ‘neo-Roman’ definition of servitude central to his own political
philosophy of ‘Republicanism,’ although he uses the word ‘domination,’ rather than
servitude, understanding these words to be synonyms: the definition of an unjust political
regime is one in which its people are ‘dominated’. In contrast, a just political dispensation
is one of ‘non-domination,’ which he understands to mean one in which people are
immune from others’ arbitrary or discretionary power.6
Skinner and Pettit’s definition of domination and servitude has been widely influential:
it has been noted that ‘in the last fifteen years in the literature of political theory,
domination has become a near synonym for injustice.’7 A study of Augustine’s use of
domination and servitude is especially called for given the new importance, and the
particular meaning, which these terms have recently acquired in contemporary political
discourse.8
In fact, the above definitions of domination and slavery carry significant implications
for our understanding of Augustine’s political thought, since Augustine used ‘domina-
tion’, and sometimes ‘servitude’, to describe what he defined as the legitimate nature of the
relationship between those who govern and those who are governed. Hence, according to
the definition of Skinner and Pettit, Augustine defended an injustice in the political sphere:
he held that a people was legitimately made dependent on the will of its ruler, in other
words, vulnerable to that ruler’s arbitrary power.
This conclusion invites the question of whether Augustine did in fact define domination
and slavery, when used of political relations, in the way suggested by Skinner and Pettit,
i.e. as dependence on another’s arbitrary power. The following finds that there are good
grounds for doubting that this was the meaning which Augustine always gave these terms
in the political sphere. It proposes that these terms in fact carried more than one meaning
in his lexicon: in particular, he distinguished two meanings of these terms, and on this basis
distinguished between the nature of slavery and domination in the domestic and political
spheres. To be dominated or enslaved, according to the first meaning, meant to exist in a
state of dependence on another’s will. Women, in particular, were reduced to this kind of
servitude to their menfolk. This was identical to the neo-Roman definition of slavery: a
master’s will was in effect his slave’s law.
In Augustine’s usage, however, to be dominated or enslaved did not necessarily refer to
a condition of vulnerability to another’s arbitrary power. There was nothing necessarily
arbitrary about the power involved in domination, since a law outside a master’s unique
power of determining could control when and in what way he was permitted to exercise his
powers. If every individual somehow had a role in determining the law according to which
a master exercised his powers, then no-one would be dependent upon another person’s or
group’s will. People might be subject to others’ powers, but these would be limited, non-
discretionary powers, which they themselves had a role in defining and bestowing.
Thus, according to the first (‘neo-Roman’) definition of slavery, a man was free while he
participated in determining the laws under which he lived, while a man was enslaved who
had no role in determining these laws. Yet Augustine also used ‘slavery’ and ‘domination’
of actions taken under laws which both parties, at least in theory, had a role in establishing.
Hence, his use of these terms was not as circumscribed as the neo-Roman usage: depending
15 SLAVERY AND
KATHERINE DOMINATION AS POLITICAL IDEAS IN AUGUSTINE’S CITY OF GOD
CHAMBERS 3
on the context, domination and servitude could refer to the possession and exercise of
either arbitrary or non-arbitrary powers.
Hence, slavery and domination had a two-fold meaning in Augustine’s vocabulary; the
correct interpretation of these terms depended on the context in which they were used. At
the same time, although Augustine’s political philosophy did not put the concepts of
domination and slavery to exactly the same use as the later neo-Roman political theorists,
he certainly shared their view that one of the meanings of domination and servitude was to
exist in a state of dependence on the will of another. Moreover, he also shared their view
that (at least among men) such a state of dependence was an injustice.9
This article begins with a discussion of Augustine’s arguments with respect to the
injustice of domination and slavery, when defined as a state of dependence on another’s
arbitrary power. It then turns to the issue of how – given his defence of the legitimacy of
domination and slavery in the political realm – he managed to avoid the dilemma of
defending an injustice in political relations by offering an alternative definition of what it
meant to be ‘enslaved’ or ‘dominated’ in the political sphere.
Like the seventeenth-century English theorists, Augustine recognised that to make one
man dependent upon the will of another was unjust: this led him to regard the ancient
institution of slavery as an injustice. It was unjust because it violated the natural order,
established by God: God created all men as rational beings, which meant that each one
was capable of being his own master; to place one rational being under the mastery of
another was thus a violation of the created order.10 In contrast, such a relationship
naturally and hence justly existed between men and women, and adults and children, since
in each case there was an inequality in reason (where the weaker in reason was justly made
dependent on the will of the stronger).
Commenting on Genesis 46:32, he observed:
For the natural order among humans is that women serve men, and children (filii) their parents,
since this is justice, that the weaker in reason serve the stronger. Therefore, this is clearly justice in
domination and servitude that those who excel in reason, should excel in domination.11
This passage implied that the domination of men over men must always be unjust: men
‘excelled in reason’, in contrast to women and children, and therefore an inequality in
power could never justly exist among men.
Similarly, in Book 19, Chapter 15 of the City of God, he observed that servitude did not
exist ‘by nature’ among men: ‘by nature, in the condition in which God created man, no
man is the slave either of man or of sin’.12 God’s plan in creating men was that servitude or
domination should not exist among them: for this reason, he created them as rational
beings. As rational beings, men were made to dominate the irrational animals.
[God] did not wish the rational being, made in his own image, to dominate over any but irrational
creatures; not man over man, but man over cattle.13
In this passage, he alluded to the order which would have existed on earth, if not for the
Fall: this was an order in which there was no domination at all among men. Here he
implied that, on account of the Fall, domination now existed among men. The rest of
Chapter 15 attempted to explain why the Fall had caused domination to exist on earth,
both insofar as this involved a divinely-ordained ‘injustice’ and insofar as it involved
justice. Crucially, in this chapter, he did not clearly distinguish between domination in the
domestic and political spheres, since domination in each sphere was a consequence of the
Fall (although arguably in different ways). His comments elsewhere in the City of God,
however, reveal that he did in fact distinguish two kinds of domination corresponding to
these two different spheres.
When Augustine used domination and slavery of the domestic sphere, he understood
these terms to refer to a state of dependence on another’s will, and held that this involved
an injustice. Before turning to Augustine’s explanation of why God permitted this injustice
after the Fall, the following looks briefly at his discussion of one of the principal kinds of
‘just domination’ among human beings, a power-relationship which had existed on earth
both before and after the Fall. This was a wife’s servitude to her husband. His discussion of
the power of men over women both reveals that one of the meanings which he gave
‘domination’ was a state of dependence on another’s will, and reveals his firm conviction
that one person could only justly be made dependent on the will of another where an
inequality in nature, leading to an inequality in reason, existed.
As discussed above, Augustine declared men’s domination over women as just because
it corresponded to a natural inequality between the sexes (an inequality in reason). By
attributing the ‘justice’ of a woman’s slavery to her weaker reason, Augustine revealed his
understanding of the meaning of ‘slavery’ in this context. Women were the weaker in
reason, which meant, in effect, that their wills were weaker than men’s wills: they were less
able than men to resist the urgings of sin.14 Hence they needed, for their own good, to be
made dependent on men’s will: they benefited from this dependence and so it was just that
this inequality existed. In fact, the ‘naturalness’ and justice of the inequality between the
sexes was evident from the fact that it existed not only in the present, but had also existed
in the Garden of Eden: in the Garden of Eden, God had ‘created’ the woman Eve to be the
man Adam’s servant.
The problem which Augustine faced, however, with claiming that men were given an
arbitrary power over women because of a natural inequality between the two sexes was
that Genesis 3:16 appeared to attribute Adam’s ‘dominion’ over Eve to the Fall, and not to
any natural differences between them: it implied that Eve’s subjugation was simply her
punishment for her transgression in eating the forbidden fruit, rather than being
established by God for her good from the very beginning. Augustine, however, argued that
Genesis 3:16 should not be interpreted to mean that before she sinned, Eve was not
dominated by Adam:
For it is not proper to believe that before [Eve’s] sin woman was made in another way than (aliter
nisi) that man would dominate over her, and she would be to him as a servant. But it can be rightly
taken that this servitude [is] meant [by Genesis 3:16], which is of a certain condition rather than of
love, so that this kind of servitude may also be found [to] have arisen as a punishment for sin, [just
as] afterwards men began to be the servants of men.15
He distinguished between the ‘servitude’ of love (dilectio), which was found in the State of
Innocence, and the servitude ‘of a certain condition’ (cuiusdam conditionis) which came
about only with the Fall. Before the Fall, the woman’s experience of her slavery had been
different: the man and woman shared a perfect love for each other, and so, although the
woman was placed in a state of dependence on the man’s will, their love for each other
made their relationship one of mutual service, as implied by the commandment in
Galatians 5:13, ‘Serve one another (invicem) through love (charitatem)’ (which Augustine
quoted in the City of God, Book 19, Chapter 15). The man cherished the woman, and the
woman willingly submitted to the man. As a consequence of the Fall, however, their
relationship came to resemble the relationship between any other master and slave: the
17 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 5
woman no longer naturally desired above all things to obey the man, the man became
capable of mistreating the woman, and hence, her slavery became a hardship, the
punishment for her sin. Augustine’s point was that the Fall did not change the relationship
between men and women – since both before and after the Fall, the woman was rightly
made dependent on the man’s will on account of her greater irrationality – nor did it
change the purpose of this relationship – since even after the Fall, women were still
enslaved in this way for their own good – but it changed her experience of that
relationship: as a punishment for eating the forbidden fruit, God had decided that she
should now no longer willingly submit to the man’s power, and hence she should find her
servitude a hardship.16
He stated firmly that nature did not permit women to have dominion over men: if a
woman were ever to preside over her husband, this would amount to another violation of
the natural order, and the woman’s guilt would ‘grow’: ‘because unless indeed she serves
him, nature will be more corrupted and her guilt will grow.’17
These passages contained no direct references to inequalities in reason as the
explanation of Eve’s subordination to Adam before the Fall. Augustine merely insisted
that ‘nature’ formed the basis for a just division in power between men and women. It was
left to the reader to infer that by nature he meant specifically women’s naturally weaker
reason, recalling his claim with respect to Genesis 46:32 that the natural order demanded
that the weaker in reason served the stronger.
In describing men’s dominion over women, Augustine used domination and servitude
to refer to a context in which the woman was completely dependent on the man’s will: there
was a sense in which men possessed an arbitrary power over women; and hence, a sense in
which women were dependent on their benevolence. He revealed his understanding of the
nature of men’s domination over women by attributing this power to an inequality in
reason between the sexes, and by describing women’s servitude in the post-lapsarian order
as a punishment. Women’s reason was weaker than men’s, and hence women needed, in
certain respects, to be completely dependent on their men folk; yet in the post-lapsarian
order, loving service no longer necessarily characterised the relations between men and
women, and hence women experienced their dependence on their men’s will as a
punishment.
Turning to slavery or domination as it existed among men, Augustine recognised that
this was and always would be a feature of fallen human society: there were masters and
slaves, and kings and subjects, and the latter was as much a kind of ‘domination’ and
‘slavery’ as the former. Nevertheless, whenever he discussed inequalities in power among
men, he did not imply that these were based on a ‘just’ or ‘natural’ division among them:
no difference in men’s natures provided just grounds for the domination of one man over
another.18
At the same time, he accepted the existence of domination among men, both in the
domestic and in the political spheres. This acceptance demands an explanation. The
following looks first at his explanation of the ‘justice’ of this injustice in the domestic
sphere, and then turns to his comments concerning servitude and domination in the
political sphere. In a similar vein to his explanation of men’s dominion over women,
Augustine’s explanation of the ‘justice’ of domestic slavery reveals that he understood
slavery in this context to mean a state of dependence on another’s will.
Although he was sympathetic to the plight of slaves, he did not condemn the possession
of them as sinful, and he counselled slaves simply to endure this hardship.19 At the same
time, while he offered an ‘apology’ for the existence of slavery among men, he did not
claim that domestic servitude was just in the sense of being a true reflection of the natural
order. Rather, it was allowed by God as a punishment for sin: his explanation was that it
was a just punishment, but it was not just in any other sense.
It remains true that slavery as a punishment is also ordained by that law which enjoins the
preservation of the order of nature, and forbids its disturbance; in fact, if nothing had been done to
contravene that law, there would have been nothing to require the discipline of slavery as a
punishment.20
The justice of slavery as a punishment for sin lay in the very fact of its injustice, i.e. its
violation of the natural order. All sin was against the order of nature, and so the just
punishment for sin, slavery, was also against this order: it was a just punishment precisely
because it inflicted an injustice. This injustice lay in the fact that, according to the natural
order, there were no inequalities among men upon which to base slavery and domination.
Augustine’s explanation of slavery as a just punishment for sin meant that he was able
to dismiss the idea that there were natural inequalities among men which gave rise to a
‘just’ servitude, while at the same time, ‘justifying’ the institution of slavery found in his
own society.
Thus, he insisted that men were justly enslaved as a punishment for sin: i.e. they were
enslaved because of their ‘deserts’ (merita), ‘for it is understood, of course, that the
condition of slavery is justly imposed on the sinner.’
That is why we do not hear of a slave anywhere in the Scriptures until Noah, the just man, punished
his son’s sins with this word (Genesis 9:25); and so that son deserved (meruit) this name because of
his guilt (culpa), not because of his nature.21
He maintained that no enslavement could occur ‘if not for the deserts of sin’ (meritum
peccati), meaning if not for the actual sins of individuals. Noah, although tainted by
original sin like all Adam’s descendants, had committed no actual sin deserving of this
punishment and so the term ‘slave’ was rightly reserved for his son Ham and his
descendants, Canaan.
We have a witness to this in Daniel, a man of God, who in captivity confesses to God his own sins
and the sins of his people, and in devout grief testifies that they are the cause of that captivity
(Daniel 9:3–15). The first cause of slavery, then, is sin, whereby man was subjected to man in the
condition of bondage; and this can only happen by the judgement of God, with whom there is no
injustice, and who knows how to allot different punishments according to the deserts of the
offenders.22
Daniel experienced captivity as a punishment for his offences; the just God knew how best
to dispense just punishments for individuals’ wrong-doings.
Yet, clearly not every sin resulted in servitude and in fact some sins actually resulted in
the sinner becoming a master, since Augustine was clear that the ‘lust’ for power or
domination itself was a sin: those who sought to dominate because of their own libido
dominandi must themselves be sinners, and yet many of them succeeded in their bids for
domination. Thus, he asserted that men who desired to dominate others found themselves
in turn pitilessly ‘enslaved’ to this desire: ‘the most pitiless domination that devastates the
hearts of men, is exercised by the very lust for domination.’23
Moreover, he did not claim that slaves were invariably greater sinners than their masters
or lords. He understood that many devout men were made slaves,24 such as the prophet
Daniel, who was a ‘man of God.’ A person might deserve slavery, not on account of a life
19 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 7
of sin, but on account of one particular sin: God alone knew what sins justly deserved the
punishment of slavery and so his strategy in allotting slavery in response to sin was not
transparent to human beings.
Although in Book 19, Chapter 15, Augustine did not clearly distinguish between the
‘domination’ involved in domestic slavery and the ‘domination’ of a political lord, the
above examples were all examples of domestic slavery. Indeed, one of the over-all purposes
of the City of God was to explain to his fellow Christians why it was that God was allowing
them to be conquered and enslaved by a heathen enemy.25 He argued that the evident
‘injustice’ of domestic slavery in fact revealed God’s justice by finding that enslavement
could be construed as a just punishment for the actual sins of the enslaved. The punitive
element in slavery was not eliminated by a master’s benevolence, nor by the relative dignity
and comfort of a slave’s life, since Augustine, of course, believed that masters should treat
their slaves well and encouraged slaves to accept their lot. Rather, even if a slave was well-
treated and content with his lot, his servitude remained an injustice and a hardship. As
with women’s experience of their servitude to men, loving service did not necessarily
characterise relations between masters and slaves, given the realities of fallen human
nature: slaves were at their masters’ mercy and they had to suffer the uncertainty that this
involved. The injustice of men’s slavery lay in the fact that it was a violation of the natural
order: all men were capable of self-government by virtue of their rationality, yet as slaves,
they were made dependent on another’s will.
Hence, with respect both to women’s servitude to men, and men’s domestic slavery,
Augustine understood ‘slavery’ and ‘domination’ to mean a condition of dependence on
another’s will: slavery, in this context, arose where one person possessed an unlimited or
arbitrary power over another. His understanding of these terms when used of the domestic
sphere is revealed by his explanation of slavery, in the case of women, as natural and just,
and, in the case of men, as an unnatural punishment for sin. A person’s level of reason
indicated that person’s capacity to govern him or herself, and hence the extent to which
that person ought (according to the dictates of nature and justice) to be free from the
arbitrary power of another.
Turning to Augustine’s discussion of inequalities in power in the political sphere, he also
used the vocabulary of domination, and less frequently slavery, when he discussed the
relationship between political rulers and their subjects. It was not only ‘bad’ or tyrannical
rulers who ‘dominated’ or enslaved their subjects, but ‘good’ kings dominated too:
domination was the very nature of political rulership.
Thus, in Book 5, Chapter 19, discussing the difference between a king and a tyrant, he
was clear that both ‘dominated,’ but the tyrant ‘lusted’ after domination, which led him to
cruelty and self-indulgence, while a king, at worst, only longed for glory and ‘the good
opinion of enlightened judges’; so long as a king did not long for praise and glory
excessively, he would strive for domination ‘in the right way.’26 He also held that the power
of domination was only given to someone by God’s providence, quoting Proverbs 8:15, ‘it
is through me that kings rule and through me that tyrants possess the land’. Again, this
statement implied that both kings and tyrants ‘dominated’ their subjects. In Book 19,
Chapter 15, he referred to God’s instruction to Adam in Genesis 1:26, ‘dominate over the
fish of the sea, the birds of the sky . . . and all the reptiles that crawl on the earth.’ In
discussing this passage, he attempted to explain how it was that men now dominated – not
only over the animals – but also over other men, ‘as kings.’27
Augustine’s use of domination to refer to kingly power and his view of kingly
domination as ordained by God had a firm biblical foundation. His use of domination to
refer to kingly power largely corresponded to the biblical usage. For example, Genesis
45:26 described Jacob, who had been made the second most powerful man in Egypt after
the Pharaoh, as ‘dominating’ over the whole land of Egypt.28 Similarly, Joshua 12:2–4
used domination to describe the rulership of kings.29 Again, in 1 Samuel 9:17, when God
established Saul as the king of Israel, kingship was described as domination.30
However, other biblical passages implied that human beings could not legitimately
dominate each other: God alone was the legitimate lord or dominus, and so God alone
should dominate. This was the message of Judges 8:22 where Gideon rejected Israel’s offer
to make him a king by declaring that not he, but God, would dominate over them.31
Jesus also warned in Matthew 20:25–26 against the existence of domination among the
faithful:
You know that the princes of the Gentiles dominate [dominantur] over them, and those who are
great [maiores] exercise power [potestatem exercent] over them. Yet it shall not be so among you:
but whosoever will be the greater [maior] among you, let him be your minister [uester minister] . . .
Similarly, Luke 22:25–26 read: ‘The kings of the Gentiles dominate [dominantur] over
them, and those who have power [potestatem habent] over them are called benefactors.
But not so among you; on the contrary, he who is greatest among you, let him be
as the younger, and he who governs [qui praecessor est] as he who serves.’ 1 Peter 5:3 also
warned the leaders of the faithful against ‘dominating [dominantes] over those entrusted
to you.’
These passages left a degree of uncertainty surrounding the question of whether
legitimate government should take the form of domination: did they mean that, while there
were kings among the Gentiles (who ‘dominated’), the leaders of the faithful should not
aspire to kingly power (thus, affirming the link between kingship and domination)? Or did
they mean that kingship among the faithful should not take the form of domination? This
latter possibility would imply that domination was a synonym, not for kingship, but for
tyranny and oppression: i.e. that it was possible to be a king without dominating.
The latter interpretation of these passages, however, in fact would strengthen the view
that for a writer in the Christian tradition, political rulers could not legitimately claim
for themselves the same extensive, arbitrary powers which were possessed by masters of
slaves, provided that it is accepted that here the choice of the term of ‘domination’ was
intended as an allusion to the powers involved in domestic servitude. Here, it is possible
that Jesus was criticising Gentile kings precisely for their resemblance to masters of slaves,
i.e. that in these instances ‘to dominate’ was used in order to evoke an abuse of political
power: the implication was that the government of truly Christian kings should take
another form.
Nevertheless, this interpretation of both these passages and the meaning of
‘domination’ in the Bible is made problematic by the persistent use of this term elsewhere
in Scripture to describe the rule of good and bad kings alike. Thus, in the other passages
discussed above, domination was used without any qualification to mean legitimate, i.e.
divinely-ordained, kingship. For example, Gideon’s refusal to ‘dominate’ the Israelites was
interpreted as a refusal to become their king, so that this passage used domination simply
to mean kingly power; initially, God did not want kings to exist among the Israelites, but
later permitted Saul to rule as a king (1 Samuel 8–9), thereby establishing and legitimising
the rule of kings, and hence kingly domination, among his people.
Some of the ambiguity found in the biblical use of domination survived in Augustine’s
account. He always strongly condemned the desire or ambition for domination:
21 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 9
[the soul] thinks it has attained something great if it is able to dominate even its companions (sociis),
that is other men. For it is inherent in the sinful soul to desire above all things, and to claim as its
due, that which is properly due to God only . . . indeed, when it seeks to dominate those who are
naturally its peers (naturaliter pares), that is, its fellow men, it is an intolerable arrogance.32
The ‘lust for domination’ (libido dominandi) was the desire to appropriate for oneself a
power which was properly bestowed only by God. Yet this did not preclude him from
maintaining that God had now bestowed this power on certain human beings, so that now
human kingship rightly existed on earth. He condemned those men who sought to elevate
themselves to a position of domination, but he did not condemn the possession of this
power in itself, where a man could be taken to have humbly accepted this power from God.
Thus, Augustine – consistent with many examples of biblical usage – regarded kingship
as rightly a kind of domination, rather than looking on domination as just one kind of
kingship (an undesirable one).
Moreover, Augustine also regarded the condition of subjects as a kind of slavery:
The first just men were set up as shepherds of flocks, rather than as kings of men, so that in this way
also God might convey the message of what was required by the order of creatures and what was
demanded by the deserts of sinners. For it is understood that the condition of slavery is justly
imposed on the sinner.33
The patriarchs were not rulers of men, but of their flocks, since the order of creatures
established this inequality in power between men and animals, but not between men and
men. It was the ‘deserts of sin’ which created a need for the political hierarchy and which
led to the ‘condition of slavery.’ This passage, more than any other, is the basis for the view
that Augustine saw a complete equation between the power of kings over their subjects and
the power of masters over their slaves. This conclusion can be reached, not simply on the
basis of the use of ‘slavery’ here, but also on the basis of the justification which Augustine
offered for the existence of this slavery among men: slavery, meaning in this case
subjection to a king, corresponded to the deserts of sin. Hence, it could be argued that
subjection to a king, like enslavement to a master, was established for no other purpose
than as a just punishment for sin.
In Book 19, Chapter 12, he also explicitly referred to the subjects of kings as
experiencing servitude. A king was simply the man who had enslaved his own people, since
‘if [a man] were offered the servitude of a larger number, of a city, maybe, or a whole
nation . . . he would raise himself on high as a king . . .’.34
The question which these passages raise is whether Augustine perceived any difference
between the power of masters over their slaves, and that of kings over their subjects. The
current interpretation considers that he did in fact equate kingly power and the power of
masters: in the words of Weithman, ‘Augustine does not distinguish clearly between a
relationship which is specifically political and other relationships of authority and subjection,
especially the relationship between a master and a slave.’35 Yet Weithman’s case rests mainly
on the similarity of the vocabulary which Augustine used to describe both relationships (and
the fact that he mentioned the deserts of sin in each case): arguably, this alone is not sufficient
grounds for concluding that he saw the two states as identical. Rather, it is necessary to go
beyond the vocabulary used, and investigate in more detail what he understood the nature of
kingly power to be. This is what the final section of this article attempts to do.
In describing kingly power as domination Augustine assumed that domination ought to
exist on earth in the political sphere: political domination was divinely ordained; although
God was the only true dominus, for the present time, God permitted this power to be
10 KATHERINE
SLAVERY CHAMBERS
AND DOMINATION AS POLITICAL IDEAS IN AUGUSTINE’S CITY OF GOD 22
exercised on earth by men. Hence, there was a divine purpose behind domination in the
political sphere, just as there was a divine purpose behind it in the domestic sphere.
Thus, unlike the republican theorists many centuries later, he did not argue that kingly
domination must be brought to an end and republican government established in its place.
Yet he also did not argue that domination among men could correspond to natural
differences among them, so that it was both just and in the interests of the dominated, as
well as the paradoxical means by which a man could experience freedom. This poses the
question of what he understood as the purpose of kingship: given that he used domination
to describe what kings legitimately did and slavery to describe subjects’ proper experience
of kingly power, the key to understanding what he meant by these terms when used of the
political sphere is to discover what he actually thought the rightful function of kingship to
be and why he thought a people ought to have a king.
As mentioned above, one possible explanation of Augustine’s acceptance of domination
and servitude in the political sphere is that he both equated kingly power to the power of a
master over his slaves, and offered the same ‘justification’ of this injustice: i.e. men were
unjustly made dependent on the will of a king as a just punishment for sin. In other words,
contrary to the natural order, they were placed under the arbitrary power of other men in
the political as well as in the domestic sphere, and the reason for this was that such
domination or slavery was a just penalty for their sinfulness. This is one interpretation of
the passage in Book 19, Chapter 15 of the City of God, where Augustine wrote of political
and domestic domination without distinguishing between them, and wrote of the ‘deserts
of sins’ as the reason for subjects’ ‘slavery’ to their ruler.
This explanation, however, would imply that, in Augustine’s eyes, political rulership was
not established with the specific goal of achieving a better life on earth for subjects, but was
instead established for the sake of their welfare after death. Domination was the essence of
kingship, yet if by domination he simply meant subjects’ dependence on their ruler’s will
then, in essence, kingship was nothing more than a king’s exercise of his arbitrary will over
his people. Yet it was God’s purpose that kings should dominate their subjects, and so this
would mean that, in establishing kingly domination on earth, God’s goal was simply to allow
men to suffer this injustice in order to atone for their sins. This would imply that God had
not instituted kingly domination for subjects’ earthly good, e.g. as a means of defending the
peace, punishing criminals, protecting the community from wrong-doing, and promoting the
common good in other ways, since these are all earthly goals, directed at a better life on
earth. If a king’s role was meant to be indistinguishable from that of a master of slaves then it
followed that, like the institution of slavery, kingship was not established for the earthly
good of subjects, but for their eternal welfare. Any earthly services which kings might
perform for their subjects were incidental; they did not correspond to the divine intention in
creating kings and they could not be defined as the purpose or rationale of kingship. Of
course, there was an expectation that both kings and masters should look after their subjects
or slaves, but this was not the purpose or end of either kingship or the institution of slavery.
In other words, this explanation would mean that, in Augustine’s opinion, God had not
instituted political rule with any mundane goal in view at all, but merely as a means for
individuals to suffer as an atonement for their sins: God’s intention was that government,
like domestic slavery, would be something which men endured for the good of their souls; it
was not established with a view to promoting the earthly good of the governed.
Most interpreters of Augustine on the purpose of kingship, however, do not see him as
denying so completely any mundane purpose to government. In fact, Augustine is seen as
strongly affirming the necessity of government on earth. According to this view, he
23 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 11
attributed to government the essential purpose of imposing peace upon human society: in
his eyes, it was necessary as the means to achieve a peaceful earthly existence. This ‘earthly’
peace gave people the space to concern themselves with their spiritual welfare and ultimate
salvation; hence, after the Fall, God had established kings as a means of bringing peace
and order to fallen humanity. Otherwise, when humans sought to do wrong to each other,
they would go unchecked and unpunished.
Thus, according to Coleman, in Augustine’s eyes, ‘the political sphere undoubtedly and
necessarily exists . . . It is a means of order, preventing men from sinning further according
to their fallen nature, and it does this by punishing, correcting and holding men at bay.’
Thus, Augustine looked on ‘politics’ as ‘the means to achieve minimum disorder. And it
does this through political authority as imposition . . .’36 This political imposition was
necessary as the means of bringing peace and order to the earthly city (the city in which
those destined for salvation and those destined for condemnation were mixed together
during their earthly life). Likewise, Bonnor holds that, for Augustine, the state was needed
in order to achieve a limited degree of cohesion through coercion: ‘. . . because of man’s
fallen nature, society is always tending to revert to chaos and requires the coercive power
of civil authority to secure a minimal cohesion for the sake of the common good.’37
Similarly, in Markus’s words, for Augustine, the state was the ‘bulwark’ ‘needed to secure
society against disintegration,’ and thereby the means of achieving ‘some precarious order,
some minimal cohesion, in a situation inherently tending to chaos.’38 Finally, Weithman
describes Augustine’s view that ‘the most salient feature of political authority is just that
feature an authority would have to have in order to govern a society of people all of whom
are constitutionally prone to conflict: the authority to coerce them’.39
Setting to one side the assumption in the above comments – namely, that, in Augustine’s
eyes, fallen humans were incapable of acting otherwise than in a socially destructive way
unless restrained by the state’s coercive powers – this interpretation, by accepting that
Augustine attributed to kingship a specific mundane object originating in the divine will,
implies a very different understanding of the meaning of ‘domination’ and ‘slavery’ when
used of kingly power. The purpose of government was to ‘dominate’, but by domination
Augustine meant the coercion of subjects into conduct compatible with peace; and by
subjects’ ‘enslavement’ he meant their experience of being forced to comply with the
demands of peace whenever they were unwilling to do so. Hence, in claiming that there
ought to be domination in the political sphere, Augustine was not stating that kingship
ought to involve an arbitrary or discretionary power, or that subjects should be dependent
on their ruler’s goodwill; rather, he used domination in this context to describe a precise
power designated by God: it was the divine will that kings ‘dominated’, meaning that they
coerced their subjects into conduct compatible with peace.
Nevertheless, the above discussion is concerned with what Augustine thought kings
ought to do, i.e. with what he saw as the function of good government. Yet he also
described tyrannical rulers as ‘dominating’ their subjects: there seems to be little doubt that
what he meant by the domination of bad kings was coercion which did not serve the ends
of justice and peace, i.e. coercion which was in effect arbitrary in that it was not limited by
considerations of subjects’ good, but corresponded solely to the will of the ruler. The
question remains of whether he saw a divinely-ordained purpose in ‘bad’ or tyrannical
kingship, with the consequence that he defended kings’ possession of an arbitrary power:
they possessed discretionary or arbitrary powers, since there was nothing to prevent good
government from descending into tyrannical government, and tyrants, in turn, could not
be prevented from doing as they pleased.
12 KATHERINE
SLAVERY CHAMBERS
This view has often been attributed to Augustine, namely, that he failed to offer any
legitimate grounds for resistance to tyranny and hence understood kingly domination as,
in practice, an unlimited power, and subjects’ servitude as identical to domestic slavery. In
Deane’s words, Augustine thought that ‘all men must give absolute obedience to God’s
ministers, the kings and rulers of this earth, no matter how impious or wicked they may
be’.40 Similarly, Chadwick attributes to Augustine the view that ‘the follower of Christ
would render to Caesar the obedience of his body, and to God that of his mind and soul’.41
More recently, however, Burnell has identified passages in the City of God where
Augustine condoned resistance to tyrannical regimes. He argues that Augustine did not
insist that subjects’ civic duties necessarily included the tolerance of injustice at the hands
of their rulers. Rather, subjects had ‘a duty of trying to ensure that civil power is in the
hands of the least unjust persons or groups possible’.42
In particular, in Book 3, Chapters 15–16, Augustine implicitly accepted that political
opposition in the face of tyrannical rule was justified. Here, he criticised the Romans for
their imprudent haste in deposing and expelling their king Tarquin (whom they wrongly
believed to be guilty of the rape of Lucretia), but did not condemn the act of expulsion
per se.43 This passage implies that had the king actually been guilty of this crime, then the
Roman people would have been entirely blameless in deposing him.
Another passage occurred in Book 4, Chapter 5, and concerned Spartacus and the
gladiators’ revolt and rule. Here, Augustine had no hesitation in affirming the rightness of
overthrowing the barbaric government of the gladiators. He did not, however, propose as
the ‘just’ grounds for their overthrow the fact that they themselves were usurpers and
hence not the divinely-sanctioned rulers: in fact, he argued that despite their lowly origins
and short-lived rule, they should be regarded as kings.44 Yet he left no doubt that he
considered their eventual defeat and overthrow as a good thing, on the grounds of the
extreme cruelty and immorality of their conduct as rulers.
In another place, Augustine drew an analogy between civil revolt against a king and the
monster Cacus’s experience of the revolt of his body in response to its desires, such as
hunger. He noted that Cacus (who, according to this metaphor, was the equivalent of the
king) was driven to respond in order to appease his bodily needs and hence preserve his
life. By this analogy, the implication was that there were certain circumstances in which
civil rebellion was justified, i.e. there were circumstances in which citizens were justified,
for everybody’s sake, in forcing their rulers to respond to their will.45
These views are supported by Augustine’s conviction – expressed, for example, in Book
4, Chapter 15 – that one nation could legitimately invade and overthrow the government
of another as a moral necessity (‘the empire would have been small indeed, if neighbouring
peoples had been peaceable, had always acted with justice, and had never provoked attack
by any wrong-doing’).46 Here, he justified the ‘stern necessity’ of invasion on the grounds
that ‘it would be worse that the unjust should lord it over the just’. Similarly, in Book 19,
Chapter 7, he defined the just war as one which changed a society in the direction of justice
(‘for it is the injustice of the opposing side that lays on the wise man the duty of waging
wars; and this injustice is assuredly to be deplored by a human being . . .’).47
These passages indicate that Augustine did not expect subjects’ to offer unconditional
obedience to their rulers: in the face of injustice, resistance was permissible and rulers
could be forced instead to obey the will of their people. Thus, the ‘domination’ which
Augustine regarded as a king’s rightful function referred to a power which did not
correspond to the king’s will alone: kingly power was seen as instituted by God with a
specific mundane goal in view, namely, the maintenance of peace and subjects’ welfare,
25 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 13
with the consequence that good government meant rule directed towards these ends, and
no others. There was another sense in which a king’s will was not law: his subjects were
entitled to resist any injustices which he perpetrated. God did not expect subjects to have
no recourse when faced with tyrannical leaders; submission to bad government did not
necessarily advance any part of God’s purpose for the faithful.
Thus, although Augustine used servitude and domination to refer to kingly power, he
did not thereby equate the power of kings to the power of masters over their slaves.
Augustine understood that domestic slaves and women were dependent on the will of their
masters or menfolk: this was the meaning of their slavery and domination. It involved an
arbitrary power in the sense that masters were permitted the unrestricted exercise of their
wills. Kingly domination, however, referred to a non-arbitrary power since there were
restrictions on kings’ exercise of their wills, restrictions which subjects themselves had a
role in determining: kings were permitted to coerce their subjects into conduct compatible
with peace and the common good, and nothing more; this is what it meant to be
‘dominated’ by a king. To exist in a state of political domination or political servitude
meant to be vulnerable to the exercise of this power by a king, not to the arbitrary exercise
of a king’s will. God permitted this kind of domination in the political sphere; the kind of
domination which was not permissible in this sphere was that possessed by masters over
their slaves, i.e. the kind of power which a tyrant sought to wield over his people when he
attempted to rule without reference to peace and justice. Here, this article has made use of
the work of Burnell, who has pointed to passages in the City of God where Augustine was
not critical of civil rebellion and the overthrow of tyrants. At the same time, Augustine
offered a consolation to those who found themselves in the clutches of a tyrannical ruler
too powerful to be overthrown or effectively resisted: such people, who were genuinely
reduced to a servitude identical to domestic slavery, should recognise and take comfort in
the knowledge that this misfortune was God’s just punishment for their sins.
Thus, although Augustine described kingship as a kind of domination, for him,
domination in the political sphere did not refer to a discretionary power. In other words,
although he used ‘domination’ and ‘slavery’ to describe the power of both good and bad
kings, Augustine did not thereby consider that subjects rightly existed in a state of
dependence on their king’s will. In fact, he understood as well as the seventeenth-century
‘neo-Roman’ political theorists the injustice of placing one man in a state of dependence on
the arbitrary power of another. This state of dependence could only justly exist where an
inequality in reason naturally existed: hence, it justly existed between women and men, and
between children and parents. Where a man was reduced to being the domestic slave of
another man, Augustine held that this injustice was permitted by God as a punishment for
sin. In this way, he gave domestic slavery an other-worldly purpose; in contrast, the primary
purpose of kingship was a mundane one: kings also existed in response to sin, but their role
was to respond to a limited range of wrongful actions, namely ones which violated laws
designed to preserve peace and justice. This was what it meant for a king to ‘dominate’, and
this was the limit of subjects’ experience of servitudo at the hands of their political rulers.
Notes
1 Q. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and P. Pettit,
Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
2 Skinner insists that coercion is not a necessary component of the neo-Roman definition of slavery: ‘The thesis on
which the neo-roman writers chiefly insist is that it is never necessary to suffer this kind of overt coercion in order to
14 KATHERINE
SLAVERY CHAMBERS
forfeit your civil liberty. You will also be rendered unfree if you merely fall into a condition of political subjection or
dependence, thereby leaving yourself open to the danger of being forcibly or coercively deprived by your government of
your life, liberty or estates,’ Liberty before Liberalism, pp. 69–70. The neo-Roman definition of slavery simply explains
that a person is a slave if he or she is ‘within’ the arbitrary power of another person. For example, Algernon Sidney, a
proponent of the neo-Roman view, wrote in his Discourses: ‘liberty solely consists in an independency upon the will of
another, and by the name of slave we understand a man who can neither dispose of his person nor goods, but enjoys all
at the will of his master . . .’ (quoted by Skinner, pp. 71–72).
3 Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, pp. 36–41.
4 Quoted in Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, pp. 48–49. See also the quote from Livy, pp. 43–44, who defined a
free state as one in which ‘the imperium of the laws is greater than that of any men’.
5 Skinner points out that neo-Roman theorists consider that people will be free in a republic where they are
governed by the will of the body politic, meaning the sum of the wills of each individual citizen (Liberty before
Liberalism, pp. 28–29). However, he states that these theorists accepted that, in practice, this would correspond to the
will of the majority. In contrast, a modern theory of republicanism might want to use this definition of freedom and
slavery to be critical of the reality of modern democracies: it might want to insist on the much stronger conclusion that
in a true democracy, the law must be determined by the freely-given consent of every member, since to be dependent on
the will of the majority is also a kind of slavery. It is also open to modern republicanism to draw a further conclusion
about inequalities in power in general, i.e. beyond the sphere of the institutions of government: for example, if
inequalities in wealth bring dependence on another’s will, then inequalities in wealth are also a source of slavery and
injustice. Again, this was certainly not a conclusion drawn by the Roman and neo-Roman theorists, for whom the
protection of private property was a core principle (see E. Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 16–17, for the place of private property in the Roman tradition).
6 P. Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, p. 21–23, 31f.
7 D. Allen, ‘Invisible citizens: political exclusion and domination in Arendt and Ellison,’ in M. S. Willams and S.
Macedo, eds., Political Exclusion and Domination (New York and London: New York University Press, 2005), p. 29.
8 There have already been some investigations of Skinner and Pettit’s idea of ‘Republicanism’ and the view that
this was a Roman idea which was revived by the humanists of the seventeenth century. Such a view implies that
republican ideals were not present in medieval political thought and even that these ideals were incompatible with the
Christian world-view. See A. Black, ‘Christianity and Republicanism: from St. Cyprian to Rousseau’, American
Political Science Review 91 (1997), pp. 647–56. Black argues that not only was republicanism present in the Middle
Ages, but it was also considered to be compatible with both monarchy and Christianity. See also C. Nederman, ‘The
Puzzling Case of Christianity and Republicanism: A comment on Black’, American Political Science Review 92 (1998),
pp. 913–18 and A. Black, ‘Christianity and Republicanism: A Response to Nederman’, American Political Science
Review 92 (1998), pp. 919–21.
9 As a result, this aspect of Augustine’s political thought can be distinguished from another tradition in European
political philosophy, which was inspired by the Greek – as opposed to the Roman – view of domination and slavery,
and which consequently considered that it was possible for one man to be justly reduced to a state of dependence on the
will of another man. Eric Nelson has studied this Greek view of slavery in the writings of a number of sixteenth-century
English political theorists, such as Thomas More and James Harringdon. Their view was that human beings are
paradoxically ‘free’ only when they are enslaved, i.e. only when they depend upon and are guided by the wills of the
‘natural aristocracy’ of their intellectual and moral superiors, since this frees them from a deeper servitude to their
passions. E. Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought, pp. 14–15. In fact, this ‘neo-Greek’ tradition was
arguably current in European political philosophy much earlier than the sixteenth century. Thomas Aquinas, for
instance, also made use of Aristotle to defend the idea of a just enslavement and a just domination. See Summa
Theologiae, ed. E. Hill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), vol. 13, Part 1a, Distinction 96, Article 4, pp.
132–4. See also K. Archibald, ‘The Concept of Social Hierarchy in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas’, The Historian
12 (1949), pp. 48–62; and M.C. Murphy, ‘Consent, Custom and the Common Good in Aquinas’s account of Political
Authority’, The Review of Politics 59 (1997), pp. 323–50.
10 This point has already been made by R. A. Markus, who observes that in Augustine’s view, ‘political authority is
[not] based on a natural order of subjection among men.’ R.A. Markus, ‘Two Conceptions of Political Authority:
Augustine, De Ciuitate Dei, XIX. 14–15, and Some Thirteenth-Century Interpretations’, The Journal of Theological
Studies 16 (1965), pp. 68–100, p. 74. Markus, however, considers that Augustine equated the power of kings over their
subjects with that of masters over their slaves (‘the terms in which Augustine came to formulate his views on politically
organized society . . . were those which he thought appropriate to the treatment of the institution of slavery,’ p. 81).
While I accept that Augustine used the same terminology to describe both institutions, my purpose in this article is to
explore whether in fact he differentiated between the kind of power involved in each. For a view similar to Markus’s,
see also P. J. Weithman, ‘Augustine’s political philosophy’ in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. E. Stump
and N. Kretzmann, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 353–76.
11 Quaestionum in Heptateuchum, ed. J. Fraipont (Turnhout: Brepols, 1958), Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina
45, Book 1, Question 153, p. 59: ‘. . . est etiam ordo naturalis in hominibus, ut seruiant feminae uiris et filii parentibus,
quia et illic haec iustitia est, ut infirmior ratione seruiat fortiori. Haec igitur in dominationibus et seruitutibus clara
iustitia est, ut qui excellunt ratione, excellant dominatione’.
12 De Ciuitate Dei, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb (Turnhout: Brepols, 1955), Corpus Christianorum : Series Latina
48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 683: ‘nullus autem natura, in qua prius deus hominem condidit, seruus est hominis aut
27 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 15
peccati’. All English translations are taken from St. Augustine. Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, trans. H.
Bettenson (London: Penguin, 2003), quoting here from p. 872 (referred to in what follows as Eng. Trans.).
13 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 682: ‘Nam: ‘‘Dominetur,’’ inquit ‘‘piscium maris et
uolatilium caeli et omnium rependtium, quae sunt super terram.’’ Rationalem factum ad imaginem suam noluit nisi
inrationabilibus dominari; non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori’. Eng. Trans. p. 872.
14 Arguably, it was not a lack of intellectual sophistication which justly placed the woman within the man’s power:
rather, it was women’s lack of self-government – which implied an inferior moral knowledge, but not necessarily an
inferior intellect, to men’s – that made it just and beneficial for them to be placed under the control of men. Milbank,
for example, interprets Augustine’s idea of reason to mean self-government, ‘the subordination of passion and power
to reason’ where ‘passion is characteristically encoded as ‘‘female,’’ and reason as ‘‘male’’.’ J. Milbank, ‘Sacred Triads,
Augustine and the Indo-European Soul,’ in Augustine and His Critics. Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner, ed. R.
Dodaro and G. Lawless, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 85.
15 De Genesi ad Litteram, ed. J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 34, column 450: ‘Neque enim et ante peccatum, aliter
factam fuisse decet credere mulierem, nisi ut uir ei dominaretur, et ad eum ipsa seruiendo conuerteretur. Sed recte accipi
potest hanc seruitutem significatam, quae cuiusdam conditionis est potius quam dilectionis, ut etiam ipsa talis seruitus,
qua homines hominibus postea esse serui coeperunt, de poena peccati reperiatur exorta . . .’. This passage is also
discussed by Markus, ‘Two Conceptions of Political Authority’, pp. 74–75.
16 K. E. Borresen does not discuss the nature of the domination which man exercised over woman in the State of
Innocence. She holds that Augustine was ‘evasive’ on this point: ‘he avoids a clear distinction . . . between the
subordination, which is part of the order of creation, and the domination, which is regarded as a punishment of sin. He
seems to affirm that this subordination indeed belongs to the order of creation, but that it is only mentioned after the
Fall when judgement is being passed . . .’ K. E. Borresen, Subordination and Equivalence. The Nature and Role of
Woman in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas (Washington: University Press of America, 1968, English trans. 1981), pp.
62–3.
17 De Genesi ad Litteram, P.L. 34:450: ‘. . . Dicit quidem Apostolus, ‘Per charitatem seruite inuicem’ (Gal. 5.13); sed
nequaquam diceret, Inuicem dominiamini. Possunt itaque conjuges per charitatem seruire inuicem; sed mulierem non
permittit Apostolus dominari in uirum (I Tim. 2.12). Hoc enim uiro potius Dei sententia detulit, et maritum habere
dominum meruit mulieris non natura, sed culpa: quod tamen nisi seruetur, deprauabitur amplius natura, et augebitur
culpa’.
18 As mentioned above (note 12), this point has already been made by a number of commentators, including
Markus and Weithman. Rist also agrees that, according to Augustine, ‘there is no ‘natural’ reason (it is only due to the
meaningless accidents of fallen society) why a particular master should be a master rather than a slave, and vice versa.’
J. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 237, Markus, ‘Two
Conceptions of Political Authority’, p. 74, and Weithman, ‘Augustine’s political philosophy’, p. 238.
19 This view, of course, had a firm biblical foundation: the Apostle Paul advised slaves to submit to their masters
(Ephesians 6:5, Colossians 3:22, 1 Timothy 6:1, Titus 2:9).
20 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 682: ‘Verum et poenalis seruitus ea lege ordinatur, quae
naturalem ordinem conseruari iubet, perturbari uetat; quia si contra eam legem non esset factum, nihil esset poenali
seruitute cohercendum’. Eng. Trans. p. 875.
21 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 682: ‘Condicio quippe seruitutis iure intellegitur inposita
peccatori. Proinde nusquam scripturarum legimus seruum, antequam hoc uocabulo Noe iustus peccatum filii
uindicaret. Nomen itaque istud culpa meruit, non natura . . .’. Eng. Trans. p. 873.
22 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 682: ‘Testis est homo Dei Daniel, cum in capiuitate positus
peccata sua et peccata populi sui confitetur Deo et hanc esse causam illius captiuitatis pio dolore testator. Prima ergo
seruitutis causa peccatum est, ut homo homini condicionis uinculo subderetur; quod non fit nisi Deo iudicante, apud
quem non est iniquitas et nouit diuersas poenas meritis distribuere delinquentium’. Eng. Trans. pp. 872–73.
23 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 683: ‘et utique felicius seruitur homini, quam libidini, cum
saeuissimo dominatu uastet corda mortalium, ut alias omittam, libido ipsa dominandi’.
24 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 683: ‘multi quidem religiosi dominis iniquis’.
25 For a discussion of the sense in which the City of God is an apologia for Christianity written with an awareness of
the growing hostility towards Christianity among Augustine’s fellow Romans, see G. R. Evans, ‘Introduction’ in St.
Augustine. Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, trans. H. Bettenson (London: Penguin, 2003), pp. xv–xvi and
xxxiv.
26 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 5, Chapter 19, p. 155: ‘interest sane inter cupiditatem humanae gloriae et
cupiditatem dominationis. Nam licet procliue sit, ut, qui humana gloria nimium delectatur, etiam dominari ardenter
affectet, tamen qui ueram licet humanarum laudum gloriam concupiscunt, dant operam bene iudicantibus non
displicere. Sunt enim multa in moribus bona, de quibus multi bene iudicant, quamuis ea multi habeant; per ea bona
morum nituntur ad gloriam et imperium uel dominationem, de quibus ait Sallustius: ‘‘sed ille uera uia nititur’’’. Eng.
Trans. pp. 212–213.
uolatilium caeli et omnium rependtium, quae sunt super terram. Rationalem factum ad imaginem suam noluit
nisi inrationabilibus dominari; non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori. Inde primi iusti pastores pecorum
magis quam reges hominum constituti sunt, ut etiam sic insinuaret Deus, quid postulet ordo creaturarum’. Eng. Trans.
p. 872.
16 KATHERINE
SLAVERY CHAMBERS
28 ‘et ipse dominatur in omni terra Aegypti.’ Quotes are taken from the Vulgate (editio vulgata), although Augustine
used one of the Old Latin versions, rather than the Vulgate translation of Saint Jerome which was only completed
c.404.
29 ‘Sehon rex Amorrhaeorum, qui habitavit in Hesebon, dominatus est ab Aroer . . . Terminus Og regis Basan, de
reliquiis Raphaim, qui habitavit in Astaroth, et in Edrai, et dominatus est in monte Hermon . . .’
30 ‘Cumque aspexisset Samuel Saulem, Dominus dixit ei : Ecce vir quem dixeram tibi : iste dominabitur populo
meo.’
31 ‘Non dominabor vestri, nec dominabitur in vos filius meus, sed dominabitur vobis Dominus.’
32 De Doctrina Christiana, ed. J. Martin (Turnhout: Brepols, 1962), Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina 32, Book
1, Chapter 23, p. 25: ‘[animus] magnum autem aliquid adeptum se putat, si etiam sociis, id est aliis hominibus, dominari
potuerit. Inest enim uitioso animo id magis appetere et sibi tamquam debitum uindicare, quod uni proprie debeter deo
. . . cum uero etiam eis qui sibi naturaliter pares sunt, hoc est, hominibus, dominari appetat, intolerabilis animi superbia
est’.
inrationabilibus dominari; non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori. Inde primi iusti pastores pecorum magis quam
reges hominum constituti sunt, ut etiam sic insinuaret Deus, quid postulet ordo creaturarum’. Eng. Trans. p. 872.
34 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 12, p. 676: ‘ideo que si offerretur ei seruitus plurium, uel ciuitatis,
uel gentis, ita ut sic ei seruirent, . . . regem conspicuum sublimaret . . .’ Eng. Trans. p. 867.
35 Weithman, ‘Augustine’s political philosophy,’ p. 238. Weithman, however, understands a master’s power simply
as the power to coerce: ‘political authority and the mastery of slaves both rely on coercion, and both teach humility to
sinfully proud human beings’ (p. 240). He does not mention the formula of Skinner and Pettit whereby what is most
characteristic of a master’s power over his slaves is its arbitrary nature, i.e. the fact that it renders a slave dependent on
the master’s will.
36 J. Coleman, A History of Political Thought from Ancient Greece to Early Christianity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000),
pp. 332–33.
37 G. Bonner, ‘Quid imperatori cum ecclesia? St Augustine on History and Society’, Augustinian Studies 2 (1971), pp.
231–51, p. 235. Reprinted in God’s Decree and Man’s Destiny. Studies in the Thought of Augustine of Hippo (London:
Variorum Reprints, 1987).
38 R. A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), pp. 95–96.
39 Weithman, ‘Augustine’s political philosophy’, p. 240.
40 Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of Augustine, p. 145. Quoted in P. Burnell, ‘The Problem of service to unjust
regimes in Augustine’s City of God’, Journal of the History of Ideas 54 (1996), p. 181.
41 H. Chadwick, Augustine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 103. Quoted in Burnell, ‘The Problem of
service to unjust regimes’, p. 181.
42 Burnell, ‘The Problem of service to unjust regimes’, pp. 186–7.
43 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, pp. 78–81.
44 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, p. 102.
45 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 12, p. 677.
46 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, p. 111: ‘Iniquitas enim eorum, cum quibus iusta bella gesta sunt, regnum adiuuit ut
cresceret, quod utique paruum esset, si quies et iustitia finitimorum contra se bellum geri nulla prouocaret iniuria’. Eng.
Trans. p. 154.
47 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, p. 672: ‘Iniquitas enim partis aduersae iusta bella ingerit gerenda sapienti; quae
iniquitas utique homini est dolenda’. Eng. Trans. p. 862.
Copyright of Heythrop Journal is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed
to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However,
users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
The Four Kinds of Law
According to St. Thomas
By
Daniel A. Gannon
[email protected]
Copyright © Deacon Daniel Gannon

Introduction
St. Thomas Aquinas identifies four types of law in his Summa Theologica – eternal law, natural
law, human law and divine law. We will explain the meaning of these four types of law,
according to St. Thomas, and elucidate how they are related and distinguished from one another.
There are many ways we could go about this discussion, but it seems fitting to begin with the
eternal law, moving then to natural law and human law, since this order of consideration
comports with how these types of law flow from one another. Finally, we will discuss the divine
law – God’s personal revelation to man, and how the divine law illumines man’s darkened
intellect and disordered will to his dignity, eternal value and destiny. The goal of our discussion
is to more clearly understand how man participates in God’s law – a law “written on our hearts”
(cf. Rom. 2:15), which is ultimately manifested as Christ’s New Law of love and grace. The
Catechism teaches, “there are different expressions of the moral law, all of them interrelated:
eternal law-the source, in God, of all law; natural law; revealed law, comprising the Old Law and
the New Law, or Law of the Gospel.”1 Man’s participation and cooperation in God’s law leads to
true beatitude and eternal life.
The Eternal Law
St. Thomas says that, “law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is
restrained from acting…”.2 He also characterizes law as something brought into being via reason
when he says “law is something pertaining to reason”, since the rule and measure of human acts
1
Catechism of the Catholic Church, (CCC), (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994), 1952.
2
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), q. 90, a. 1. He goes on in the same
article to explain that, “lex [law] is derived from ligare [to bind], because it binds one to act.” Cf. Ibid., q. 90, a. 4
“The definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good,
made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.”
is reason.3 Now, the eternal law is nothing other than the divine governance of all things. This
governance is an act of intellect (reason) in God, according to St. Thomas, and “since the Divine
Reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Proverbs 8:23,
therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.”4 God’s governance is more than the
mere order and nature of the physical universe. Pope John Paul II notes, importantly, that God
provides in a special way for man, in that, “God’s wisdom is providence, a love which cares …
for man not ‘from without’… but ‘from within’, through reason…”5 So, we begin to see that
God’s rational order of “all things visible and invisible”6, consists in His providential Will to
order all things to His glory and love. This is realized most perfectly in the rational creature’s
participation, through reason and will, in the eternal law of God. This eternal law of God is
imprinted in the rational nature of man, according to Thomas. This leads us to what he calls – the
“natural law”.7
The Natural Law
The natural law is summarized by Thomas in his Summa:
Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most
excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both
for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a
3
Cf. Ibid. “Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, …
since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the
Philosopher (De Physica ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for
instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently it follows
that law is something pertaining to reason.”
4
Summa, q. 91, a. 1. Pope John Paul II observes in Veritatis Splendor, how St. Augustine defines the eternal law as,
“the reason or the will of God, who commands us to respect the natural order and forbids us to disturb it.” John Paul
II, Encyclical Letter, Veritatis Splendor, (August 6th, 1993), n. 43.
5
VS, n. 43.
6
Denzinger, Council of Nicea: Nicene Creed, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, (Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto
Publications, 2002), p. 26.
7
Cf. Summa, q. 91, a. 2.
natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in
the rational creature is called the natural law.8
Man “participates” or partakes of the eternal law and will of God through his active, intelligent
cooperation. William May explains this well when he says, “The eternal law is ‘in’ them both
because they are ruled and measured by it and because they actively rule and measure their own
acts in accordance with it.”9 It is thus in man properly and formally as “law”, since man’s actions
proceed from reason. While the source of the eternal law, viz. God, is extrinsic to man, it seems
man’s participation of the eternal law (i.e. the natural law) is something intrinsic to man – it is
“imprinted” on our very nature, according to St. Thomas.10 Hence, if man’s acts are in accord
with what Thomas calls the imprint of “Divine Light” on him, his actions will be in accord with
his nature (given him by God’s eternal design/”law”), with reason and be directed toward a full
realization of his eternal destiny (revealed via the divine law) and thus – his true happiness.
There is potential for confusion between the eternal and natural law, since we are told in
Veritatis Splendor that, “the natural law is itself the eternal law, implanted in beings endowed
with reason, and inclining them towards their right action and end; it is none other than the
eternal reason of the Creator and Ruler of the Universe.”11 But we should make the qualification
that the natural law is “entitatively distinct from the eternal law that exists in God … it is not
something ‘other than’ the eternal law… it is a reality brought into being through reason; it is a
8
Ibid. Cf. VS, n. 43, where John Paul II describes, “natural law as the human expression of God’s eternal law.”
9
William May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, (Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor, 2003), p. 73.
10
Cf. Summa, q. 91, a. 2.
11
Cf. VS, n. 44, quoting Encyclical Letter Libertas Praestantissimum (June 20, 1888): Leonis XIII P.M. Acta, VIII,
Romae 1889, 219.
work of human intelligence as ordered to action.”12 This is the sense in which St. Thomas says
that man, “participates” in the eternal law via reason – this act of “participation”, rationally and
freely – is called the natural law.13
Upon establishing the origin and definition of natural law, Thomas observes that the first thing
reason ordered to action (practical reason) grasps in this regard is … the good.
Consequently, the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of
good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the first
precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. " All
other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical
reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the
natural law as something to be done or avoided.14
This is the law St. Paul refers to as being “written on our hearts” (Rom. 2:15), which is a
beautiful expression of how the eternal law is apprehended by reason and “calls out” to man’s
conscience and heart. These inclinations planted in man – by God, help order man to his ultimate
good – eternal happiness.15 Self-evident principles flow from Thomas’ first precept ‘do good,
avoid evil’, such as: “harm no man”; “provide for offspring”; “give another his due”.16 God is the
12
May, p. 74. “As such and properly, then, natural law is for St. Thomas an achievement of practical reason. It
consists of a body or ordered set of true propositions formed by practical reason about what is to be done.” He goes
on to note in his footnote on this that there are non demonstrable starting points or principles in both the practical
and speculative intellect, which are not two reasons in man, but two ways reason is exercised.
13
Cf. Charles Rice, 50 Questions On the Natural Law, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999), p. 51, describes natural
law as, “a rule of reason, promulgated by God in man’s nature, whereby man can discern how he should act. ‘The
natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man’s mind so as to be known by him
naturally.’” (quoting Summa, q. 91, a. 4); Cf. Smith, Lecture 2: Since natural law is based upon reason, it follows the
ethics of natural law is a universal ethics, because all human beings are rational creatures
14
Summa, q. 94, a. 2. ; Cf. VS, n. 44, where John Paul II states, “Man is able to recognize good and evil thanks to
that discernment of good from evil which he himself carries out by his reason, in particular by his reason
enlightened by Divine revelation and by faith…”
15
Cf. Rice, p. 52. Rice notes the basic inclinations in man include: a) to seek the good, including the highest good,
God; b)to preserve himself in existence; c) to preserve the species – conjugal relations; d) to live in community with
others; e) to use his intellect and will – to know the truth and make judgments.
16
Cf. Smith, Lecture 2.
author of nature and thus the author of natural law – to live in accord with the natural law is to
live according to the true good – God’s will.17 However, St. Thomas warns the concupiscence of
original sin and personal sin in man can lead him to reach the wrong conclusions and actions,
which are contrary to the true good.18 The Catechism notes subjective culpability may be
mitigated or diminished, but affirms some acts are always objectively wrong.19 We are now
getting to more particular determinations man makes from natural law precepts. St. Thomas calls
these particular determinations human law.
Human Law
St. Thomas describes human law by stating, “it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from
general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more
particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human
reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed.”20
17
Cf. Ibid.
18
Cf. Summa, q. 94, a. 6. He states the natural law, “is blotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as
reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence
or some other passion, as stated above (Q77,A2). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can
be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect
of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural
vices, as the Apostle states (Romans 1), were not esteemed sinful.”
19
Cf. CCC, 1755 – 56. Cf. CCC, 1776, speaking of the objective nature of the natural law: “Deep within his
conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling
him to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, sounds in his heart at the right moment. . . . For man has in his
heart a law inscribed by God. . . . His conscience is man's most secret core and his sanctuary. There he is alone with
God whose voice echoes in his depths.” Cf. VS, n. 79-80: “The primary and decisive element for moral judgment is
the object of the human act … reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature
incapable of being ordered to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image.”
Such acts are called “intrinsically evil” (intrinsece malum) acts, which are “always and per se…on account of their
very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances.”
20
Summa, q. 91, a. 3.
Those “conditions” are enumerated in his basic description of law, which is “an ordinance of
21
reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.”
So, we see a procession from universal to particular as we move from man’s apprehension and
participation of the eternal law via reason (which we call natural law and its immediate precepts)
to particular, human laws, which should reflect and conform to God’s eternal law.
Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the
plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law.
But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the eternal law.
Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the
eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Libero Arbitrio i,6) that "in temporal law
there is nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal law."22
Human laws must be ordered to God’s eternal law, which is apprehended by an act of reason in
the natural law precepts. Human law is thus derived from natural law.23 For example, one may
derive a law prohibiting murder from the natural law precept, “harm no man”.24 The natural law
functions as both a guide for human laws to benefit the common good (e.g. family and
economically favorable laws), and as a protection against laws violating natural law precepts
(e.g. abortion, euthanasia).25 Such human laws which violate natural law (or divine law) are
unjust and constitute, “acts of violence rather than laws.”26 St. Augustine noted, “a law that is not
21
Summa, q. 90, a. 4.
22
Summa, q. 93. a. 3.
23
Cf. Rice, p. 62.
24
Ibid.; Rice calls this example a derivation of human from natural law “by conclusion”.
25
Ibid., p. 63
26
S umma, q. 96, a. 4.; Cf. Ibid. “Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid
scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his right, according to Matthew 5:40,41: "If a man.
. . take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever will force thee one mile, go with him other
two."
just, seems to be no law at all.”27 Such laws are not binding in conscience. This is a prescription
for limited government, which recognizes the divine foundation, universality and permanency of
God’s eternal and natural law, as well as the limitations of what government can require or deny.
It is also a limitation on what is often called in modern society “individual rights” or “rights to
privacy”, which in certain cases veil destructive and even murderous acts and even give them
28
protection under the “law”. Pope John Paul II states, “the natural law expresses the dignity of
the human person and lays the foundation for his fundamental rights and duties.”29 Authentic
human law promotes and protects these rights and duties expressed in the natural law. This leads
us to ask: How can man have certitude about his rights and duties to God?
The Divine Law
St. Thomas affirmed the necessity of Divine Revelation for man’s acts to be directed towards his
supernatural end – the Beatific Vision. “Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary
for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law.”30 The Divine Law includes both the
Old and the New Testament. St. Thomas stated the Divine Law was necessary because there
Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing to
idolatry, or to anything else contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must nowise be observed, because, as
stated in Acts 5:29, "we ought to obey God rather than man."
27
Ibid. citing St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio i,5.
28
Cf. VS, n. 51: “The separation which some have posited between the freedom of individuals and the nature which
all have in common … obscures the perception of the universality of the moral law on the part of reason. But
inasmuch as the natural law expresses the dignity of the human person and lays the foundation for his fundamental
rights and duties, it is universal in its precepts and its authority extends to all mankind. This universality does not
ignore the individuality of human beings … it embraces at its root each of the person’s free acts. .. When on the
contrary they disregard the law, our acts damage the communion of persons, to the detriment of each.”
29
Ibid.
30
Summa, q. 91, a. 4.
needed to be a law given by God, proportionate to man’s supernatural end; because of the
uncertainty of human judgment; because human law cannot curb or direct interior acts, but
Divine Law judges man’s interior movements; and because human law cannot forbid or punish
all acts, but Divine Law supervenes, so that all sins are forbidden.31 Thomas also elucidates how
faith in Divine Revelation allows man to “arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth”,
32
as not all persons are able or as willing to apply themselves to study. Finally, and importantly –
the Divine Law provides certitude, since, “reason is very deficient in things concerning God”…
who is infinite.33
The Church looks to Sacred Scripture, revealed by God and handed down by the authority of the
Apostolic Church; Sacred Tradition, the unwritten actions of the Apostles and their successors in
union with Peter and his successors – which are guided by the Holy Spirit; and the Magisterium
of the Church, “whose authority is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ. This teaching office is
not above the word of God, but serves it.”34 Hence, man has great practical and infallible
assistance in the Magisterium to help him know how he is to direct his actions correctly towards
his ultimate good – eternal salvation. Indeed, far beyond a legalistic morality of what is
forbidden, the Divine Law, (authentically interpreted by the Magisterium) and in particular the
New Law revealed in Christ – illuminates man’s mind and heart though grace, calling him to the
31
Cf. Ibid.
32
Cf. Summa, II-II, q. 2, a. 4.
33
Ibid.
34
Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum, Ed. Austin
Flannery, O.P., (Dublin, Ireland: Dominican Publications, 1975), n. 10; Cf. Ibid. “It is clear, therefore, that sacred
tradition, Sacred Scripture and the teaching authority of the Church, in accord with God's most wise design, are so
linked and joined together that one cannot stand without the others, and that all together and each in its own way
under the action of the one Holy Spirit contribute effectively to the salvation of souls.”
commandment of Christ to love, which is the “form of all the virtues”, according to St. Thomas.35
“This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you.” (Jn. 15:12) The term
“as” connotes a commandment by Christ for us to be perfect, as He is perfect.36 Hence, “Jesus’
way of acting and his words, his deeds and his precepts constitute the moral rule of Christian
life”, according to John Paul II.37 Thus, the Divine Law is “superabundant” in calling man to
order his reason, his will, his heart and actions to “perfection [which] demands that maturity in
self-giving to which human freedom is called.”38 The Divine Law completes the other forms of
law, going beyond precept to divine love, which has no limits and elevates man to his full
actualization in God as his “all”.
Pope John Paul II and the Law
Janet Smith’s observations about Pope John Paul II’s “Personalist” gloss on traditional Thomistic
thought regarding natural law are very insightful, and illustrate the magisterial greatness of the
Polish Pontiff. With John Paul II, there is a shift in emphasis from Thomas’ objective,
metaphysical, rationalistic or mechanistic emphasis in describing the natural law’s relationship to
35
Cf. Summa, II-II, q. 23, a. 6 “The proper function of charity as the form of all the virtues is to direct and ordain the
acts of all the virtues effectively to the ultimate supernatural end, even those of faith and hope.”; Cf. Summa, q. 23,
a. 8. St. Thomas beautifully states: “Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues
to its own end. And since a mother is one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called the mother
of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last
end.”
36
VS, n. 20, “The word ‘as’ also indicates the degree of Jesus’ love and of the love with which his disciples are
called to love one another.”
37
I bid. Christ gives his very life for us, so we must give our lives completely in the service of love of neighbor for
Christ’s sake. There is no limit to charity – we can always grow in love and virtue, in this life. John Paul says, “This
is what Jesus asks of everyone who wishes to follow him: ‘If any man would come after me, let him deny himself
and take up his cross and follow me’ (Mt. 16:24).”
38
VS, n. 17. “Human freedom and God’s law are not in opposition; on the contrary, they appeal one to the other.”
human (moral) acts – to a more Personalist, subjective, and phenomenological emphasis.39 John
Paul II does not take away from nor contradict Thomas. He uses the basic natural and eternal law
thesis, explained above, as a starting point for a deeper reflection, but emphasizes man not only
as a rational creature, but as a “self-determining creature who must shape himself in accord with
the truth”,40 in order to realize his true dignity and calling to be perfect, as Christ called the rich
young man to be perfect. (cf. Matt. 19:16-22)41 In Veritatis Splendor, the Pope reveals the
complementariness of the natural law and the divine law in his treatment of the objectivity and
rationality of the natural law precepts as lived by human persons made in the image and likeness
of God, who know and love God through Revelation.
The Personalist approach of John Paul II acknowledges the Commandments as a starting point
and condition precedent to move deeper into the meaning of life … viz. Christ’s New Law of
love – the Beatitudes and the grace to live according to Christ’s new commandment to “love one
another”. (Jn. 15:17)42 Thus, we see with John Paul II, “the human person is not ‘confined’ by
39
40
I bid. “While Wojtyla accepts Aquinas’ view of the person, he supplements it.” Dr. Smith quotes John Paul II on
St. Thomas: “St. Thomas gives us an excellent view of the objective existence and activity of the person, but it
would be difficult to speak in his view of the lived experiences of the person.” (Karol Wojtyla, Person and
community: Selected Essays, trans. By Theresa Sandok, OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993))
41
Cf. VS, n. 16.
42
Cf. VS, n. 64; Cf. Summa, II-II, q. 45, a. 2: John Paul II notes there is “a sort of connaturality between man and the
true good … through the virtuous attitudes of the individual…”. While acknowledging the foundational importance
of the commandments, the Pope emphasizes the development of Christian virtue and perfection, which is
complimentary, not contradictory, to the commandments. We must imitate the “self-portrait” of Christ in the
Beatitudes to truly grow in virtue. Thus, Pope John Paul concludes: “Following Christ is the essential and
primordial foundation of Christian morality.” (VS, n. 19)
Cf. Rev. Servais Pinckaers, O.P., The Sources of Christian Ethics, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1995), p. 136: Consistent with the Pope, Pinckaers warns of the danger of a morality, “defined as the
sum of obligations imposed on us by the will of God,” and emphasizes the need for a “voluntary and rational
natural law but freely participates in God’s governance … he may freely choose to do the good
or not to do it.”43 The subjective emphasis of John Paul II compared to St. Thomas’ emphasis on
objectivity is elucidated by Smith well when she suggests, “Aquinas’ chief interest is in
determining what acts are good and evil; for Wojtyla the chief interest is in showing that man’s
very subjectivity and freedom requires that he be concerned with the truth.”44 While Thomas
would certainly agree with John Paul II’s emphasis on man being self-determining in choosing to
follow Christ, man’s “gift of self”, and the effect man’s actions have on himself and his
fulfillment as a person – Thomas’ focus tended to be on the fact that man is able to choose
because he is an “individual substance of a rational nature”, which is his definition of the human
person. John Paul II defines the person more richly: “The person…is always a rational and free
concrete being, capable of all those activities that reason and freedom alone make possible.”45
The question John Paul II wishes us to focus on is not simply what rules are to be followed, but
also, “What is the meaning of life?” The great Pontiff exhorts man to that critical relationship
between the (objective) law and (subjective) personal freedom, which is lived out in the ‘heart’
of the person, in his moral conscience – which must be ordered to objective truth to be
authentically free.46 John Paul II masterfully deepened objective, Thomistic natural law themes
with Personalism in a way that is complimentary.
commitment, at the level of the ‘heart’ in the biblical sense of the word. This is where the virtues have their place
(vices also) as stable and personal dispositions to do good.”
43
Smith, Lecture 3.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid., quoting, Person and Community, p. 167.
46
Cf. VS, n. 54-64.
Summary
St. Thomas’ four kinds of law illuminate the order and splendor of God’s creation, both physical
and most excellently, rational. God’s eternal law is His Divine Wisdom and Providence,
directing and ordering all of creation to Himself as their end. The participation of the eternal law
in the rational creature is the natural law, whereby man’s reason apprehends certain self-evident
precepts derived from the eternal law, such as “seek the good, avoid evil”. Man applies his
reason, guided by the divine law (Sacred Scripture) as interpreted and elucidated even more
practically by Sacred Tradition via the Magisterium of the Catholic Church—to ascertain in his
conscience how he should act in accordance with the true good.47 The divine law reveals to man
infallibly the truth about God and invites man to a relationship of love and reconciliation with his
Creator, through the saving work of Christ. Human laws are derived from natural law precepts
and should promote the common good, as well as protect persons from violations of the natural
law – such as abortion, for example. A law which contradicts the natural law or divine law, is no
law at all and is not binding in conscience. Thus, we see how these types of law interrelate and
complement one another for the ultimate good of man – eternal life.
Bibliography
ew York: Benziger Brothers, 1947.

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. N
Catechism of the Catholic Church. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994.
Denzinger, Henry. The Sources of Catholic Dogma. Translated by Roy Deferrari. Fitzwilliam,
NH: Loreto Publications, 2002.
John Paul II. Encyclical Letter, Veritatis Splendor. August 6th, 1993. Boston, Massachusetts: St.
Paul Books & Media.
47
Cf. Summa, q. 91, a. 2. “The first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.”
May, William. An Introduction to Moral Theology. Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor,
2003.
Paul VI. Encyclical Letter, Humanae Vitae. July 25, 1968. Boston, Massachusetts: St. Paul
Books & Media.
Pinckaers, Rev. Servais O.P. The Sources of Christian Ethics. Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, 1995.
Rice, Charles. 50 Questions On the Natural Law. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999.
Smith, Janet. Introduction to Sexual Ethics. Lecture Notes: Holy Apostles College & Seminary;
[Web Mentor Online]; available from http://home.comcast.net/~icuweb/c00201.htm, 2007.
Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents. Flannery O.P., Austin. (ed.)
Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum. Dublin, Ireland: Dominican
Publications, 1975.
File: Brewbaker Macro Update Created on: 3/9/2007 10:06 AM Last Printed: 3/9/2007 10:28 AM
THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE METAPHYSICS OF LAW
William S. Brewbaker III*
ABSTRACT
Despite modernity’s longstanding aversion to metaphysics, legal schol-

ars are increasingly questioning whether law can be understood in isolation
from wider questions about the nature of reality. This Article examines per-
haps the most famous of metaphysical legal texts—Thomas Aquinas’s still
widely read Treatise on Law—with a view toward tracing the influence of
Thomas’s metaphysical presuppositions.
This Article shows that Thomas’s account of human law cannot be fully
understood apart from his metaphysics. Attention to Thomas’s hierarchical
view of reality exposes tensions between Thomas’s “top-down” account of
law and his sophisticated “bottom-up” observations. For example, Thomas
grounds human law’s authority in its foundation in the “higher” natural and
eternal laws. At the same time, he is well aware that many if not most legal
questions involve “determination of particulars”—the resolution of ques-
tions that might reasonably be answered in more than one way. Thomas’s
metaphysics sometimes works against his inclination to give place to human
freedom in the creation of law.
Thomas’s metaphysical approach also raises important questions for
contemporary legal theory. His insistence on addressing the question of
law’s ontological status, for example, challenges the reductionism of much
contemporary jurisprudence and provides a vocabulary for accounting for
the wide variety of analytical approaches legal philosophers employ.
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 576

I. THOMAS AQUINAS’S METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTION OF NATURE .......... 580
II. LAW’S ESSENCE .................................................................................... 584
A. Defining Law .................................................................................. 584
B. Metaphysical Influences in the Treatise ......................................... 588
III. HUMAN LAW’S ONTOLOGY ................................................................. 592
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama. I am grateful to Alfred Brophy, Alan Durham, David
VanDrunen, Timothy Hoff, Mark Murphy, John Nagle, and Michael Pardo for helpful comments on
previous drafts of this Article. I am also grateful to Dean Ken Randall and the University of Alabama
Law School Foundation for generous research support, to Chris Sanders for research assistance, to Caro-
line Barge for secretarial assistance, and to Ben Lucy for his friendship and encouragement. The errors
that remain are mine.
575
576 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 58:3:575
A. Is There Such a Thing as Law? ...................................................... 592

B. Unjust Laws .................................................................................... 594
IV. ORDERS OF REALITY/METHODOLOGY ................................................ 600
V. BEING: HIERARCHICAL AND ANALOGICAL........................................... 605
A. The Hierarchy of Being: An Overview .......................................... 605
B. Hierarchy and Analogical Knowledge ........................................... 607
C. Hierarchy, Analogy, and the Treatise on Law................................ 609
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 613
INTRODUCTION
One of the great, if unsurprising, projects of twentieth-century Ameri-

can jurisprudence was the attempt to separate law and metaphysics.1 The
project was unsurprising because the objections to metaphysics were both
numerous and obvious: If metaphysical speculations prevented scientists
from “seeing” the natural world clearly, why should the same not be true of
law?2 If we cannot give a full account of even the most common (and
largely fixed) features of natural reality with any degree of certainty, why
make jurisprudence hinge on our ability to do so with respect to human arti-
facts like law? And what is the meaning, in any event, of statements that
cannot be verified through sense experience and logical deduction?3 Given
the mediated nature of our access even to empirical phenomena, why sup-
pose that we can understand the deepest principles of being and action that
make the world what it is? Why not avoid the temptation to engage in end-
less (and fruitless) debates over essences (including law’s essence4) and
focus instead on programs that are more likely to succeed, such as analyzing
our social practices and the way we talk about them?5 Why allow legal ar-
gumentation that draws upon alleged fixities to hamper officials’ ability to
make needed reforms?6 Why impede our politics with the philosophical
1. “It would not be much of a stretch . . . to say that the central effort of legal thinkers from
Holmes through the Legal Realists through the modern proponents of ‘policy science’ has been precisely
to improve law by ridding it of the curse of metaphysics.” STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 2-3
(2004). See generally id. at 65-96 (criticizing main schools of 20th century legal thought).
2. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 844-45 (1935).
4. “As Ludwig Wittgenstein described philosophy in general, legal philosophy under a Hartian
approach sees its primary purpose as a kind of therapy: a way of overcoming the temptation to ask meta-
physical questions (‘what is Law?’ or ‘do norms exist’), and a method of transforming such questions
into (re-)descriptions of the way we actually act.” BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT
6 (3d ed. 2003) (footnotes omitted).
5. But see Jules L. Coleman & Ori Simchen, “Law,” 9 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2003) (arguing that
Hartian jurisprudence is about law itself, not merely the concept of law). See generally H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
6. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1776).
2007] Thomas Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Law 577
vestiges of antiquated religious structures from which we are still in need of

liberation?7
Although there is still a near consensus that attempting to define law as
a kind and to connect it to a more general account of reality tends to obscure
rather than enhance our understanding of law, the verdict is no longer
unanimous. Indeed, there seems to have been a modest revival of interest in
the relationship between law and metaphysics—not only among religious
believers, where such interest might be expected,8 but also among secular
theorists as well.9 Conceptual analysis of law, at least in its strong form, has
been challenged on methodological grounds;10 there is a stronger philoso-
phical argument to be made for moral realism now than was the case a few
decades ago,11 and some have questioned whether our ontologically-
challenged legal world view can make sense of law as it is practiced by
lawyers and judges in any event.12
This Article does not address the merit or demerit of metaphysical legal
theory generally. Rather, it has a twofold purpose. First, it attempts to trace
the influence of metaphysics in a classic jurisprudential text, Thomas Aqui-
nas’s Treatise on Law. Thomas’s understanding of metaphysics is some-
what narrower than the conventional modern usage of the word. Contempo-
rary usage thinks of metaphysics as “the study of ultimate reality,”13 dealing
with questions like, “What are the most general features of the World?[,]”
7. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Outlaw Blues, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1418, 1427 (1989) (reviewing MARK
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988)) (“[S]uch
things as divine revelation and biblical literalism are irrational superstitious nonsense . . . .”).
8. Because the characteristics of the natural world can be ascribed to an Author.
9. “I doubt that there would be a conceivable enterprise called general jurisprudence if law were
[merely] a nominal kind . . . .” Michael S. Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 188, 206 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
My own view is that the only things whose nature is fixed by our concepts are ‘things’
that do not exist—Pegasus, the twentieth-century kings of France, and the like. There are no
things referred to by such terms, so such words’ meaning can only be given by their concepts.
....
General jurisprudence should eschew such conceptual analysis in favour of studying the phe-
nomenon itself, law.
Id. at 205-06; see also SMITH, supra note 1; Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Facts in Law and
Facts of Law, 7 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 153, 157-61 (2003); Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo,
The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1790-97 (2003); Coleman & Simchen,
supra note 5; Michael S. Moore, Legal Reality: A Naturalist Approach to Legal Ontology, 21 LAW &
PHIL. 619 (2002).
10. “The aim of Conceptual Analysis is to uncover interesting and informative truths about the
concepts we employ to make the world rationally intelligible to us. The basic idea is that concepts are
reified objects of thought that structure our experience and make the world rationally intelligible to us,
and because they are shared are essential to our ability to communicate with one another.” Jules L.
Coleman, Methodology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 311,
344 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). Coleman further notes that “[i]t is nowadays a com-
monplace in philosophy that Quine has presented several compelling arguments adequate to undermine
the projects of Conceptual Analysis.” Id.
11. See generally MICHAEL MOORE, OBJECTIVITY IN ETHICS AND LAW (2004).
12. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 1, at 22-37; Robert P. George, What is Law? A Century of Argu-
ments, FIRST THINGS, Apr. 2001, at 23, 23-29.
13. PETER VAN INWAGEN, METAPHYSICS 1 (1993).
“Why does a World exist?,” and “What is our place in the world?”14 Tho-
mas understands the term rather more narrowly as referring to the investiga-
tion of the general, transcendental characteristics of being and beings.15 Al-
though Thomas’s metaphysics leaves an unmistakable imprint on his ac-
count of law,16 the Treatise is often read as though Thomas’s understanding
of the way things are were not all that different from ours.17 Second, I hope
to show that Thomas’s account of law, in all its metaphysical splendor and
obscurity, raises questions about law that might profitably be examined in
the process of attempting to construct an account of human law that con-
nects to worldly realities. Even if we reject Thomas’s metaphysics, the an-
gelic doctor may still have something to teach us.
Part I begins by connecting Thomas’s account of law—especially his
account of natural law—with his conception of nature.18 Thomas’s account
14. Id. at 4. Inwagen also helpfully uses the antinomy of appearance and reality and the idea of
“getting behind” appearances to reality to illustrate the domain of metaphysics as the study of “ultimate
reality.” Id.
15. In the prologue to his Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Thomas characterizes meta-
physics as the science that “considers first causes,” that “deals with the most universal principles”—
specifically “being and those things which naturally accompany being, such as unity and plurality, po-
tency and act”—and that considers things that are “separate from matter” (i.e., God and the angels). ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE 1 (John P. Rowan trans., Henry
Regnery Co. 1961) [hereinafter AQUINAS, METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE]. These inquiries are unified by
their consideration of “being in general.” Id. at 2. The science is known by different names because it
considers being under these various aspects: “It is called divine science or theology inasmuch as it con-
siders [God and the intellectual substances]. It is called metaphysics inasmuch as it considers being and
the attributes which naturally accompany being . . . . And it is called first philosophy inasmuch as it
considers the first causes of things.” Id.; see also ANTHONY J. LISSKA, AQUINAS’S THEORY OF NATURAL
LAW 86 (1996) (characterizing scholastic understanding of metaphysics as “referring . . . to transcenden-
tal claims about being”).
16. Clearly, Thomas does not deduce his account of law from his metaphysical system in a histori-
cal and theological vacuum. I have not attempted to sort out the relative influence of history, Christian
doctrine, and metaphysics in his thought but only to show that metaphysics conditions his account in
significant ways.
17. The obvious exception to this statement is the routine acknowledgment that teleology has an
important place in Thomas’s account of law.
18. To understand a particular account of natural law, one must grapple with at least two broad
questions. The first is a question of methodology: What is the relationship between nature and ethics or
law? In recent years, the fact/value dichotomy has consumed most of this aspect of the discussion.
Scholars sympathetic to the natural law tradition increasingly argue that the fact/value dichotomy has
“collapsed” or otherwise is avoided in natural-law thinking. See Kevin P. Lee, The Collapse of the
Fact/Value Dichotomy: A Brief for Catholic Legal Scholars, 1 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 685, 685-86
(2004); see also LISSKA, supra note 15, at 195-201; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 51-61 (2d
ed. 1984).
The second question is more basic: When theorists speak of nature, what do they have in mind?
Consider, for example, the different images used to represent nature at various times and places. Female
imagery for nature abounded in the Middle Ages and Renaissance: “The earth was to be conceived as a
nurturing mother, who sustained and supported humanity throughout their time of sojourn in the world.”
1 ALISTER E. MCGRATH, A SCIENTIFIC THEOLOGY: NATURE 105 (2001). Other prominent images in-
cluded the organism, Francis Oakley, Medieval Theories of Natural Law: William of Ockham and the
Significance of the Voluntarist Tradition, 6 NAT. L.F. 65, 79 (1961) (citing R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE
IDEA OF NATURE (1945)); the machine, id.; the stage; the book; and the mirror, 1 MCGRATH, supra, at
103-05, 107-10. The idea that “laws of nature” exist is a similar construct. Id. at 226-28 (citing Francis
Oakley, Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science, in CREATION: THE IMPACT OF AN IDEA 54-83
(Daniel O’Connor & Francis Oakley eds., 1961)). Imagery also may be useful in describing what nature
is not; nature frequently is represented in opposition to grace, “unnatural” vices, technology, culture, the
mimetic arts, the supernatural, the metaphysical, and even the inexcusable. C.S. LEWIS, STUDIES IN
of law depends fundamentally on his conception of human action and the

characteristic inclinations of the human person.19 The focus here, however,
will be on Thomas’s account of nature in general. Contemporary concep-
tions of nature are dominated by the hard sciences, which attempt to identify
empirically the connections between individual discrete events in the natural
order.20 Thomas’s goal in describing nature, on the other hand, is to identify
WORDS 42-74 (2d ed. 1967); see also JOHN HABGOOD, THE CONCEPT OF NATURE 1-5 (2002).
Not only is nature represented by conflicting images, but many theoretical accounts of nature
also exist. This is not merely a modern phenomenon. Thomas himself notes multiple uses of the word
nature. See ST IaIIae.10.1 (for a discussion of this citation format, see infra note 19). Plato and Aristotle,
for example, both divided the world into the realms of nature, art, and chance but differed as to each
realm’s precise role in the overall scheme of things. 1 MCGRATH, supra, at 90-95. They likewise dif-
fered over the origins of human perceptions of universals and particulars. Medievals inherited a tradition
of reflection on natural law that drew not only upon conflicting Stoic and Platonic elements but also
upon accounts of natural law based in different traditions of inquiry. The project of medieval synthesis
involved assimilating accounts of nature and natural law drawn not only from philosophers and theologi-
ans but also from canon and civil lawyers. See JEAN PORTER, NATURAL AND DIVINE LAW 66-75 (1999).
The natural sciences dramatically and increasingly have influenced accounts of nature since then. Far
from seeing nature as a “second book” of God’s revelation, see id. at 71, it is now common to view
nature only as “the amoral scene of Darwinian struggle.” RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 235 (1990).
The concrete consequences of differing conceptions of nature are perhaps exhibited nowhere
better than in law. Scholars who would strenuously resist the label “natural lawyer” nevertheless cannot
avoid being interested in the world in which law must operate. The efficiency-minded academic lawyer
is concerned with the psychology of market decision-making, the family lawyer with which features of
family life are “givens” and which are not, see generally SEX, PREFERENCE AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND NATURE (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997), and the environmental law-
yer with whether nature is “a material resource for human consumption” or something else, see Holly
Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 11, 13-14 (2000) (noting “three principal discourses” of nature in environmental debates: the first
“treats nature as a material resource for human consumption”; the second “treats nature as an esthetic
resource”; and the third “argues that humanity has an ethical obligation to protect nature independent of
any instrumental value nature may have”). See also Alex Geisinger, Sustainable Development and the
Domination of Nature: Spreading the Seed of the Western Ideology of Nature, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 43, 47-48 (1999) (criticizing Western ideology of “separation and domination” with respect to
nature and noting alternative “metaphors for our understanding of nature,” including “(1) nature as a
limited resource on which humans rely; (2) nature as balanced and interdependent; and (3) the model of
nature versus society, characterized by the market’s devaluation of nature, the separation from nature
that leads to failure to appreciate it, and the American idealization of the environmentalism of primitive
peoples”).
19. See ST IaIIae.90.1, c. In citing to Thomas’s Summa Theologica, I have borrowed Norman
Kretzmann’s form:
[The abbreviation ST is followed by]
the traditional designation for the Part (Pars)—Ia (Prima), IaIIae (Prima secundae), IIaIIae
(Secunda secundae), or IIIa (Tertia). The first arabic numeral following any one of those des-
ignations indicates the Question in that Part, and the next arabic numeral, following a full
point, indicates the Article belonging to that Question. A ‘c’ immediately following the sec-
ond arabic numeral indicates that the passage belongs to Aquinas’s reply in that Article (the
‘body’ (corpus) of the Article); ‘obj. 1’, ‘obj. 2’, etc., indicates one of the ‘objections’ (op-
posing arguments); ‘sc’ indicates the ‘sed contra’ (the citation of an authority or generally ac-
ceptable consideration contrary to the line taken in the Objections), and ‘ad 1’, ‘ad 2’, etc.,
indicates one of Aquinas’s rejoinders to the objections.
NORMAN KRETZMANN, THE METAPHYSICS OF CREATION: AQUINAS’S NATURAL THEOLOGY IN SUMMA
CONTRA GENTILES II 9 n.16 (1999). Analogous forms are used for Thomas’s other works cited in this
Article. Unless otherwise noted, translations of the Summa Theologiae are taken from ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics
1981).
20. “Modern science studies the world of space and time, not some reality beyond them, and arose
the common characteristics of “beings” and the principles underlying their

movements, i.e., to develop a science of metaphysics.
Part II begins the exploration of the specifics of Thomas’s metaphysics
with an account of his attempt to define law’s essence. Examination of
Thomas’s famous definition of law shows how, following Aristotle’s
method, Thomas thinks law can be understood by focusing on its formal,
final, material, and efficient causes. It also shows how Thomas’s meta-
physical assumptions about bodies and human action affect the specifics of
Thomas’s account. Part III examines Thomas’s account of human law’s
ontology, which raises a number of metaphysical questions, including the
ontological status of human law relative to other types of law, the status of
unjust laws in Thomas’s framework, and how it is that human laws can vary
so significantly notwithstanding their shared ontological dependence on the
single natural law.
Part IV describes Thomas’s methodology, which is grounded on the as-
sumption that there are different orders of reality and, thus, different meth-
ods of analysis that may obtain for different kinds of realities in the world.
Thomas’s account challenges the reductionism of some contemporary juris-
prudence, while at the same time explaining why law is fruitfully analyzed
from so many competing perspectives.
Part V examines two of the most well-known features of Thomas’s
metaphysics: the analogy of being and his assumption that reality is funda-
mentally hierarchical, proceeding in a chain from God downward through
successively inferior orders of angels, humans, animals, plants, and inani-
mate objects. Part V connects these assumptions about reality with Tho-
mas’s account of law. Thomas affirms a substantial degree of human free-
dom in human lawmaking, drawing a helpful analogy between rulers and
architects. Nevertheless, because Thomas holds that God’s plan for the uni-
verse extends even to the minutest details of human law, and because all
being is, for Thomas, hierarchical, there is a noteworthy gravitational pull
against human freedom in lawmaking at work in the Treatise, albeit one that
Thomas himself repeatedly seems to be striving to resist.
I. THOMAS AQUINAS’S METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTION OF NATURE
Thomas Aquinas is probably best known to legal scholars for his ac-
count of natural law in Question 94 of the Treatise on Law. One of the first
when a logical quest for timeless patterns gave way to a mathematical, hypothetical and experimental
approach to the contingent rationality of space and time . . . .” COLIN E. GUNTON, THE ONE, THE THREE
AND THE MANY 75 (1993) [hereinafter GUNTON, THE ONE, THE THREE AND THE MANY]; see also
ETIENNE GILSON, THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAS 178 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press
1994) (1956) (modern empiricism reduces causation to “constant relationship[s] between phenomena”);
COLIN E. GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR 134 (1998) [hereinafter GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR]
(“[T]he modern age replaced an essentially Hellenic philosophy of nature, according to which it is what
it is by virtue of intrinsic rational powers and causes operating above material being, with one of contin-
gencies consisting in patterning within it.”). See generally M.B. Foster, The Christian Doctrine of Crea-
tion and the Rise of Modern Natural Science, 43 MIND 446 (1934).
questions that will occur to any reader of Question 94 (or indeed to anyone
who thinks much about the phrase “natural law”) is which “nature” is
grounding the enterprise: Human nature? The cosmos? The nature of law?
In his treatment of natural law, Thomas explicitly connects law and na-
ture in two ways. First, he says in Question 90 that “God instilled [natural
law] into man’s mind so as to be known by him naturally.”21 Second, the
characteristic inclination of the human person is to use the “light of natural
reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil.”22 Implicitly,
however, Thomas’s account of law is also influenced dramatically by his
presuppositions about the nature of reality. For Thomas, what is most im-
portant about nature is not the observable web of contingent patterning23 but
rather the universal principles that lie beneath observable particulars.24
Thus, for example, in the Treatise on the Creation,25 Thomas begins neither
with the particular story told in Genesis 126 nor with a bottom-up account of
natural phenomena but rather with a philosophical demonstration that “God
is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and [that]
primary matter is from Him.”27
Thomas’s focus on universal principles of being is no accident. Rather,
he argues, it is the culmination of human scientific progress over the centu-
ries: The ancient philosophers “failed to realize that any beings existed ex-
cept sensible bodies,” and because they regarded matter as eternal and un-
created, they had trouble accounting for changes they observed in it.28 The
recognition of “a distinction between the substantial form and matter”29
improved upon this understanding, even though the causes of change in
bodies continued to be attributed mistakenly to “universal causes” like the
zodiac or Platonic ideas. Further refinements of the classical understanding
of the interconnection between form, substance, accident, and causation
likewise aided human understanding, but the most significant change, ac-
21. ST IaIIae.90.4, ad 1.
22. ST IaIIae.91.2, c. John Finnis characterizes Thomas’s answer to the question why natural law is
so called as follows:
Why are these principles natural law? Not because they are somehow read off from nature or
human nature. Rather, for at least three reasons. They are not made by human devising {ad-
inventio} but rather are first-order realities, as are the other realities which pertain to our na-
ture. Their reasonableness, moreover, is a sharing in the practical reasonableness, the wis-
dom, of the very author of our nature, the creator by whose wisdom and power the fulfilment
which we can freely choose is (like our freedom itself) made possible. And no human choices
or acts are against the natural law (or indeed against any divine law) except in so far as they
are against human good.
JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 309 (1998) (footnote omitted); see
also RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE xxi-xxiii (2003).
23. See supra note 20.
24. I do not mean to suggest Thomas is uninterested in the natural world, only that he thinks the
most important task for understanding the natural world is understanding “being in general.”
25. ST Ia.44-49.
26. But see Treatise on the Work of the Six Days, ST Ia.65-74, which appears afterward.
27. ST Ia.44.4, ad 4. The quotation appears at the end of Question 44 and seems to summarize
Thomas’s position as set out in the various articles therein.
28. ST Ia.44.2, c.
29. Id.
cording to Thomas, was one of focus—from a consideration of “being under

some particular aspect . . . to the consideration of being, as being.”30 Tho-
mas concludes that “whatever is the cause of things considered as beings,
must be the cause of things [generally].”31
Thomas’s primary approach to nature, then, is to try to discover princi-
ples that apply generally to all beings, an approach that involves back-
ground assumptions radically different from those modern readers would
bring to the same enterprise. Most of us are unaccustomed to thinking in
explicitly metaphysical terms at all, much less in the highly developed Aris-
totelian scheme Thomas inherits and reconfigures. More fundamentally, we
tend to take our conception of nature from the contemporary natural sci-
ences, which are largely empiricist. Because modern science’s goals involve
the identification of generalizable relationships and working principles that
enable prediction or manipulation of future states of affairs, it cannot avoid
metaphysics (or something like it) entirely.32 Nevertheless, modern concep-
tions of metaphysics are far more limited and modest than those Thomas
employs.33
As noted above, a working assumption of the modern scientific method
is that a too-robust metaphysics hinders efforts to learn the truth about the
world. At least since Francis Bacon’s assault on Aristotle in The New Or-
ganon,34 empiricists have argued that a priori conceptions of reality obscure
30. Id.
31. ST Ia.44.2, c; see also Jan A. Aertsen, Aquinas’s Philosophy in Its Historical Setting, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS 12, 28-30 (Norman Kretzmann & Eleonore Stump eds., 1993)
(citing passage in relation to Thomas’s belief in philosophical progress); cf. ST Ia.75.1, c. Thomas never-
theless conceived of himself as a naturalist. See generally GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR, supra note
20, at 105-07, 112.
32. See, e.g., WILLEM B. DREES, RELIGION, SCIENCE AND NATURALISM 152, 259-74 (1996) (argu-
ing that “our understanding of reality raises some questions, questions which are not themselves an-
swered by science and thus may be considered as pointing beyond science to metaphysical issues, with-
out, however, pointing to one particular metaphysical view”); 3 ALISTER E. MCGRATH, A SCIENTIFIC
THEOLOGY: THEORY 250-58 (2003) (arguing that scientists’ attempts to evade metaphysics entirely have
been unsuccessful).
33. See generally LISSKA, supra note 15, at 86. Even modern religious believers outside the
Thomist tradition are likely to find Thomas’s approach to nature uncongenial. To begin with, they are
likely to share—in practice if not in theory—the culture’s empiricist approach to understanding nature.
Even assuming they are prepared to find a place for a divine ordering in nature, Thomas’s emphasis on
being and his use of Aristotle’s fourfold account of causation will seem strange and out of kilter with
modern scientific understanding. Readers from Christian traditions marked by a skepticism toward
natural theology also may find an insufficient connection between Thomas’s account of the created order
and more particular aspects of the biblical narrative, including Jesus’s incarnation and promised return to
consummate all things.
34. Bacon writes:
The most obvious example of the first type is Aristotle, who spoils natural philosophy with
his dialectic. He constructed the world of categories; he attributed to the human soul the no-
blest substance, a genus based on words of second intention; he transformed the interaction of
dense and rare, by which bodies occupy greater and smaller dimensions or spaces, into the
unilluminating distinction between act and potentiality; he insisted that each individual body
has a unique and specific motion, and if they participate in some other motion, that motion is
due to a different reason; and he imposed innumerable other things on nature at his own
whim. He was always more concerned with how one might explain oneself in replying, and
to giving some positive response in words, than of the internal truth of things; and this shows
up best if we compare his philosophy with other philosophies in repute among the Greeks.
rather than illuminate natural phenomena.35 Bacon argued, for example, that
acceptance of Aristotle’s emphasis on natural teleology discouraged con-
crete investigation into more immediate cause-and-effect relationships.36
Though it took some time for the inductive method to take root, the modern
natural sciences are now so firmly committed to the priority of empirical
observation over a priori theorizing that it can be difficult to imagine an
alternative conception of the “scientific method.”37
Thomas’s conception of nature, then, is at odds with modern working
assumptions about the natural world in two respects. First, his account is
metaphysical in the general sense that its primary goal is to identify and
apply the unseen principles that govern all reality (specifically everything
that partakes of being) to all facets of life rather than to examine particular
phenomena in a systematic way to discern connections between events.
Second, Thomas assumes, contrary to Bacon and the empiricists, that the
most important thing to understand about an object is what it is for—where
it fits in the cosmic order. While it seems unlikely that science will abandon
its quest for something like the underlying principles that were the subject
of the metaphysicians’ quest, a strongly teleological account of the natural
The ‘similar substances’ of Anaxagoras, the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus, the earth
and sky of Parmenides, the strife and friendship of Empedocles, the dissolution of bodies into
the undifferentiated nature of fire and their return to solidity in Heraclitus, all have something
of natural philosophy in them, and have the feel of nature and experience and bodies; whereas
Aristotle’s physics too often sound like mere terms of dialectic, which he rehashed under a
more solemn name in his metaphysics, claiming to be more of a realist, not a nominalist. And
no one should be impressed because in his books On Animals and in his Problems and other
treatises there is often discussion of experiments. He had in fact made up his mind before-
hand, and did not properly consult experience as the basis of his decisions and axioms; after
making his decisions arbitrarily, he parades experience around, distorted to suit his opinions,
a captive. Hence on this ground too he is guiltier than his modern followers (the scholastic
philosophers) who have wholly abandoned experience.
FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ORGANON 51-52 (Lisa Jardine & Michael Silverthorne eds., 2000) (1620)
(Aphorism LXIII).
35. Thomas’s metaphysics has been accused of obscuring both scientific observation and biblical
interpretation. Later theologians have argued (in a vein not dissimilar to Bacon) that philosophical con-
ceptions of God inherited from the ancient Greek philosophers, some of which Thomas inherits and does
not modify adequately—particularly his account of God and God’s relation to the creation—have inhib-
ited a full understanding of the biblical narrative as it might inform a theological understanding of crea-
tion. Colin Gunton, for example, argues that neglect of the doctrines of the incarnation, the divine cove-
nants, and eschatology generally has hampered an understanding of the created order that makes room
both for the integrity of the created order as distinct from the Creator and for God’s continuing purpose
for, and interaction in time within, creation. See generally GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR, supra note
20; see also OLIVER O’DONOVAN, RESURRECTION AND MORAL ORDER 53-75 (1986) (eschatology).
36. Bacon argues:
It is no less of a problem that in their philosophies and observations they waste their efforts
on investigating and treating the principles of things and the ultimate causes of nature (ulti-
matibus naturae), since all utility and opportunity for application lies in the intermediate
causes (in mediis). This is why men do not cease to abstract nature until they reach potential
and unformed matter, nor again do they cease to dissect nature till they come to the atom.
Even if these things were true, they can do little to improve men’s fortunes.
BACON, supra note 34, at 55 (Aphorism LXVI).
37. Oliver O’Donovan has made the point succinctly: “Only when thought could escape the inhibit-
ing influence of a teleological philosophy could it examine the universe in a way that was open to the
contingency of relations, not presupposing that it would find a unifying purposiveness but prepared to
find exactly what it did find.” O’DONOVAN, supra note 35, at 45.
world has come to be seen as implausible in the wake of the natural sci-
ences’ extraordinary successes, which have been brought about largely by
the abandonment of a teleological focus.38 As discussed below, Thomas’s
metaphysical presuppositions decisively shape his account of nature and
thus his accounts of natural and human law. However, unless we are to re-
peat the scholastics’ mistakes, we cannot simply assume a priori that Tho-
mas’s account of law is unenlightening because of its metaphysical orienta-
tion. The account itself must be explored.
II. LAW’S ESSENCE
A. Defining Law
The Treatise on Law begins, naturally enough, with a consideration of

law’s essence. Thomas analyzes law, by analogy,39 as if it were a natural
kind.40 In Thomas’s world, natural kinds are marked by their essences,
which are identified in terms of the characteristic tendencies of the members
of the group marked out as that kind of being.41 Although Thomas modifies
important aspects of Aristotle’s metaphysics, he adopts Aristotle’s basic
framework for understanding essences in the natural world. Thomas accepts
Aristotle’s hylomorphic account of objects; his account of motion, act, and
potentiality; and, most importantly for present purposes, his fourfold ac-
count of causation.42
Like Aristotle, Thomas is interested in accounting for the observed fact
that all material beings exhibit both stability and change and for material
beings’ simultaneous universality (i.e., membership in a class of beings) and
particularity (e.g., Socrates and John are both men, but they are not each
other). In broad outline, a material being’s essence is understood best in
terms of four causes: (1) its form—that which allows one to know what
something is; (2) its matter—what it is made of; (3) its efficient cause—
where it came from or the point at which its motion started; and (4) its final
cause—what it is for/where it is headed.43
Because law is not a material entity, the fourfold causation model can
be applied only analogically.44 Thomas argues that law’s formal cause is “an
38. See O’DONOVAN, supra note 35, at 45. But see GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR, supra note 20,
at 105-06 (criticizing Aristotle for de-emphasizing the material relations of things in favor of “ideal or
intellectual relations of things”); id. at 106 (“[T]he key to later science is the combination of experiment
and mathematics which goes ill with Aristotle’s tendency to classify phenomena rationally . . . .”).
39. See infra Part V (C).
40. See infra Part III.
41. Cf. LISSKA, supra note 15, at 103-05.
42. See generally F.C. COPLESTON, AQUINAS 73-110 (Penguin Books 1991) (1955).
43. See 1 AQUINAS, METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, I.L.4:C, at 70-71; see also PIERRE
CONWAY, METAPHYSICS OF AQUINAS 34 (Mary Michael Spangler ed., 1996).
44. See infra Part V; cf. FINNIS, supra note 22, at 31. On Aristotle’s application of fourfold causa-
tion to manmade and other objects, see R.J. Hankinson, Philosophy of Science, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE 109, 121-22 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1995). In addition to that adduced below,
the textual evidence favoring the claim that Thomas consciously is using the fourfold causation model is
ordinance of reason” (a reasonable command or prohibition), its efficient

cause is “either . . . the whole people, or . . . someone who is the viceregent
[sic] of the whole people,”45 and its final cause is the common good. Law is
immaterial, so there is no material cause strictly speaking; nevertheless,
law’s promulgation seems to occupy the analogous position in Thomas’s
account.
In addressing law’s formal cause, Thomas starts with the common-sense
notion of human law as a rule or measure of human activity.46 Common
sense is buttressed by his controversial suggestion that lex is derived from
ligare, which means “to bind.”47 While Thomas seems to regard the idea
that laws are rules as self-evident, he feels compelled to justify the second
aspect of his account of the form of law—that rules are not law unless they
bear some relation to reason.48 Here, he offers a metaphysical proof: (1) All
actions are undertaken for an end; (2) The starting point for human actions
is reasoning about what to do. The principle of the genus of human action
thus is reason;49 (3) Because “the principle in any genus, is the rule and
measure of that genus,”50 and reason is the principle of the genus of human
action,51 it follows that law is a matter of reason.52
As noted above, law does not have a material cause. However, Thomas
discusses promulgation in Question 90 by analogy to material causation.53 If
as follows: (1) his statement in the Prologue to the Treatise on Law that he will first consider law’s
“essence” and (2) the fact that his description in the Prologue of the discussion of law’s essence to fol-
low includes references to law’s “cause” and “end” as separate discussions (corresponding to ST IaI-
Iae.90.2-90.3).
45. ST IaIIae.90.3, c.
46. Thomas presupposes that the appropriate starting point for investigation is that which is first in
the order of knowledge. See infra Part V.
47. See ST IaIIae.90.1, c. An arguably more persuasive etymology for lex is legere, meaning “to
read.”
48. ST IaIIae.90.1, ad 3 (“But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature
of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. . . . [O]therwise the sovereign’s will would
savor of lawlessness rather than of law.”).
49. See ST IaIIae.1.1, ad 3. Aristotle holds that a principle is something that “comes first either with
reference to a thing’s being (as the first part of a thing is said to be a principle) or with reference to its
coming to be (as the first mover is said to be a principle) or with reference to the knowing of it.” 1
AQUINAS, METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, V.L.1:C, at 303. Thomas does not disagree with
this assessment as far as it goes but notes the differences that also mark the various uses of principle. In
particular, he emphasizes that the good is the “principle[] of the . . . motion of many things; that is, all
those which are done for the sake of some end. For in the realm of . . . moral acts, . . . demonstrations
make special use of the final cause.” Id.
In the discussion about law, Thomas says reason is the first principle of human action because
“it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action.” ST
IaIIae.90.1, c; see also CONWAY, supra note 43, at 108-11.
51. Human action is a term of art in Thomas’s thought. Humans, like everything else in the natural
world, act for an end, and it is this characteristic act that is dispositive of their essence. The characteristic
human act is to use reason to pursue the good. See generally ST IaIIae.1-48; GILSON, supra note 20, at
251-56; RALPH MCINERNY, ETHICA THOMISTICA 60-76 (rev. ed. 1997); YVES R. SIMON, THE
TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW 78-82 (Vukan Kuic ed., 1965).
52. For an explanation as to why Thomas thinks he is entitled to draw inferences about law in gen-
eral from characteristics of human law, see infra Part V.C.
53. ST IaIIae.95.4, obj. 2, contains the suggestion that law’s material cause consists of the kind of
command issued by the relevant authority. Thus “statutes, decrees of the commonalty, senatorial de-
matter is required for the embodiment and separation of material beings,

promulgation may be said to serve an analogous function in connection with
law. Laws cannot serve as universal principles of practical reason54 unless
they are “applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by [them],”55
and promulgation is the means through which such application takes
place.56 The written character of law also receives attention in this discus-
sion.57
Law’s final cause (its purpose), according to Thomas, is the common
good.58 Again, Thomas’s justification for this conclusion is largely a priori.
As we already have seen, the principle (i.e., starting point or source) of hu-
man acts is reason. Because a law is a rule and measure of human acts, laws
must be rules of reason, specifically practical reason.59 Reason itself, how-
ever, must also start somewhere, and practical reason’s starting point is the
pursuit of the good,60 which for humans is happiness.61 Thus, it follows that
law’s overarching orientation is toward human happiness.
The critical remaining question is whose happiness the law should con-
sider. Thomas reasons as follows that the happiness to be considered is that
of the community rather than the individual: (1) “[E]very part is ordained to
the whole, as imperfect to perfect”; (2) Individual humans are part of the
perfect community; therefore: (3) the community is the primary focus of
consideration and law should be oriented toward it rather than toward the
individual.62 The conclusion is double-edged: On one hand, a law that dis-
advantages particular individuals may be justified by its tendency to pro-
crees, and the like . . . do not differ, except materially.” Id. Thomas rejects this claim, holding that the
division of human laws into these various types is meaningful because different forms of government
generate correlative embodiments of law. Id. at c; see also Nicholas Aroney, Subsidiarity, Federalism
and the Best Constitution: Thomas Aquinas on City, Province and Empire, 26 LAW & PHIL. 161 (2007).
Promulgation seems a better analogue to matter because it is the vehicle through which earthly law
presents itself to humans. It has the further advantage of being an essential element of law according to
the received wisdom of the day. See THOMAS GILBY, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS
134-35 (1958).
54. ST IaIIae.90.1, ad 2 (“Such like universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed
to actions—have the nature of law.”). Thomas borrows the familiar Aristotelian distinction between
practical reason, which relates to decisions about what to do and speculative or theoretical reason,
which relates to our knowledge of things as they are apart from our actions.
56. Thomas also notes that promulgation “extends to future time by reason of the durability of
written characters, by which means it is continually promulgated.” ST IaIIae.90.4, ad 3. One might argue
that written characters are, analogically speaking, law’s material cause. But promulgation has a stronger
claim in that Thomas’s definition of law includes not only the focal case of human law but also the
unwritten eternal and natural laws, which nevertheless are promulgated.
57. Id.
58. Id. at IaIIae.90.2, c.
59. Id. at IaIIae 90.1, ad 2.
60. See id. at IaIIae.94.2, c. (“Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension sim-
ply, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed
to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good.”).
61. Id. at IaIIae.2.7; id. at IaIIae.3.1.
62. Id. at IaIIae.90.2, c; see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ON KINGSHIP 9-10 (Gerald B. Phelan trans.,
1982); cf. ST IaIIae.96.4, c (analogizing burdens on individuals required to facilitate the common good
to the sacrifices that nature makes in parts of organic bodies in order to preserve the whole).
mote the common good. On the other, laws aimed at individual activities
must find their justification in the common good; otherwise, they are “de-
void of the nature of a law.”63
Lastly, law’s efficient cause (its origin) is the political community’s
ruler(s). Thomas again emphasizes law’s connection to human action, and
he again makes an a priori argument. He just has demonstrated that law
“regards first and foremost the order to the common good.”64 Because law,
as a product of practical reason, involves ordering toward an end, Thomas
argues that the direction toward that end is properly the choice of the person
“to whom the end belongs.”65 Thus, laws should be made by either “the
whole people or . . . a public personage who has care of the whole peo-
ple.”66
Thomas also connects the requirement that law should be made by a
public person to the prior discussion of the regulation of human action by
practical reason by arguing that law should be “an efficacious inducement to
virtue.”67 “[P]rivate person[s] cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously . . .
[but] can only advise.”68 Law, on the other hand, can induce obedience from
the reason, if only due to fear of punishment.69
This argument presupposes both a state monopoly on the exercise of
force, at least deadly force,70 and some account of a distinction between
public and private personages. Thomas writes elsewhere that “the care of
the common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority:
wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers
to death.”71 He also draws a clear distinction between public and private
dealings, arguing, for example, that judges may draw only on legally admis-
sible evidence in making their rulings and never on their private knowledge,
even when a case’s outcome might turn on their decision to do so.72
63. ST IaIIae.90.2, c. John Finnis argues that an important thrust of the discussion of the common
good in Thomas’s treatment of law and politics is that it serves, contrary to common understanding, as a
limitation on government power: “[Thomas’s] position is not readily distinguishable from the ‘grand
simple principle’ (itself open to interpretation and diverse applications) of John Stuart Mill’s On Lib-
erty.” FINNIS, supra note 22, at 228.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at IaIIae.90.3, ad 2.
68. Id.; see also id. at Ia.IIae.50.2, c (discussing rule by command and its relationship to the com-
manded person’s will).
69. Id. at IaIIae.92.2, c. But see FINNIS, supra note 22, at 257 and sources cited therein (discussing
law’s “internalization” by the people).
70. ST IIaIIae.64.3, c. Civil magistrates are entitled to employ “perfect coercive power” that extends
to “irreparable punishments such as death and mutilation.” Id. at IIaIIae.65.2, ad 2. Parents and slave-
holders can employ punishments, such as beatings, that “do not inflict irreparable harm.” Id.
71. Id. at IIaIIae.64.3, c.
72. See id. at IIaIIae.67.2, c. See generally FINNIS, supra note 22, at 250-52 (discussing the distinc-
tion between public and private personages and its relationship to the rule of law).
B. Metaphysical Influences in the Treatise
What implications does Thomas’s metaphysics have for his account of

law’s essence? The claim that law may be analyzed as if it were a natural
kind with an essence is fundamental, and it is examined in more detail in
Part III. For the moment, it is enough to notice how Thomas’s metaphysical
framework colors his observations about law (particularly human law) and
his argumentation.
It is only fitting to begin by observing that perhaps Thomas’s biggest
shortcoming in many legal theorists’ eyes—his refusal to separate law and
morality—follows from his metaphysics.73 If, as Thomas supposes, one
cannot fully understand anything without understanding its end (its final
cause), and if the very idea of good is connected with the fulfillment of that
end, no airtight separation of facts and values can exist in the realm of
knowledge. Thomas’s reputation in this regard appears to be undergoing
some rehabilitation as conventional wisdom about the impossibility of de-
riving values from facts is being questioned and doubt about the possibility
of value-neutral observation of social practices increases.74
The most striking single instance of metaphysical influence in Tho-
mas’s discussion of law’s definition is the analogy75 he draws between or-
ganic bodies and their members and the body politic and its constituents.76
The theme is significant not only because it recurs several times in the
Question in which Thomas defines law but also because one can observe
Thomas’s apparent struggle to square his metaphysics with what he regards
as an appropriate account of human law and lawmaking.77
Recall Thomas’s argument that law’s final cause is the common good.78
Following Aristotle,79 Thomas begins with the principle that wholes have
priority over parts.80 The focal case in the conception of wholes and parts is
that of the bodies of living organisms.81 Such bodies are, generally speak-
ing, self-sustaining in ways that their parts are not; thus it may be said that
the parts exist for the sake of the whole, and it seems reasonable to give the
73. It also is no doubt part of his theology, as that term is usually understood. And Thomas’s views
about God no doubt were important in his acceptance and modification of Aristotelian philosophy.
74. See O’DONOVAN, supra note 35, at 46-52 (arguing that our understanding of generic categories
ultimately depends on teleology). But see Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Method-
ology Problem in Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17 (2003). See generally LISSKA, supra note 15;
MACINTYRE, supra note 18; Robert P. George, Natural Law and Human Nature, in NATURAL LAW
THEORY, supra note 9, at 31; Lee, supra note 18; Daniel N. Robinson, Lloyd Weinreb’s Problems with
Natural Law, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY 213, 214-17 (Robert P. George ed.,
1996).
75. Analogy is itself a crucial feature of Thomas’s account of law. See infra Part V.
76. ST19 IaIIae.96.4, c.
77. See id.
79. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS ¶ 1253a, at 55 ll. 19-41 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House
1943).
80. See ST IaIIae.90.3, c; id. at IaIIae.96.4, c.
81. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 79.
body priority over its individual “members.”82 Again following Aristotle,83

Thomas holds that human potential cannot be fully realized outside of
communities; the complete community is thus a whole in a way an individ-
ual person is not.84 Communities provide not only the basis for physical
survival but also a social context in which the virtuous life can be lived.
Because the individual is but a part of the perfect community, itself a natu-
ral institution, the community’s good deserves priority in lawmaking and is
not in any fundamental conflict with the individual’s good.
Thomas’s reliance on the body/member analogy as justification for the
idea that law is oriented to the common good may baffle modern readers.
However, in his context, it was far more persuasive. His conclusion rests on
the authority of both Isidore and Aristotle and presumably also the bulk of
the Christian political tradition in which Thomas was working. As we shall
see, Thomas believes more familiar realities, like animal bodies, can some-
times shed light by analogy on other, deeper realities.85 Thus, he has inde-
pendent reasons to believe that inquiry into the relationship between the
bodies of living things and their parts can shed light on the lives of “bodies”
like communities. In sum, he may have seen little reason to question either
that the common good should have unqualified priority in lawmaking or that
the body/member analogy provided important support for the position.
One of the body/member analogy’s strengths is its ability to give an ac-
count of the potential confluence between the good of a whole and that of
its parts. Bodies need their parts, and presumably do not inflict injury on
them lightly. Moreover, the parts cannot exist without the whole, so there is
no question that if one must choose between the interests of the whole and
that of its parts, the whole has priority.86 Nevertheless, as applied to political
life, the analogy pushes more strongly toward the priority of the whole than
Thomas thinks appropriate. Thomas is not naive enough to think that the
body politic (as represented by its rulers) inevitably will care for each of its
parts just as a human might be expected to care for his.87 Nor does he think
humans depend on the body politic to the same extent their limbs depend on
their body, and he recognizes that humans may have ends of their own.
These disanalogies require Thomas to find a way to prevent his account of
the community/citizen relationship from becoming a license for self-serving
rule by tyrants or overly intrusive political control.
82. Member is used here in the sense of “limb” or “organ” when referring to the organism and in the
sense of person when referring to a part of the body politic.
83. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 79, ¶ 1252b, at 54 ll. 29-30.
84. See ST IaIIae.90.3, c.
85. See infra Part V.
86. The body/member metaphor also works relatively well when Thomas is explaining why law’s
efficient cause is the “whole people or . . . a public personage who has care of the whole people.” ST
IaIIae.90.3, c. In this instance, it helps to underwrite the distinction between public and private authority.
Laws should be made by the whole (or its representative), not by the part, because law’s purpose is to
order the public life of the community.
87. See id. at IaIIae.96.4, c. (dealing with a ruler’s actions that further his personal good and not that
of the community).
Thomas deals with these problems by giving an account of the common

good that cuts in the opposite direction from the body/member metaphor.
An organic body’s parts may exist for the sake of the whole, but in Tho-
mas’s account of the political common good, the whole exists for the sake
of its parts. Thomas uses the concept of the common good to declare out-of-
bounds both laws made only in the ruler’s self-interest88 and those that im-
pinge on individual decisions without benefiting to the whole.89 Not only
that, but in Thomas’s vision, the purpose of building a community is not to
establish an empire but rather to enable the community’s members to lead
virtuous lives. The whole point of having a community is to enable individ-
ual members to flourish.
These two different directions ultimately come into conflict, however,
when Thomas deals with the community’s treatment of criminal offenders.
In a series of questions in the Second Part, Thomas discusses the propriety
of punishments for wrongdoers, concluding that it is perfectly acceptable to
harm an individual for the community’s sake. For example, in dealing with
the question of capital punishment, Thomas writes:
[I]t is lawful to kill dumb animals, in so far as they are naturally di-
rected to man’s use, as the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now
every part is directed to the whole, . . . wherefore every part is natu-
rally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the
health of the whole body demands the excision of a member,
through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will
be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now
every individual person is compared to the whole community, as
part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the
community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advanta-
geous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good,
since a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump (1 Cor. v.6).90
Significantly, the killing of humans is put on a different ground than the

killing of animals for food. Thomas justifies the taking of animal and plant
88. Id.
89. See id. at IaIIae.96.3, c; see also FINNIS, supra note 22, at 222-31 (arguing that common good in
this context refers to a “limited common good, specific to the political community [which Thomas refers
to as] public good”). One can see a similar move in Thomas’s treatment of the relationship between
secular and ecclesiastical power. In ST IIaIIae.60.6, ad 3, Thomas writes:
The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as the body is subject to the soul. Conse-
quently the judgment is not usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal mat-
ters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have been committed to the spiritual by
the temporal authority. The implication is that the higher spiritual authority would be usurp-
ing power if it intruded in matters other than those set out. Thomas was not entirely consis-
tent in his treatment of church-state relations in other works.
See Paul E. Sigmund, Law and Politics, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS, supra note
31, at 217, 218-19.
90. ST IIaIIae.64.2, c. Thomas makes similar arguments in id. at IIaIIae.64.3 (dealing with the
execution of death sentences); id. at IIaIIae.64.5 (concerning suicide); and id. at IIaIIae.65.1 (maiming).
life for food on the basis of the ordering of creation.91 Humans are not made
to be “used” by the community in the same way animals and plants are
made to be used for human sustenance.92
Nevertheless, Thomas’s organic image93 of community life creates
some interesting tensions in his account of the death penalty. On one hand,
the justification for execution relies more on deterrence than retribution; the
evildoer may be put to death because he is “dangerous and infectious to the
community.”94 On the other, Thomas holds that it is evil in itself to kill a
human being.95 He reconciles these two principles by arguing that the mur-
derer’s execution96 is justified because the murderer has forfeited his human
dignity.97 Once the wrongdoer’s dignity has been forfeited, he may be used
for the greater good in the way animals are.98
This is about as close as Thomas comes to recognizing the possibility of
an inherent conflict between individuals and the community, and his solu-
tion is not entirely satisfactory. He maintains that no conflict exists between
the common good and the well-functioning human’s individual good—“The
common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as
the good of the whole is the end of each part”99—but he seems to doubt his
own argument. Even as Thomas defends the execution of the criminal from
society’s perspective, he writes that “in every man though he be sinful, we
ought to love the nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by
slaying him.”100 If no inherent conflict exists between the individual good
and the common good, why must “the nature which God has made” and
which “we ought to love” be destroyed?101
One can also see metaphysical elements in the significance Thomas at-
taches to the nature of human action. Recall that Thomas defends law’s
91. Id. at IIaIIae.64.1.

92. Cf. id. at IIaIIae.64.1, c. (“There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is.”).
93. Thomas does not think human society is literally organic. The community/body analogy can be
pressed too far. Cf. id. at IaIIae.17.4; id. at IIIa.8.1, ad 2. Nevertheless, Finnis may overstate the case
somewhat when he claims that “Aquinas firmly discourages attempts to understand human societies as
organisms or substances. There are analogies between organisms and societies; . . . but the disanalogies
are fundamentally more important.” FINNIS, supra note 22, at 25 (footnotes omitted).
94. ST IIaIIae 64.2, c.
95. Id. at IIaIIae.64.2, ad 3.
96. It is not clear that Thomas limits the death penalty to murder. See id. at IIaIIae.64.2, sc.
97. Thomas writes:
By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dig-
nity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into
the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to others. . . .
Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may
be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than
a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i. 1 and Ethic. vii. 6).
Id. at IIaIIae 64.2, ad 3.
98. See id.
99. Id. at IIaIIae.58.9, ad 3. On the other hand, the same cannot be said about the good of individu-
als: “[T]he good of one individual is not the end of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is
directed to the common good . . . .” Id.
101. Id.
close connection to reason as follows: (1) all actions are undertaken for an
end; (2) the distinctive feature of specifically human actions is that they
result from deliberation and reasonable choice.102 The principle in the genus
of human action is thus reason; (3) because reason is the principle of the
genus of human action, reason is the rule and measure of human action.
While the metaphysical thrust of the specific argument we have just
seen Thomas make is not unimportant,103 the real work in the argument is
done at a deeper yet still metaphysical level. To accept Thomas’s argument,
one must already have assumed that (1) the world has an externally given
order, (2) part of that order includes a distinctive human “essence,” and (3)
that essence involves using reason to act for a good end. These are contro-
versial assumptions, but if one is prepared to accept them, the argument
makes sense: it would be at least anomalous if rules binding humans to par-
ticular courses of action had no connection to someone’s reason.
On the other hand, those with doubts about the world’s orderliness are
not the only ones who may find Thomas’s justification implausible. As we
have just seen, Thomas’s metaphysical arguments in support of his account
of law show that his account depends crucially on his account of the human
person. Thus, even among those prepared to admit the existence of some-
thing like a human essence, accounts differ as to what that essence might be.
Though Thomas is participating in a long Christian tradition of identifying
reason as that which separates humans from other animals and thus consti-
tutes the “image of God,” alternative traditions also exist.104 If, for example,
the essence of human being (in theological terms, the “image of God”)105 is
to be a person living in mutually constitutive relations with other people (in
an “analogy of relation”106 to the Trinity),107 love, rather than reason, might
be taken to be the defining principle of authentic human action.108
III. HUMAN LAW’S ONTOLOGY
A. Is There Such a Thing as Law?
Implicit in Thomas’s attempt to define law is the assumption that it is

more than a nominal kind—a set of objects related only by a common name.
However, although Thomas believes in universals, he does not subscribe to
102. Cf. id. at IaIIae.1.1, c; id. at ad 3.

103. I.e., it relies on the assumptions that all actions are taken for an end, that natural kinds have
distinctive essences represented by characteristic actions, and that the orientation (principle) of such
actions is something against which they can be measured.
104. See generally G.C. BERKOUWER, MAN: THE IMAGE OF GOD 67-118 (Dirk W. Jellema trans.,
1962) (surveying alternatives).
105. GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR, supra note 20, at 193.
106. Id. at 206.
107. For a defense of a view like this, see id. at 193-211.
108. Interestingly, while this might make Thomas’s proof of reason’s place in law more difficult, it
would make his defense of law’s orientation to the common good much more straightforward than the
analogy he draws between the body politic and human bodies.
the Platonic notion that kinds (“human being,” “horse,” etc.) exist separately
from the objects that embody them. Rather, the archetypes for these features
of the created order are part of the eternal law, the blueprint by which God
made the world. To the extent the universals have any separate existence, it
is only as ideas in the mind of God.109
Does law exist separately from laws? It follows from the preceding
paragraph that Thomas would reject the existence of law as a singular entity
while affirming the existence of laws as the embodiment of the kind, law. If
law followed the order of things in the material world, we would expect to
find various human laws, natural laws, eternal laws, etc., that share the
characteristics of the species of law of which they are a part but not the
separate existence of a single, generic human law, natural law, eternal law,
etc., that encompasses all laws in each such category. Thomas equivocates
on this issue, however. He argues that while there are discrete precepts of
natural law, human law, and divine law, as well as “many types of things in
the Divine mind,”110 each type of law may be viewed as a unity because
“things, which are in themselves different, may be considered as one, ac-
cording as they are ordained to one common thing.”111 Because the various
kinds of law are ordained to the common good, each is rightly considered
law, as are the particular laws (or precepts) we might also identify.112
Thomas’s claim that human law is law raises a further question. We
shall see later113 that Thomas divides reality into two categories—things that
cannot be affected by human will and things that can be so affected. Al-
though the eternal and natural laws belong to the former category, human
law would seem to belong to the latter. How, if at all, does law’s human
authorship affect its status as law?
Thomas clearly does not think human authorship precludes human law
from obtaining the status of law. Human law is derived from natural law,
which human beings did not create, but it is not the same as natural law.
Indeed, Thomas gives human law its own category in his taxonomy in the
Treatise.114 Moreover, Thomas acknowledges that much human law in-
109. Cf. ST Ia.85.1, ad 1; COPLESTON, supra note 42, at 93-96.

110. ST IaIIae 93.1, obj. 1.
112. See id. (eternal law); id. at IaIIae.94.2, ad 1 (“All these precepts of the law of nature have the
character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept.”); id. at IaIIae.99.1, ad 1 (old
law). The reasoning concerning laws’ general orientation toward the common good would seem to
provide a basis for arguing the existence of a human law in addition to human laws. The question would
seem appropriate to the inquiry made in id. at IaIIae.91.3 (“Whether There Is a Human Law”), but Tho-
mas never (as far as I have been able to determine) claims that though many precepts of human law
exist, human law constitutes a unity. Indeed, he affirms Isidore’s division of human law into two sepa-
rate categories, the law of nations and the civil law, each derived from natural law in different ways. See
id. at IaIIae.95.4.
113. See infra Part IV.
114. Finnis writes:
[A] conceptual distinction or disconnection [between law and morality] is effortlessly estab-
lished by the move made in the Summa, of taking human positive law as a subject for consid-
eration in its own right (and its own name), a topic readily identifiable and identified prior to
any question about its relation to morality.
volves the “determination of particulars”; i.e., the resolution of details that,

as far as humans can determine, might defensibly be decided one way or the
other. Human law thus is not the “brooding omnipresence” so often decried
by natural law’s opponents.115 Rather, it consists of particular rules, and the
human sovereign puts it into effect. Unlike the other main instantiations of
law, human law is a cultural artifact; nevertheless, it is not created ex nihilo.
It reflects reality, including, but not limited to, the human capacity to use
reason to act for a good end and the moral reality of the temporal world it is
created to govern.
B. Unjust Laws
We have just seen that Thomas affirms both that human beings make
law and that human authorship does not prevent human laws from being
included in the generic category, law. Nevertheless, Thomas’s claims else-
where in the Treatise—in particular his statement that “that which is not just
seems to be no law at all”116—suggest that not every human enactment by a
person in political authority qualifies as law.
Thomas’s famous statement about unjust laws is perhaps the best-
known, and most controversial, feature of his account of human law. John
Finnis argues that, in order to understand Thomas at this point, one must
take into account the possible vantage points from which law may be exam-
ined.117 From the citizen’s perspective, saying that an unjust law is not law
may simply mean that immoral enactments are not binding in conscience
(except to avoid scandal), even if disobeying them may have adverse tem-
poral consequences.118 Thomas’s account of law is, however, not exclu-
sively intended as an ethical guide to the faithful, and his suggestion that
unjust laws are not law is more troublesome when read from the viewpoint
of the theologian/theorist119 or that of the lawyer or judge working in a legal
system in which morality is not a conventional part of the rules of recogni-
tion.120
Reading the Treatise as a whole, it seems evident that Thomas is not
concerned primarily with providing a universal legal rule of recognition.121
John Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM
195, 203-04 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
115. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
116. ST IaIIae.95.2, c (emphasis omitted); see also id. at IaIIae.96.4c (“[A] law that is not just, seems
to be no law at all.”).
117. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 365-66 (1980).
118. ST IaIIae.96.4.
119. The Summa is a work of theology. The theologian offers a presentation of law in theological
perspective. See infra notes 164-178 and accompanying text.
120. I.e., the rules enabling those in a society to recognize when a law is in effect. See generally
HART, supra note 5, at 77-96.
121. Cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 41 (Univ. Chi. Press
1979) (1765): “[The law of nature] is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no
human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force,
and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.” One may debate whether Black-
In Question 96, he clearly states that an unjust law sometimes should be

obeyed, as a matter of conscience, “to avoid scandal.”122 The “scandal”
Thomas has in mind is, of course, civil disobedience. The potentially scan-
dalized community, the citizen, and Thomas are all able to recognize that
this unjust enactment is a law as far as the community, its lawyers, and its
judges are concerned.123
Moreover, as noted above, Thomas is writing a work of theology, not a
legal treatise. As a result, he is interested in providing an external theologi-
cal (speculative) account of law and, secondarily, a work of ethics for the
faithful. Thus, his readers presumably are more interested in the questions
“How is human law related to God?” and “Does living rightly always entail
obedience to human law?” than in “What is the content of the human law?”
One thus might offer a summary rebuttal to the charge that Thomas denies
the status of law to immoral law as follows: Thomas merely holds that un-
just laws do not bind one’s conscience the way other laws do, even if they
are still laws from the sovereign’s perspective and their violation may result
in unhappy consequences for the lawbreaker.
Despite these plausible and important replies to his critics, it is hard to
read Thomas as saying other than that human law’s ontological status (i.e.,
its being law) depends on its connection to right reason. Consider Thomas’s
implicit appeal to the distinction between appearance and reality in this
statement from Question 93:
Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right rea-
son; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal
law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust
law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence. Nevertheless
even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law,
though being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the
eternal law; since all power is from the Lord God, according to Ro-
mans.124
stone intended this statement to suggest a rule of recognition. On one hand, his use of the words validity
and authority tend to suggest he does. On the other, as John Finnis points out, even in Blackstone’s
“blunt formulation[],” he is “affirm[ing] that unjust LAWS are not law.” FINNIS, supra note 117, at 364.
122. ST IaIIae.96.4, c.
123. As John Finnis has argued:
[The natural law] tradition explicitly (by speaking of ‘unjust laws’) accords to iniquitous
rules legal validity, whether on the ground and in the sense that these rules are accepted in the
courts as guides to judicial decision, or on the ground and in the sense that, in the judgment of
the speaker, they satisfy the criteria of validity laid down by constitutional or other legal
rules, or on both these grounds and in both these senses. The tradition goes so far as to say
that there may be an obligation to conform to some such unjust laws in order to uphold re-
spect for the legal system as a whole . . . .
FINNIS, supra note 117, at 365; see also Norman Kretzmann, Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex: Laws on Trial in
Aquinas’ Court of Conscience, 33 AM. J. JURIS. 99, 99 (1988). But see FINNIS, supra note 117, at 364
n.13 (citing ST IIaIIae.70.4, ad 2 and contrasting ST IIaIIae.57.1, ad 1) (noting that Thomas “does say
that an unjust judgment of a court is not a judgment”).
124. ST IaIIae.93.3, ad 2; see also id. at IaIIae.95.2, c (internal citations omitted):
Moreover, violence may be read not merely in the contemporary sense

of the imposition of will by brute force, but also in its Aristotelian context
as describing motion that hinders fulfillment of law’s telos.125 Unjust “laws”
move the community farther away from its happiness; law’s essence is to do
just the opposite. The most such enactments can do is appear to be laws.
The best way to understand Thomas’s position about human law’s rela-
tionship to reason is to take seriously Thomas’s belief that humans make
laws while simultaneously affirming that they do not make them ex nihilo
(out of nothing). All human law, says Thomas, is derived from the natural
law, which he defines as the human being’s participation in the eternal
law.126 Nevertheless, all law is not derived from natural law in the same
way. The jus gentium, or law of nations, are legal rules that are more or less
constant across time and place. These laws are derived from the natural law
“as . . . conclusion[s] from premises.”127 Civil law (jus civile), on the other
hand, is derived from the natural law “by way of determination of certain
generalities.”128 Thomas compares these “determinations” to the decisions
that an architect must make to finish a house that has been planned to have a
general shape but for which many of the details have been left unspeci-
fied.129 Significantly, human laws that are determinations can be expected to
vary across places and times “according as each political community de-
cides on what is best for itself.”130
Despite these acknowledged variations, Thomas continues to argue for
the universal connection between right reason and law. He explains the dis-
tinction between the two types of natural law derivation by analogizing be-
tween practical and speculative reason: Scientific knowledge (which in-
volves speculative or theoretical reason) includes “naturally known inde-
As Augustine says . . . that which is not just seems to be no law at all: wherefore the force of
a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from
being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as
is clear from what has been stated above . . . . Consequently every human law has just so
much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it de-
flects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.
Cf. id. at IaIIae.95.4, c (citing Aristotle for the proposition that tyrannical governments do not produce
law).
In ST IaIIae.96.4, c, Thomas also speaks of the force of human law as depending on its justice.
In that passage, he notes that laws are unjust if they are “contrary to human good” because they deviate
from the essentials of appropriate end, author, and form. Id. In that case, they are “acts of violence rather
than laws.” Id. Laws also “may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good” (e.g., commanding
idolatry). Id. The statements in ST IaIIae.96.4, obs. 1 aim to answer the question whether “human law
does . . . bind a man in conscience.” They thus arguably have a more practical than theoretical focus;
nevertheless, they are not inconsistent with the more theoretical statements made in Questions 93 and 95
(and quoted above).
125. See Simon Oliver, Motion According to Aquinas and Newton, 17 MOD. THEOLOGY 163, 167
(2001).
126. ST IaIIae.91.2, c; see infra note 217.
127. ST IaIIae.91.2, c.
128. Id.
130. Id.
monstrable principles”131 but is also gained when human effort and experi-
ence lead to “the conclusions of the various sciences.”132 Similarly, the
practical reason begins with the general principles of the natural law and,
through human effort and experience, arrives at determinations of the ac-
tions to be taken in particular cases.133 In some cases the most general prin-
ciples lead to legal rules in short order, as when “one should do harm to no
man”134 leads to prohibitions on murder or battery. In other cases, determin-
ing the appropriate rule must rely more on indirect reasoning from the natu-
ral principles and on experience with what has proven useful in the working
of the world.135
There are, for Thomas, two main reasons that legal rules vary notwith-
standing their supposed common origin in reason: (1) ruler error and (2) the
interaction between rules and context. First, although everyone knows the
most basic principles of practical reason (the natural law), some people are
unaware of the more specific principles. Unawareness or rejection of natural
law leads to differentiated and suboptimal law. Thomas primarily identifies
moral corruption as the reason the more detailed principles of natural law
are not known,136 but he also suggests that a (presumably blameless) lack of
wisdom or experience might account for such ignorance.137
The second source for variation is the seemingly limitless diversity of
human circumstances. Circumstantial diversity causes laws to vary with
time and place and also accounts for the fact that rules sometimes produce
unforeseen and perverse consequences. Thomas’s affirmation on the subject
of legal variation is straightforward: “The general principles of the natural
law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great
variety of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws
among various people.”138 The determinations represent judgments about
how the general principles of the natural law are to be applied in the cir-
cumstances at hand, and thus can be expected to vary according to time,
place, and the character of the people being governed.139 Thomas even

132. Id.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 139-140.
134. ST IaIIae.95.2, c (emphasis omitted).
135. Id. at IaIIae.95.2, c; cf. id. at IaIIae.91.3, c (discussing the relationship between custom and
utility); id. at IaIIae.94.5, c (discussing natural law by addition and subtraction).
136. Id. at IaIIae.94.4, c; cf. id. at IaIIae.94.6, c.
137. See id. at IaIIae.95.1, ad 2; IaIIae.95.2, ad 4. Thomas’s argument is based in part on a compari-
son between practical and speculative reason. Thomas holds that certain general principles of speculative
reason (e.g., the principle of non-contradiction) are always true and are generally known but that scien-
tific conclusions, although equally true, are not equally known to everyone. See id. at IaIIae.94.4, c
(“[T]hus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although
it is not known to all.”). Practical reason deals not with necessary truths but rather with what is to be
done (“contingent matters”). Id. Thomas argues that practical reason is similar to speculative reason in
that its general principles are always true and are generally known, and also in that its specific conclu-
sions are less widely known than the general principles. Id. Practical reason differs from speculative
reason in that its conclusions are variable and contingent rather than necessary. Id.
139. As to the latter, see id. at IaIIae.96.2, c.
speaks of “additions” to the natural law as human laws include provisions

that have been discovered to be conducive to human flourishing.140
Thomas also observes that rules sometimes “fail” and thus cannot al-
ways be implemented according to their express terms. Indeed, he explains
that the more specific a rule is, the more likely it is to fail occasionally in its
concrete application. For example, Thomas derives the rule that goods
should be returned to their owner from the more general principle that one
should act according to reason. The latter principle is general and is always
true. The former principle is usually true, but not always. Thus, even though
it is right “that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their
owner,”141 this principle should not be followed “if [the goods] are claimed
for the purpose of fighting against one’s country.”142 If the principle is made
even more specific, such as by adding the condition that goods held in trust
should be returned “with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a
way,”143 it is all the more likely that the principles should not be applied in
particular circumstances: “[T]he greater the number of conditions added, the
greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail . . . .”144
In addition to these two main causes, Thomas hints at a third source of
legal variation. As already noted, in his discussion of determinations, Tho-
mas analogizes these decisions to those an architect must make in “deter-
min[ing] the general form of a house to some particular shape.”145 This il-
lustration suggests that variations in law might be expected even absent
ruler “error” and even in similar cultural/historical contexts. While architec-
tural discretion is limited by the laws of physics, the type of building being
built, budget, topography, and a host of other factors, we would not expect
the details of each building to be precisely the same where the identity of
the architect is different. So, apparently, it is with law.
Nevertheless, there may be reasons to doubt whether Aquinas intended
to go quite this far in celebrating human freedom to make law. When the
problem of variation in human law is explicitly raised in Question 95 as an
objection to the claim that human law is derived from natural law, Thomas
140. Id. at IaIIae.94.5, c; cf . id. at IaIIae.91.3, c (“Wherefore Tully says . . . justice has its source in
nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which
emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the
law.”).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at IaIIae.95.2, c. The Latin artifex is translated craftsman in a popular English edition of the
Summa, but architect seems equally appropriate, since Thomas’s example is a person who gives a house
its particular shape. See also FINNIS, supra note 22, at 267 (arguing that the metaphor is intended to
“[stress] the designer’s wide freedom within the ambit of the commission”); George, supra note 12, at
23-29 (noting Thomas’s “stress on determinationes by which human lawmakers give effect to the re-
quirements of natural law in the shape of positive law for the common good of his community—
enjoying, to a considerable extent, the creative freedom Aquinas analogized to that of the architect—
reveals his awareness of the legitimate variability of human laws”).
attributes the variations to “the great variety of human affairs”146 and does
not mention the great variety of legislators and judges. In addition, Thomas
suggests elsewhere the single best determination for each case is contained
in the eternal law—the reasonable will of God.147 It is thus hard to avoid the
conclusion that any deviation from that right answer would be problematic,
even if it were inevitable.
Finally, it is worth noting that a rule’s ontological status as law does not
necessarily mean it must always be obeyed. As we have seen, in Thomas’s
thought, (1) reason, (2) political authority, and (3) a view to the common
good are necessary to constitute “law.” That said, just laws (presumably
even those derived rather directly from the natural law) may sometimes fail
in their application and should thus occasionally be disobeyed,148 and unjust
“laws” should be obeyed in some cases to avoid scandal.149 Perhaps surpris-
ingly, Thomas’s ethics do not in all cases tie the obligation to obey a gov-
ernmental command to its ontological status as law.150
146. ST IaIIae.95.2, ad 3.
147. Thomas comments:
[O]n the part of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, ac-
cording to certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of indi-
vidual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human
reason to proceed further to sanction them by law.
Id. at IaIIae.91.3, ad 1 (emphasis added). Significantly, the objection to which this reply is addressed is
that human law is not needed because natural law is sufficient to order human affairs. Id. at IaIIae.91.3,
obj. 1. Thomas’s answer is that human law is needed because natural law (humans’ participation in the
eternal law) is incomplete. Id. at IaIIae.91.3, c. Legislators fill this gap by making particular determina-
tions that, when reasonable, are binding. Id. The “particular determination” nevertheless is answered in
principle in the eternal law, though we lack direct access to the determination. Id.
That Aquinas should affirm this is not as surprising as it might seem at first blush. It merely
requires assuming that God, who is infinitely wise and just and who is all-knowing, is aware of the
determination that needs making and, thus, knows the best solution.
148. Aquinas writes:
Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the general
welfare, it should not be observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an estab-
lished law that the gates of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a
general rule: but, if it were to happen that the enemy are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are
defenders of the city, it would be a great loss to the city, if the gates were not opened to them:
and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to the letter of the law . . . .
Id. at IaIIae.96.6, c. One might object that the issue raised in Thomas’s example is not one of disobedi-
ence but merely of interpretation, i.e., the lawgiver would not have intended the gate to be kept closed
under the circumstances; therefore, one who opened the gate would not be disobeying a valid law but
would merely be interpreting it correctly. Although Thomas does connect the authorized disobedience
with the lawgiver’s presumed intent to “maintain the common weal,” id., there are a number of other
aspects of the discussion that seem to call such a reading into question. Id. First, Thomas expressly
characterizes the case in view as one “wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful,” and con-
cludes that “it [i.e., the law at issue] should not be observed.” Id. Second, he requires that the letter of the
law be observed in such cases “if the observance of the law according to the letter does not involve any
sudden risk needing instant remedy,” because “it is not competent for everyone to expound what is
useful” to the political community. Id. In such cases the letter of the law must be followed until the
authorities can be consulted. Third, these authorities “have the power to dispense from the laws.” Id. The
“law” in this discussion is not an ideal but is a concrete rule that has the limitations that attend legisla-
tion.
150. This makes the comments about the relative force of human law and natural law all the more
confusing. Perhaps the difficulty can be resolved along the lines of Thomas’s account of human acts.
Many acts are not good or bad considered in the abstract; they take on moral qualities only in their
IV. ORDERS OF REALITY/METHODOLOGY
We already have seen that Thomas presupposes that law may be ana-
lyzed more or less as a natural kind, even though he recognizes that human
laws are constructs. Nevertheless, Thomas assumes that a single scientific
method is insufficient to enable investigation of all types of reality, and this
assumption affects his account of law. Thomas presupposes that there are
(1) different types of objects, (2) different modes of knowing, and (3) dif-
ferent intentions in the knower.151 First, Thomas emphasizes that more than
one kind of object may be known. He identifies four distinct types of sci-
ence that represent different objects of study and, indeed, different orders of
reality:
There is one order that reason does not establish but only beholds,
such is the order of things in nature. There is a second order that
reason establishes in its own act of consideration, for example,
when it arranges its concepts among themselves, and the signs of
concepts as well, because words express the meanings of the con-
cepts. There is a third order that reason in deliberating establishes in
the operations of the will. There is a fourth order that reason in
planning establishes in the external things which it causes, such as a
chest and a house.152
These orders are helpfully characterized as (1) natural science, (2) logic
(conceived broadly), (3) moral philosophy, and (4) technique.153
The objects of study represented in these orders may be divided roughly
according to whether their subject is things humans do or make (operabilia)
or things they do not (speculabilia). Thomas also divides knowledge into
the broad categories of speculative knowledge and practical knowledge.
When one considers an object that is what it is regardless of human willing
or thinking, the only available knowledge of it is speculative knowledge.
specific context. See id. at IaIIae.18.9, c; COPLESTON, supra note 42, at 206.
151. See MCINERNY, supra note 51, at 38-40 (discussing ST Ia.14.16).
152. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, Lect. 1, n.1 (C.I. Litzinger
trans., 1993), quoted in RALPH MCINERNY, AQUINAS 41 (2004).
153. Aquinas concludes that:
[S]ciences {scientiae} are of four irreducibly distinct {diversae} kinds: (1) sciences of mat-
ters and relationships {ordo} unaffected by our thinking, i.e. of the ‘order of nature {rerum
naturalium}’ studied by the ‘natural philosophy’ . . .; (2) the sciences of the order we can
bring into our own thinking, i.e. logic in its widest sense; (3) the sciences of the order we can
bring into our deliberating, choosing, and voluntary actions, i.e. the moral, economic, and po-
litical sciences compendiously called philosophia moralis; (4) the sciences of the multitude of
practical arts, the technologies or techniques which, by bringing order into matter of any kind
external to our thinking and willing, yield ‘things constituted by human reason.’
FINNIS, supra note 22, at 21 (footnotes omitted). John Finnis draws this summary not only from the
prologue to Thomas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics but also from the prologue to
his Commentary on the Politics. Id.; see also Jan A. Aertsen, Thomas Aquinas on the Good: The Rela-
tion Between Metaphysics and Ethics, in AQUINAS’S MORAL THEORY 235, 235-53 (Scott MacDonald &
Eleonore Stump eds., 1999).
Knowledge of other objects may be purely practical or mixed. Finally,

knowledge is sought with either practical or theoretical intentions—the
knower seeks knowledge either because he wishes to obtain it for its own
sake or because he wants to do something.154
Thomas’s categories suggest that because human law is an “operable”
not a “speculable,” the study of law will always fit broadly into the category
of practical reason. Nevertheless, even though human law is an “operable,”
it may be known either in practical or in theoretical mode. One may ap-
proach the study of law by asking a question like, “How does one draft leg-
islation?” Such an inquiry reflects a practical mode of knowledge. On the
other hand, one might ask a theoretical question such as whether more than
one type of law exists. Finally, even if one tries to know law in the practical
mode, one’s intentions may nevertheless be theoretical. Thus, both members
of Congress and graduate students may share an interest in how legislation
is drafted but may have very different motives for asking the question.
The application of Thomas’s general account of knowledge to the study
of law raises the question of the kinds of knowledge lawyers and legal
scholars are in the business of acquiring. Even if human law is a natural
kind in the sense that it exists as part of the world’s divine design, it re-
mains, to borrow from Thomas, an “operable” and not a “speculable.” Thus,
we should not be surprised when legal materials and processes are some-
what resistant to being fully accounted for through methodologies customar-
ily used in the natural sciences.155 Moreover, Thomas’s account suggests it
would be wrong to expect that the study of law should yield only one kind
of knowledge; practical and theoretical dimensions of legal scholarship can-
not neatly be hived off from each other.
Perhaps more significantly, Thomas’s account of the types of knowl-
edge raises the question of the general category into which knowledge of
the law might fit. Recall that his three categories of knowledge concerning
“operables” roughly correspond to logic, moral philosophy, and the “practi-
cal arts” (technique). Because he defines law as a rule and measure govern-
ing human action, Thomas treats law as a branch of moral philosophy. In-
deed, the Treatise on Law begins with the assumption that law, whether
natural or human, is given to regulate human action. Because practical rea-
son regulates human action, and because practical reason’s first principle is
154. MCINERNY, supra note 51, at 38-40; see also ST Ia.14.16, c.

155. John Finnis argues that the implications of Thomas’s view of orders of reality are crucial:
[H]uman actions, and the societies constituted by human action, cannot be adequately under-
stood as if they were merely (1) natural occurrences, (2) contents of thought, or (4) products
of techniques of mastering natural materials. . . . [H]uman actions and societies cannot be
adequately described, explained, justified, or criticized unless they are understood as also,
and centrally, the carrying out of free choices. For neither the making of free choices nor any
of their consequences regarded as such are reducible to nature, logic, or technique.
FINNIS, supra note 22, at 22; cf. 2 ALISTER E. MCGRATH, A SCIENTIFIC THEOLOGY: REALITY 199-227
(2002) (offering an account of reality as “stratified”). McGrath draws extensively on the work of Roy
Bhaskar. See generally ROY BHASKAR, FROM EAST TO WEST: ODYSSEY OF A SOUL (2000); ROY
BHASKAR, RECLAIMING REALITY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY (1989).
that good is to be done and evil avoided, no ultimate separation of law and
morality can exist.
However, it would be wrong to conclude that Thomas thinks law and
ethics are indistinguishable. If one of the Treatise on Law’s purposes is to
defend the claim that reason, authority, the common good, and publicity
unite law in all its manifestations, another equally important purpose is to
explain what distinguishes the various kinds of law from each other. Tho-
mas takes natural law to be the starting point for ethical deliberation in gen-
eral.156 Human law is distinguished from natural law in the following ways:
(1) Human law is derived from natural law.157 As we already have seen,
Thomas acknowledges that much human law consists of determination of
particulars, legal determinations that each political community makes as it
“decides on what is best for itself.”158 These decisions are not fully deter-
mined by the moral rules of the natural law but instead are the decisions of
“expert and prudent men . . . based . . . on its principles.”159 (2) Moreover,
human law is neither to repress every vice nor to prescribe all acts of vir-
tue.160 (3) And, because law derives much of its force from custom, it is not
to be changed whenever something better comes along.161 Nevertheless,
human law has in common with moral philosophy the aim of leading hu-
mans “to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually,”162 and its function, seen from
a theological perspective, is as an external restraint on human action tending
to lead humans to virtue.163
Might law appropriately be studied from vantage points other than
moral philosophy? There is reason to believe Thomas would be open to this
possibility despite his identification of law with rules governing moral con-
duct.164 Recall that the Treatise is part of a larger work of theology. In
Thomas’s framework, theological accounts of phenomena like human law
are “top-down” accounts.165 While philosophy proceeds from a considera-
tion of creatures “upwards” to a consideration of God, theology considers
God first and only then considers creatures in light of him.166 To be sure,
theologians consider the creation to learn more about God, as in the case of
156. Ralph McInerny, Ethics, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS, supra note 31, at 196,
208-12.
157. ST IaIIae.95.2, c.
158. Id. at IaIIae.95.4, c.; cf. id. at IaIIae.95.2, c.
159. Id. at IaIIae.95.2, ad 4. This looks like prudence that is similar to the sort of prudence required
for individual moral decision making when the rules run out. See MCINERNY, supra note 51, at 99-102
(discussing ST IaIIae.58.5, c); see also ST IaIIae.94.5, c (discussing changes to the natural law by “addi-
tion” and “subtraction”).
160. ST IaIIae.96.2, c; id. at IaIIae.96.3, c.
161. Id. at IaIIae.97.2, c. Note that law thereby is distinguished from technique.
163. See id. at IaIIae.90 (prologue) (considering “the extrinsic principles of acts”).
164. Cf. Robert P. George, One Hundred Years of Legal Philosophy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1533,
1548 (1999) (“[L]aw exists in what Aristotelians would call the order of technique, but it is created in
that order precisely for the sake of purposes that obtain in the moral order.”).
165. KRETZMANN, supra note 19, at 26-27.
166. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES II.4.5 (James F. Anderson trans., Univ.
Notre Dame 1975) (1956) [hereinafter SCG]; GILSON, supra note 20, at 21.
natural theology.167 They also study creatures’ origin in God and how crea-
tures are related to him.168 Nevertheless, Thomas says that while the natural
philosopher (scientist) is interested in the fact that fire has an “upward ten-
dency,”169 the theologian is interested in how it “represent[s] the sublimity
of God”170 and in the ways it is related to God,171 such as his creation of it
and its subjection to him.172 The point of a theological account of something
in the natural world thus is not to give an exhaustive account of it173 but to
set forth its significance in relation to God and his purposes for the crea-
tion.174
It follows that theological knowledge is primarily speculative “because
it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts.”175 When it
comes to divine things, the only type of knowledge humans can have is
speculative knowledge because such things are not open to human decision-
making.176 Nevertheless, theology necessarily must provide an account of
human acts because “man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of
God.”177 Thomas’s account of law (and thus of human law) is included in
the Summa because of law’s relationship to human acts. Theology has im-
plications for practical decision-making notwithstanding the fact that its
initial goal is not to provide practical wisdom.178
Two conclusions may be drawn from this discussion. First, the Summa’s
theological account of law need not preclude accounts of law undertaken
with nontheological motivations. Indeed, given that the Summa is primarily
a work of speculative reason, someone seeking practical wisdom might well
expect to find more directly useful sources elsewhere. Second, one sees in
this discussion that the boundaries between different sources of knowledge
are not, for Thomas, hermetically sealed. The example of fire is instructive
at this point. The study of fire by both scientists and theologians is entirely
appropriate, even if the foci of their respective inquiries are entirely differ-
ent.
167. See SCG, supra note 166, at II.2; see also id. at II.4.1 (“The Christian faith . . . regards fire . . .
as representing the sublimity of God . . . .”).
168. ST Ia.2 (introduction); see also id. at Ia.1.3, ad 2; Ia.1.7, c. Theology’s subject matter includes
both God and “everything other than God, but only as everything other than God relates to God as its
source and its goal . . . . Theology is about God considered in himself and considered in the fundamen-
tally explanatory source-and-goal relationships—primarily the relationships of efficient and final causa-
tion—to everything else, especially to the rational creature. It is in this way that the business of theology
is the single ultimate explanation of everything, the Grandest Unified Theory . . . .” KRETZMANN, supra
note 19, at 10.
169. SCG, supra note 166, at II.4.2.
170. Id. at II.4.1.
171. Id. at II.4.1 (“as being directed to Him in any way at all”); id. at II.4.2.
172. Id. at II.4.2.
173. Id. at II.2.
174. Id.
175. ST Ia.1.4, c.
176. See id. at Ia.14.16, c. (stating that human knowledge about divine things is speculative because
such things are “not operable by the knower”).
177. Id. at Ia.1.4, c.
178. See RALPH MCINERNY, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 62 (Univ. Notre Dame 1982) (1977) (classifying
this type of knowledge as “minimally practical knowledge or theoretical moral knowledge”).
Returning to the general categories of knowledge Thomas supplies, it

seems reasonable to think law might be understood in any of the four gen-
eral areas of scientific knowledge. The natural law tradition reflects Tho-
mas’s treatment of law as a branch of moral philosophy. Other schools of
legal thought emphasize law’s connections with other branches of knowl-
edge. Legal positivism and legal naturalism stress legal scholarship’s conti-
nuity with the methods of the natural and social sciences. Meanwhile, for-
malism emphasizes law’s connection to logic and rationality, and one can
see a focus on law as technique in sociological and economic jurists’ inter-
est in law as a tool for social engineering.
Thomas’s taxonomy of sciences seems on its face to exclude cultural or
historical perspectives on law. Interestingly, however, Thomas devotes a
significant part of his discussion of human law to the relationship between
law and custom.179 Law is closely related to ethics yet distinct from it.180
Similarly, law is related to, but distinguishable from, social custom. In
Thomas’s framework, though law always must be reasonable (and therefore
evil custom can never amount to law), social and cultural (and thus histori-
cal) context is a critical component of law.181 Thomas follows Justinian in
affirming that custom can make, abolish, and interpret law.182 Just as human
speech manifests reason and can result in “the creation, abolition, and inter-
pretation of law,”183 repeated and widespread action likewise manifests rea-
soned deliberation and can have the same effects with respect to law.184
Although Thomas may be prepared to accept knowledge about law from
sources other than moral philosophy, it would be wrong to assume that he
accepts the possibility of value-free knowledge about law in the sense that
we might pretend we knew nothing about law’s purpose and then study it
from that perspective. Much less would he be prepared to accept an account
of law that dismissed its integral connection to moral philosophy. Thomas is
famously committed to law’s fundamentally moral character: It is of the
essence of law to be a measure of human action, and practical reason is al-
ways to guide human action.185 Practical reason’s starting point is that
“good is to be done . . . and evil . . . avoided.”186 An account of law that
neglects this knowledge is unlikely to be a fruitful account.187 Moreover,
179. ST IaIIae.97.2, c; IaIIae.97.3, c; IaIIae.95.3, c. See generally DAVID VANDRUNEN, LAW AND
CUSTOM: THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW 25-55 (2003).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 157-163.
181. ST IaIIae.97.3, c.
182. VANDRUNEN, supra note 179, at 37-41; see also ST IaIIae.97.3, c.
183. VANDRUNEN, supra note 179, at 37.
184. See id. at 98-102 (discussing the relationship between utility and law in Thomas’s account). But
see ST IaIIae.91.3, c. (undercutting custom as resting on historical/cultural circumstances). The discus-
sion there suggests rather that customs emanate from “nature . . . by reason of their utility” and later are
“sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law.” Id. at IaIIae.91.3, c.
185. ST IaIIae.90.1, c.
187. See O’DONOVAN, supra note 35, at 46-52 (arguing that even generic, as opposed to teleological,
differentiation entails a moral component).
absent a robust sense of what law is for, the implications of facts learned
about law outside moral philosophy are far from clear.188
A potentially valuable feature of Thomas’s jurisprudence is thus its anti-
reductionist tendency. There is no mistaking Thomas’s commitment to prac-
tical reason (morality broadly defined) as the law’s controlling feature.
Nevertheless, Thomas tries not to reduce law to morality. He also traces
law’s relationships to political authority, history, revelation, and technique.
Law is related to all these fields of study but is not reducible to any of them.
Perhaps in an effort to “say something” about law, contemporary legal
scholarship tends toward reductionism by accounting for legal rules, or pro-
viding for new ones, based solely on one chosen dimension of knowledge
about law.189
V. BEING: HIERARCHICAL AND ANALOGICAL
A. The Hierarchy of Being: An Overview 190
Two of the most famous features of Thomas’s account of reality are his
claims that being is hierarchical and analogical. Thomas believes beings
exist in a hierarchy of perfection with God, the immutable, spiritual intel-
lect, at the top and with corruptible, inanimate matter at the bottom. In be-
tween (in descending order of perfection) are angels, humans, animals, and
plants. Inanimate objects occupy the spectrum’s lower end. Compounds are
more perfect than the raw elements because they display properties like
magnetism that they derive from heavenly bodies.191 Nevertheless, they are
ontologically inferior to plants because plants possess their own innate prin-
ciple of life, which Thomas calls a “soul” (though he does not mean to sug-
gest any sort of self-awareness or spirituality).192 Animals (and their souls)
are more perfect than plants because they are sentient beings, but they too
lack the capacity to reflect on what they perceive. Though Thomas refers to
humans’ intellectual capacities in terms of a human having a “rational soul,”
the human soul differs from that of other animate beings193 in that it is a
188. Finnis writes:

Should the theory of politics perhaps be replaced with a general theory of consumption and
consumer-satisfying institutions? Should the theory of law be absorbed into a general theory
of “social engineering” or of “markets”? One cannot answer such questions without ranking
features of human existence in terms of importance.
FINNIS, supra note 22, at 49.
189. The most obvious example approaches legal decision-making from the perspective of the so-
called “efficiency-minded judge.”
190. Readers familiar with Thomas’s account of being may wish to skip subparts A. and B. of this
Part.
191. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestio Disputata de Anima, 1, in THOMAS AQUINAS, SELECTED
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 184, 189 (Timothy McDermott trans., 1993) [hereinafter QDA 1].
192. Id.; see also SCG, supra note 166, at II.4.1.
193. Norman Kretzmann helpfully connects contemporary use of “animate” and “inanimate” (and
their derivation from anima) with Thomas’s description of rocks as not having souls and plants and
animals as having them. Norman Kretzmann, Philosophy of Mind, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
AQUINAS, supra note 31, at 128, 129.
principle both incorporeal and subsistent194 that is the human’s substantial

form. Within each category exist subcategories that likewise vary in perfec-
tion.
Thomas also believes substances can only know like substances.195 It
thus is significant that even though humans can apprehend reality only
through their five senses, the rational soul’s knowledge transcends sense
impressions. Humans’ ability to know abstract natures of things implies that
the soul is spiritual, not material, because the natures known through the
intellect are not sensible objects but are “altogether abstracted from matter
and material conditions, and without any bodily organ.”196 Because the na-
tures being known are real, but not material, the capacity for intellectual
understanding is for Thomas a fundamentally spiritual capacity, which hu-
mans have in common with beings above them in the hierarchical chain but
not those below. The human capacity for rationality is shared only with
spiritual beings: the angels and God. Rocks, plants, and animals are not self-
aware—of all material creatures, only humans are. The human soul thus
exists “on the borderline between corporeal and separate [i.e., purely spiri-
tual] substances.”197 Thomas identifies this spiritual capacity for rationality
as the “image of God” in humans.198
Higher beings also are relatively more actualized than lower ones.
Thomas holds that God, the highest being, distinct from the creatures, is
perfect because he is pure act; no unrealized potentiality exists in him. In
Thomas’s world, change is the result of potency becoming act—that is, of
relatively imperfect being moved to (or attracted to) some end. God’s acting
for an end would imply his being moved by something else and thus would
call into question his perfection and his place as the “unmoved mover.”
Even God’s creation of the world is done not to achieve any end, in Tho-
mas’s view, but only to communicate his goodness to the creatures.199
At the opposite end of the actualization spectrum200 is primary matter,
which is “pure potentiality.”201 Primary matter is not nothing; it exists, but
194. ST Ia.75.2, c; Kretzmann, supra note 193, at 131. The soul’s independent subsistence forms the
basis for its immortality. Id.
195. QDA 1, supra note 191, at 187-88.
197. Kretzmann, supra note 193, at 136 (quoting QDA 1, supra note 191, at Ic) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see id. at 152 n.23.
198. ST Ia.93.6, c.
199. Id. at Ia.9.1c; Ia.44.4, c.
200. Cf. QDA 1, supra note 191, at 189 (“The activities of elemental forms—the lowest and closest to
matter of all—don’t transcend the physico-chemical level of expanding and contracting and what seem
other ways of arranging matter.” (emphasis added)).
201. 2 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 326 (Contin-
uum 2003) (1950); id. (prime matter is “the indeterminate substrate of substantial change”); cf. ST
Ia.44.2, obj. 3 (“primary matter is only in potentiality”); AQUINAS, METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra
note 15, at VIII.1; GILSON, supra note 20, at 176-77; John F. Wippel, Metaphysics, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO AQUINAS, supra note 31, at 85, 111-12 (“pure potentiality”). In support of his assertion
that God created primary matter, Thomas cites Augustine’s statement that primary matter is “nigh unto
nothing.” ST Ia.44.2, sc.
never apart from a substantial form. Its existence is inferred from the fact
that sensible things change from one form to another. Prime matter is the
common underlying “stuff” that remains even as the substantial form
changes. Nevertheless, it is completely unactualized and therefore cannot
exist on its own. Again, between God and primary matter are the various
species of the created order. Thomas holds that differentiation inevitably
implies varying degrees of perfection in the creatures.202
B. Hierarchy and Analogical Knowledge
As noted above, one feature of Thomas’s hierarchical world is that crea-

tures’ ability to know the world is related to their place in the hierarchy of
being. Thomas, as a theologian, is especially concerned with what humans
can know of God through the created order. He holds that humans’ only
natural knowledge of God is indirect and largely negative.203 God is spirit,
and human minds can only receive sensory impressions. Nevertheless, as
we have already seen, human intellect is immaterial and can proceed be-
yond sense impressions:
As human intellect it must start from sense, from material beings,

but as human intellect it can proceed beyond sense, not being con-
fined to material essences, though it can do this only in so far as the
immaterial objects are manifested in and through the sensible
world, in so far as the material things have a relation to immaterial
objects. . . . [T]he intellect does not and cannot by its own power
apprehend God directly; but sensible objects, as finite and contin-
gent, reveal their relation to God, so that the intellect can know that
God exists.204
Even though humans cannot perceive God directly, Thomas argues, God’s
nature is manifested to some extent through the physical, tangible things he
has made.205
Nevertheless, because God is distinct from the created world, and be-
cause a vast gulf exists between God’s perfection and that of the creatures,
Thomas is quick to emphasize that God’s characteristics (especially his ex-
istence) cannot be predicated univocally of both God and creatures.206 Tho-
mas follows Aristotle in observing that the same word may be predicated of
different objects in three ways: (1) univocally, (2) equivocally, and (3) by
202. ST Ia.47.2.
203. See MCINERNY, supra note 178, at 118-25 (and sources cited); see also 2 COPLESTON, supra
note 201, at 347-62; 388-97.
204. 2 COPLESTON, supra note 201, at 393.
205. ST Ia.13.5 (citing Romans 1:20).
206. God is distinguished from the creation chiefly because he is the only being whose essence it is to
exist. All other beings derive their existence from him. ST Ia.3.4, c.
analogy.207 His account of analogical predication and its connection to the

hierarchy of being proves important for the Treatise on Law.
Univocal predication occurs when the things spoken about “share a
common term and the same account is associated with that term.”208
Equivocal predication occurs when different things “share the same name,
but a different account of the name is given in its various applications or
uses.”209 Thus, woman is used univocally when predicated of Laura Bush or
Hillary Clinton because the same account of the word’s meaning can be
applied to both. On the other hand, bee may be used equivocally to describe
either an insect or a spelling competition. The word’s use is appropriate in
either instance but only because more than one account of what is meant by
bee is available to the speaker.
Thomas, again following Aristotle, also identifies a third category of
predication involving words that have multiple possible meanings, but
whose meanings, though different, bear some relationship to each other—
the accounts to which they refer are similar in some respects and different in
others.210 Thus, healthy may be predicated analogically of a body or of
medicine or of urine. The meanings of healthy in each case are related but
different: A body is healthy if all its parts are functioning well, medicine is
healthy if it causes health in a body, and healthy urine is one indication that
a body is functioning well.211
Thomas’s most famous use of the concept of analogy occurs in connec-
tion with his account of being. Because God, unlike everything else in the
universe, is self-existent, his being is categorically different from creaturely
“being.” Thomas thus holds that being and other attributes of God, when
predicated of God and of creatures, can only be understood analogically.
Moreover, the analogy’s primary term is the characteristic as found in God,
with the analogous human characteristic being both essentially like and
unlike the analogous divine quality. Humans know something of what God
is like from the world he has made, but they must be careful not to forget
that God’s instantiation of the relevant attribute is not subject to creaturely
limitation and imperfection and thus is qualitatively different from crea-
turely instantiations of the same attribute.212 Thomas’s use of analogy at this
point is a matter of both linguistics and ontology.
A corollary of the analogical nature of being is that things known most
easily and directly in the natural world may in fact be less important (and
even less real) than similar realities that are invisible yet analogous.213 Thus,
207. ST Ia.13.5, c.
208. MCINERNY, supra note 178, at 134-35.
209. Id. at 135.
210. Id. at 136.
211. ST Ia.13.5, c. cf. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS: BOOKS Γ, Δ, and Ε Γ2, at 1003a33-1003b6 (Chris-
topher Kirwan trans., 2d ed. 1993)(350 B.C.).
212. ST Ia.13.4, c; Ia.13.5, c.
213. See id. at Ia.84.7, ad 3; SIMON, supra note 51, at 110-12. See generally Yves R. Simon, On
Order in Analogical Sets, 34 THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM 1, 16-26 (1960).
in the Treatise on Law, Thomas takes human law as the starting point for his
general definition of law. Humans can observe human law directly. Obser-
vation discloses human law’s intimate relation to reason, its orientation to
the common good, its origin in appropriate political authority, and its public
nature.214
Significantly, however, Thomas presupposes that what can be known
about human law may help illuminate other, less directly observable reali-
ties that go by the name “law,” most notably the “higher” eternal and natu-
ral laws.215 While insights about human law can be applied to higher law
only by analogy, they nevertheless are presupposed to provide insight about
those higher laws. The bases for this assumption are that God reveals him-
self through his effects—through what he has made—and that these effects
have varying degrees of perfection. As a result, the “lower” material things
directly accessible to human perception reveal, albeit only by analogy,
“higher” effects of God.
C. Hierarchy, Analogy, and the Treatise on Law
What difference does this make for Thomas’s account of law and espe-
cially human law? The most obvious consequences are found in the discus-
sion of the kinds of law in Question 91. Here he discusses in turn eternal
law, natural law, human law, divine law, and even the “law” in the fomes of
sin.216 Thomas is at pains to justify treating divine providence (eternal law),
ethics (natural law), jurisprudence (human law), Scripture (divine law), and
even the human tendency toward sin as part of the same phenomenon: law.
Analogy and hierarchy are his main devices for ordering this group of re-
lated, though obviously different, things. Thomas draws a clear hierarchical
relationship among eternal law, natural law, and human law. Eternal law—
the plan for the governance of the universe existing in the mind of God—is
the ultimate authority. Human law gets its authority by being derived from
natural law, which is itself a “participation” of the eternal law.217 This is the
214. ST IaIIae.90, c.
215. See id. at IaIIae.93.5, c, in which Thomas begins with the more familiar and more observable
human law and draws an analogy to describe the operation of the eternal law.
216. See id. at IaIIae.91.6, obj. 1. The fomes of sin refers to the human inclination toward sin St. Paul
decries in Romans: “[B]ut I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and
bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.” Romans 7:23.
217. John Wippel explains “participation” as follows:
If a particular quality or characteristic is possessed by a given subject only partially rather
than totally, the subject is said to participate in the quality or characteristic. Because other
subjects may also share in that perfection, each is said to participate in it. No one of them is
identical with it.
Wippel, supra note 201, at 93; cf. FINNIS, supra note 117, at 399 (“A quality that an entity or state of
affairs has or includes is participated, in Aquinas’s sense, if that quality is caused by a similar quality
which some other entity or state of affairs has or includes in a more intrinsic or less dependent way.”).
See generally id. at 398-403. For a discussion of the distinction between Platonic understandings of
participation and Thomas’s understanding, see MCINERNY, supra note 178, at 118-25. Elsewhere, Finnis
translates participatio as “sharing out”: “And so it is clear that the natural law is precisely the sharing out
of the eternal law in the rational creature . . . .” FINNIS, supra note 22, at 308 n.64 (translating a portion
clearest operation of Thomas’s analogy/hierarchy presupposition. Law is

defined by beginning with human law, and the definition of law so derived
is read back, albeit analogically, into higher features of reality. It turns out
that just as human law is the product of reason, is promulgated, and is ori-
ented toward the common good, the same can be said of eternal and natural
law. With that being said, different notions of promulgation, common good,
and reason are required to complete the chain. “Law” is not predicated
univocally of each of the three types, only by analogy.
Whereas the natural law and human law direct humans with respect to
their earthly happiness, divine law is a necessary part of the laws governing
humans because humans have a supernatural end in addition to their natural
end. Because they cannot naturally perceive things conducive to their spiri-
tual welfare, revelation is needed. Thomas also notes (1) Scripture’s use-
fulness in teaching the appropriate judgments on “contingent and particular
matters”218 that otherwise would be in dispute were natural law the only
guide to decision, (2) God’s competence to prescribe rules for “interior
movements” whereas human law’s competence extends only to “exterior
acts,” and (3) the necessity that Scripture should forbid “all sins,” which
would be impossible for human authorities to do.219
Thomas has to work harder to justify the inclusion of the “law of the
‘fomes’ of sin” in Question 91.220 Thomas has in mind here the human ten-
dency not to do what one knows to be the right thing to do. This appropri-
ately is called a law, he argues, both because it resembles a natural inclina-
tion within a person—Thomas holds that it is actually a “deviation from the
law of reason” and for this reason it is not really a law221 —and because the
inclination is “a penalty following from the Divine law depriving man of his
proper dignity.”222
Given Thomas’s presupposition that the things we observe in the world
may have something to teach us about unseen realities, one would expect
Thomas’s account of natural law and eternal law to be shaped more by his
account of human law than vice versa. Indeed, some Protestant theologians
criticize Thomas’s description of God’s relationship to the world in terms of
“eternal law” as too Platonic and insufficiently Christological. The typical
charge is that Thomas has taken Plato’s Ideas and relocated them in the
of ST IaIIae 91.2, c.).

Russell Hittinger recently has argued on the basis of Thomas’s statement that natural law is a
participation of the eternal law that in Thomas “[t]here are not four or five kinds of law, but only two.
Law that proceeds from the divine mind and law that proceeds from the human mind; as Augustine said,
one is eternal and the other is temporal.” HITTINGER, supra note 22, at xi (citing Stephen Louis Brock,
The Legal Character of Natural Law According to St. Thomas Aquinas ch. 2-C (1988) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. Toronto)).
218. ST IaIIae.91.4, c.
219. Id.
220. Id. at IaIIae.91.6, obj. 1.
222. Id.
mind of God.223 The Bible depicts the second person of the Trinity not only
as the pre-incarnate Logos (the primary mode of Christ’s depiction in the
Summa)224 but also as taking on human form, living as a poor, itinerant
prophet, and being put to death by the authorities.225 The dominant image of
God in the Treatise on Law is that of supreme governor who does his will
through commands to inferior governors, an image that arguably understates
God’s personal interaction with the world.226
Not only, as we have just seen, does Thomas’s picture of human law
and lawmaking influence his theology, but his theology also affects his ac-
count of human law and specifically his account of how human law gets its
authority. Thomas declares emphatically that “every human law has just so
much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature.”227 How-
ever, human law can be derived from natural law in either of two ways.
Laws with a close connection to the clearest ethical principles of the natural
law (e.g., laws against murder) are derived “as a conclusion from prem-
ises”228 and have force from both human law and natural law. Other laws
that do not have a close fit with obvious natural law principles (here Tho-
mas gives as examples the penalties for murder or other crimes) are “deter-
minations” and have “no other force than that of human law.”229
Thomas apparently considers both types of human law to be, ontologi-
cally speaking, law because both meet the minimum qualifications of being
derived from natural law. Determinations, however, carry less weight in
some unspecified respect. Given that both types of law are enforceable by
the civil authority and binding on the conscience,230 the additional “force”
223. See, e.g., GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR, supra note 20, at 101-02. But see Jean-Marc Laporte,
Christ in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: Peripheral or Pervasive?, 67 THE THOMIST 221, 221-48
(2003).
224. See ST Ia.34.1, ad. 2.
225. See, e.g., N.T. WRIGHT, JESUS AND THE VICTORY OF GOD 147-97 (1996).
Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government is de-
rived by secondary governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done
in a state flows from the king’s command to his inferior administrators: and again in things of
art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the under-
craftsmen, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in
the Chief Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived
from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the eter-
nal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the eter-
nal law.
ST at IaIIae.93.3, c.
It hardly seems likely that Thomas adopted this picture of God’s governance based solely on its
resemblance to human government and lawmaking. One difficulty with the application of the idea of
analogy in this way is that it necessarily involves decisions about which analogies should be pursued and
which should not. Cf. 3 MCGRATH, supra note 32, at 113-19 (discussing the authority of analogies).
227. ST IaIIae.95.2, c.
229. Id. at IaIIae.95.2, c; see supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text (discussing determina-
tions).
230. ST IaIIae.96.4, c.
added by the more direct derivation from ethical first principles is un-
clear.231
Perhaps the obscurity may be removed as follows: Thomas suggests in
Question 91 that all legal questions have a right answer. In principle, the
eternal law, the reasonable will of God, contains each case’s appropriate
determination.232 Although the eternal law contains a best answer in every
case, human beings do not have direct access to every such answer. Never-
theless, we do have natural knowledge of the general principles of the natu-
ral law. (Recall that, for Thomas, natural law is a “participation of” the eter-
nal law—the limited imprint of the divine light on human beings.233) We
thus can make some sense of the hierarchy of authority within human law at
which Thomas gestures in Question 95: Human laws instantiating the first
principles of natural law known to all humans carry the highest possible
authority; their authority stems not merely from their enactment by proper
political authorities but also from their status as part of the eternal law—
God’s will for humans generally. Human laws derived directly from these
first principles as “conclusions from premises”234 carry similar though
slightly attenuated standing. Laws enacted by appropriate authorities with a
view to the common good and with apparent (though not infallible) reason
have the force of human law,235 i.e., less force than laws that carry the im-
primatur of the natural law itself. Nevertheless, they are rules that bind
prima facie the religious believer’s conduct.236
One implication of Thomas’s analysis is that what gives human law its
authority is primarily divine reason, not created human reason. The best
law, or at least the strongest law, is the one that involves as little human will
as possible given the nature of the created order. To his credit, Thomas does
not deny the role of human will in his account of human law, rightly observ-
ing that much human law is linked to obvious ethical principles only in a
tenuous way. The acknowledgment, however, is somewhat begrudging. The
freedom humans enjoy to use their reasoning capacity to fashion laws (even
good laws) and the appropriate diversity of human law are alluded to237 but
neither celebrated nor explored. Indeed, as we have seen, Thomas attributes
diversity of law not primarily to a degree of divinely permitted freedom in
lawmaking but mainly to ignorance of the natural law and “the great variety
231. John Finnis suggests that Aquinas’ statement that determinations have their force “from human
law alone,” “goes further than the [Aquinas’] analysis itself warrants,” and that it would be more accu-
rate to say that determinations have force because of reason and because they have been enacted. FINNIS,
supra note 22, at 267.
232. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
233. ST IaIIae.91.2, c.
235. Cf. id. at IaIIae.96.2, ad 3 (“human law falls short of the eternal law”); Ia.13.5, c (natural causes
“fall short” when they reproduce themselves in less perfect beings).
236. See FINNIS, supra note 22, at 267-74.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 126-130 (discussing the various foundations for and varia-
tions of derived human laws).
of human affairs.”238 The emphasis is primarily on the “right answer”

known at once to God239 and to “expert and prudent men,”240 if not to ordi-
nary humans.241 These features of his account provide the grain of truth in
derisive comments about the “brooding omnipresence” of natural law. The
thought that the answers to all questions are already present in the eternal
law, and that law’s authority consists primarily in its reason, easily can lead
to the temptation to seek a priori answers to legal questions.
In Thomas’s defense, the eternal law from which human law derives its
authority includes God’s control over the identity of the community’s rul-
ers.242 Moreover, Thomas notes the role of prudence and gradual accumula-
tion of human knowledge about law, which can serve as the basis of future
reasonable decisions.243 If all that Thomas has in mind when he says all
human law is derived from the natural law is that humans will make law by
reasoning based on their accumulated moral and technical experience of
law’s operations, his account would seem to leave adequate room for human
freedom. At the same time, the more important this sort of lawmaking is to
human law, the less significant human law’s “derivation” from natural law
would seem to be.
CONCLUSION
Thomas’s metaphysical orientation creates a wide gulf between his

thought and conventional Anglo-American jurisprudence. To be sure, many
of his arguments are unpersuasive because they proceed a priori from con-
testable assumptions about being in general or the human person. Neverthe-
less, taking Thomas’s metaphysics seriously permits us to see places where
contemporary legal scholarship might profit from following his lead.
The most promising of these are related to Thomas’s methodology. One
thing that enables Thomas to proceed with his analysis of law is the convic-
tion that human law, though man-made, is an inherent part of the natural
order and is therefore capable of being studied coherently. The reasons why
that presupposition has been called into question cannot be simply forgot-
ten, but neither should one pretend that conceptual analysis has been a satis-
factory substitute for the traditional study of law itself.
238. ST IaIIae.95.2, ad 3.
240. ST IaIIae.95.2, ad 4.
241. Id. at IaIIae.93.1, ad 1. Thomas’s rejoinder might well be that God, in his infinite knowledge
and wisdom, could do the best possible job of legislating and adjudicating or that the statement is in-
tended to show that practical reasoning about determinations is not merely a subjective matter. These
statements no doubt are unobjectionable to Christian believers as far as they go, but they do not address
the question of whether God has taken jurisdiction over such matters or whether part of his good inten-
tion might be to leave humans free, within broad parameters, to make their own arrangements about
earthly political order. Cf. William S. Brewbaker III, Found Law, Made Law and Creation: Re-
Examining Blackstone’s Declaratory Theory, 22 J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming 2006-2007).
242. ST IaIIae.93.1, c.
243. See, e.g., id. at IaIIae.97.1-97.3 (discussing change in human law and the relationship between
custom and law). See generally VANDRUNEN, supra note 179.
Indeed, other features of Thomas’s methodology might lend some

needed methodological coherence to legal scholarship. I do not mean coher-
ence in the sense of prescribing a monistic approach to legal scholarship but
rather just the opposite. Thomas’s account of the various orders of reality
and of practical and theoretical wisdom, combined with his sensitivity to the
concerns different sciences bring to the objects they study, provide a ready
vocabulary for explaining the wide variety of approaches one observes in
legal scholarship. In particular, Thomas is sensitive to the idea that one’s
methodology for studying a subject should not proceed a priori as if all ob-
jects of study were the same but should proceed so as to discover what
method of study best suits the object being investigated. One can easily
imagine, as Thomas does, that civil law, being a product of human reason
and freedom, might require a methodology different from, say, geology.
Moreover, one may study law with either practical or theoretical intentions,
and those intentions may vary depending on the student’s interest. As Tho-
mas’s account itself demonstrates, the theologian may have a quite different
interest in the study of law than the jurist.
It may be that legal scholars find fault with Thomas to some degree be-
cause his interests differ from theirs. The vast majority of law practice,
judging, and legal analysis is concerned with what Thomas calls the “de-
termination of particulars.” Thomas can be praised for recognizing that
these determinations cannot simply be deduced from moral principles, but
his short treatment of law provides little guidance as to what makes a de-
termination good. One can imagine his responding that it is not the theolo-
gian’s job to supply the jurist with such answers.
Although Thomas is a theologian and not a lawyer, this answer is not
entirely sufficient. Thomas’s emphasis on the (ontologically) higher eternal
and natural law tends to undercut human law’s integrity in its own right.
Thomas appears to insist that human law’s authority is connected not just to
human reason but also to divine reason. The result is that Thomas has diffi-
culty giving a satisfying account of human freedom in lawmaking, even as
he acknowledges that earthly rulers enjoy a substantial amount of freedom
to act reasonably in making law.
LENIN'S THE S T A T E A N D R E V O L U T I O N *
Ralph Miliband
T h e State and Revolution is rightIy regarded as one of Lenin's most

important works. I t addresses itself to questions of the utmost im-
portance for socialist theory and practice, none of which have lost any
of their relevance-rather the reverse. And as a statement of the
Marxist theory of the state, both before and particularly after the
conquest of power, it has, because it was written by Lenin, enjoyed
an exceptionally authoritative status for successive generations of
socialists, never more so than in recent years, since its spirit and sub-
stance can so readily be invoked against the hyper-bureaucratic ex-
perience of Russian-type rCgimes, and against official Communist
parties as well. In short, here, for intrinsic and circumstantial reasons, is
indeed one of the "sacred texts" of Marxist thought.
"Sacred texts", however, are alien to the spirit of Marxism, or a t
least should be; and this is itself sufficient reason for submitting T h e
State and Revolution to critical analysis. But there is also another and
more specific reason for undertaking such an analysis, namely that this
work of Lenin is commonly held, within the Marxist tradition, to pro-
vide a theoretical and indeed a practical solution to the all-important
question of t l e socialist exercise of power. My own reading of it sug-
gests, for what it is worth, a rather different conclusion : this is that
T h e State and Reuolution, far from resolving the problems with which
it is concerned, only serves to underline their complexity, and to empha-
size something which the experience of more than half a century has
in any case richly-and tragically-served to confirm, namely that
the exercise of socialist power remains the Achilles' heel of Marxism.
This is why, in a year which will witness so much legitimate celebra-
tion of Lenin's genius and achievements, a critical appraisal of T h e
State and Revolution may not come amiss. For it is only by probing
the gaps in the argument which it puts forward that the discussion of
issues which are fundamental to the socialist project may be advanced.
The basic point upon which the whole of Lenin's argument rests,
and to which he returns again and again, derives from Marx and
Engels. This is that while all previous revolutions have "perfected" (i.e.
reinforced) the state machine, "the working class cannot simply lay
*This article was written for a special issue of Monthly Review com-
memorating the centenary of Lenin's birth, and is published here by kind per-
mission of the Editors of Monthly Review.
309
hold of the state machinery and wield it for its own purposes"; and
that it must instead smash, break, destroy that machinery. The cardinal
importance which Lenin attaches to this idea has often been taken
to mean that the purpose of T h e State and Revolution is to counter-
pose violent revolution to "peaceful transition". This is not so. The
contraposition is certainly important and Lenin did believe (much
more categorically than Marx, incidentally) that the proletarian revo-
lution could not be achieved save by violent means. But as the Italian
Marxist Lucio Colletti has recently noted, "Lenin's polemic is not
directed against those who do not wish for the seizure bf power. The
object of his attack is not reformism. On the contrary, it is directed
against those who wish for the seizure of power but not for the des-
truction of the old State as we1Y.l "On the contrary" in the above
quotation is too strong : Lenin is also arguing against reformism. But
it is perfectly true that his main concern in T h e State and Revolution
is to-attack and reject any concept of revolution which does not take
literally Marx's views that the bourgeois state must be smashed.
The obvious and crucial question which this raises is what kind of
post-revolutionary state is to succeed the smashed bourgeois state. For
it is of course one of the basic tenets of Marxism, and one of its basic
differences with anarchism, that while the proletarian revolution must
smash the old state, it does not abolish the state itself : a state remains
in being, and even endures for a long time to come, even though it
begins immediately to "wither away". What is most remarkable about
the answer which Lenin gives to the question of the nature of the
post-revolutionary state is how far he takes the concept of the "wither-
ing away" of the state in T h e State and Revolution : so far, in fact,
that the state, on the morrow of the revoluticn, has not only begun to
wither away, but is already at an advanced ~ t a g eof decomposition.
This, it must be noted at once, does not mean that the revolutionary
power is to be weak. On the contrary, Lenin never fails to insist thit
it must be very strong indeed, and that it must remain strong over
an extended period of time. What it does mean is that this power is
not exercised by the state in the common meaning of that word, i.e.
as a separate and distinct organ of power, however "democratic";
but that "the state" has been turned from "a state of bureaucrats"
into "a state of armed workers" (p. 3341." This, Lenin notes, is "a state
machine nevertheless", but "in the shape of armed workers who proceed
to form a militia involving the entire population" (p. 336). Again,
"all citizens are transformed into hired employees of the state, which
consists of the armed workers" (p. 336); and again, "the state, that
*All quotations from T h e State and Revolution are taken from V. I. Lenin,
Selected Works (London, 1969) and the page reference is given in brackets.
Unless otherwise specified, all italics are in the text.
directed against those who do not wish for the seizure of power. The
is to attack and reject any concept of revolution which does not take
wither away, but is already at a n advanced ~ t a g eof decomposition.
This, it must be noted a t once, does not mean that the revolutionary
power is to be weak. On the contrary, Lenin never fails to insist that
is the proletariat armed and organized as the ruling class" (p. 308).
Identical or similar formulations occur throughout the work.
In T h e Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, written
after the Bolshevik seizure of power, Lenin fiercely rejected Kautsky's
view that a class "can only dominate but not govern" : "It is altogether
wrong, also", Lenin wrote, "to say that a class cannot govern. Such
an absurdity can only be uttered by a parliamentary cretin who sees
nothing but bourgeois parliaments, who has noticed nothing but 'ruling
parties.' "2 T h e State and Revolution is precisely based on the notion
that the proletariat can "govern", and not only "dominate", and that
it must do so if the dictatorship of the proletariat is to be more than a
slogan. "Revolution," Lenin also writes "consists not in the new class
commanding, governing with the aid of the old state machine, but in
this class smashing this machine and commanding, governing with
the aid of a n e w machine. Kautsky blurs over this basic idea of
Marxism, or he does not understand it at all" (p. 347). This new
"machine'', as it appears in T h e State and Revolution is the state of
the armed workers. What is involved here, to all appearances, is
unmediated class rule, a notion much more closely associated with
anarchism than with Marxism.
This needs to be qualified. But what is so striking about T h e State

and Revolution is how little it needs to be qualified, as I propose to
show.
Lenin strongly attacks the anarchists, and insists on the need to
retain the state in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
"We are not utopians," he writes, "we do not 'dream' of dispensing
at once with a11 administration, with all subordination" (p. 298). But
he then goes on : "The subordination, however, must be the armed
vanguard of all the exploited and working people, i.e. t o the proletariat
(my italics). A beginning can and must be made at once, overnight,
to replace the specific 'bossing' of state officials by the simple functions
of 'foremen and accountants', functions which are already fully within
the ability of the average town dweller and can well be performed for
workmen's wages. W e , the workers, shall organize large-scale pro-
duction on the basis of what capitalism has already created, relying
on our own experience as workers, establishing strict, iron discipline
backed bv the state of the armed workers. We shall reduce the role
of state officials to that of simply carrying out our instructions as res-
ponsible, revocable, moderately paid 'foremen and accountants' (of
course, with the aid of technicians of all sorts, types, and degrees"
(p. 298).
Clearly, some kind of officialdom continues to exist, but equally
clearly, it functions under the strictest and continuous supervision and
control of the armed workers; and officials are, as Lenin notes re-
peatedly, revocable at any time. "Bureaucrats", on this view, have not
been altogether abolished; but they have been reduced to the role of
utterly subordinate executants of the popular will, as expressed by
the armed workers.
As for a second main institution of the old state, the standing army,
it has been replaced, in the words quoted earlier, by armed workers
who proceed to form a militia involving the whole population.
Thus, two institutions which Lenin views as "most characteristic"
(p. 283) of the bourgeois state machine have been radically dealt with :
one of them, the bureaucracy, has been drastically reduced in size
and what remains of it has been utterly subdued by direct popular
supervision, backed by the power of instant revocability; while the
other, the standing army, has actually been abolished.
Even so, Lenin stresses, the centralized state has not been abolished.
But it takes the form of "voluntary centralism, of the voluntary amal-
gamation of the communes into a nation, of the voluntary fusion of
the proletarian communes, for the purpose of destroying bourgeois
rule and the bourgeois state machine" (p. 301).
Here too, the obvious question concerns the institutions through
which the dictatorship of the proletariat may be expressed. For Lenin
does speak in T h e State and Revolution "of a gigantic replacement
of certain institutions by other institutions of a fundamentally different
type" (p. 293). But T h e State and Revolution has actually very little
to say about institutions, save for some very brief references to the
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
Lenin reserves some of his choicest epithets for one form of repre-
sentative institution, namely "the venal and rotten parliamentarism
of bourgeois society" (p. 297). However, "the way out of parliamen-
tarism is not, of course, the abolition of representative institutions and
the elective principle, but the conversion of the representative institu-
tions from talking shops into 'working bodies' " (p. 296). The institu-
tions which embody this principle are, as noted, the Soviets of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies. On one occasion, Lenin speaks of "the simple
organization of the armed people (such as the Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies. . . .)" (p. 329); on another, of "the conversion of all
y
citizens into workers and other employees of one huge 'syndicate -the
whole state-and the complete subordination of the entire work of this
syndicate to a genuinely democratic state, the state of the Soviets of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" (p. 334); and the third such reference
is in the form of a question : "Kautsky develops a 'superstitious
reverence' for 'ministries'; but why can they not be replaced, say, by
committees of specialists working under sovereign, all-powerful Soviets
and Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies?" (p. 346). I t must be noted, how-
ever, that the Soviets are "sovereign and all-powerful" in relation to
the "committee" of which Lenin speaks. In regard to their constituents,
the deputies are of course subject to recall at any time : "representa-
tion" must here be conceived as operating within the narrow limits
determined by popular rule.
The "state" of which Lenin speaks in The State and Revolution
is therefore one in which the standing army has ceased to exist; where
what remains of officialdom has come to be completely subordinated
to the armed workers; and where the representatives of these armed
workers are similarly subordinated to them. I t is this "model" which
would seem to justify the contention, advanced earlier, that the "state"
which expresses the dictatorship of the proletariat is, already on the
morrow of the revolution, at a stage of advanced decomposition.
The problems which this raises are legion; and the fact that they
are altogether ignored in T h e State and Revolution cannot be left
out of account in a realistic assessment of it.
The first of these problems is that of the political mediation of the
revolutionary power. By this I mean that the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat is obviously inconceivable without some degree at least of
political articulation and leadership, which implies political organiza-
tion. But the extraordinary fact, given the whole cast of Lenin's mind,
is that the political element which otherwise occupies so crucial a place
in his thought, namely the party, receives such scant attention in T h e
State and Revolution.
There are three references to the party in the work, two of which
have no direct bearing on the issue of the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat. One of these is an incidental remark concerning the need for
the party to engage in the struggle "against religion which stupifies
the people" (p. 318); the second, equally incidental, notes that "in
revising the programme of our Party, we must by all means take the
advice of Engels and Marx into consideration, in order to come nearer
the truth, to restore Marxism by ridding it of its distortions, to guide
the struggle of the working class for its emancipation more correctly"
(p. 310). The third and most relevant reference goes as follows : "By
educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the
proletariat, capable of assuming power and leading the whole people
to socialism, of directing and organizing the new system, of being the
teacher, the guide, the leader of all the working and exploited people
in organizing their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the
bourgeoisie" (p. 281).
I t is not entirely clear from this passage whether it is the prole-
tariat which is capable of assuming power, leading, directing, organiz-
ing, etc.; or whether it is the vanguard of the proletariat, i.e. the
314 THE SOCIALIST REGISTER, 1970
workers' party, which is here designated. Both interpretations are
possible. On the first, the question of political leadership is left alto-
gether in abeyance. I t may be recalled that it was so left by Marx in
his considerations on the Paris Commune and on the dictatorship of
the proletariat. But it is not something which can, it seems to me,
be left in abeyance in the discussion of revolutionary rule-save in
terms of a theory of spontaneity which constitutes an avoidance of
the problem rather than its resolution. O n the other hand, the second
interpretation, which fits in better with everything we know of Lenin's
appraisal of the importance of the party, only serves to raise the ques-
tion without tackling it. That question is of course absolutely para-
mount to the whole meaning of the concept of the dictatorship of the
proletariat : what is the relationship between the proletariat whose
dictatorship the revolution is deemed to establish, and the party which
educates, leads, directs, organizes, etc? I t is only on the basis of an
assumption of a symbiotic, organic relationship between the two, that
the question vanishes altogether; but while such a relationship may
well have existed between the Bolshevik Party and the Russian pro-
letariat in the months preceding the October Revolution, i.e. when
Lenin wrote The State and Revolution, the assumption that this kind
of relationship can ever be taken as an automatic and permanent fact
belongs to the rhetoric of power, not to its reality.
Whether it is the party or the proletariat which is, in the passage
above, designated as leading the whole people to socialism, the fact
is that Lenin did of course assert the former's central role after the
Bolsheviks had seized power. Indeed, he was by 1919 asserting its
exclusive political guidance. "Yes, the dictatorship of one party !" he
said then : "we stand upon it and cannot depart from this ground,
since this is the party which in the course of decades has won for itself
the position of vanguard of the whole factory and industrial prole-
tariat". In fact, "the dictatorship of the working class is carried into
effect by the party of the Bolsheviks which since 1905 or earlier has
been united with the whole revolutionary pr~letariat".~ Later on, as
E. H. Carr also notes, he described the attempt to distinguish between
the dictatorship of the class and the dictatorship of the party as proof
of an "unbelievable and inextricable confusion of t h o ~ g h t " ;and
~ in
1921, he was bluntly asserting against the criticisms of the Workers'
Opposition that " . . . the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible
except through the Communist part^".^
This may well have been the case, but it must be obvious that this
is an altogether different "model" of the exercise of revolutionary power
from that presented in The State and Revolution, and that it radically
transforms the meaning to be attached to the "dictatorship of the
proletariat". At the very least, it brings into the sharpest possible forms
the question of the relation between the ruling party and the prole-
tariat. Nor even is it the $arty which is here in question, but rather
the party leadership, in accordance with that grim dynamic which
Trotsky had prophetically outlined after the split of Russian Social
Democracy between BoIshevik and Mensheviks, namely that "the party
organization [the caucus] a t first substitutes itself for the party as a
whole; then the Central Committee substitutes itself for the organiza-
tion; and finally a single 'dictator' substitutes itself for the Central Com-
mittee. . . ."6
For a time after the Revolution, Lenin was able to believe and claim
that there was no conflict between the dictatorship of the proletariat
and the dictatorship of the party; and Stalin was to make that claim
the basis and legitimation of his own total rule. In the case of Lenin,
very few things are as significant a measure of his greatness than that
he should have come, while in power, to question that identification,
and to be obsessed by the thought that it could not simply be taken
for granted. He might well, as his successors were to do, have tried to
conceal from himself the extent of the gulf between the claim and the
reality: that he did not and that he died a deeply troubled man7 is
not the least important part of his legacy, though it is not the part of
his legacy which is likely to be evoked, let alone celebrated, in the
country of the Bolshevik Revolution.
It is of course very tempting to attribute the transformation of the

dictatorship of the proletariat, as presented in The State and Revolu-
tion into the dictatorship of the party, or rather of its leaders, to the
particular circumstances of Russia after 1917-to backwardness, civil
war, foreign intervention, devastation, massive deprivation, popular
disaffection, and the failure of other countries to heed the call of revo-
lution.
The temptation, it seems to me, ought to be resisted. Of course, the
adverse circumstances with which the Bolsheviks had to cope were
real and oppressive enough. But I would argue that these circum-
stances only aggravated, though certainly to an extreme degree, a
problem which is in any case inherent in the concept of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat. The problem arises because that dictatorship,
even in the most favourable circumstances, is unrealizable without
political mediation; and because the necessary introduction of the
notion of political mediation into the "model" considerably affects the
latter's character, to say the least. This is particularly the case if
political mediation is conceived in terms of single party rule. For such
rule, even if "democratic centralism" is much more flexibly applied
than has ever been the case, makes much more difficult, and may pre-
clude, the institutionalization of what may loosely be called socialist
pluralism. This is exceptionally difficult to achieve and may even be
impossible in most revolutionary situations. But it is just as well to
recognize that unless adequate provision is made for alternative chan-
nels of expression and political articulation, which the concept of single
party rule excludes by definition, any talk of socialist democracy is
so much hot air. Single party rule postulates an undivided, revolu-
tionary proletarian will of which it is the natural expression. But this
is not a reasonable postulate upon which to rest the "dictatorship of
proletariat" : in no society, however constituted, is there an undivided,
single popular will. This is precisely why the problem of political media-
tion arises. The problem need not be thought insuperable. But its reso-
lution requires, for a start, that it should a t least be recognized.
The question of the party, however, brings one back to the question
of the state. When Lenin said, in the case of Russia, that the dictator-
ship of the proletariat was impossible except through the Communist
Party, what he also implied was that the Party must infuse its will
into and assure its domination over the institutions which had, in T h e
State and Revolution been designated as representing the armed workers.
In 1921 he noted that "as the governing party we could not help
y
fusing the Soviet 'authorities' with the party 'authorities -with us

they are fused and they will be";* and in one of his last articles in
Pravda, written in early 1923, he also suggested that "the flexible union
of Soviet with party element", which had been a "source of enormous
strength" in external policy "will be at least equally in place (I think,
far more in place) if applied to our whole state apparatu~".~ But this
means that if the party must be strong, so must the state which serves
as its organ of rule. And indeed, as early as March 1918, Lenin was
saying that "for the present we stand unconditionally for the state";
and to the question which he himself put : "When will the state begin
to die away?" he gave the answer : "We shall have time to hold more
than two congresses before we can say, See how our state is dying
away. Till then it is too soon. T o proclaim in advance the dying away
of the state will be a violation of historical perspective".1°
There is one sense in which this is perfectly consistent with T h e
State and Revolution; and another, more important sense, in which
it is not. I t is consistent in the sense that Lenin always envisaged a
strong power to exist after the revolution had been achieved. But it is'
inconsistent in the sense that he also, in The State and Revolution
envisaged this power to be exercised, not by the state as commonly
understood, but by a "state" of armed workers. Certain it is that the
state of which he was speaking after the revolution was not the state
of which he was speaking when he wrote T h e State and Revolution.
Here too, I believe that simply to attribute the inconsistency to the
particular Russian conditions which faced the Bolsheviks is insufficient.
For it seems to me that the kind of all-but unmediated popular rule
which Lenin describes in the work belongs in fact, whatever the cir-
cumstances in which revolution occurs, to a fairly distant future, in
which, as Lenin himself put it, "the need for violence against people in
general, for the subordination of one man to another, and of one section
of the population to another, will vanish altogether since people will
become accustomed to observing the elementary conditions of social
life without violence and without subordination" (p. 328). Until that
time, a state does endure, but it is not likely to be of the kind of state
of which Lenin speaks in T h e Stcite and Revolution : it is a state about
which it is not necessary to use inverted commas.
In Lenin's handling of the matter, at least in T h e State and Revolu-
tion, two "models" of the state are contraposed in the sharpest possible
way: either there is the "old state", with its repressive, military-
bureaucratic apparatus, i.e. the bourgeois state; or there is the "tran-
sitional" type of state of the dictatorship of the proIetariat which, as
I have argued, is scarcely a state at all. But if, as I believe, this latter
type of "state" represents, on the morrow of a revolution and for a
long time after, a short cut which real life does not allow," Lenin's
formulations serve to avoid rather than to meet the fundamental ques-
tion, which is at the centre of the socialist project, namely the kind
of state, without inverted commas, which is congruent with the exercise
of socialist power.
In this respect, it needs to be said that the legacy of Marx and Engels
is rather more uncertain than Lenin allows. Both men undoubtedly
conceived it as one of the main tasks, indeed the main task of the
proletarian revolution to "smash" the old state; and it is also perfectly
true that Marx did say about the Commune that it was "the political
form at last discovered under which to work out the economic eman-
cipation of labour"ll But it is not irrelevant to note that, ten years
after the Commune, Marx also wrote that "quite apart from the fact
that this [i.e. the Commune] was merely the rising of a city under
exceptional conditions, the majority of the Commune was in no wise
socialist, nor could be".12 Nor of course did Marx ever describe the
Commune as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only Engels did so,
in the 1891 Preface to T h e Civil War in France : "Of late, the Social-
Democratic Philistine has once more been filled with wholesome terror
a t the words : Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Well and good, gentle-
"This may need qualification in the following sense: on the morrow of

revolution, the problem does often appear to have vanished. The real problems
begin to emerge the day after, and the day after that, when the initial impetus
and enthusiasm begin to wane and vast new problems and dangers have to be
confronted.
men, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at
the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat".18
But in the same year 1891, Engels also said, in his Critique of the
Draft of the Erfurt Programme of the German Social Democratic
Party, that "if one thing is certain it is that our party and the working
class can only come to power in the form of the democratic republic.
This is even the specific form for the dictatorship of the proletariat,
as the Great French Revolution has already shown. . . ." (Quoted by
Lenin in The State and Revolution, p. 314). Commenting on this,
Lenin states that "Engels repeated here in a particularly striking form
the fundamental idea which runs through all of Marx's works, namely
that the democratic republic is the nearest approach to the dictator-
ship of the proletariat" (p. 314). But the "nearest approach" is not
"the specific form"; and it may be doubted that the notion of the
democratic republic as the nearest approach to the dictatorship of the
proletariat, is a fundamental idea which runs through all of Marx's
works. Also, in the Preface to The Civil War in France, Engels said
of the state that "at best it is an evil inherited by the proletariat after
its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the vic-
torious proletariat will have to lop off as speedily as possible, just as
the Commune had to, until a generation reared in new, free social
conditions is able to discard the entire lumber of the state" (Quoted
by Lenin, The State and Revolution, p. 320. My italics).
I t is on the basis of such passages that the Menshevik leader, Julius
Martov, following Kautsky, wrote after the Bolshevik revolution that
in speaking of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Engels is not em-
ploying the term "to indicate a form of government, but to designate
the social structure of the State power".14
This seems to me to be a misreading of Engels, and also of Marx.
For both men certainly thought that the dictatorship of the proletariat
meant not only "the social structure of the State power" but also and
quite emphatically "a form of government"; and Lenin is much closer
to them when he speaks in The State and Revolution of "a gigantic
replacement of certain institutions by institutions of a fundamentally
different type" (p. 293).
The point, however, is that, even taking full account of what Marx
and Engels have to say about the Commune, they left these institu-
tions of a fundamentally different type to be worked out by later
generations; and so, notwithstanding The State and Revolution, did
Lenin.
This, however, does not detract from the importance of the work.
Despite all the questions which it leaves unresolved, it carries a message
whose importance the passage of time has only served to demonstrate :
this is that the socialist project is an anti-bureaucratic project, and
that at its core is the vision of a society in which "for the first time in
the history of civilized society, the mass of the population will rise to
take an independent part, not only in voting and elections, but also in
the eueryday administration of the state. Under socialism all will govern
in turn and will soon become accustomed to no one governing" (p. 348).
This was also Marx's vision; and one of the historic merits of T h e
State and Revolution is to have brought it back to the position it
deserves on the socialist agenda. Its second historic merit i3 to have
insisted that this must not be allowed to remain a far-distant, shimmer-
ing hope that could safely be disregarded in the present; but that its
actualization must be considered as an immediate part of revolutionary
theory and practice. I have argued here that Lenin greatly over-
estimated in T h e State and Reuolution how far the state could be
made to "wither away" in any conceivable post-revolutionary situa-
tion. But it may well be that the integration of this kind of over-
estimation into socialist thinking is the necessary condition for the
transcendance of the grey and bureaucratic "practicality" which has
so deeply infected the socialist experience of the last half-century.
NOTES
Lucio Colletti, "Power and Democracy in Socialist Society" in New L e f t
Reuiew, No. 56, July-August 1969, p. 19. For another interesting assess-
ment of T h e State and Revolution, see L. Magri, " 'L'Etat et la RCvolution'
Aujourd 'hui" in Les T e m p s Modernes, August-September 1968, No.
266-267.
V. I. Lenin, T h e Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky
(London, 1941), p. 24. Italics in text.
E. H. Carr, T h e Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (London, 1950), Vol. I,
p. 230.
Zbid., p. 230.
Robert V. Daniels, "The State and Revolution: A Case Study in the
Genesis and Transformation of Communist Ideology", in T h e American
Slavic and East European Review (February, 1953), Vol. XII, No. 1, p. 24.
I. Deutscher, T h e Prophet Armed. Trotsky: 1879-1921 (London, 1954),
p. 90.
See, e.g. M. Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle (London, 1969).
Carr, op. cit., p. 223.
Ibid., p. 224.
Ibid., p. 246.
K . Marx, "The Civil War in France", in Selected Works (Moscow, 1950),
Vol. I, p. 473.
K. Marx to F. Domela-Niewenhuis, February 22, 1881, in K. Marx and
F . Engels. Selected Correspondence (Moscow, 1953), p. 410.
Selected Works, o p . cit., Vol. I, p. 440.
J. Martov, T h e State and the Socialist Revolution (New York, 1938), p. 41.
Restoring Revolutionary Theory: Towards an Understanding of Lenin's "The State and
Revolution"
Author(s): Rustam Singh
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 24, No. 43 (Oct. 28, 1989), pp. 2431-2433
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Accessed: 12-04-2018 20:14 UTC
Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Economic and Political Weekly
This content downloaded from 14.139.242.82 on Thu, 12 Apr 2018 20:14:30 UTC
Restoring Revolutionary Theory
Towards an Understanding of Lenin's
The State and Revolution
Rustam Singh
While the generally held opinion is that Lenin's The State and Revolution is a restatemzent of Marx's and E
theory of state, the author argues, taking into account both the substance of the text and the book's underlying
motive, that it is primarily an attempt to define the nature, form and method of the proletarian revolution tn order
to conclusively terminate the bourgeois political order.
edition of the book. In the very first sentence a socialist society; and (2) why this had to
of the preface he says: "The question of the be a violent revolution. He felt compelled
LENIN's book, The State and Revolution, state is now acquiring particular importance to do this in order to counter the arguments
is generally regarded as a restatement of both in theory and in practical politics". In of his fellow Marxists-Kautsky et al-who
Marx's and Engels' theory of state.' It is words The State and Revolution was
other were either not in favour of a revolution at
the position of this writer that the book is not merely a theoretical exercise. Further all and advocated reform, citing in their sup-
primarily an attempt to expound the nature ahead in the preface he says: "The world port certain views of Marx and Engels, or,
of the proletarian revolution, and the form proletarian revolution is clearly maturing. where they did favour a revolution-as in the
this revolution should necessarily take and The question of its relation to the state is case of Kautsky-they did not want violence
the methods it should adopt to successfully acquiring practical importance." Here Lenin to becarried so far as to destroy the institu-
and conclusively put an end to the bourgeois moves from the 'question of state ' to the tional apparatus of the overthrown bour-
political order and establish in its place a question of the 'proletarian revolution'. In geois state. Those who held the former posi-
socialist order. other words, he is not viewing the question tion argued that the bourgeois state did not
We take this position in spite of the fact
of the state as an independent question. It have to be overthrown by force; it would give
that in Chapter I of the book Lenin himself is intimately connected with the question of way to a proletarian state by the logical
describes his 'prime task' to be 'to re- the proletarian revolution. In fact, it has sequence of historical developments. And
establish what Marx really taught on the acquired importance only because it is con- those who took the latter position believed
subject to state'2 (emphasis in original). In nected with the question of the proletarian that the bourgeois state-structure could be
our view, what is important is not that Lenin revolution. To make this clearer, we shall used, as it was, for the purposes of the pro-
sought to re-establish Marx's views on state, quote two more statements of Lenin from letarian state. They viewed the state ap-
but rather why he felt it necessary to under- the same preface. "The struggle to free the paratus as a thing separate and apart from
take such an exercise. This in other words working people from the influence of the the interests of the class that held the reigns
means that while trying to arrive at a cor- bourgeoisie..." says Lenin, "is impossible of power, implying that any class could
rect understanding of the book, one has to without a struggle against opportunist pre- usurp this power and use the pre-existing
consider not only what is written in the book judices concerning the 'state'." This state- state apparatus as it wished.
itself but also the underlying motive of the
ment shows that Lenin's main concern is the
book. Lenin felt it important to counter these
struggle to free the workers from the bour-
We have also to keep in mind, while con- beliefs immediately because there was a
geoisie, and a correct interpretation of
sidering this book, that Lenin was first and danger of the revolutionaries becoming com-
Marx's theory of state is only a part of this
placent and losing the sharper edges of their
foremost a political activist, a revolutionary, struggle. The next statement does not leave revolutionary feelings if these beliefs prevail-
and only then a theorist. As a matter of fact,
any dcoubt regarding the intentions of Lenin ed. In The State and Revolution, therefore,
the fact of his being a theorist was only in- in writing The State and Revolution. "The
he restated certain tenets of Marxism in such
cidental. Most of the time he was busy in
question of the relation of the socialist
polemics with his political opponents, both a way that he could prove without doubt the
proletarian revolution to the state", he says, immediate necessity of a violent revolution.
socialist and otherwise. Whenever he did "... is acquiring not only practical impor-
In the process he carried out some deliberate
undertake some theoretical work, he did it tance, but also the significance of a most
with the express purpose of clarifying to his and unabashed distortions of Marxism, but
urgent problem of the day, the problem of
the nature of these disfortions was different
opponents, to his colleagues in the party, to explaining to the masses what they will have
from that of the distortions carried out by
ordinary party workers, and to the people to do before long to free themselves from
at large some particular theoretical puzzle
'opportunists' and 'social chauvinists' whom
capitalist tyranny.'3 The problem of ex-
Lenin, in Chapter I of the book, accuses of
or point, and-the advantage or lack of it of plaining to the masses what thev will have 'vulgarising' Marxism. 4
adopting or not adopting a particular tac- to do before long to free themselves from
capitalist tyranny. This, in a word, is the pro- As a matter of fact, Lenin was never un-
tical or strategical line at a given time on that
basis. Looked at closely, in fact, even his willing to make changes in the theory to
blemr Lenin sets out to tackle in The State
theoretical writing reveal themseives to andbe Revolution. And the question of the make it more suitable to the practical needs
little more than polemical exeriises, albeit of the moment. This attitude towards theory
socialist proletarian revolution and its rela-
a little weightier and profounder than pure tion to the state is the gut issuie of this become~s evident from the following state-
polemics. On a more general level, the aim problem. ment which he made immediately after the
of all Lenin's writings, like all his actions, February revolution. "We would be commit-
was to take him nearer to the making of a II ting a great mistake", he said, "if we attemp-
proletarian revolution and the establishment ted to force the complex, urgent, rapidly
of a socialist order in Russia. The penning Lenin was concerned, above all, with developing practical tasks of the revolution
of The State and Revolution was also geared showing two things in The State and Revolu- into the procrustean bed of narrowly con-
towards this aim. And he gives a clear in- tion: (1) why a revolution was necessary to ceived 'theory'..".5 This attitude is further
dication of this in the preface to the first overthrow the bourgeois state and establish confirmed by another statement which he
Economic and Political Weekly October 28, 1989 2431
made about a month later: ....it is essential tasks of the revolution.9 argument about the withering away of the
to grasp the incontestable truth that a Lenin next attempts to clarify the mean- state everyone remembers, also contains an
Marxist must take cognisance of real life, of ing of Engels' often- quoted words regarding argument of the significance of violent
the true facts of reality, and not cling to a the 'withering away' of the state. And he con- revolution. Engels' historical analysis of its
theory of yesterday, which, like all theories, demns the 'revisionists' for interpreting these role becomes a veritable panegyric on violent
at best only outlines the main and the words in a way which gives the impression revolution. This 'no one remembers'.... And
general, only comes near to embracing life that according to Engels it is the bourgeois yet it is inseparably bound up with the
in all its complexity"6 (emphasis in state that withers away. This, according to 'withering away' of the state into one har-
original). If this was Lenin's attitude towards Lenin, bears no resemblance with the monious whole." "We have already said
theory, it is inconceivable that he would original argument of Engels which is ex- above", continues Lenin, "and shall show
waste his time elaborating Marx's and tremely rich in ideas. "To prune Marxism more fully later, that the theory of Marx and
Engels' theory of state at the height of to such an extent", remarks Lenin, "means Engels of the inevitability of a violent revolu-
revolutionary preoccupation (The State and tion refers to the bourgeois state. The latter
reducing it to opportunism, for this 'inter-
Revolution was written in August and pretation' only leaves a vague notion of a cannot be superseded by the proletarian
September 1917). He clearly had some other slow, even, gradual change, of absence of state.... through the process of 'withering
purpose in mind, and that purpose, as we leaps and storms, of absence of revolution"away', but, as a general rule, only through
have already indicated, was to impress upon a violent revolution. The panegyric Engels
This interpretation of the withering away of
his followers and Marxist opponents the im- sang in its honour, and which fully corres-
the state, according to Lenin, obscures, if not
mediate necessity of a violent revolution. We repudiates the role of revolution. Thus it ponds to Marx's repeated statements....this
get a confirmation of this from what he says disregards the 'most important' element of panegyric is by no means a mere 'impulse',
further on in the same context. Here he is Engels' argument. Lenin then gives his own a mere declamation or a polemical sally. The
attacking those who believed that the interpretation of this phrase of Engels. necessity of systematically imbuing the
bourgeois revolution had not yet been com- masses with this and precisely this view of
",..Engels speaks here", says Lenin, "of the
pleted and, therefore, that it was too early proletarian revolution 'abolishing' the violent revolution lies at the root of the en-
to think in terms of a proletarian revolution: tire theory of Marx and Engels""i (em-
bourgeois state, while the words about the
To deal with the question of "completion" state withering away refer to the remnants phasis in original).
of the bourgeois revolution in the old way of the prol?tarian state after the socialist Talking of the corrections that Marx and
is to sacrifice living Marxism to the dead let-
revolution. According to Engels, the bour- Engels felt should be made in the Com-
ter. According to the old way of thinking, thegeois state does not 'wither away', but is munist Manifesto on the basis of lessons
rule of the bourgeoisie could and should be. 'abolished' by the proletariat in the course drawn from the revolutionary experience of
followed by the rule of the proletariat and of the revolution" 10 (emphasis in original). the Paris Commune, Lenin quotes the
the peasantry, by their dictatorship. In real A careful reading of Engels' argument as following words of Marx and Engels from
life, however, things have already turned out
quoted by Lenin reveals that even this is not the preface of the then new German edition
differently; there has been an extremely
an exactly correct interpretation of what of the Manifesto: "...one thing especially was
original, novel and unprecedented interlacing
Engels says. Lenin has deliberately made it proved by the Commune, viz, that 'the work-
of the one with the other7 (emphasis in
appear to be heavily tilted on the side of ing class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-
original).
revolution. But this only goes to show made state machinery and wield it for its
As Lucio Colletti observes:
own purposes'." According to Lenin, these
Lenin's bias in favour of revolution and his
None of Lenin's writings [has] a 'con- words of Marx and Engels have been
impatience with the notion of slow, gradual
templative' character. This is less than ever
the case with State and Revolution. Lenin
change. This becomes clear when one looksdistorted by the 'opportunists' to say that
at some more statements of Lenin about Marx here emphasises the idea of slow
embarked upon it so as to decide what to do
in the ongoing revolution.8 Engels' above-mentioned argument. ". . the development in contradistinction to the
same work of Engels", states Leinin, "whose seizure of power, etc. But, as a matter of fact,
III
Lenin begins by clarifying the basic idea

of Marxism with regard to the state: that the
state is the product of the irreconcilability
CENTRE FOR SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT
of class antagonisms and an organ of class 807 Vishal Bhawan, 95 Nehru Place
rule, an organ for the oppression of one class
by another, and he goes on to prove that the New Delhi 110 019
existence of the state means that the class
antagonisms are irreconcilable. But why is
Lenin so concerned with showing the origin
The Centre for Science and Environment invites applications
and nature of the state? Because of the for the posts of Senior Researchers in Science, Social
following reason:
Sciences.
... If the state is the product of the irrecon-
cilability of class antagonisms... it is clear that The Centre is a public interest research organisation concerned with sustain
the liberation of the oppressed class is im-
natural resource management in India. Its work is a mix between ind
possible... without the destruction of the ap-
paratus of state power which was created by journalism and policy research and is mainly directed towards preparatio
the ruling class... (emphasis in original). publications and informational materials designed to create an informed pu
Destruction of the apparatus of state power,
opinion.
we can see, was the central concern of Lenin,
and he relates the origin and development
of the state only to point out the necessity Apply with full details of qualifications, experience and salary expectations to
of this destruction. He supports himself, on the Director.
this point, by citing Marx who he says, had
drawn this 'self-evident' conclusion on the
basis of a concrete historical analysis of the
2432 Economic and Political Weekly October 28, 1989
the exact opposite is true. "Marx's idea is selves, it would not have had to 'abolish' the the minority... From this 'capitalist
that the working class must bregk up, smash institutions of the state-they would have democracy' forward development does not
the 'ready-made state machinery", and not ceased to function as they ceased to have proceed 'simply, directly and smoothly',
confine itself merely to laying hold of it". anything to do.'6 towards 'greater and greater democracy', as
The words "to smash the ready-made state That the bourgeoisie understood these the liberal professors and petty-bourgeois op-
processes of revolution much better than portunists would have us believe. "Forward
machinery"' Lenin emphasises, "briefly ex-
development, i e, development towards com-
press the principal lesson of Marxism regar- most socialists is also shown by Lenin. He
munism, proceeds through the dictatorship
ding the tasks of the proletariat during a .cites Engels' preface to the third edition of
of the proletariat, and cannot do otherwise,
revolution in relation to the state"12 (em- Marx's pamphlet The Civil War in France
for the resistance of the capitalist exploiters
phasis in original). where Engels gives a summary of the lessons
cannot be broken by anyone else or in any
Having shown that it is the proletarian of the Paris Commune and of the bourgeois
other way".
state that shall wither away and not the revolutions preceding that. This summary, Quoting Engels, Lenin asserts that
bourgeois state, and that the former can be emphasises Lenin, "may justly be called the the proletariat needs the state, not in interests
established only through a violent revolu- last word of Marxism on the question under of freedom but in order to hold down its
tion, Lenin takes up the task of demonst- consideration". Engels observes in this sum- adversaries.... . Only in communist society,
rating the necessity of the continued use of mary that in France the workers emerged when the resistance of the capitalists has been
violence for the thorough and systematic with arms from every revolution. And every completely crushed... only then the state....
abolition of the remnants of the bourgeoisie time "...the disarming of the workers was the ceases to exist, and it becomes possible to
after the proletariat has come into power. He first commandment for the bourgeois, who speak of freedom (emphasis in original).
quotes Marx and Engels to outline the tasks were at the helm of the state. Hence, after
of the proletariat from now on: every revolution won by the workers, a new IV
struggle, ending with the defeat of the
The proletariat will use its political In chapter 1 of The State and Revolution,
supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital workers' "This summary of the experience
Lenin talks of attempts to convert the revolu-
from the bourgeosie, to centralise all in- of bourgeois revolutions is as concise as it
tionaries into 'harmless icons', after their
struments of production in the hands of the is expressive". remarks Lenin. "The essence
death, and of 'robbing' their revolutionary
state, i.e, of the proletariat organised as theof the matter.... (has the oppressed class
arms?)....is here remarkably well grasped. It theories of their 'revolutionary edge'. Some
ruling class....
such thing can also be said about Lenin and
Castigating the 'revisionists', especially Kaut- is precisely this essence that is most often
his theory as expounded in this book. At-
sky, for ignoring this element of the Marxian evaded both by professors influenced by
bourgeois ideology, and by petty-bourgeois tempts to present this theory primarily as a
theory, Lenin says:
democrats" (emphasis in original).'7 theory of state and not as a theory of revolu-
Opportunism does not extend recognition of tion "omiit, obscure [and] distort the revolu-
Lenin takes special pains, at this point, to
the class struggle to the cardinal point, to the tionary side of this theory, its revolutionary
emphasise that according to Engels it is 'not
period of transition from capitalism to com- soul". 22
only under a monarchy, but also in a
munism, of the....complete abolition of the
democrrtic republic' that 'the state remains
bourgeoisie. In reality, this period inevitably Notes
is a period of an unprecedentedly violent a state, i e, it retains its fundamental
class struggle in unprecedentedly acute distinguishing feature of transforming the 1 See, for example, Robert Coniquest, Lenin,
forms... (emphasis in original).'4 officials, the 'servants of society'. its organs, Fontana/Collins, Glasgow, 1972, p 85;
into the masters of society. He quotes Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of
Lenin refers, in this connection, to Marx's
Engels according to whom, Marxism, Vol 2, Oxford University Press,
controversy with the anarchists. Marx had
Oxford, 1982, p 498; and George Lichtheim,
ridiculed them for suggesting that after over- ...people think they have taken quite an ex-
Marxism: A Historical and Critical Study,
throwing the bourgeois state the workers traordinarily bold step forward when they
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980,
should immediately lay down their arms. have rid themselves of belief in hereditary
p 350.
Marx did not 'at all' oppose, according to monarchy and swear by the democratic
2 Selected Works, Volume 2, Progress
Lenin, the view that the state would disap- republic. In reality, however, state is nothing
but a machine for the oppression of one class Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 240.
pear when classes disappeared. What he did 3 Ibid, pp 238-39.
by another, and indeed in the democratic
oppose was the proposition that the workers 4 Ibid, p 240.
republic no less than, in the monarchy. And
should renounce the use of arms, organised 5 'Letters From Afar: Third Letter', Collected
at best it is an evil inherited by the proletariat
violence, that is, the state, which is to serve Works, Volume 23, Progress Publishers,
after the victorious struggle for class
to 'crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie'. Moscow, 1964, p 330.
supremacy, whose worst sides the victorious
Lenin maintains that to achieve the aim of proletariat will have to lop off as speedily as 6 'Letters on Tactics: First Letter', Collected
abolishing the state the workers "must tem- possible...until a generation reared in new, Works, Volume 24, Progress Publishers,
porarily make use of the instruments, free social conditions is able to discard the Moscow, 1964, p 45.
resources and methods of state power entire lumber of the state.18 7 Ibid., pp 45-6.
against the exploiters...' He then quotes Explaining this what according to him may 8 From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in
Engels to reinforce his argument. "A revolu-seem "strange and incomprehensible" argu- Ideology and Society, Oxford University
tion is...an act whereby one part of the Press, Delhi, 1978, p 226.
ment, Lenin says that since democracy
9 Selected Works, op cit, p 242.
population imposes its will upon the other"recognises the subordination of the minori-
10 Ibid, p 249.
by means of rifles, bayonets and canon..',ty to the majority, i e, an organisation for
11 Ibid, pp 251-52.
Engels had said. "And the victorious party the systematic use of force by one class
12 Ibid, pp 263-64.
must maintain its rule by means of terror against another", therefore it is still a state
13 Ibid, p 254.
which its arms inspire in the reactionaries".(emphasis in original).'9 This kind of state,
14 Ibid, p 262.
And he had accused the Paris Commune forhowever, is realisable only under the dictator- 15 Ibib, pp 281-83.
making "too little use" of such means. By ship of the proletariat which for the first 16 Ibid, p 285.
doing this, says Lenin, Engels had taken "thetime brings 'democracy for the people' (em- 17 Ibid, p 292.
bull by the horns" (emphasis in original).'5phasis in original).20 A democratic republic, 18 Ibid, pp 294-95.
In other words, had the Commune made fullon the other hand, remains 19 Ibid, p 297.
and timely use-of its coercive power, it might hemmed in by the narrow limits set by 20 Ibid, p 302.
have succeeded. All 'traces-of the state in it' capitalist exploitation, and consequently 21 Ibid, pp 301-02.
would-then 'have withered away' of them- always remains, in effect, a democracy for 22 Ibid, p 240.
The Origins of Totalitarianism
Author(s): Eric Voegelin
Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jan., 1953), pp. 68-76
Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on
behalf of Review of Politics
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1404747
Accessed: 25-01-2019 10:53 UTC
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Cambridge University Press, University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of

Politics are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Review of
Politics
This content downloaded from 14.139.242.82 on Fri, 25 Jan 2019 10:53:33 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
By Eric Voegelin
T HE vast majority of all human beings alive on earth is af-

fected in some measure by the totalitarian mass movements
of our time. Whether men are members, supporters, fellow-trav-
ellers, naive connivers, actual or potential victims, whether they
are under the domination of a totalitarian government, or whether
they are still free to organize their defenses against the disaster,
the relation to the movements has become an intimate part of
their spiritual, intellectual, economic, and physical existence. The
putrefaction of Western civilization, as it were, has released a
cadaveric poison spreading its infection through the body of
humanity. What no religious founder, no philosopher, no imperial
conqueror of the past has achieved - to create a community of
mankind by creating a common concern for all men - has now
been realized through the community of suffering under the
earthwide expansion of Western foulness.
Even under favorable circumstances, a communal process of
such magnitude and complexity will not lend itself easily to ex-
ploration and theorization by the political scientist. In space the
knowledge of facts must extend to a plurality of civilizations; by
subject matter the inquiry will have to range from religious ex-
periences and their symbolization, through governmental institu-
tions and the organization of terrorism, to the transformations of
personality under the pressure of fear and habituation to atroci-
ties; in time the inquiry will have to trace the genesis of the move-
ments through the course of a civilization that has lasted for a mil-
lennium. Regrettably, though, the circumstances are not favor-
able. The positivistic destruction of political science is not yet
overcome; and the great obstacle to an adequate treatment of
totalitarianism is still the insufficiency of theoretical instruments.
It is difficult to categorize political phenomena properly without
a well developed philosophical anthropology, or phenomena of
spiritual disintegration without a theory of the spirit; for the
morally abhorrent and the emotionally existing will overshadow
the essential. Moreover, the revolutionary outburst of totalitarian-
68
THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 69
ism in our time is the climax of a secular evolution

because of the unsatisfactory state of critical theory,
that grew to actuality in a long historical process will d
cation. The catastrophic manifestations of the rev
massacre and misery of millions of human beings,
spectator so strongly as unprecedented in comparis
immediately preceding more peaceful age that the
difference will obscure the essential sameness.
In view of these difficulties the work by Hannah Arendt on
The Origins of Totalitarianism deserves careful attention.* It is
an attempt to make contemporary phenomena intelligible by trac-
ing their origin back to the eighteenth century, thus establishing
a time unit in which the essence of totalitarianism unfolded to its
fullness. And as far as the nature of totalitarianism is concerned,
it penetrates to the theoretically relevant issues. This book on the
troubles of the age, however, is also marked by these troubles, for
it bears the scars of the unsatisfactory state of theory to which we
have alluded. It abounds with brilliant formulations and pro-
found insights - as one would expect only from an author who
has mastered her problems as a philosopher-but surprisingly,
when the author pursues these insights into their consequences, the
elaboration veers toward regrettable flatness. Such derailments,
while embarrassing, are nevertheless instructive - sometimes more
instructive than the insights themselves - because they reveal the
intellectual confusion of the age, and show more convincingly
than any argument why totalitarian ideas find mass acceptance
and will find it for a long time to come.
The book is organized in three parts: Antisemitism, Imperial-
ism, and Totalitarianism. The sequence of the three topics is
roughly chronological, though the phenomena under the three
titles do overlap in time. Antisemitism begins to rear its head in
the Age of Enlightenment; the imperialist expansion and the pan-
movements reach from the middle of the nineteenth century to
the present; and the totalitarian movements belong to the twen-
tieth century. The sequence is, furthermore, an order of increas-
ing intensity and ferocity in the growth of totalitarian features
toward the climax in the atrocities of the concentration camps.
* Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt, Brace and
Company, New York, 1951, XV, 477 pages.)
70 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
And it is, finally, a gradual revelation of the essence of

rianism from its inchoate forms in the eighteenth cen
fully developed, nihilistic crushing of human beings.
This organization of the materials, however, canno
pletely understood without its emotional motivatio
more than one way to deal with the problems of totalit
and it is not certain, as we shall see, that Dr. Arendt's
Anyway, there can be no doubt that the fate of the
mass slaughter and the homelessness of displaced per
the author a center of emotional shock, the center f
radiates her desire to inquire into the causes of the hor
derstand political phenomena in Western civilization
to the same class, and to consider means that will ste
This emotionally determined method of proceeding f
crete center of shock toward generalizations leads to
tion of subject matter. The shock is caused by the fate
beings, of the leaders, followers, and victims of totalit
ments; hence, the crumbling of old and the format
institutions, the life-courses of individuals in an age
tional change, the dissolution and formation of types o
as well as of the ideas of right conduct, will becom
totalitarianism will have to be understood by its manif
the medium of conduct and institutions just adumb
indeed there runs through the book - as the govern
the obsolescence of the national state as the shelterin
tion of Western political societies, owing to technol
nomic, and the consequent changes of political p
every change sections of society become "superfluo
sense that they lose their function and therefore are th
their social status and economic existence. The centralization of
the national state and the rise of bureaucracies in France makes
the nobility superfluous; the growth of industrial societies a
new sources of revenue in the late nineteenth century make th
Jews as state bankers superfluous; every industrial crisis create
superfluity of human beings through unemployment; taxation
the inflations of the twentieth century dissolve the middle clas
into social rubble; the wars and the totalitarian regimes prod
the millions of refugees, slave-laborers, and inmates of concent
tion camps, and push the membership of whole societies into th
position of expendable human material. As far as the in

aspect of the process is concerned totalitarianism, thus,
integration of national societies and their transformatio
gregates of superfluous human beings.
The delimitation of subject matter through the e
aroused by the fate of human beings is the strengt
Arendt's book. The concern about man and the causes of his
fate in social upheavals is the source of historiography. The
ner in which the author spans her arc from the presently m
events to their origins in the concentration of the national
evolves distant memories of the grand manner in which
dides spanned his arc from the catastrophic movement of his
from the great kinesis, to its origins in the emergence
Athenian polis after the Persian Wars. The emotion in its pu
makes the intellect a sensitive instrument for recognizin
selecting the relevant facts; and if the purity of the hum
terest remains untainted by partisanship, the result will be
torical study of respectable rank - as in the case of the p
work, which in its substantive parts is remarkably free of
logical nonsense. With admirable detachment from the p
strife of the day, the author has succeeded in writing the h
of the circumstances that occasioned the movements, of the
tarian movements themselves, and above all of the dissolutio
human personality, from the early anti-bourgeois and antis
resentment to the contemporary horrors of the "man wh
his duty" and of his victims.
This is not the occasion to go into details. Nevertheless, a
of the topics must be mentioned in order to convey an idea
richness of the work. The first part is perhaps the best sho
tory of the antisemitic problem in existence; for special att
should be singled out the sections on the court-jews an
decline, on the Jewish problem in enlightened and romantic
lin, the sketch of Disraeli, and the concise account of the Dr
Affair. The second part- on Imperialism - is theoretica
most penetrating, for it creates the type-concepts for the re
between phenomena which are rarely placed in their pr
wider context. It contains the studies on the fateful emanci
of the bourgeoisie that wants to be an upper class without a
ing the responsibilities of rulership, on the disintegration of
ern national societies and the formation of elites

the genesis of race-thinking in the eighteenth century
perialist expansion of the Western national states
problem in the empires, on the corresponding con
movements and the genesis of racial nationalism.
larger studies are embedded previous miniatures of s
tions and personalities, such as the splendid studies o
Barnato, of the character traits of the Boers and the
of the British colonial bureaucracy, of the inabilit
national states to create an imperial culture in the
and the subsequent failure of British and French imp
the element of infantilism in Kipling and Lawren
and of the Central European minority question. T
-on Totalitarianism - contains studies on the clas
that results from general superfluity of the members
on the difference between mob and mass, on total
ganda, on totalitarian police, and the concentration
The digest of this enormous material, well docu
footnotes and bibliographies, is sometimes broad,
joy of skilful narration by the true historian, but
gether by the conceptual discipline of the general
theless, at this point a note of criticism will have
The organization of the book is somewhat less strict
be, if the author had availed herself more readily of
ical instruments which the present state of scienc
disposition. Her principle of relevance that orders th
materials into a story of totalitarianism is the disint
civilization into masses of human beings without secu
and social status; and her materials are relevant in so
demonstrate the process of disintegration. Obviously
is the same that has been categorized by Toynbee a
of the internal and external proletariat. It is surprisi
author has not used Toynbee's highly differentiated
that even his name appears neither in the footnot
bibliography, nor in the index. The use of Toynbee's
have substantially added to the weight of Dr. Aren
This excellent book, as we have indicated, is un
marred, however, by certain theoretical defects. The
movements of the totalitarian type on the level of s
and change, as well as of types of conduct determine

apt to endow historical causality with an aura of f
tions and changes, to be sure, require, but they do no
a response. The character of a man, the range and
his passions, the controls exerted by his virtues, and
freedom, enter as further determinants. If conduct i
stood as the response of a man to a situation, and the
response as rooted in the potentialities of human n
than in the situation itself, the process of history w
closed stream, of which every cross-cut at a given po
is the exhaustive determinant of the future course. Dr. Arendt is
aware of this problem. She knows that changes in the economi
and social situations do not simply make people superfluous, an
that superfluous people do not respond by necessity with resent-
ment, cruelty, and violence; she knows that a ruthlessly competi-
tive society owes its character to an absence of restraint and of a
sense of responsibility for consequences; and she is even uneasily
aware that not all the misery of National Socialist concentratio
camps was caused by the oppressors, but that a part of it stemme
from the spiritual lostness that so many of the victims brought
with them. Her understanding of such questions is revealed be
yond doubt in the following passage: "Nothing perhaps distin-
guishes modern masses as radically from those of previous cen
turies as the loss of faith in a Last Judgment: the worst have lost
their fear and the best have lost their hope. Unable as yet to live
without fear and hope, these masses are attracted by every effort
which seems to promise a man-made fabrication of the paradis
they longed for and of the hell they had feared. Just as the popu
larized feature of Marx's classless society have a queer resem
blance to the Messianic Age, so the reality of the concentratio
camps resembles nothing so much as mediaeval pictures of hell
(p. 419). The spiritual disease of agnosticism is the peculiar prob-
lem of the modern masses, and the man-made paradises and man-
made hells are its symptoms; and the masses have the disease
whether they are in their paradise or in their hell. The author
thus, is aware of the problem; but, oddly enough, the knowledge
does not affect her treatment of the materials. If the spiritua
disease is the decisive feature that distinguishes modern masse
from those of earlier centuries, then one would expect the study
of totalitarianism not to be delimited by the institution

down of national societies and the growth of socially su
masses, but rather by the genesis of the spiritual disease
since the response to the institutional breakdown clearl
marks of the disease. Then the origins of totalitarian
not have to be sought primarily in the fate of the natio
and attendant social and economic changes since the
century, but rather in the rise of immanentist sectaria
the high Middle Ages; and the totalitarian movements w
be simply revolutionary movements of functionally
people, but immanentist creed movements in which
heresies have come to their fruition. Dr. Arendt, as we
does not draw the theoretical conclusions from her own
Such inconclusiveness has a cause. It comes to lig
other one of the profound formulations which the auth
in a surprising direction: "What totalitarian ideologie
aim at is not the transformation of the outside world or the revo-
lutionizing transmutation of society, but the transformation of
human nature itself" (p. 432). This is, indeed, the essence of
totalitarianism as an immanentist creed movement. Totalitarian
movements do not intend to remedy social evils by industr
changes, but want to create a millennium in the eschatologi
sense through transformation of human nature. The Christ
faith in transcendental perfection through the grace of God ha
been converted-and perverted-into the idea of immanen
perfection through an act of man. And this understanding of t
spiritual and intellectual breakdown is followed in Dr. Arend
text by the sentence: "Human nature as such is at stake, an
even though it seems that these experiments succeed not in cha
ing man but only in destroying him . . . one should bear in min
the necessary limitations to an experiment which requires globa
control in order to show conclusive results" (p. 433). When
read this sentence, I could hardly believe my eyes. "Nature"
a philosophical concept; it denotes that which identifies a th
as a thing of this kind and not of another one. A "nature" c
not be changed or transformed; a "change of nature" is a co
tradiction of terms; tampering with the "nature" of a thin
means destroying the thing. To conceive the idea of "changi
the nature" of man (or of anything) is a symptom of the int
lectual breakdown of Western civilization. The author

adopts the immanentist ideology; she keeps an "open min
regard to the totalitarian atrocities; she considers the que
a "change of nature" a matter that will have to be se
"trial and error"; and since the "trial" could not yet av
of the opportunities afforded by a global laboratory, the
must remain in suspense for the time being.
These sentences of Dr. Arendt, of course, must not
strued as a concession to totalitarianism in the more restricted
sense, that is, as a concession to National Socialist and Com-
munist atrocities. On the contrary, they reflect a typically liber
progressive, pragmatist attitude toward philosophical proble
We suggested previously that the author's theoretical derailmen
are sometimes more interesting than her insights. And this att
tude is, indeed, of general importance because it reveals ho
much ground liberals and totalitarians have in common; the
sential immanentism which unites them overrides the differences
of ethos which separate them. The true dividing line in the con
temporary crisis does not run between liberals and totalitarians,
but between the religious and philosophical transcendentalists on
the one side, and the liberal and totalitarian immanentist sec
rians on the other side. It is sad, but it must be reported, t
the author herself draws this line. The argument starts from h
confusion about the "nature of man": "Only the criminal attemp
to change the nature of man is adequate to our trembling insigh
that no nature, not even the nature of man, can any longer
considered to be the measure of all things"- a sentence which, i
it has any sense at all, can only mean that the nature of m
ceases to be the measure, when some imbecile conceives the noti
of changing it. The author seems to be impressed by the imbeci
and is ready to forget about the nature of man, as well as ab
all human civilization that has been built on its understandi
The "mob," she concedes, has correctly seen "that the whole
nearly three thousand years of Western civilization . . .
broken down." Out go the philosophers of Greece, the proph
of Israel, Christ, not to mention the Patres and Scholastics
for man has "come of age," and that means "that from now
man is the only possible creator of his own laws and the o
possible maker of his own history." This coming-of-age has to b
accepted;
accepted; man
man
is the
is new
thelawmaker;
new lawmaker;
and on theand
tablets
on wiped
the tab
clean
cleanofof
thethe
pastpast
he will
heinscribe
will inscribe
the "new the
discoveries
"new indiscoveries
morality" i
which
which Burke
Burkehad had
still considered
still considered
impossible.
impossible.
It
It sounds
sounds likelike
a nihilistic
a nihilistic
nightmare.
nightmare.
And a nightmare
And aitnightis
rather
rather than
than a well
a well
considered
considered
theory. Ittheory.
would beItunfair
would to hold
be unf
the
theauthor
author responsible
responsibleon the on
levelthe
of critical
level of thought
criticalfor though
what
obviously
obviously is aistraumatic
a traumaticshuddering
shuddering
under the under
impact of theexperi-
impact o
ences
encesthat thatwerewere
stronger
stronger
than thethan
forcesthe
of forces
spiritual of
andspiritual
intellec- an
tual
tualresistance.
resistance. The book
The as book
a whole
as amust
wholenot be
must
judgednot by be
thejud
theoretical
theoretical derailments
derailments which which
occur mostly
occur in mostly
its concluding
in its part.
concl
The
Thetreatment
treatment of the
ofsubject
the subject
matter itself
matteris animated,
itself is if animated,
not al-
ways
wayspenetrated,
penetrated, by the byage-old
the age-old
knowledge knowledge
about humanabout naturehum
and
andthe the lifelife
of the
of spirit
the spirit
which, which,
in the conclusions,
in the conclusions,
the author
wishes
wishes to to
discard
discardand to and
replace
to replace
by "new discoveries."
by "new discoverie
Let us
rather
rather taketakecomfort
comfortin theinunconscious
the unconscious
irony of the irony
closingofsen-
the cl
tence
tenceofof thetheworkwork
wherewhere
the author
theappeals,
author for
appeals,
the "new" forspirit
the "n
of
ofhuman
human solidarity,
solidarity,to Actsto16:
Acts
28: "Do
16:thyself
28: "Dono harm;
thyself for no
we harm
are
areallall
here."
here."Perhaps,
Perhaps,
when thewhenauthor
theprogresses
author fromprogresses
quoting fr
to
tohearing
hearing thesethese
words,words,
her nightmarish
her nightmarish
fright will fright
end like that
will en
of
ofthethe jailer
jailer
to whom
to whom they were
they addressed.
were addressed.
A REPLY
By Hannah Arendt
Much as I appreciate the unusual kindness of the edito
the Review of Politics who asked me to answer Prof. Eric
Voegelin's criticism of my book, I am not quite sure that
I decided wisely when I accepted their offer. I certainly would
not, and should not, have accepted if his review were of the
usual friendly or unfriendly kind. Such replies, by their very
nature, all too easily tempt the author either to review his own
book or to write a review of the review. In order to avoid such
temptations, I have refrained as much as I could, even on the
level of personal conversation, to take issue with any reviewer of
my book, no matter how much I agreed or disagreed with him.
Professor Voegelin's criticism, however, is of a kind that can
be answered in all propriety. He raises certain very general
questions of method, on one side, and of general philosophical
[The Origins of Totalitarianism]: A Reply
Author(s): Hannah Arendt
Accessed: 13-04-2018 05:07 UTC

Politics
This content downloaded from 14.139.242.82 on Fri, 13 Apr 2018 05:07:37 UTC
accepted;
accepted; man
man
is the
is new
thelawmaker;
new lawmaker;
and on theand
tablets
on wiped
the tab
clean
cleanofof
thethe
pastpast
he will
heinscribe
will inscribe
the "new the
discoveries
"new indiscoveries
morality" i
which
which Burke
Burkehad had
still considered
still considered
impossible.
impossible.
It
It sounds
sounds likelike
a nihilistic
a nihilistic
nightmare.
nightmare.
And a nightmare
And aitnightis
rather
rather than
than a well
a well
considered
considered
theory. Ittheory.
would beItunfair
would to hold
be unf
the
theauthor
author responsible
levelthe
of critical
level of thought
criticalfor though
what
obviously
shuddering
under the under
impact o
ences
stronger
stronger
than thethan
forcesthe
of forces
spiritual of
andspiritual
intellec- an
tual
tualresistance.
The as book
a whole
as amust
wholenot be
must
judgednot by be
thejud
theoretical
occur mostly
occur in mostly
its concluding
in its part.
concl
The
Thetreatment
treatment of the
ofsubject
the subject
matter itself
matteris animated,
not al-
ways
wayspenetrated,
the age-old
knowledge knowledge
and
andthe the lifelife
of the
of spirit
the spirit
which, which,
in the conclusions,
in the conclusions,
the author
wishes
wishes to to
discard
discardand to and
replace
to replace
by "new discoverie
Let us
rather
the unconscious
irony of the irony
closingofsen-
the cl
tence
wherewhere
the author
theappeals,
author for
appeals,
the "new" forspirit
the "n
of
ofhuman
human solidarity,
Acts
28: "Do
16:thyself
28: "Dono harm;
thyself for no
we harm
are
areallall
here."
here."Perhaps,
Perhaps,
when thewhenauthor
theprogresses
quoting fr
to
tohearing
hearing thesethese
words,words,
her nightmarish
her nightmarish
fright will fright
end like that
will en
of
ofthethe jailer
jailer
to whom
to whom they were
they addressed.
were addressed.
A REPLY
By Hannah Arendt
implications on the other. Both of course belong

while I feel that within the necessary limitations
study and political analysis I made myself suffic
certain general perplexities which have come to ligh
full development of totalitarianism, I also know t
explain the particular method which I came t
account for a rather unusual approach-not to
historical and political issues where account or justif
only distract-to the whole field of political a
sciences as such. One of the difficulties of the book is that it does
not belong to any school and hardly uses any of the officially
recognized or officially controversial instruments.
The problem originally confronting me was simple and baf-
fling at the same time: all historiography is necessarily salvation
and frequently justification; it is due to man's fear that he may
forget and to his striving for something which is even more than
remembrance. These impulses are already implicit in the mere
observation of chronological order and they are not likely to be
overcome through the interference of value-iudgments which
usually interrupt the narrative and make the account appear
biased and "unscientific." I think the history of antisemitism is a
good example of this kind of history-writing. The reason why
this whole literature is so extraordinarily poor in terms of scholar-
ship is that the historians - if they were not conscious antisemites
which of course they never were - had to write the history of a
subject which they did not want to conserve; they had to write
in a destructive way and to write history for purposes of destruc-
tion is somehow a contradiction in terms. The way out has been
to hold on, so to speak, to the Jews, to make them the subject
of conservation. But this was no solution, for to look at the
events only from the side of the victim resulted in apologetics-
which of course is no history at all.
Thus my first problem was how to write historically about
something-totalitarianism-which I did not want to conserve
but on the contrary felt engaged to destroy. My way of solving
this problem has given rise to the reproach that the book was
lacking in unity. What I did -and what I might have done
anyway because of my previous training and the way of my
thinking-was to discover the chief elements of totalitarianism
and to analyze them in historical terms, tracing t

back in history as far as I deemed proper and ne
is, I did not write a history of totalitarianism but an
terms of history; I did not write a history of antise
imperialism, but analyzed the element of Jew-h
element of expansion insofar as these elements were
visible and played a decisive role in the totalitarian
itself. The book, therefore, does not really deal with
of totaritarianism - as its title unfortunately clai
a historical account of the elements which crystalliz
tarianism, this account is followed by an analysis of
structure of totalitarian movements and domination itself. The
elementary structure of totalitarianism is the hidden structure
the book while its more apparent unity is provided by certa
fundamental concepts which run like red threads through th
whole.
The same problem of method can be approached from an-
other side and then presents itself as a problem of "style." This
has been praised as passionate and criticized as sentimental. Both
judgments seem to me a little beside the point. I parted quite
consciously with the tradition of sine ira et studio of whose great-
ness I was fully aware, and to me this was a methodological ne-
cessity closely connected with my particular subject matter.
Let us suppose - to take one among many possible examples
-that the historian is confronted with excessive poverty in a
society of great wealth, such-as the poverty of the British working
classes during the early stages of the industrial revolution. The
natural human reaction to such conditions is one of anger and
indignation because these conditions are against the dignity of
man. If I describe these conditions without permitting my indig.
nation to interfere, I have lifted this particular phenomenon out
of its context in human society and have thereby robbed it of
part of its nature, deprived it of one of its important inherent
qualities. For to arouse indignation is one of the qualities of
excessive poverty insofar as poverty occurs among human beings.
I therefore can not agree with Professor Voegelin that the "mor-
ally abhorrent and the emotionally existing will overshadow
the essential," because I believe them to form an integral part of
it. This has nothing to do with sentimentality or moralizing,
although, of course, either can become a pitfall fo

If I moralized or became sentimental, I simply did
what I was supposed to do, namely to describe the
phenomenon as occurring, not on the moon, but in t
human society. To describe the concentration cam
not to be "objective," but to condone them; and su
cannot be changed by a condemnation which the
feel duty bound to add but which remains unrelat
scription itself. When I used the image of Hell, I
this allegorically but literally: it seems rather obv
who have lost their faith in Paradise, will not be able
it on earth; but it is not so certain that those who h
belief in Hell as a place of the hereafter may not b
able to establish on earth exact imitations of what pe
believe about Hell. In this sense I think that a descrip
camps as hell on earth is more "objective," that i
quate to their essence than statements of a purely so
psychological nature.
The problem of style is a problem of adequacy
sponse. If I write in the same "objective" mann
Elizabethan age and the twentieth century, it may
my dealing with both periods is inadequate becau
nounced the human faculty to respond to either. T
tion of style is bound up with the problem of un
which has plagued the historical sciences almost fr
ginnings. I do not wish to go into this matter her
add that I am convinced that understanding is clos
that faculty of imagination which Kant called Ein
and which has nothing in common with fictiona
Spiritual Exercises are exercises of imagination and
more relevant to method in the historical sciences than academic
training realizes.
Reflections of this kind, originally caused by the special na-
ture of my subject, and the personal experience which is neces-
sarily involved in an historical investigation that employs imag-
ination consciously as an important tool of cognition, resulted in
a critical approach toward almost all interpretation of contem-
porary history. I hinted at this in two short paragraphs of the
Preface where I warned the reader against the concepts of Prog-
ress and of Doom as "two sides of the same medal" as well as

against any attempt at "deducing the unprecedented from pr
dents." These two approaches are closely interconnected.
reason why Professor Voegelin can speak of "the putrefaction
Western civilization" and the "earthwide expansion of We
foulness" is that he treats "phenomenal differences"-whic
me as differences of factuality are all-important-as minor
growths of some "essential sameness" of a doctrinal nature
merous affinities between totalitarianism and some other trends
in Occidental political or intellectual history have been described
with this result, in my opinion: they all failed to point out t
distinct quality of what was actually happening. The "phenom
enal differences," far from "obscuring" some essential sameness,
are those phenomena which make totalitarianism "totalitarian
which distinguish this one form of government and moveme
from all others and therefore can alone help us in finding it
essence. What is unprecedented in totalitarianism is not prima
ily its ideological content, but the event of totalitarian dominati
itself. This can be seen clearly if we have to admit that the
deeds of its considered policies have exploded our traditiona
categories of political thought (totalitarian domination is unli
all forms of tyranny and despotism we know of) and the stand-
ards of our moral judgment (totalitarian crimes are very inad
quately described as "murder" and totalitarian criminals can
hardly be punished as "murderers").
Mr. Voegelin seems to think that totalitarianism is only th
other side of liberalism, positivism and pragmatism. But whethe
one agrees with liberalism or not (and I may say here that I a
rather certain that I am neither a liberal nor a positivist nor
pragmatist), the point is that liberals are clearly not totalitarian
This, of course, does not exclude the fact that liberal or po
tivistic elements also lend themselves to totalitarian thinking; bu
such affinities would only mean that one has to draw eve
sharper distinctions because of the fact that liberals are not
totalitarians.
I hope that I do not belabor this point unduly. It is impor-
tant to me because I think that what separates my approach
from Professor Voegelin's is that I proceed from facts and events
instead of intellectual affinities and influences. This is perhaps a
bit difficult to perceive because I am of course mu

with philosophical implications and changes in sp
interpretation. But this certainly does not mean tha
"a gradual revelation of the essence of totalitarian
inchoate forms in the eighteenth century to the ful
because this essence, in my opinion, did not exist
not come into being. I therefore talk only of "elem
eventually crystallize into totalitarianism, some
traceable to the eighteenth century, some perhaps
back, (although I would doubt Voegelin's own th
"rise of immanentist sectarianism" since the lat
eventually ended in totalitarianism). Under no c
would I call any of them totalitarian.
For similar reasons and for the sake of distinguis
ideas and actual events in history, I cannot ag
Voegelin's remark that "the spiritual disease is th
ture that distinguishes modem masses from those of
turies." To me, modern masses are disintegrated
that they are "masses" in a strict sense of the wo
distinguished from the multitudes of former cen
they do not have common interests to bind them
any kind of common "consent" which, according t
stitutes inter-est, that which is between men, rangi
from material to spiritual and other matters. Th
can be a common ground and it can be a commo
always fulfills the double function of binding men
separating them in an articulate way. The lack of
terest so characteristic of modern masses is therefor
sign of their homelessness and rootlessness. But it a
for the curious fact that these modem masses are fo
atomization of society, that the mass-men who lack
relationships nevertheless offer the best possible
movements in which peoples are so closely pressed t
they seem to have become One. The loss of intere
with the loss of "self," and modem masses are di
my view by their self-lessness, that is their lack
terests."
I know that problems of this sort can be avoided
prets totalitarian movements as a new--and perv
gion, a substitute for the lost creed of traditiona

this, it would follow that some "need for religion
the rise of totalitarianism. I feel unable to follow
qualified form in which Professor Voegelin uses the
secular religion. There is no substitute for God in th
ideologies - Hitler's use of the "Almighty" was a
what he himself believed to be a superstition. Mo
the metaphysical place for God has remained emp
duction of these semi-theological arguments in the
totalitarianism, on the other side, is only too likely t
wide-spread and strictly blasphemous modem "i
God who is "good for you"-for your mental or
for the integration of your personality and God
that is "ideas" which make of God a function of m
This functionalization seems to me in many respects
perhaps the most dangerous stage of atheism.
By this, I do not mean to say that Professor V
ever become guilty of such functionalization. N
that there is some connection between atheism and totalitarian-
ism. But this connection seems to me purely negative and
at all peculiar to the rise of totalitarianism. It is true th
Christian cannot become a follower of either Hitler or Sta
and it is true that morality as such is in jeopardy wheneve
faith in God who gave the Ten Commandments is no lon
secure. But this is at most a condition sine qua non, noth
which could positively explain whatever happened afterw
Those who conclude from the frightening events of our times
we have got to go back to religion and faith for political reas
seem to me to show just as much lack of faith in God as t
opponents.
Mr. Voegelin deplores, as I do, the "insufficiency of theoretical
instruments" in the political sciences (and with what to me ap-
peared as inconsistency accuses me a few pages later of not hav-
ing availed myself more readily of them). Apart from the
present trends of psychologism and sociologism about which I
think Mr. Voegelin and I are in agreement, my chief quarrel
with the present state of the historical and political sciences is
their growing incapacity for making distinctions. Terms like
nationalism, imperialism, totalitarianism, etc. are used indiscrim-
inately for all kinds of political phenomena (usually just

brow" words for aggression) and none of them is a
understood with its particular historical background.
is a generalization in which the words themselves los
ing. Imperialism does not mean a thing if it is used
inately for Assyrian and Roman and British and Bol
tory; nationalism is discussed in times and countries wh
experienced the nation state; totalitarianism is discov
kinds of tyrannies or forms of collective communities,
kind of confusion - where everything distinct disa
everything that is new and shocking is (not explain
plained away either through drawing some analogies or
it to a previously known chain of causes and influe
to me to be the hallmark of the modern historical a
sciences.
In conclusion, I may be permitted to clarify my state
in our moder predicament "human nature as such is
a statement which provoked Mr. Voegelin's sharpest cr
cause he sees in the very idea of "changing the natu
or of anything" and in the very fact that I took th
totalitarianism at all seriously a "symptom of the
breakdown of Western civilization." The problem of th
ship between essence and existence in Occidental tho
to me to be a bit more complicated and controversi
Voegelin's statement on "nature," (identifying "a
thing" and therefore incapable of change by definit
but this I can hardly discuss here. It may be enough to
terminological differences apart, I hardly proposed mo
of nature than Mr. Voegelin himself in his book o
Science of Politics; discussing the Platonic-Aristotelian
soul, he states: "one might almost say that before th
of psyche man had no soul." (p. 67) In Mr. Voegeli
I could have said that after the discoveries of totali
ination and its experiments we have reason to fear
may lose his soul.
In other words, the success of totalitarianism is ide
a much more radical liquidation of freedom as a p
as a human reality than anything we have ever witnes
Under these conditions, it will be hardly consoling to
unchangeable
unchangeable nature of
nature
man andof
conclude
manthat
and
either
conclude
man him- that eit
self
self is being
is being
destroyed
destroyed
or that freedom
or that
does notfreedom
belong to man's
does not belo
essential
essential capabilities.
capabilities.
HistoricallyHistorically
we know of man'swe nature
know
only of man
insofar
insofar as it as
has it
existence,
has existence,
and no realm of andeternal
noessences
realm will
of eterna
ever
ever console
console
us if manus loses
if man
his essential
loses capabilities.
his essential capabilit
My
My fear,
fear,
when when
I wrote the
I wrote
concluding thechapter
concluding
of my book,chapter
was
was notnot
unlikeunlike
the fear the
whichfear
Montesquieu
which already
Montesquieu
expressed alrea
when
when he saw
he that
saw Western
that civilization
Western wascivilization
no longer guaranteed
was no long
by
bylaws
lawsalthough
although
its peoplesits
werepeoples
still ruledwere
by customs
stillwhich
ruled by c
he
hediddid
not not
deem sufficient
deem sufficient
to resist an onslaught
to resist
of despotism.
an onslaught
He
Hesays
saysin theinPreface
the to Preface
L'Esprit des
toLois
L'Esprit
"L'homme,des cet etre
Lois "L'hom
des
desautres,
autres,est egalement
est egalement
capable de connaitre
capable sa propre
de connaitre
nature sa p
flexible,
flexible, se pliant
se pliant
dans la societe
dans auxlapensees
societe
et auxaux
impressions
pensees et au
lorsqu'on
lorsqu'onla lui la
montre,
lui montre,
et d'en perdre
etjusqu'au
d'ensentiment
perdrelorsqu'on
jusqu'au sentim
la
laluilui
derobe."
derobe."
(Man, this
(Man,
flexiblethis
being,flexible
who submits
being,
himself who sub
in
insociety
society
to theto
thoughts
the thoughts
and impressions
and
of his
impressions
fellow-men, is of his fel
equally
equally capable
capable
of knowing
of his
knowing
own naturehis
whenown
it is shown
nature
to when i
him
him as it
asis it
andis
of and
losingof
it tolosing
the pointitwhere
to the
he haspoint
no realiza-
where he ha
tion
tion that
that
he is robbed
he is of
robbed
it.) of it.)
CONCLUDING REMARK
By Eric Voegelin
It does not happen often these days that a work
science has sufficient theoretical texture to warrant an examina-
tion of principles. Since Dr. Arendt's book was distinguished by
a high degree of theoretical consciousness, I felt obliged to
acknowledge this quality and to pay it a sincere compliment by
criticizing some of the formulations. The criticisms had the fur-
ther pleasant consequence of stimulating the preceding, more
elaborate explanation of the author's views concerning method.
But this should be enough as an aid to the reader of the book.
My word in conclusion, requested by the Editors of the Review,
will therefore be of the briefest -a ceremony rather than an
argument.
I shall do no more than draw attention to what we agree is
the question at stake, though Dr. Arendt's answer differs from
mine. It is the question of essence in history, the question of how
Teaching Schedule
of
Sociology
(Sociological Theories and Perspectives)
for
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)
2nd Semester
(Major)
Session 2019-2020
Compiled By :
Dr. Honey Kumar
Table of Contents
1. Preface 3-5
2. Objectives of the Course 6
3. Syllabus 7-8
4. Teaching Schedule 9-10
5. Reading Material 11
6. Additional Readings 12
Page 2 of 19
1. Preface
This paper primarily introduces the students with the discipline of sociology and
associated sociological theories and perspectives. Sociology, composed of two words
socio (means society) and ology (means science), is the scientific study of society. It
enables us to understand and critically explore the social world in which we live and
interact with other human beings. Sociologists while studying society primarily focuses
on human interactions which include social relationships, social change, culture and
social order etc. Further, they study discipline of broad scope which covers
understanding of social institutions; family, marriage, kinship, law, religion etc.,
interaction among different social groups and many other areas such as gender, race,
caste, class, power, authority, education, and issues related to health care, drug abuse,
homosexuality etc. They develop sociological theories and perspectives to understand
and define above issues and social phenomenon. For example, the father of sociology,
Comte, developed theory of positivism and evolutionary perspective to understand
social phenomenon. Similarly Durkheim, a modern father of sociology, gave birth to
functionalist perspective to understand society and related issues.
The course syllabus is divided into four modules namely evolutionary theories,
functionalism and structuralism, conflict perspective and interactionism. The first
module deals with the introduction to sociological theories and evolutionary
perspective. Evolutionary perspective largely focus on the evolution of society its
culture, institutions etc. This is also known as positivist perspective. In the 19th
century, evolutionism was a current of thought based on a biological analogy but
distinguished from Darwinism an theory by its deterministic nature. Darwin’s general
theory of evolution claims that natural species evolve through variation and natural
selection, a process that is not necessarily progressive. However, in the evolutionary
Page 3 of 19
theory espoused by Victorian social scientists, human societies were bound to improve,
change was progressive, and led to further civilization and moral improvement of
human society. This perspective also talks about positivism. The positivist
perspective in sociology introduced above with regard to the pioneers of the discipline
August Comte and Emile Durkheimis most closely aligned with the forms of
knowledge associated with the natural sciences. The emphasis is on empirical
observation and measurement (i.e., observation through the senses), value neutrality or
objectivity, and the search for law-like statements about the social world (analogous to
Newton’s laws of gravity for the natural world). Since mathematics and statistical
operations are the main forms of logical demonstration in the natural scientific
explanation, positivism relies on translating human phenomena into quantifiable units
of measurement. It regards the social world as an objective or “positive” reality, in no
essential respects different from the natural world. Positivism is oriented to developing
knowledge useful for controlling or administering social life, which explains its ties to
the projects of social engineering going back to Comte’s original vision for sociology.
The next module develops an understanding about functionalism and
structuralism. Functionalism, also called structural-functional theory, sees society as a
structure with interrelated parts designed to meet the biological and social needs of the
individuals in that society. Although the use of the concepts of dunction adn
functionalism is usually associated with the work of Talcott Parsons in modern
sociology, there is a long tradition of functional explanation in studying societies and a
form of modified functionalism is now undergoing a revival. Among the founders of
sociology, Durkheim and Spencer are most closely associated with functionalism,
since they often employs analogies with biology. They saw similarities between
society and the human body and argued that just as the various organs of the body
Page 4 of 19
work together to keep the body functioning, the various parts of society work together
to keeps society functioning. The parts of society that Spencer referred to were
the social institutions, or patterns of beliefs and behaviors focused on meeting social
needs, such as government, education, family, healthcare, religion, and the economy.
The second last module of the syllabi talks about Marxism or conflict theories.
Conflict theory looks at society as a competition for limited resources. This
perspective is a macro-level approach most identified with the writings of German
philosopher and sociologist Karl Marx , who saw society as being made up of
individuals in different social classes who must compete for social, material, and
political resources such as food and housing, employment, education, and leisure time.
Social institutions like government, education, and religion reflect this competition in
their inherent inequalities and help maintain the unequal social structure. Some
individuals and organizations are able to obtain and keep more resources than others,
and they use their power to influence others.
The last module delves with behaviouralism or interactionist perspective. It is a
micro-level theory that focuses on the relationships among individuals within a society.
Further, it enlighten about post developments in interactionism such as
phenomenology, ethnomethodology etc.. Overall the paper gives detailed insight about
the base of sociology and develops theoretical understanding to look at different
aspects of human life sensitively.
Page 5 of 19
Objectives of the course
 To introduce students the depth of subject.
 To develop critical understanding and sensitivity among students about societal
issues.
 To enable students of law for developing understanding of sociological
perspectives and theories.
 To inculcate students to look at social issues from sociological perspectives.
 To motivate students to identify problems and find out possible solutions with
the help sociological theories.
 To develop sociological imagination in order to understand the
interrelationships and dependencies between the individual, society and wider
global processes.
Page 6 of 19
SYLLABUS
SOCIOLOGY - MAJOR -2
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES AND PERSPECTIVES
ACADEMIC SESSION
(2019-20)
Course Credits: 5
MODULE I
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
Modern Social Thought and Emergence of Sociological Theory

Auguste Comte: Law of Three Stages, Hierarchy of Sciences, Social Static and Social
Dynamics, Positivism
Herbert Spencer: Theory of Evolution, Organic Analogy, Survival of the Fittest,
Classification of Societies
Pitirim Sorokin: Social and Cultural Dynamics, Social Stratification and Social
Mobility
Lewis Henry Morgan: Theory of Social Evolution
MODULE II
FUNCTIONALISM AND STRUCTURALISM
Emile Durkheim: Theory of Social facts, Theory of Suicide, Division of Labour,

Collective Representations
Talcott Parsons: Theory of Social Action, Social System, Pattern Variables
Robert K. Merton: Theories of Middle Range, Theory of Anomie, Manifest and
Latent Functions, Functional Analysis.
Bronislaw Malinowski: Theory of Culture
Claude Levi Strauss: Structuralism
MODULE III
CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE
Karl Marx: Historical Materialism, Class Struggle, Dialectics, Alienation, Surplus

Value, Base and Superstructure
Ralf Daherndorf: Dialectical Conflict Theory
Randall Collins: Towards a More Integrated Conflict Theory
Lewis Coser: Functions of Conflict
Antonio Gramsci: Theory of Hegemony
MODULE IV
INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVE AND POST MODERNISM
Max Weber: Social Action, Authority, Bureaucracy, The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, Verstehen, Ideal Type.
Symbolic Interactionism: Distinctive Features, G.H. Mead; Theory of Self
Page 7 of 19
Phenomenology: Distinctive Features
Ethnomethodology: Distinctive Features
Dramaturgy: Distinctive Features (E.Goffman)
Postmodernism: Distinctive Features
Page 8 of 19
Teaching Schedule
S. No. Topic Number of
Lectures
MODULE – I
1. Modern Sociological Thought and Emergence of 4

Sociological Theory
2. Auguste Comte 2
3. Herbert Spencer 2
4. Pitirim Sorokin 2
5. Lewis Henry Morgan 2
Total Lectures 12
MODULE – II
1. Emile Durkheim 4
2. Talcott Parsons 3
3. Robert K. Merton 3
4. Bronislaw Malinowski 1
5. Claude Levi Strauss 1
Total Lectures 12
MODULE – III
1. Karl Marx 5
2. Ralf Daherndorf 2
3. Randall Collins 2
4. Lewis Coser 2
Page 9 of 19
5. Antonio Gramsci 2
Total Lectures 13
MODULE – IV
1. Max Weber 4
2. Symbolic Interactionism 1
3. Phenomenology 1
4. Ethnomethodology 1
5. Dramaturgy 1
6. Postmodernism 1
Total Lectures 09
Suggested Readings
 Alex Inkeles, What is Sociology? An Introduction to the Discipline and
Profession, PHI Learning, New Delhi, 2012.
Page 10 of 19
 Anthony Giddens, Philip W. Sutton, Sociology, Seventh Edition, Wiley, New
Delhi, 2013.
 Charles Lemert, Social Theory-The Multicultural & Classic Readings, Fourth
Edition, Rawat Publications, Jaipur, 2013.
 David Jary and Julia Jary, Dictionary of Sociology, Harper Collins Publisher,
2005.
 E.C.Cuff, W.W.Sharrock and D.W. Francis, Perspectives in Sociology,
Routledge, New York, 2009.
 George Ritzer, Contemporary Sociological Theory, McGraw-Hill Publishing
Company, Singapore, 1988.
 Lewis A. Coser, Masters of Sociological Thought, Rawat Publications, Jaipur,
2010.
 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Routledge
Classics, New York, 1930.
 Peter Barry, Beginning Theory-An Introduction to Literary and Cultural
Theory, Viva Books, New Delhi, 2010.
 Paul B. Horton, Chester L. Hunt, Sociology, Tata McGraw-Hill, New Delhi,
2004.
 S.L.Doshi, Modernity, Postmodernity and Neo-Sociological Theories, Rawat
Publications, Jaipur, 2009.
 T.B.Bottomore, Sociology, a guide to problems and literature, Routledge, New
Delhi, 2014.
 Tim Woods, Beginning PostModernism, Viva, New Delhi, 2017.
Additional Readings
Page 11 of 19
 Anthony Giddens, 2013, Sociology, New Delhi:Wiley.
 David M. Newman and Jodi A. Obrien (eds.), 2006, Sociology: Exploring the
Architecture of Everyday Life, London: Sage Publications.
 Peter Barry,2013, Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural
Theory, New Delhi: Oxford
 M. Haralambos and R.M. Heald, 2010, Sociology: Themes and Perspectives,
Chapter 13; Sociological Theory, pp. 521-558, New York: Oxford.
 S.L. Doshi,2009, Modernity, Postmodernity and Neo-Sociological Theories,
New Delhi: Rawat Publications.
 Paul B. Horton and Chester L. Hunt,2004, Sociology, New Delhi:TataMcGraw-
Hill.
Page 12 of 19
Teaching Pedagogy
 Use of Modern Technologies for teaching such as Power Point Presentation
 Lecture Method
 Group Discussion Method
 Question Answer Sessions
 Extra Classes for Academic Problems of students
 Project Viva
Page 13 of 19
List of Assignments/Projects
1) Marxian Perspective on Development in Sociology
2) Evolutionary Perspective and Development
3) The Relevance of Religious Beliefs: A Debate on Marx and Weber
4) A Discourse on Sociology as Science
5) The Relevance of Dialectical Approach
6) Marx and Alienation
7) Marxism on Capitalism
8) A Discourse on Agency versus Structure in Sociology
9) Functional Perspective and Their Relevance
10) Levi Strauss and the idea of Structuralism
11) Different Perspectives on Evolution of Society
12) Interactionist Perspectives and Their Relevance ; Symbolic Interactionism,
Ethnomethodology, Phenomenology
13) Weber on Authority
14) Protestant Ethics and Spirit of Capitalism: A Review
15) A Detailed Discourse on Science of Society: Different Perspectives
16) Emergence of Sociology
17) Applicability of Different Theoretical Perspectives of Sociology in Society
18) A Discourse on Social Fact
19) The Concept of Hegemony: A Work of Gramsci
20) Positivism and its criticism
Page 14 of 19
Instructions to Students
 No student shall be allowed to enter in class after scheduled class timings.
 No Assignment shall be accepted after the due date.
 The students are advised to go through the topic to be undertaken in the class
one day prior to the scheduled class.
 Lecture will be delivered through power point presentation. Students are
advised to collect the hard copies of presentation after the lecture.
 The list of suggested readings is only illustrative and new suggestions may be
added to it during the semester.
 Some reading material shall be uploaded on ERP for students during the
semester. The students are advised to download the reading material and use it
for their preparation.
 All students shall carry the instructed reading material in class along with their
short notes so as to enable a meaningful discussion.
 The above teaching schedule is tentative and is subject to change as per the
need and requirements of the session.
Page 15 of 19
Page 16 of 19
Page 17 of 19
Page 18 of 19
Page 19 of 19
Teaching Curriculum
of
Political Science
for
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)
Second Semester (Minor)
Session 2019-20
Compiled by
Saurav Sarmah
Table of Contents
Part Contents Page Nos.
Introduction
● History of Political Science
● Branches of Political Science
● Interface between Political Science and Law
1 1-4
● Political Science at RGNUL
● What is the difference between Political Theory
and Political Thought?
● What is Western Political Thought?
Course Outline
● Syllabus
2
● Course Requirements 4-11
● Minimum Number of Lectures
● Project Topics
Study Materials
● Textbooks
● Articles and Book Chapters
3
● Original Works 11-13
● Databases
● News, Commentaries and Debates
● YouTube Lectures and Films
4 Detailed Lecture Plan

14-21
(according to syllabus)
5 List of Attachments 21
11 attachments of 162 pages
This teaching curriculum is tentative and subject to change as per the requirements of the
course.
WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Minor Sem 2)
Part 1: Introduction
History of Political Science
Political Science as a separate academic discipline emerged in the 19th century, but the study
of political philosophy and statecraft had begun with the first written records. Ancient
civilisations, of the Greeks, Indians and Chinese, had profound knowledge of politics. They
developed their own systems of government based on the knowledge. We can divide the
development of politics into various stages:
1. Ancient Period: Greek-Roman philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Marcus
Aurelius, Indian philosophers like Manu and Kautilya and Chinese philosophers like
Confucius and Sun Tzu.
2. Christian-Islamic Period: Church fathers like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas and
Islamic masters like Ibn Khaldun.
3. Renaissance-Enlightenment Period: Modern thinkers beginning with Machiavelli.
4. Traditional Political Science: Foundation of the subject based on philosophical,
historical, legal and institutional methods, by mostly American scholars in the end of
the 19th century.
5. Behaviouralism: Domination of empirical, comparative, systems and other scientific
methods in the 1950s and 60s.
6. Post-behaviouralism: Reintroduction of philosophical and historical perspectives
1970s onwards.
7. Now: Domination of postcolonialism, subalternism, postmodernism, constructivism
and intersectionalism.
Branches of Political Science

Political Science is a large discipline, with numerous branches, the most prominent of which
are:
1. Political Theory/Philosophy
2. Comparative Politics
3. Public Administration
4. International Relations
Besides, there are many other interdisciplinary fields, with dominant role for Political
Science, e.g.
1. Human Rights
2. Gender Studies
3. Peace and Conflict Studies
4. Strategic and Defence Studies
5. Civilisational Studies, etc.
1
Interface between Political Science and Law
Political Science is closely related to Law. Important legal concepts and constitutional
principles originate in political philosophy. The founding fathers of the US Constitution
were influenced by the writings of John Locke and Montesquieu, the People’s Republic of
China was founded on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the Indian Constitution is an
amalgamation of political ideas, e.g. sovereignty, socialism, secularism, democracy,
republicanism, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity, from diverse sources.
Many renowned politicians in the world have been lawyers. Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
and Mohammad Ali Jinnah were lawyers before they became politicians. Even in our
times, former US President Barack Obama, former Finance Ministers Arun Jaitley and
P. Chidambaram had been lawyers and Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese
President Xi Jinping had studied law.
Public Administration provides the fundamental principles, on the basis of which

government, bureaucracy, industry and other businesses are organised. The laws
governing these institutions, are influenced by the fundamentals of Public Administration.
Civil servants and business executives can learn immensely from Public Administration.
International Relations is perhaps the most lucrative branch of Political Science. It provides
knowledge that can be useful to lawyers at the world stage. International Law emerged from
the writings of political philosophers and strategists and wars fought and treaties signed by
powerful countries. Hence, it is necessary to understand International Relations, in order to
become an international lawyer or a diplomat.
Thus, Political Science not only helps in understanding Law but also provides career
opportunities, in politics, administration, foreign policy, think tanks, business and of
course, academics, for law students.
Political Science at RGNUL

Our university offers Political Science as Major or Minor in BA, LLB. The Major students
need to study the subject for 6 semesters. They are offered 6 papers, one in each semester:
1. Political Theory
4. Comparative Public Administration
5. India’s Foreign Policy
6. International Relations and Organisations
2
Papers 1, 2 and 3 are parts of Political Philosophy, Paper 4 is a combination of Comparative
Politics and Public Administration and Papers 5 and 6 are parts of International Relations. So,
the students get an opportunity to study all the main branches of the subject. Moreover, our
university goes beyond the Eurocentric approach to Political Science. Our students are
trained in European, American, Chinese, Christian, Islamic and indigenous Indian
thought.
The students, who opt for Economics or Sociology Major, need to select Political Science as
a Minor subject. The Minor students study the subject for 3 semesters. They are offered 3
papers, one in each semester:
1. Political Theory: An Introduction

What is the difference between Political Theory and Political Thought?

There are many terms starting with ‘political’, viz. political science, political theory, political
thought, political philosophy and political ideology. The word ‘political’ refers to social
relations involving power, i.e. ability to control human behaviour and its highest
manifestation, state. State is a sovereign entity within a territory; in other words, it has no
external master or internal challenger. Only rights can protect an individual from the tyranny
of state. So, political science is basically a systematic study of power, state and rights and
their many manifestations. Its theoretical part is called political theory. ‘Theory’ means
generalisation of some ideas. It explains and predicts about a subject matter. Thus, political
theory discusses the foundation and development of political science as a discipline and
theories of political concepts.
There is no obvious distinction between political theory and political thought. Theory denotes
a more scientific approach to concepts, while thought is more philosophical. In the structure
of the papers, there are certain distinctions:
(i) Theory is concerned with concepts. In each concept, a number of thinkers are
studied. On the other hand, thought deals with thinkers. In thought, different concepts
given by each thinker are studied.
(ii) Theory, normative or empirical, implies precise and coherent articulation of ideas,
while thought contains ambiguities, paradoxes and contradictions inherent in the
thinking process.
(iii) Theory is ahistorical. It applies across time and space. But thought develops
within a historical and geographical context.
These distinctions are arbitrary. Theory and thought are often used interchangeably. Political
philosophy is another term used for political thought. Political ideology is belief in a political
philosophy and commitment to implement it.
3
What is Western Political Thought?
The political discourse is dominated by Western ideas. ‘West’ refers to the civilisation that
developed in Ancient Greece and Rome and then combined with Biblical ideas. It was
dominated by the Roman Catholic Church, underwent Renaissance, Protestant Reformation,
Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution, abolished slavery and imperialism (after imposing
them on the non-Western people) and defeated Nazism and Bolshevism. The ‘West’ overtook
the ‘Rest’ gradually from the 16th century to the 19th century and controlled almost the entire
world in the beginning of the 20th century. It still dominates the political discourse, despite
non-Western people regaining their independence from the middle of the 20th century and
non-Western civilisations, like China, Islam and India, reasserting their identities and
interests in the 21st century. Hence, it is important to understand the Western political
thinkers and the dominance of their ideas.
Western Political Thought is the second paper in Political Science. It introduces the students
to the main political ideas from Ancient Greece (Plato and Aristotle), medieval Christendom
(Augustine and Thomas Aquinas) and modern Europe and America. Among the modern
thinkers, we shall discuss about Machiavelli, the social contractualists, the utilitarians,
Hegel, Karl Marx, Lenin, John Rawls and Hannah Arendt.
Part 2: Course Outline

Syllabus
MODULE I
1.1 Plato: Ideal State, Theories of Knowledge and Justice
1.2 Aristotle: Classification of States
1.3 Aristotle: Moral Action and Best Constitution
1.4 Aristotle: Views on Property and Slavery, Theory of Revolution
MODULE II
2.1 Christian Political Thought in the Middle Ages: Augustine and Thomas Aquinas
2.2 Augustine: Theory of State in the City of God, Justification of Slavery
2.3 Thomas Aquinas: Classification of Laws, Justification of Monarchy
2.4 Machiavelli: Humanism and Republicanism
MODULE III
3.2 Bentham: Representative Government as the Maximiser of Utility
3.3 John Stuart Mill: Concept of Liberty
3.4 Hegel: State and Civil Society
4
MODULE IV
4.1 Karl Marx: The State and Class Struggle
4.2 Lenin: State and Revolution
4.3 John Rawls: Distributive Justice
4.4 Hannah Arendt: Totalitarianism, Human Condition
Course Requirements
1. Attendance: Minimum 85% (3 marks)
2. Class participation (2 marks)
3. Project: Written (15 marks), PowerPoint presentation (10 marks) and viva voce (10
marks)
4. Exams: Mid-sem (20 marks) and End-sem (40 marks)
Attendance: At RGNUL, class attendance is compulsory. The students are advised not to miss
even a single lecture; the loss would be irreparable. All topics, projects and possible
announcements are discussed in the class. Due to unavoidable circumstances, if anyone is
absent for a class, they are advised to meet the teacher in the office on the following working
day between 4 pm and 5 pm. However, only those who are interested in learning would be
allowed in the class; indiscipline would not be tolerated and the erring student would be
expelled from the class. If a student falls short of minimum required 85% attendance,
they are responsible and they are requested not to bother the teacher about it.
Class participation: Education is not a one-sided process. It is an interaction among various

elements - subject, teacher, student and technology. Only those students who are interested in
learning should attend the class. They are expected to participate in classroom activities, viz.
lecture, discussion, What’s New, Let’s Debate, Quiz, Assignment and Review.
The lecture will be delivered by the teacher, the students should listen to it carefully and
take down notes for future reference. After a topic has been covered, students should raise
their hands, if they have any questions. If they have no questions, the teacher would ask them
questions. In both cases, there would be a discussion. Besides the regular lectures and
discussions, other class activities would also take place:
1. What’s New?
Students are encouraged to read newspapers daily and become familiar with political
news happening in the world. Randomly, any 5 students would be invited to orally
report one news each to the class. If unprepared, that student has to submit a written
report in the following class.
2. Let’s Debate
5
One motion from the syllabus would be debated between 4 top scorers in the mid-sem
exams. There would be 5 rounds: opening statements, rebuttals, questions from the
class, concluding statements and voting.
3. Quiz
After every module is completed, there would be a quiz on that module in the class.
The entire class would be divided into three groups, A, B and C. There would be 3
rounds: (i) any random student from one group would be asked a question, 10 marks
for right answers, no negative marking; (ii) one group would be asked a question and
any student can raise the hand and reply, 20 marks for right answers, 5 negative
marking; (iii) each group would nominate one student, whoever knows the answer
should raise their hand, 20 marks for correct answers, 10 marks negative marking.
The total marks would determine the winner.
4. Assignment
Students would be given questions from the syllabus as homework. They are
encouraged to answer them according to the instructions and submit it to the teacher
in their office.
5. Review
Students would be given a Jstor article or YouTube video, related to the syllabus, to
review and make a presentation in the class. If unprepared, that student has to submit
a written report in the following class.
No electronic gadget, phone or computer is allowed in the class. Students should use
notebook and pen for taking notes and recommended reading materials for reference. Only
the teacher can authorise the use of other technologies and resources in the class. However,
beyond the class, students are encouraged to use the latest gadgets, applications and internet
resources for academic work.
Project: Each student has to complete one project for each paper. The students would be
divided into groups and each group allotted a topic for the project. [See Page 10] Each
ith the guidance of the teacher on the due
student has to make a separate written submission w
date. The project would be analysed for plagiarism by the teacher using URKUND, for
which the students need to send their projects to the teacher’s URKUND address
provided in class.
After the submission, viva voce would be held for each group separately on a fixed date. The
students have to make a PowerPoint presentation and participate in group discussion and
answer questions from the teacher and the class, on the basis of which they will be evaluated.
Those who do not submit the projects on time or appear for the viva voce should consult
the project co-ordinators and not bother the teacher.
6
Exams: There will be two main exams for every paper. The mid-sem exam would be held for
40 marks, consisting of four compulsory short notes of 5 marks each and two long answers
each of 10 marks from two modules, out of which one from each module needs to be
answered. The students will be shown the evaluated papers before the end-sem, so that they
can learn from their mistakes. In the final marks, 20 marks weightage would be given to
mid-sem exam.
Section A (5 x 4)
a. X
b. Y
c. Z
d. O
Section B (10 x 1)
2. Long Q A
or
3. Long Q B
Section C (10 x 1)
4. Long Q C
or
5. Long Q D
The end-sem exam would be for 80 marks, consisting of four compulsory short notes of 5
marks each and two long answers each of 15 marks from four modules, out of which one
from each module needs to be answered. In the final marks, 40 marks weightage would be
given to end-sem exam.
Section A (5 x 4)
a. X
b. Y
c. Z
d. O
Section B (15 x 1)
2. Long Q A
or
3. Long Q B
7
Section C (15 x 1)
4. Long Q C
or
5. Long Q D
Section D (15x1)
6. Long Q E
or
7. Long Q F
Section E (15x1)
8. Long Q G
or
9. Long Q H
The students need to get 50% in project and exams and also in the final marks to pass the
paper. Hence, the students are suggested to consult the teacher on how to write an answer
before the exams. [See Attachment 1]
Minimum Number of Lectures
Topic No. of lectures
Introduction 2
1.1 Plato: Ideal State, Theories of

2
Knowledge and Justice
1.2 Aristotle: Classification of States,

1
Theory of Revolution
1.3 Aristotle: Moral Action and Best

1
Constitution
1.4 Aristotle: Views on Property and

1
Slavery
Total lectures in Module I 8
8
2.1 Christian Political Thought
3
(Fundamentals)
2.2 Augustine: Theory of State in the City

4
of God, Justification of Slavery
2.3 Thomas Aquinas: Classification of Law,

2
Justification of Monarchy
2.4 Machiavelli: Humanism and

2
Republicanism
Total lectures in Module II 11
3.1 Social Contractualists: Hobbes, Locke

3
and Rousseau
3.2 Bentham: Representative Government

1
as the Maximiser of Utility
3.3 John Stuart Mill: Concept of Liberty 2
3.4 Hegel: State and Civil Society 1
Total lectures in Module III 7
4.1 Karl Marx: The State and Class Struggle 3
4.2 Lenin: State and Revolution 2
4.3 John Rawls: Distributive Justice 2
4.4 Hannah Arendt: Totalitarianism, Human

1
Condition
Conclusion 2
Total lectures in Module IV 10
Grand total number of lectures 36
9
Besides these minimum 36 lectures, there would be more classes for viva voce, debates,
quizzes, seminars, workshops and movie screenings. There would be compulsory
attendance for all class activities.
Project Topics
1. Adam Smith (Liberalism)

2. Aleksandr Dugin
3. Alexis de Tocqueville (Liberalism)
4. Antisthenes, Diogenes and Crates (Cynicism)
5. Antonio Gramsci (Socialism)
6. Ayn Rand (Objectivism)
7. Baron de Montesquieu (Liberalism)
8. Cicero
9. Edmund Burke (Conservatism)
10. Epicureanism
11. Ethnonationalism
12. Eurocommunism
13. Frankfurt School
14. Harold Laski (Socialism)
15. Hitchens, Dawkins, Dennett and Harris (Neo-atheism)
16. Immanuel Kant
17. Intellectual Dark Web
18. Jacobus Arminius (Protestantism)
19. Jacques Derrida (Postmodernism)
20. John Calvin (Protestantism)
21. John Wesley (Protestantism)
22. Jordan Peterson
23. Joseph Smith (Mormonism)
24. Leo Strauss
25. Liberation Theology (Catholicism)
26. Maimonides (Judaism)
27. Martin Luther (Protestantism)
28. Mary Wollstonecraft (Feminism)
29. Michel Foucault (Postmodernism)
30. Neoplatonism
31. Nicene Creed
32. Robert Nozick (Libertarianism)
33. Roy Bhaskar (Critical Realism)
34. Slavoj Zizek (Socialism)
35. Social Gospel (Protestantism)
36. Socratic Dialogues
10
37. Soviet Model (Socialism)
38. Thucydides (Realism)
39. Transhumanism
40. Zeno and Marcus Aurelius (Stoicism)
Part 3: Study Materials
Textbooks (need to read only the relevant portions from the syllabus)
1. Leo Strauss (1989), An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo
2. George H. Sabine (1973), A History of Political Theory, 4th edition, revised by
Thomas L. Thorson, New York: Dryden Press.
3. Subrata Mukherjee and Sushila Ramaswamy (2011), A History of Political Thought:
Plato to Marx, 2nd edition, Delhi: PHI Learning.
4. V. Venkata Rao (1997), Ancient Political Thought, New Delhi: S. Chand.
5. Diarmaid MacCulloch (2009), Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years, New
York: Viking.
6. R.P. Sharma (c. 1970), Modern Western Political Thought, New Delhi: Sterling.
7. O.P. Gauba (2011), Western Political Thought, Gurgaon: Macmillan.
8. R.S. Chaurasia (2001), History of Western Political Thought, Vol. I & II, New Delhi:
Atlantic.
9. Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch (2012), An Introduction to Political Thought: A
Conceptual Toolkit, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
10. Brian R. Nelson (1996), Western Political Thought: From Socrates to the Age of
Ideology, 2nd edition, Delhi: Pearson.
11. J.S. McClelland (1996), A History of Western Political Thought, London: Routledge.
12. Thomas Aquinas (1959), Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, edited by A.P.
13. Michael Evans (1975), Karl Marx, New York: Routledge.
14. Catherine Audard (2014), John Rawls, New York: Routledge.
15. Thomas Pogge (2007), John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice, translated by
16. Michael Allingham (2014), Distributive Justice, New York: Routledge.
17. Margaret Canovan (1994), Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political
18. Dana Villa (2000), Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Articles and Book Chapters (compulsory reading for specific topics)

11
1-7.[Attachment 3]
7. Jules Townshend (1996), “Soviet or Parliamentary Democracy? Lenin versus
10. Santosh Bakaya (2006), “The Great Debate: Rawls and Nozick”, in The Political
(1): 68-76. [Attachment 10]
Original Works
1. Plato: http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/browse-Plato.html
2. Aristotle: http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/browse-Aristotle.html
3. The Ten Commandments: http://biblescripture.net/Commandments.html
4. The Nicene Creed: http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/
5. The Bible: https://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/
6. Augustine: https://www.augustinus.it/links/inglese/opere.htm
7. Thomas Aquinas: https://thegreatthinkers.org/aquinas/major-works/
8. Machiavelli: https://thegreatthinkers.org/machiavelli/major-works/
9. Thomas Hobbes: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/thomas-hobbes
10. John Locke: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/john-locke
11. Rousseau: https://thegreatthinkers.org/rousseau/major-works/
12. Jeremy Bentham: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/jeremy-bentham
13. John Stuart Mill: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/john-stuart-mill
14. Hegel: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/index.htm
15. Karl Marx: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/date/index.htm
16. Lenin: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/by-date.htm
17. John Rawls (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Belknap.
12
18. Robert Nozick (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books.
19. Amartya Sen (2009), The Idea of Justice, Cambridge: Belknap.
20. Hannah Arendt (1951), The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Schocken.
21. Hannah Arendt (1958), The Human Condition, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Databases
1. JSTOR: https://www.jstor.org/
2. Google Scholar: https://scholar.google.co.in/
3. Shodhganga: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/
4. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://www.iep.utm.edu/
5. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/
News, Commentaries and Debates (for class participation and competitive exams)
1. Philosophy Now, London: https://philosophynow.org/
2. The Hindu and Frontline, Chennai: https://www.thehindu.com/ and
https://frontline.thehindu.com/
3. Swarajya: Read India Right, Bengaluru: https://swarajyamag.com/
4. New Delhi Television (NDTV), New Delhi: https://www.ndtv.com/
5. World is One News (WION), Noida: http://www.wionews.com/
6. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), London: https://www.bbc.com/news
7. The Rubin Report, Los Angeles: https://www.youtube.com/user/RubinReport
YouTube Lectures and Films (for Review)

1. Yale Courses (Political Science), YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLp-cIkvQ88-3DJkwB4iUnoHP7mUG6jFsA
2. Ryan Reeves (Early & Medieval Church History), YouTube:
Ef-
3. Jordan B Peterson (The Psychological Significance of the Biblical Stories), YouTube:
4. The Passion of the Christ (2004), an American Biblical film directed by Mel Gibson,
5. Luther (2003), an American-German historical film directed by Eric Till and Marc
6. La Révolution française (1989), a French-German-Italian-British-Canadian historical
7. Hannah Arendt (2012), a German-Luxembourgish-French biographical film directed
13
Part 4: Detailed Lecture Plan
Introduction
No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Revise important points from last semester
(b) Revisit the rules of engagement in the class
(c) Introduce the course outline
Readings:
● Western Political Thought Teaching Curriculum
● Saurav Sarmah (2017), “How to write an answer” [Attachment 1]
● George H. Sabine (1939), “What is a Political Theory?” The Journal of Politics, 1 (1):
● Leo Strauss (1989), An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo
1.1 Plato
No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Discuss the important influences on Plato
(b) Explain the Platonic concept of ideal state
(c) Explain the Platonic theories of knowledge and justice
(d) Debate the relevance of Platonic thought
Readings:
pp. 16-46.
● Plato: http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/browse-Plato.html
1.2, 1.3 & 1.4 Aristotle

No. of lectures: 3
Objectives:
(a) Discuss the important influences on Aristotle
(b) Explain the Aristotelian classification of states and theory of revolution
(c) Explain the Aristotelian concept of ideal state
(d) Explain the Aristotelian concepts of property and slavery
(e) Debate the relevance of Aristotelian thought
Readings:
14
pp. 48-64.
● Aristotle: http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/browse-Aristotle.html
2.1 Christian Political Thought (Fundamentals)

No. of lectures: 3
Objectives:
(a) Narrate the origin and evolution of Christianity
(b) Explain the doctrines of Christianity - Ten Commandments, original sin and Nicene
Creed
Readings:
● Diarmaid MacCulloch (2009), Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years, New
York: Viking.
● The Ten Commandments: http://biblescripture.net/Commandments.html
● The Nicene Creed: http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/
● The Bible: https://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/
● Ryan Reeves (Early & Medieval Church History), YouTube:
Ef-
● Jordan B Peterson (The Psychological Significance of the Biblical Stories), YouTube:
● The Passion of the Christ (2004), an American Biblical film directed by Mel Gibson,
● Luther (2003), an American-German historical film directed by Eric Till and Marc
2.2 Augustine
No. of lectures: 4
Objectives:
(a) Narrate the religious evolution of Augustine
(b) Discuss the sack of Rome and Augustine’s defence of Christianity
(c) Explain his concept of Two Cities
(d) Discuss his defence of slavery
Readings:
15
pp. 87-103.
● Saint Augustine (2008), “The City of God”, Christian Book Summaries, 4 (24): 1-7.
[Attachment 3]
● Frederick William Loetscher (1935), “St. Augustine’s Conception of the State”,
● Catherine Chambers (2013), “Slavery and Domination as Political Ideas in
● Augustine: https://www.augustinus.it/links/inglese/opere.htm
2.3 Thomas Aquinas

No. of Lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Discuss the re-emergence of Greek philosophy in Europe after the Dark Ages
(b) Aquinas’s synthesis of faith and reason
(c) Explain his fourfold classification of laws
(d) Discuss his concept of ideal state
Readings:
pp. 104-120.
● Thomas Aquinas (1959), Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, edited by A.P.
● William S. Brewbaker III (2006-07), “Thomas Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Law”,
● Daniel A. Gannon, “Four Kinds of Laws According to St. Thomas”. [Attachment 7]
● Thomas Aquinas: https://thegreatthinkers.org/aquinas/major-works/
2.4 Machiavelli
No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Discuss the dawn of modernity in Europe
(b) Explain the core ideas of Machiavelli - self-interest and Centaur
(c) Discuss his ideas on humanism and republicanism
(d) Discuss about his separation of politics and ethics
Readings:
16
● Brian R. Nelson (1996), Western Political Thought: From Socrates to the Age of
Ideology, 2nd edition, Delhi: Pearson, pp. 137-160.
pp. 142-159.
● Machiavelli: https://thegreatthinkers.org/machiavelli/major-works/

No. of lectures: 3
Objectives:
(a) Narrate the political conditions at the time of the contractualists
(b) Compare and contrast the ideas of the three philosophers
(c) Discuss the impact and critique of the ideas of contractualists
Readings:
Thomas L. Thorson, New York: Dryden Press, pp. 422-440, 483-499, 528-548.
● R.P. Sharma (c. 1970), Modern Western Political Thought, New Delhi: Sterling, 1-52.
Atlantic, pp. 277-326.
● Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch (2012), An Introduction to Political Thought: A
Conceptual Toolkit, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 69-124.
pp. 165-262.
● Thomas Hobbes: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/thomas-hobbes
● John Locke: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/john-locke
● Rousseau: https://thegreatthinkers.org/rousseau/major-works/
● La Révolution française (1989), a French-German-Italian-British-Canadian historical
3.2 Bentham
No. of lectures: 1
Objectives:
(a) Discuss the main ideas of Bentham - pleasure principle and majority principle
(b) Discuss his views on rights
Readings:
17
92-104.
pp. 433-449.
● Jeremy Bentham: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/jeremy-bentham
3.3 John Stuart Mill

No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Discuss Mill’s refinement of Bentham’s ideas
(b) Discuss his concept of liberty
Readings:
109-119.
pp. 449-463.
● John Stuart Mill: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/john-stuart-mill
3.4 Hegel
No. of lectures: 1
Objectives:
(a) Discuss Hegel’s political ideas
(b) Discuss his concept of dialectics
Readings:
140-149.
18
501-521.
● Hegel: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/index.htm
4.1 Karl Marx

No. of lectures: 3
Objectives:
(a) Explain the influences on Marx
(b) Explain the doctrines of Marxism - base-superstructure and historical materialism
(c) Discuss the Marxist ideas on capitalism, state and class war
(d) Discuss the different Marxist theories of state
Readings:
342-381.
Atlantic, pp. 510-563.Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch (2012), An Introduction to
Political Thought: A Conceptual Toolkit, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp.
130-150.
pp. 524-547.
● Michael Evans (1975), Karl Marx, New York: Routledge.
● Karl Marx: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/date/index.htm
4.2 Lenin
No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Discuss the innovations introduced by Lenin to Marxism
(b) Explain the main ideas of Lenin
(c) Analyse his book State and Revolution
Readings:
390-402.
pp. 580-591.
19
● Jules Townshend (1996), “Soviet or Parliamentary Democracy? Lenin versus
● Ralph Miliband (1970), “Lenin’s The State and Revolution”, The Socialist Register,
● Rustam Singh (1989), “Restoring Revolutionary Theory: Towards an Understanding
● Lenin: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/by-date.htm
4.3 John Rawls

No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Explain Rawlsian theory of justice
(b) Debate the criticisms of Rawls made by Nozick, Sen and the Marxists
(c) Contextualise him in the 21st century milieu
Readings:
● Catherine Audard (2014), John Rawls, New York: Routledge.
● Thomas Pogge (2007), John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice, translated by
● Michael Allingham (2014), Distributive Justice, New York: Routledge.
● Santosh Bakaya (2006), “The Great Debate: Rawls and Nozick”, in The Political
● John Rawls (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Belknap.
● Robert Nozick (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books.
● Amartya Sen (2009), The Idea of Justice, Cambridge: Belknap.
4.4 Hannah Arendt

No. of lectures: 1
Objectives:
(a) Discuss Arendt’s book Origins of Totalitarianism
(b) Understand her concept of banality of evil
(c) Discuss her book Human Condition
Readings:
● Margaret Canovan (1994), Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political
● Dana Villa (2000), Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
● Hannah Arendt (1951), The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Schocken.
20
● Hannah Arendt (1958), The Human Condition, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
● Eric Voegelin (1953), “The Origins of Totalitarianism”, The Review of Politics, 15
(1): 68-76. [Attachment 10]
● Hannah Arendt (1953), “The Origins of Totalitarianism: A Reply”, The Review of
● Hannah Arendt (2012), a German-Luxembourgish-French biographical film directed
Conclusion
No. of lectures: 2
Objectives:
(a) Address any pending issues
(b) Clarify any remaining doubts
Part 5: Attachments
1. Saurav Sarmah (2017), “How to write an answer” [Attachment 1]

1-7.[Attachment 3]
(1): 68-76. [Attachment 10]
21
Comrades,
Exams are coming. You are busy with preparations. Some of you are approaching
teachers, asking how to answer questions in the exams. It is good to ask questions to
teachers, that is the process of learning. However, I observe that students are too
bothered with subjectivity of the teacher, what the teacher is expecting. It is not a
good thing, because such mind-set curtails your creativity, your style of expression.
Your writing should have two qualities: (1) absorbing style and (2) richness in
content. I don’t know of a teacher who doesn’t mark well an answer with these two
qualities. So, improve your style and content.
Subjectivity matters in case of illegibility of the handwritten answers. Write in a way

the teacher can read your answer. Bad handwriting and unstructured answers irritate a
reader. Your handwriting needn’t be decorative, but clean and well-spaced. There is a
standard pattern of answering questions in social sciences:
1. Introduction: half a page

2. Definitions: quote 3-4 renowned scholars
3. Features/Comparisons/Contrasts/etc.: points, sub-points, headings, sub-headings
4. Critical Analysis: positive and negative impacts, criticism and defence by other
scholars, your assessment
5. Conclusion: half a page
Within the pattern, give headings, sub-headings, points, sub-points, underline the
headings and use different styles of pointers to differentiate from question numbers
and between points and sub-points. That will make a well-structured answer. Give
definitions and criticisms of renowned authorities, discuss the comparison between
different scholars and cite some relevant examples. That will enrich the content of the
answer.
Time management is very important. You should know how many pages you can
write in 3 hours. Divide minutes and pages among the answers according to (1) marks
allotted and (2) your preparedness. Do the calculations before sitting in the exam hall.
Spend more time and space on the answers you have learnt well. At least, the
important points should be memorised and mentioned for answers you haven’t
prepared well, so that the teacher can give you some marks. But don’t waste too much
time writing irrelevant matter or scratching your head to remember a point you don’t
know.
Thus, some objective standards have been mentioned: (1) clean, well-spaced
handwriting, (2) well-structured answers, (3) headings and pointers, (4) citations of
authorities and examples and (5) time management.
As far as style and content are concerned, they vary from individual to individual, due
to difference of skills and learning. Those who read lots of good books and listen to
lectures attentively tend to score more marks in the exams. Compete with yourself,
improve your reading, read two good books every month, attend all the classes, listen
attentively, ask questions, and express your doubts and disagreements. Even if you are
bored or tired, sit quietly, at least something is going into your head.
Is there anything else that I would like to add? Don’t write boring answers. For
example,
Q. Discuss Karl Marx’s Theory of Communism.

A. Karl Marx was one of the greatest philosophers of the 19th century. He was born
on 5 May 1818 and died on 14 March 1883. He was born in Trier to a middle class
family. He was a philosopher, economist, sociologist, journalist, revolutionary
socialist, humanist, atheist, philanthropist, husband, father and friend. His best friend
was Friedrich Engels…
The purpose of an introduction is not to feed irrelevant data to the reader, but to
attract her to what you have written, build interest and expectation, so that the reader
appreciates your writing. Hence,
A. On 9 November, 1989, thousands of people marched on the streets of Berlin. They

approached the dreaded and despised wall that had divided their great city for 28
years. Some jumped across it, others tore portions down. It was end of an era, the
communist society was collapsing and by the end of 1991, nothing was left of it. The
Soviet Union had disintegrated and ceased to exist. We don’t know if communism has
any chance of resurrection or if it should be placed within the dustbin of history, but it
had inspired millions throughout the last century for making great sacrifices and
equally great brutalities, with a dream of a better future, a dream for a new man and
a new society, devoid of exploitation and suffering. That idea of communism was
theorised by one of the greatest brains of the 19th century, Karl Marx.
Before examining Karl Marx’s Theory of Communism, we should look at the diverse
definitions of communism given by thinkers of yore. Plato defines communism as “…
There are two principal elements in his definition: … Saint Simon differs from Plato
as he considers…Saint Simon states communism is “… Karl Marx’s idea of
communism comes close to Saint Simon’s. He defines communism as “… Marx
considers the ideas of earlier communists as utopian, while his being scientific. In his
Communist Manifesto, …
Similarly, the purpose of conclusion is not to simply summarise what you have
already written in the main body, but to suggest a futuristic scenario, leaving scope for
a sequel to your answer, giving the impression that you have more to say. For
instance,
Marx’s communist ideal was born in the infancy of Industrial Revolution and lost its
shine in a post-industrial, service-oriented, consumer and information society. But
with robotics, artificial intelligence and electronic networking, humans are being
replaced by machines and a post-proletariat society is emerging. What will happen to
the jobless? Capitalist society had triumphed on the promise of social mobility and
fair competition to everyone. When due to dearth of jobs, there would be no mobility
or competition; will the ideal of communism re-emerge as a panacea to the jobless
and impoverished? Marx’s genius may not have still breathed its last.
Sorry for such a long essay. Best of luck for your exams.
Saurav Sarmah
What is a Political Theory?
Author(s): George H. Sabine
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Feb., 1939), pp. 1-16
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
Association
Accessed: 02-08-2017 13:59 UTC
Southern Political Science Association, The University of Chicago Press are collaborating
with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Politics
The Journal of Politics
Vol. 1 FEBRUARY, 1939 No. 1
WHAT IS A POLITICAL THEORY?*

GEORGE H. SABINE
Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University
For many centuries the philosophy of Western Europe has

included as one of its accustomed parts a study of the nature
and well-being of civic societies, a kind of companion-piece to
its study, in psychology and ethics, of the nature and well-being
of the human individual. Like so much else in European phil-
osophy, this interest in the political community was, at the be-
ginning, a creature of Greek civilization. It began with that
humanistic reaction, fostered by the Sophists and crystallized
in the overpowering personality of Socrates, which so completely
changed the course of Greek philosophy at the end of the fifth
century before Christ. Political philosophy began in Athens at
the same time with the birth of social studies, such as linguistics,
the history and criticism of literature, the descriptive analysis of
political and economic institutions, and a critical as distinguished
from a merely narrative history. This humanistic relationship,
which dominated philosophy for many centuries, was not dis-
solved even when the rise of the modern natural sciences in
the seventeenth century restored subjects like physics and math-
ematics to a place of foremost interest in the minds of philo-
sophical scholars. Perhaps marginal, in the sense that it has
existed on the edges of the more precise and more technical
disciplines, political philosophy has still maintained its standing
as a subject of perennial philosophical concern.
It is usually unprofitable to argue, speculatively and a priori,
about the form or the purposes that a branch of science or phil-
osophy ought to have. The discussion of scientific methods,
*Delivered before the Philosophy Club of the Yale Graduate School

in February, 1938.
like any other discussion, needs a subject matter, and in the case
of political philosophy, this must be provided by the history of
the subject. The question, What is a political theory, ought to
be answered descriptively, since in fact political philosophy is
whatever philosophers have thought about civil society and called
by that name. Evidently, any practicable description will not be
complete, for in the course of history political philosophy has
assumed many forms, has served many purposes, and has an-
swered to many conceptions of scientific and philosophical re-
liability. Still, the subject has to some extent been a unit
throughout its history, and some description of its salient char-
acteristics is possible. But though the description must depend
on history, the object of seeking such a description at all is not
historical. A person who wants to know what a political phil-
osophy is, if he is not an antiquarian, means to ask about its
truth, its certainty, or its reliability, and about the kind of crit-
icism that should be applied in order to test these qualities.
Obviously these are not historical questions, for the occurrence
of a theory says nothing whatever about its truth.
This essay, therefore, has a twofold purpose. In the first
place, it will enumerate some of the properties that political
theories have actually had. Though this involves selection and
concentration on a few properties that have recurred frequently
and that seem important, it is intended to be quite factual, de-
pending upon the analysis of what have figured as political
theories in the literature of philosophy. In the second place,
however, it is the intention to keep in view a variety of questions
about the truth or validity of political theories. How far can
they be described as simply true or false? In what sense can
words like sound, true, valid, reliable be applied to them? And
finally, the practical question, by what kind of criticism can
elements of truth in them be discriminated from elements of
falsehood?
When one runs his eye over the historical literature that be-
longs traditionally to political philosophy, he is struck at once
by the fact that this literature is not typically the product of
the study or the laboratory. Even when it is produced by
scholars, its authors have one eye fixed on the forum; and when
political philosophy is produced in quantities, it is a sure symp-

tom that society itself is going through a period of stress anid
strain. It is a remarkable fact that, in a history extending over
nearly twenty-five hundred years, a considerable part of the most
significant writing on political philosphy was done in two periods
of only about fifty years each and in two places of quite re-
stricted area. The first of these places was Athens, and the
period was the two middle quarters of the fourth century before
Christ, which saw the production of Plato's Republic and Laws
and Aristotle's Politics. The second place was England, and the
period was the half century between 1640 and 1690, which pro-
duced the works of Hobbes and Locke, together with the works
of a host of lesser figures. Both these periods, it should be
noted, witnessed changes of the most momentous importance in
the course of European social and intellectual history. The fiist
period saw the lapse of the Greek city from its place of cultural
leadership-surely the nmajor moral upheaval of the ancient
world-and the preparation of that amalgam of Greek and
Asiatic civilization which determined the whole future course of
European culture. The second period saw the formation of the
first constitutional state on national lines and the preparation of
those intellectual and scientific changes that governed the West-
ern World down at least until 1914.
These two cases are major examples of a quality in political
philosophy which might be illustrated almost without end and
which is indeed typical. Political theories are secreted, to para-
phrase a famous comparison of substantive and procedural law,
in the interstices of political and social crisis. They are pro-
duced, not indeed by the crisis as such, but by its reaction on
minds that have the sensitivity and the intellectual penetration to
be aware of crisis. Hence there is in every political theory a
reference to a pretty specific situation, which needs to be grasped
in order to understand what the philosopher is thinking about.
Always he is thinking about something that has actually oc-
curred and that has been the stimulus of his thought. To recover
this situation and its power of intellectual stimulation may, if
the theory belongs to a remote time and place, be a difficult task
set to the historical imagination. But to reconstruct, as nearly
as one can, the time, the place, and the circumstance in which it
was produced is always an important factor in understanding a
political philosophy. For it is one of the characteristics of such
a philosophy that it occurs as a part of or an incident in politics
itself. It is an element of the same intellectual and social life
within which politics is another element.
It is true, of course, that this reference to a specific situation
should not be overemphasized. Because a political theory refers
to the historical occasion from which it originated, it need not
be applicable to that alone. Political problems and situations
are more or less alike from time to time3 and from place to place;
what has been thought on one occasion is a factor in what is
thought on another. For obvious reasons the political philosophy
that remains alive is just that which can weave itself into the de-
veloping tradition of the subject. The greatest political theo-
rizing is that which excels in both respects, in analysis of a
present situation and in suggestiveness for other situations.
Judged by this standard, Aristotle's Politics was probably the
most important treatise on the subject that was ever written.
Rarely has a form of government been subjected to a more pene-
trating examination than the Greek city received in the Fourth
and Fifth Books of the Politics; probably never has a political
treatise written in one age played so great a part in another as
the Politics played in the fourteenth century, or again even in
the nineteenth.
Since a political theory depends upon a special configuration
of facts, it is to that extent turned toward the past. It is also,
however, turned toward the future, for the kind of interest that
produces political theory is in general quite different from that
of an antiquarian. Characteristically political theories are bred
of the interest that makes men want to do something about a
situation which they believe to be bad. But even the most vio-
lently conservative theory-a theory directed to the merest
preservation of the status quo-would still be directed, in the
mind of its maker, toward the future, since a policy of doing
nothing is still a policy. Quite regularly a political theory does
-contain or imply a policy. It commends some way of doing or
criticizes some other; it defends or attacks what has been done
and argues for the continuance or the reversal of a line of con-

duct. Examples might be multiplied at any length. Locke, as
everyone knows, wrote "to establish the throne of our great
restorer, our present King William," and to show the validity
of representative government founded in the consent of the
people. Quite regularly his version of natural rights served to
consolidate the gains of successful revolution or to defend the
legitimacy of revolutionary programs. With equal regularity
the great opponent of Locke's theory, the theory of dynastic
legitimacy or royal divine right, was used to commend the values
of political stability and national unity, or to neutralize revo-
lutionary propaganda. Very often, perhaps usually, political
theories have had some sort of partizan bias, revolutionary,
liberal, conservative, or reactionary. Even the most detached
philosophies have grown from some interested reading of the
facts, some estimate of what the facts signify for the future, and
some concern with the way events should shape themselves.
There is, then, no such thing as a disinterested political theory,
if that word be used to mean literally something that is bred of
indifference. For those who are genuinely indifferent about the
future do not take the trouble to make political theories, and those
who do take that trouble usually care intensely about something.
This attitude of regard for the future itself needs to be analysed
and divided. It always must include, either expressly or by im-
plication, both a judgment about what is likely and a judgment
about what is desirable. In short, a political theory includes an
estimate of probabilities and an estimate of values. It can
scarcely lack the former because any responsible attitude toward
the future must take account of the possibilities, or, more ac-
curately, the varying degrees of likelihood that belong to di-
ferent projects for action, unless indeed a theorist is the com-
plete doctrinaire. It certainly cannot lack the latter because any
interested attitude toward the future involves preferences,
choices, the sense of moral imperatives, the belief that one out-
come is better than another. The word policy is quite meaning-
less without some assumptions about what is desirable or obliga-
tory-however one chooses to name this act of evaluation.
A political theory, then, as thus far analyzed, covers three
kinds of factors: it includes factual statements about the posture
of affairs that gave rise to it; it contains statements of what may

be roughly called a causal nature, to the effect that one kind of
thing is more likely to happen, or may be more easily brought
about, than another; and it contains statements that something
ought to happen or is the right and desirable thing to have happen.
This analysis, it will be perceived, follows pretty closely the de-
scription of reflective thinking given by the pragmatists, par-
ticularly by Professor Dewey and George H. Mead. The prag-
matists, indeed, would generalize the description, asserting that
the joint reference to past and future, and the joint reference
to causes and values, are characteristic of every complete act of
thought, whether about politics or anything else. Any theory,
for the pragmatist, is a plan of action designed to adjust a
tension between actually conflicting but potentially harmonizable
needs, and this definition is defended on the still more general
principle that no concept could be meaningful at all except as a
factor in behavior. Whether this general psychological theory
of thinking is true or not, the description is reasonably accurate
so far as theories of politics are concerned.
Granting that political theories have characteristically con-
tained factors of the three kinds mentioned-the factual, the
causal, and the valuational-it still remains a question what
logical relation holds between these three types of proposition.
The pragmatist infers that because the three sometimes (or, as
he thinks, always) occur in the same psychological situation, they
must therefore be united in some logical form of synthesis. In
other words, what he calls a complete act of thought claims to be
complete in a logical as well as a psychological sense. The
validity of this conclusion is the philosophical problem (or one
current form of it) that this essay is meant to pose, because it
appears to be a major issue in contemporary thought. The con-
clusion herein defended is that logically the three kinds of prop-
ositions are quite distinct; in short, that the likelihood of an
event's happening and the desirability of its happening are quite
without any logical correlation. And this conclusion implies a
destructive criticism of pragmatism, in so far as pragmatism has
claimed to be more than a chapter in social psychology. This
general conclusion will be made a little clearer, and perhaps a
little more convincing, in the latter part of the essay, but at

present it will be better to finish describing a political theory.
The description so far given applies to what might be called
the logical structure of a political theory, the elements in it that
make propositions and that might, in consequence, be affirmed
or denied. Very often, however-perhaps usually-political
theories have, and are intended to have, psychological as well as
logical effects. Because they deal with practical social issues
and are created as incidents of conflict, they are intended to per-
suade as well as to convince. Even the most abstract political
theory probably never altogether lays aside some such purpose,
and even the coolest scholar can hardly be indifferent to the
adoption of courses that he believes to be wise and good. In
popular political theorizing the element of persuasion is usually
very much in the foreground. When Thomas Jefferson wrote
the famous second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence,
he set down the main axioms of the philosophy of natural rights
as a justification, to America and to the world, of the action that
the Congress had already taken in voting a resolution that "these
United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and inde-
pendent states." Years afterward, when John Adams testily
declared that there was not an idea in the document which was
not a generally accepted commonplace, Jefferson very reasonably
replied that he had not been deputed by the Congress to "invent
new ideas." He was to state the case for Congress and the
Colonies in a form that would carry conviction to all men of
intelligence and good will. The doctrine that men have inde-
feasible rights and are justified in protecting them by armed
resitance was persuasive just because it had a familiarity and an
emotional warmth bred by centuries of belief.
The project of persuading, however, opens up larger possi-
bilities than are immediately evident. In form at least, the
Declaration of Independence, though certainly biased, was still
essentially argumentative, possibly because it was addressed to
an age in which the love of rationality was itself a major
passion. But passion of any sort is inherently persuasive. It
generates its own belief in the fulfillment of its own wishes and
projects its own loves and hates into the perception of facts both
past and future. If the object of a political theory were merely
to generate belief, it would probably be a waste of time to spend

much effort on either facts or arguments. The obvious-and, it
must be acknowledged, the effective-short-cut is to generate the
passions and supply them with the psychological apparatus of
uncritical belief that perpetuates them and gives them effect.
The part that political philosophy has been made to play in the
modern dictatorships might be described as an elaborate experi-
ment in applied psychiatry, and they show that this art is not
only feasible but comparatively easy. One thinks at once of
the part that the conception of race has played in recent German
political writing. On scientific grounds no competent anthro-
pologist for a moment takes seriously the idea that any European
race is pure. Neither is it possible to believe that the perse-
cution of the Jews resulted from any of the actual character-
istics of that group in Germany, such as their greater prosperity
or their alleged inability to think, feel, or act like other Germans.
They were merely suitable-for emotional, not for actual rea-
sons-to be cast in the role of national scapegoat. The ideal of
racial purity has a strictly mystical significance. It serves as a
symbol, and object of veneration, to solidify a party, to release
its energies, and to foster that "more savage will to power" which
Hitler has described as the key to national greatness. Race is
a "myth," in the sense that Georges Sorel attached to that word.
In truth, however, it is not the dictatorships alone that have
discovered what might be called the folklore of political phi-
losophy. The Freudian psychologists, and indeed psychologists
of many other schools, have explored the influence that interests,
wishes, and desires exert upon belief and their tendency to pro-
duce "rationalizations" that can masquerade as valid theories.
As a mode of attacking an opponent's position this sort of criti-
cism has become a standard part of the modern controversialists'
equipment, witness the prevalence of a word like "ideology" in
our modern vocabulary of political criticism. There is no de-
nying that partizan interests do generate partizan beliefs, and
that partizan beliefs do claim the certainty of fact or the necessity
of logic. Probably it is true that no man, whatever his honesty
of purpose or his desire to be fair, can always weigh his own
interests on an equal scale with interests that he dislikes or dis-
trusts. -But it is one thing to say that political theories have
sometimes served the same purposes as folklore, and another to

imply, as enthusiastic psychologists and sociologists sometimes
seem to do, that they never serve any other purpose, or that a
theory is nothing but a tactical manoeuvre in the class-struggle
or in the national struggle for power. This game of ideological
criticism permits of any number of players, and when the game
is all played out and every view has been shown to be equally
nonsensical, then the serious business of politics as thus con-
ceived can begin, namely, breaking heads instead of answering
arguments.
It is true, of course, that every political theory is a fact, a
quite substantial fact that occurs in the gamut of facts that makes
up a particular political situation. As such, it had its causes
and may, no doubt, have its effects. Moreover, it has its effects
whether it be true or false, because in either case it exists in a
quite objective sense, as a thing that may affect men's conduct.
It is always possible that men behave differently in any given
situation, merely because they entertain some theory about their
own existence and the situation in which they find themselves.
This is a curious involution that occurs in all social theories and
that has no precise analogue in the theories of natural science,
unless it be in those cases, recently brought to light by the prin-
ciple of indeterminism, where the mere fact of observation op-
erates to change the very state of affairs which is under ob-
servation. Where this occurs, the natural scientist admits with
all modesty that he has reached a limit beyond which he cannot
conceive a refinement of his theory. And the social scientist
must surely, in all intellectual honesty, do the same. In so far
as theories figure as facts, standing in causal relations with other
facts, and in so far as they appear as the data of human behavior
which a theorist must himself count among the data of the situ-
ation that he is studying, they must of course be accepted as all
data are, simply as elements of the reality studied. Their effects
are in no way correlated with their truth, for even false theories
may influence men's conduct. Their causal influence as ex-
isting facts is simply irrelevant to their truth or falsity. But
in any given time and place one must make up his mind which
language he elects to speak. If he accepts a theory as itself a
bona fide effort to speak the truth, he must accord it that respect
10 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS [Vol. 1
which belongs to such an effort. He must meet it on the plane

of logic, must confirm or refute it on that level, by showing its
consistency or inconsistency and its ability or inability to explain
the facts. When he begins to discuss its influence, he' puts it
among existing things in the world of events and objects, and
events are not themselves true or false; they simply occur.
An example will make the meaning clearer. A critic may
deal in two quite different ways with the doctrine that Jefferson
wrote into the Declaration of Independence. It is possible to
discuss the validity of those propositions about inalienable and
indefeasible natural rights, to apply a rational criticism to the
assertion that all men are created equal, to analyse their meaning,
to show how they agreed with a prevalent conception of sci-
entific method, and to point out wherein they fall short of the
self-evidence that Jefferson attributed to them. But such criti-
cism is possible only so far as the critic is willing to discuss the
factual truth or logical consistency of the theory examined.
Quite apart from all such questions, however, it is still a fact
that Jefferson and his fellow-members of the Continental Con-
gress did believe in the theory of natural rights. It is quite
possible that they would not have acted as they did had their
beliefs been otherwise. It is credible that in so believing they
may have been unconsciously the agents of a militant middle-
class, intent upon rising to the political power that their economic
importance warranted. If such causal influences swayed their
action, it is of no consequence whatever whether what they be-
lieved was true or false. As Bishop Butler said, "Everything is
what it is, and not another thing," and beliefs may have their
effects however false they are. But surely no critic can apply
both criteria at once. He may be concerned to assess the cor-
rectness of a doctrine, and if so its consequences are irrelevant;
or he may be concerned with its actual effects and influences, and
then its truth is irrelevant.
Political theories, therefore, live on two planes or play a double
role. They are theories, or logical entities belonging to the ab-
stract world of thought, but they are also beliefs, events in
people's minds and factors in their conduct. In this latter role
they are influential (if they are) not because they are true but
because they are believed. On this plane they operate as events,
or as actual factors in historical situations, and as such are part

of the data which the historian of politics has to deal with. But
this historical reality is obviously not what interests those per-
sons who sincerely believe a theory to be true; such persons are
not interested in a theory because it exists but because they be-
lieve it to be a valid explanation of something else. What the
framers of the Declaration of Independence meant to do was
"to declare the causes" that impelled them to dissolve the political
bands which had connected the Colonies with England, an ex-
planation required by "a decent respect to the opinions of man-
kind." In this they set down as a major premise the claim of
indefeasible natural rights and as a minor premise a long list of
aggressions, which they attributed to the King of England and
interpreted as evidence of a settled determination to tyrannize.
For them these claims were not merely beliefs; they were parts
of what purported to be a correct statement of facts and a valid
inference from them. A rational criticism, as distinguished from
a study of historical causes, would have to take these claims as
bona fide, even though it might end with the conclusion that they
were utterly fallacious.
To return now to the beginning of this essay, it will be ap-
parent that the questions there raised referred to the rational
criticism of political theories, the question whether, or in what
sense, they can claim the logical attributes of truth or validity.
It will be remembered also that in the description there given of
poiltical theories it was said that they regularly unite two kinds
of factors. In the first place, there are elements of a factual
and causal nature: the apprehension of a state of affairs actually
existing, an estimate of the relative importance of different
factors in this situation, and a weighing of future possibilities.
In the second place, there are elements of valuation: an esti-
mation of importance, not in the sense of what is likely to happen,
but of what ought to happen, the discrimination of a better from
a worse way, the conviction that some courses of action are
morally obligatory, an expression of choice or preference growing
from an attitude of desire, or fear, or confidence toward what
the present holds and what the future may bring forth. The
question, then, is whether a theory uniting these two kinds of
factors can be rationally adjudged to be true or false; in short,
whether there is any common measure that can extend over and
validate the theory as a whole.
Now the only absolutely general standard of rational criticism
is the rule that a theory must not contain propositions that are
mutually contradictory. A person who thinks about politics is
under the same obligation to think consistently as one who thinks
about any other subject, and to be convicted of an inconsistency
is as damaging to a political theorist as to any other kind of
theorist. Moreover, the standard of straight, coherent thinking
is applicable both to thought which has facts for its subject-
matter and to thought which has values for its subject-matter.
A thinker can argue for mutually contradictory obligations as
easily as he can attribute mutually incompatible properties to
objects, and when he does the first he is as certainly wrong as
when he does the second, for the avoidance of contradiction is a
general principle that applies to all valid intellectual operations
whatsoever. Nevertheless, the mere absence of contradiction
cannot be regarded as equivalent to truth, except perhaps in pure
logic and mathematics. For even if a theory were altogether
self-consistent, there would still be the question whether what
actually happens is the same as what the theory contemplates,
and even if a theory of values were entirely coherent, there would
still be the question whether the values which it contemplates are
really acceptable as ends to be striven for and, if possible, at-
tained. After making every admission possible to the binding-
force of logical consistency, one must still agree that it goes only
a little way toward validating a theory of any kind, whether in
politics or any other subject.
If non-contradiction, though indispensable, is still not a sut-
ficient principle of criticism, is there any other principle that can
bridge the two kinds of propositions-allegations of fact and
ascriptions of value-that occur together in every political theory?
Apparently the answer must be, No. In combining these two
kinds of factor a political theory puts together propositions for
which there is no common logical measure and which all the dic-
tates of clear thinking require to be distinguished. In so far as
a political theory depends on the assertion, expressed or implied,
that some state of the facts is so and so, the only test applicable
to it consists in inquiring whether the facts really were as alleged
or different. In so far as it presumes that one course of evehtb

is more likely to occur than another, it can be tested only in the
light of the actual probabilities and perhaps in part by seeing
whether the event seems to justify the expectation. In either
case the assertion that an event has happened and the assertion
that it ought to have happened are simply different and there-
fore ought not to be confused. And similarly, to say that a
future event is probable is quite different from saying that it is
desirable, or good, or the reverse. The two kinds of propo-
sitions are logically disparate in the sense that any statement con-
taining such a copulative verb as "ought to be" requires the as-
sumption of a standard of value which is never present as such
in any purely actual situation or any purely causal sequence of
events. When the two kinds of statement occur in conjunction,
as they continually do in political theories, the beginning of
critical judgment is analysis, the discrimination of the two kinds
and the application to each of the tests appropriate to it.
Analysis and discrimination in this matter do not imply the
superficial idea that political theories can be made "scientific"
by the omission of references to moral and other forms of valu-
ation. This idea usually depends not at all on discrimination of
values as one element in a theory, but only on a simple-minded
unconsciousness of valuations that have become habitual. It de-
pends upon the kind of intellectual simplicity that Schopenhauer
once attributed to an opponent: he imagined, Schopenhauer said,
that whatever he had learned before he was fifteen years old was
an innate principle of human reason. In truth it is humanly
impossible even to describe a political or social situation without
at least implicit assumptions about the importance of the elements
that are to go into the description; the choice is between implicit
assumptions and the explicit avowal of what is assumed. More-
over, there is no objection, at least on the score of logic, to mak-
ing explicit assumptions about what is desirable; a policy or an
end can be discussed as reasonably as anything else. It is prob-
ably not true even that men disagree more about values than
they do about other matters. In any case there is no logical
reason why a social philosopher should not postulate any value
he chooses, provided only that he avows what he is doing and
does not pretend to prove what he is merely taking for granted.
14 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS [\Tol. I
What he cannot do logically (or even honestly, if he knows

what he is doing) is to pass off his valuations as if they were
inescapable facts.
The practical question, of course, remains, whether it is really
possible to perform this act of analysis, at least so long as a
political theory is still an element in a living situation. Looking
back to the past one easily perceives how often men's judgment
of facts is swayed by their interests or misled by the intensity of
their moral convictions, but in one's own thinking it must be
admitted that one does not, and probably cannot, always avoid
the same kind of error. The common usages of language con-
spire to make such confusions. The most ordinary words, like
is and must be, have regularly a twofold use, to signify indif-
ferently logical or moral necessity, existence or predication, and
the precise meaning must be gathered, if at all, from the context.
Thus, to refer again to the Declaration of Independence, when
Jefferson declared it to be "self-evident that all men are created
equal," he may have thought that the proposition was analogous
to the alleged self-evident propositions that stand on the opening
pages of Euclid. In the light of an exact analysis of those propo-
sitions, however, no one can imagine that he was merely giving a
rule for handling symbols. It is hardly likely that Jefferson
thought that all men are as a matter of fact equal; certainly the
moral effect of the sentence is spoiled if one takes it to be parallel
with some literally true statement about the way men are created,
such as, All men are created babies. As everyone knows, Jef-
ferson was really expressing a moral conviction to the effect
that, in some matters of vital human importance, it is wrong to
deprive men of their freedom of choice. One may accept or
reject this assertion, but he cannot intelligently do either unless
he sees what is really intended. In a sense the inevitability of
confusion or error is irrelevant, even if it is a fact. No one
wholly avoids inconsistency, but inconsistency is an error just
the same. If there is a confusion inherent in the conflation of
facts and values, it is still a confusion even if the whole world
conspires to do it. Of course, no one doubts that, in this as in
other respects, men do think more clearly when they try reso-
lutely to avoid confusion.
It would be altogether unfair, however, to imply that the coa-

lescence of judgments of value with judgments of fact or of
logical implication has only the' standing of a frequent, but ad-
mitted, popular confusion. On the contrary this coalescence is
undertaken systematically in certain philosophies which, together,
cover a considerable part of current philosophical opinion. A
representative of one of these views would enter an exception
against the statement made above, that propositions stating facts
and propositions ascribing values are logically disparate and would
hold that it is possible to include both within a single logical
synthesis. Historically this contention goes back to Hegel, who
believed that the idea of a self-developing totality in logic could
sublate the duality of rationalism and empiricism and refute at
once the revolutionary doctrine of natural rights and the con-
ventionalism or positivism implied by Hume's critique of natural
rights. This was the purpose which Hegel thought that dialectic
could fulfill. By means of dialectic he supposed it possible to
show that certain values must emerge in the course of history
and, conversely, that the causal processes of history are regu-
lated by an inherent tsndency to realize and conserve values.
The dialectic was at once, therefore, a causal exploration and an
immanent ethical criticism. However it may be formulated, the
belief that some such dovetailing of value and fact is a soluble
problem remains the best index of Hegel's influence over later
philosophy. It continued to characterize the English Neo-
Hegelians, and with all their differences it remains the funda-
mental claim of the M'arxists, whose dialectical materialism is
still in essence a claim that causal and moral necessity can be
synthetized. In a milder form the purposes, if not the apparatus,
of Hegel's dialectic perpetuated themselves in the pragmatism of
Professor Dewey and Professor Mead, already referred to. For
from the allegation that meanings can occur only in the fulfill-
ment of purposes and that reflective thought is only a directive
agency in behavior, it appears to follow that logical adequacy
must include both factual efficiency and the fulfillment of pur-
pose.
It would be silly to embark upon a thumb-nail refutation of
Hegelianism, with all its ramifications, at the end of an essay
already too long. The purpose has been to outline a problem and
2-Pol
to suggest a type of solution but not to offer a refutation of other

types of solution that have been attempted. Its intention has
been to suggest that here is one of the systematic differences be-
tween philosophical points of view, rooted as such differences
are likely to be in diverse theories of knowledge. Descriptively
one finds in human thinking about a concrete problem-say the
problem attacked by a political theory-what seems to be a
variety of factors answering to a variety of critical standards.
There are allegations of fact and cause; there are imputations of
value or obligation; there are the consequences, for human be-
havior, of believing or disbelieving the theory. Now must it be
the case that there is some criterion of truth large enough to
stretch over all these factors in the problem? If some such cri-
terion is proposed-say "coherence"-does it cover the ground
because it affords a really applicable standard for all types of
problem, or does it seem to do so merely because it is so vague
and ambiguous that no one knows with certainty what it means?
Or, on the other hand, is it possible that the drawing of dis-
tinctions is both the beginning and the end of wisdom? In short,
is it possible that truth is a word with several different meanings
and that no one can say what it means unless he is allowed to
discriminate at least what Leibniz called truths of reason and
truths of fact, and perhaps several other kinds beside? With
this reference to Leibniz it will be well to stop. For it suggests
the obvious line of criticism, namely, that this paper illustrates a
kind of philosophic atavism, the nostalgia for clear and distinct
ideas that was more typical of the seventeenth than of the nine-
teenth century.
An Encapsulated View of the Best from Christian Publishers
Volume 4 . Issue 24
August 2008
C L A S S I C S
COUNCIL OF REFERENCE
Dr. Richard Averbeck

The City of God
Rev. D. Stuart Briscoe by Saint Augustine
Dr. Paul Cedar
Public Domain
From the Classics Collection
Mr. Dave Coleman
Dr. & Mrs. Larry Crabb A Quick Focus

Mr. Roger Cross
The Book’s Purpose
Dr. Kenneth
Rev. SamuelO.Farina
Gangel
Clarify that Christianity was not to blame for the fall of the
Rev.Kenneth
Dr. & Mrs. O.
Lud Golz
Gangel Roman Empire
Dr.
Rev.Howard
& Mrs.G.Lud
Hendricks
Golz Reveal that even the most evil actions of fallen angels and sin-
ful man cannot thwart the unfolding of God’s eternal plan
Dr.Mr. OlanG.
Howard Hendrix
Hendricks
Propose that the fall of the Roman Empire was insignificant
Dr.
Mr.David Jeremiah
Olan Hendrix
in the context of the eternal plan of God
Rev.David
Dr. KnuteJeremiah
Larson Describe the choice we must all make~choose to occupy
Dr.
Rev.John C. Maxwell
Knute Larson either the City of God or the City of Earth~the consequence
Dr.John
Dr. Bruce
C.McNicol
Maxwell
of which is eternal
Mr.Bruce
Dr. DeanMcNicol
Merrill The Book’s Message
The year was A.D. 410 when King Alaric of the Vandals captured
Mrs. Elisa Morgan
Mr. Dean Merrill the city of Rome. The Romans thought the city would never fall, so
Dr.Elisa
Mrs. Luis Morgan
Palau the conquering of Rome shook them to the core and led to the col-
lapse of the entire Roman Empire. Those of pagan beliefs quickly
Dr. Dr.
Gilbert A. Peterson
Ray Ortlund blamed the Christians~the Roman gods had abandoned them because
Rev.
Dr. Wes
LuisRoberts
Palau
so many had forsaken them and accepted Christ. Augustine refuted
this idea. Using this historical moment as a springboard, he estab-
Dr.Rev. & Mrs.
Gilbert Jamie
A. Peterson lished that all of history is simply a record of the execution of God’s
Rassmussen plans. God set in motion a plan that included free will and choices~
Rev. Wes Roberts
Mr. Jim Warren the consequences of which are eternal. With the fall of angels and
Rev. & Mrs. Jamie the original sin of Adam, the earthly city was established. It was and
Dr.Rassmussen
Rick Warren is still occupied by those who strive for the glorification of self.
Mr. Jim Warren
Running parallel throughout time has been the heavenly
Dr. Rick Warren city~the City of God. It was and is still occupied by those who
Publishers strive to praise and glorify only the one true God. Every person
Catherine & David
Publishers
Martin
must choose which city to occupy and serve.
Catherine & David
Martin
Editors
Cheryl & Michael
Chiapperino
Editors
Cheryl & Michael
Chiapperino
22
was due to the virtue of the ancient
Book
Book I I Romans themselves, but ultimately
to the counsel of God~He reward-
Pagans claimed that Rome fell because the Christian religion had weak- ed their virtue by increasing their
ened it. In truth, the blessings and difficulties of life happened to good dominion even though they did
and bad alike~misfortune happened to everyone. In fact, the barbarians not worship Him. Totally ignorant
who stormed the city spared, for Christ’s sake, their adversaries. It was un- of the true source of the success,
usual that the conqueror would show mercy to the defeated out of respect the Romans boasted of their great-
for their gods. The Romans themselves, when conquering cities, did not ness.
spare the lives of the defeated. The cruelties that occurred during the cap-
ture of Rome were in agreement with the convention of war, but the acts In contrast, Christians know
of mercy were the result of the influence of the name of Christ. Although they must be far from boasting,
imprisoned and mistreated, the saints lost nothing by losing their earthly for they know the true source of
possessions. Even when subjected to violations during their captivity, their their success. All they do is for love
own will did not consent and their souls were not contaminated. of their eternal home, whereas the
Romans did all for human glory
Book II II and an earthly dominion. There is
Book a vast difference between true glory
and the desire of domination. Al-
Before the time of Christ, Rome had suffered hardships and tragedies. though they did not acknowledge
Although its people had worshipped false gods, they were not protected it, the Romans enjoyed a dominion
from misfortune. To the contrary, the Romans suffered the greatest calamity that was granted by Him from whom
of all~they became weak due to moral and spiritual corruption. Their gods all power emanates and by whose
did nothing to protect them; instead, totally devoid of holiness of life, their providence all things are ruled.
worship lead them further into depravity. This was not, by any means, a
unique event in human history. Since Christian beliefs result in healthy liv-
ing, and since history shows many examples of the unhealthy consequences Book VI
of paganism, it benefited Romans to renounce their pagan practices.
Book VI
Are the heathen gods to be
Book
BookIIIIII worshipped for the sake of eternal
life? Through the worship of these
Even when false gods were worshipped by the Romans, the world con- gods, are we assured eternal happi-
tinually suffered. Why did they not defend Rome in the past? Before the ness? Varro, the most esteemed
advent of Christ, Romans were subjected to calamities~physical and bodily writer on heathen theology, divides
disasters. Consider the adultery of Paris, the fratricidal act of Romulus, the theology into three kinds~mythical,
destruction of Ilium by Finbria, the wickedness of the war waged against natural, and civil. Varro himself
the Albans~actions brought about by their own moral and spiritual degrada- reveals that neither mythical nor
tion. Romans suffered incredible disasters during the Punic Wars~no pro- civil theology can assure happiness
tection was provided by their gods. Yet, these things are set aside in memory in future life. Other pagan authors
when considering the reason for Rome’s demise. It is effrontery to impute and teachers attempt to show nat-
the present troubles to Christ and His followers, since even when the gods ural explanations for their gods.
were worshipped, such calamities befell the people. But, once the vanity of these gods
has been exposed, it becomes ob-
Book vious that they are unable to be-
BookIVIV stow eternal life on anyone; they
do not afford help even with respect
The long duration of the empire of Rome is not to be attributed to the to the present, the things of this
worshipping of the heathen gods, who failed to defend Rome throughout temporal life.
a history abounding with disaster. Have earthly kingdoms been aided or
thwarted through intervention by these gods? Has the worship of these Book VII
gods been of service to obtain or extend Rome’s empire? Or, is there one Book VII
true God, the giver of virtue and felicity who held the past, present, and
future in His hand? Consider the kingdom of the Jews; it was founded by Can eternal life be obtained
the one and true God and preserved by Him as long as they remained stead- by the worship of Janus, Jupiter,
fast in their worship of Him alone. The times of all kings and kingdoms Saturn, or other select gods of civil
are ordained by the judgment and power of the true God. theology? Who are the select gods?
Book V For what reasons do they occupy
Book V offices above the commoner gods?
According to Varro, “god” is the
The power and increase of the Roman Empire, and all other kingdoms, soul of the world and is manifested
cannot be attributed to false gods. The cause is neither fortuitous nor does in various parts or “souls” whose
it consist in the position of the stars. In a sense, this power and increase continued on page 3
3
Book VII true worship of God, evidenced by
continued from page 2 their ascribing divine honor to both
nature is divine. Even Varro himself pronounced his own opinions of these good and bad angels, rather than
parts, or souls~whether named Janus, Jupiter, Terminus, Pecunia, Saturn, understanding that sacrifice is due
Mercury, Mars, Apollo, Diana, Neptune, Salacia, or Venilia~ as ambiguous. to the true God only. Angels~holy
He affirms Earth to be a goddess since that “part” of what he defines “god” angels~motivated by love, desire
to be encom-passes it. In reality, all of these things which the physical theo- that we not worship them but wor-
logists refer to as parts, or souls, ought to have been recognized as charac- ship instead the one true God. Un-
teristics of the one true God. Only by distinguishing the Creator from the fortunately, some Platonists, such
creation can the truth of one Author be acknowledged. as Porphyry, remain connected to
demon worship. True miracles are
Book VIII created by the one true God and
Book VIII are delivered through the ministry
of His holy angels. Men are to
Mythical and civil theologies are of no avail toward securing a blessed worship God for both eternal bless-
eternal life. Will the worship of the gods of natural theology secure blessedness ings and earthly prosperity because
in the life to come? To answer this question, philosophers of more excellent all things are ordered by His divine
wisdom must be consulted. Plato, uppermost disciple of Socrates, provides intervention. The purpose of holy
a useful foundation in his threefold division of philosophy. So, it is the angels is to fulfill the providence
Platonists opinions, in particular, that are preferred in this ongoing dispute of God. No holy angel will demand
concerning matters of theology, since they excel in logic and rational think- divine honor for himself but only
ing. Platonists also exude strength in moral philosophy, coming nearest of for God.
pagan philosophers to Christian faith, though the Christian religion is above As a fulfillment of the Ark of
all the science of philosophers. Even the Platonists, who often refer to one the Covenant, the promises, and
true God, continued to suggest that sacred rites were to be performed to the requirement of sacrifices, the
honor many gods. Concerning these gods, Plato defined them as good, as supreme and true sacrifice, Jesus
friends of virtue. Christ, the mediator between God
and men, was provided by God
The Platonist Apuleius discussed the manner and actions of demons. Himself. Only through Christ do
They were to be worshipped and employed in order to gain favor in the saints derive power against demons
eyes of the gods. What religion would believe such a thing? And, to the and true purification of heart. The
point of the gods using demons as messengers and interpreters, do they do Platonists state principles by which
so willingly or without their knowledge? In no way can men be reconciled the soul is purified, but there is
to good gods by demons. Demons are the slaves of vice. They delight in only one true principle that purifies
and patronize what good and wise men abhor and condemn~blasphemous and renews the human soul~the
fiction and magical arts. Regardless of the opinion of Apuleius, we must re- sacrifice of Christ Jesus. Men are
ject the worship of demons! The superstitions and idolatry must be abolished. justified and made pure by faith in
the mystery of Christ’s incarnation.
Book IX Porphyry, whose mistakes are
Book IX
even worse than those of Apuleius,
Among the demons, are there distinctions between good and bad? Are is weakened by his wavering be-
there good demons who can assist the human soul to reach true blessedness? tween the confession of the true
Apuleius ascribes no virtue to demons. He explains that it is gods who God and the worship of demons.
dwell in Heaven, demons who occupy the air, and men who inhabit Earth. How could he be so blind as to
Platonists suggest that the souls of men become demons upon vacating the not recognize the truth~Christ
body. Consider, since demons are not blessed like the gods nor wretched Jesus? The grace provided through
like men, can demons mediate between gods and men when they have noth- Christ has alone provided the uni-
ing in common with either? Christ Jesus is the only true mediator between versal way of the soul’s deliverance.
God and men, being both God and man. To obtain the blessed life and
partake in the supreme good, man needs mediation not by a demon but Book XI
by Christ alone. Though demons may make promises of godly intercession, Book XI
their true goal is to turn men from the path of truth. Christ alone provides
men with eternal blessedness. Herein begins the explanation
of the origins, histories, and desti-
Book X nies of the two cities~the earthly
Book X and the heavenly~formed by the
separation of the good and bad
The angels of Heaven want only God, whom they serve, to be given angels. First, let it be clear that
divine honor through sacrifice or “latreia.” The Platonists believe that God there is no knowledge of God but
alone can bestow happiness on men or angels, but it is yet to be decided through the mediator between
whether the spirits want sacrifice offered to them or to the one God alone. God and men, Christ Jesus. It is
Although Platonists have some knowledge of the Creator, they misunderstand not wise to attempt to understand
continued on page 4
4
Book XI we piously believe; but that the fall-
en angels, who by their own default
the infinite ages of time lost that light, did not enjoy this
before the creation of the blessedness even before they sinned,
“There is no question, world nor the infinite reason bids us conclude.”
then, that if the angels realms of space. The
world and time had one Two different communities of
are included in the works beginning; one did not angels existed, signified by the
of God during these six precede the other. God names Light and Dark.
days, they are that light created all and on the
The wickedness of Dark is not
which was called ‘Day,’ seventh day He rested.
nature, but contrary to nature, and
and whose unity Scrip- “When it is said that has its origin, not in the Creator,
ture signalizes by calling God rested on the seventh but in the will. This was not a sur-
day from all His works, prise to God, for He uses for good
that day not the ‘first and hallowed it, we are even the evil committed through
day,’ but ‘one day.’ not to conceive of this in the will.
For the second day, the a childish fashion, as if
work were a toil to God,
third, and the rest are who ‘spake and it was “But God, as He is the
not other days; but the done,’~ spake by the spir- supremely good Creator of
same ‘one’ day is repeat- itual and eternal, not good natures, so is He of
audible and transitory
ed to complete the num- word. But God’s rest sig- evil wills the most just
ber six or seven, so that nifies the rest of those Ruler; so that, while they
who rest in God, as the make an ill use of good
there should be know- joy of a house means the natures, He makes a good
ledge both of God’s joy of those in the house use even of evil wills.
works and of His rest. who rejoice, though not
the house, but something Accordingly, He caused the
For when God said, ‘Let else, causes the joy.” devil (good by God’s
there be light, and there Although the Bible creation, wicked by his own
was light,’ if we are jus- does not record the exact will) to be cast down from
tified in understanding moment when the an- his high position, and to
gels were created, we become the mockery of His
in this light the creation know that by their very angels,~that is, He caused
of the angels, then cer- nature they are light.
his temptations to benefit
tainly they were created God, the good and
those whom he wishes to
unchangeable Trinity of
par-takers of the eternal Father, Son, and Holy injure by them.”
light which is the un- Ghost, is one God in
changeable Wisdom of whom substance and
quality are identical.
God, by which all things In this blessedness the Book XII
were made, and whom angels were created. Book XII
we call the only-begotten “From all this, it will Regarding the angels, is there
readily occur to any one in some a good will and in others
Son of God; so that they, that the blessedness which an evil will? The nature of angels,
being illumined by the an intelligent being both good and bad, is the same.
Light that created them, desires as its legitimate The difference between angels of
object results from a com- light and angels of darkness lies
might themselves be- bination of these two not in a difference in their nature
come light and be called things, namely, that it and origin, since God created them
uninterruptedly enjoy
‘Day,’ in participation of the unchangeable good,
both, but in a difference in their
that unchangeable Light wills and desires. Angels of darkness
which is God; and that were not content to continue in
and Day which is the it be delivered from all the eternal truth and love of God.
dubiety, and know cer-
Word of God, by whom tainly that it shall eter-
They, instead, became enamored
with their own power and in so
both themselves and all nally abide in the same doing, traded the dignity of God’s
else were made.” enjoyment. That it is so
with the angels of light continued on page 5
5
Book XII As a result of sin, two cities
continued from page 4 were formed~the earthly and the
heavenly. The earthly city is ruled
eternity for pride and vanity, which lead to deception and envy. by love of self; the heavenly city,
Regarding the creation of man, he is not from eternity, but was crea- by love of God and contempt of
ted by the one true God. “In this first man, who was created in the be- self. The first seeks glory from men;
ginning, there was laid the foundation, not indeed evidently, but in the latter from the Lord. The first
God’s foreknowledge, of these two cities or societies, so far as regards the delights in its own strength; the
human race. For from that man all men were to be derived~some of latter says,
them to be associated with the good angels in their reward, others with “I will love thee, O Lord, my
the wicked in punishment; all being ordered by the secret yet just judgment strength” (Psalm 18:1).
of God.”
“And therefore the wise men of
the one city, living according to
Book XIII man, have sought for profit to
Book XIII their own bodies or souls, or both,
By Adam’s original sin did death come to be. Unlike the angels who and those who have known God
cannot die, man was created to live by condition~if he lived in obedience ‘glorified Him not as God, neither
to his Creator, he would enjoy angelic immortality and blessed eternity; were thankful, but became vain
if he disobeyed, he would experience death. in their imaginations, and their
foolish heart was darkened; pro-
What then is death? First, there is the death of the mortal body, but fessing themselves to be wise,’~that
here the issue of death of the soul is addressed. The soul was created to is, ‘glorying in their own wisdom,
be immortal, yet can experience a kind of death in itself when separated and being possessed by pride,’~they
from God. “The death, then, of the soul takes place when God forsakes it, became fools, and ‘changed the
as the death of the body when the soul forsakes it.” glory of the incorruptible God into
an image made like to corruptible
And so, there are two deaths~the death of the body and the death man, and to birds, and four-footed
of the soul. “Of the first and bodily death, then, we may say that to the beasts, and creeping things.’ For
good it is good, and evil to the evil. But, doubtless, the second, as it happens they were either leaders or followers
to none of the good, so it can be good for none.” of the people in adoring images,
‘and worshipped and served the
creature more than the Creator,
Book XIV who is blessed forever.’ (Romans
Book XIV 1: 21–25). But in the other city
Through the original sin of Adam, all men would have been doomed there is no human wis-dom, but
to the endless misery of the second death had not God intervened, only godliness, which offers due
through His grace, by providing a Savior in Christ Jesus. This Savior is worship to the true God, and looks
needed by all of mankind for all are sinners. The sin of men is not caused for its reward in the society of the
by the flesh but by the soul. The misery contracted from sin is not the saints, of holy angels as well as holy
sin itself but sin’s punishment. Despite the falling of angels and the sin men, ‘that God may be all in all’”
of men, God’s will is still carried out. (1 Corinthians 15: 28).
“The sins of men and angels do nothing to im- Books XV–XVII

Book XV–XVII
pede the ‘great works of the Lord which accom- Throughout the Old Testament
plish His will.’ For He who by His providence we see the cities develop~the earth-
and omnipotence distributes to everyone his ly by the children of the flesh and
the heavenly by the children of the
own portion, is able to make good use not only promise. The parallel courses of
of the good, but also of the wicked … God was the earthly and heavenly cities were
not ignorant that man would fall, why should highlighted in Scripture, from
Abraham to the Old Testament
He not have suffered him to be tempted by an prophets, and then on to Christ.
angel who hated and envied him? It was not,
indeed, that He was unaware that he should be Book XIX–XXI
Books XIX–XXI
conquered, but because He foresaw that by the
man’s seed, aided by divine grace, this same devil Regarding the two cities, what
himself should be conquered, to the greater then is their destiny? The heavenly
city, the City of Supreme Good,
glory of the saints.” is destined for life eternal; the
continued on page 6
6
Books XIX–XXI
sacred song, in which I read or
earthly city, for eternal death. David predicted the end of the world in hear the words, ‘Blessed are they
his Psalms: “In the beginning hast Thou laid the foundations of the earth, that dwell in Thy house, O Lord;
O Lord; and the heavens are the work of Thy hands. They shall perish, but they will be still praising Thee’”
Thou shall endure; yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; and as a (Psalm 84:4).
vesture Thou shall change them, and they shall be changed: but Thou art
the same, and Thy years shall not fail” (Psalm 52: 25–27). He makes it The saints will want for nothing
clear that the earthly city will end, but the heavenly city will go on for and discontent shall be nonexistent.
eternity. Those of the earthly city shall be judged justly and receive their “But who can conceive, not to say
eternal damnation. Those of the heavenly city will also be judged justly: describe, what degrees of honor and
glory shall be awarded to the vari-
“And hence, when His saints have been gathered to Him and set at ous degrees of merit? Yet it cannot
His right hand in the last judgment, Christ shall say, ‘Come, ye blessed be doubted that there shall be de-
of my Father, take possession of the kingdom prepared for you from the grees. And in that blessed city there
foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and ye gave me to eat,’ shall be this great blessing, that no
(Matthew 25:34) and so on, mentioning the good works of the good, and inferior shall envy any superior,
their eternal rewards assigned by the last sentence of the Judge.” as now the archangels are not en-
vied by the angels, because no one
Book will wish to be what he has not re-
Book XXII
XXII ceived, though bound in strictest
concord with him who has received;
The earthly city shall end. What will be the future of the heavenly as in the body the finger does not
city~the City of God? There will be an eternal happiness of the saints~the seek to be the eye, though both mem-
inhabitants of the heavenly city. “There shall be a new heaven and a new bers are harmoniously included
earth: and the former shall not be mentioned, nor come into mind; but in the complete structure of the
they shall find joy and rejoicing in it: for I will make Jerusalem a rejoicing, body. And thus, along with his gift,
and my people a joy. And I will rejoice in Jerusalem, and joy in my people, greater or less, each shall receive
and the voice of weeping shall be no more heard in her” (Isaiah 65:17–19). this further gift of contentment to
desire no more than he has.”
The saints will experience the resurrection of the body~not just their
earthly bodies, but bodies made new, bodies with all blemishes that They shall experience abundant
marred human beauty removed. free will. “Neither are we to suppose
that because sin shall have no power
to delight them, free will must be
withdrawn. It will, on the contrary,
“Whatever, therefore, has been taken from the be all the more truly free, because
body, either during life or after death shall be set free from delight in sinning to
restored to it, and, in conjunction with what has take unfailing delight in not sin-
ning. For the first freedom of will
remained in the grave, shall rise again, transformed which man received when he was
from the oldness of the animal body into the created upright consisted in an
newness of the spiritual body, and clothed in ability not to sin, but also in an
ability to sin; whereas this last
incorruption and immortality. But even though freedom of will shall be superior,
the body has been all quite ground to powder by inasmuch as it shall not be able to
sin. This, indeed, shall not be a na-
some severe accident, or by the ruthlessness of tural ability, but the gift of God.”
enemies, and though it has been so diligently
scattered to the winds, or into the water, that there They shall carry no weight of
guilt for their past sins. “The saints
is no trace of it left, yet it shall not be beyond the shall forget their past ills, for they
omnipotence of the Creator,~no, not a hair of its shall have so thoroughly escaped
head shall perish.” them all, that they shall be quite
blotted out of their experience. But
their intellectual knowledge, which
The saints, clothed in immortal and spiritual bodies, shall be occupied shall be great, shall keep them ac-
by praising and worshipping God. “How great shall be that felicity, which quainted not only with their own
shall be tainted with no evil, which shall lack no good, and which shall past woes, but with the eternal suf-
afford leisure for the praises of God, who shall be all in all! For I know ferings of the lost. For if they were
not what other employment there can be where no lassitude shall slacken
activity, nor any want stimulate to labor. I am admonished also by the
77
Book XXII
not to know that they had been miserable, how could they, as the Psalmist
says, for ever sing the mercies of God? Certainly that city shall have no
greater joy than the celebration of the grace of Christ, who redeemed us
by His blood.”
The saints will throughout eternity carry out David’s words, “Be
still, and know that I am God” (Psalm 46:10). Volume 4, Issue 24
Publishers
Catherine & David Martin
“When we are restored by Him, Editors
Cheryl & Michael Chiapperino
and perfected with greater grace, Published on the World Wide Web at
ChristianBookSummaries.com.
we shall have eternal leisure to see The mission of Christian Book Summaries
that He is God, for we shall be full is to enhance the ministry of thinking
Christians by providing thorough and
of Him when He shall be all in all readable summaries of noteworthy books
from Christian publishers.
... This knowledge shall be The opinions expressed are
those of the original writers
perfected when we shall be perfectly and are not necessarily those
of Christian Book Summaries
at rest, and shall perfectly know or its Council of Reference.
City of God, written in Latin by
that He is God.” Augustine of Hippo in the early 5th
century, deals with issues concerning
God, martyrdom, Jews, and other
Christian philosophies. Public domain
CBS Available at your favorite bookstore
or online bookseller. It can also be
downloaded free of charge at a vari-
ety of websites, including Christian
Classics Ethereal Library
(www.ccel.org).
The author: Saint Augustine
(354– 430), Bishop of Hippo
Regius, was a philosopher and theo-
logian. Augustine, a Latin church
father, is one of the most important
figures in the development of West-
ern Christianity. Radically influ-
enced by Platonism, he framed the
concepts of original sin and just war.
When the Roman Empire in the
West was starting to disintegrate,
Augustine developed the concept
of the Church as a spiritual City
of God, distinct from the material
City of Man.
Summarized by: Bonnie Church
is a website content manager, edi-
tor, freelance writer, and avid gar-
dener. She and her husband, Doug,
are proud parents of six and grand-
parents of ten. She is a graduate
of the University of Minnesota.
Bonnie, Doug, and their family
live in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
American Society of Church History
St. Augustine's Conception of the State

Author(s): Frederick William Loetscher
Source: Church History, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Mar., 1935), pp. 16-42
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Society of Church
History
Accessed: 26-02-2017 11:23 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Cambridge University Press, American Society of Church History are collaborating with
JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Church History
ST. AUGUSTINE'S CONCEPTION OF THE STATE1
FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER
Princeton Theological Seminary
In his celebrated lecture on the Confessions of St.

Augustine the late Professor Adolf von Harnack decl
"Between St. Paul the Apostle and Luther the Reformer
Christian Church has possessed no one who could measure
self with Augustine; and in comprehensive influence no
is to be compared with him."2 Not only was this North A
bishop the chief luminary of Western Christendom in hi
generation, but through his writings he fairly dominate
philosophy, the theology, and the ethics of the Middle
he stimulated the medieval mystics, alike those who acc
and many of those who rejected the traditional dogmas;
spired both the so-called forerunners of the Reformatio
the leading humanists of the Renaissance; and in large m
he moulded the evangelical faith and piety of the Luther
especially of the Reformed churches from the days of
founders down to our own times. But in no realm of tho
or life was his influence more potent or historically
significant than in that characteristic development of th
tions of church and state that marked the millenial peri
ginning, less than half a century after his death, with th
of the Western Empire in the year 476. He was the weig
authority to whom emperors and popes could and did ap
for support in their age-long contest for the supreme p
the former to vindicate their independence in secular af
and the latter to prove their lordship over all other ear
potentates, whether temporal or spiritual.3
Augustine wrote no treatise dealing specifically with
1 The presidential address delivered at the meeting of the Society in Wa
ington on December 27, 1934.
2 Monasticism: Its Ideals and History: and The Confessions of St. Augustine
(Crown Theological Library, xxviii), p. 123.
3 Cf. K. Mirbt, Die Stellung Augustins in der Publizistik des gregorianischen
Kirchenstreits, Leipzig, 1888. He shows the thoroughly partisan use that
both factions made of Augustine's often purely incidental and never fully
developed statements.
16
subject, nor did he ever set forth his views concerni

in a systematic fashion. These must be gathere
casional references in his Letters and Sermons, fr
Donatist Writings,4 and above all from his De C
the greatest, and excepting his Confessions, the be
the most read of all his works.
The monumental City of God-the author himself calls it

a magnum opus et arduum-6 is unquestionably the ablest re-
futation of heathenism and defence of Christianity that the
ancient church has bequeathed to us. It was occasioned by an
event that shook the Graeco-Roman world to its very founda-
tions: in August, 410, the imperial capital-Roma aeterna,
Roma felix, Roma invicta-fell a prey to Alaric's plundering
hordes. Men were filled with amazement and terror; the more
so because for generations such a catastrophe had been deemed
a sheer impossibility. The pagans promptly charged this
calamity, as they had long been wont to do with every sort of
public misfortune, to the ever-increasing ascendency of Chris-
tianity over their own time-honored religion. And it was in
answer to this accusation that Augustine wrote this immortal
work, devoting to the task about fourteen of his ripest and
busiest years (412-426).' His apologetic purpose dominated
the entire treatise.8 Of the twenty-two books, the first five, as
he himself declares in his Retractations, "refute those who
fancy that the polytheistic worship is necessary in order to
secure worldly prosperity," while the next five deal with those
who "maintain that the worship of the gods is advantageous
for the life to come." The remaining twelve books, though
4 These are specially important for his doctrine of the church. Cf. H. Reuter,
Augustinmsche Studien, Gotha, 1887, p. 151: "Man kann die Staatslehre
Augustin's nur mit ausserster Vorsicht und selbst dann nicht vollstandig aus
den lib. de civ. schipfen. Sie ist korrekt nur unter Vergleichung anderer
Schriften, namentlich der antidonatistischen aufzubauen."
5 We use the edition of B. Dombart, Leipzig, (vol. i, 1908; vol. ii, 1918); and
the English translation by Marcus Dods in the Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers, Buffalo, 1887, Second Series, vol. ii.
6 I, Praefatio; xxii, 30 (ii, p. 635, ed. Dombart) : ingentis huius operis " ; Retract.
ii, 69 (i, p. 1): "grande opus."
7 The facts in regard to the origin of the work, the dates for the publication
of the several parts, the course of the argument as a whole, and such matters,
may be found in the introductory chapter of H. Scholz's Glalbe and Unglaube
in der Weltgeschichte: Ein Kommentar zu Augustins De Civitate Dei, Leipzig,
1911. Later writers have called attention to some misconceptions in this
"Commentary", but it is on the whole the most useful guide we have for
the study of the City of God.
8 Cf. the ancient title in Dombart, ii, p. 635: "De Civitate Dei contra paganos."
9 Retract., ii, 43 (E. T., p. xii); cf. De Civ. Dei, x, 32, at the end.
2
18 CHURCH HISTORY
by no means lacking in passages of polemic vigor, g

may be called his positive interpretation of Christian
ceived as the civitas Dei in contrast with the civitas
and presented in three groups of four books each
respectively, with the origin, the progress, and the
destinies of the two cities. Thus his original aim, that
ing that it was not the renunciation of the old deities
ruined Rome, was confirmed by a constructive theor
tory that purports to embrace the whole life of the r
the fall of man to the final judgment. No doubt, th
more magnificent in its conception than adequate in
tion! Augustine's learning, especially his exegetical
torical scholarship, did not equal his theological ge
may, indeed, question the propriety of calling the wo
osophy of history in the modern sense; but it was t
worthy attempt in this direction, an achievement t
more striking in view of the fact that for more than a
years nothing better or even comparable was produced o
tian soil, and that the essential features of his solution of the
problem have been adopted by many modern writers.10
We have said that Augustine nowhere gives us a systematic
presentation of his views concerning the state; and this, we
repeat, is true even of the City of God. But it was inevitable
that when the pagans took occasion from the fall of Rome to
defend their traditional polytheism, he should feel constrained
to consider that political event in the light of his own theological
principles as a Catholic Christian, and that in so doing he
should have to test the two basic historical realities involved in
the debate-the church and the state-as to their highest value,
their ideal significance, their relation to the spiritual world.'1
This is the explanation of that characteristic blending of
empiricism and transcendentalism that has given rise to such
varied and often contradictory interpretations of this work. On
the one hand, his whole discussion is conditioned by concrete
facts taken from the realm of ecclesiastical and political history;
10 See Flint, Philosophy of History in France and French Belgium and Switzer-
land, 1894, pp. 152ff.; J. Reinkens, Die Geschichtsphilosophie des heiligen
Augustinus, 1865; G. J. Seyrich. Die Geschichtsphilosohpie Augustins nach
seiner Schrift De civitate Dei, 1891; J. Biegler, Die Civitas Dei des heiligen
Augustirus, 1894; A. Niemann, Auigustins Geschichtsphilosophie, 1895.
11 Karl Holl, "Augustins innere Entwicklung," (in Gesammelte Aufsatze rur
Kirchengeschichte, Tiibingen, iii, 1928) p. l01f.; Hermelink, "Die civitas
terrena bei Augustin" (Festgabe von Fachgenossen und Freunden A. Von
Harnack zum siebzigsten Geburtstag dargebracht, Tiibingen, 1921), p. 311f.
on the other, his ethical judgments concerning t

uniformly determined by his habit of viewing th
the state sub specie aeternitatis. It is the clear re
this double truth that has convinced most modern
of the City of God that the fundamental contrast
is not, as most medieval expounders maintained
partisan purposes, that between the church and t
rather that between the civitas Dei and the civitas ter
transcendent organisms of which the ecclesiastica
organizations of this world are but partial and im
bodiments. It was thus that Augustine, in the
of his apologetic task, found it necessary to expr
concerning the state, and in doing so to relate his
doctrine of the kingdom of God.
We come, therefore, to the heart of our subjec
now raise the much controverted question as to t
of the term civitas terrena, with which Augustin
of his reflections on the state and on all sorts of p
taining to civil government. The name was obvio
by him as an antithesis to the familiar civitas Dei of
It may be well, therefore, to glance, first of all, a
more important traits that mark his use of this la
tion, especially in the work that forms our chief sou
In book xi, chapter 1, which may be regarded
troduction to the positive and constructive part of
the author refers to three passages in the Psalter
adds: "From these and similar testimonies, all of which it
were tedious to cite,13 we have learned that there is a city of
God."14 This earthly Jerusalem is later represented as the
"prophetic image" of the "supernal city of the saints,"'5 which
includes all-both angels'8 and human beings-who live "ac-
cording to God"l7 or "according to the Spirit."'8 In its widest
extent the civitas Dei becomes the universal and eternal king-
dom of God, embracing both the society of the holy angels
12 Psalm 87, 3; 48, 2; 46, 4.
13 Among these he may have had in mind Heb. 11, 10; 11, 16; 12, 22; 13, 14;
and Rev. 3, 12; 21, 2.
14 Seholz, op. cit., p. 71f., gives an extended account of some striking adumbra-
tions, amounting almost to anticipations, of the Augustinian antithesis be-
tween civitas Dei and civitas terrena, in Plato, Plotinus, the Stoics, Philo,
Hermas, Origen, Lactantius, Ambrose, and Ticonius.
15 xv, 1, xv, 2 (ii, p. 59, 60).
16 xiv, 13 (ii, p. 33).
17 xv, 1 (ii, p. 58).
18 xiv, 1 (ii, p. 4).
20 CHURCH HISTORY
that antedates human history,'9 and the commZunio san

as the company of the elect.20 In its earthly form the c
begins with Adam,2l "not, indeed, evidently, but acc
God's foreknowledge."22 From Seth the developmen
through the patriarchs and the prophets and, not wit
admixtures from the ranks of the ungodly, through
of Israel.23 Of special interest here is the inclusion, wit
society of the blessed, of the Erythraean Sibyl,24 "the h
wonderful Job,"25 and the Queen of the South.26
advent of the Saviour the civitas Dei enters upon th
stage of its earthly career, so that the church is now
identified with the regnum Christi.2 At the second
Christ, when the final judgment takes place, the eart
of the civitas Dei is exchanged for the heavenly, with t
fication of the saints and their enjoyment of the beatif
of God.28
Over against the civitas Dei Augustine places the
terrena. This binomial, it must be confessed, is no
defined. It is used with various connotations. Reut
ago referred to the unfortunate fact that German writ
monly employed the word "state" to translate civita
clearly showed that much of what Augustine says a
civitas terrena does not apply at all to the state as su
bach,30 indeed, is quite too optimistic in declaring that
error has since been universally admitted. But he an
Catholic writers, notably Seidel and Schilling,3 and m
19 xi, 28 (i, p. 502).
20 xx, 3 (ii, p. 556f.). How far Augustine's doctrine of predestination under-
mines the Catholic dog,ma of the church may be seen in Reuter, op. cit., p. 96f.
21 Not with Seth, as Reuter (p. 132) represents.
22 xii, 28 (i, p. 556).
23 xvii, 15 and 16, and the later chapters dealing with the history of the Jews.
24 xviii, 23 (ii, 285).
25 xviii, 47 (ii, 330).
26 xx, 5 (ii, 411).
27 xx, 9 (ii, p. 429, 431). Augustine gave up his earlier chiliasm and interpreted
the millenium as the present reign of Christ and his saints.
28 xxii, 29 and 30.
29 Reuter, op. ct., p. 130: "Die Wahl des Wortes civitas ist doch eine verhangnis-
volle geworden." Cf. p. 131.
30 Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, i, Freiburg, 1909, p. 332.
31 Bruno Seidel, "Die Lehre des hi. Augustinus vom Staate," in Kirchen-
geschichtliche Abhandlungen herausg. von Dr. Max Sdralek, ix, i, Breslau,
1909, pp. 5-14; Otto Schilling, Die Staats- und Soiallehre des hi. Augustinus,
Freiburg, 1910, particularly pp. 37-44, where he shows that Gierke (Das
Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, iii, Berlin, 1897) misinterprets the five pas-
sages from De Civ. Dei which he cites in support of his view that Augustine
denies all justification to the state per se.
Protestant authorities32 like Robertson, Scholz, Eckstadt,

Troeltsch, Hermelink, and Figgis, may be said to have secured
a fairly general recognition of the view that while an empirical
state may, according to Augustine, be an embodiment or form
of the civitas terrena, it is not proper to equate this term with
the essential idea of the state.
In trying to get hold of Augustine's conception of the
civitas terrena, it is natural to consider his use of the noun
itself, apart from any modifying adjunct. He defines civitas
as "nothing else than a multitude of men bound together by
some associating tie."33 Frequently emphasis is laid on certain
specific features of the unifying principle; such as "concordia,"
"than which," he says, "nothing is more useful to the State,"34
and the correlative terms obedience and rule.35 These char-
acterizations are helpful as far as they go, but they are not
sufficiently definite to distinguish the civitas from allied forms
of communal life; nor do they give any indication of the size
of the society to which they may be applied. As a matter of
fact, the word is frequently employed,36 as by other Latin
authors, to denote individual cities, city-states, and states in
our modern sense of the term-political bodies embracing rel-
atively large areas under a single governing authority.37 Civitas
thus becomes a synonym of the various words used in Latin to
denote the state as we understand it,-res pzblica, res populi,
regnum, imperium.
But it is only when we give due consideration to the relig-
ious and moral implications of the adjective "earthly," that
the distinctive traits of the civitas terrena become plain. It is
the special merit of Seidel's dissertation that he has so con-
vincingly proved that throughout the City of God the civitas
32 Archibald Robertson, Regnum Dei, London, 1901, p. 206ff.; Scholz, as cited-
though his judgment of Augustine s "state" is not as favorable as the
facets warrant; K. Eckstiidt, Augustins Anschauung vom Staat, Kirchhain,
1912, p. 7; Troeltsch, Augustin, die christliche Antikce und das Mittelalter,
Berlin, 1915, p. 12f.; Hermelink, as cited, p. 302; J. N. Figgis, The Political,
Aspects of St. Augustine's 'City of God', Lond., 1921, p. 50.
33 xv, 8 (ii, p. 73): "civitas, quae nihil est aliud quam hominum multitudo
aliquo societatis vinculo conligata". Cf. Quaest. ev. ii, 46 (Migne, P. L.
35, 1360): "rationalium multitudo legis unius societate devincta."
34 Letter 138, 11, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, i, p. 484.
Cf. De Civ D. xix, 24 (ii, p. 400): "Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis
rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus."
35 xix, 16 (ii, p. 384): "ad ordinatam imperandi oboediendique concordiam
civium. "
36 Eckstadt, p. 14, gives a list of instances.
37 xxii, 6 (ii, 563): "civitates positas sub iure Romano."
22 CHURCH HISTORY
terrena is essentially the societas impiorum. As in t

the corresponding civitas Dei, the spiritual factor is
decisive one. Hence fallen angels,38 as well as unre
human beings, may belong to this community. It em
who out of love of self live in contempt of God,39 all the
all "who in the uncleannes of their hearts mind earthly
The civitas terrena, therefore, is not necessarily an
state; it is rather a body of persons, whether angels
who center their interest in that which is purely transi
which, as compared with the substantial and perman
of the civitas Dei, is of far inferior worth, whatever be
under the conditions of the present temporal ord
"citizenry of the earth-born,"4 who "rejoice in th
felicity of an earthly community,"43 "who prefer their
to the Founder of the holy city,"44 who "live aft
flesh,"45 and "run riot in an endless variety of sott
sures."46 From these and other passages that might
it is clear that, contrary to Reuter's contention,47 it is
in the last twelve but also in the first ten books of the C
that civitas terrena denotes primarily "the society of
pious."48 The basal contrast is never that between the
church and some empirical state, be this more or less he
nor that between the church and the state as such, bu
tween the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena, as organic
of two opposite and indeed irreconcilable principles-
unbelief.49 Conscious of the peculiarity of his nome
Augustine says at the beginning of the twelfth book
38 xiv, 13 (ii, p. 33). Cf. xviii, 18 (ii, p. 277): "civitate, quae pro
angelorum et hominum societas impiorum est"; xii, 1 (i, p. 512):
potius civitates, hoc est societates, merito esse dicantur, una in bo
in malis non solum angelis, verum etiam hominibus constitutae."'
39 xiv, 28 (ii, p. 56): "Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam
scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero amor Dei usque
ad contemptum sui."
40 i, Praef.
41 viii, 25 (i, p. 363).
42 xvi, 17 (ii, p. 153): "'terrigenarum civitas."
43 xv, 15 (ii, p. 88).
44 x, 32 (i, p. 460).
45 xiv, 1 (ii p. 1).
46 i, 30 (i, p. 47).
47 Op. cit., p. 126.
48 There are, indeed, a few cases in which the "terrena" seems to be morally
colorless, signifying, simply, "on earth"; see Eekstiidt, p. 19f., and Seidel,
p. 13.
49 xx, 9 (ii, p. 431): "impia civitas . . . et populus infidelium contrarius populo
fideli et civitati Dei".
so far as I can, demonstrate that it is not incongr

suitable to speak of a society composed of angels
that there may properly be said to be, not four (t
of angels and as many of men), but rather two c
that is societies, one composed of the good, and the o
wicked, alike angels and men."50 Throughout th
is the governing idea.5' We shall cite only one mo
"And these we also mystically call the two cities,
communities of men, of which the one is predesti
eternally with God, and the other to suffer eterna
with the devil."52 As Hermelink says,53 the word
here as generally in Augustine, refers to the my
of holy Scripture and denotes a mysterious relati
cealed in the sacred text and not only justifying b
an allegorical interpretation. Essentially, therefor
terrena is just as much a metaphysical conception as
Dei. In the last analysis, it is the predestinated, t
the reprobate, that are designated by the two comm
There is, however, another aspect of the matter,
we now turn. The civitas terrena has always found
historic communities here on earth. While, theref
never, on the one hand, fully identify the whole wit
several parts, the civitas terrena with any given poli
zation, it is true, on the other, that states, whatever
may be forms of the civitas terrena. This isexpressly
stance, of Rome itself,55 the state with which hi
purpose required him particularly to deal. In th
the entire work, it is obviously the civitas terren
in the famous lines used by Virgil to set forth the
of the heathen Romans, "to show pity to the hum
crush the sons of pride."'5 We cannot dwell upon
50 F. Kolde, Das Staatswesen des Mittelalters, Teil 1, Seine Grun
Augustin, p. 6, misconstrues this statement, saying, "Dem ir
gegeniiber steht der himmlische, der sich selber weiter in zwei einander
entgegengesetzte Teile spaltete, den guten und den bosen." The error is the
more remarkable as Reinkens, to whom he refers, gave the correct rendering.
51 Cf. Bliemetzrieder, "Ueber St. Augustin's Schrift, 'De civitate Dei' " in
Theologische Quartalschrift, Tiibingen, 1913, p. 103.
52 xv, 1 (ii, p. 58).
53 Op. cit., p. 309. Seidel, p. 7, refers to the occasional phrase "secundum
scripturas nostras" (xiv, 1) as an equivalent, but this does not bring out
clearly the main idea-that of the more or less hidden figurative meaning.
54 So Troeltsch, p. 11.
55 v, 19 (i, p. 230): "quandam formam terrenae civitatis."
56 Cf. Holl, as cited, p. 100.
24 CHURCH HISTORY
of Augustine's history of the civitas terrena, but mu

ourselves with the mention of a few salient facts. O
interest is the first stage in the organization of this co
The civitas terrena enters the mundane realm throu
but Cain is the first to give it a social expression. Co
on Genesis 4:17, "And Cain builded a city," Augus
"Thus the founder of the civitas terrena was a fratricide."57
It is to be observed, indeed, that he does not say that Cain
founded "the state," a mistranslation frequently charged against
him;58 but while the remark contains no disparagement of the
state as such, it clearly shows that in his opinion the city founded
by Cain was a part of the civitas terrena. The terrene com-
munity, extending its sway from generation to generation, be-
comes inextricably mixed with its rival, the civitas Dei.59 After
the flood, which destroyed the wicked, the sons of Noah restore
the earthly city.60 In Abraham's time, says Augustine, "there
were three famous kingdoms of the nations, in which the city
of the earth-born ... chiefly flourished, namely the three king-
doms of Sicyon, Egypt, and Assyria." Of these the last was
much the most powerful, with Babylon as its head, the very
name signifying the confusion that always results from the
unbridled lust of power.61 When Assyria declined in the East,
Rome, like another Babylon, arose in the West.62 Augustine
is not lacking in appreciation of the old Roman virtues: many
of their wars, he admits, were just,63 and the people, if not saint-
ly, were at least less shameful :64 but he emphasizes the fact that
their city, too, was founded by a fratricide,65 and that its whole
history was stained with sinful excesses of every sort.66 One
after another, therefore, the great monarchies of the past are
pictured as exhibiting the characteristic God-defying spirit of
the civitas terrena. The state thus becomes identified, not in-
deed fully and absolutely but partially and relatively, with the
57 xv, 5 (ii, p. 64).
58 E. g., Eueken, Die Lebensanschaumlgen der grossen Denker, 1890, p. 282;
and Scholz, p. 99.
59 i, 35 (i, p. 51). Cf. xv, 22 (ii, p. 106), referring to Genesis 6:2.
60 xv, 20 (ii, p. 99).
61 xvi, 17 (ii, p. 153f.); cf. xvii, 16 (ii, p. 239).
62 Ibid.
63 iv, 15 (i, p. 165).
64 v, 13 (i, p. 218).
65 xv, 5 (ii, p. 64).
66 Books ii-v.
civitas terrena.6 From the historical point of vie

terrena works itself out in political states that em
that is contrary to the divine will.68 But in spite
we must, as Schilling reminds us,69 always take p
tain whether in a given context Augustine has in
we mean by the state as such, or whether-as will
be found to be the case-he is speaking of heathen
heathen state, or the societas improborum.
Augustine's conception of the nature of the sta
clearly set forth in two passages in which he d
length with the definition of a commonwealth given
of Scipio by Cicero in his De Republica. The first o
cussions is found in the City of God, book ii, c
Augustine here refers to Cicero's statements that
res populi; that "a people ... is an assemblage ass
common acknowledgment of law, and by a comm
terests;" and further, that a republic . . . exists o
is well and justly governed." And then Augusti
he intends in its proper place to show that accord
definition "Rome never was a republic, because tru
never a place in it." For, he continues, "true ju
existence save in that republic whose founder and ruler is
Christ." For the fulfillment of his promise we must turn to
book xix, chapter 21. Here Augustine, accepting Cicero's own
concession that a "republic cannot be administered without
justice," concludes: "Consequently, if the republic is the weal
of the people, and there is no people if it be not associated by a
common acknowledgment of right, and if there is no right where
there is no justice, then most certainly it follows that there is
no republic where there is no justice." But "justice," he says,
"is that virtue which gives every one his due. Where, then,
is the justice of man, when he deserts the true God and yields
himself to impure demons? Is this to give every one his due?"
According to Augustine, then, if supernatural justice, that is
justice in the sense thus indicated, were essential to a state,
then neither Rome nor any other pagan state ever was a true
67 Mausbach, i, p. 332f., gives three reasons for the fact: 1) political interests
and motives, if not restrained, lead to the sinful cupiditas and superbia of
the civitas terrena; 2) the ancient world monarchies reflected this tendency
in its heathenish character; and 3) the treatise itself was occasioned by the
defenders of the heathen Roman state.
68 Hermelink, p. 309.
69 Op. cit., p. 37.
26 CHURCH HISTORY
state. Many of his interpreters have, therefore, decla

he virtually deprived the state of all possible justific
ethical grounds.70 But Augustine gives the discussion
different turn. As Figgis rightly declares: "So far in
Augustine from saying that injustice destroys the b
commonwealth, that he uses the admitted injustice an
tion of Rome in the later days of the Republic as a re
absurdurn of Scipio's definition."7'
The fact is that our author specifically rejects the ide
vera iustitia must be an attribute of the state. He discards
Scipio's definition as too narrow to suit the historical facts, and
substitutes for it one of his own. It is this: "A people is an
assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common
agreement as to the objects of their love."72 Then he says:
"According to this definition of ours, the Roman people is a
people and its weal is without doubt a commonwealth or
republic." And he adds that the same is true of "the Athenians
or any Greek state, of the Egyptians, of the early Assyrian
Babylon, and of every other nation, great or small, which had
a public government."
What, then, are the characteristic traits of the state ac-
cording to his own definition of the term?
We need not dwell upon the requirement that citizens must
be "reasonable" beings, as distinguished from brutes. But more
significant is the matter of "agreement as to the objects of their
love;" for, as Augustine says in the immediate context, "in
order to discover the character of any people, we have only to
observe what they love . . . and it will be a superior people in
proportion as it is bound together by higher interests, inferior
in proportion as it is bound together by lower." Eckstadt73 has
been the first, so far as we have been able to ascertain, to give
70 See Seidel, p. 25, for an excellent summary of the various forms of this
basal error in the writings of Schmidt, Dorner, Reuter, Gierke, Kolde, Eucken,
von Eicken, and Sommerlad; the last-named going the length of saying:
"Einzig und allein die irdische staatliche Gesellschaft gewinnt fur den grossen
Kirehenlehrer Bereehtigung, die sich unbedingt und unbeschriinkt in den Dienst
der Gemeinde Gottes, der Kirche, und ihres Organs, des Klerus, begiebt."
(Die wirtschaftliche Thitigkeit der Kirche in Deutschland, i, p. 137). We
think that Seidel is justified in saying: "Alle diese den wahren Ansehauungen
Augustins widersprec'henden Behauptungen riihren von der verkehrten
Auffassung des Begriffs civitas terrena als Wesensbestimmung fur 'Staat'
oder 'nichtchristlicher Staat' her."
71 Op. cit., p. 63.
72 xix, 24 (ii, p. 400): "Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum
quas diligit concordi communione sociatus."
73 Op. cit., p. 29f.
due emphasis to this feature of Augustine's conceptio

larly as it pertains to the underlying concordia. We
allude to a few of the cardinal passages cited by h
community," says Augustine, "is nothing else than
nious multitude of human beings."74 Quoting Sallus
proval, Augustine declares that the "maxima conc
joyed by the Romans between the second and third P
was due to their "most excellent morals" at that time
later dissensions sprang from their discordia.5 With
of irony, he says that if the goddess Concordia, to
Romans built a temple on the very site of those sed
massacres, had been present in the city, "she would
suffered herself to be torn by such dissensions."76 A
already seen, Augustine, in his Letter to Marcellinu
the state as a "multitude of men bound together by
of concord,"" and adds that if the Romans had imit
quarrels of their deities, the state would have fallen to
There can, then, be no doubt, that concordia, to the
Augustine, is an essential attribute of the state. But
question emerges here, a question that still divides hi
ters into irreconcilable groups. It is the question of
relation between concordia and iustitia. We have seen that
Augustine was quite unwilling to deny statehood to the great
monarchies of the past, even though they lacked that true and
supernatural righteousness that gives to God, as well as to all
other persons, their dues. But can there be a state without
any justice whatsoever? Reuter78 was the first to insist that
Augustine makes a distinction between absolute and relative,
or what Reuter calls rational justice, and that Augustine main-
tains that every state, being in some sense an ethical community,
must have at least this rational or natural justice that admin-
isters human affairs with some regard to equity. Is not, then,
this concordia itself based on some sort of iustitia? The debate
turns chiefly on the interpretation of the celebrated passage in
book iv, chapter 4:79 "Justice, then, being taken away, what are
74 i, 15 (i, p. 27): "cum aliud civitas non sit quam concors hominum multitudo."
75 ii, 18 (i, p. 74). Cf. iii, 23 (i, p. 135): "discordiae civiles vel potius inciviles.'
76 iii, 25 (i, p. 136).
77 (See note 33).
78 Op. cit., p. 137f.
79 iv, 4 (i, p. 150): "Remota itaque iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna
latrocinia? "
28 CHURCH HISTORY
kingdoms but great robberies ?" Scholz80 says that th

pronounce a veritable sentence of death over the st
takes the ablative absolute as causative, so that th
is: "Inasmuch as justice (as a matter of fact) is lacking,
kingdoms are nothing but robberies." But Mausbach,81 Seidei,82
Bliemetzrieder,83 Hermelink,84 Schilling,85 and Figgis86 all take
the clause in a merely conditional sense. And unquestionably
the context favors this construction. Augustine is not here
speaking of that true justice that seeks the glory of God and
that only Christian citizens can exemplify, but of that sort of
equity or fair dealing which even criminals must practice among
themselves; for, as he goes on to say: "what are robberies
themselves but little kingdoms? The band itself is made up of
men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together
by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law
agreed on." Unless, therefore, there is this sort of natural
law, there can be no state at all.87 This justice may be rudi-
mentary and feeble-a vitium rather than a virtuls8--but
without it there could be no enduring society whatever. Justice
alone can secure the needed concordia. Augustine quotes with
approval Scipio's simile: "What musicians call harmony in
singing, is concord in matters of state, which is the strictest
bond and best security of any republic, and which by no in-
genuity can be retained where justice has become extinct."89
The state is thus, according to our author, a natural neces-
sity. No doubt, his severe condemnation of the civitas terrena
involves many a harsh judgment on those states, whether heath-
en, Jewish, or nominally Christian, that fall utterly short in
promoting the common weal even in temporal, to say nothing of
spiritual affairs. He is particularly opposed to the tyranny of
strong nations over weak neighbors. He allows that to a con-
siderable extent Rome built up her greatness by "honorable
80 Op. cit., p. 102. But on the very next page he admits that Augustine concedes
to the " Naturstaat" a certain "'iustitia civilis. '
81 Vol. i, p. 336f.
82 P. 20f.
83 P. IlOf.
84 P. 321. He thinks, however, that the possibility ought to be left open that
the clause may be both causal and hypothetical.
85 P. 40.
86 P. 60.
87 Scholz, and especially Troeltsch and Schilling, develop the historic ba
of Augustine's ideas on the lex naturae.
88 Seidel, p. 23.
89 ii, 21 (i, p. 80).
means."90 His own ideal, however, is that of grou

states, "rejoicing in neighborly concord;" and he
this ideal had been realized, "there would have bee
small kingdoms of nations in the world, as there are
small houses of citizens in a city."91
What has just been said suggests a further wor
to the origin of the state. Here, again, it is of prime
to distinguish between the underlying principle an
tion in history. The state, according to Augustine
ism that evolves naturally out of man's divinely
nature. The whole race was made to proceed from
we are told, in order that God might thereby show
He prized "unity in a multitude."92 Even more pow
other members of the animal kingdom, man is m
laws of his nature "to hold fellowship and maintai
all men, so far as in him lies."93 Marriage is the
the city;94 "the house ought to be the beginning o
the city."95 Like Cicero, Augustine makes the
organic link between the individual and the state
significant is Augustine's statement concernin
peace": "But in the family of the just man . .. eve
rule serve those whom they seem to command; f
not from a love of power, but from a sense of du
to others-not because they are proud of author
cause they love mercy."97 And this is precisely the
concord that ought to prevail in the state; for
"prescribed by the order of nature: it is thus that
man."98
But sin has disturbed what would have been the normal
relationships alike in the family and in the state. Augustine
says: God "did not intend that His rational creature, who
was made in His image, should have dominion over anything
but the irrational creation,-not man over man but man over
90 iii, 10 (i, p. 107): "Decenter his artibus Roma crevit."
91 iv, 15 (i, p. 164).
92 xii, 23 (i, p. 550): 'in pluribus unitas."
93 xix, 12 (ii, p. 375): "Quanto magis homo fertur quodam modo naturae suae
legibus ad ineundam societatem pacemque cum hominibus, quantum in ipso est,
omnibus obtinendam. '
94 xv, 16 (ii, p. 93): ' "quoddam seminarium est civitatis."
95 xix, 16 (ii, p. 383): "Quia igitur hominis domus initium sive particula debet
esse eivitatis.''
96 Cf. Schilling, p. 60.
97 xix, 14 (ii, p. 381).
98 xix, 15 (ii, p. 381).
30 CHURCH HISTORY
beasts. And hence the righteous men in primitive ti

made shepherds of cattle rather than kings of me
through sin came slavery as its just desert, together
lust of power'?? and the manifold evils of the civitas
But even so, not everything in a morally imperfect
essentially bad. Even godless citizens, as will be se
may do their part in securing and maintaining peac
though it cannot be the highest blessing of a comm
is nevertheless a real and valuable good.101 We may n
fore, regard the state per se as a direct consequence o
even if sin had not disturbed the normal development o
the organic life of the race would have found exp
communal forms. "For there is nothing," says Augu
social by nature, so prone to discord by corruptio
(human) race."'02 Occasionally, he speaks of a pac
cietatis;'03 but the emphasis lies not on the voluntary
of the action taken, but on the social instincts that d
the choice of ends. This entire natural order is groun
will of God, by whose providence all human kingdom
tablished.'04
Among the tasks of the state by far the most impor
that of securing and maintaining peace. And here, a
reminds us,'05 Augustine is an epoch-making thinke
modern man in his clear grasp of the inestimable cult
of peace. "For peace," we read, "is so great a good, th
in this earthly and mortal life there is no word we h
such pleasure, nothing we desire with such zest, or f
more thoroughly gratifying.""'6 Again, "Domesti
the well-ordered concord between those of the family
and those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concor
the citizens. The peace of the celestial city is the per
99 Ibid.
100 Augustine, like the earlier Fathers, accepted slavery as a historical fact; but
Mausbach, i, p. 327, goes too far in intimating, on the basis of xix, 14
(ii, p. 380), that he regarded slavery as "necessary."
101 Gregorovius, Rome in the Middle Ages, 4th ed., E. t., i. p. 169, says:
Augustine "considered the Empire of the Romans, with all its imperious maj-
esty, its laws, literature and philosophy, only as the accursed work of devils."
But Augustine says, on the contrary, that it was God who gave Rome its ancient
glory; v. 15f.
102 xii, 28 (i, p. 555).
103 Confessiones, iii, c. 8, 15; cf. De Civ. D., iv, 4.
104 v, 1 (i, p. 190): "Prorsus divina providentia regna constituuntur humana."
105 Op. cit., p. 51. Cf. H. Fuchs, Augustin und der antike Friedensgedanke, Berlin,
1926, p. 16f.
106 xix, 11 (ii, p. 372).
dered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and of

in God."'07 The peace that marks the blessedness
life is the secret of all happiness even in this life.
"the whole use of things temporal has a reference
of earthly peace in the earthly community, while in
God it is connected with eternal peace."'19
Peace in the state means, on the one hand, p
against external foes. Augustine is no pacifist. He
frightful evils of war, but at the same time he re
some wars are thoroughly justified. He says: "
victory remains with the party that had the juste
hesitates to congratulate the victor and style i
peace ? These things, then, are good things, and w
the gifts of God.""' In case of an unwarranted
without, it is incumbent on the state, in the very
peace, to defend itself.l' He praises the old Roman
real excellencies, even though they were not of the h
of merit, inasmuch as they were due to a love of e
and fame.12 Nevertheless, many of their wars
eous.13 He duly appreciates the benefits of the un
under Augustus."4 Even Christians may with
science serve the state in civil or military life."5 B
against the pride of dominion and the passion for
izement that have marked the expansion of some
vast monarchies, especially Assyria and-in its l
Rome itself.16
On the other hand, peace in the state means also the proper
regulation of internal affairs. The spirit of selfishness that
characterizes the members of the civitas terrena inevitably leads
107 xix, 13 (ii, p. 377).
108 xix, 10 and 11 (ii, p. 370f.).
109 xix, 14 (ii, p. 379).
110 xv, 4 (ii, p. 63).
111 xix, 7 (ii, p. 367).
112 v, 15 (i, p. 220).
113 iv, 15 (i, p. 164): "Si ergo iusta gerenda bella, non impia, non iniqua,
Romani imperium tam magnum adquirere potuerunt." Cf. i, 21 (i, p. 35),
concerning those who-in the biblical history-" waged war in obedience to
the divine command. '
114 xviii, 22 (ii, p. 284).
115 Ep. 138 (to Marcellinus), c. 15. Ep. 189 (to Boniface), e. 4: "Do not think
that it is impossible for any one to please God while engaged in active military
service. "
116 iv, 6 (i, p. 153): "Inferre autem bella finitimis et in cetera inde procedere
ac populos sibi non molestos sola regni cupiditate conterere et subdere, quid
aliud quam grande latrocinium nominandum est?"
32 CHURCH HISTORY
to dissension and strife, particularly with refer

acquisition and use of private property. Augustine
that earthly possessions are not in themselves evil
who live by faith understand the art of using arigh
that are necessary for this mortal life."' They m
propriety even pray for wealth, provided they purpos
it, agreeably to the will of God, for the benefit of th
men.118 But possessions involve legal rights, and w
give rise to litigation, only the state can determine
by securing "the well-ordered concord of civic obe
rule" through "the combination of men's wills to
things which are helpful to this life."'20 Reuter,'12 in
that Augustine had no firm conviction in regard to
value of private possessions. But Seidel 122 and Kold
pret him more accurately, when they say that while h
regard the ownership of private property under th
conditions of administration as an ideal system, h
cedes to it a divine origin and justifies it on the bas
rights. It is not the possession of material good, b
proper use of it, as if it alone were worth while,
evil into the world.'24 In any event, there is no ot
than the state for the protection of civil rights and t
ment of the mutual obligations of citizens. It is d
pointed to promote the common welfare by means of
and, when necessary, its judicial processes.125
Even, therefore, if the state had no further task t
of defending its inhabitants against attacks from w
of maintaining public order and tranquility within,
of inestimable value to human society. Dorner'26 m
the passage to which he refers in proof of his stat
Augustine condemned as sinful the seeking of eart
117 xix, 17 (ii, p. 384).
118 Ep. 130 (to Proba), c. xii, section 13.
119 Ep. 93 (to Vincentius), c. 12, sect. 50: "Every earthly possession can be
rightly retained only on the ground of divine right, according to which all
things belong to the righteous, or of human right, which is the jurisdiction
of the kings of the earth." Cf. xix, 17 (ii, p. 384): "legibus terrenae
civitatis, quae sustentandae mortali vitae aecommodata sunt, obtemperare non
dubitat. ''
120 xix, 17 (ii, p. 384).
121 Op. cit., p. 384.
122 Op. cit., p. 34.
123 Op. cit., p. 29.
124 Ibid.
125 xix, 5 and 6 (ii, p. 364f.).
126 Augustinus, 1873, p. 298.
for its own sake. For the context shows that the writer is not
speaking of the state as such but of the civitas terrena that is
guilty because of its "neglect of the better things that belong
to the superna civitas." He says explicitly: "But the things
which this city [the civitas terrena] desires cannot justly be
said to be evil, inasmuch as in its own human sphere it is itself
a good of a higher order."127
But Augustine does not confine the responsibilities of the
state to the sphere of purely secular and temporal interests.
According to his favorite analogy, the state is an enlarged fam-
ily and the magistrate ought to discharge the duty of "a pious
father."'28 The civil power must deal not only with matters
pertaining to law and order but also with considerations of
ztilitas and felicitas"2. But the secret of happiness, we are told,
is the same for the state as for the individual,'30 and as "those
who are true fathers of their households desire and endeavor
that all the members of their household, equally with their own
children, should worship and win God,"'8' so the state must give
due attention to the moral and religious welfare of its people.
As we have seen, the civitas terrena is blameworthy, not be-
cause it aims to secure material prosperity, but because it makes
this its chief and exclusive concern, and neglects the higher,
the ethical and spiritual values of life. Addressing its mem-
bers, Augustine says: "Depraved by good fortune and not
chastened by adversity, what you desire in your security is not
the tranquility of the commonwealth, but the impunity of your
own vicious luxury."'32 But in the ideal state the rulers will
promote the worship of the true God and exercise authority
"not from a love of power but from a sense of duty they owe
to others."'33 As Christians they will do what in them lies to
put an end to idolatry and obtain for their subjects the happiness
127 xv. 4 (ii, p. 63): "Non autem recte dicitur ea bona non esse, quae concupiscit
haec civitas, quando est et ipsa in suo genere melior." We follow Hermelink,
p. 315, and Mausbach, i, 339, in the interpretation of this difficult and much
debated passage. Cf. Scholz, p. 105, and Bliemetzrieder, p. 102.
128 Ep. 133 (to Marcellinus), c. 2 (ed. Goldbacher, iii, p. 82): "Imple, Christiane
iudex, pii patris officium.,'
129 iv, 3 (i, p. 149f.).
130 Ep. 155 (to Marcellinus), c. 7 (ed. Goldbacher, iii, p. 437): "Quoniam vero
te rei publicae scimus amatorem, non aliunde esse beatum hominem, aliunde
civitatem vide quam sit in illis sacris litteris clarum."
131 xix, 16 (ii, p. 383).
132 i, 33 (i, p. 50).
133 xix, 14 (ii, p. 381).
3
34 CHURCH HISTORY
of that people whose God is the Lord.'34 Accordin

author, "there could be nothing more fortunate for h
fairs than that, by the mercy of God, they who are
with true piety of life, if they have the skill for ruling
should also have the power;"'13 and "if the true God
shipped, and if He is served with genuine rites and tru
it is advantageous that good men should long reign both
wide."'36 Under these circumstances Augustine wo
be willing to abandon his ideal of a family of small sta
then the question of territorial size would be of minor
ance.137
From what has been said it is obvious that the state, ac-
cording to Augustine, has important pedagogical and disciplin-
ary functions to perform, and that in the discharge of
these duties it is necessarily dependent upon the church as the
divinely appointed teacher of pure religion and wholesome
morals. We thus come, in the course of our exposition of his
views, to the last phase of our subject, the relation of church
and state to each other. It is no doubt true, as Reuter reminds
us,"13 that the author of the City of God nowhere professes to
give us a special treatment of this problem in the sense with
which later historic usage has made us familiar. Nevertheless,
many statements, incidental though they are to his primary
apologetic purpose, and a considerable number of passages in
his Letters and especially in his anti-Donatist writings, enable
us to reproduce his ideas with a fair degree of accuracy and
completeness.
It is plain that Augustine writes as a Catholic Christian.
He accepts without criticism the authority of the emperor as
the head of a state that after centuries of conflict with Chris-
tianity had established the orthodox Nicene faith as the official
and only permissible religion. The civitas Dei, ideally con-
sidered, remains limited to the communio sanctorum as the
company of the elect, but it finds a real though imperfect em-
bodiment in the historic visible church which, so far as it con-
tains true saints, is even now to be identified with the regnum
Dei. And in like manner, when he deals with the given em-
pirical data, he either directly equates the civitas terrena with
134 Ep. 155, c. 2 (Goldbacher iii, p. 349).
135 v. 19 (ii, p. 230).
136 iv, 3 (i, p. 149f.).
137 iv, 28 (i, p. 181): "melius hic regnum haberent, quantumcumque haberent."
138 L. c., p. 151.
the existing empire or at least brings the two into such

connection with each other that it becomes imposs
to separate the idea from its concrete expression.'9.
Broadly speaking, the relation of church and st
termined, according to Augustine, by the principle
Jesus in these terms: "Then render unto Caesar
that are Caesar's and unto God the things that ar
But in practice the two spheres of activity and influen
be rigidly kept apart, and the Christian will be cons
vary his attitude to the civil power according to his
as to its conformity to his basal religious convic
those of his fellow citizens who may belong to t
improborum, he will yield obedience even to those
the realm that have no higher aim than the attainment
ervation of earthly peace and material prosperity. F
needs these benefits; and indeed he alone knows how to use
them to the best advantage as aids to the cultivation of the
spiritual life. He will do all he can to help even the non-Chris-
tian state to perform its legitimate tasks. But one thing he
cannot, because he may not do, and that is to obey any law that
conflicts with his obligation to render due worship to God. As
Augustine puts the matter: "This heavenly city, then, while
it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all nations, and gathers
together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling
about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby
earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that,
however various these are, they all tend to one and the same
end of earthly peace. It therefore is so far from rescinding
and abolishing these diversities, that it even preserves and
adopts them, so long only as no hindrance to the worship of
the one supreme and true God is thus introduced.14' In the
case of a Christian state-a state that regulates all public in-
terests, including morals and religion, by the principles of the
Gospel-the church naturally has a far more intimate relation
to the civil power and exerts a correspondingly greater in-
fluence upon it. In such a commonwealth Christians labor the
more hopefully for the recognition by all of the need of that
vera iustitia which, though not essential to the existence of the
139 Scholz, p. 1lOf.; Holl, pp. 101, 115; Robertson, p. 214; and Seidel, p. 44, note
1, as against Reuter's contention that the kingdom of God means only the
invisible communion of the saints and not the hierarchically governed church.
140 Luke 20, 25.
141 xix, 17 (ii, p. 385 f.).
36 CHURCH HISTORY
state, conditions its highest welfare by securing the s

of all its activities to the ideal purposes of the kingdom
By precept and example they will show that Christian
does no harm to civic interests but actually promotes
forging that bond "of concord, than which nothing
useful to the state,"142 so that, as Augustine says: "w
religion listened to as it deserves, it would establish, con
strengthen, and enlarge the commonwealth in a way b
that Romulus, Numa, Brutus, and all the other men of
in Roman history achieved."'43 Then would Christian
be truly happy, "not through ardent desire of empty glo
through love of eternal felicity, if for their sins the
not to offer to the true God, their own God, the sac
humility, contrition, and prayer."'44 They will be min
only in their private lives but also in their official co
the claims of the celestial commonwealth.'45 They w
their Christian subjects, be actuated, not by selfish m
considerations of worldly honor or power, but by a du
for the spiritual as well as the temporal welfare of th
are under them.'46 And in turn the principles of Chr
will promote loyalty to the state by making its citiz
ready and joyful obedience to all legislation that does
flict with the revealed will of God, and by disposing
bring their households into harmony with the civic orde
In general, then, the relation of church and s
Augustine conceived it, may fairly be described as one of
dependence and reciprocal obligations. Each needs t
and is bound to help it in the realization of its divinely
ed mission. But this broad statement falls far short
an adequate representation of his views. It throws no
the perplexing but important question that is sure to ar
divergent opinions lead to a conflict of authorities-t
tion as to which of the two is the superior power. So
142 Ep. 138 (to Marcellinus), c. ii, sect. 11 (ed. Goldbacher, iii, p. 136).
143 Ibid., sect. 10 (iii, p. 135).
144 v, 24 (i, p. 237), the justly celebrated "Mirror of the Princes". Cf. v, 26,
on the piety of Theodosius.
145 Ep. 155 (to Macedonius), c. 9, sect. 17 (ed. Goldbaeher, iii, p. 477): "ut te
appareat in terreni iudicis cingulo non parua ex parte caelestem rem publicam
cogitare. '
146 xix, 19 (ii, p. 388): "In actione vero non amandus est honor in hac vita
sive potentia, quoniam omnia vana sub sole, sed opus ipsum, quod per honorem
vel potentiam fit, si recte atque utiliter fit, id est, ut valeat ad earn salutem
subditorum, quae secundum Deum est."
147 xix, 16 (ii, p. 384).
olic interpreters,"48 indeed, assert that no such clash o

is possible, or at most concede that it can be due on
fault on the part of a representative of either si
stern facts of history made Augustine himself see th
tice his theoretical separation of the political and e
spheres could not be maintained, and brought him t
clusion that while the state had, to be sure, a limit
exclusive jurisdiction, there was a much wider real
ing both matters of policy and methods of adminis
which the state had to subject itself, for its own g
guidance of the church. We can only briefly ref
of the cardinal points in his treatment of this aspe
subject.
Writing as a member of that victorious church that had
not only destroyed countless idols but also witnessed "the high-
est dignitary of the noblest empire laying aside his crown and
kneeling as a suppliant at the tomb of the fisherman Peter,"'49
Augustine emphasizes the right and the duty of the civil magis-
trate to promote, by every means at his disposal, the moral and
religious welfare of the people.'50 In rather fulsome language
he specially commends Theodosius for the help he gave the
church in her fight against idolatry and against Arianism.l5l
It was his settled conviction that Christian emperors should
"make their power the handmaid of the majesty of God by
using it for the greatest possible extension of his worship."152
"Accordingly," we are told, "when we take into consideration
the social condition of the human race, kings, in the very fact
that they are kings, have a service which they can render to the
Lord in a manner which is impossible for any who are not
kings.",53
How far Augustine carried the idea that the state should
protect and promote the welfare of the church can best be seen
in his anti-Donatist writings. These are of prime importance
in this connection just because they reflect the development of
148 Seidel, pp. 50, 53; and, less explicitly and confidently, Schilling, p. 144.
149 Ep. 232 (to the brethren of Madaura), c. 3 (ed. Goldbacher, iv, p. 514). Cf.
Ep. 35 (to Eusebius), anno 396, e. 3 (Goldbacher, ii, p. 30): "Dominus . . .
qui iugo suo in gremio eius toto orbe diffuse omnia terrena regna subiecit."
150 Ep. 185 (to Boniface, "Concerning the Correction of the Donatists"), c. 2,
sect. 8 and c. 5, sect. 20 (ed. Goldbacher, iv, p. 7 and p. 18).
151 v. 26 (i, p. 240).
152 v, 24 (i, p. 237).
153 Contra Lit. Petiliani, ii, c. 92, sect. 210 (The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,
First Series, iv. p. 583).
38 CHURCH HISTORY
his teaching concerning the Catholic church and her sacr

As against the Donatists, Augustine holds that this
with her marks of unity, sanctity, catholicity, and ap
is infallible, indispensable, and permanent.154 There
heresies are to be condemned, because they are departu
the authentic faith of this church; and likewise all s
because they rupture that bond of love that condition
presses the union of her true members with Christ
one another. How, then, is the church to deal with these
foes of hers ?
In a tract written about the year 397, shortly after he had
become bishop, Augustine, addressing some Manichaeans in
his then customary tone of conciliation, says: "It is ours, ac-
cordingly, to desire . . . that we might attain our end in your
correction, not by contention, and strife, and persecution, but
by kindly consolation, by friendly exhortation, by quiet dis-
cussion."'55 And writing to Vincentius, a moderate Donatist,
he says: "For originally my opinion was, that no one should
be coerced into the unity of Christ, that we must act only by
words, fight only by arguments, and prevail by force of reason,
lest we should have those whom we knew as avowed heretics
feigning themselves to be Catholics."'56 With his profoundly
spiritual conception of true piety, with his frank recognition of
the freedom of the religious personality, and with his vivid
recollection of the difficulties he had himself experienced in
attaining the truth, he was in those early days content to be-
lieve that it was the divine will that "erring men," as he says,
"should be amended rather than destroyed."'57 But presently-
from about the year 408-having become convinced of the futil-
ity of trying to win his adversaries by peaceful methods, he
advocated, repeatedly and with increasing vigor and insistence,
the coercion of heretics by the civil power. He was, of course,
well aware that the Donatists had been the first to appeal for
aid to the emperor, that they had often done so, and that it was
154 Harnack, History of Dogma, E. t., v. p. 144f.; for the modifications occasioned
by Augustine's later emphasis on predestination, see p. 163f.
155 Contra Ep. Manichaei Quam Vocant Fundamenti, c. i (Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers, F. Ser., iv, p. 129).
156 Ep. 93 (anno 408, to Vincentius, one of the small group of Donatists called
Rogatists), c. 5, seet. 17 (ed. Goldbacher, ii, p. 461). Cf. Ep. 23 (anno 392,
when Augustine was still a presbyter), c. 7 (Goldbacher, i, p. 71): "cessabit
a nostris partibus terror temporalium potestatum; cesset etiam a uestris
partibus terror congregatorum Cireumcellionum: re agamus, ratione agamus,
diuinarum scripturarum auctoritatibus agamus."
157 Contra Ep. Manich., as cited, i.
only after such efforts had failed that they insiste

state should keep its hands off church properties and le
ious bodies unmolested.'58 He was also much influ
the fact that other bishops, who had begun to rely
were actually winning back into the church large n
Donatists, many of whom expressed their delight in
delivered from the terror of their own fanatical leaders.'5
Moreover, the violence of the plundering and murderous Cir-
cumcellions gave ample justification for the state to intervene
for the restoration of peace and order; though it is worthy of
note that even in the case of these atrocious crimes Augustine
admonished proconsuls to exercise moderation and under no
circumstances to inflict capital punishment.'6? But he wen
much further. He took Luke 23:14, improperly translated in
the Vulgate as "compelle intrare," as a sufficient vindication of
the use of force, even in purely religious and theological matters,
by the civil magistrate under the tutelage of the church ;1" and to
the same purpose, and with equally sophistical exegesis, he
exploited the account of Paul's "violent" conversion'62 and
other biblical narratives that seemed to him to prove the bene-
ficial effects of compulsion in the sphere of moral conduct.'63
It was under these circumstances, and by such questionable
methods of argumentation, that he developed his theory, as far-
reaching in its historical consequences as it is incompatible
with modern ideas of religious toleration, that the state, under
the guidance of the church, the divinely appointed teacher of
revealed truth, must perform a pedagogical and disciplinary
function that involves the use of the civil power for the con-
version of heretics and schismatics or for their adequate punish-
ment if they obstinately persist in their errors-a theory that
quite justifies Reuter's verdict, "Augustine is the first dogmati-
cian of the Inquisition."'"4
Taking Augustine's statements as a whole, we may say
that to him church and state are neither mutually exclusive nor
necessarily hostile to each other. They both have a divine right
158 Ep. 93, c. iv, sect. 12ff. (Goldbacher, ii, p. 456).
159 Ibid&, c. If., c. 17ff. Cf. Ep. 185, e. ii, sect. 7 (Goldb., iv, p. 7).
160 Ep. 100 (to Donatus), c. 1 and 2 (Goldb., ii, p. 535); Ep. 133 (to Marcellinus),
c. 3 (Goldb., iii, p. 83); Ep. 134 (to Apringius), e. 2 (Goldb., iii, p. 85).
161 Ep. 173 (to Donatus), c. 10 (Goldb., iii, p. 647); Ep. 185 (to Boniface), c.
ii, sect. 7 (Goldb., iv, p. 7); Ep. 93, c. v, sect. 18 (Goldb., ii, p. 463).
162 Ep. 173, as cited c. iii (iii, p. 641).
163 Ep. 93, c. ii, sect. 7 (ii, p. 451f.).
164 Op, cit., p. 501, n. 3.
40 CHURCH HISTORY
to be, and they ought not only to tolerate but also to

with one another. As regards the state, he certainly take
ing from it that is essential to its existence or prospe
does he question either its competence or its complete au
in the realm of purely secular affairs. Ideally, as any
would agree, its activities are salutary just in the pr
in which they enhance the common, and especially the
welfare of its citizens. From this point of view, ther
no doubt as to Augustine's real patriotism or even, in
some one-sided emphases on other-worldliness, of his
recognition of all those cultural values that depend f
realization upon the development and maintenance
righteousness without which there can be no civic con
peace.165 Though Christianity does not belong to the
of the state, the best commonwealth, Augustine woul
one that embodies the best principles and the highes
But this does not justify the assertion of Reuter,'66
state is a state only in the measure in which it subord
self to Christian norms, the true state the Christian s
generalization of Eckstadt'67 is much nearer the trut
cording to Augustine's own verdict, the state is the b
as much as the objects of its affection are the better.
Christian state is not the ideal according to its essenc
is the most valuable according to its content."
On the other hand, no fair reading of the evidence w
imize the importance of the many statements that fa
may be called the clericalist conception of the state.
of God must be supplemented by the anti-Donatist w
Letters, and other minor writings. It may be true, ind
in certain respects the church, according to Augustin
as much dependent on the state-for example, to take
cardinal instance, in the preservation of property rig
the state upon the church. Nevertheless, even in his
and in his own official conduct, the event clearly sho
civil magistrates were bound to take not only advice
commands from bishops; and though ostensibly this s
tion might be limited to spiritual affairs only,'68 yet pr
this spiritual realm was made to embrace not only r
165 Cf. Seidel, p. 26; Mausbach, i, p. 350; and Figgis, p. 67.
166 Op. cit., p. 142.
167 Op. cit., p. 40.
168 Seidel, p. 46, n. 3.
and moral issues but also, by the very necessities

all sorts of ecclesiastical, social, cultural, and hum
terests. Though Augustine personally was abou
hierarchically minded as any of the early Catholic
though in his latest anti-Pelagian works he dev
trine of predestination that really "destroyed the Ca
of the Church,""'6 nevertheless neither he himse
spiritual heirs during the next millenium fully
logic of his "evangelicalism." It was inevitable und
toric conditions that determined the growth of the p
his Pauline view of saving grace would be transfo
theory of sacramental grace that would harmoniz
dominant sacerdotalism of the age. Scholz,170 no
too far in declaring that "the whole program of
'priest-state' is contained in these deductions" fro
ciples underlying the City of God; but he is quite rig
"or at least it can be read out of them." For if th
Augustine holds, is dependent upon the church fo
natural iustitia by which alone men can fulfill th
obligations to God; and further, if the empirical c
kingdom of heaven, the civitas Dei, and the only t
wealth is that in which Christ is the ruler, and i
civil magistrate must use his influence, personal
and all his powers, military resources included, t
else to punish all whom the ecclesiastical authorit
termine to be heretics or schismatics, then certain
cratic state becomes an inevitable necessity, and it
will not stop short of regarding himself as king
lord of lords. We need not deny that Augustin
state more highly than did the ancient Christian
vindicated for it a considerable sphere of activity
had an independent right to be obeyed. But his vi
fication of the communion of saints, the city of G
dom of heaven, the numerus praedestinatorum, with
hierarchically governed church, was bound to ma
ecclesia in imperio give place to the later imperium
And looking beyond the Middle Ages and the R
169 Reuter, op. cit., p. 98. Cf. Harnack, History of Dogma, v. p. 166: "Thus the
thought of predestination shatters every notion of the Church." . "Not
only does the Medieval Catholic doctrine of the Sacraments go back to Augustine,
but so do the spiritualists of the Middle Ages, and, in turn, Luther and Calvin
are indebted to him for suggestions" (ibid., p. 162).
170 Op. cit., p. 108.
42 CHURCH HISTORY
we may affirm with Roberts

too much to say, we have in
theory of the Church as a S
equipped with all that is nece
politic, perfect not indeed in
bers, but in organization, ins
everything necessary to the c
171 Regnum Dei, p. 214
HeyJ
13 XLVIII
LIV (2010),
(2013),
KATHERINE pp. pp. 1–16
13–28
CHAMBERS DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2265.2010.00612.x
SLAVERY AND DOMINATION AS POLITICAL

IDEAS IN AUGUSTINE’S CITY OF GOD
KATHERINE CHAMBERS
University of Southampton, UK
The purpose of this article is to explore the meaning of domination and slavery in the political philosophy
of Augustine of Hippo (354–430), particularly in the major work of his later years, the City of God. It
offers an exploration of this aspect of Augustine’s thought in the light of relatively recent scholarship on
the meaning of these terms for political philosophy (in particular, the work of Quentin Skinner and Philip
Pettit). It finds that, in Augustine’s eyes, the nature of domination or slavery in the political sphere
differed from its nature in the domestic sphere.
The importance of the idea of domination in Augustine’s political philosophy is well-

known, but, as yet there has been no study exploring exactly what he meant by this term.
At the same time it is artificial to separate the idea of domination from that of slavery: for a
Latin author a master of slaves is a dominus; those who are enslaved are ‘dominated’.
Augustine used both terms of the political sphere.
One context for the present study is the work of Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit who
have highlighted the centrality of the concepts of domination and slavery for the history of
political philosophy and for contemporary political discourse.1 They have also proposed
a particular definition of domination and servitude – and of the injustice which these
involve – arguing that to be dominated or enslaved is to experience dependence on another
person’s will; in other words, to be vulnerable to an arbitrary power possessed by that
person. The essence of slavery is simply existing in a condition of such vulnerability, since
even a well-treated slave remains at all times dependent on a master’s benevolence for his
good treatment. The willingness of the slave to obey his master is not a relevant
consideration, since even those who willingly obey their masters are still in a state of
servitude.2
In Liberty before Liberalism, Skinner found that the seventeenth-century English
parliamentarians were inspired by the discussion of slavery and freedom in the Codex of
Justinian, and in the political writings of ancient Rome (in particular, the works of Cicero,
Sallust, Livy and Tacitus) leading them to define injustice in the political sphere as a state
of dependence on the will of a ruler: slaves existed in this state, and so, by definition,
freemen should not.3 By defining slavery as a relationship of dependence on another’s will,
the parliamentarians argued that when a king possessed any discretionary or prerogative
powers (even if these powers were never exercised), his subjects ceased to be free, and were
instead reduced to slavery. This allowed Charles I’s opponents to attack, among other
things, his claim to have the right to veto any legislation put to him by parliament: if the
king’s will was able to determine the law in this way, then his subjects were enslaved. As
Milton argued in Eikonoklastes, ‘If our highest consultations and purpos’d lawes must be
r The The
© 2010 author 2010.The
Author. Journal
Heythrop Journalr
compilation ©Trustees for Roman
2010 Trustees Catholic
for Roman Purposes
Catholic Registered
Purposes 2010. Published
Registered. Published by Blackwell
Blackwell Publishing
Publishing Ltd,
Ltd, 9600
Garsington
GarsingtonRoad,
Road,Oxford
OxfordOX4
OX42DQ,
2DQ,UK
UK and
and 350 Main
Main Street,
Street, Malden,
Malden,MA
MA02148,
02148,USA.
USA.
terminated by the Kings will, then is the will of one man our Law, and no subtletie of
dispute can redeem the Parliament and Nation from being Slaves . . .’4 The free were, of
course, subject to the law and to the powers of government; but when the king’s will was
effectively the law, or when the powers of those who governed were in fact discretionary
powers, then the free were not free at all, but enslaved.5
Pettit makes this ‘neo-Roman’ definition of servitude central to his own political
philosophy of ‘Republicanism,’ although he uses the word ‘domination,’ rather than
servitude, understanding these words to be synonyms: the definition of an unjust political
regime is one in which its people are ‘dominated’. In contrast, a just political dispensation
is one of ‘non-domination,’ which he understands to mean one in which people are
immune from others’ arbitrary or discretionary power.6
Skinner and Pettit’s definition of domination and servitude has been widely influential:
it has been noted that ‘in the last fifteen years in the literature of political theory,
domination has become a near synonym for injustice.’7 A study of Augustine’s use of
domination and servitude is especially called for given the new importance, and the
particular meaning, which these terms have recently acquired in contemporary political
discourse.8
In fact, the above definitions of domination and slavery carry significant implications
for our understanding of Augustine’s political thought, since Augustine used ‘domina-
tion’, and sometimes ‘servitude’, to describe what he defined as the legitimate nature of the
relationship between those who govern and those who are governed. Hence, according to
the definition of Skinner and Pettit, Augustine defended an injustice in the political sphere:
he held that a people was legitimately made dependent on the will of its ruler, in other
words, vulnerable to that ruler’s arbitrary power.
This conclusion invites the question of whether Augustine did in fact define domination
and slavery, when used of political relations, in the way suggested by Skinner and Pettit,
i.e. as dependence on another’s arbitrary power. The following finds that there are good
grounds for doubting that this was the meaning which Augustine always gave these terms
in the political sphere. It proposes that these terms in fact carried more than one meaning
in his lexicon: in particular, he distinguished two meanings of these terms, and on this basis
distinguished between the nature of slavery and domination in the domestic and political
spheres. To be dominated or enslaved, according to the first meaning, meant to exist in a
state of dependence on another’s will. Women, in particular, were reduced to this kind of
servitude to their menfolk. This was identical to the neo-Roman definition of slavery: a
master’s will was in effect his slave’s law.
In Augustine’s usage, however, to be dominated or enslaved did not necessarily refer to
a condition of vulnerability to another’s arbitrary power. There was nothing necessarily
arbitrary about the power involved in domination, since a law outside a master’s unique
power of determining could control when and in what way he was permitted to exercise his
powers. If every individual somehow had a role in determining the law according to which
a master exercised his powers, then no-one would be dependent upon another person’s or
group’s will. People might be subject to others’ powers, but these would be limited, non-
discretionary powers, which they themselves had a role in defining and bestowing.
Thus, according to the first (‘neo-Roman’) definition of slavery, a man was free while he
participated in determining the laws under which he lived, while a man was enslaved who
had no role in determining these laws. Yet Augustine also used ‘slavery’ and ‘domination’
of actions taken under laws which both parties, at least in theory, had a role in establishing.
Hence, his use of these terms was not as circumscribed as the neo-Roman usage: depending
15 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 3
on the context, domination and servitude could refer to the possession and exercise of
either arbitrary or non-arbitrary powers.
Hence, slavery and domination had a two-fold meaning in Augustine’s vocabulary; the
correct interpretation of these terms depended on the context in which they were used. At
the same time, although Augustine’s political philosophy did not put the concepts of
domination and slavery to exactly the same use as the later neo-Roman political theorists,
he certainly shared their view that one of the meanings of domination and servitude was to
exist in a state of dependence on the will of another. Moreover, he also shared their view
that (at least among men) such a state of dependence was an injustice.9
This article begins with a discussion of Augustine’s arguments with respect to the
injustice of domination and slavery, when defined as a state of dependence on another’s
arbitrary power. It then turns to the issue of how – given his defence of the legitimacy of
domination and slavery in the political realm – he managed to avoid the dilemma of
defending an injustice in political relations by offering an alternative definition of what it
meant to be ‘enslaved’ or ‘dominated’ in the political sphere.
Like the seventeenth-century English theorists, Augustine recognised that to make one
man dependent upon the will of another was unjust: this led him to regard the ancient
institution of slavery as an injustice. It was unjust because it violated the natural order,
established by God: God created all men as rational beings, which meant that each one
was capable of being his own master; to place one rational being under the mastery of
another was thus a violation of the created order.10 In contrast, such a relationship
naturally and hence justly existed between men and women, and adults and children, since
in each case there was an inequality in reason (where the weaker in reason was justly made
dependent on the will of the stronger).
Commenting on Genesis 46:32, he observed:
For the natural order among humans is that women serve men, and children (filii) their parents,
since this is justice, that the weaker in reason serve the stronger. Therefore, this is clearly justice in
domination and servitude that those who excel in reason, should excel in domination.11
This passage implied that the domination of men over men must always be unjust: men
‘excelled in reason’, in contrast to women and children, and therefore an inequality in
power could never justly exist among men.
Similarly, in Book 19, Chapter 15 of the City of God, he observed that servitude did not
exist ‘by nature’ among men: ‘by nature, in the condition in which God created man, no
man is the slave either of man or of sin’.12 God’s plan in creating men was that servitude or
domination should not exist among them: for this reason, he created them as rational
beings. As rational beings, men were made to dominate the irrational animals.
[God] did not wish the rational being, made in his own image, to dominate over any but irrational
creatures; not man over man, but man over cattle.13
In this passage, he alluded to the order which would have existed on earth, if not for the
Fall: this was an order in which there was no domination at all among men. Here he
implied that, on account of the Fall, domination now existed among men. The rest of
Chapter 15 attempted to explain why the Fall had caused domination to exist on earth,
both insofar as this involved a divinely-ordained ‘injustice’ and insofar as it involved
justice. Crucially, in this chapter, he did not clearly distinguish between domination in the
domestic and political spheres, since domination in each sphere was a consequence of the
Fall (although arguably in different ways). His comments elsewhere in the City of God,
however, reveal that he did in fact distinguish two kinds of domination corresponding to
these two different spheres.
When Augustine used domination and slavery of the domestic sphere, he understood
these terms to refer to a state of dependence on another’s will, and held that this involved
an injustice. Before turning to Augustine’s explanation of why God permitted this injustice
after the Fall, the following looks briefly at his discussion of one of the principal kinds of
‘just domination’ among human beings, a power-relationship which had existed on earth
both before and after the Fall. This was a wife’s servitude to her husband. His discussion of
the power of men over women both reveals that one of the meanings which he gave
‘domination’ was a state of dependence on another’s will, and reveals his firm conviction
that one person could only justly be made dependent on the will of another where an
inequality in nature, leading to an inequality in reason, existed.
As discussed above, Augustine declared men’s domination over women as just because
it corresponded to a natural inequality between the sexes (an inequality in reason). By
attributing the ‘justice’ of a woman’s slavery to her weaker reason, Augustine revealed his
understanding of the meaning of ‘slavery’ in this context. Women were the weaker in
reason, which meant, in effect, that their wills were weaker than men’s wills: they were less
able than men to resist the urgings of sin.14 Hence they needed, for their own good, to be
made dependent on men’s will: they benefited from this dependence and so it was just that
this inequality existed. In fact, the ‘naturalness’ and justice of the inequality between the
sexes was evident from the fact that it existed not only in the present, but had also existed
in the Garden of Eden: in the Garden of Eden, God had ‘created’ the woman Eve to be the
man Adam’s servant.
The problem which Augustine faced, however, with claiming that men were given an
arbitrary power over women because of a natural inequality between the two sexes was
that Genesis 3:16 appeared to attribute Adam’s ‘dominion’ over Eve to the Fall, and not to
any natural differences between them: it implied that Eve’s subjugation was simply her
punishment for her transgression in eating the forbidden fruit, rather than being
established by God for her good from the very beginning. Augustine, however, argued that
Genesis 3:16 should not be interpreted to mean that before she sinned, Eve was not
dominated by Adam:
For it is not proper to believe that before [Eve’s] sin woman was made in another way than (aliter
nisi) that man would dominate over her, and she would be to him as a servant. But it can be rightly
taken that this servitude [is] meant [by Genesis 3:16], which is of a certain condition rather than of
love, so that this kind of servitude may also be found [to] have arisen as a punishment for sin, [just
as] afterwards men began to be the servants of men.15
He distinguished between the ‘servitude’ of love (dilectio), which was found in the State of
Innocence, and the servitude ‘of a certain condition’ (cuiusdam conditionis) which came
about only with the Fall. Before the Fall, the woman’s experience of her slavery had been
different: the man and woman shared a perfect love for each other, and so, although the
woman was placed in a state of dependence on the man’s will, their love for each other
made their relationship one of mutual service, as implied by the commandment in
Galatians 5:13, ‘Serve one another (invicem) through love (charitatem)’ (which Augustine
quoted in the City of God, Book 19, Chapter 15). The man cherished the woman, and the
woman willingly submitted to the man. As a consequence of the Fall, however, their
relationship came to resemble the relationship between any other master and slave: the
17 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 5
woman no longer naturally desired above all things to obey the man, the man became
capable of mistreating the woman, and hence, her slavery became a hardship, the
punishment for her sin. Augustine’s point was that the Fall did not change the relationship
between men and women – since both before and after the Fall, the woman was rightly
made dependent on the man’s will on account of her greater irrationality – nor did it
change the purpose of this relationship – since even after the Fall, women were still
enslaved in this way for their own good – but it changed her experience of that
relationship: as a punishment for eating the forbidden fruit, God had decided that she
should now no longer willingly submit to the man’s power, and hence she should find her
servitude a hardship.16
He stated firmly that nature did not permit women to have dominion over men: if a
woman were ever to preside over her husband, this would amount to another violation of
the natural order, and the woman’s guilt would ‘grow’: ‘because unless indeed she serves
him, nature will be more corrupted and her guilt will grow.’17
These passages contained no direct references to inequalities in reason as the
explanation of Eve’s subordination to Adam before the Fall. Augustine merely insisted
that ‘nature’ formed the basis for a just division in power between men and women. It was
left to the reader to infer that by nature he meant specifically women’s naturally weaker
reason, recalling his claim with respect to Genesis 46:32 that the natural order demanded
that the weaker in reason served the stronger.
In describing men’s dominion over women, Augustine used domination and servitude
to refer to a context in which the woman was completely dependent on the man’s will: there
was a sense in which men possessed an arbitrary power over women; and hence, a sense in
which women were dependent on their benevolence. He revealed his understanding of the
nature of men’s domination over women by attributing this power to an inequality in
reason between the sexes, and by describing women’s servitude in the post-lapsarian order
as a punishment. Women’s reason was weaker than men’s, and hence women needed, in
certain respects, to be completely dependent on their men folk; yet in the post-lapsarian
order, loving service no longer necessarily characterised the relations between men and
women, and hence women experienced their dependence on their men’s will as a
punishment.
Turning to slavery or domination as it existed among men, Augustine recognised that
this was and always would be a feature of fallen human society: there were masters and
slaves, and kings and subjects, and the latter was as much a kind of ‘domination’ and
‘slavery’ as the former. Nevertheless, whenever he discussed inequalities in power among
men, he did not imply that these were based on a ‘just’ or ‘natural’ division among them:
no difference in men’s natures provided just grounds for the domination of one man over
another.18
At the same time, he accepted the existence of domination among men, both in the
domestic and in the political spheres. This acceptance demands an explanation. The
following looks first at his explanation of the ‘justice’ of this injustice in the domestic
sphere, and then turns to his comments concerning servitude and domination in the
political sphere. In a similar vein to his explanation of men’s dominion over women,
Augustine’s explanation of the ‘justice’ of domestic slavery reveals that he understood
slavery in this context to mean a state of dependence on another’s will.
Although he was sympathetic to the plight of slaves, he did not condemn the possession
of them as sinful, and he counselled slaves simply to endure this hardship.19 At the same
time, while he offered an ‘apology’ for the existence of slavery among men, he did not
claim that domestic servitude was just in the sense of being a true reflection of the natural
order. Rather, it was allowed by God as a punishment for sin: his explanation was that it
was a just punishment, but it was not just in any other sense.
It remains true that slavery as a punishment is also ordained by that law which enjoins the
preservation of the order of nature, and forbids its disturbance; in fact, if nothing had been done to
contravene that law, there would have been nothing to require the discipline of slavery as a
punishment.20
The justice of slavery as a punishment for sin lay in the very fact of its injustice, i.e. its
violation of the natural order. All sin was against the order of nature, and so the just
punishment for sin, slavery, was also against this order: it was a just punishment precisely
because it inflicted an injustice. This injustice lay in the fact that, according to the natural
order, there were no inequalities among men upon which to base slavery and domination.
Augustine’s explanation of slavery as a just punishment for sin meant that he was able
to dismiss the idea that there were natural inequalities among men which gave rise to a
‘just’ servitude, while at the same time, ‘justifying’ the institution of slavery found in his
own society.
Thus, he insisted that men were justly enslaved as a punishment for sin: i.e. they were
enslaved because of their ‘deserts’ (merita), ‘for it is understood, of course, that the
condition of slavery is justly imposed on the sinner.’
That is why we do not hear of a slave anywhere in the Scriptures until Noah, the just man, punished
his son’s sins with this word (Genesis 9:25); and so that son deserved (meruit) this name because of
his guilt (culpa), not because of his nature.21
He maintained that no enslavement could occur ‘if not for the deserts of sin’ (meritum
peccati), meaning if not for the actual sins of individuals. Noah, although tainted by
original sin like all Adam’s descendants, had committed no actual sin deserving of this
punishment and so the term ‘slave’ was rightly reserved for his son Ham and his
descendants, Canaan.
We have a witness to this in Daniel, a man of God, who in captivity confesses to God his own sins
and the sins of his people, and in devout grief testifies that they are the cause of that captivity
(Daniel 9:3–15). The first cause of slavery, then, is sin, whereby man was subjected to man in the
condition of bondage; and this can only happen by the judgement of God, with whom there is no
injustice, and who knows how to allot different punishments according to the deserts of the
offenders.22
Daniel experienced captivity as a punishment for his offences; the just God knew how best
to dispense just punishments for individuals’ wrong-doings.
Yet, clearly not every sin resulted in servitude and in fact some sins actually resulted in
the sinner becoming a master, since Augustine was clear that the ‘lust’ for power or
domination itself was a sin: those who sought to dominate because of their own libido
dominandi must themselves be sinners, and yet many of them succeeded in their bids for
domination. Thus, he asserted that men who desired to dominate others found themselves
in turn pitilessly ‘enslaved’ to this desire: ‘the most pitiless domination that devastates the
hearts of men, is exercised by the very lust for domination.’23
Moreover, he did not claim that slaves were invariably greater sinners than their masters
or lords. He understood that many devout men were made slaves,24 such as the prophet
Daniel, who was a ‘man of God.’ A person might deserve slavery, not on account of a life
19 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 7
of sin, but on account of one particular sin: God alone knew what sins justly deserved the
punishment of slavery and so his strategy in allotting slavery in response to sin was not
transparent to human beings.
Although in Book 19, Chapter 15, Augustine did not clearly distinguish between the
‘domination’ involved in domestic slavery and the ‘domination’ of a political lord, the
above examples were all examples of domestic slavery. Indeed, one of the over-all purposes
of the City of God was to explain to his fellow Christians why it was that God was allowing
them to be conquered and enslaved by a heathen enemy.25 He argued that the evident
‘injustice’ of domestic slavery in fact revealed God’s justice by finding that enslavement
could be construed as a just punishment for the actual sins of the enslaved. The punitive
element in slavery was not eliminated by a master’s benevolence, nor by the relative dignity
and comfort of a slave’s life, since Augustine, of course, believed that masters should treat
their slaves well and encouraged slaves to accept their lot. Rather, even if a slave was well-
treated and content with his lot, his servitude remained an injustice and a hardship. As
with women’s experience of their servitude to men, loving service did not necessarily
characterise relations between masters and slaves, given the realities of fallen human
nature: slaves were at their masters’ mercy and they had to suffer the uncertainty that this
involved. The injustice of men’s slavery lay in the fact that it was a violation of the natural
order: all men were capable of self-government by virtue of their rationality, yet as slaves,
they were made dependent on another’s will.
Hence, with respect both to women’s servitude to men, and men’s domestic slavery,
Augustine understood ‘slavery’ and ‘domination’ to mean a condition of dependence on
another’s will: slavery, in this context, arose where one person possessed an unlimited or
arbitrary power over another. His understanding of these terms when used of the domestic
sphere is revealed by his explanation of slavery, in the case of women, as natural and just,
and, in the case of men, as an unnatural punishment for sin. A person’s level of reason
indicated that person’s capacity to govern him or herself, and hence the extent to which
that person ought (according to the dictates of nature and justice) to be free from the
arbitrary power of another.
Turning to Augustine’s discussion of inequalities in power in the political sphere, he also
used the vocabulary of domination, and less frequently slavery, when he discussed the
relationship between political rulers and their subjects. It was not only ‘bad’ or tyrannical
rulers who ‘dominated’ or enslaved their subjects, but ‘good’ kings dominated too:
domination was the very nature of political rulership.
Thus, in Book 5, Chapter 19, discussing the difference between a king and a tyrant, he
was clear that both ‘dominated,’ but the tyrant ‘lusted’ after domination, which led him to
cruelty and self-indulgence, while a king, at worst, only longed for glory and ‘the good
opinion of enlightened judges’; so long as a king did not long for praise and glory
excessively, he would strive for domination ‘in the right way.’26 He also held that the power
of domination was only given to someone by God’s providence, quoting Proverbs 8:15, ‘it
is through me that kings rule and through me that tyrants possess the land’. Again, this
statement implied that both kings and tyrants ‘dominated’ their subjects. In Book 19,
Chapter 15, he referred to God’s instruction to Adam in Genesis 1:26, ‘dominate over the
fish of the sea, the birds of the sky . . . and all the reptiles that crawl on the earth.’ In
discussing this passage, he attempted to explain how it was that men now dominated – not
only over the animals – but also over other men, ‘as kings.’27
Augustine’s use of domination to refer to kingly power and his view of kingly
domination as ordained by God had a firm biblical foundation. His use of domination to
refer to kingly power largely corresponded to the biblical usage. For example, Genesis
45:26 described Jacob, who had been made the second most powerful man in Egypt after
the Pharaoh, as ‘dominating’ over the whole land of Egypt.28 Similarly, Joshua 12:2–4
used domination to describe the rulership of kings.29 Again, in 1 Samuel 9:17, when God
established Saul as the king of Israel, kingship was described as domination.30
However, other biblical passages implied that human beings could not legitimately
dominate each other: God alone was the legitimate lord or dominus, and so God alone
should dominate. This was the message of Judges 8:22 where Gideon rejected Israel’s offer
to make him a king by declaring that not he, but God, would dominate over them.31
Jesus also warned in Matthew 20:25–26 against the existence of domination among the
faithful:
You know that the princes of the Gentiles dominate [dominantur] over them, and those who are
great [maiores] exercise power [potestatem exercent] over them. Yet it shall not be so among you:
but whosoever will be the greater [maior] among you, let him be your minister [uester minister] . . .
Similarly, Luke 22:25–26 read: ‘The kings of the Gentiles dominate [dominantur] over
them, and those who have power [potestatem habent] over them are called benefactors.
But not so among you; on the contrary, he who is greatest among you, let him be
as the younger, and he who governs [qui praecessor est] as he who serves.’ 1 Peter 5:3 also
warned the leaders of the faithful against ‘dominating [dominantes] over those entrusted
to you.’
These passages left a degree of uncertainty surrounding the question of whether
legitimate government should take the form of domination: did they mean that, while there
were kings among the Gentiles (who ‘dominated’), the leaders of the faithful should not
aspire to kingly power (thus, affirming the link between kingship and domination)? Or did
they mean that kingship among the faithful should not take the form of domination? This
latter possibility would imply that domination was a synonym, not for kingship, but for
tyranny and oppression: i.e. that it was possible to be a king without dominating.
The latter interpretation of these passages, however, in fact would strengthen the view
that for a writer in the Christian tradition, political rulers could not legitimately claim
for themselves the same extensive, arbitrary powers which were possessed by masters of
slaves, provided that it is accepted that here the choice of the term of ‘domination’ was
intended as an allusion to the powers involved in domestic servitude. Here, it is possible
that Jesus was criticising Gentile kings precisely for their resemblance to masters of slaves,
i.e. that in these instances ‘to dominate’ was used in order to evoke an abuse of political
power: the implication was that the government of truly Christian kings should take
another form.
Nevertheless, this interpretation of both these passages and the meaning of
‘domination’ in the Bible is made problematic by the persistent use of this term elsewhere
in Scripture to describe the rule of good and bad kings alike. Thus, in the other passages
discussed above, domination was used without any qualification to mean legitimate, i.e.
divinely-ordained, kingship. For example, Gideon’s refusal to ‘dominate’ the Israelites was
interpreted as a refusal to become their king, so that this passage used domination simply
to mean kingly power; initially, God did not want kings to exist among the Israelites, but
later permitted Saul to rule as a king (1 Samuel 8–9), thereby establishing and legitimising
the rule of kings, and hence kingly domination, among his people.
Some of the ambiguity found in the biblical use of domination survived in Augustine’s
account. He always strongly condemned the desire or ambition for domination:
21 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 9
[the soul] thinks it has attained something great if it is able to dominate even its companions (sociis),
that is other men. For it is inherent in the sinful soul to desire above all things, and to claim as its
due, that which is properly due to God only . . . indeed, when it seeks to dominate those who are
naturally its peers (naturaliter pares), that is, its fellow men, it is an intolerable arrogance.32
The ‘lust for domination’ (libido dominandi) was the desire to appropriate for oneself a
power which was properly bestowed only by God. Yet this did not preclude him from
maintaining that God had now bestowed this power on certain human beings, so that now
human kingship rightly existed on earth. He condemned those men who sought to elevate
themselves to a position of domination, but he did not condemn the possession of this
power in itself, where a man could be taken to have humbly accepted this power from God.
Thus, Augustine – consistent with many examples of biblical usage – regarded kingship
as rightly a kind of domination, rather than looking on domination as just one kind of
kingship (an undesirable one).
Moreover, Augustine also regarded the condition of subjects as a kind of slavery:
The first just men were set up as shepherds of flocks, rather than as kings of men, so that in this way
also God might convey the message of what was required by the order of creatures and what was
demanded by the deserts of sinners. For it is understood that the condition of slavery is justly
imposed on the sinner.33
The patriarchs were not rulers of men, but of their flocks, since the order of creatures
established this inequality in power between men and animals, but not between men and
men. It was the ‘deserts of sin’ which created a need for the political hierarchy and which
led to the ‘condition of slavery.’ This passage, more than any other, is the basis for the view
that Augustine saw a complete equation between the power of kings over their subjects and
the power of masters over their slaves. This conclusion can be reached, not simply on the
basis of the use of ‘slavery’ here, but also on the basis of the justification which Augustine
offered for the existence of this slavery among men: slavery, meaning in this case
subjection to a king, corresponded to the deserts of sin. Hence, it could be argued that
subjection to a king, like enslavement to a master, was established for no other purpose
than as a just punishment for sin.
In Book 19, Chapter 12, he also explicitly referred to the subjects of kings as
experiencing servitude. A king was simply the man who had enslaved his own people, since
‘if [a man] were offered the servitude of a larger number, of a city, maybe, or a whole
nation . . . he would raise himself on high as a king . . .’.34
The question which these passages raise is whether Augustine perceived any difference
between the power of masters over their slaves, and that of kings over their subjects. The
current interpretation considers that he did in fact equate kingly power and the power of
masters: in the words of Weithman, ‘Augustine does not distinguish clearly between a
relationship which is specifically political and other relationships of authority and subjection,
especially the relationship between a master and a slave.’35 Yet Weithman’s case rests mainly
on the similarity of the vocabulary which Augustine used to describe both relationships (and
the fact that he mentioned the deserts of sin in each case): arguably, this alone is not sufficient
grounds for concluding that he saw the two states as identical. Rather, it is necessary to go
beyond the vocabulary used, and investigate in more detail what he understood the nature of
kingly power to be. This is what the final section of this article attempts to do.
In describing kingly power as domination Augustine assumed that domination ought to
exist on earth in the political sphere: political domination was divinely ordained; although
God was the only true dominus, for the present time, God permitted this power to be
10 KATHERINE
SLAVERY CHAMBERS
exercised on earth by men. Hence, there was a divine purpose behind domination in the
political sphere, just as there was a divine purpose behind it in the domestic sphere.
Thus, unlike the republican theorists many centuries later, he did not argue that kingly
domination must be brought to an end and republican government established in its place.
Yet he also did not argue that domination among men could correspond to natural
differences among them, so that it was both just and in the interests of the dominated, as
well as the paradoxical means by which a man could experience freedom. This poses the
question of what he understood as the purpose of kingship: given that he used domination
to describe what kings legitimately did and slavery to describe subjects’ proper experience
of kingly power, the key to understanding what he meant by these terms when used of the
political sphere is to discover what he actually thought the rightful function of kingship to
be and why he thought a people ought to have a king.
As mentioned above, one possible explanation of Augustine’s acceptance of domination
and servitude in the political sphere is that he both equated kingly power to the power of a
master over his slaves, and offered the same ‘justification’ of this injustice: i.e. men were
unjustly made dependent on the will of a king as a just punishment for sin. In other words,
contrary to the natural order, they were placed under the arbitrary power of other men in
the political as well as in the domestic sphere, and the reason for this was that such
domination or slavery was a just penalty for their sinfulness. This is one interpretation of
the passage in Book 19, Chapter 15 of the City of God, where Augustine wrote of political
and domestic domination without distinguishing between them, and wrote of the ‘deserts
of sins’ as the reason for subjects’ ‘slavery’ to their ruler.
This explanation, however, would imply that, in Augustine’s eyes, political rulership was
not established with the specific goal of achieving a better life on earth for subjects, but was
instead established for the sake of their welfare after death. Domination was the essence of
kingship, yet if by domination he simply meant subjects’ dependence on their ruler’s will
then, in essence, kingship was nothing more than a king’s exercise of his arbitrary will over
his people. Yet it was God’s purpose that kings should dominate their subjects, and so this
would mean that, in establishing kingly domination on earth, God’s goal was simply to allow
men to suffer this injustice in order to atone for their sins. This would imply that God had
not instituted kingly domination for subjects’ earthly good, e.g. as a means of defending the
peace, punishing criminals, protecting the community from wrong-doing, and promoting the
common good in other ways, since these are all earthly goals, directed at a better life on
earth. If a king’s role was meant to be indistinguishable from that of a master of slaves then it
followed that, like the institution of slavery, kingship was not established for the earthly
good of subjects, but for their eternal welfare. Any earthly services which kings might
perform for their subjects were incidental; they did not correspond to the divine intention in
creating kings and they could not be defined as the purpose or rationale of kingship. Of
course, there was an expectation that both kings and masters should look after their subjects
or slaves, but this was not the purpose or end of either kingship or the institution of slavery.
In other words, this explanation would mean that, in Augustine’s opinion, God had not
instituted political rule with any mundane goal in view at all, but merely as a means for
individuals to suffer as an atonement for their sins: God’s intention was that government,
like domestic slavery, would be something which men endured for the good of their souls; it
was not established with a view to promoting the earthly good of the governed.
Most interpreters of Augustine on the purpose of kingship, however, do not see him as
denying so completely any mundane purpose to government. In fact, Augustine is seen as
strongly affirming the necessity of government on earth. According to this view, he
23 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 11
attributed to government the essential purpose of imposing peace upon human society: in
his eyes, it was necessary as the means to achieve a peaceful earthly existence. This ‘earthly’
peace gave people the space to concern themselves with their spiritual welfare and ultimate
salvation; hence, after the Fall, God had established kings as a means of bringing peace
and order to fallen humanity. Otherwise, when humans sought to do wrong to each other,
they would go unchecked and unpunished.
Thus, according to Coleman, in Augustine’s eyes, ‘the political sphere undoubtedly and
necessarily exists . . . It is a means of order, preventing men from sinning further according
to their fallen nature, and it does this by punishing, correcting and holding men at bay.’
Thus, Augustine looked on ‘politics’ as ‘the means to achieve minimum disorder. And it
does this through political authority as imposition . . .’36 This political imposition was
necessary as the means of bringing peace and order to the earthly city (the city in which
those destined for salvation and those destined for condemnation were mixed together
during their earthly life). Likewise, Bonnor holds that, for Augustine, the state was needed
in order to achieve a limited degree of cohesion through coercion: ‘. . . because of man’s
fallen nature, society is always tending to revert to chaos and requires the coercive power
of civil authority to secure a minimal cohesion for the sake of the common good.’37
Similarly, in Markus’s words, for Augustine, the state was the ‘bulwark’ ‘needed to secure
society against disintegration,’ and thereby the means of achieving ‘some precarious order,
some minimal cohesion, in a situation inherently tending to chaos.’38 Finally, Weithman
describes Augustine’s view that ‘the most salient feature of political authority is just that
feature an authority would have to have in order to govern a society of people all of whom
are constitutionally prone to conflict: the authority to coerce them’.39
Setting to one side the assumption in the above comments – namely, that, in Augustine’s
eyes, fallen humans were incapable of acting otherwise than in a socially destructive way
unless restrained by the state’s coercive powers – this interpretation, by accepting that
Augustine attributed to kingship a specific mundane object originating in the divine will,
implies a very different understanding of the meaning of ‘domination’ and ‘slavery’ when
used of kingly power. The purpose of government was to ‘dominate’, but by domination
Augustine meant the coercion of subjects into conduct compatible with peace; and by
subjects’ ‘enslavement’ he meant their experience of being forced to comply with the
demands of peace whenever they were unwilling to do so. Hence, in claiming that there
ought to be domination in the political sphere, Augustine was not stating that kingship
ought to involve an arbitrary or discretionary power, or that subjects should be dependent
on their ruler’s goodwill; rather, he used domination in this context to describe a precise
power designated by God: it was the divine will that kings ‘dominated’, meaning that they
coerced their subjects into conduct compatible with peace.
Nevertheless, the above discussion is concerned with what Augustine thought kings
ought to do, i.e. with what he saw as the function of good government. Yet he also
described tyrannical rulers as ‘dominating’ their subjects: there seems to be little doubt that
what he meant by the domination of bad kings was coercion which did not serve the ends
of justice and peace, i.e. coercion which was in effect arbitrary in that it was not limited by
considerations of subjects’ good, but corresponded solely to the will of the ruler. The
question remains of whether he saw a divinely-ordained purpose in ‘bad’ or tyrannical
kingship, with the consequence that he defended kings’ possession of an arbitrary power:
they possessed discretionary or arbitrary powers, since there was nothing to prevent good
government from descending into tyrannical government, and tyrants, in turn, could not
be prevented from doing as they pleased.
12 KATHERINE
SLAVERY CHAMBERS
This view has often been attributed to Augustine, namely, that he failed to offer any
legitimate grounds for resistance to tyranny and hence understood kingly domination as,
in practice, an unlimited power, and subjects’ servitude as identical to domestic slavery. In
Deane’s words, Augustine thought that ‘all men must give absolute obedience to God’s
ministers, the kings and rulers of this earth, no matter how impious or wicked they may
be’.40 Similarly, Chadwick attributes to Augustine the view that ‘the follower of Christ
would render to Caesar the obedience of his body, and to God that of his mind and soul’.41
More recently, however, Burnell has identified passages in the City of God where
Augustine condoned resistance to tyrannical regimes. He argues that Augustine did not
insist that subjects’ civic duties necessarily included the tolerance of injustice at the hands
of their rulers. Rather, subjects had ‘a duty of trying to ensure that civil power is in the
hands of the least unjust persons or groups possible’.42
In particular, in Book 3, Chapters 15–16, Augustine implicitly accepted that political
opposition in the face of tyrannical rule was justified. Here, he criticised the Romans for
their imprudent haste in deposing and expelling their king Tarquin (whom they wrongly
believed to be guilty of the rape of Lucretia), but did not condemn the act of expulsion
per se.43 This passage implies that had the king actually been guilty of this crime, then the
Roman people would have been entirely blameless in deposing him.
Another passage occurred in Book 4, Chapter 5, and concerned Spartacus and the
gladiators’ revolt and rule. Here, Augustine had no hesitation in affirming the rightness of
overthrowing the barbaric government of the gladiators. He did not, however, propose as
the ‘just’ grounds for their overthrow the fact that they themselves were usurpers and
hence not the divinely-sanctioned rulers: in fact, he argued that despite their lowly origins
and short-lived rule, they should be regarded as kings.44 Yet he left no doubt that he
considered their eventual defeat and overthrow as a good thing, on the grounds of the
extreme cruelty and immorality of their conduct as rulers.
In another place, Augustine drew an analogy between civil revolt against a king and the
monster Cacus’s experience of the revolt of his body in response to its desires, such as
hunger. He noted that Cacus (who, according to this metaphor, was the equivalent of the
king) was driven to respond in order to appease his bodily needs and hence preserve his
life. By this analogy, the implication was that there were certain circumstances in which
civil rebellion was justified, i.e. there were circumstances in which citizens were justified,
for everybody’s sake, in forcing their rulers to respond to their will.45
These views are supported by Augustine’s conviction – expressed, for example, in Book
4, Chapter 15 – that one nation could legitimately invade and overthrow the government
of another as a moral necessity (‘the empire would have been small indeed, if neighbouring
peoples had been peaceable, had always acted with justice, and had never provoked attack
by any wrong-doing’).46 Here, he justified the ‘stern necessity’ of invasion on the grounds
that ‘it would be worse that the unjust should lord it over the just’. Similarly, in Book 19,
Chapter 7, he defined the just war as one which changed a society in the direction of justice
(‘for it is the injustice of the opposing side that lays on the wise man the duty of waging
wars; and this injustice is assuredly to be deplored by a human being . . .’).47
These passages indicate that Augustine did not expect subjects’ to offer unconditional
obedience to their rulers: in the face of injustice, resistance was permissible and rulers
could be forced instead to obey the will of their people. Thus, the ‘domination’ which
Augustine regarded as a king’s rightful function referred to a power which did not
correspond to the king’s will alone: kingly power was seen as instituted by God with a
specific mundane goal in view, namely, the maintenance of peace and subjects’ welfare,
25 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 13
with the consequence that good government meant rule directed towards these ends, and
no others. There was another sense in which a king’s will was not law: his subjects were
entitled to resist any injustices which he perpetrated. God did not expect subjects to have
no recourse when faced with tyrannical leaders; submission to bad government did not
necessarily advance any part of God’s purpose for the faithful.
Thus, although Augustine used servitude and domination to refer to kingly power, he
did not thereby equate the power of kings to the power of masters over their slaves.
Augustine understood that domestic slaves and women were dependent on the will of their
masters or menfolk: this was the meaning of their slavery and domination. It involved an
arbitrary power in the sense that masters were permitted the unrestricted exercise of their
wills. Kingly domination, however, referred to a non-arbitrary power since there were
restrictions on kings’ exercise of their wills, restrictions which subjects themselves had a
role in determining: kings were permitted to coerce their subjects into conduct compatible
with peace and the common good, and nothing more; this is what it meant to be
‘dominated’ by a king. To exist in a state of political domination or political servitude
meant to be vulnerable to the exercise of this power by a king, not to the arbitrary exercise
of a king’s will. God permitted this kind of domination in the political sphere; the kind of
domination which was not permissible in this sphere was that possessed by masters over
their slaves, i.e. the kind of power which a tyrant sought to wield over his people when he
attempted to rule without reference to peace and justice. Here, this article has made use of
the work of Burnell, who has pointed to passages in the City of God where Augustine was
not critical of civil rebellion and the overthrow of tyrants. At the same time, Augustine
offered a consolation to those who found themselves in the clutches of a tyrannical ruler
too powerful to be overthrown or effectively resisted: such people, who were genuinely
reduced to a servitude identical to domestic slavery, should recognise and take comfort in
the knowledge that this misfortune was God’s just punishment for their sins.
Thus, although Augustine described kingship as a kind of domination, for him,
domination in the political sphere did not refer to a discretionary power. In other words,
although he used ‘domination’ and ‘slavery’ to describe the power of both good and bad
kings, Augustine did not thereby consider that subjects rightly existed in a state of
dependence on their king’s will. In fact, he understood as well as the seventeenth-century
‘neo-Roman’ political theorists the injustice of placing one man in a state of dependence on
the arbitrary power of another. This state of dependence could only justly exist where an
inequality in reason naturally existed: hence, it justly existed between women and men, and
between children and parents. Where a man was reduced to being the domestic slave of
another man, Augustine held that this injustice was permitted by God as a punishment for
sin. In this way, he gave domestic slavery an other-worldly purpose; in contrast, the primary
purpose of kingship was a mundane one: kings also existed in response to sin, but their role
was to respond to a limited range of wrongful actions, namely ones which violated laws
designed to preserve peace and justice. This was what it meant for a king to ‘dominate’, and
this was the limit of subjects’ experience of servitudo at the hands of their political rulers.
Notes
1 Q. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and P. Pettit,
Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
2 Skinner insists that coercion is not a necessary component of the neo-Roman definition of slavery: ‘The thesis on
which the neo-roman writers chiefly insist is that it is never necessary to suffer this kind of overt coercion in order to
14 KATHERINE
SLAVERY CHAMBERS
forfeit your civil liberty. You will also be rendered unfree if you merely fall into a condition of political subjection or
dependence, thereby leaving yourself open to the danger of being forcibly or coercively deprived by your government of
your life, liberty or estates,’ Liberty before Liberalism, pp. 69–70. The neo-Roman definition of slavery simply explains
that a person is a slave if he or she is ‘within’ the arbitrary power of another person. For example, Algernon Sidney, a
proponent of the neo-Roman view, wrote in his Discourses: ‘liberty solely consists in an independency upon the will of
another, and by the name of slave we understand a man who can neither dispose of his person nor goods, but enjoys all
at the will of his master . . .’ (quoted by Skinner, pp. 71–72).
3 Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, pp. 36–41.
4 Quoted in Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, pp. 48–49. See also the quote from Livy, pp. 43–44, who defined a
free state as one in which ‘the imperium of the laws is greater than that of any men’.
5 Skinner points out that neo-Roman theorists consider that people will be free in a republic where they are
governed by the will of the body politic, meaning the sum of the wills of each individual citizen (Liberty before
Liberalism, pp. 28–29). However, he states that these theorists accepted that, in practice, this would correspond to the
will of the majority. In contrast, a modern theory of republicanism might want to use this definition of freedom and
slavery to be critical of the reality of modern democracies: it might want to insist on the much stronger conclusion that
in a true democracy, the law must be determined by the freely-given consent of every member, since to be dependent on
the will of the majority is also a kind of slavery. It is also open to modern republicanism to draw a further conclusion
about inequalities in power in general, i.e. beyond the sphere of the institutions of government: for example, if
inequalities in wealth bring dependence on another’s will, then inequalities in wealth are also a source of slavery and
injustice. Again, this was certainly not a conclusion drawn by the Roman and neo-Roman theorists, for whom the
protection of private property was a core principle (see E. Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 16–17, for the place of private property in the Roman tradition).
6 P. Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, p. 21–23, 31f.
7 D. Allen, ‘Invisible citizens: political exclusion and domination in Arendt and Ellison,’ in M. S. Willams and S.
Macedo, eds., Political Exclusion and Domination (New York and London: New York University Press, 2005), p. 29.
8 There have already been some investigations of Skinner and Pettit’s idea of ‘Republicanism’ and the view that
this was a Roman idea which was revived by the humanists of the seventeenth century. Such a view implies that
republican ideals were not present in medieval political thought and even that these ideals were incompatible with the
Christian world-view. See A. Black, ‘Christianity and Republicanism: from St. Cyprian to Rousseau’, American
Political Science Review 91 (1997), pp. 647–56. Black argues that not only was republicanism present in the Middle
Ages, but it was also considered to be compatible with both monarchy and Christianity. See also C. Nederman, ‘The
Puzzling Case of Christianity and Republicanism: A comment on Black’, American Political Science Review 92 (1998),
pp. 913–18 and A. Black, ‘Christianity and Republicanism: A Response to Nederman’, American Political Science
Review 92 (1998), pp. 919–21.
9 As a result, this aspect of Augustine’s political thought can be distinguished from another tradition in European
political philosophy, which was inspired by the Greek – as opposed to the Roman – view of domination and slavery,
and which consequently considered that it was possible for one man to be justly reduced to a state of dependence on the
will of another man. Eric Nelson has studied this Greek view of slavery in the writings of a number of sixteenth-century
English political theorists, such as Thomas More and James Harringdon. Their view was that human beings are
paradoxically ‘free’ only when they are enslaved, i.e. only when they depend upon and are guided by the wills of the
‘natural aristocracy’ of their intellectual and moral superiors, since this frees them from a deeper servitude to their
passions. E. Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought, pp. 14–15. In fact, this ‘neo-Greek’ tradition was
arguably current in European political philosophy much earlier than the sixteenth century. Thomas Aquinas, for
instance, also made use of Aristotle to defend the idea of a just enslavement and a just domination. See Summa
Theologiae, ed. E. Hill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), vol. 13, Part 1a, Distinction 96, Article 4, pp.
132–4. See also K. Archibald, ‘The Concept of Social Hierarchy in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas’, The Historian
12 (1949), pp. 48–62; and M.C. Murphy, ‘Consent, Custom and the Common Good in Aquinas’s account of Political
Authority’, The Review of Politics 59 (1997), pp. 323–50.
10 This point has already been made by R. A. Markus, who observes that in Augustine’s view, ‘political authority is
[not] based on a natural order of subjection among men.’ R.A. Markus, ‘Two Conceptions of Political Authority:
Augustine, De Ciuitate Dei, XIX. 14–15, and Some Thirteenth-Century Interpretations’, The Journal of Theological
Studies 16 (1965), pp. 68–100, p. 74. Markus, however, considers that Augustine equated the power of kings over their
subjects with that of masters over their slaves (‘the terms in which Augustine came to formulate his views on politically
organized society . . . were those which he thought appropriate to the treatment of the institution of slavery,’ p. 81).
While I accept that Augustine used the same terminology to describe both institutions, my purpose in this article is to
explore whether in fact he differentiated between the kind of power involved in each. For a view similar to Markus’s,
see also P. J. Weithman, ‘Augustine’s political philosophy’ in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. E. Stump
and N. Kretzmann, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 353–76.
11 Quaestionum in Heptateuchum, ed. J. Fraipont (Turnhout: Brepols, 1958), Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina
45, Book 1, Question 153, p. 59: ‘. . . est etiam ordo naturalis in hominibus, ut seruiant feminae uiris et filii parentibus,
quia et illic haec iustitia est, ut infirmior ratione seruiat fortiori. Haec igitur in dominationibus et seruitutibus clara
iustitia est, ut qui excellunt ratione, excellant dominatione’.
12 De Ciuitate Dei, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb (Turnhout: Brepols, 1955), Corpus Christianorum : Series Latina
48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 683: ‘nullus autem natura, in qua prius deus hominem condidit, seruus est hominis aut
27 SLAVERY AND
CHAMBERS 15
peccati’. All English translations are taken from St. Augustine. Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, trans. H.
Bettenson (London: Penguin, 2003), quoting here from p. 872 (referred to in what follows as Eng. Trans.).
inrationabilibus dominari; non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori’. Eng. Trans. p. 872.
14 Arguably, it was not a lack of intellectual sophistication which justly placed the woman within the man’s power:
rather, it was women’s lack of self-government – which implied an inferior moral knowledge, but not necessarily an
inferior intellect, to men’s – that made it just and beneficial for them to be placed under the control of men. Milbank,
for example, interprets Augustine’s idea of reason to mean self-government, ‘the subordination of passion and power
to reason’ where ‘passion is characteristically encoded as ‘‘female,’’ and reason as ‘‘male’’.’ J. Milbank, ‘Sacred Triads,
Augustine and the Indo-European Soul,’ in Augustine and His Critics. Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner, ed. R.
Dodaro and G. Lawless, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 85.
15 De Genesi ad Litteram, ed. J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 34, column 450: ‘Neque enim et ante peccatum, aliter
factam fuisse decet credere mulierem, nisi ut uir ei dominaretur, et ad eum ipsa seruiendo conuerteretur. Sed recte accipi
potest hanc seruitutem significatam, quae cuiusdam conditionis est potius quam dilectionis, ut etiam ipsa talis seruitus,
qua homines hominibus postea esse serui coeperunt, de poena peccati reperiatur exorta . . .’. This passage is also
discussed by Markus, ‘Two Conceptions of Political Authority’, pp. 74–75.
16 K. E. Borresen does not discuss the nature of the domination which man exercised over woman in the State of
Innocence. She holds that Augustine was ‘evasive’ on this point: ‘he avoids a clear distinction . . . between the
subordination, which is part of the order of creation, and the domination, which is regarded as a punishment of sin. He
seems to affirm that this subordination indeed belongs to the order of creation, but that it is only mentioned after the
Fall when judgement is being passed . . .’ K. E. Borresen, Subordination and Equivalence. The Nature and Role of
Woman in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas (Washington: University Press of America, 1968, English trans. 1981), pp.
62–3.
17 De Genesi ad Litteram, P.L. 34:450: ‘. . . Dicit quidem Apostolus, ‘Per charitatem seruite inuicem’ (Gal. 5.13); sed
nequaquam diceret, Inuicem dominiamini. Possunt itaque conjuges per charitatem seruire inuicem; sed mulierem non
permittit Apostolus dominari in uirum (I Tim. 2.12). Hoc enim uiro potius Dei sententia detulit, et maritum habere
dominum meruit mulieris non natura, sed culpa: quod tamen nisi seruetur, deprauabitur amplius natura, et augebitur
culpa’.
18 As mentioned above (note 12), this point has already been made by a number of commentators, including
Markus and Weithman. Rist also agrees that, according to Augustine, ‘there is no ‘natural’ reason (it is only due to the
meaningless accidents of fallen society) why a particular master should be a master rather than a slave, and vice versa.’
J. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 237, Markus, ‘Two
Conceptions of Political Authority’, p. 74, and Weithman, ‘Augustine’s political philosophy’, p. 238.
19 This view, of course, had a firm biblical foundation: the Apostle Paul advised slaves to submit to their masters
(Ephesians 6:5, Colossians 3:22, 1 Timothy 6:1, Titus 2:9).
20 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 682: ‘Verum et poenalis seruitus ea lege ordinatur, quae
naturalem ordinem conseruari iubet, perturbari uetat; quia si contra eam legem non esset factum, nihil esset poenali
seruitute cohercendum’. Eng. Trans. p. 875.
21 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 682: ‘Condicio quippe seruitutis iure intellegitur inposita
peccatori. Proinde nusquam scripturarum legimus seruum, antequam hoc uocabulo Noe iustus peccatum filii
uindicaret. Nomen itaque istud culpa meruit, non natura . . .’. Eng. Trans. p. 873.
22 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 682: ‘Testis est homo Dei Daniel, cum in capiuitate positus
peccata sua et peccata populi sui confitetur Deo et hanc esse causam illius captiuitatis pio dolore testator. Prima ergo
seruitutis causa peccatum est, ut homo homini condicionis uinculo subderetur; quod non fit nisi Deo iudicante, apud
quem non est iniquitas et nouit diuersas poenas meritis distribuere delinquentium’. Eng. Trans. pp. 872–73.
23 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 683: ‘et utique felicius seruitur homini, quam libidini, cum
saeuissimo dominatu uastet corda mortalium, ut alias omittam, libido ipsa dominandi’.
24 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 15, p. 683: ‘multi quidem religiosi dominis iniquis’.
25 For a discussion of the sense in which the City of God is an apologia for Christianity written with an awareness of
the growing hostility towards Christianity among Augustine’s fellow Romans, see G. R. Evans, ‘Introduction’ in St.
Augustine. Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, trans. H. Bettenson (London: Penguin, 2003), pp. xv–xvi and
xxxiv.
26 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 5, Chapter 19, p. 155: ‘interest sane inter cupiditatem humanae gloriae et
cupiditatem dominationis. Nam licet procliue sit, ut, qui humana gloria nimium delectatur, etiam dominari ardenter
affectet, tamen qui ueram licet humanarum laudum gloriam concupiscunt, dant operam bene iudicantibus non
displicere. Sunt enim multa in moribus bona, de quibus multi bene iudicant, quamuis ea multi habeant; per ea bona
morum nituntur ad gloriam et imperium uel dominationem, de quibus ait Sallustius: ‘‘sed ille uera uia nititur’’’. Eng.
Trans. pp. 212–213.
uolatilium caeli et omnium rependtium, quae sunt super terram. Rationalem factum ad imaginem suam noluit
nisi inrationabilibus dominari; non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori. Inde primi iusti pastores pecorum
magis quam reges hominum constituti sunt, ut etiam sic insinuaret Deus, quid postulet ordo creaturarum’. Eng. Trans.
p. 872.
16 KATHERINE
SLAVERY CHAMBERS
28 ‘et ipse dominatur in omni terra Aegypti.’ Quotes are taken from the Vulgate (editio vulgata), although Augustine
used one of the Old Latin versions, rather than the Vulgate translation of Saint Jerome which was only completed
c.404.
29 ‘Sehon rex Amorrhaeorum, qui habitavit in Hesebon, dominatus est ab Aroer . . . Terminus Og regis Basan, de
reliquiis Raphaim, qui habitavit in Astaroth, et in Edrai, et dominatus est in monte Hermon . . .’
30 ‘Cumque aspexisset Samuel Saulem, Dominus dixit ei : Ecce vir quem dixeram tibi : iste dominabitur populo
meo.’
31 ‘Non dominabor vestri, nec dominabitur in vos filius meus, sed dominabitur vobis Dominus.’
32 De Doctrina Christiana, ed. J. Martin (Turnhout: Brepols, 1962), Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina 32, Book
1, Chapter 23, p. 25: ‘[animus] magnum autem aliquid adeptum se putat, si etiam sociis, id est aliis hominibus, dominari
potuerit. Inest enim uitioso animo id magis appetere et sibi tamquam debitum uindicare, quod uni proprie debeter deo
. . . cum uero etiam eis qui sibi naturaliter pares sunt, hoc est, hominibus, dominari appetat, intolerabilis animi superbia
est’.
inrationabilibus dominari; non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori. Inde primi iusti pastores pecorum magis quam
reges hominum constituti sunt, ut etiam sic insinuaret Deus, quid postulet ordo creaturarum’. Eng. Trans. p. 872.
34 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 12, p. 676: ‘ideo que si offerretur ei seruitus plurium, uel ciuitatis,
uel gentis, ita ut sic ei seruirent, . . . regem conspicuum sublimaret . . .’ Eng. Trans. p. 867.
35 Weithman, ‘Augustine’s political philosophy,’ p. 238. Weithman, however, understands a master’s power simply
as the power to coerce: ‘political authority and the mastery of slaves both rely on coercion, and both teach humility to
sinfully proud human beings’ (p. 240). He does not mention the formula of Skinner and Pettit whereby what is most
characteristic of a master’s power over his slaves is its arbitrary nature, i.e. the fact that it renders a slave dependent on
the master’s will.
36 J. Coleman, A History of Political Thought from Ancient Greece to Early Christianity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000),
pp. 332–33.
37 G. Bonner, ‘Quid imperatori cum ecclesia? St Augustine on History and Society’, Augustinian Studies 2 (1971), pp.
231–51, p. 235. Reprinted in God’s Decree and Man’s Destiny. Studies in the Thought of Augustine of Hippo (London:
Variorum Reprints, 1987).
38 R. A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), pp. 95–96.
39 Weithman, ‘Augustine’s political philosophy’, p. 240.
40 Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of Augustine, p. 145. Quoted in P. Burnell, ‘The Problem of service to unjust
regimes in Augustine’s City of God’, Journal of the History of Ideas 54 (1996), p. 181.
41 H. Chadwick, Augustine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 103. Quoted in Burnell, ‘The Problem of
service to unjust regimes’, p. 181.
42 Burnell, ‘The Problem of service to unjust regimes’, pp. 186–7.
43 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, pp. 78–81.
44 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, p. 102.
45 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, Book 19, Chapter 12, p. 677.
46 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, p. 111: ‘Iniquitas enim eorum, cum quibus iusta bella gesta sunt, regnum adiuuit ut
cresceret, quod utique paruum esset, si quies et iustitia finitimorum contra se bellum geri nulla prouocaret iniuria’. Eng.
Trans. p. 154.
47 De Ciuitate Dei, CC:SL 48, p. 672: ‘Iniquitas enim partis aduersae iusta bella ingerit gerenda sapienti; quae
iniquitas utique homini est dolenda’. Eng. Trans. p. 862.
Copyright of Heythrop Journal is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed
to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However,
users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE METAPHYSICS OF LAW
William S. Brewbaker III*
ABSTRACT
Despite modernity’s longstanding aversion to metaphysics, legal schol-

ars are increasingly questioning whether law can be understood in isolation
from wider questions about the nature of reality. This Article examines per-
haps the most famous of metaphysical legal texts—Thomas Aquinas’s still
widely read Treatise on Law—with a view toward tracing the influence of
Thomas’s metaphysical presuppositions.
This Article shows that Thomas’s account of human law cannot be fully
understood apart from his metaphysics. Attention to Thomas’s hierarchical
view of reality exposes tensions between Thomas’s “top-down” account of
law and his sophisticated “bottom-up” observations. For example, Thomas
grounds human law’s authority in its foundation in the “higher” natural and
eternal laws. At the same time, he is well aware that many if not most legal
questions involve “determination of particulars”—the resolution of ques-
tions that might reasonably be answered in more than one way. Thomas’s
metaphysics sometimes works against his inclination to give place to human
freedom in the creation of law.
Thomas’s metaphysical approach also raises important questions for
contemporary legal theory. His insistence on addressing the question of
law’s ontological status, for example, challenges the reductionism of much
contemporary jurisprudence and provides a vocabulary for accounting for
the wide variety of analytical approaches legal philosophers employ.
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 576

I. THOMAS AQUINAS’S METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTION OF NATURE .......... 580
II. LAW’S ESSENCE .................................................................................... 584
A. Defining Law .................................................................................. 584
B. Metaphysical Influences in the Treatise ......................................... 588
III. HUMAN LAW’S ONTOLOGY ................................................................. 592
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama. I am grateful to Alfred Brophy, Alan Durham, David
VanDrunen, Timothy Hoff, Mark Murphy, John Nagle, and Michael Pardo for helpful comments on
previous drafts of this Article. I am also grateful to Dean Ken Randall and the University of Alabama
Law School Foundation for generous research support, to Chris Sanders for research assistance, to Caro-
line Barge for secretarial assistance, and to Ben Lucy for his friendship and encouragement. The errors
that remain are mine.
575
A. Is There Such a Thing as Law? ...................................................... 592

B. Unjust Laws .................................................................................... 594
IV. ORDERS OF REALITY/METHODOLOGY ................................................ 600
V. BEING: HIERARCHICAL AND ANALOGICAL........................................... 605
A. The Hierarchy of Being: An Overview .......................................... 605
B. Hierarchy and Analogical Knowledge ........................................... 607
C. Hierarchy, Analogy, and the Treatise on Law................................ 609
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 613
INTRODUCTION
One of the great, if unsurprising, projects of twentieth-century Ameri-

can jurisprudence was the attempt to separate law and metaphysics.1 The
project was unsurprising because the objections to metaphysics were both
numerous and obvious: If metaphysical speculations prevented scientists
from “seeing” the natural world clearly, why should the same not be true of
law?2 If we cannot give a full account of even the most common (and
largely fixed) features of natural reality with any degree of certainty, why
make jurisprudence hinge on our ability to do so with respect to human arti-
facts like law? And what is the meaning, in any event, of statements that
cannot be verified through sense experience and logical deduction?3 Given
the mediated nature of our access even to empirical phenomena, why sup-
pose that we can understand the deepest principles of being and action that
make the world what it is? Why not avoid the temptation to engage in end-
less (and fruitless) debates over essences (including law’s essence4) and
focus instead on programs that are more likely to succeed, such as analyzing
our social practices and the way we talk about them?5 Why allow legal ar-
gumentation that draws upon alleged fixities to hamper officials’ ability to
make needed reforms?6 Why impede our politics with the philosophical
1. “It would not be much of a stretch . . . to say that the central effort of legal thinkers from
Holmes through the Legal Realists through the modern proponents of ‘policy science’ has been precisely
to improve law by ridding it of the curse of metaphysics.” STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 2-3
(2004). See generally id. at 65-96 (criticizing main schools of 20th century legal thought).
2. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 844-45 (1935).
4. “As Ludwig Wittgenstein described philosophy in general, legal philosophy under a Hartian
approach sees its primary purpose as a kind of therapy: a way of overcoming the temptation to ask meta-
physical questions (‘what is Law?’ or ‘do norms exist’), and a method of transforming such questions
into (re-)descriptions of the way we actually act.” BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT
6 (3d ed. 2003) (footnotes omitted).
5. But see Jules L. Coleman & Ori Simchen, “Law,” 9 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2003) (arguing that
Hartian jurisprudence is about law itself, not merely the concept of law). See generally H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
6. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1776).
vestiges of antiquated religious structures from which we are still in need of

liberation?7
Although there is still a near consensus that attempting to define law as
a kind and to connect it to a more general account of reality tends to obscure
rather than enhance our understanding of law, the verdict is no longer
unanimous. Indeed, there seems to have been a modest revival of interest in
the relationship between law and metaphysics—not only among religious
believers, where such interest might be expected,8 but also among secular
theorists as well.9 Conceptual analysis of law, at least in its strong form, has
been challenged on methodological grounds;10 there is a stronger philoso-
phical argument to be made for moral realism now than was the case a few
decades ago,11 and some have questioned whether our ontologically-
challenged legal world view can make sense of law as it is practiced by
lawyers and judges in any event.12
This Article does not address the merit or demerit of metaphysical legal
theory generally. Rather, it has a twofold purpose. First, it attempts to trace
the influence of metaphysics in a classic jurisprudential text, Thomas Aqui-
nas’s Treatise on Law. Thomas’s understanding of metaphysics is some-
what narrower than the conventional modern usage of the word. Contempo-
rary usage thinks of metaphysics as “the study of ultimate reality,”13 dealing
with questions like, “What are the most general features of the World?[,]”
7. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Outlaw Blues, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1418, 1427 (1989) (reviewing MARK
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988)) (“[S]uch
things as divine revelation and biblical literalism are irrational superstitious nonsense . . . .”).
8. Because the characteristics of the natural world can be ascribed to an Author.
9. “I doubt that there would be a conceivable enterprise called general jurisprudence if law were
[merely] a nominal kind . . . .” Michael S. Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 188, 206 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
My own view is that the only things whose nature is fixed by our concepts are ‘things’
that do not exist—Pegasus, the twentieth-century kings of France, and the like. There are no
things referred to by such terms, so such words’ meaning can only be given by their concepts.
....
General jurisprudence should eschew such conceptual analysis in favour of studying the phe-
nomenon itself, law.
Id. at 205-06; see also SMITH, supra note 1; Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Facts in Law and
Facts of Law, 7 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 153, 157-61 (2003); Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo,
The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1790-97 (2003); Coleman & Simchen,
supra note 5; Michael S. Moore, Legal Reality: A Naturalist Approach to Legal Ontology, 21 LAW &
PHIL. 619 (2002).
10. “The aim of Conceptual Analysis is to uncover interesting and informative truths about the
concepts we employ to make the world rationally intelligible to us. The basic idea is that concepts are
reified objects of thought that structure our experience and make the world rationally intelligible to us,
and because they are shared are essential to our ability to communicate with one another.” Jules L.
Coleman, Methodology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 311,
344 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). Coleman further notes that “[i]t is nowadays a com-
monplace in philosophy that Quine has presented several compelling arguments adequate to undermine
the projects of Conceptual Analysis.” Id.
11. See generally MICHAEL MOORE, OBJECTIVITY IN ETHICS AND LAW (2004).
12. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 1, at 22-37; Robert P. George, What is Law? A Century of Argu-
ments, FIRST THINGS, Apr. 2001, at 23, 23-29.
13. PETER VAN INWAGEN, METAPHYSICS 1 (1993).
“Why does a World exist?,” and “What is our place in the world?”14 Tho-
mas understands the term rather more narrowly as referring to the investiga-
tion of the general, transcendental characteristics of being and beings.15 Al-
though Thomas’s metaphysics leaves an unmistakable imprint on his ac-
count of law,16 the Treatise is often read as though Thomas’s understanding
of the way things are were not all that different from ours.17 Second, I hope
to show that Thomas’s account of law, in all its metaphysical splendor and
obscurity, raises questions about law that might profitably be examined in
the process of attempting to construct an account of human law that con-
nects to worldly realities. Even if we reject Thomas’s metaphysics, the an-
gelic doctor may still have something to teach us.
Part I begins by connecting Thomas’s account of law—especially his
account of natural law—with his conception of nature.18 Thomas’s account
14. Id. at 4. Inwagen also helpfully uses the antinomy of appearance and reality and the idea of
“getting behind” appearances to reality to illustrate the domain of metaphysics as the study of “ultimate
reality.” Id.
15. In the prologue to his Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Thomas characterizes meta-
physics as the science that “considers first causes,” that “deals with the most universal principles”—
specifically “being and those things which naturally accompany being, such as unity and plurality, po-
tency and act”—and that considers things that are “separate from matter” (i.e., God and the angels). ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE 1 (John P. Rowan trans., Henry
Regnery Co. 1961) [hereinafter AQUINAS, METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE]. These inquiries are unified by
their consideration of “being in general.” Id. at 2. The science is known by different names because it
considers being under these various aspects: “It is called divine science or theology inasmuch as it con-
siders [God and the intellectual substances]. It is called metaphysics inasmuch as it considers being and
the attributes which naturally accompany being . . . . And it is called first philosophy inasmuch as it
considers the first causes of things.” Id.; see also ANTHONY J. LISSKA, AQUINAS’S THEORY OF NATURAL
LAW 86 (1996) (characterizing scholastic understanding of metaphysics as “referring . . . to transcenden-
tal claims about being”).
16. Clearly, Thomas does not deduce his account of law from his metaphysical system in a histori-
cal and theological vacuum. I have not attempted to sort out the relative influence of history, Christian
doctrine, and metaphysics in his thought but only to show that metaphysics conditions his account in
significant ways.
17. The obvious exception to this statement is the routine acknowledgment that teleology has an
important place in Thomas’s account of law.
18. To understand a particular account of natural law, one must grapple with at least two broad
questions. The first is a question of methodology: What is the relationship between nature and ethics or
law? In recent years, the fact/value dichotomy has consumed most of this aspect of the discussion.
Scholars sympathetic to the natural law tradition increasingly argue that the fact/value dichotomy has
“collapsed” or otherwise is avoided in natural-law thinking. See Kevin P. Lee, The Collapse of the
Fact/Value Dichotomy: A Brief for Catholic Legal Scholars, 1 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 685, 685-86
(2004); see also LISSKA, supra note 15, at 195-201; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 51-61 (2d
ed. 1984).
The second question is more basic: When theorists speak of nature, what do they have in mind?
Consider, for example, the different images used to represent nature at various times and places. Female
imagery for nature abounded in the Middle Ages and Renaissance: “The earth was to be conceived as a
nurturing mother, who sustained and supported humanity throughout their time of sojourn in the world.”
1 ALISTER E. MCGRATH, A SCIENTIFIC THEOLOGY: NATURE 105 (2001). Other prominent images in-
cluded the organism, Francis Oakley, Medieval Theories of Natural Law: William of Ockham and the
Significance of the Voluntarist Tradition, 6 NAT. L.F. 65, 79 (1961) (citing R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE
IDEA OF NATURE (1945)); the machine, id.; the stage; the book; and the mirror, 1 MCGRATH, supra, at
103-05, 107-10. The idea that “laws of nature” exist is a similar construct. Id. at 226-28 (citing Francis
Oakley, Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science, in CREATION: THE IMPACT OF AN IDEA 54-83
(Daniel O’Connor & Francis Oakley eds., 1961)). Imagery also may be useful in describing what nature
is not; nature frequently is represented in opposition to grace, “unnatural” vices, technology, culture, the
mimetic arts, the supernatural, the metaphysical, and even the inexcusable. C.S. LEWIS, STUDIES IN
of law depends fundamentally on his conception of human action and the

characteristic inclinations of the human person.19 The focus here, however,
will be on Thomas’s account of nature in general. Contemporary concep-
tions of nature are dominated by the hard sciences, which attempt to identify
empirically the connections between individual discrete events in the natural
order.20 Thomas’s goal in describing nature, on the other hand, is to identify
WORDS 42-74 (2d ed. 1967); see also JOHN HABGOOD, THE CONCEPT OF NATURE 1-5 (2002).
Not only is nature represented by conflicting images, but many theoretical accounts of nature
also exist. This is not merely a modern phenomenon. Thomas himself notes multiple uses of the word
nature. See ST IaIIae.10.1 (for a discussion of this citation format, see infra note 19). Plato and Aristotle,
for example, both divided the world into the realms of nature, art, and chance but differed as to each
realm’s precise role in the overall scheme of things. 1 MCGRATH, supra, at 90-95. They likewise dif-
fered over the origins of human perceptions of universals and particulars. Medievals inherited a tradition
of reflection on natural law that drew not only upon conflicting Stoic and Platonic elements but also
upon accounts of natural law based in different traditions of inquiry. The project of medieval synthesis
involved assimilating accounts of nature and natural law drawn not only from philosophers and theologi-
ans but also from canon and civil lawyers. See JEAN PORTER, NATURAL AND DIVINE LAW 66-75 (1999).
The natural sciences dramatically and increasingly have influenced accounts of nature since then. Far
from seeing nature as a “second book” of God’s revelation, see id. at 71, it is now common to view
nature only as “the amoral scene of Darwinian struggle.” RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 235 (1990).
The concrete consequences of differing conceptions of nature are perhaps exhibited nowhere
better than in law. Scholars who would strenuously resist the label “natural lawyer” nevertheless cannot
avoid being interested in the world in which law must operate. The efficiency-minded academic lawyer
is concerned with the psychology of market decision-making, the family lawyer with which features of
family life are “givens” and which are not, see generally SEX, PREFERENCE AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND NATURE (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997), and the environmental law-
yer with whether nature is “a material resource for human consumption” or something else, see Holly
Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 11, 13-14 (2000) (noting “three principal discourses” of nature in environmental debates: the first
“treats nature as a material resource for human consumption”; the second “treats nature as an esthetic
resource”; and the third “argues that humanity has an ethical obligation to protect nature independent of
any instrumental value nature may have”). See also Alex Geisinger, Sustainable Development and the
Domination of Nature: Spreading the Seed of the Western Ideology of Nature, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 43, 47-48 (1999) (criticizing Western ideology of “separation and domination” with respect to
nature and noting alternative “metaphors for our understanding of nature,” including “(1) nature as a
limited resource on which humans rely; (2) nature as balanced and interdependent; and (3) the model of
nature versus society, characterized by the market’s devaluation of nature, the separation from nature
that leads to failure to appreciate it, and the American idealization of the environmentalism of primitive
peoples”).
19. See ST IaIIae.90.1, c. In citing to Thomas’s Summa Theologica, I have borrowed Norman
Kretzmann’s form:
[The abbreviation ST is followed by]
the traditional designation for the Part (Pars)—Ia (Prima), IaIIae (Prima secundae), IIaIIae
(Secunda secundae), or IIIa (Tertia). The first arabic numeral following any one of those des-
ignations indicates the Question in that Part, and the next arabic numeral, following a full
point, indicates the Article belonging to that Question. A ‘c’ immediately following the sec-
ond arabic numeral indicates that the passage belongs to Aquinas’s reply in that Article (the
‘body’ (corpus) of the Article); ‘obj. 1’, ‘obj. 2’, etc., indicates one of the ‘objections’ (op-
posing arguments); ‘sc’ indicates the ‘sed contra’ (the citation of an authority or generally ac-
ceptable consideration contrary to the line taken in the Objections), and ‘ad 1’, ‘ad 2’, etc.,
indicates one of Aquinas’s rejoinders to the objections.
NORMAN KRETZMANN, THE METAPHYSICS OF CREATION: AQUINAS’S NATURAL THEOLOGY IN SUMMA
CONTRA GENTILES II 9 n.16 (1999). Analogous forms are used for Thomas’s other works cited in this
Article. Unless otherwise noted, translations of the Summa Theologiae are taken from ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics
1981).
20. “Modern science studies the world of space and time, not some reality beyond them, and arose
the common characteristics of “beings” and the principles underlying their

movements, i.e., to develop a science of metaphysics.
Part II begins the exploration of the specifics of Thomas’s metaphysics
with an account of his attempt to define law’s essence. Examination of
Thomas’s famous definition of law shows how, following Aristotle’s
method, Thomas thinks law can be understood by focusing on its formal,
final, material, and efficient causes. It also shows how Thomas’s meta-
physical assumptions about bodies and human action affect the specifics of
Thomas’s account. Part III examines Thomas’s account of human law’s
ontology, which raises a number of metaphysical questions, including the
ontological status of human law relative to other types of law, the status of
unjust laws in Thomas’s framework, and how it is that human laws can vary
so significantly notwithstanding their shared ontological dependence on the
single natural law.
Part IV describes Thomas’s methodology, which is grounded on the as-
sumption that there are different orders of reality and, thus, different meth-
ods of analysis that may obtain for different kinds of realities in the world.
Thomas’s account challenges the reductionism of some contemporary juris-
prudence, while at the same time explaining why law is fruitfully analyzed
from so many competing perspectives.
Part V examines two of the most well-known features of Thomas’s
metaphysics: the analogy of being and his assumption that reality is funda-
mentally hierarchical, proceeding in a chain from God downward through
successively inferior orders of angels, humans, animals, plants, and inani-
mate objects. Part V connects these assumptions about reality with Tho-
mas’s account of law. Thomas affirms a substantial degree of human free-
dom in human lawmaking, drawing a helpful analogy between rulers and
architects. Nevertheless, because Thomas holds that God’s plan for the uni-
verse extends even to the minutest details of human law, and because all
being is, for Thomas, hierarchical, there is a noteworthy gravitational pull
against human freedom in lawmaking at work in the Treatise, albeit one that
Thomas himself repeatedly seems to be striving to resist.
I. THOMAS AQUINAS’S METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTION OF NATURE
Thomas Aquinas is probably best known to legal scholars for his ac-
count of natural law in Question 94 of the Treatise on Law. One of the first
when a logical quest for timeless patterns gave way to a mathematical, hypothetical and experimental
approach to the contingent rationality of space and time . . . .” COLIN E. GUNTON, THE ONE, THE THREE
AND THE MANY 75 (1993) [hereinafter GUNTON, THE ONE, THE THREE AND THE MANY]; see also
ETIENNE GILSON, THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAS 178 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press
1994) (1956) (modern empiricism reduces causation to “constant relationship[s] between phenomena”);
COLIN E. GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR 134 (1998) [hereinafter GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR]
(“[T]he modern age replaced an essentially Hellenic philosophy of nature, according to which it is what
it is by virtue of intrinsic rational powers and causes operating above material being, with one of contin-
gencies consisting in patterning within it.”). See generally M.B. Foster, The Christian Doctrine of Crea-
tion and the Rise of Modern Natural Science, 43 MIND 446 (1934).
questions that will occur to any reader of Question 94 (or indeed to anyone
who thinks much about the phrase “natural law”) is which “nature” is
grounding the enterprise: Human nature? The cosmos? The nature of law?
In his treatment of natural law, Thomas explicitly connects law and na-
ture in two ways. First, he says in Question 90 that “God instilled [natural
law] into man’s mind so as to be known by him naturally.”21 Second, the
characteristic inclination of the human person is to use the “light of natural
reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil.”22 Implicitly,
however, Thomas’s account of law is also influenced dramatically by his
presuppositions about the nature of reality. For Thomas, what is most im-
portant about nature is not the observable web of contingent patterning23 but
rather the universal principles that lie beneath observable particulars.24
Thus, for example, in the Treatise on the Creation,25 Thomas begins neither
with the particular story told in Genesis 126 nor with a bottom-up account of
natural phenomena but rather with a philosophical demonstration that “God
is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and [that]
primary matter is from Him.”27
Thomas’s focus on universal principles of being is no accident. Rather,
he argues, it is the culmination of human scientific progress over the centu-
ries: The ancient philosophers “failed to realize that any beings existed ex-
cept sensible bodies,” and because they regarded matter as eternal and un-
created, they had trouble accounting for changes they observed in it.28 The
recognition of “a distinction between the substantial form and matter”29
improved upon this understanding, even though the causes of change in
bodies continued to be attributed mistakenly to “universal causes” like the
zodiac or Platonic ideas. Further refinements of the classical understanding
of the interconnection between form, substance, accident, and causation
likewise aided human understanding, but the most significant change, ac-
21. ST IaIIae.90.4, ad 1.
22. ST IaIIae.91.2, c. John Finnis characterizes Thomas’s answer to the question why natural law is
so called as follows:
Why are these principles natural law? Not because they are somehow read off from nature or
human nature. Rather, for at least three reasons. They are not made by human devising {ad-
inventio} but rather are first-order realities, as are the other realities which pertain to our na-
ture. Their reasonableness, moreover, is a sharing in the practical reasonableness, the wis-
dom, of the very author of our nature, the creator by whose wisdom and power the fulfilment
which we can freely choose is (like our freedom itself) made possible. And no human choices
or acts are against the natural law (or indeed against any divine law) except in so far as they
are against human good.
JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 309 (1998) (footnote omitted); see
also RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE xxi-xxiii (2003).
24. I do not mean to suggest Thomas is uninterested in the natural world, only that he thinks the
most important task for understanding the natural world is understanding “being in general.”
25. ST Ia.44-49.
26. But see Treatise on the Work of the Six Days, ST Ia.65-74, which appears afterward.
27. ST Ia.44.4, ad 4. The quotation appears at the end of Question 44 and seems to summarize
Thomas’s position as set out in the various articles therein.
28. ST Ia.44.2, c.
29. Id.
cording to Thomas, was one of focus—from a consideration of “being under

some particular aspect . . . to the consideration of being, as being.”30 Tho-
mas concludes that “whatever is the cause of things considered as beings,
must be the cause of things [generally].”31
Thomas’s primary approach to nature, then, is to try to discover princi-
ples that apply generally to all beings, an approach that involves back-
ground assumptions radically different from those modern readers would
bring to the same enterprise. Most of us are unaccustomed to thinking in
explicitly metaphysical terms at all, much less in the highly developed Aris-
totelian scheme Thomas inherits and reconfigures. More fundamentally, we
tend to take our conception of nature from the contemporary natural sci-
ences, which are largely empiricist. Because modern science’s goals involve
the identification of generalizable relationships and working principles that
enable prediction or manipulation of future states of affairs, it cannot avoid
metaphysics (or something like it) entirely.32 Nevertheless, modern concep-
tions of metaphysics are far more limited and modest than those Thomas
employs.33
As noted above, a working assumption of the modern scientific method
is that a too-robust metaphysics hinders efforts to learn the truth about the
world. At least since Francis Bacon’s assault on Aristotle in The New Or-
ganon,34 empiricists have argued that a priori conceptions of reality obscure
30. Id.
31. ST Ia.44.2, c; see also Jan A. Aertsen, Aquinas’s Philosophy in Its Historical Setting, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS 12, 28-30 (Norman Kretzmann & Eleonore Stump eds., 1993)
(citing passage in relation to Thomas’s belief in philosophical progress); cf. ST Ia.75.1, c. Thomas never-
theless conceived of himself as a naturalist. See generally GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR, supra note
20, at 105-07, 112.
32. See, e.g., WILLEM B. DREES, RELIGION, SCIENCE AND NATURALISM 152, 259-74 (1996) (argu-
ing that “our understanding of reality raises some questions, questions which are not themselves an-
swered by science and thus may be considered as pointing beyond science to metaphysical issues, with-
out, however, pointing to one particular metaphysical view”); 3 ALISTER E. MCGRATH, A SCIENTIFIC
THEOLOGY: THEORY 250-58 (2003) (arguing that scientists’ attempts to evade metaphysics entirely have
been unsuccessful).
33. See generally LISSKA, supra note 15, at 86. Even modern religious believers outside the
Thomist tradition are likely to find Thomas’s approach to nature uncongenial. To begin with, they are
likely to share—in practice if not in theory—the culture’s empiricist approach to understanding nature.
Even assuming they are prepared to find a place for a divine ordering in nature, Thomas’s emphasis on
being and his use of Aristotle’s fourfold account of causation will seem strange and out of kilter with
modern scientific understanding. Readers from Christian traditions marked by a skepticism toward
natural theology also may find an insufficient connection between Thomas’s account of the created order
and more particular aspects of the biblical narrative, including Jesus’s incarnation and promised return to
consummate all things.
34. Bacon writes:
The most obvious example of the first type is Aristotle, who spoils natural philosophy with
his dialectic. He constructed the world of categories; he attributed to the human soul the no-
blest substance, a genus based on words of second intention; he transformed the interaction of
dense and rare, by which bodies occupy greater and smaller dimensions or spaces, into the
unilluminating distinction between act and potentiality; he insisted that each individual body
has a unique and specific motion, and if they participate in some other motion, that motion is
due to a different reason; and he imposed innumerable other things on nature at his own
whim. He was always more concerned with how one might explain oneself in replying, and
to giving some positive response in words, than of the internal truth of things; and this shows
up best if we compare his philosophy with other philosophies in repute among the Greeks.
rather than illuminate natural phenomena.35 Bacon argued, for example, that
acceptance of Aristotle’s emphasis on natural teleology discouraged con-
crete investigation into more immediate cause-and-effect relationships.36
Though it took some time for the inductive method to take root, the modern
natural sciences are now so firmly committed to the priority of empirical
observation over a priori theorizing that it can be difficult to imagine an
alternative conception of the “scientific method.”37
Thomas’s conception of nature, then, is at odds with modern working
assumptions about the natural world in two respects. First, his account is
metaphysical in the general sense that its primary goal is to identify and
apply the unseen principles that govern all reality (specifically everything
that partakes of being) to all facets of life rather than to examine particular
phenomena in a systematic way to discern connections between events.
Second, Thomas assumes, contrary to Bacon and the empiricists, that the
most important thing to understand about an object is what it is for—where
it fits in the cosmic order. While it seems unlikely that science will abandon
its quest for something like the underlying principles that were the subject
of the metaphysicians’ quest, a strongly teleological account of the natural
The ‘similar substances’ of Anaxagoras, the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus, the earth
and sky of Parmenides, the strife and friendship of Empedocles, the dissolution of bodies into
the undifferentiated nature of fire and their return to solidity in Heraclitus, all have something
of natural philosophy in them, and have the feel of nature and experience and bodies; whereas
Aristotle’s physics too often sound like mere terms of dialectic, which he rehashed under a
more solemn name in his metaphysics, claiming to be more of a realist, not a nominalist. And
no one should be impressed because in his books On Animals and in his Problems and other
treatises there is often discussion of experiments. He had in fact made up his mind before-
hand, and did not properly consult experience as the basis of his decisions and axioms; after
making his decisions arbitrarily, he parades experience around, distorted to suit his opinions,
a captive. Hence on this ground too he is guiltier than his modern followers (the scholastic
philosophers) who have wholly abandoned experience.
FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ORGANON 51-52 (Lisa Jardine & Michael Silverthorne eds., 2000) (1620)
(Aphorism LXIII).
35. Thomas’s metaphysics has been accused of obscuring both scientific observation and biblical
interpretation. Later theologians have argued (in a vein not dissimilar to Bacon) that philosophical con-
ceptions of God inherited from the ancient Greek philosophers, some of which Thomas inherits and does
not modify adequately—particularly his account of God and God’s relation to the creation—have inhib-
ited a full understanding of the biblical narrative as it might inform a theological understanding of crea-
tion. Colin Gunton, for example, argues that neglect of the doctrines of the incarnation, the divine cove-
nants, and eschatology generally has hampered an understanding of the created order that makes room
both for the integrity of the created order as distinct from the Creator and for God’s continuing purpose
for, and interaction in time within, creation. See generally GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR, supra note
20; see also OLIVER O’DONOVAN, RESURRECTION AND MORAL ORDER 53-75 (1986) (eschatology).
36. Bacon argues:
It is no less of a problem that in their philosophies and observations they waste their efforts
on investigating and treating the principles of things and the ultimate causes of nature (ulti-
matibus naturae), since all utility and opportunity for application lies in the intermediate
causes (in mediis). This is why men do not cease to abstract nature until they reach potential
and unformed matter, nor again do they cease to dissect nature till they come to the atom.
Even if these things were true, they can do little to improve men’s fortunes.
BACON, supra note 34, at 55 (Aphorism LXVI).
37. Oliver O’Donovan has made the point succinctly: “Only when thought could escape the inhibit-
ing influence of a teleological philosophy could it examine the universe in a way that was open to the
contingency of relations, not presupposing that it would find a unifying purposiveness but prepared to
find exactly what it did find.” O’DONOVAN, supra note 35, at 45.
world has come to be seen as implausible in the wake of the natural sci-
ences’ extraordinary successes, which have been brought about largely by
the abandonment of a teleological focus.38 As discussed below, Thomas’s
metaphysical presuppositions decisively shape his account of nature and
thus his accounts of natural and human law. However, unless we are to re-
peat the scholastics’ mistakes, we cannot simply assume a priori that Tho-
mas’s account of law is unenlightening because of its metaphysical orienta-
tion. The account itself must be explored.
II. LAW’S ESSENCE
A. Defining Law
The Treatise on Law begins, naturally enough, with a consideration of

law’s essence. Thomas analyzes law, by analogy,39 as if it were a natural
kind.40 In Thomas’s world, natural kinds are marked by their essences,
which are identified in terms of the characteristic tendencies of the members
of the group marked out as that kind of being.41 Although Thomas modifies
important aspects of Aristotle’s metaphysics, he adopts Aristotle’s basic
framework for understanding essences in the natural world. Thomas accepts
Aristotle’s hylomorphic account of objects; his account of motion, act, and
potentiality; and, most importantly for present purposes, his fourfold ac-
count of causation.42
Like Aristotle, Thomas is interested in accounting for the observed fact
that all material beings exhibit both stability and change and for material
beings’ simultaneous universality (i.e., membership in a class of beings) and
particularity (e.g., Socrates and John are both men, but they are not each
other). In broad outline, a material being’s essence is understood best in
terms of four causes: (1) its form—that which allows one to know what
something is; (2) its matter—what it is made of; (3) its efficient cause—
where it came from or the point at which its motion started; and (4) its final
cause—what it is for/where it is headed.43
Because law is not a material entity, the fourfold causation model can
be applied only analogically.44 Thomas argues that law’s formal cause is “an
38. See O’DONOVAN, supra note 35, at 45. But see GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR, supra note 20,
at 105-06 (criticizing Aristotle for de-emphasizing the material relations of things in favor of “ideal or
intellectual relations of things”); id. at 106 (“[T]he key to later science is the combination of experiment
and mathematics which goes ill with Aristotle’s tendency to classify phenomena rationally . . . .”).
39. See infra Part V (C).
40. See infra Part III.
41. Cf. LISSKA, supra note 15, at 103-05.
42. See generally F.C. COPLESTON, AQUINAS 73-110 (Penguin Books 1991) (1955).
43. See 1 AQUINAS, METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, I.L.4:C, at 70-71; see also PIERRE
CONWAY, METAPHYSICS OF AQUINAS 34 (Mary Michael Spangler ed., 1996).
44. See infra Part V; cf. FINNIS, supra note 22, at 31. On Aristotle’s application of fourfold causa-
tion to manmade and other objects, see R.J. Hankinson, Philosophy of Science, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE 109, 121-22 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1995). In addition to that adduced below,
the textual evidence favoring the claim that Thomas consciously is using the fourfold causation model is
ordinance of reason” (a reasonable command or prohibition), its efficient

cause is “either . . . the whole people, or . . . someone who is the viceregent
[sic] of the whole people,”45 and its final cause is the common good. Law is
immaterial, so there is no material cause strictly speaking; nevertheless,
law’s promulgation seems to occupy the analogous position in Thomas’s
account.
In addressing law’s formal cause, Thomas starts with the common-sense
notion of human law as a rule or measure of human activity.46 Common
sense is buttressed by his controversial suggestion that lex is derived from
ligare, which means “to bind.”47 While Thomas seems to regard the idea
that laws are rules as self-evident, he feels compelled to justify the second
aspect of his account of the form of law—that rules are not law unless they
bear some relation to reason.48 Here, he offers a metaphysical proof: (1) All
actions are undertaken for an end; (2) The starting point for human actions
is reasoning about what to do. The principle of the genus of human action
thus is reason;49 (3) Because “the principle in any genus, is the rule and
measure of that genus,”50 and reason is the principle of the genus of human
action,51 it follows that law is a matter of reason.52
As noted above, law does not have a material cause. However, Thomas
discusses promulgation in Question 90 by analogy to material causation.53 If
as follows: (1) his statement in the Prologue to the Treatise on Law that he will first consider law’s
“essence” and (2) the fact that his description in the Prologue of the discussion of law’s essence to fol-
low includes references to law’s “cause” and “end” as separate discussions (corresponding to ST IaI-
Iae.90.2-90.3).
46. Thomas presupposes that the appropriate starting point for investigation is that which is first in
the order of knowledge. See infra Part V.
47. See ST IaIIae.90.1, c. An arguably more persuasive etymology for lex is legere, meaning “to
read.”
48. ST IaIIae.90.1, ad 3 (“But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature
of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. . . . [O]therwise the sovereign’s will would
savor of lawlessness rather than of law.”).
49. See ST IaIIae.1.1, ad 3. Aristotle holds that a principle is something that “comes first either with
reference to a thing’s being (as the first part of a thing is said to be a principle) or with reference to its
coming to be (as the first mover is said to be a principle) or with reference to the knowing of it.” 1
AQUINAS, METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, V.L.1:C, at 303. Thomas does not disagree with
this assessment as far as it goes but notes the differences that also mark the various uses of principle. In
particular, he emphasizes that the good is the “principle[] of the . . . motion of many things; that is, all
those which are done for the sake of some end. For in the realm of . . . moral acts, . . . demonstrations
make special use of the final cause.” Id.
In the discussion about law, Thomas says reason is the first principle of human action because
“it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action.” ST
IaIIae.90.1, c; see also CONWAY, supra note 43, at 108-11.
51. Human action is a term of art in Thomas’s thought. Humans, like everything else in the natural
world, act for an end, and it is this characteristic act that is dispositive of their essence. The characteristic
human act is to use reason to pursue the good. See generally ST IaIIae.1-48; GILSON, supra note 20, at
251-56; RALPH MCINERNY, ETHICA THOMISTICA 60-76 (rev. ed. 1997); YVES R. SIMON, THE
TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW 78-82 (Vukan Kuic ed., 1965).
52. For an explanation as to why Thomas thinks he is entitled to draw inferences about law in gen-
eral from characteristics of human law, see infra Part V.C.
53. ST IaIIae.95.4, obj. 2, contains the suggestion that law’s material cause consists of the kind of
command issued by the relevant authority. Thus “statutes, decrees of the commonalty, senatorial de-
matter is required for the embodiment and separation of material beings,

promulgation may be said to serve an analogous function in connection with
law. Laws cannot serve as universal principles of practical reason54 unless
they are “applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by [them],”55
and promulgation is the means through which such application takes
place.56 The written character of law also receives attention in this discus-
sion.57
Law’s final cause (its purpose), according to Thomas, is the common
good.58 Again, Thomas’s justification for this conclusion is largely a priori.
As we already have seen, the principle (i.e., starting point or source) of hu-
man acts is reason. Because a law is a rule and measure of human acts, laws
must be rules of reason, specifically practical reason.59 Reason itself, how-
ever, must also start somewhere, and practical reason’s starting point is the
pursuit of the good,60 which for humans is happiness.61 Thus, it follows that
law’s overarching orientation is toward human happiness.
The critical remaining question is whose happiness the law should con-
sider. Thomas reasons as follows that the happiness to be considered is that
of the community rather than the individual: (1) “[E]very part is ordained to
the whole, as imperfect to perfect”; (2) Individual humans are part of the
perfect community; therefore: (3) the community is the primary focus of
consideration and law should be oriented toward it rather than toward the
individual.62 The conclusion is double-edged: On one hand, a law that dis-
advantages particular individuals may be justified by its tendency to pro-
crees, and the like . . . do not differ, except materially.” Id. Thomas rejects this claim, holding that the
division of human laws into these various types is meaningful because different forms of government
generate correlative embodiments of law. Id. at c; see also Nicholas Aroney, Subsidiarity, Federalism
and the Best Constitution: Thomas Aquinas on City, Province and Empire, 26 LAW & PHIL. 161 (2007).
Promulgation seems a better analogue to matter because it is the vehicle through which earthly law
presents itself to humans. It has the further advantage of being an essential element of law according to
the received wisdom of the day. See THOMAS GILBY, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS
134-35 (1958).
54. ST IaIIae.90.1, ad 2 (“Such like universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed
to actions—have the nature of law.”). Thomas borrows the familiar Aristotelian distinction between
practical reason, which relates to decisions about what to do and speculative or theoretical reason,
which relates to our knowledge of things as they are apart from our actions.
56. Thomas also notes that promulgation “extends to future time by reason of the durability of
written characters, by which means it is continually promulgated.” ST IaIIae.90.4, ad 3. One might argue
that written characters are, analogically speaking, law’s material cause. But promulgation has a stronger
claim in that Thomas’s definition of law includes not only the focal case of human law but also the
unwritten eternal and natural laws, which nevertheless are promulgated.
57. Id.
59. Id. at IaIIae 90.1, ad 2.
60. See id. at IaIIae.94.2, c. (“Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension sim-
ply, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed
to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good.”).
61. Id. at IaIIae.2.7; id. at IaIIae.3.1.
62. Id. at IaIIae.90.2, c; see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ON KINGSHIP 9-10 (Gerald B. Phelan trans.,
1982); cf. ST IaIIae.96.4, c (analogizing burdens on individuals required to facilitate the common good
to the sacrifices that nature makes in parts of organic bodies in order to preserve the whole).
mote the common good. On the other, laws aimed at individual activities
must find their justification in the common good; otherwise, they are “de-
void of the nature of a law.”63
Lastly, law’s efficient cause (its origin) is the political community’s
ruler(s). Thomas again emphasizes law’s connection to human action, and
he again makes an a priori argument. He just has demonstrated that law
“regards first and foremost the order to the common good.”64 Because law,
as a product of practical reason, involves ordering toward an end, Thomas
argues that the direction toward that end is properly the choice of the person
“to whom the end belongs.”65 Thus, laws should be made by either “the
whole people or . . . a public personage who has care of the whole peo-
ple.”66
Thomas also connects the requirement that law should be made by a
public person to the prior discussion of the regulation of human action by
practical reason by arguing that law should be “an efficacious inducement to
virtue.”67 “[P]rivate person[s] cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously . . .
[but] can only advise.”68 Law, on the other hand, can induce obedience from
the reason, if only due to fear of punishment.69
This argument presupposes both a state monopoly on the exercise of
force, at least deadly force,70 and some account of a distinction between
public and private personages. Thomas writes elsewhere that “the care of
the common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority:
wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers
to death.”71 He also draws a clear distinction between public and private
dealings, arguing, for example, that judges may draw only on legally admis-
sible evidence in making their rulings and never on their private knowledge,
even when a case’s outcome might turn on their decision to do so.72
63. ST IaIIae.90.2, c. John Finnis argues that an important thrust of the discussion of the common
good in Thomas’s treatment of law and politics is that it serves, contrary to common understanding, as a
limitation on government power: “[Thomas’s] position is not readily distinguishable from the ‘grand
simple principle’ (itself open to interpretation and diverse applications) of John Stuart Mill’s On Lib-
erty.” FINNIS, supra note 22, at 228.
65. Id.
66. Id.
68. Id.; see also id. at Ia.IIae.50.2, c (discussing rule by command and its relationship to the com-
manded person’s will).
69. Id. at IaIIae.92.2, c. But see FINNIS, supra note 22, at 257 and sources cited therein (discussing
law’s “internalization” by the people).
70. ST IIaIIae.64.3, c. Civil magistrates are entitled to employ “perfect coercive power” that extends
to “irreparable punishments such as death and mutilation.” Id. at IIaIIae.65.2, ad 2. Parents and slave-
holders can employ punishments, such as beatings, that “do not inflict irreparable harm.” Id.
72. See id. at IIaIIae.67.2, c. See generally FINNIS, supra note 22, at 250-52 (discussing the distinc-
tion between public and private personages and its relationship to the rule of law).
B. Metaphysical Influences in the Treatise
What implications does Thomas’s metaphysics have for his account of

law’s essence? The claim that law may be analyzed as if it were a natural
kind with an essence is fundamental, and it is examined in more detail in
Part III. For the moment, it is enough to notice how Thomas’s metaphysical
framework colors his observations about law (particularly human law) and
his argumentation.
It is only fitting to begin by observing that perhaps Thomas’s biggest
shortcoming in many legal theorists’ eyes—his refusal to separate law and
morality—follows from his metaphysics.73 If, as Thomas supposes, one
cannot fully understand anything without understanding its end (its final
cause), and if the very idea of good is connected with the fulfillment of that
end, no airtight separation of facts and values can exist in the realm of
knowledge. Thomas’s reputation in this regard appears to be undergoing
some rehabilitation as conventional wisdom about the impossibility of de-
riving values from facts is being questioned and doubt about the possibility
of value-neutral observation of social practices increases.74
The most striking single instance of metaphysical influence in Tho-
mas’s discussion of law’s definition is the analogy75 he draws between or-
ganic bodies and their members and the body politic and its constituents.76
The theme is significant not only because it recurs several times in the
Question in which Thomas defines law but also because one can observe
Thomas’s apparent struggle to square his metaphysics with what he regards
as an appropriate account of human law and lawmaking.77
Recall Thomas’s argument that law’s final cause is the common good.78
Following Aristotle,79 Thomas begins with the principle that wholes have
priority over parts.80 The focal case in the conception of wholes and parts is
that of the bodies of living organisms.81 Such bodies are, generally speak-
ing, self-sustaining in ways that their parts are not; thus it may be said that
the parts exist for the sake of the whole, and it seems reasonable to give the
73. It also is no doubt part of his theology, as that term is usually understood. And Thomas’s views
about God no doubt were important in his acceptance and modification of Aristotelian philosophy.
74. See O’DONOVAN, supra note 35, at 46-52 (arguing that our understanding of generic categories
ultimately depends on teleology). But see Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Method-
ology Problem in Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17 (2003). See generally LISSKA, supra note 15;
MACINTYRE, supra note 18; Robert P. George, Natural Law and Human Nature, in NATURAL LAW
THEORY, supra note 9, at 31; Lee, supra note 18; Daniel N. Robinson, Lloyd Weinreb’s Problems with
Natural Law, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY 213, 214-17 (Robert P. George ed.,
1996).
75. Analogy is itself a crucial feature of Thomas’s account of law. See infra Part V.
76. ST19 IaIIae.96.4, c.
77. See id.
79. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS ¶ 1253a, at 55 ll. 19-41 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House
1943).
80. See ST IaIIae.90.3, c; id. at IaIIae.96.4, c.
81. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 79.
body priority over its individual “members.”82 Again following Aristotle,83

Thomas holds that human potential cannot be fully realized outside of
communities; the complete community is thus a whole in a way an individ-
ual person is not.84 Communities provide not only the basis for physical
survival but also a social context in which the virtuous life can be lived.
Because the individual is but a part of the perfect community, itself a natu-
ral institution, the community’s good deserves priority in lawmaking and is
not in any fundamental conflict with the individual’s good.
Thomas’s reliance on the body/member analogy as justification for the
idea that law is oriented to the common good may baffle modern readers.
However, in his context, it was far more persuasive. His conclusion rests on
the authority of both Isidore and Aristotle and presumably also the bulk of
the Christian political tradition in which Thomas was working. As we shall
see, Thomas believes more familiar realities, like animal bodies, can some-
times shed light by analogy on other, deeper realities.85 Thus, he has inde-
pendent reasons to believe that inquiry into the relationship between the
bodies of living things and their parts can shed light on the lives of “bodies”
like communities. In sum, he may have seen little reason to question either
that the common good should have unqualified priority in lawmaking or that
the body/member analogy provided important support for the position.
One of the body/member analogy’s strengths is its ability to give an ac-
count of the potential confluence between the good of a whole and that of
its parts. Bodies need their parts, and presumably do not inflict injury on
them lightly. Moreover, the parts cannot exist without the whole, so there is
no question that if one must choose between the interests of the whole and
that of its parts, the whole has priority.86 Nevertheless, as applied to political
life, the analogy pushes more strongly toward the priority of the whole than
Thomas thinks appropriate. Thomas is not naive enough to think that the
body politic (as represented by its rulers) inevitably will care for each of its
parts just as a human might be expected to care for his.87 Nor does he think
humans depend on the body politic to the same extent their limbs depend on
their body, and he recognizes that humans may have ends of their own.
These disanalogies require Thomas to find a way to prevent his account of
the community/citizen relationship from becoming a license for self-serving
rule by tyrants or overly intrusive political control.
82. Member is used here in the sense of “limb” or “organ” when referring to the organism and in the
sense of person when referring to a part of the body politic.
83. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 79, ¶ 1252b, at 54 ll. 29-30.
84. See ST IaIIae.90.3, c.
85. See infra Part V.
86. The body/member metaphor also works relatively well when Thomas is explaining why law’s
efficient cause is the “whole people or . . . a public personage who has care of the whole people.” ST
IaIIae.90.3, c. In this instance, it helps to underwrite the distinction between public and private authority.
Laws should be made by the whole (or its representative), not by the part, because law’s purpose is to
order the public life of the community.
87. See id. at IaIIae.96.4, c. (dealing with a ruler’s actions that further his personal good and not that
of the community).
Thomas deals with these problems by giving an account of the common

good that cuts in the opposite direction from the body/member metaphor.
An organic body’s parts may exist for the sake of the whole, but in Tho-
mas’s account of the political common good, the whole exists for the sake
of its parts. Thomas uses the concept of the common good to declare out-of-
bounds both laws made only in the ruler’s self-interest88 and those that im-
pinge on individual decisions without benefiting to the whole.89 Not only
that, but in Thomas’s vision, the purpose of building a community is not to
establish an empire but rather to enable the community’s members to lead
virtuous lives. The whole point of having a community is to enable individ-
ual members to flourish.
These two different directions ultimately come into conflict, however,
when Thomas deals with the community’s treatment of criminal offenders.
In a series of questions in the Second Part, Thomas discusses the propriety
of punishments for wrongdoers, concluding that it is perfectly acceptable to
harm an individual for the community’s sake. For example, in dealing with
the question of capital punishment, Thomas writes:
[I]t is lawful to kill dumb animals, in so far as they are naturally di-
rected to man’s use, as the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now
every part is directed to the whole, . . . wherefore every part is natu-
rally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the
health of the whole body demands the excision of a member,
through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will
be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now
every individual person is compared to the whole community, as
part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the
community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advanta-
geous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good,
since a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump (1 Cor. v.6).90
Significantly, the killing of humans is put on a different ground than the

killing of animals for food. Thomas justifies the taking of animal and plant
88. Id.
89. See id. at IaIIae.96.3, c; see also FINNIS, supra note 22, at 222-31 (arguing that common good in
this context refers to a “limited common good, specific to the political community [which Thomas refers
to as] public good”). One can see a similar move in Thomas’s treatment of the relationship between
secular and ecclesiastical power. In ST IIaIIae.60.6, ad 3, Thomas writes:
The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as the body is subject to the soul. Conse-
quently the judgment is not usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal mat-
ters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have been committed to the spiritual by
the temporal authority. The implication is that the higher spiritual authority would be usurp-
ing power if it intruded in matters other than those set out. Thomas was not entirely consis-
tent in his treatment of church-state relations in other works.
See Paul E. Sigmund, Law and Politics, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS, supra note
31, at 217, 218-19.
90. ST IIaIIae.64.2, c. Thomas makes similar arguments in id. at IIaIIae.64.3 (dealing with the
execution of death sentences); id. at IIaIIae.64.5 (concerning suicide); and id. at IIaIIae.65.1 (maiming).
life for food on the basis of the ordering of creation.91 Humans are not made
to be “used” by the community in the same way animals and plants are
made to be used for human sustenance.92
Nevertheless, Thomas’s organic image93 of community life creates
some interesting tensions in his account of the death penalty. On one hand,
the justification for execution relies more on deterrence than retribution; the
evildoer may be put to death because he is “dangerous and infectious to the
community.”94 On the other, Thomas holds that it is evil in itself to kill a
human being.95 He reconciles these two principles by arguing that the mur-
derer’s execution96 is justified because the murderer has forfeited his human
dignity.97 Once the wrongdoer’s dignity has been forfeited, he may be used
for the greater good in the way animals are.98
This is about as close as Thomas comes to recognizing the possibility of
an inherent conflict between individuals and the community, and his solu-
tion is not entirely satisfactory. He maintains that no conflict exists between
the common good and the well-functioning human’s individual good—“The
common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as
the good of the whole is the end of each part”99—but he seems to doubt his
own argument. Even as Thomas defends the execution of the criminal from
society’s perspective, he writes that “in every man though he be sinful, we
ought to love the nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by
slaying him.”100 If no inherent conflict exists between the individual good
and the common good, why must “the nature which God has made” and
which “we ought to love” be destroyed?101
One can also see metaphysical elements in the significance Thomas at-
taches to the nature of human action. Recall that Thomas defends law’s
91. Id. at IIaIIae.64.1.

92. Cf. id. at IIaIIae.64.1, c. (“There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is.”).
93. Thomas does not think human society is literally organic. The community/body analogy can be
pressed too far. Cf. id. at IaIIae.17.4; id. at IIIa.8.1, ad 2. Nevertheless, Finnis may overstate the case
somewhat when he claims that “Aquinas firmly discourages attempts to understand human societies as
organisms or substances. There are analogies between organisms and societies; . . . but the disanalogies
are fundamentally more important.” FINNIS, supra note 22, at 25 (footnotes omitted).
94. ST IIaIIae 64.2, c.
95. Id. at IIaIIae.64.2, ad 3.
96. It is not clear that Thomas limits the death penalty to murder. See id. at IIaIIae.64.2, sc.
97. Thomas writes:
By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dig-
nity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into
the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to others. . . .
Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may
be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than
a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i. 1 and Ethic. vii. 6).
Id. at IIaIIae 64.2, ad 3.
98. See id.
99. Id. at IIaIIae.58.9, ad 3. On the other hand, the same cannot be said about the good of individu-
als: “[T]he good of one individual is not the end of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is
directed to the common good . . . .” Id.
101. Id.
close connection to reason as follows: (1) all actions are undertaken for an
end; (2) the distinctive feature of specifically human actions is that they
result from deliberation and reasonable choice.102 The principle in the genus
of human action is thus reason; (3) because reason is the principle of the
genus of human action, reason is the rule and measure of human action.
While the metaphysical thrust of the specific argument we have just
seen Thomas make is not unimportant,103 the real work in the argument is
done at a deeper yet still metaphysical level. To accept Thomas’s argument,
one must already have assumed that (1) the world has an externally given
order, (2) part of that order includes a distinctive human “essence,” and (3)
that essence involves using reason to act for a good end. These are contro-
versial assumptions, but if one is prepared to accept them, the argument
makes sense: it would be at least anomalous if rules binding humans to par-
ticular courses of action had no connection to someone’s reason.
On the other hand, those with doubts about the world’s orderliness are
not the only ones who may find Thomas’s justification implausible. As we
have just seen, Thomas’s metaphysical arguments in support of his account
of law show that his account depends crucially on his account of the human
person. Thus, even among those prepared to admit the existence of some-
thing like a human essence, accounts differ as to what that essence might be.
Though Thomas is participating in a long Christian tradition of identifying
reason as that which separates humans from other animals and thus consti-
tutes the “image of God,” alternative traditions also exist.104 If, for example,
the essence of human being (in theological terms, the “image of God”)105 is
to be a person living in mutually constitutive relations with other people (in
an “analogy of relation”106 to the Trinity),107 love, rather than reason, might
be taken to be the defining principle of authentic human action.108
III. HUMAN LAW’S ONTOLOGY
A. Is There Such a Thing as Law?
Implicit in Thomas’s attempt to define law is the assumption that it is

more than a nominal kind—a set of objects related only by a common name.
However, although Thomas believes in universals, he does not subscribe to
102. Cf. id. at IaIIae.1.1, c; id. at ad 3.

103. I.e., it relies on the assumptions that all actions are taken for an end, that natural kinds have
distinctive essences represented by characteristic actions, and that the orientation (principle) of such
actions is something against which they can be measured.
104. See generally G.C. BERKOUWER, MAN: THE IMAGE OF GOD 67-118 (Dirk W. Jellema trans.,
1962) (surveying alternatives).
105. GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR, supra note 20, at 193.
106. Id. at 206.
107. For a defense of a view like this, see id. at 193-211.
108. Interestingly, while this might make Thomas’s proof of reason’s place in law more difficult, it
would make his defense of law’s orientation to the common good much more straightforward than the
analogy he draws between the body politic and human bodies.
the Platonic notion that kinds (“human being,” “horse,” etc.) exist separately
from the objects that embody them. Rather, the archetypes for these features
of the created order are part of the eternal law, the blueprint by which God
made the world. To the extent the universals have any separate existence, it
is only as ideas in the mind of God.109
Does law exist separately from laws? It follows from the preceding
paragraph that Thomas would reject the existence of law as a singular entity
while affirming the existence of laws as the embodiment of the kind, law. If
law followed the order of things in the material world, we would expect to
find various human laws, natural laws, eternal laws, etc., that share the
characteristics of the species of law of which they are a part but not the
separate existence of a single, generic human law, natural law, eternal law,
etc., that encompasses all laws in each such category. Thomas equivocates
on this issue, however. He argues that while there are discrete precepts of
natural law, human law, and divine law, as well as “many types of things in
the Divine mind,”110 each type of law may be viewed as a unity because
“things, which are in themselves different, may be considered as one, ac-
cording as they are ordained to one common thing.”111 Because the various
kinds of law are ordained to the common good, each is rightly considered
law, as are the particular laws (or precepts) we might also identify.112
Thomas’s claim that human law is law raises a further question. We
shall see later113 that Thomas divides reality into two categories—things that
cannot be affected by human will and things that can be so affected. Al-
though the eternal and natural laws belong to the former category, human
law would seem to belong to the latter. How, if at all, does law’s human
authorship affect its status as law?
Thomas clearly does not think human authorship precludes human law
from obtaining the status of law. Human law is derived from natural law,
which human beings did not create, but it is not the same as natural law.
Indeed, Thomas gives human law its own category in his taxonomy in the
Treatise.114 Moreover, Thomas acknowledges that much human law in-
109. Cf. ST Ia.85.1, ad 1; COPLESTON, supra note 42, at 93-96.

110. ST IaIIae 93.1, obj. 1.
112. See id. (eternal law); id. at IaIIae.94.2, ad 1 (“All these precepts of the law of nature have the
character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept.”); id. at IaIIae.99.1, ad 1 (old
law). The reasoning concerning laws’ general orientation toward the common good would seem to
provide a basis for arguing the existence of a human law in addition to human laws. The question would
seem appropriate to the inquiry made in id. at IaIIae.91.3 (“Whether There Is a Human Law”), but Tho-
mas never (as far as I have been able to determine) claims that though many precepts of human law
exist, human law constitutes a unity. Indeed, he affirms Isidore’s division of human law into two sepa-
rate categories, the law of nations and the civil law, each derived from natural law in different ways. See
id. at IaIIae.95.4.
113. See infra Part IV.
114. Finnis writes:
[A] conceptual distinction or disconnection [between law and morality] is effortlessly estab-
lished by the move made in the Summa, of taking human positive law as a subject for consid-
eration in its own right (and its own name), a topic readily identifiable and identified prior to
any question about its relation to morality.
volves the “determination of particulars”; i.e., the resolution of details that,

as far as humans can determine, might defensibly be decided one way or the
other. Human law thus is not the “brooding omnipresence” so often decried
by natural law’s opponents.115 Rather, it consists of particular rules, and the
human sovereign puts it into effect. Unlike the other main instantiations of
law, human law is a cultural artifact; nevertheless, it is not created ex nihilo.
It reflects reality, including, but not limited to, the human capacity to use
reason to act for a good end and the moral reality of the temporal world it is
created to govern.
B. Unjust Laws
We have just seen that Thomas affirms both that human beings make
law and that human authorship does not prevent human laws from being
included in the generic category, law. Nevertheless, Thomas’s claims else-
where in the Treatise—in particular his statement that “that which is not just
seems to be no law at all”116—suggest that not every human enactment by a
person in political authority qualifies as law.
Thomas’s famous statement about unjust laws is perhaps the best-
known, and most controversial, feature of his account of human law. John
Finnis argues that, in order to understand Thomas at this point, one must
take into account the possible vantage points from which law may be exam-
ined.117 From the citizen’s perspective, saying that an unjust law is not law
may simply mean that immoral enactments are not binding in conscience
(except to avoid scandal), even if disobeying them may have adverse tem-
poral consequences.118 Thomas’s account of law is, however, not exclu-
sively intended as an ethical guide to the faithful, and his suggestion that
unjust laws are not law is more troublesome when read from the viewpoint
of the theologian/theorist119 or that of the lawyer or judge working in a legal
system in which morality is not a conventional part of the rules of recogni-
tion.120
Reading the Treatise as a whole, it seems evident that Thomas is not
concerned primarily with providing a universal legal rule of recognition.121
John Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM
195, 203-04 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
115. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
116. ST IaIIae.95.2, c (emphasis omitted); see also id. at IaIIae.96.4c (“[A] law that is not just, seems
to be no law at all.”).
117. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 365-66 (1980).
118. ST IaIIae.96.4.
119. The Summa is a work of theology. The theologian offers a presentation of law in theological
perspective. See infra notes 164-178 and accompanying text.
120. I.e., the rules enabling those in a society to recognize when a law is in effect. See generally
HART, supra note 5, at 77-96.
121. Cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 41 (Univ. Chi. Press
1979) (1765): “[The law of nature] is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no
human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force,
and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.” One may debate whether Black-
In Question 96, he clearly states that an unjust law sometimes should be

obeyed, as a matter of conscience, “to avoid scandal.”122 The “scandal”
Thomas has in mind is, of course, civil disobedience. The potentially scan-
dalized community, the citizen, and Thomas are all able to recognize that
this unjust enactment is a law as far as the community, its lawyers, and its
judges are concerned.123
Moreover, as noted above, Thomas is writing a work of theology, not a
legal treatise. As a result, he is interested in providing an external theologi-
cal (speculative) account of law and, secondarily, a work of ethics for the
faithful. Thus, his readers presumably are more interested in the questions
“How is human law related to God?” and “Does living rightly always entail
obedience to human law?” than in “What is the content of the human law?”
One thus might offer a summary rebuttal to the charge that Thomas denies
the status of law to immoral law as follows: Thomas merely holds that un-
just laws do not bind one’s conscience the way other laws do, even if they
are still laws from the sovereign’s perspective and their violation may result
in unhappy consequences for the lawbreaker.
Despite these plausible and important replies to his critics, it is hard to
read Thomas as saying other than that human law’s ontological status (i.e.,
its being law) depends on its connection to right reason. Consider Thomas’s
implicit appeal to the distinction between appearance and reality in this
statement from Question 93:
Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right rea-
son; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal
law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust
law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence. Nevertheless
even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law,
though being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the
eternal law; since all power is from the Lord God, according to Ro-
mans.124
stone intended this statement to suggest a rule of recognition. On one hand, his use of the words validity
and authority tend to suggest he does. On the other, as John Finnis points out, even in Blackstone’s
“blunt formulation[],” he is “affirm[ing] that unjust LAWS are not law.” FINNIS, supra note 117, at 364.
122. ST IaIIae.96.4, c.
123. As John Finnis has argued:
[The natural law] tradition explicitly (by speaking of ‘unjust laws’) accords to iniquitous
rules legal validity, whether on the ground and in the sense that these rules are accepted in the
courts as guides to judicial decision, or on the ground and in the sense that, in the judgment of
the speaker, they satisfy the criteria of validity laid down by constitutional or other legal
rules, or on both these grounds and in both these senses. The tradition goes so far as to say
that there may be an obligation to conform to some such unjust laws in order to uphold re-
spect for the legal system as a whole . . . .
FINNIS, supra note 117, at 365; see also Norman Kretzmann, Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex: Laws on Trial in
Aquinas’ Court of Conscience, 33 AM. J. JURIS. 99, 99 (1988). But see FINNIS, supra note 117, at 364
n.13 (citing ST IIaIIae.70.4, ad 2 and contrasting ST IIaIIae.57.1, ad 1) (noting that Thomas “does say
that an unjust judgment of a court is not a judgment”).
124. ST IaIIae.93.3, ad 2; see also id. at IaIIae.95.2, c (internal citations omitted):
Moreover, violence may be read not merely in the contemporary sense

of the imposition of will by brute force, but also in its Aristotelian context
as describing motion that hinders fulfillment of law’s telos.125 Unjust “laws”
move the community farther away from its happiness; law’s essence is to do
just the opposite. The most such enactments can do is appear to be laws.
The best way to understand Thomas’s position about human law’s rela-
tionship to reason is to take seriously Thomas’s belief that humans make
laws while simultaneously affirming that they do not make them ex nihilo
(out of nothing). All human law, says Thomas, is derived from the natural
law, which he defines as the human being’s participation in the eternal
law.126 Nevertheless, all law is not derived from natural law in the same
way. The jus gentium, or law of nations, are legal rules that are more or less
constant across time and place. These laws are derived from the natural law
“as . . . conclusion[s] from premises.”127 Civil law (jus civile), on the other
hand, is derived from the natural law “by way of determination of certain
generalities.”128 Thomas compares these “determinations” to the decisions
that an architect must make to finish a house that has been planned to have a
general shape but for which many of the details have been left unspeci-
fied.129 Significantly, human laws that are determinations can be expected to
vary across places and times “according as each political community de-
cides on what is best for itself.”130
Despite these acknowledged variations, Thomas continues to argue for
the universal connection between right reason and law. He explains the dis-
tinction between the two types of natural law derivation by analogizing be-
tween practical and speculative reason: Scientific knowledge (which in-
volves speculative or theoretical reason) includes “naturally known inde-
As Augustine says . . . that which is not just seems to be no law at all: wherefore the force of
a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from
being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as
is clear from what has been stated above . . . . Consequently every human law has just so
much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it de-
flects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.
Cf. id. at IaIIae.95.4, c (citing Aristotle for the proposition that tyrannical governments do not produce
law).
In ST IaIIae.96.4, c, Thomas also speaks of the force of human law as depending on its justice.
In that passage, he notes that laws are unjust if they are “contrary to human good” because they deviate
from the essentials of appropriate end, author, and form. Id. In that case, they are “acts of violence rather
than laws.” Id. Laws also “may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good” (e.g., commanding
idolatry). Id. The statements in ST IaIIae.96.4, obs. 1 aim to answer the question whether “human law
does . . . bind a man in conscience.” They thus arguably have a more practical than theoretical focus;
nevertheless, they are not inconsistent with the more theoretical statements made in Questions 93 and 95
(and quoted above).
125. See Simon Oliver, Motion According to Aquinas and Newton, 17 MOD. THEOLOGY 163, 167
(2001).
126. ST IaIIae.91.2, c; see infra note 217.
127. ST IaIIae.91.2, c.
128. Id.
130. Id.
monstrable principles”131 but is also gained when human effort and experi-
ence lead to “the conclusions of the various sciences.”132 Similarly, the
practical reason begins with the general principles of the natural law and,
through human effort and experience, arrives at determinations of the ac-
tions to be taken in particular cases.133 In some cases the most general prin-
ciples lead to legal rules in short order, as when “one should do harm to no
man”134 leads to prohibitions on murder or battery. In other cases, determin-
ing the appropriate rule must rely more on indirect reasoning from the natu-
ral principles and on experience with what has proven useful in the working
of the world.135
There are, for Thomas, two main reasons that legal rules vary notwith-
standing their supposed common origin in reason: (1) ruler error and (2) the
interaction between rules and context. First, although everyone knows the
most basic principles of practical reason (the natural law), some people are
unaware of the more specific principles. Unawareness or rejection of natural
law leads to differentiated and suboptimal law. Thomas primarily identifies
moral corruption as the reason the more detailed principles of natural law
are not known,136 but he also suggests that a (presumably blameless) lack of
wisdom or experience might account for such ignorance.137
The second source for variation is the seemingly limitless diversity of
human circumstances. Circumstantial diversity causes laws to vary with
time and place and also accounts for the fact that rules sometimes produce
unforeseen and perverse consequences. Thomas’s affirmation on the subject
of legal variation is straightforward: “The general principles of the natural
law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great
variety of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws
among various people.”138 The determinations represent judgments about
how the general principles of the natural law are to be applied in the cir-
cumstances at hand, and thus can be expected to vary according to time,
place, and the character of the people being governed.139 Thomas even

132. Id.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 139-140.
134. ST IaIIae.95.2, c (emphasis omitted).
135. Id. at IaIIae.95.2, c; cf. id. at IaIIae.91.3, c (discussing the relationship between custom and
utility); id. at IaIIae.94.5, c (discussing natural law by addition and subtraction).
136. Id. at IaIIae.94.4, c; cf. id. at IaIIae.94.6, c.
137. See id. at IaIIae.95.1, ad 2; IaIIae.95.2, ad 4. Thomas’s argument is based in part on a compari-
son between practical and speculative reason. Thomas holds that certain general principles of speculative
reason (e.g., the principle of non-contradiction) are always true and are generally known but that scien-
tific conclusions, although equally true, are not equally known to everyone. See id. at IaIIae.94.4, c
(“[T]hus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although
it is not known to all.”). Practical reason deals not with necessary truths but rather with what is to be
done (“contingent matters”). Id. Thomas argues that practical reason is similar to speculative reason in
that its general principles are always true and are generally known, and also in that its specific conclu-
sions are less widely known than the general principles. Id. Practical reason differs from speculative
reason in that its conclusions are variable and contingent rather than necessary. Id.
139. As to the latter, see id. at IaIIae.96.2, c.
speaks of “additions” to the natural law as human laws include provisions

that have been discovered to be conducive to human flourishing.140
Thomas also observes that rules sometimes “fail” and thus cannot al-
ways be implemented according to their express terms. Indeed, he explains
that the more specific a rule is, the more likely it is to fail occasionally in its
concrete application. For example, Thomas derives the rule that goods
should be returned to their owner from the more general principle that one
should act according to reason. The latter principle is general and is always
true. The former principle is usually true, but not always. Thus, even though
it is right “that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their
owner,”141 this principle should not be followed “if [the goods] are claimed
for the purpose of fighting against one’s country.”142 If the principle is made
even more specific, such as by adding the condition that goods held in trust
should be returned “with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a
way,”143 it is all the more likely that the principles should not be applied in
particular circumstances: “[T]he greater the number of conditions added, the
greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail . . . .”144
In addition to these two main causes, Thomas hints at a third source of
legal variation. As already noted, in his discussion of determinations, Tho-
mas analogizes these decisions to those an architect must make in “deter-
min[ing] the general form of a house to some particular shape.”145 This il-
lustration suggests that variations in law might be expected even absent
ruler “error” and even in similar cultural/historical contexts. While architec-
tural discretion is limited by the laws of physics, the type of building being
built, budget, topography, and a host of other factors, we would not expect
the details of each building to be precisely the same where the identity of
the architect is different. So, apparently, it is with law.
Nevertheless, there may be reasons to doubt whether Aquinas intended
to go quite this far in celebrating human freedom to make law. When the
problem of variation in human law is explicitly raised in Question 95 as an
objection to the claim that human law is derived from natural law, Thomas
140. Id. at IaIIae.94.5, c; cf . id. at IaIIae.91.3, c (“Wherefore Tully says . . . justice has its source in
nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which
emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the
law.”).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at IaIIae.95.2, c. The Latin artifex is translated craftsman in a popular English edition of the
Summa, but architect seems equally appropriate, since Thomas’s example is a person who gives a house
its particular shape. See also FINNIS, supra note 22, at 267 (arguing that the metaphor is intended to
“[stress] the designer’s wide freedom within the ambit of the commission”); George, supra note 12, at
23-29 (noting Thomas’s “stress on determinationes by which human lawmakers give effect to the re-
quirements of natural law in the shape of positive law for the common good of his community—
enjoying, to a considerable extent, the creative freedom Aquinas analogized to that of the architect—
reveals his awareness of the legitimate variability of human laws”).
attributes the variations to “the great variety of human affairs”146 and does
not mention the great variety of legislators and judges. In addition, Thomas
suggests elsewhere the single best determination for each case is contained
in the eternal law—the reasonable will of God.147 It is thus hard to avoid the
conclusion that any deviation from that right answer would be problematic,
even if it were inevitable.
Finally, it is worth noting that a rule’s ontological status as law does not
necessarily mean it must always be obeyed. As we have seen, in Thomas’s
thought, (1) reason, (2) political authority, and (3) a view to the common
good are necessary to constitute “law.” That said, just laws (presumably
even those derived rather directly from the natural law) may sometimes fail
in their application and should thus occasionally be disobeyed,148 and unjust
“laws” should be obeyed in some cases to avoid scandal.149 Perhaps surpris-
ingly, Thomas’s ethics do not in all cases tie the obligation to obey a gov-
ernmental command to its ontological status as law.150
146. ST IaIIae.95.2, ad 3.
147. Thomas comments:
[O]n the part of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, ac-
cording to certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of indi-
vidual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human
reason to proceed further to sanction them by law.
Id. at IaIIae.91.3, ad 1 (emphasis added). Significantly, the objection to which this reply is addressed is
that human law is not needed because natural law is sufficient to order human affairs. Id. at IaIIae.91.3,
obj. 1. Thomas’s answer is that human law is needed because natural law (humans’ participation in the
eternal law) is incomplete. Id. at IaIIae.91.3, c. Legislators fill this gap by making particular determina-
tions that, when reasonable, are binding. Id. The “particular determination” nevertheless is answered in
principle in the eternal law, though we lack direct access to the determination. Id.
That Aquinas should affirm this is not as surprising as it might seem at first blush. It merely
requires assuming that God, who is infinitely wise and just and who is all-knowing, is aware of the
determination that needs making and, thus, knows the best solution.
Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the general
welfare, it should not be observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an estab-
lished law that the gates of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a
general rule: but, if it were to happen that the enemy are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are
defenders of the city, it would be a great loss to the city, if the gates were not opened to them:
and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to the letter of the law . . . .
Id. at IaIIae.96.6, c. One might object that the issue raised in Thomas’s example is not one of disobedi-
ence but merely of interpretation, i.e., the lawgiver would not have intended the gate to be kept closed
under the circumstances; therefore, one who opened the gate would not be disobeying a valid law but
would merely be interpreting it correctly. Although Thomas does connect the authorized disobedience
with the lawgiver’s presumed intent to “maintain the common weal,” id., there are a number of other
aspects of the discussion that seem to call such a reading into question. Id. First, Thomas expressly
characterizes the case in view as one “wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful,” and con-
cludes that “it [i.e., the law at issue] should not be observed.” Id. Second, he requires that the letter of the
law be observed in such cases “if the observance of the law according to the letter does not involve any
sudden risk needing instant remedy,” because “it is not competent for everyone to expound what is
useful” to the political community. Id. In such cases the letter of the law must be followed until the
authorities can be consulted. Third, these authorities “have the power to dispense from the laws.” Id. The
“law” in this discussion is not an ideal but is a concrete rule that has the limitations that attend legisla-
tion.
150. This makes the comments about the relative force of human law and natural law all the more
confusing. Perhaps the difficulty can be resolved along the lines of Thomas’s account of human acts.
Many acts are not good or bad considered in the abstract; they take on moral qualities only in their
IV. ORDERS OF REALITY/METHODOLOGY
We already have seen that Thomas presupposes that law may be ana-
lyzed more or less as a natural kind, even though he recognizes that human
laws are constructs. Nevertheless, Thomas assumes that a single scientific
method is insufficient to enable investigation of all types of reality, and this
assumption affects his account of law. Thomas presupposes that there are
(1) different types of objects, (2) different modes of knowing, and (3) dif-
ferent intentions in the knower.151 First, Thomas emphasizes that more than
one kind of object may be known. He identifies four distinct types of sci-
ence that represent different objects of study and, indeed, different orders of
reality:
There is one order that reason does not establish but only beholds,
such is the order of things in nature. There is a second order that
reason establishes in its own act of consideration, for example,
when it arranges its concepts among themselves, and the signs of
concepts as well, because words express the meanings of the con-
cepts. There is a third order that reason in deliberating establishes in
the operations of the will. There is a fourth order that reason in
planning establishes in the external things which it causes, such as a
chest and a house.152
These orders are helpfully characterized as (1) natural science, (2) logic
(conceived broadly), (3) moral philosophy, and (4) technique.153
The objects of study represented in these orders may be divided roughly
according to whether their subject is things humans do or make (operabilia)
or things they do not (speculabilia). Thomas also divides knowledge into
the broad categories of speculative knowledge and practical knowledge.
When one considers an object that is what it is regardless of human willing
or thinking, the only available knowledge of it is speculative knowledge.
specific context. See id. at IaIIae.18.9, c; COPLESTON, supra note 42, at 206.
151. See MCINERNY, supra note 51, at 38-40 (discussing ST Ia.14.16).
152. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, Lect. 1, n.1 (C.I. Litzinger
trans., 1993), quoted in RALPH MCINERNY, AQUINAS 41 (2004).
153. Aquinas concludes that:
[S]ciences {scientiae} are of four irreducibly distinct {diversae} kinds: (1) sciences of mat-
ters and relationships {ordo} unaffected by our thinking, i.e. of the ‘order of nature {rerum
naturalium}’ studied by the ‘natural philosophy’ . . .; (2) the sciences of the order we can
bring into our own thinking, i.e. logic in its widest sense; (3) the sciences of the order we can
bring into our deliberating, choosing, and voluntary actions, i.e. the moral, economic, and po-
litical sciences compendiously called philosophia moralis; (4) the sciences of the multitude of
practical arts, the technologies or techniques which, by bringing order into matter of any kind
external to our thinking and willing, yield ‘things constituted by human reason.’
FINNIS, supra note 22, at 21 (footnotes omitted). John Finnis draws this summary not only from the
prologue to Thomas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics but also from the prologue to
his Commentary on the Politics. Id.; see also Jan A. Aertsen, Thomas Aquinas on the Good: The Rela-
tion Between Metaphysics and Ethics, in AQUINAS’S MORAL THEORY 235, 235-53 (Scott MacDonald &
Eleonore Stump eds., 1999).
Knowledge of other objects may be purely practical or mixed. Finally,

knowledge is sought with either practical or theoretical intentions—the
knower seeks knowledge either because he wishes to obtain it for its own
sake or because he wants to do something.154
Thomas’s categories suggest that because human law is an “operable”
not a “speculable,” the study of law will always fit broadly into the category
of practical reason. Nevertheless, even though human law is an “operable,”
it may be known either in practical or in theoretical mode. One may ap-
proach the study of law by asking a question like, “How does one draft leg-
islation?” Such an inquiry reflects a practical mode of knowledge. On the
other hand, one might ask a theoretical question such as whether more than
one type of law exists. Finally, even if one tries to know law in the practical
mode, one’s intentions may nevertheless be theoretical. Thus, both members
of Congress and graduate students may share an interest in how legislation
is drafted but may have very different motives for asking the question.
The application of Thomas’s general account of knowledge to the study
of law raises the question of the kinds of knowledge lawyers and legal
scholars are in the business of acquiring. Even if human law is a natural
kind in the sense that it exists as part of the world’s divine design, it re-
mains, to borrow from Thomas, an “operable” and not a “speculable.” Thus,
we should not be surprised when legal materials and processes are some-
what resistant to being fully accounted for through methodologies customar-
ily used in the natural sciences.155 Moreover, Thomas’s account suggests it
would be wrong to expect that the study of law should yield only one kind
of knowledge; practical and theoretical dimensions of legal scholarship can-
not neatly be hived off from each other.
Perhaps more significantly, Thomas’s account of the types of knowl-
edge raises the question of the general category into which knowledge of
the law might fit. Recall that his three categories of knowledge concerning
“operables” roughly correspond to logic, moral philosophy, and the “practi-
cal arts” (technique). Because he defines law as a rule and measure govern-
ing human action, Thomas treats law as a branch of moral philosophy. In-
deed, the Treatise on Law begins with the assumption that law, whether
natural or human, is given to regulate human action. Because practical rea-
son regulates human action, and because practical reason’s first principle is
154. MCINERNY, supra note 51, at 38-40; see also ST Ia.14.16, c.

155. John Finnis argues that the implications of Thomas’s view of orders of reality are crucial:
[H]uman actions, and the societies constituted by human action, cannot be adequately under-
stood as if they were merely (1) natural occurrences, (2) contents of thought, or (4) products
of techniques of mastering natural materials. . . . [H]uman actions and societies cannot be
adequately described, explained, justified, or criticized unless they are understood as also,
and centrally, the carrying out of free choices. For neither the making of free choices nor any
of their consequences regarded as such are reducible to nature, logic, or technique.
FINNIS, supra note 22, at 22; cf. 2 ALISTER E. MCGRATH, A SCIENTIFIC THEOLOGY: REALITY 199-227
(2002) (offering an account of reality as “stratified”). McGrath draws extensively on the work of Roy
Bhaskar. See generally ROY BHASKAR, FROM EAST TO WEST: ODYSSEY OF A SOUL (2000); ROY
BHASKAR, RECLAIMING REALITY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY (1989).
that good is to be done and evil avoided, no ultimate separation of law and
morality can exist.
However, it would be wrong to conclude that Thomas thinks law and
ethics are indistinguishable. If one of the Treatise on Law’s purposes is to
defend the claim that reason, authority, the common good, and publicity
unite law in all its manifestations, another equally important purpose is to
explain what distinguishes the various kinds of law from each other. Tho-
mas takes natural law to be the starting point for ethical deliberation in gen-
eral.156 Human law is distinguished from natural law in the following ways:
(1) Human law is derived from natural law.157 As we already have seen,
Thomas acknowledges that much human law consists of determination of
particulars, legal determinations that each political community makes as it
“decides on what is best for itself.”158 These decisions are not fully deter-
mined by the moral rules of the natural law but instead are the decisions of
“expert and prudent men . . . based . . . on its principles.”159 (2) Moreover,
human law is neither to repress every vice nor to prescribe all acts of vir-
tue.160 (3) And, because law derives much of its force from custom, it is not
to be changed whenever something better comes along.161 Nevertheless,
human law has in common with moral philosophy the aim of leading hu-
mans “to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually,”162 and its function, seen from
a theological perspective, is as an external restraint on human action tending
to lead humans to virtue.163
Might law appropriately be studied from vantage points other than
moral philosophy? There is reason to believe Thomas would be open to this
possibility despite his identification of law with rules governing moral con-
duct.164 Recall that the Treatise is part of a larger work of theology. In
Thomas’s framework, theological accounts of phenomena like human law
are “top-down” accounts.165 While philosophy proceeds from a considera-
tion of creatures “upwards” to a consideration of God, theology considers
God first and only then considers creatures in light of him.166 To be sure,
theologians consider the creation to learn more about God, as in the case of
156. Ralph McInerny, Ethics, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS, supra note 31, at 196,
208-12.
157. ST IaIIae.95.2, c.
158. Id. at IaIIae.95.4, c.; cf. id. at IaIIae.95.2, c.
159. Id. at IaIIae.95.2, ad 4. This looks like prudence that is similar to the sort of prudence required
for individual moral decision making when the rules run out. See MCINERNY, supra note 51, at 99-102
(discussing ST IaIIae.58.5, c); see also ST IaIIae.94.5, c (discussing changes to the natural law by “addi-
tion” and “subtraction”).
160. ST IaIIae.96.2, c; id. at IaIIae.96.3, c.
161. Id. at IaIIae.97.2, c. Note that law thereby is distinguished from technique.
163. See id. at IaIIae.90 (prologue) (considering “the extrinsic principles of acts”).
164. Cf. Robert P. George, One Hundred Years of Legal Philosophy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1533,
1548 (1999) (“[L]aw exists in what Aristotelians would call the order of technique, but it is created in
that order precisely for the sake of purposes that obtain in the moral order.”).
165. KRETZMANN, supra note 19, at 26-27.
166. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES II.4.5 (James F. Anderson trans., Univ.
Notre Dame 1975) (1956) [hereinafter SCG]; GILSON, supra note 20, at 21.
natural theology.167 They also study creatures’ origin in God and how crea-
tures are related to him.168 Nevertheless, Thomas says that while the natural
philosopher (scientist) is interested in the fact that fire has an “upward ten-
dency,”169 the theologian is interested in how it “represent[s] the sublimity
of God”170 and in the ways it is related to God,171 such as his creation of it
and its subjection to him.172 The point of a theological account of something
in the natural world thus is not to give an exhaustive account of it173 but to
set forth its significance in relation to God and his purposes for the crea-
tion.174
It follows that theological knowledge is primarily speculative “because
it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts.”175 When it
comes to divine things, the only type of knowledge humans can have is
speculative knowledge because such things are not open to human decision-
making.176 Nevertheless, theology necessarily must provide an account of
human acts because “man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of
God.”177 Thomas’s account of law (and thus of human law) is included in
the Summa because of law’s relationship to human acts. Theology has im-
plications for practical decision-making notwithstanding the fact that its
initial goal is not to provide practical wisdom.178
Two conclusions may be drawn from this discussion. First, the Summa’s
theological account of law need not preclude accounts of law undertaken
with nontheological motivations. Indeed, given that the Summa is primarily
a work of speculative reason, someone seeking practical wisdom might well
expect to find more directly useful sources elsewhere. Second, one sees in
this discussion that the boundaries between different sources of knowledge
are not, for Thomas, hermetically sealed. The example of fire is instructive
at this point. The study of fire by both scientists and theologians is entirely
appropriate, even if the foci of their respective inquiries are entirely differ-
ent.
167. See SCG, supra note 166, at II.2; see also id. at II.4.1 (“The Christian faith . . . regards fire . . .
as representing the sublimity of God . . . .”).
168. ST Ia.2 (introduction); see also id. at Ia.1.3, ad 2; Ia.1.7, c. Theology’s subject matter includes
both God and “everything other than God, but only as everything other than God relates to God as its
source and its goal . . . . Theology is about God considered in himself and considered in the fundamen-
tally explanatory source-and-goal relationships—primarily the relationships of efficient and final causa-
tion—to everything else, especially to the rational creature. It is in this way that the business of theology
is the single ultimate explanation of everything, the Grandest Unified Theory . . . .” KRETZMANN, supra
note 19, at 10.
169. SCG, supra note 166, at II.4.2.
170. Id. at II.4.1.
171. Id. at II.4.1 (“as being directed to Him in any way at all”); id. at II.4.2.
172. Id. at II.4.2.
173. Id. at II.2.
174. Id.
175. ST Ia.1.4, c.
176. See id. at Ia.14.16, c. (stating that human knowledge about divine things is speculative because
such things are “not operable by the knower”).
177. Id. at Ia.1.4, c.
178. See RALPH MCINERNY, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 62 (Univ. Notre Dame 1982) (1977) (classifying
this type of knowledge as “minimally practical knowledge or theoretical moral knowledge”).
Returning to the general categories of knowledge Thomas supplies, it

seems reasonable to think law might be understood in any of the four gen-
eral areas of scientific knowledge. The natural law tradition reflects Tho-
mas’s treatment of law as a branch of moral philosophy. Other schools of
legal thought emphasize law’s connections with other branches of knowl-
edge. Legal positivism and legal naturalism stress legal scholarship’s conti-
nuity with the methods of the natural and social sciences. Meanwhile, for-
malism emphasizes law’s connection to logic and rationality, and one can
see a focus on law as technique in sociological and economic jurists’ inter-
est in law as a tool for social engineering.
Thomas’s taxonomy of sciences seems on its face to exclude cultural or
historical perspectives on law. Interestingly, however, Thomas devotes a
significant part of his discussion of human law to the relationship between
law and custom.179 Law is closely related to ethics yet distinct from it.180
Similarly, law is related to, but distinguishable from, social custom. In
Thomas’s framework, though law always must be reasonable (and therefore
evil custom can never amount to law), social and cultural (and thus histori-
cal) context is a critical component of law.181 Thomas follows Justinian in
affirming that custom can make, abolish, and interpret law.182 Just as human
speech manifests reason and can result in “the creation, abolition, and inter-
pretation of law,”183 repeated and widespread action likewise manifests rea-
soned deliberation and can have the same effects with respect to law.184
Although Thomas may be prepared to accept knowledge about law from
sources other than moral philosophy, it would be wrong to assume that he
accepts the possibility of value-free knowledge about law in the sense that
we might pretend we knew nothing about law’s purpose and then study it
from that perspective. Much less would he be prepared to accept an account
of law that dismissed its integral connection to moral philosophy. Thomas is
famously committed to law’s fundamentally moral character: It is of the
essence of law to be a measure of human action, and practical reason is al-
ways to guide human action.185 Practical reason’s starting point is that
“good is to be done . . . and evil . . . avoided.”186 An account of law that
neglects this knowledge is unlikely to be a fruitful account.187 Moreover,
179. ST IaIIae.97.2, c; IaIIae.97.3, c; IaIIae.95.3, c. See generally DAVID VANDRUNEN, LAW AND
CUSTOM: THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW 25-55 (2003).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 157-163.
181. ST IaIIae.97.3, c.
182. VANDRUNEN, supra note 179, at 37-41; see also ST IaIIae.97.3, c.
183. VANDRUNEN, supra note 179, at 37.
184. See id. at 98-102 (discussing the relationship between utility and law in Thomas’s account). But
see ST IaIIae.91.3, c. (undercutting custom as resting on historical/cultural circumstances). The discus-
sion there suggests rather that customs emanate from “nature . . . by reason of their utility” and later are
“sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law.” Id. at IaIIae.91.3, c.
185. ST IaIIae.90.1, c.
187. See O’DONOVAN, supra note 35, at 46-52 (arguing that even generic, as opposed to teleological,
differentiation entails a moral component).
absent a robust sense of what law is for, the implications of facts learned
about law outside moral philosophy are far from clear.188
A potentially valuable feature of Thomas’s jurisprudence is thus its anti-
reductionist tendency. There is no mistaking Thomas’s commitment to prac-
tical reason (morality broadly defined) as the law’s controlling feature.
Nevertheless, Thomas tries not to reduce law to morality. He also traces
law’s relationships to political authority, history, revelation, and technique.
Law is related to all these fields of study but is not reducible to any of them.
Perhaps in an effort to “say something” about law, contemporary legal
scholarship tends toward reductionism by accounting for legal rules, or pro-
viding for new ones, based solely on one chosen dimension of knowledge
about law.189
V. BEING: HIERARCHICAL AND ANALOGICAL
A. The Hierarchy of Being: An Overview 190
Two of the most famous features of Thomas’s account of reality are his
claims that being is hierarchical and analogical. Thomas believes beings
exist in a hierarchy of perfection with God, the immutable, spiritual intel-
lect, at the top and with corruptible, inanimate matter at the bottom. In be-
tween (in descending order of perfection) are angels, humans, animals, and
plants. Inanimate objects occupy the spectrum’s lower end. Compounds are
more perfect than the raw elements because they display properties like
magnetism that they derive from heavenly bodies.191 Nevertheless, they are
ontologically inferior to plants because plants possess their own innate prin-
ciple of life, which Thomas calls a “soul” (though he does not mean to sug-
gest any sort of self-awareness or spirituality).192 Animals (and their souls)
are more perfect than plants because they are sentient beings, but they too
lack the capacity to reflect on what they perceive. Though Thomas refers to
humans’ intellectual capacities in terms of a human having a “rational soul,”
the human soul differs from that of other animate beings193 in that it is a
188. Finnis writes:

Should the theory of politics perhaps be replaced with a general theory of consumption and
consumer-satisfying institutions? Should the theory of law be absorbed into a general theory
of “social engineering” or of “markets”? One cannot answer such questions without ranking
features of human existence in terms of importance.
FINNIS, supra note 22, at 49.
189. The most obvious example approaches legal decision-making from the perspective of the so-
called “efficiency-minded judge.”
190. Readers familiar with Thomas’s account of being may wish to skip subparts A. and B. of this
Part.
192. Id.; see also SCG, supra note 166, at II.4.1.
193. Norman Kretzmann helpfully connects contemporary use of “animate” and “inanimate” (and
their derivation from anima) with Thomas’s description of rocks as not having souls and plants and
animals as having them. Norman Kretzmann, Philosophy of Mind, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
AQUINAS, supra note 31, at 128, 129.
principle both incorporeal and subsistent194 that is the human’s substantial

form. Within each category exist subcategories that likewise vary in perfec-
tion.
Thomas also believes substances can only know like substances.195 It
thus is significant that even though humans can apprehend reality only
through their five senses, the rational soul’s knowledge transcends sense
impressions. Humans’ ability to know abstract natures of things implies that
the soul is spiritual, not material, because the natures known through the
intellect are not sensible objects but are “altogether abstracted from matter
and material conditions, and without any bodily organ.”196 Because the na-
tures being known are real, but not material, the capacity for intellectual
understanding is for Thomas a fundamentally spiritual capacity, which hu-
mans have in common with beings above them in the hierarchical chain but
not those below. The human capacity for rationality is shared only with
spiritual beings: the angels and God. Rocks, plants, and animals are not self-
aware—of all material creatures, only humans are. The human soul thus
exists “on the borderline between corporeal and separate [i.e., purely spiri-
tual] substances.”197 Thomas identifies this spiritual capacity for rationality
as the “image of God” in humans.198
Higher beings also are relatively more actualized than lower ones.
Thomas holds that God, the highest being, distinct from the creatures, is
perfect because he is pure act; no unrealized potentiality exists in him. In
Thomas’s world, change is the result of potency becoming act—that is, of
relatively imperfect being moved to (or attracted to) some end. God’s acting
for an end would imply his being moved by something else and thus would
call into question his perfection and his place as the “unmoved mover.”
Even God’s creation of the world is done not to achieve any end, in Tho-
mas’s view, but only to communicate his goodness to the creatures.199
At the opposite end of the actualization spectrum200 is primary matter,
which is “pure potentiality.”201 Primary matter is not nothing; it exists, but
194. ST Ia.75.2, c; Kretzmann, supra note 193, at 131. The soul’s independent subsistence forms the
basis for its immortality. Id.
195. QDA 1, supra note 191, at 187-88.
197. Kretzmann, supra note 193, at 136 (quoting QDA 1, supra note 191, at Ic) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see id. at 152 n.23.
198. ST Ia.93.6, c.
199. Id. at Ia.9.1c; Ia.44.4, c.
200. Cf. QDA 1, supra note 191, at 189 (“The activities of elemental forms—the lowest and closest to
matter of all—don’t transcend the physico-chemical level of expanding and contracting and what seem
other ways of arranging matter.” (emphasis added)).
201. 2 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 326 (Contin-
uum 2003) (1950); id. (prime matter is “the indeterminate substrate of substantial change”); cf. ST
Ia.44.2, obj. 3 (“primary matter is only in potentiality”); AQUINAS, METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra
note 15, at VIII.1; GILSON, supra note 20, at 176-77; John F. Wippel, Metaphysics, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO AQUINAS, supra note 31, at 85, 111-12 (“pure potentiality”). In support of his assertion
that God created primary matter, Thomas cites Augustine’s statement that primary matter is “nigh unto
nothing.” ST Ia.44.2, sc.
never apart from a substantial form. Its existence is inferred from the fact
that sensible things change from one form to another. Prime matter is the
common underlying “stuff” that remains even as the substantial form
changes. Nevertheless, it is completely unactualized and therefore cannot
exist on its own. Again, between God and primary matter are the various
species of the created order. Thomas holds that differentiation inevitably
implies varying degrees of perfection in the creatures.202
B. Hierarchy and Analogical Knowledge
As noted above, one feature of Thomas’s hierarchical world is that crea-

tures’ ability to know the world is related to their place in the hierarchy of
being. Thomas, as a theologian, is especially concerned with what humans
can know of God through the created order. He holds that humans’ only
natural knowledge of God is indirect and largely negative.203 God is spirit,
and human minds can only receive sensory impressions. Nevertheless, as
we have already seen, human intellect is immaterial and can proceed be-
yond sense impressions:
As human intellect it must start from sense, from material beings,

but as human intellect it can proceed beyond sense, not being con-
fined to material essences, though it can do this only in so far as the
immaterial objects are manifested in and through the sensible
world, in so far as the material things have a relation to immaterial
objects. . . . [T]he intellect does not and cannot by its own power
apprehend God directly; but sensible objects, as finite and contin-
gent, reveal their relation to God, so that the intellect can know that
God exists.204
Even though humans cannot perceive God directly, Thomas argues, God’s
nature is manifested to some extent through the physical, tangible things he
has made.205
Nevertheless, because God is distinct from the created world, and be-
cause a vast gulf exists between God’s perfection and that of the creatures,
Thomas is quick to emphasize that God’s characteristics (especially his ex-
istence) cannot be predicated univocally of both God and creatures.206 Tho-
mas follows Aristotle in observing that the same word may be predicated of
different objects in three ways: (1) univocally, (2) equivocally, and (3) by
202. ST Ia.47.2.
203. See MCINERNY, supra note 178, at 118-25 (and sources cited); see also 2 COPLESTON, supra
note 201, at 347-62; 388-97.
204. 2 COPLESTON, supra note 201, at 393.
205. ST Ia.13.5 (citing Romans 1:20).
206. God is distinguished from the creation chiefly because he is the only being whose essence it is to
exist. All other beings derive their existence from him. ST Ia.3.4, c.
analogy.207 His account of analogical predication and its connection to the

hierarchy of being proves important for the Treatise on Law.
Univocal predication occurs when the things spoken about “share a
common term and the same account is associated with that term.”208
Equivocal predication occurs when different things “share the same name,
but a different account of the name is given in its various applications or
uses.”209 Thus, woman is used univocally when predicated of Laura Bush or
Hillary Clinton because the same account of the word’s meaning can be
applied to both. On the other hand, bee may be used equivocally to describe
either an insect or a spelling competition. The word’s use is appropriate in
either instance but only because more than one account of what is meant by
bee is available to the speaker.
Thomas, again following Aristotle, also identifies a third category of
predication involving words that have multiple possible meanings, but
whose meanings, though different, bear some relationship to each other—
the accounts to which they refer are similar in some respects and different in
others.210 Thus, healthy may be predicated analogically of a body or of
medicine or of urine. The meanings of healthy in each case are related but
different: A body is healthy if all its parts are functioning well, medicine is
healthy if it causes health in a body, and healthy urine is one indication that
a body is functioning well.211
Thomas’s most famous use of the concept of analogy occurs in connec-
tion with his account of being. Because God, unlike everything else in the
universe, is self-existent, his being is categorically different from creaturely
“being.” Thomas thus holds that being and other attributes of God, when
predicated of God and of creatures, can only be understood analogically.
Moreover, the analogy’s primary term is the characteristic as found in God,
with the analogous human characteristic being both essentially like and
unlike the analogous divine quality. Humans know something of what God
is like from the world he has made, but they must be careful not to forget
that God’s instantiation of the relevant attribute is not subject to creaturely
limitation and imperfection and thus is qualitatively different from crea-
turely instantiations of the same attribute.212 Thomas’s use of analogy at this
point is a matter of both linguistics and ontology.
A corollary of the analogical nature of being is that things known most
easily and directly in the natural world may in fact be less important (and
even less real) than similar realities that are invisible yet analogous.213 Thus,
207. ST Ia.13.5, c.
208. MCINERNY, supra note 178, at 134-35.
209. Id. at 135.
210. Id. at 136.
211. ST Ia.13.5, c. cf. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS: BOOKS Γ, Δ, and Ε Γ2, at 1003a33-1003b6 (Chris-
topher Kirwan trans., 2d ed. 1993)(350 B.C.).
212. ST Ia.13.4, c; Ia.13.5, c.
213. See id. at Ia.84.7, ad 3; SIMON, supra note 51, at 110-12. See generally Yves R. Simon, On
Order in Analogical Sets, 34 THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM 1, 16-26 (1960).
in the Treatise on Law, Thomas takes human law as the starting point for his
general definition of law. Humans can observe human law directly. Obser-
vation discloses human law’s intimate relation to reason, its orientation to
the common good, its origin in appropriate political authority, and its public
nature.214
Significantly, however, Thomas presupposes that what can be known
about human law may help illuminate other, less directly observable reali-
ties that go by the name “law,” most notably the “higher” eternal and natu-
ral laws.215 While insights about human law can be applied to higher law
only by analogy, they nevertheless are presupposed to provide insight about
those higher laws. The bases for this assumption are that God reveals him-
self through his effects—through what he has made—and that these effects
have varying degrees of perfection. As a result, the “lower” material things
directly accessible to human perception reveal, albeit only by analogy,
“higher” effects of God.
C. Hierarchy, Analogy, and the Treatise on Law
What difference does this make for Thomas’s account of law and espe-
cially human law? The most obvious consequences are found in the discus-
sion of the kinds of law in Question 91. Here he discusses in turn eternal
law, natural law, human law, divine law, and even the “law” in the fomes of
sin.216 Thomas is at pains to justify treating divine providence (eternal law),
ethics (natural law), jurisprudence (human law), Scripture (divine law), and
even the human tendency toward sin as part of the same phenomenon: law.
Analogy and hierarchy are his main devices for ordering this group of re-
lated, though obviously different, things. Thomas draws a clear hierarchical
relationship among eternal law, natural law, and human law. Eternal law—
the plan for the governance of the universe existing in the mind of God—is
the ultimate authority. Human law gets its authority by being derived from
natural law, which is itself a “participation” of the eternal law.217 This is the
214. ST IaIIae.90, c.
215. See id. at IaIIae.93.5, c, in which Thomas begins with the more familiar and more observable
human law and draws an analogy to describe the operation of the eternal law.
216. See id. at IaIIae.91.6, obj. 1. The fomes of sin refers to the human inclination toward sin St. Paul
decries in Romans: “[B]ut I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and
bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.” Romans 7:23.
217. John Wippel explains “participation” as follows:
If a particular quality or characteristic is possessed by a given subject only partially rather
than totally, the subject is said to participate in the quality or characteristic. Because other
subjects may also share in that perfection, each is said to participate in it. No one of them is
identical with it.
Wippel, supra note 201, at 93; cf. FINNIS, supra note 117, at 399 (“A quality that an entity or state of
affairs has or includes is participated, in Aquinas’s sense, if that quality is caused by a similar quality
which some other entity or state of affairs has or includes in a more intrinsic or less dependent way.”).
See generally id. at 398-403. For a discussion of the distinction between Platonic understandings of
participation and Thomas’s understanding, see MCINERNY, supra note 178, at 118-25. Elsewhere, Finnis
translates participatio as “sharing out”: “And so it is clear that the natural law is precisely the sharing out
of the eternal law in the rational creature . . . .” FINNIS, supra note 22, at 308 n.64 (translating a portion
clearest operation of Thomas’s analogy/hierarchy presupposition. Law is

defined by beginning with human law, and the definition of law so derived
is read back, albeit analogically, into higher features of reality. It turns out
that just as human law is the product of reason, is promulgated, and is ori-
ented toward the common good, the same can be said of eternal and natural
law. With that being said, different notions of promulgation, common good,
and reason are required to complete the chain. “Law” is not predicated
univocally of each of the three types, only by analogy.
Whereas the natural law and human law direct humans with respect to
their earthly happiness, divine law is a necessary part of the laws governing
humans because humans have a supernatural end in addition to their natural
end. Because they cannot naturally perceive things conducive to their spiri-
tual welfare, revelation is needed. Thomas also notes (1) Scripture’s use-
fulness in teaching the appropriate judgments on “contingent and particular
matters”218 that otherwise would be in dispute were natural law the only
guide to decision, (2) God’s competence to prescribe rules for “interior
movements” whereas human law’s competence extends only to “exterior
acts,” and (3) the necessity that Scripture should forbid “all sins,” which
would be impossible for human authorities to do.219
Thomas has to work harder to justify the inclusion of the “law of the
‘fomes’ of sin” in Question 91.220 Thomas has in mind here the human ten-
dency not to do what one knows to be the right thing to do. This appropri-
ately is called a law, he argues, both because it resembles a natural inclina-
tion within a person—Thomas holds that it is actually a “deviation from the
law of reason” and for this reason it is not really a law221 —and because the
inclination is “a penalty following from the Divine law depriving man of his
proper dignity.”222
Given Thomas’s presupposition that the things we observe in the world
may have something to teach us about unseen realities, one would expect
Thomas’s account of natural law and eternal law to be shaped more by his
account of human law than vice versa. Indeed, some Protestant theologians
criticize Thomas’s description of God’s relationship to the world in terms of
“eternal law” as too Platonic and insufficiently Christological. The typical
charge is that Thomas has taken Plato’s Ideas and relocated them in the
of ST IaIIae 91.2, c.).

Russell Hittinger recently has argued on the basis of Thomas’s statement that natural law is a
participation of the eternal law that in Thomas “[t]here are not four or five kinds of law, but only two.
Law that proceeds from the divine mind and law that proceeds from the human mind; as Augustine said,
one is eternal and the other is temporal.” HITTINGER, supra note 22, at xi (citing Stephen Louis Brock,
The Legal Character of Natural Law According to St. Thomas Aquinas ch. 2-C (1988) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. Toronto)).
218. ST IaIIae.91.4, c.
219. Id.
220. Id. at IaIIae.91.6, obj. 1.
222. Id.
mind of God.223 The Bible depicts the second person of the Trinity not only
as the pre-incarnate Logos (the primary mode of Christ’s depiction in the
Summa)224 but also as taking on human form, living as a poor, itinerant
prophet, and being put to death by the authorities.225 The dominant image of
God in the Treatise on Law is that of supreme governor who does his will
through commands to inferior governors, an image that arguably understates
God’s personal interaction with the world.226
Not only, as we have just seen, does Thomas’s picture of human law
and lawmaking influence his theology, but his theology also affects his ac-
count of human law and specifically his account of how human law gets its
authority. Thomas declares emphatically that “every human law has just so
much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature.”227 How-
ever, human law can be derived from natural law in either of two ways.
Laws with a close connection to the clearest ethical principles of the natural
law (e.g., laws against murder) are derived “as a conclusion from prem-
ises”228 and have force from both human law and natural law. Other laws
that do not have a close fit with obvious natural law principles (here Tho-
mas gives as examples the penalties for murder or other crimes) are “deter-
minations” and have “no other force than that of human law.”229
Thomas apparently considers both types of human law to be, ontologi-
cally speaking, law because both meet the minimum qualifications of being
derived from natural law. Determinations, however, carry less weight in
some unspecified respect. Given that both types of law are enforceable by
the civil authority and binding on the conscience,230 the additional “force”
223. See, e.g., GUNTON, THE TRIUNE CREATOR, supra note 20, at 101-02. But see Jean-Marc Laporte,
Christ in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: Peripheral or Pervasive?, 67 THE THOMIST 221, 221-48
(2003).
224. See ST Ia.34.1, ad. 2.
225. See, e.g., N.T. WRIGHT, JESUS AND THE VICTORY OF GOD 147-97 (1996).
Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government is de-
rived by secondary governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done
in a state flows from the king’s command to his inferior administrators: and again in things of
art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the under-
craftsmen, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in
the Chief Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived
from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the eter-
nal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the eter-
nal law.
ST at IaIIae.93.3, c.
It hardly seems likely that Thomas adopted this picture of God’s governance based solely on its
resemblance to human government and lawmaking. One difficulty with the application of the idea of
analogy in this way is that it necessarily involves decisions about which analogies should be pursued and
which should not. Cf. 3 MCGRATH, supra note 32, at 113-19 (discussing the authority of analogies).
227. ST IaIIae.95.2, c.
229. Id. at IaIIae.95.2, c; see supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text (discussing determina-
tions).
230. ST IaIIae.96.4, c.
added by the more direct derivation from ethical first principles is un-
clear.231
Perhaps the obscurity may be removed as follows: Thomas suggests in
Question 91 that all legal questions have a right answer. In principle, the
eternal law, the reasonable will of God, contains each case’s appropriate
determination.232 Although the eternal law contains a best answer in every
case, human beings do not have direct access to every such answer. Never-
theless, we do have natural knowledge of the general principles of the natu-
ral law. (Recall that, for Thomas, natural law is a “participation of” the eter-
nal law—the limited imprint of the divine light on human beings.233) We
thus can make some sense of the hierarchy of authority within human law at
which Thomas gestures in Question 95: Human laws instantiating the first
principles of natural law known to all humans carry the highest possible
authority; their authority stems not merely from their enactment by proper
political authorities but also from their status as part of the eternal law—
God’s will for humans generally. Human laws derived directly from these
first principles as “conclusions from premises”234 carry similar though
slightly attenuated standing. Laws enacted by appropriate authorities with a
view to the common good and with apparent (though not infallible) reason
have the force of human law,235 i.e., less force than laws that carry the im-
primatur of the natural law itself. Nevertheless, they are rules that bind
prima facie the religious believer’s conduct.236
One implication of Thomas’s analysis is that what gives human law its
authority is primarily divine reason, not created human reason. The best
law, or at least the strongest law, is the one that involves as little human will
as possible given the nature of the created order. To his credit, Thomas does
not deny the role of human will in his account of human law, rightly observ-
ing that much human law is linked to obvious ethical principles only in a
tenuous way. The acknowledgment, however, is somewhat begrudging. The
freedom humans enjoy to use their reasoning capacity to fashion laws (even
good laws) and the appropriate diversity of human law are alluded to237 but
neither celebrated nor explored. Indeed, as we have seen, Thomas attributes
diversity of law not primarily to a degree of divinely permitted freedom in
lawmaking but mainly to ignorance of the natural law and “the great variety
231. John Finnis suggests that Aquinas’ statement that determinations have their force “from human
law alone,” “goes further than the [Aquinas’] analysis itself warrants,” and that it would be more accu-
rate to say that determinations have force because of reason and because they have been enacted. FINNIS,
supra note 22, at 267.
232. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
233. ST IaIIae.91.2, c.
235. Cf. id. at IaIIae.96.2, ad 3 (“human law falls short of the eternal law”); Ia.13.5, c (natural causes
“fall short” when they reproduce themselves in less perfect beings).
236. See FINNIS, supra note 22, at 267-74.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 126-130 (discussing the various foundations for and varia-
tions of derived human laws).
of human affairs.”238 The emphasis is primarily on the “right answer”

known at once to God239 and to “expert and prudent men,”240 if not to ordi-
nary humans.241 These features of his account provide the grain of truth in
derisive comments about the “brooding omnipresence” of natural law. The
thought that the answers to all questions are already present in the eternal
law, and that law’s authority consists primarily in its reason, easily can lead
to the temptation to seek a priori answers to legal questions.
In Thomas’s defense, the eternal law from which human law derives its
authority includes God’s control over the identity of the community’s rul-
ers.242 Moreover, Thomas notes the role of prudence and gradual accumula-
tion of human knowledge about law, which can serve as the basis of future
reasonable decisions.243 If all that Thomas has in mind when he says all
human law is derived from the natural law is that humans will make law by
reasoning based on their accumulated moral and technical experience of
law’s operations, his account would seem to leave adequate room for human
freedom. At the same time, the more important this sort of lawmaking is to
human law, the less significant human law’s “derivation” from natural law
would seem to be.
CONCLUSION
Thomas’s metaphysical orientation creates a wide gulf between his

thought and conventional Anglo-American jurisprudence. To be sure, many
of his arguments are unpersuasive because they proceed a priori from con-
testable assumptions about being in general or the human person. Neverthe-
less, taking Thomas’s metaphysics seriously permits us to see places where
contemporary legal scholarship might profit from following his lead.
The most promising of these are related to Thomas’s methodology. One
thing that enables Thomas to proceed with his analysis of law is the convic-
tion that human law, though man-made, is an inherent part of the natural
order and is therefore capable of being studied coherently. The reasons why
that presupposition has been called into question cannot be simply forgot-
ten, but neither should one pretend that conceptual analysis has been a satis-
factory substitute for the traditional study of law itself.
238. ST IaIIae.95.2, ad 3.
240. ST IaIIae.95.2, ad 4.
241. Id. at IaIIae.93.1, ad 1. Thomas’s rejoinder might well be that God, in his infinite knowledge
and wisdom, could do the best possible job of legislating and adjudicating or that the statement is in-
tended to show that practical reasoning about determinations is not merely a subjective matter. These
statements no doubt are unobjectionable to Christian believers as far as they go, but they do not address
the question of whether God has taken jurisdiction over such matters or whether part of his good inten-
tion might be to leave humans free, within broad parameters, to make their own arrangements about
earthly political order. Cf. William S. Brewbaker III, Found Law, Made Law and Creation: Re-
Examining Blackstone’s Declaratory Theory, 22 J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming 2006-2007).
242. ST IaIIae.93.1, c.
243. See, e.g., id. at IaIIae.97.1-97.3 (discussing change in human law and the relationship between
custom and law). See generally VANDRUNEN, supra note 179.
Indeed, other features of Thomas’s methodology might lend some

needed methodological coherence to legal scholarship. I do not mean coher-
ence in the sense of prescribing a monistic approach to legal scholarship but
rather just the opposite. Thomas’s account of the various orders of reality
and of practical and theoretical wisdom, combined with his sensitivity to the
concerns different sciences bring to the objects they study, provide a ready
vocabulary for explaining the wide variety of approaches one observes in
legal scholarship. In particular, Thomas is sensitive to the idea that one’s
methodology for studying a subject should not proceed a priori as if all ob-
jects of study were the same but should proceed so as to discover what
method of study best suits the object being investigated. One can easily
imagine, as Thomas does, that civil law, being a product of human reason
and freedom, might require a methodology different from, say, geology.
Moreover, one may study law with either practical or theoretical intentions,
and those intentions may vary depending on the student’s interest. As Tho-
mas’s account itself demonstrates, the theologian may have a quite different
interest in the study of law than the jurist.
It may be that legal scholars find fault with Thomas to some degree be-
cause his interests differ from theirs. The vast majority of law practice,
judging, and legal analysis is concerned with what Thomas calls the “de-
termination of particulars.” Thomas can be praised for recognizing that
these determinations cannot simply be deduced from moral principles, but
his short treatment of law provides little guidance as to what makes a de-
termination good. One can imagine his responding that it is not the theolo-
gian’s job to supply the jurist with such answers.
Although Thomas is a theologian and not a lawyer, this answer is not
entirely sufficient. Thomas’s emphasis on the (ontologically) higher eternal
and natural law tends to undercut human law’s integrity in its own right.
Thomas appears to insist that human law’s authority is connected not just to
human reason but also to divine reason. The result is that Thomas has diffi-
culty giving a satisfying account of human freedom in lawmaking, even as
he acknowledges that earthly rulers enjoy a substantial amount of freedom
to act reasonably in making law.
The Four Kinds of Law
According to St. Thomas
By
Daniel A. Gannon
[email protected]
Copyright © Deacon Daniel Gannon

Introduction
St. Thomas Aquinas identifies four types of law in his Summa Theologica – eternal law, natural
law, human law and divine law. We will explain the meaning of these four types of law,
according to St. Thomas, and elucidate how they are related and distinguished from one another.
There are many ways we could go about this discussion, but it seems fitting to begin with the
eternal law, moving then to natural law and human law, since this order of consideration
comports with how these types of law flow from one another. Finally, we will discuss the divine
law – God’s personal revelation to man, and how the divine law illumines man’s darkened
intellect and disordered will to his dignity, eternal value and destiny. The goal of our discussion
is to more clearly understand how man participates in God’s law – a law “written on our hearts”
(cf. Rom. 2:15), which is ultimately manifested as Christ’s New Law of love and grace. The
Catechism teaches, “there are different expressions of the moral law, all of them interrelated:
eternal law-the source, in God, of all law; natural law; revealed law, comprising the Old Law and
the New Law, or Law of the Gospel.”1 Man’s participation and cooperation in God’s law leads to
true beatitude and eternal life.
The Eternal Law
St. Thomas says that, “law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is
restrained from acting…”.2 He also characterizes law as something brought into being via reason
when he says “law is something pertaining to reason”, since the rule and measure of human acts
1
Catechism of the Catholic Church, (CCC), (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994), 1952.
2
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), q. 90, a. 1. He goes on in the same
article to explain that, “lex [law] is derived from ligare [to bind], because it binds one to act.” Cf. Ibid., q. 90, a. 4
“The definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good,
made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.”
is reason.3 Now, the eternal law is nothing other than the divine governance of all things. This
governance is an act of intellect (reason) in God, according to St. Thomas, and “since the Divine
Reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Proverbs 8:23,
therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.”4 God’s governance is more than the
mere order and nature of the physical universe. Pope John Paul II notes, importantly, that God
provides in a special way for man, in that, “God’s wisdom is providence, a love which cares …
for man not ‘from without’… but ‘from within’, through reason…”5 So, we begin to see that
God’s rational order of “all things visible and invisible”6, consists in His providential Will to
order all things to His glory and love. This is realized most perfectly in the rational creature’s
participation, through reason and will, in the eternal law of God. This eternal law of God is
imprinted in the rational nature of man, according to Thomas. This leads us to what he calls – the
“natural law”.7
The Natural Law
The natural law is summarized by Thomas in his Summa:
Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most
excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both
for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a
3
Cf. Ibid. “Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, …
since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the
Philosopher (De Physica ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for
instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently it follows
that law is something pertaining to reason.”
4
Summa, q. 91, a. 1. Pope John Paul II observes in Veritatis Splendor, how St. Augustine defines the eternal law as,
“the reason or the will of God, who commands us to respect the natural order and forbids us to disturb it.” John Paul
II, Encyclical Letter, Veritatis Splendor, (August 6th, 1993), n. 43.
5
VS, n. 43.
6
Denzinger, Council of Nicea: Nicene Creed, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, (Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto
Publications, 2002), p. 26.
7
Cf. Summa, q. 91, a. 2.
natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in
the rational creature is called the natural law.8
Man “participates” or partakes of the eternal law and will of God through his active, intelligent
cooperation. William May explains this well when he says, “The eternal law is ‘in’ them both
because they are ruled and measured by it and because they actively rule and measure their own
acts in accordance with it.”9 It is thus in man properly and formally as “law”, since man’s actions
proceed from reason. While the source of the eternal law, viz. God, is extrinsic to man, it seems
man’s participation of the eternal law (i.e. the natural law) is something intrinsic to man – it is
“imprinted” on our very nature, according to St. Thomas.10 Hence, if man’s acts are in accord
with what Thomas calls the imprint of “Divine Light” on him, his actions will be in accord with
his nature (given him by God’s eternal design/”law”), with reason and be directed toward a full
realization of his eternal destiny (revealed via the divine law) and thus – his true happiness.
There is potential for confusion between the eternal and natural law, since we are told in
Veritatis Splendor that, “the natural law is itself the eternal law, implanted in beings endowed
with reason, and inclining them towards their right action and end; it is none other than the
eternal reason of the Creator and Ruler of the Universe.”11 But we should make the qualification
that the natural law is “entitatively distinct from the eternal law that exists in God … it is not
something ‘other than’ the eternal law… it is a reality brought into being through reason; it is a
8
Ibid. Cf. VS, n. 43, where John Paul II describes, “natural law as the human expression of God’s eternal law.”
9
William May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, (Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor, 2003), p. 73.
10
Cf. Summa, q. 91, a. 2.
11
Cf. VS, n. 44, quoting Encyclical Letter Libertas Praestantissimum (June 20, 1888): Leonis XIII P.M. Acta, VIII,
Romae 1889, 219.
work of human intelligence as ordered to action.”12 This is the sense in which St. Thomas says
that man, “participates” in the eternal law via reason – this act of “participation”, rationally and
freely – is called the natural law.13
Upon establishing the origin and definition of natural law, Thomas observes that the first thing
reason ordered to action (practical reason) grasps in this regard is … the good.
Consequently, the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of
good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the first
precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. " All
other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical
reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the
natural law as something to be done or avoided.14
This is the law St. Paul refers to as being “written on our hearts” (Rom. 2:15), which is a
beautiful expression of how the eternal law is apprehended by reason and “calls out” to man’s
conscience and heart. These inclinations planted in man – by God, help order man to his ultimate
good – eternal happiness.15 Self-evident principles flow from Thomas’ first precept ‘do good,
avoid evil’, such as: “harm no man”; “provide for offspring”; “give another his due”.16 God is the
12
May, p. 74. “As such and properly, then, natural law is for St. Thomas an achievement of practical reason. It
consists of a body or ordered set of true propositions formed by practical reason about what is to be done.” He goes
on to note in his footnote on this that there are non demonstrable starting points or principles in both the practical
and speculative intellect, which are not two reasons in man, but two ways reason is exercised.
13
Cf. Charles Rice, 50 Questions On the Natural Law, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999), p. 51, describes natural
law as, “a rule of reason, promulgated by God in man’s nature, whereby man can discern how he should act. ‘The
natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man’s mind so as to be known by him
naturally.’” (quoting Summa, q. 91, a. 4); Cf. Smith, Lecture 2: Since natural law is based upon reason, it follows the
ethics of natural law is a universal ethics, because all human beings are rational creatures
14
Summa, q. 94, a. 2. ; Cf. VS, n. 44, where John Paul II states, “Man is able to recognize good and evil thanks to
that discernment of good from evil which he himself carries out by his reason, in particular by his reason
enlightened by Divine revelation and by faith…”
15
Cf. Rice, p. 52. Rice notes the basic inclinations in man include: a) to seek the good, including the highest good,
God; b)to preserve himself in existence; c) to preserve the species – conjugal relations; d) to live in community with
others; e) to use his intellect and will – to know the truth and make judgments.
16
author of nature and thus the author of natural law – to live in accord with the natural law is to
live according to the true good – God’s will.17 However, St. Thomas warns the concupiscence of
original sin and personal sin in man can lead him to reach the wrong conclusions and actions,
which are contrary to the true good.18 The Catechism notes subjective culpability may be
mitigated or diminished, but affirms some acts are always objectively wrong.19 We are now
getting to more particular determinations man makes from natural law precepts. St. Thomas calls
these particular determinations human law.
Human Law
St. Thomas describes human law by stating, “it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from
general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more
particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human
reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed.”20
17
Cf. Ibid.
18
Cf. Summa, q. 94, a. 6. He states the natural law, “is blotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as
reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence
or some other passion, as stated above (Q77,A2). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can
be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect
of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural
vices, as the Apostle states (Romans 1), were not esteemed sinful.”
19
Cf. CCC, 1755 – 56. Cf. CCC, 1776, speaking of the objective nature of the natural law: “Deep within his
conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling
him to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, sounds in his heart at the right moment. . . . For man has in his
heart a law inscribed by God. . . . His conscience is man's most secret core and his sanctuary. There he is alone with
God whose voice echoes in his depths.” Cf. VS, n. 79-80: “The primary and decisive element for moral judgment is
the object of the human act … reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature
incapable of being ordered to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image.”
Such acts are called “intrinsically evil” (intrinsece malum) acts, which are “always and per se…on account of their
very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances.”
20
Summa, q. 91, a. 3.
Those “conditions” are enumerated in his basic description of law, which is “an ordinance of
21
reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.”
So, we see a procession from universal to particular as we move from man’s apprehension and
participation of the eternal law via reason (which we call natural law and its immediate precepts)
to particular, human laws, which should reflect and conform to God’s eternal law.
Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the
plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law.
But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the eternal law.
Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the
eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Libero Arbitrio i,6) that "in temporal law
there is nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal law."22
Human laws must be ordered to God’s eternal law, which is apprehended by an act of reason in
the natural law precepts. Human law is thus derived from natural law.23 For example, one may
derive a law prohibiting murder from the natural law precept, “harm no man”.24 The natural law
functions as both a guide for human laws to benefit the common good (e.g. family and
economically favorable laws), and as a protection against laws violating natural law precepts
(e.g. abortion, euthanasia).25 Such human laws which violate natural law (or divine law) are
unjust and constitute, “acts of violence rather than laws.”26 St. Augustine noted, “a law that is not
21
Summa, q. 90, a. 4.
22
Summa, q. 93. a. 3.
23
Cf. Rice, p. 62.
24
Ibid.; Rice calls this example a derivation of human from natural law “by conclusion”.
25
Ibid., p. 63
26
S umma, q. 96, a. 4.; Cf. Ibid. “Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid
scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his right, according to Matthew 5:40,41: "If a man.
. . take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever will force thee one mile, go with him other
two."
just, seems to be no law at all.”27 Such laws are not binding in conscience. This is a prescription
for limited government, which recognizes the divine foundation, universality and permanency of
God’s eternal and natural law, as well as the limitations of what government can require or deny.
It is also a limitation on what is often called in modern society “individual rights” or “rights to
privacy”, which in certain cases veil destructive and even murderous acts and even give them
28
protection under the “law”. Pope John Paul II states, “the natural law expresses the dignity of
the human person and lays the foundation for his fundamental rights and duties.”29 Authentic
human law promotes and protects these rights and duties expressed in the natural law. This leads
us to ask: How can man have certitude about his rights and duties to God?
The Divine Law
St. Thomas affirmed the necessity of Divine Revelation for man’s acts to be directed towards his
supernatural end – the Beatific Vision. “Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary
for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law.”30 The Divine Law includes both the
Old and the New Testament. St. Thomas stated the Divine Law was necessary because there
Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing to
idolatry, or to anything else contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must nowise be observed, because, as
stated in Acts 5:29, "we ought to obey God rather than man."
27
Ibid. citing St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio i,5.
28
Cf. VS, n. 51: “The separation which some have posited between the freedom of individuals and the nature which
all have in common … obscures the perception of the universality of the moral law on the part of reason. But
inasmuch as the natural law expresses the dignity of the human person and lays the foundation for his fundamental
rights and duties, it is universal in its precepts and its authority extends to all mankind. This universality does not
ignore the individuality of human beings … it embraces at its root each of the person’s free acts. .. When on the
contrary they disregard the law, our acts damage the communion of persons, to the detriment of each.”
29
Ibid.
30
Summa, q. 91, a. 4.
needed to be a law given by God, proportionate to man’s supernatural end; because of the
uncertainty of human judgment; because human law cannot curb or direct interior acts, but
Divine Law judges man’s interior movements; and because human law cannot forbid or punish
all acts, but Divine Law supervenes, so that all sins are forbidden.31 Thomas also elucidates how
faith in Divine Revelation allows man to “arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth”,
32
as not all persons are able or as willing to apply themselves to study. Finally, and importantly –
the Divine Law provides certitude, since, “reason is very deficient in things concerning God”…
who is infinite.33
The Church looks to Sacred Scripture, revealed by God and handed down by the authority of the
Apostolic Church; Sacred Tradition, the unwritten actions of the Apostles and their successors in
union with Peter and his successors – which are guided by the Holy Spirit; and the Magisterium
of the Church, “whose authority is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ. This teaching office is
not above the word of God, but serves it.”34 Hence, man has great practical and infallible
assistance in the Magisterium to help him know how he is to direct his actions correctly towards
his ultimate good – eternal salvation. Indeed, far beyond a legalistic morality of what is
forbidden, the Divine Law, (authentically interpreted by the Magisterium) and in particular the
New Law revealed in Christ – illuminates man’s mind and heart though grace, calling him to the
31
Cf. Ibid.
32
Cf. Summa, II-II, q. 2, a. 4.
33
Ibid.
34
Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum, Ed. Austin
Flannery, O.P., (Dublin, Ireland: Dominican Publications, 1975), n. 10; Cf. Ibid. “It is clear, therefore, that sacred
tradition, Sacred Scripture and the teaching authority of the Church, in accord with God's most wise design, are so
linked and joined together that one cannot stand without the others, and that all together and each in its own way
under the action of the one Holy Spirit contribute effectively to the salvation of souls.”
commandment of Christ to love, which is the “form of all the virtues”, according to St. Thomas.35
“This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you.” (Jn. 15:12) The term
“as” connotes a commandment by Christ for us to be perfect, as He is perfect.36 Hence, “Jesus’
way of acting and his words, his deeds and his precepts constitute the moral rule of Christian
life”, according to John Paul II.37 Thus, the Divine Law is “superabundant” in calling man to
order his reason, his will, his heart and actions to “perfection [which] demands that maturity in
self-giving to which human freedom is called.”38 The Divine Law completes the other forms of
law, going beyond precept to divine love, which has no limits and elevates man to his full
actualization in God as his “all”.
Pope John Paul II and the Law
Janet Smith’s observations about Pope John Paul II’s “Personalist” gloss on traditional Thomistic
thought regarding natural law are very insightful, and illustrate the magisterial greatness of the
Polish Pontiff. With John Paul II, there is a shift in emphasis from Thomas’ objective,
metaphysical, rationalistic or mechanistic emphasis in describing the natural law’s relationship to
35
Cf. Summa, II-II, q. 23, a. 6 “The proper function of charity as the form of all the virtues is to direct and ordain the
acts of all the virtues effectively to the ultimate supernatural end, even those of faith and hope.”; Cf. Summa, q. 23,
a. 8. St. Thomas beautifully states: “Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues
to its own end. And since a mother is one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called the mother
of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last
end.”
36
VS, n. 20, “The word ‘as’ also indicates the degree of Jesus’ love and of the love with which his disciples are
called to love one another.”
37
I bid. Christ gives his very life for us, so we must give our lives completely in the service of love of neighbor for
Christ’s sake. There is no limit to charity – we can always grow in love and virtue, in this life. John Paul says, “This
is what Jesus asks of everyone who wishes to follow him: ‘If any man would come after me, let him deny himself
and take up his cross and follow me’ (Mt. 16:24).”
38
VS, n. 17. “Human freedom and God’s law are not in opposition; on the contrary, they appeal one to the other.”
human (moral) acts – to a more Personalist, subjective, and phenomenological emphasis.39 John
Paul II does not take away from nor contradict Thomas. He uses the basic natural and eternal law
thesis, explained above, as a starting point for a deeper reflection, but emphasizes man not only
as a rational creature, but as a “self-determining creature who must shape himself in accord with
the truth”,40 in order to realize his true dignity and calling to be perfect, as Christ called the rich
young man to be perfect. (cf. Matt. 19:16-22)41 In Veritatis Splendor, the Pope reveals the
complementariness of the natural law and the divine law in his treatment of the objectivity and
rationality of the natural law precepts as lived by human persons made in the image and likeness
of God, who know and love God through Revelation.
The Personalist approach of John Paul II acknowledges the Commandments as a starting point
and condition precedent to move deeper into the meaning of life … viz. Christ’s New Law of
love – the Beatitudes and the grace to live according to Christ’s new commandment to “love one
another”. (Jn. 15:17)42 Thus, we see with John Paul II, “the human person is not ‘confined’ by
39
40
I bid. “While Wojtyla accepts Aquinas’ view of the person, he supplements it.” Dr. Smith quotes John Paul II on
St. Thomas: “St. Thomas gives us an excellent view of the objective existence and activity of the person, but it
would be difficult to speak in his view of the lived experiences of the person.” (Karol Wojtyla, Person and
community: Selected Essays, trans. By Theresa Sandok, OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993))
41
Cf. VS, n. 16.
42
Cf. VS, n. 64; Cf. Summa, II-II, q. 45, a. 2: John Paul II notes there is “a sort of connaturality between man and the
true good … through the virtuous attitudes of the individual…”. While acknowledging the foundational importance
of the commandments, the Pope emphasizes the development of Christian virtue and perfection, which is
complimentary, not contradictory, to the commandments. We must imitate the “self-portrait” of Christ in the
Beatitudes to truly grow in virtue. Thus, Pope John Paul concludes: “Following Christ is the essential and
primordial foundation of Christian morality.” (VS, n. 19)
Cf. Rev. Servais Pinckaers, O.P., The Sources of Christian Ethics, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1995), p. 136: Consistent with the Pope, Pinckaers warns of the danger of a morality, “defined as the
sum of obligations imposed on us by the will of God,” and emphasizes the need for a “voluntary and rational
natural law but freely participates in God’s governance … he may freely choose to do the good
or not to do it.”43 The subjective emphasis of John Paul II compared to St. Thomas’ emphasis on
objectivity is elucidated by Smith well when she suggests, “Aquinas’ chief interest is in
determining what acts are good and evil; for Wojtyla the chief interest is in showing that man’s
very subjectivity and freedom requires that he be concerned with the truth.”44 While Thomas
would certainly agree with John Paul II’s emphasis on man being self-determining in choosing to
follow Christ, man’s “gift of self”, and the effect man’s actions have on himself and his
fulfillment as a person – Thomas’ focus tended to be on the fact that man is able to choose
because he is an “individual substance of a rational nature”, which is his definition of the human
person. John Paul II defines the person more richly: “The person…is always a rational and free
concrete being, capable of all those activities that reason and freedom alone make possible.”45
The question John Paul II wishes us to focus on is not simply what rules are to be followed, but
also, “What is the meaning of life?” The great Pontiff exhorts man to that critical relationship
between the (objective) law and (subjective) personal freedom, which is lived out in the ‘heart’
of the person, in his moral conscience – which must be ordered to objective truth to be
authentically free.46 John Paul II masterfully deepened objective, Thomistic natural law themes
with Personalism in a way that is complimentary.
commitment, at the level of the ‘heart’ in the biblical sense of the word. This is where the virtues have their place
(vices also) as stable and personal dispositions to do good.”
43
Smith, Lecture 3.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid., quoting, Person and Community, p. 167.
46
Cf. VS, n. 54-64.
Summary
St. Thomas’ four kinds of law illuminate the order and splendor of God’s creation, both physical
and most excellently, rational. God’s eternal law is His Divine Wisdom and Providence,
directing and ordering all of creation to Himself as their end. The participation of the eternal law
in the rational creature is the natural law, whereby man’s reason apprehends certain self-evident
precepts derived from the eternal law, such as “seek the good, avoid evil”. Man applies his
reason, guided by the divine law (Sacred Scripture) as interpreted and elucidated even more
practically by Sacred Tradition via the Magisterium of the Catholic Church—to ascertain in his
conscience how he should act in accordance with the true good.47 The divine law reveals to man
infallibly the truth about God and invites man to a relationship of love and reconciliation with his
Creator, through the saving work of Christ. Human laws are derived from natural law precepts
and should promote the common good, as well as protect persons from violations of the natural
law – such as abortion, for example. A law which contradicts the natural law or divine law, is no
law at all and is not binding in conscience. Thus, we see how these types of law interrelate and
complement one another for the ultimate good of man – eternal life.
Bibliography
ew York: Benziger Brothers, 1947.

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. N
Catechism of the Catholic Church. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994.
Denzinger, Henry. The Sources of Catholic Dogma. Translated by Roy Deferrari. Fitzwilliam,
NH: Loreto Publications, 2002.
John Paul II. Encyclical Letter, Veritatis Splendor. August 6th, 1993. Boston, Massachusetts: St.
Paul Books & Media.
47
Cf. Summa, q. 91, a. 2. “The first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.”
May, William. An Introduction to Moral Theology. Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor,
2003.
Paul VI. Encyclical Letter, Humanae Vitae. July 25, 1968. Boston, Massachusetts: St. Paul
Books & Media.
Pinckaers, Rev. Servais O.P. The Sources of Christian Ethics. Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, 1995.
Rice, Charles. 50 Questions On the Natural Law. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999.
Smith, Janet. Introduction to Sexual Ethics. Lecture Notes: Holy Apostles College & Seminary;
[Web Mentor Online]; available from http://home.comcast.net/~icuweb/c00201.htm, 2007.
Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents. Flannery O.P., Austin. (ed.)
Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum. Dublin, Ireland: Dominican
Publications, 1975.
LENIN'S THE S T A T E A N D R E V O L U T I O N *
Ralph Miliband
T h e State and Revolution is rightIy regarded as one of Lenin's most

important works. I t addresses itself to questions of the utmost im-
portance for socialist theory and practice, none of which have lost any
of their relevance-rather the reverse. And as a statement of the
Marxist theory of the state, both before and particularly after the
conquest of power, it has, because it was written by Lenin, enjoyed
an exceptionally authoritative status for successive generations of
socialists, never more so than in recent years, since its spirit and sub-
stance can so readily be invoked against the hyper-bureaucratic ex-
perience of Russian-type rCgimes, and against official Communist
parties as well. In short, here, for intrinsic and circumstantial reasons, is
indeed one of the "sacred texts" of Marxist thought.
"Sacred texts", however, are alien to the spirit of Marxism, or a t
least should be; and this is itself sufficient reason for submitting T h e
State and Revolution to critical analysis. But there is also another and
more specific reason for undertaking such an analysis, namely that this
work of Lenin is commonly held, within the Marxist tradition, to pro-
vide a theoretical and indeed a practical solution to the all-important
question of t l e socialist exercise of power. My own reading of it sug-
gests, for what it is worth, a rather different conclusion : this is that
T h e State and Reuolution, far from resolving the problems with which
it is concerned, only serves to underline their complexity, and to empha-
size something which the experience of more than half a century has
in any case richly-and tragically-served to confirm, namely that
the exercise of socialist power remains the Achilles' heel of Marxism.
This is why, in a year which will witness so much legitimate celebra-
tion of Lenin's genius and achievements, a critical appraisal of T h e
State and Revolution may not come amiss. For it is only by probing
the gaps in the argument which it puts forward that the discussion of
issues which are fundamental to the socialist project may be advanced.
The basic point upon which the whole of Lenin's argument rests,
and to which he returns again and again, derives from Marx and
Engels. This is that while all previous revolutions have "perfected" (i.e.
reinforced) the state machine, "the working class cannot simply lay
*This article was written for a special issue of Monthly Review com-
memorating the centenary of Lenin's birth, and is published here by kind per-
mission of the Editors of Monthly Review.
309
directed against those who do not wish for the seizure bf power. The
is to-attack and reject any concept of revolution which does not take
wither away, but is already at an advanced ~ t a g eof decomposition.
This, it must be noted at once, does not mean that the revolutionary
power is to be weak. On the contrary, Lenin never fails to insist thit
directed against those who do not wish for the seizure of power. The
is to attack and reject any concept of revolution which does not take
wither away, but is already at a n advanced ~ t a g eof decomposition.
This, it must be noted a t once, does not mean that the revolutionary
power is to be weak. On the contrary, Lenin never fails to insist that
is the proletariat armed and organized as the ruling class" (p. 308).
Identical or similar formulations occur throughout the work.
In T h e Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, written
after the Bolshevik seizure of power, Lenin fiercely rejected Kautsky's
view that a class "can only dominate but not govern" : "It is altogether
wrong, also", Lenin wrote, "to say that a class cannot govern. Such
an absurdity can only be uttered by a parliamentary cretin who sees
nothing but bourgeois parliaments, who has noticed nothing but 'ruling
parties.' "2 T h e State and Revolution is precisely based on the notion
that the proletariat can "govern", and not only "dominate", and that
it must do so if the dictatorship of the proletariat is to be more than a
slogan. "Revolution," Lenin also writes "consists not in the new class
commanding, governing with the aid of the old state machine, but in
this class smashing this machine and commanding, governing with
the aid of a n e w machine. Kautsky blurs over this basic idea of
Marxism, or he does not understand it at all" (p. 347). This new
"machine'', as it appears in T h e State and Revolution is the state of
the armed workers. What is involved here, to all appearances, is
unmediated class rule, a notion much more closely associated with
anarchism than with Marxism.
This needs to be qualified. But what is so striking about T h e State

and Revolution is how little it needs to be qualified, as I propose to
show.
Lenin strongly attacks the anarchists, and insists on the need to
retain the state in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
"We are not utopians," he writes, "we do not 'dream' of dispensing
at once with a11 administration, with all subordination" (p. 298). But
he then goes on : "The subordination, however, must be the armed
vanguard of all the exploited and working people, i.e. t o the proletariat
(my italics). A beginning can and must be made at once, overnight,
to replace the specific 'bossing' of state officials by the simple functions
of 'foremen and accountants', functions which are already fully within
the ability of the average town dweller and can well be performed for
workmen's wages. W e , the workers, shall organize large-scale pro-
duction on the basis of what capitalism has already created, relying
on our own experience as workers, establishing strict, iron discipline
backed bv the state of the armed workers. We shall reduce the role
of state officials to that of simply carrying out our instructions as res-
ponsible, revocable, moderately paid 'foremen and accountants' (of
course, with the aid of technicians of all sorts, types, and degrees"
(p. 298).
Clearly, some kind of officialdom continues to exist, but equally
clearly, it functions under the strictest and continuous supervision and
control of the armed workers; and officials are, as Lenin notes re-
peatedly, revocable at any time. "Bureaucrats", on this view, have not
been altogether abolished; but they have been reduced to the role of
utterly subordinate executants of the popular will, as expressed by
the armed workers.
As for a second main institution of the old state, the standing army,
it has been replaced, in the words quoted earlier, by armed workers
who proceed to form a militia involving the whole population.
Thus, two institutions which Lenin views as "most characteristic"
(p. 283) of the bourgeois state machine have been radically dealt with :
one of them, the bureaucracy, has been drastically reduced in size
and what remains of it has been utterly subdued by direct popular
supervision, backed by the power of instant revocability; while the
other, the standing army, has actually been abolished.
Even so, Lenin stresses, the centralized state has not been abolished.
But it takes the form of "voluntary centralism, of the voluntary amal-
gamation of the communes into a nation, of the voluntary fusion of
the proletarian communes, for the purpose of destroying bourgeois
rule and the bourgeois state machine" (p. 301).
Here too, the obvious question concerns the institutions through
which the dictatorship of the proletariat may be expressed. For Lenin
does speak in T h e State and Revolution "of a gigantic replacement
of certain institutions by other institutions of a fundamentally different
type" (p. 293). But T h e State and Revolution has actually very little
to say about institutions, save for some very brief references to the
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
Lenin reserves some of his choicest epithets for one form of repre-
sentative institution, namely "the venal and rotten parliamentarism
of bourgeois society" (p. 297). However, "the way out of parliamen-
tarism is not, of course, the abolition of representative institutions and
the elective principle, but the conversion of the representative institu-
tions from talking shops into 'working bodies' " (p. 296). The institu-
tions which embody this principle are, as noted, the Soviets of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies. On one occasion, Lenin speaks of "the simple
organization of the armed people (such as the Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies. . . .)" (p. 329); on another, of "the conversion of all
y
citizens into workers and other employees of one huge 'syndicate -the
whole state-and the complete subordination of the entire work of this
syndicate to a genuinely democratic state, the state of the Soviets of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" (p. 334); and the third such reference
is in the form of a question : "Kautsky develops a 'superstitious
reverence' for 'ministries'; but why can they not be replaced, say, by
committees of specialists working under sovereign, all-powerful Soviets
and Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies?" (p. 346). I t must be noted, how-
ever, that the Soviets are "sovereign and all-powerful" in relation to
the "committee" of which Lenin speaks. In regard to their constituents,
the deputies are of course subject to recall at any time : "representa-
tion" must here be conceived as operating within the narrow limits
determined by popular rule.
The "state" of which Lenin speaks in The State and Revolution
is therefore one in which the standing army has ceased to exist; where
what remains of officialdom has come to be completely subordinated
to the armed workers; and where the representatives of these armed
workers are similarly subordinated to them. I t is this "model" which
would seem to justify the contention, advanced earlier, that the "state"
which expresses the dictatorship of the proletariat is, already on the
morrow of the revolution, at a stage of advanced decomposition.
The problems which this raises are legion; and the fact that they
are altogether ignored in T h e State and Revolution cannot be left
out of account in a realistic assessment of it.
The first of these problems is that of the political mediation of the
revolutionary power. By this I mean that the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat is obviously inconceivable without some degree at least of
political articulation and leadership, which implies political organiza-
tion. But the extraordinary fact, given the whole cast of Lenin's mind,
is that the political element which otherwise occupies so crucial a place
in his thought, namely the party, receives such scant attention in T h e
State and Revolution.
There are three references to the party in the work, two of which
have no direct bearing on the issue of the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat. One of these is an incidental remark concerning the need for
the party to engage in the struggle "against religion which stupifies
the people" (p. 318); the second, equally incidental, notes that "in
revising the programme of our Party, we must by all means take the
advice of Engels and Marx into consideration, in order to come nearer
the truth, to restore Marxism by ridding it of its distortions, to guide
the struggle of the working class for its emancipation more correctly"
(p. 310). The third and most relevant reference goes as follows : "By
educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the
proletariat, capable of assuming power and leading the whole people
to socialism, of directing and organizing the new system, of being the
teacher, the guide, the leader of all the working and exploited people
in organizing their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the
bourgeoisie" (p. 281).
I t is not entirely clear from this passage whether it is the prole-
tariat which is capable of assuming power, leading, directing, organiz-
ing, etc.; or whether it is the vanguard of the proletariat, i.e. the
314 THE SOCIALIST REGISTER, 1970
workers' party, which is here designated. Both interpretations are
possible. On the first, the question of political leadership is left alto-
gether in abeyance. I t may be recalled that it was so left by Marx in
his considerations on the Paris Commune and on the dictatorship of
the proletariat. But it is not something which can, it seems to me,
be left in abeyance in the discussion of revolutionary rule-save in
terms of a theory of spontaneity which constitutes an avoidance of
the problem rather than its resolution. O n the other hand, the second
interpretation, which fits in better with everything we know of Lenin's
appraisal of the importance of the party, only serves to raise the ques-
tion without tackling it. That question is of course absolutely para-
mount to the whole meaning of the concept of the dictatorship of the
proletariat : what is the relationship between the proletariat whose
dictatorship the revolution is deemed to establish, and the party which
educates, leads, directs, organizes, etc? I t is only on the basis of an
assumption of a symbiotic, organic relationship between the two, that
the question vanishes altogether; but while such a relationship may
well have existed between the Bolshevik Party and the Russian pro-
letariat in the months preceding the October Revolution, i.e. when
Lenin wrote The State and Revolution, the assumption that this kind
of relationship can ever be taken as an automatic and permanent fact
belongs to the rhetoric of power, not to its reality.
Whether it is the party or the proletariat which is, in the passage
above, designated as leading the whole people to socialism, the fact
is that Lenin did of course assert the former's central role after the
Bolsheviks had seized power. Indeed, he was by 1919 asserting its
exclusive political guidance. "Yes, the dictatorship of one party !" he
said then : "we stand upon it and cannot depart from this ground,
since this is the party which in the course of decades has won for itself
the position of vanguard of the whole factory and industrial prole-
tariat". In fact, "the dictatorship of the working class is carried into
effect by the party of the Bolsheviks which since 1905 or earlier has
been united with the whole revolutionary pr~letariat".~ Later on, as
E. H. Carr also notes, he described the attempt to distinguish between
the dictatorship of the class and the dictatorship of the party as proof
of an "unbelievable and inextricable confusion of t h o ~ g h t " ;and
~ in
1921, he was bluntly asserting against the criticisms of the Workers'
Opposition that " . . . the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible
except through the Communist part^".^
This may well have been the case, but it must be obvious that this
is an altogether different "model" of the exercise of revolutionary power
from that presented in The State and Revolution, and that it radically
transforms the meaning to be attached to the "dictatorship of the
proletariat". At the very least, it brings into the sharpest possible forms
the question of the relation between the ruling party and the prole-
tariat. Nor even is it the $arty which is here in question, but rather
the party leadership, in accordance with that grim dynamic which
Trotsky had prophetically outlined after the split of Russian Social
Democracy between BoIshevik and Mensheviks, namely that "the party
organization [the caucus] a t first substitutes itself for the party as a
whole; then the Central Committee substitutes itself for the organiza-
tion; and finally a single 'dictator' substitutes itself for the Central Com-
mittee. . . ."6
For a time after the Revolution, Lenin was able to believe and claim
that there was no conflict between the dictatorship of the proletariat
and the dictatorship of the party; and Stalin was to make that claim
the basis and legitimation of his own total rule. In the case of Lenin,
very few things are as significant a measure of his greatness than that
he should have come, while in power, to question that identification,
and to be obsessed by the thought that it could not simply be taken
for granted. He might well, as his successors were to do, have tried to
conceal from himself the extent of the gulf between the claim and the
reality: that he did not and that he died a deeply troubled man7 is
not the least important part of his legacy, though it is not the part of
his legacy which is likely to be evoked, let alone celebrated, in the
country of the Bolshevik Revolution.
It is of course very tempting to attribute the transformation of the

dictatorship of the proletariat, as presented in The State and Revolu-
tion into the dictatorship of the party, or rather of its leaders, to the
particular circumstances of Russia after 1917-to backwardness, civil
war, foreign intervention, devastation, massive deprivation, popular
disaffection, and the failure of other countries to heed the call of revo-
lution.
The temptation, it seems to me, ought to be resisted. Of course, the
adverse circumstances with which the Bolsheviks had to cope were
real and oppressive enough. But I would argue that these circum-
stances only aggravated, though certainly to an extreme degree, a
problem which is in any case inherent in the concept of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat. The problem arises because that dictatorship,
even in the most favourable circumstances, is unrealizable without
political mediation; and because the necessary introduction of the
notion of political mediation into the "model" considerably affects the
latter's character, to say the least. This is particularly the case if
political mediation is conceived in terms of single party rule. For such
rule, even if "democratic centralism" is much more flexibly applied
than has ever been the case, makes much more difficult, and may pre-
clude, the institutionalization of what may loosely be called socialist
pluralism. This is exceptionally difficult to achieve and may even be
impossible in most revolutionary situations. But it is just as well to
recognize that unless adequate provision is made for alternative chan-
nels of expression and political articulation, which the concept of single
party rule excludes by definition, any talk of socialist democracy is
so much hot air. Single party rule postulates an undivided, revolu-
tionary proletarian will of which it is the natural expression. But this
is not a reasonable postulate upon which to rest the "dictatorship of
proletariat" : in no society, however constituted, is there an undivided,
single popular will. This is precisely why the problem of political media-
tion arises. The problem need not be thought insuperable. But its reso-
lution requires, for a start, that it should a t least be recognized.
The question of the party, however, brings one back to the question
of the state. When Lenin said, in the case of Russia, that the dictator-
ship of the proletariat was impossible except through the Communist
Party, what he also implied was that the Party must infuse its will
into and assure its domination over the institutions which had, in T h e
State and Revolution been designated as representing the armed workers.
In 1921 he noted that "as the governing party we could not help
y
fusing the Soviet 'authorities' with the party 'authorities -with us

they are fused and they will be";* and in one of his last articles in
Pravda, written in early 1923, he also suggested that "the flexible union
of Soviet with party element", which had been a "source of enormous
strength" in external policy "will be at least equally in place (I think,
far more in place) if applied to our whole state apparatu~".~ But this
means that if the party must be strong, so must the state which serves
as its organ of rule. And indeed, as early as March 1918, Lenin was
saying that "for the present we stand unconditionally for the state";
and to the question which he himself put : "When will the state begin
to die away?" he gave the answer : "We shall have time to hold more
than two congresses before we can say, See how our state is dying
away. Till then it is too soon. T o proclaim in advance the dying away
of the state will be a violation of historical perspective".1°
There is one sense in which this is perfectly consistent with T h e
State and Revolution; and another, more important sense, in which
it is not. I t is consistent in the sense that Lenin always envisaged a
strong power to exist after the revolution had been achieved. But it is'
inconsistent in the sense that he also, in The State and Revolution
envisaged this power to be exercised, not by the state as commonly
understood, but by a "state" of armed workers. Certain it is that the
state of which he was speaking after the revolution was not the state
of which he was speaking when he wrote T h e State and Revolution.
Here too, I believe that simply to attribute the inconsistency to the
particular Russian conditions which faced the Bolsheviks is insufficient.
For it seems to me that the kind of all-but unmediated popular rule
which Lenin describes in the work belongs in fact, whatever the cir-
cumstances in which revolution occurs, to a fairly distant future, in
which, as Lenin himself put it, "the need for violence against people in
general, for the subordination of one man to another, and of one section
of the population to another, will vanish altogether since people will
become accustomed to observing the elementary conditions of social
life without violence and without subordination" (p. 328). Until that
time, a state does endure, but it is not likely to be of the kind of state
of which Lenin speaks in T h e Stcite and Revolution : it is a state about
which it is not necessary to use inverted commas.
In Lenin's handling of the matter, at least in T h e State and Revolu-
tion, two "models" of the state are contraposed in the sharpest possible
way: either there is the "old state", with its repressive, military-
bureaucratic apparatus, i.e. the bourgeois state; or there is the "tran-
sitional" type of state of the dictatorship of the proIetariat which, as
I have argued, is scarcely a state at all. But if, as I believe, this latter
type of "state" represents, on the morrow of a revolution and for a
long time after, a short cut which real life does not allow," Lenin's
formulations serve to avoid rather than to meet the fundamental ques-
tion, which is at the centre of the socialist project, namely the kind
of state, without inverted commas, which is congruent with the exercise
of socialist power.
In this respect, it needs to be said that the legacy of Marx and Engels
is rather more uncertain than Lenin allows. Both men undoubtedly
conceived it as one of the main tasks, indeed the main task of the
proletarian revolution to "smash" the old state; and it is also perfectly
true that Marx did say about the Commune that it was "the political
form at last discovered under which to work out the economic eman-
cipation of labour"ll But it is not irrelevant to note that, ten years
after the Commune, Marx also wrote that "quite apart from the fact
that this [i.e. the Commune] was merely the rising of a city under
exceptional conditions, the majority of the Commune was in no wise
socialist, nor could be".12 Nor of course did Marx ever describe the
Commune as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only Engels did so,
in the 1891 Preface to T h e Civil War in France : "Of late, the Social-
Democratic Philistine has once more been filled with wholesome terror
a t the words : Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Well and good, gentle-
"This may need qualification in the following sense: on the morrow of

revolution, the problem does often appear to have vanished. The real problems
begin to emerge the day after, and the day after that, when the initial impetus
and enthusiasm begin to wane and vast new problems and dangers have to be
confronted.
men, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at
the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat".18
But in the same year 1891, Engels also said, in his Critique of the
Draft of the Erfurt Programme of the German Social Democratic
Party, that "if one thing is certain it is that our party and the working
class can only come to power in the form of the democratic republic.
This is even the specific form for the dictatorship of the proletariat,
as the Great French Revolution has already shown. . . ." (Quoted by
Lenin in The State and Revolution, p. 314). Commenting on this,
Lenin states that "Engels repeated here in a particularly striking form
the fundamental idea which runs through all of Marx's works, namely
that the democratic republic is the nearest approach to the dictator-
ship of the proletariat" (p. 314). But the "nearest approach" is not
"the specific form"; and it may be doubted that the notion of the
democratic republic as the nearest approach to the dictatorship of the
proletariat, is a fundamental idea which runs through all of Marx's
works. Also, in the Preface to The Civil War in France, Engels said
of the state that "at best it is an evil inherited by the proletariat after
its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the vic-
torious proletariat will have to lop off as speedily as possible, just as
the Commune had to, until a generation reared in new, free social
conditions is able to discard the entire lumber of the state" (Quoted
by Lenin, The State and Revolution, p. 320. My italics).
I t is on the basis of such passages that the Menshevik leader, Julius
Martov, following Kautsky, wrote after the Bolshevik revolution that
in speaking of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Engels is not em-
ploying the term "to indicate a form of government, but to designate
the social structure of the State power".14
This seems to me to be a misreading of Engels, and also of Marx.
For both men certainly thought that the dictatorship of the proletariat
meant not only "the social structure of the State power" but also and
quite emphatically "a form of government"; and Lenin is much closer
to them when he speaks in The State and Revolution of "a gigantic
replacement of certain institutions by institutions of a fundamentally
different type" (p. 293).
The point, however, is that, even taking full account of what Marx
and Engels have to say about the Commune, they left these institu-
tions of a fundamentally different type to be worked out by later
generations; and so, notwithstanding The State and Revolution, did
Lenin.
This, however, does not detract from the importance of the work.
Despite all the questions which it leaves unresolved, it carries a message
whose importance the passage of time has only served to demonstrate :
this is that the socialist project is an anti-bureaucratic project, and
that at its core is the vision of a society in which "for the first time in
the history of civilized society, the mass of the population will rise to
take an independent part, not only in voting and elections, but also in
the eueryday administration of the state. Under socialism all will govern
in turn and will soon become accustomed to no one governing" (p. 348).
This was also Marx's vision; and one of the historic merits of T h e
State and Revolution is to have brought it back to the position it
deserves on the socialist agenda. Its second historic merit i3 to have
insisted that this must not be allowed to remain a far-distant, shimmer-
ing hope that could safely be disregarded in the present; but that its
actualization must be considered as an immediate part of revolutionary
theory and practice. I have argued here that Lenin greatly over-
estimated in T h e State and Reuolution how far the state could be
made to "wither away" in any conceivable post-revolutionary situa-
tion. But it may well be that the integration of this kind of over-
estimation into socialist thinking is the necessary condition for the
transcendance of the grey and bureaucratic "practicality" which has
so deeply infected the socialist experience of the last half-century.
NOTES
Lucio Colletti, "Power and Democracy in Socialist Society" in New L e f t
Reuiew, No. 56, July-August 1969, p. 19. For another interesting assess-
ment of T h e State and Revolution, see L. Magri, " 'L'Etat et la RCvolution'
Aujourd 'hui" in Les T e m p s Modernes, August-September 1968, No.
266-267.
V. I. Lenin, T h e Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky
(London, 1941), p. 24. Italics in text.
E. H. Carr, T h e Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (London, 1950), Vol. I,
p. 230.
Zbid., p. 230.
Robert V. Daniels, "The State and Revolution: A Case Study in the
Genesis and Transformation of Communist Ideology", in T h e American
Slavic and East European Review (February, 1953), Vol. XII, No. 1, p. 24.
I. Deutscher, T h e Prophet Armed. Trotsky: 1879-1921 (London, 1954),
p. 90.
See, e.g. M. Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle (London, 1969).
Carr, op. cit., p. 223.
Ibid., p. 224.
Ibid., p. 246.
K . Marx, "The Civil War in France", in Selected Works (Moscow, 1950),
Vol. I, p. 473.
K. Marx to F. Domela-Niewenhuis, February 22, 1881, in K. Marx and
F . Engels. Selected Correspondence (Moscow, 1953), p. 410.
Selected Works, o p . cit., Vol. I, p. 440.
J. Martov, T h e State and the Socialist Revolution (New York, 1938), p. 41.
Restoring Revolutionary Theory: Towards an Understanding of Lenin's "The State and
Revolution"
Author(s): Rustam Singh
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 24, No. 43 (Oct. 28, 1989), pp. 2431-2433
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Accessed: 12-04-2018 20:14 UTC
Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Economic and Political Weekly
Restoring Revolutionary Theory
Towards an Understanding of Lenin's
The State and Revolution
Rustam Singh
While the generally held opinion is that Lenin's The State and Revolution is a restatemzent of Marx's and E
theory of state, the author argues, taking into account both the substance of the text and the book's underlying
motive, that it is primarily an attempt to define the nature, form and method of the proletarian revolution tn order
to conclusively terminate the bourgeois political order.
edition of the book. In the very first sentence a socialist society; and (2) why this had to
of the preface he says: "The question of the be a violent revolution. He felt compelled
LENIN's book, The State and Revolution, state is now acquiring particular importance to do this in order to counter the arguments
is generally regarded as a restatement of both in theory and in practical politics". In of his fellow Marxists-Kautsky et al-who
Marx's and Engels' theory of state.' It is words The State and Revolution was
other were either not in favour of a revolution at
the position of this writer that the book is not merely a theoretical exercise. Further all and advocated reform, citing in their sup-
primarily an attempt to expound the nature ahead in the preface he says: "The world port certain views of Marx and Engels, or,
of the proletarian revolution, and the form proletarian revolution is clearly maturing. where they did favour a revolution-as in the
this revolution should necessarily take and The question of its relation to the state is case of Kautsky-they did not want violence
the methods it should adopt to successfully acquiring practical importance." Here Lenin to becarried so far as to destroy the institu-
and conclusively put an end to the bourgeois moves from the 'question of state ' to the tional apparatus of the overthrown bour-
political order and establish in its place a question of the 'proletarian revolution'. In geois state. Those who held the former posi-
socialist order. other words, he is not viewing the question tion argued that the bourgeois state did not
We take this position in spite of the fact
of the state as an independent question. It have to be overthrown by force; it would give
that in Chapter I of the book Lenin himself is intimately connected with the question of way to a proletarian state by the logical
describes his 'prime task' to be 'to re- the proletarian revolution. In fact, it has sequence of historical developments. And
establish what Marx really taught on the acquired importance only because it is con- those who took the latter position believed
subject to state'2 (emphasis in original). In nected with the question of the proletarian that the bourgeois state-structure could be
our view, what is important is not that Lenin revolution. To make this clearer, we shall used, as it was, for the purposes of the pro-
sought to re-establish Marx's views on state, quote two more statements of Lenin from letarian state. They viewed the state ap-
but rather why he felt it necessary to under- the same preface. "The struggle to free the paratus as a thing separate and apart from
take such an exercise. This in other words working people from the influence of the the interests of the class that held the reigns
means that while trying to arrive at a cor- bourgeoisie..." says Lenin, "is impossible of power, implying that any class could
rect understanding of the book, one has to without a struggle against opportunist pre- usurp this power and use the pre-existing
consider not only what is written in the book judices concerning the 'state'." This state- state apparatus as it wished.
itself but also the underlying motive of the
ment shows that Lenin's main concern is the
book. Lenin felt it important to counter these
struggle to free the workers from the bour-
We have also to keep in mind, while con- beliefs immediately because there was a
geoisie, and a correct interpretation of
sidering this book, that Lenin was first and danger of the revolutionaries becoming com-
Marx's theory of state is only a part of this
placent and losing the sharper edges of their
foremost a political activist, a revolutionary, struggle. The next statement does not leave revolutionary feelings if these beliefs prevail-
and only then a theorist. As a matter of fact,
any dcoubt regarding the intentions of Lenin ed. In The State and Revolution, therefore,
the fact of his being a theorist was only in- in writing The State and Revolution. "The
he restated certain tenets of Marxism in such
cidental. Most of the time he was busy in
question of the relation of the socialist
polemics with his political opponents, both a way that he could prove without doubt the
proletarian revolution to the state", he says, immediate necessity of a violent revolution.
socialist and otherwise. Whenever he did "... is acquiring not only practical impor-
In the process he carried out some deliberate
undertake some theoretical work, he did it tance, but also the significance of a most
with the express purpose of clarifying to his and unabashed distortions of Marxism, but
urgent problem of the day, the problem of
the nature of these disfortions was different
opponents, to his colleagues in the party, to explaining to the masses what they will have
from that of the distortions carried out by
ordinary party workers, and to the people to do before long to free themselves from
at large some particular theoretical puzzle
'opportunists' and 'social chauvinists' whom
capitalist tyranny.'3 The problem of ex-
Lenin, in Chapter I of the book, accuses of
or point, and-the advantage or lack of it of plaining to the masses what thev will have 'vulgarising' Marxism. 4
adopting or not adopting a particular tac- to do before long to free themselves from
capitalist tyranny. This, in a word, is the pro- As a matter of fact, Lenin was never un-
tical or strategical line at a given time on that
basis. Looked at closely, in fact, even his willing to make changes in the theory to
blemr Lenin sets out to tackle in The State
theoretical writing reveal themseives to andbe Revolution. And the question of the make it more suitable to the practical needs
little more than polemical exeriises, albeit of the moment. This attitude towards theory
socialist proletarian revolution and its rela-
a little weightier and profounder than pure tion to the state is the gut issuie of this become~s evident from the following state-
polemics. On a more general level, the aim problem. ment which he made immediately after the
of all Lenin's writings, like all his actions, February revolution. "We would be commit-
was to take him nearer to the making of a II ting a great mistake", he said, "if we attemp-
proletarian revolution and the establishment ted to force the complex, urgent, rapidly
of a socialist order in Russia. The penning Lenin was concerned, above all, with developing practical tasks of the revolution
of The State and Revolution was also geared showing two things in The State and Revolu- into the procrustean bed of narrowly con-
towards this aim. And he gives a clear in- tion: (1) why a revolution was necessary to ceived 'theory'..".5 This attitude is further
dication of this in the preface to the first overthrow the bourgeois state and establish confirmed by another statement which he
made about a month later: ....it is essential tasks of the revolution.9 argument about the withering away of the
to grasp the incontestable truth that a Lenin next attempts to clarify the mean- state everyone remembers, also contains an
Marxist must take cognisance of real life, of ing of Engels' often- quoted words regarding argument of the significance of violent
the true facts of reality, and not cling to a the 'withering away' of the state. And he con- revolution. Engels' historical analysis of its
theory of yesterday, which, like all theories, demns the 'revisionists' for interpreting these role becomes a veritable panegyric on violent
at best only outlines the main and the words in a way which gives the impression revolution. This 'no one remembers'.... And
general, only comes near to embracing life that according to Engels it is the bourgeois yet it is inseparably bound up with the
in all its complexity"6 (emphasis in state that withers away. This, according to 'withering away' of the state into one har-
original). If this was Lenin's attitude towards Lenin, bears no resemblance with the monious whole." "We have already said
theory, it is inconceivable that he would original argument of Engels which is ex- above", continues Lenin, "and shall show
waste his time elaborating Marx's and tremely rich in ideas. "To prune Marxism more fully later, that the theory of Marx and
Engels' theory of state at the height of to such an extent", remarks Lenin, "means Engels of the inevitability of a violent revolu-
revolutionary preoccupation (The State and tion refers to the bourgeois state. The latter
reducing it to opportunism, for this 'inter-
Revolution was written in August and pretation' only leaves a vague notion of a cannot be superseded by the proletarian
September 1917). He clearly had some other slow, even, gradual change, of absence of state.... through the process of 'withering
purpose in mind, and that purpose, as we leaps and storms, of absence of revolution"away', but, as a general rule, only through
have already indicated, was to impress upon a violent revolution. The panegyric Engels
This interpretation of the withering away of
his followers and Marxist opponents the im- sang in its honour, and which fully corres-
the state, according to Lenin, obscures, if not
mediate necessity of a violent revolution. We repudiates the role of revolution. Thus it ponds to Marx's repeated statements....this
get a confirmation of this from what he says disregards the 'most important' element of panegyric is by no means a mere 'impulse',
further on in the same context. Here he is Engels' argument. Lenin then gives his own a mere declamation or a polemical sally. The
attacking those who believed that the interpretation of this phrase of Engels. necessity of systematically imbuing the
bourgeois revolution had not yet been com- masses with this and precisely this view of
",..Engels speaks here", says Lenin, "of the
pleted and, therefore, that it was too early proletarian revolution 'abolishing' the violent revolution lies at the root of the en-
to think in terms of a proletarian revolution: tire theory of Marx and Engels""i (em-
bourgeois state, while the words about the
To deal with the question of "completion" state withering away refer to the remnants phasis in original).
of the bourgeois revolution in the old way of the prol?tarian state after the socialist Talking of the corrections that Marx and
is to sacrifice living Marxism to the dead let-
revolution. According to Engels, the bour- Engels felt should be made in the Com-
ter. According to the old way of thinking, thegeois state does not 'wither away', but is munist Manifesto on the basis of lessons
rule of the bourgeoisie could and should be. 'abolished' by the proletariat in the course drawn from the revolutionary experience of
followed by the rule of the proletariat and of the revolution" 10 (emphasis in original). the Paris Commune, Lenin quotes the
the peasantry, by their dictatorship. In real A careful reading of Engels' argument as following words of Marx and Engels from
life, however, things have already turned out
quoted by Lenin reveals that even this is not the preface of the then new German edition
differently; there has been an extremely
an exactly correct interpretation of what of the Manifesto: "...one thing especially was
original, novel and unprecedented interlacing
Engels says. Lenin has deliberately made it proved by the Commune, viz, that 'the work-
of the one with the other7 (emphasis in
appear to be heavily tilted on the side of ing class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-
original).
revolution. But this only goes to show made state machinery and wield it for its
As Lucio Colletti observes:
own purposes'." According to Lenin, these
Lenin's bias in favour of revolution and his
None of Lenin's writings [has] a 'con- words of Marx and Engels have been
impatience with the notion of slow, gradual
templative' character. This is less than ever
the case with State and Revolution. Lenin
change. This becomes clear when one looksdistorted by the 'opportunists' to say that
at some more statements of Lenin about Marx here emphasises the idea of slow
embarked upon it so as to decide what to do
in the ongoing revolution.8 Engels' above-mentioned argument. ". . the development in contradistinction to the
same work of Engels", states Leinin, "whose seizure of power, etc. But, as a matter of fact,
III
Lenin begins by clarifying the basic idea

of Marxism with regard to the state: that the
state is the product of the irreconcilability
CENTRE FOR SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT
of class antagonisms and an organ of class 807 Vishal Bhawan, 95 Nehru Place
rule, an organ for the oppression of one class
by another, and he goes on to prove that the New Delhi 110 019
existence of the state means that the class
antagonisms are irreconcilable. But why is
Lenin so concerned with showing the origin
The Centre for Science and Environment invites applications
and nature of the state? Because of the for the posts of Senior Researchers in Science, Social
following reason:
Sciences.
... If the state is the product of the irrecon-
cilability of class antagonisms... it is clear that The Centre is a public interest research organisation concerned with sustain
the liberation of the oppressed class is im-
natural resource management in India. Its work is a mix between ind
possible... without the destruction of the ap-
paratus of state power which was created by journalism and policy research and is mainly directed towards preparatio
the ruling class... (emphasis in original). publications and informational materials designed to create an informed pu
Destruction of the apparatus of state power,
opinion.
we can see, was the central concern of Lenin,
and he relates the origin and development
of the state only to point out the necessity Apply with full details of qualifications, experience and salary expectations to
of this destruction. He supports himself, on the Director.
this point, by citing Marx who he says, had
drawn this 'self-evident' conclusion on the
basis of a concrete historical analysis of the
2432 Economic and Political Weekly October 28, 1989
the exact opposite is true. "Marx's idea is selves, it would not have had to 'abolish' the the minority... From this 'capitalist
that the working class must bregk up, smash institutions of the state-they would have democracy' forward development does not
the 'ready-made state machinery", and not ceased to function as they ceased to have proceed 'simply, directly and smoothly',
confine itself merely to laying hold of it". anything to do.'6 towards 'greater and greater democracy', as
The words "to smash the ready-made state That the bourgeoisie understood these the liberal professors and petty-bourgeois op-
processes of revolution much better than portunists would have us believe. "Forward
machinery"' Lenin emphasises, "briefly ex-
development, i e, development towards com-
press the principal lesson of Marxism regar- most socialists is also shown by Lenin. He
munism, proceeds through the dictatorship
ding the tasks of the proletariat during a .cites Engels' preface to the third edition of
of the proletariat, and cannot do otherwise,
revolution in relation to the state"12 (em- Marx's pamphlet The Civil War in France
for the resistance of the capitalist exploiters
phasis in original). where Engels gives a summary of the lessons
cannot be broken by anyone else or in any
Having shown that it is the proletarian of the Paris Commune and of the bourgeois
other way".
state that shall wither away and not the revolutions preceding that. This summary, Quoting Engels, Lenin asserts that
bourgeois state, and that the former can be emphasises Lenin, "may justly be called the the proletariat needs the state, not in interests
established only through a violent revolu- last word of Marxism on the question under of freedom but in order to hold down its
tion, Lenin takes up the task of demonst- consideration". Engels observes in this sum- adversaries.... . Only in communist society,
rating the necessity of the continued use of mary that in France the workers emerged when the resistance of the capitalists has been
violence for the thorough and systematic with arms from every revolution. And every completely crushed... only then the state....
abolition of the remnants of the bourgeoisie time "...the disarming of the workers was the ceases to exist, and it becomes possible to
after the proletariat has come into power. He first commandment for the bourgeois, who speak of freedom (emphasis in original).
quotes Marx and Engels to outline the tasks were at the helm of the state. Hence, after
of the proletariat from now on: every revolution won by the workers, a new IV
struggle, ending with the defeat of the
The proletariat will use its political In chapter 1 of The State and Revolution,
supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital workers' "This summary of the experience
Lenin talks of attempts to convert the revolu-
from the bourgeosie, to centralise all in- of bourgeois revolutions is as concise as it
tionaries into 'harmless icons', after their
struments of production in the hands of the is expressive". remarks Lenin. "The essence
death, and of 'robbing' their revolutionary
state, i.e, of the proletariat organised as theof the matter.... (has the oppressed class
arms?)....is here remarkably well grasped. It theories of their 'revolutionary edge'. Some
ruling class....
such thing can also be said about Lenin and
Castigating the 'revisionists', especially Kaut- is precisely this essence that is most often
his theory as expounded in this book. At-
sky, for ignoring this element of the Marxian evaded both by professors influenced by
bourgeois ideology, and by petty-bourgeois tempts to present this theory primarily as a
theory, Lenin says:
democrats" (emphasis in original).'7 theory of state and not as a theory of revolu-
Opportunism does not extend recognition of tion "omiit, obscure [and] distort the revolu-
Lenin takes special pains, at this point, to
the class struggle to the cardinal point, to the tionary side of this theory, its revolutionary
emphasise that according to Engels it is 'not
period of transition from capitalism to com- soul". 22
only under a monarchy, but also in a
munism, of the....complete abolition of the
democrrtic republic' that 'the state remains
bourgeoisie. In reality, this period inevitably Notes
is a period of an unprecedentedly violent a state, i e, it retains its fundamental
class struggle in unprecedentedly acute distinguishing feature of transforming the 1 See, for example, Robert Coniquest, Lenin,
forms... (emphasis in original).'4 officials, the 'servants of society'. its organs, Fontana/Collins, Glasgow, 1972, p 85;
into the masters of society. He quotes Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of
Lenin refers, in this connection, to Marx's
Engels according to whom, Marxism, Vol 2, Oxford University Press,
controversy with the anarchists. Marx had
Oxford, 1982, p 498; and George Lichtheim,
ridiculed them for suggesting that after over- ...people think they have taken quite an ex-
Marxism: A Historical and Critical Study,
throwing the bourgeois state the workers traordinarily bold step forward when they
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980,
should immediately lay down their arms. have rid themselves of belief in hereditary
p 350.
Marx did not 'at all' oppose, according to monarchy and swear by the democratic
2 Selected Works, Volume 2, Progress
Lenin, the view that the state would disap- republic. In reality, however, state is nothing
but a machine for the oppression of one class Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 240.
pear when classes disappeared. What he did 3 Ibid, pp 238-39.
by another, and indeed in the democratic
oppose was the proposition that the workers 4 Ibid, p 240.
republic no less than, in the monarchy. And
should renounce the use of arms, organised 5 'Letters From Afar: Third Letter', Collected
at best it is an evil inherited by the proletariat
violence, that is, the state, which is to serve Works, Volume 23, Progress Publishers,
after the victorious struggle for class
to 'crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie'. Moscow, 1964, p 330.
supremacy, whose worst sides the victorious
Lenin maintains that to achieve the aim of proletariat will have to lop off as speedily as 6 'Letters on Tactics: First Letter', Collected
abolishing the state the workers "must tem- possible...until a generation reared in new, Works, Volume 24, Progress Publishers,
porarily make use of the instruments, free social conditions is able to discard the Moscow, 1964, p 45.
resources and methods of state power entire lumber of the state.18 7 Ibid., pp 45-6.
against the exploiters...' He then quotes Explaining this what according to him may 8 From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in
Engels to reinforce his argument. "A revolu-seem "strange and incomprehensible" argu- Ideology and Society, Oxford University
tion is...an act whereby one part of the Press, Delhi, 1978, p 226.
ment, Lenin says that since democracy
9 Selected Works, op cit, p 242.
population imposes its will upon the other"recognises the subordination of the minori-
10 Ibid, p 249.
by means of rifles, bayonets and canon..',ty to the majority, i e, an organisation for
11 Ibid, pp 251-52.
Engels had said. "And the victorious party the systematic use of force by one class
12 Ibid, pp 263-64.
must maintain its rule by means of terror against another", therefore it is still a state
13 Ibid, p 254.
which its arms inspire in the reactionaries".(emphasis in original).'9 This kind of state,
14 Ibid, p 262.
And he had accused the Paris Commune forhowever, is realisable only under the dictator- 15 Ibib, pp 281-83.
making "too little use" of such means. By ship of the proletariat which for the first 16 Ibid, p 285.
doing this, says Lenin, Engels had taken "thetime brings 'democracy for the people' (em- 17 Ibid, p 292.
bull by the horns" (emphasis in original).'5phasis in original).20 A democratic republic, 18 Ibid, pp 294-95.
In other words, had the Commune made fullon the other hand, remains 19 Ibid, p 297.
and timely use-of its coercive power, it might hemmed in by the narrow limits set by 20 Ibid, p 302.
have succeeded. All 'traces-of the state in it' capitalist exploitation, and consequently 21 Ibid, pp 301-02.
would-then 'have withered away' of them- always remains, in effect, a democracy for 22 Ibid, p 240.
Author(s): Eric Voegelin
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1404747
Accessed: 25-01-2019 10:53 UTC
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Politics
By Eric Voegelin
T HE vast majority of all human beings alive on earth is af-

fected in some measure by the totalitarian mass movements
of our time. Whether men are members, supporters, fellow-trav-
ellers, naive connivers, actual or potential victims, whether they
are under the domination of a totalitarian government, or whether
they are still free to organize their defenses against the disaster,
the relation to the movements has become an intimate part of
their spiritual, intellectual, economic, and physical existence. The
putrefaction of Western civilization, as it were, has released a
cadaveric poison spreading its infection through the body of
humanity. What no religious founder, no philosopher, no imperial
conqueror of the past has achieved - to create a community of
mankind by creating a common concern for all men - has now
been realized through the community of suffering under the
earthwide expansion of Western foulness.
Even under favorable circumstances, a communal process of
such magnitude and complexity will not lend itself easily to ex-
ploration and theorization by the political scientist. In space the
knowledge of facts must extend to a plurality of civilizations; by
subject matter the inquiry will have to range from religious ex-
periences and their symbolization, through governmental institu-
tions and the organization of terrorism, to the transformations of
personality under the pressure of fear and habituation to atroci-
ties; in time the inquiry will have to trace the genesis of the move-
ments through the course of a civilization that has lasted for a mil-
lennium. Regrettably, though, the circumstances are not favor-
able. The positivistic destruction of political science is not yet
overcome; and the great obstacle to an adequate treatment of
totalitarianism is still the insufficiency of theoretical instruments.
It is difficult to categorize political phenomena properly without
a well developed philosophical anthropology, or phenomena of
spiritual disintegration without a theory of the spirit; for the
morally abhorrent and the emotionally existing will overshadow
the essential. Moreover, the revolutionary outburst of totalitarian-
68
ism in our time is the climax of a secular evolution

because of the unsatisfactory state of critical theory,
that grew to actuality in a long historical process will d
cation. The catastrophic manifestations of the rev
massacre and misery of millions of human beings,
spectator so strongly as unprecedented in comparis
immediately preceding more peaceful age that the
difference will obscure the essential sameness.
In view of these difficulties the work by Hannah Arendt on
The Origins of Totalitarianism deserves careful attention.* It is
an attempt to make contemporary phenomena intelligible by trac-
ing their origin back to the eighteenth century, thus establishing
a time unit in which the essence of totalitarianism unfolded to its
fullness. And as far as the nature of totalitarianism is concerned,
it penetrates to the theoretically relevant issues. This book on the
troubles of the age, however, is also marked by these troubles, for
it bears the scars of the unsatisfactory state of theory to which we
have alluded. It abounds with brilliant formulations and pro-
found insights - as one would expect only from an author who
has mastered her problems as a philosopher-but surprisingly,
when the author pursues these insights into their consequences, the
elaboration veers toward regrettable flatness. Such derailments,
while embarrassing, are nevertheless instructive - sometimes more
instructive than the insights themselves - because they reveal the
intellectual confusion of the age, and show more convincingly
than any argument why totalitarian ideas find mass acceptance
and will find it for a long time to come.
The book is organized in three parts: Antisemitism, Imperial-
ism, and Totalitarianism. The sequence of the three topics is
roughly chronological, though the phenomena under the three
titles do overlap in time. Antisemitism begins to rear its head in
the Age of Enlightenment; the imperialist expansion and the pan-
movements reach from the middle of the nineteenth century to
the present; and the totalitarian movements belong to the twen-
tieth century. The sequence is, furthermore, an order of increas-
ing intensity and ferocity in the growth of totalitarian features
toward the climax in the atrocities of the concentration camps.
* Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt, Brace and
Company, New York, 1951, XV, 477 pages.)
And it is, finally, a gradual revelation of the essence of

rianism from its inchoate forms in the eighteenth cen
fully developed, nihilistic crushing of human beings.
This organization of the materials, however, canno
pletely understood without its emotional motivatio
more than one way to deal with the problems of totalit
and it is not certain, as we shall see, that Dr. Arendt's
Anyway, there can be no doubt that the fate of the
mass slaughter and the homelessness of displaced per
the author a center of emotional shock, the center f
radiates her desire to inquire into the causes of the hor
derstand political phenomena in Western civilization
to the same class, and to consider means that will ste
This emotionally determined method of proceeding f
crete center of shock toward generalizations leads to
tion of subject matter. The shock is caused by the fate
beings, of the leaders, followers, and victims of totalit
ments; hence, the crumbling of old and the format
institutions, the life-courses of individuals in an age
tional change, the dissolution and formation of types o
as well as of the ideas of right conduct, will becom
totalitarianism will have to be understood by its manif
the medium of conduct and institutions just adumb
indeed there runs through the book - as the govern
the obsolescence of the national state as the shelterin
tion of Western political societies, owing to technol
nomic, and the consequent changes of political p
every change sections of society become "superfluo
sense that they lose their function and therefore are th
their social status and economic existence. The centralization of
the national state and the rise of bureaucracies in France makes
the nobility superfluous; the growth of industrial societies a
new sources of revenue in the late nineteenth century make th
Jews as state bankers superfluous; every industrial crisis create
superfluity of human beings through unemployment; taxation
the inflations of the twentieth century dissolve the middle clas
into social rubble; the wars and the totalitarian regimes prod
the millions of refugees, slave-laborers, and inmates of concent
tion camps, and push the membership of whole societies into th
position of expendable human material. As far as the in

aspect of the process is concerned totalitarianism, thus,
integration of national societies and their transformatio
gregates of superfluous human beings.
The delimitation of subject matter through the e
aroused by the fate of human beings is the strengt
Arendt's book. The concern about man and the causes of his
fate in social upheavals is the source of historiography. The
ner in which the author spans her arc from the presently m
events to their origins in the concentration of the national
evolves distant memories of the grand manner in which
dides spanned his arc from the catastrophic movement of his
from the great kinesis, to its origins in the emergence
Athenian polis after the Persian Wars. The emotion in its pu
makes the intellect a sensitive instrument for recognizin
selecting the relevant facts; and if the purity of the hum
terest remains untainted by partisanship, the result will be
torical study of respectable rank - as in the case of the p
work, which in its substantive parts is remarkably free of
logical nonsense. With admirable detachment from the p
strife of the day, the author has succeeded in writing the h
of the circumstances that occasioned the movements, of the
tarian movements themselves, and above all of the dissolutio
human personality, from the early anti-bourgeois and antis
resentment to the contemporary horrors of the "man wh
his duty" and of his victims.
This is not the occasion to go into details. Nevertheless, a
of the topics must be mentioned in order to convey an idea
richness of the work. The first part is perhaps the best sho
tory of the antisemitic problem in existence; for special att
should be singled out the sections on the court-jews an
decline, on the Jewish problem in enlightened and romantic
lin, the sketch of Disraeli, and the concise account of the Dr
Affair. The second part- on Imperialism - is theoretica
most penetrating, for it creates the type-concepts for the re
between phenomena which are rarely placed in their pr
wider context. It contains the studies on the fateful emanci
of the bourgeoisie that wants to be an upper class without a
ing the responsibilities of rulership, on the disintegration of
ern national societies and the formation of elites

the genesis of race-thinking in the eighteenth century
perialist expansion of the Western national states
problem in the empires, on the corresponding con
movements and the genesis of racial nationalism.
larger studies are embedded previous miniatures of s
tions and personalities, such as the splendid studies o
Barnato, of the character traits of the Boers and the
of the British colonial bureaucracy, of the inabilit
national states to create an imperial culture in the
and the subsequent failure of British and French imp
the element of infantilism in Kipling and Lawren
and of the Central European minority question. T
-on Totalitarianism - contains studies on the clas
that results from general superfluity of the members
on the difference between mob and mass, on total
ganda, on totalitarian police, and the concentration
The digest of this enormous material, well docu
footnotes and bibliographies, is sometimes broad,
joy of skilful narration by the true historian, but
gether by the conceptual discipline of the general
theless, at this point a note of criticism will have
The organization of the book is somewhat less strict
be, if the author had availed herself more readily of
ical instruments which the present state of scienc
disposition. Her principle of relevance that orders th
materials into a story of totalitarianism is the disint
civilization into masses of human beings without secu
and social status; and her materials are relevant in so
demonstrate the process of disintegration. Obviously
is the same that has been categorized by Toynbee a
of the internal and external proletariat. It is surprisi
author has not used Toynbee's highly differentiated
that even his name appears neither in the footnot
bibliography, nor in the index. The use of Toynbee's
have substantially added to the weight of Dr. Aren
This excellent book, as we have indicated, is un
marred, however, by certain theoretical defects. The
movements of the totalitarian type on the level of s
and change, as well as of types of conduct determine

apt to endow historical causality with an aura of f
tions and changes, to be sure, require, but they do no
a response. The character of a man, the range and
his passions, the controls exerted by his virtues, and
freedom, enter as further determinants. If conduct i
stood as the response of a man to a situation, and the
response as rooted in the potentialities of human n
than in the situation itself, the process of history w
closed stream, of which every cross-cut at a given po
is the exhaustive determinant of the future course. Dr. Arendt is
aware of this problem. She knows that changes in the economi
and social situations do not simply make people superfluous, an
that superfluous people do not respond by necessity with resent-
ment, cruelty, and violence; she knows that a ruthlessly competi-
tive society owes its character to an absence of restraint and of a
sense of responsibility for consequences; and she is even uneasily
aware that not all the misery of National Socialist concentratio
camps was caused by the oppressors, but that a part of it stemme
from the spiritual lostness that so many of the victims brought
with them. Her understanding of such questions is revealed be
yond doubt in the following passage: "Nothing perhaps distin-
guishes modern masses as radically from those of previous cen
turies as the loss of faith in a Last Judgment: the worst have lost
their fear and the best have lost their hope. Unable as yet to live
without fear and hope, these masses are attracted by every effort
which seems to promise a man-made fabrication of the paradis
they longed for and of the hell they had feared. Just as the popu
larized feature of Marx's classless society have a queer resem
blance to the Messianic Age, so the reality of the concentratio
camps resembles nothing so much as mediaeval pictures of hell
(p. 419). The spiritual disease of agnosticism is the peculiar prob-
lem of the modern masses, and the man-made paradises and man-
made hells are its symptoms; and the masses have the disease
whether they are in their paradise or in their hell. The author
thus, is aware of the problem; but, oddly enough, the knowledge
does not affect her treatment of the materials. If the spiritua
disease is the decisive feature that distinguishes modern masse
from those of earlier centuries, then one would expect the study
of totalitarianism not to be delimited by the institution

down of national societies and the growth of socially su
masses, but rather by the genesis of the spiritual disease
since the response to the institutional breakdown clearl
marks of the disease. Then the origins of totalitarian
not have to be sought primarily in the fate of the natio
and attendant social and economic changes since the
century, but rather in the rise of immanentist sectaria
the high Middle Ages; and the totalitarian movements w
be simply revolutionary movements of functionally
people, but immanentist creed movements in which
heresies have come to their fruition. Dr. Arendt, as we
does not draw the theoretical conclusions from her own
Such inconclusiveness has a cause. It comes to lig
other one of the profound formulations which the auth
in a surprising direction: "What totalitarian ideologie
aim at is not the transformation of the outside world or the revo-
lutionizing transmutation of society, but the transformation of
human nature itself" (p. 432). This is, indeed, the essence of
totalitarianism as an immanentist creed movement. Totalitarian
movements do not intend to remedy social evils by industr
changes, but want to create a millennium in the eschatologi
sense through transformation of human nature. The Christ
faith in transcendental perfection through the grace of God ha
been converted-and perverted-into the idea of immanen
perfection through an act of man. And this understanding of t
spiritual and intellectual breakdown is followed in Dr. Arend
text by the sentence: "Human nature as such is at stake, an
even though it seems that these experiments succeed not in cha
ing man but only in destroying him . . . one should bear in min
the necessary limitations to an experiment which requires globa
control in order to show conclusive results" (p. 433). When
read this sentence, I could hardly believe my eyes. "Nature"
a philosophical concept; it denotes that which identifies a th
as a thing of this kind and not of another one. A "nature" c
not be changed or transformed; a "change of nature" is a co
tradiction of terms; tampering with the "nature" of a thin
means destroying the thing. To conceive the idea of "changi
the nature" of man (or of anything) is a symptom of the int
lectual breakdown of Western civilization. The author

adopts the immanentist ideology; she keeps an "open min
regard to the totalitarian atrocities; she considers the que
a "change of nature" a matter that will have to be se
"trial and error"; and since the "trial" could not yet av
of the opportunities afforded by a global laboratory, the
must remain in suspense for the time being.
These sentences of Dr. Arendt, of course, must not
strued as a concession to totalitarianism in the more restricted
sense, that is, as a concession to National Socialist and Com-
munist atrocities. On the contrary, they reflect a typically liber
progressive, pragmatist attitude toward philosophical proble
We suggested previously that the author's theoretical derailmen
are sometimes more interesting than her insights. And this att
tude is, indeed, of general importance because it reveals ho
much ground liberals and totalitarians have in common; the
sential immanentism which unites them overrides the differences
of ethos which separate them. The true dividing line in the con
temporary crisis does not run between liberals and totalitarians,
but between the religious and philosophical transcendentalists on
the one side, and the liberal and totalitarian immanentist sec
rians on the other side. It is sad, but it must be reported, t
the author herself draws this line. The argument starts from h
confusion about the "nature of man": "Only the criminal attemp
to change the nature of man is adequate to our trembling insigh
that no nature, not even the nature of man, can any longer
considered to be the measure of all things"- a sentence which, i
it has any sense at all, can only mean that the nature of m
ceases to be the measure, when some imbecile conceives the noti
of changing it. The author seems to be impressed by the imbeci
and is ready to forget about the nature of man, as well as ab
all human civilization that has been built on its understandi
The "mob," she concedes, has correctly seen "that the whole
nearly three thousand years of Western civilization . . .
broken down." Out go the philosophers of Greece, the proph
of Israel, Christ, not to mention the Patres and Scholastics
for man has "come of age," and that means "that from now
man is the only possible creator of his own laws and the o
possible maker of his own history." This coming-of-age has to b
accepted;
accepted; man
man
is the
is new
thelawmaker;
new lawmaker;
and on theand
tablets
on wiped
the tab
clean
cleanofof
thethe
pastpast
he will
heinscribe
will inscribe
the "new the
discoveries
"new indiscoveries
morality" i
which
which Burke
Burkehad had
still considered
still considered
impossible.
impossible.
It
It sounds
sounds likelike
a nihilistic
a nihilistic
nightmare.
nightmare.
And a nightmare
And aitnightis
rather
rather than
than a well
a well
considered
considered
theory. Ittheory.
would beItunfair
would to hold
be unf
the
theauthor
author responsible
levelthe
of critical
level of thought
criticalfor though
what
obviously
shuddering
under the under
impact o
ences
stronger
stronger
than thethan
forcesthe
of forces
spiritual of
andspiritual
intellec- an
tual
tualresistance.
The as book
a whole
as amust
wholenot be
must
judgednot by be
thejud
theoretical
occur mostly
occur in mostly
its concluding
in its part.
concl
The
Thetreatment
treatment of the
ofsubject
the subject
matter itself
matteris animated,
not al-
ways
wayspenetrated,
the age-old
knowledge knowledge
and
andthe the lifelife
of the
of spirit
the spirit
which, which,
in the conclusions,
in the conclusions,
the author
wishes
wishes to to
discard
discardand to and
replace
to replace
by "new discoverie
Let us
rather
the unconscious
irony of the irony
closingofsen-
the cl
tence
wherewhere
the author
theappeals,
author for
appeals,
the "new" forspirit
the "n
of
ofhuman
human solidarity,
Acts
28: "Do
16:thyself
28: "Dono harm;
thyself for no
we harm
are
areallall
here."
here."Perhaps,
Perhaps,
when thewhenauthor
theprogresses
quoting fr
to
tohearing
hearing thesethese
words,words,
her nightmarish
her nightmarish
fright will fright
end like that
will en
of
ofthethe jailer
jailer
to whom
to whom they were
they addressed.
were addressed.
A REPLY
By Hannah Arendt
[The Origins of Totalitarianism]: A Reply
Author(s): Hannah Arendt
Accessed: 13-04-2018 05:07 UTC

Politics
accepted;
accepted; man
man
is the
is new
thelawmaker;
new lawmaker;
and on theand
tablets
on wiped
the tab
clean
cleanofof
thethe
pastpast
he will
heinscribe
will inscribe
the "new the
discoveries
"new indiscoveries
morality" i
which
which Burke
Burkehad had
still considered
still considered
impossible.
impossible.
It
It sounds
sounds likelike
a nihilistic
a nihilistic
nightmare.
nightmare.
And a nightmare
And aitnightis
rather
rather than
than a well
a well
considered
considered
theory. Ittheory.
would beItunfair
would to hold
be unf
the
theauthor
author responsible
levelthe
of critical
level of thought
criticalfor though
what
obviously
shuddering
under the under
impact o
ences
stronger
stronger
than thethan
forcesthe
of forces
spiritual of
andspiritual
intellec- an
tual
tualresistance.
The as book
a whole
as amust
wholenot be
must
judgednot by be
thejud
theoretical
occur mostly
occur in mostly
its concluding
in its part.
concl
The
Thetreatment
treatment of the
ofsubject
the subject
matter itself
matteris animated,
not al-
ways
wayspenetrated,
the age-old
knowledge knowledge
and
andthe the lifelife
of the
of spirit
the spirit
which, which,
in the conclusions,
in the conclusions,
the author
wishes
wishes to to
discard
discardand to and
replace
to replace
by "new discoverie
Let us
rather
the unconscious
irony of the irony
closingofsen-
the cl
tence
wherewhere
the author
theappeals,
author for
appeals,
the "new" forspirit
the "n
of
ofhuman
human solidarity,
Acts
28: "Do
16:thyself
28: "Dono harm;
thyself for no
we harm
are
areallall
here."
here."Perhaps,
Perhaps,
when thewhenauthor
theprogresses
quoting fr
to
tohearing
hearing thesethese
words,words,
her nightmarish
her nightmarish
fright will fright
end like that
will en
of
ofthethe jailer
jailer
to whom
to whom they were
they addressed.
were addressed.
A REPLY
By Hannah Arendt
implications on the other. Both of course belong

while I feel that within the necessary limitations
study and political analysis I made myself suffic
certain general perplexities which have come to ligh
full development of totalitarianism, I also know t
explain the particular method which I came t
account for a rather unusual approach-not to
historical and political issues where account or justif
only distract-to the whole field of political a
sciences as such. One of the difficulties of the book is that it does
not belong to any school and hardly uses any of the officially
recognized or officially controversial instruments.
The problem originally confronting me was simple and baf-
fling at the same time: all historiography is necessarily salvation
and frequently justification; it is due to man's fear that he may
forget and to his striving for something which is even more than
remembrance. These impulses are already implicit in the mere
observation of chronological order and they are not likely to be
overcome through the interference of value-iudgments which
usually interrupt the narrative and make the account appear
biased and "unscientific." I think the history of antisemitism is a
good example of this kind of history-writing. The reason why
this whole literature is so extraordinarily poor in terms of scholar-
ship is that the historians - if they were not conscious antisemites
which of course they never were - had to write the history of a
subject which they did not want to conserve; they had to write
in a destructive way and to write history for purposes of destruc-
tion is somehow a contradiction in terms. The way out has been
to hold on, so to speak, to the Jews, to make them the subject
of conservation. But this was no solution, for to look at the
events only from the side of the victim resulted in apologetics-
which of course is no history at all.
Thus my first problem was how to write historically about
something-totalitarianism-which I did not want to conserve
but on the contrary felt engaged to destroy. My way of solving
this problem has given rise to the reproach that the book was
lacking in unity. What I did -and what I might have done
anyway because of my previous training and the way of my
thinking-was to discover the chief elements of totalitarianism
and to analyze them in historical terms, tracing t

back in history as far as I deemed proper and ne
is, I did not write a history of totalitarianism but an
terms of history; I did not write a history of antise
imperialism, but analyzed the element of Jew-h
element of expansion insofar as these elements were
visible and played a decisive role in the totalitarian
itself. The book, therefore, does not really deal with
of totaritarianism - as its title unfortunately clai
a historical account of the elements which crystalliz
tarianism, this account is followed by an analysis of
structure of totalitarian movements and domination itself. The
elementary structure of totalitarianism is the hidden structure
the book while its more apparent unity is provided by certa
fundamental concepts which run like red threads through th
whole.
The same problem of method can be approached from an-
other side and then presents itself as a problem of "style." This
has been praised as passionate and criticized as sentimental. Both
judgments seem to me a little beside the point. I parted quite
consciously with the tradition of sine ira et studio of whose great-
ness I was fully aware, and to me this was a methodological ne-
cessity closely connected with my particular subject matter.
Let us suppose - to take one among many possible examples
-that the historian is confronted with excessive poverty in a
society of great wealth, such-as the poverty of the British working
classes during the early stages of the industrial revolution. The
natural human reaction to such conditions is one of anger and
indignation because these conditions are against the dignity of
man. If I describe these conditions without permitting my indig.
nation to interfere, I have lifted this particular phenomenon out
of its context in human society and have thereby robbed it of
part of its nature, deprived it of one of its important inherent
qualities. For to arouse indignation is one of the qualities of
excessive poverty insofar as poverty occurs among human beings.
I therefore can not agree with Professor Voegelin that the "mor-
ally abhorrent and the emotionally existing will overshadow
the essential," because I believe them to form an integral part of
it. This has nothing to do with sentimentality or moralizing,
although, of course, either can become a pitfall fo

If I moralized or became sentimental, I simply did
what I was supposed to do, namely to describe the
phenomenon as occurring, not on the moon, but in t
human society. To describe the concentration cam
not to be "objective," but to condone them; and su
cannot be changed by a condemnation which the
feel duty bound to add but which remains unrelat
scription itself. When I used the image of Hell, I
this allegorically but literally: it seems rather obv
who have lost their faith in Paradise, will not be able
it on earth; but it is not so certain that those who h
belief in Hell as a place of the hereafter may not b
able to establish on earth exact imitations of what pe
believe about Hell. In this sense I think that a descrip
camps as hell on earth is more "objective," that i
quate to their essence than statements of a purely so
psychological nature.
The problem of style is a problem of adequacy
sponse. If I write in the same "objective" mann
Elizabethan age and the twentieth century, it may
my dealing with both periods is inadequate becau
nounced the human faculty to respond to either. T
tion of style is bound up with the problem of un
which has plagued the historical sciences almost fr
ginnings. I do not wish to go into this matter her
add that I am convinced that understanding is clos
that faculty of imagination which Kant called Ein
and which has nothing in common with fictiona
Spiritual Exercises are exercises of imagination and
more relevant to method in the historical sciences than academic
training realizes.
Reflections of this kind, originally caused by the special na-
ture of my subject, and the personal experience which is neces-
sarily involved in an historical investigation that employs imag-
ination consciously as an important tool of cognition, resulted in
a critical approach toward almost all interpretation of contem-
porary history. I hinted at this in two short paragraphs of the
Preface where I warned the reader against the concepts of Prog-
ress and of Doom as "two sides of the same medal" as well as

against any attempt at "deducing the unprecedented from pr
dents." These two approaches are closely interconnected.
reason why Professor Voegelin can speak of "the putrefaction
Western civilization" and the "earthwide expansion of We
foulness" is that he treats "phenomenal differences"-whic
me as differences of factuality are all-important-as minor
growths of some "essential sameness" of a doctrinal nature
merous affinities between totalitarianism and some other trends
in Occidental political or intellectual history have been described
with this result, in my opinion: they all failed to point out t
distinct quality of what was actually happening. The "phenom
enal differences," far from "obscuring" some essential sameness,
are those phenomena which make totalitarianism "totalitarian
which distinguish this one form of government and moveme
from all others and therefore can alone help us in finding it
essence. What is unprecedented in totalitarianism is not prima
ily its ideological content, but the event of totalitarian dominati
itself. This can be seen clearly if we have to admit that the
deeds of its considered policies have exploded our traditiona
categories of political thought (totalitarian domination is unli
all forms of tyranny and despotism we know of) and the stand-
ards of our moral judgment (totalitarian crimes are very inad
quately described as "murder" and totalitarian criminals can
hardly be punished as "murderers").
Mr. Voegelin seems to think that totalitarianism is only th
other side of liberalism, positivism and pragmatism. But whethe
one agrees with liberalism or not (and I may say here that I a
rather certain that I am neither a liberal nor a positivist nor
pragmatist), the point is that liberals are clearly not totalitarian
This, of course, does not exclude the fact that liberal or po
tivistic elements also lend themselves to totalitarian thinking; bu
such affinities would only mean that one has to draw eve
sharper distinctions because of the fact that liberals are not
totalitarians.
I hope that I do not belabor this point unduly. It is impor-
tant to me because I think that what separates my approach
from Professor Voegelin's is that I proceed from facts and events
instead of intellectual affinities and influences. This is perhaps a
bit difficult to perceive because I am of course mu

with philosophical implications and changes in sp
interpretation. But this certainly does not mean tha
"a gradual revelation of the essence of totalitarian
inchoate forms in the eighteenth century to the ful
because this essence, in my opinion, did not exist
not come into being. I therefore talk only of "elem
eventually crystallize into totalitarianism, some
traceable to the eighteenth century, some perhaps
back, (although I would doubt Voegelin's own th
"rise of immanentist sectarianism" since the lat
eventually ended in totalitarianism). Under no c
would I call any of them totalitarian.
For similar reasons and for the sake of distinguis
ideas and actual events in history, I cannot ag
Voegelin's remark that "the spiritual disease is th
ture that distinguishes modem masses from those of
turies." To me, modern masses are disintegrated
that they are "masses" in a strict sense of the wo
distinguished from the multitudes of former cen
they do not have common interests to bind them
any kind of common "consent" which, according t
stitutes inter-est, that which is between men, rangi
from material to spiritual and other matters. Th
can be a common ground and it can be a commo
always fulfills the double function of binding men
separating them in an articulate way. The lack of
terest so characteristic of modern masses is therefor
sign of their homelessness and rootlessness. But it a
for the curious fact that these modem masses are fo
atomization of society, that the mass-men who lack
relationships nevertheless offer the best possible
movements in which peoples are so closely pressed t
they seem to have become One. The loss of intere
with the loss of "self," and modem masses are di
my view by their self-lessness, that is their lack
terests."
I know that problems of this sort can be avoided
prets totalitarian movements as a new--and perv
gion, a substitute for the lost creed of traditiona

this, it would follow that some "need for religion
the rise of totalitarianism. I feel unable to follow
qualified form in which Professor Voegelin uses the
secular religion. There is no substitute for God in th
ideologies - Hitler's use of the "Almighty" was a
what he himself believed to be a superstition. Mo
the metaphysical place for God has remained emp
duction of these semi-theological arguments in the
totalitarianism, on the other side, is only too likely t
wide-spread and strictly blasphemous modem "i
God who is "good for you"-for your mental or
for the integration of your personality and God
that is "ideas" which make of God a function of m
This functionalization seems to me in many respects
perhaps the most dangerous stage of atheism.
By this, I do not mean to say that Professor V
ever become guilty of such functionalization. N
that there is some connection between atheism and totalitarian-
ism. But this connection seems to me purely negative and
at all peculiar to the rise of totalitarianism. It is true th
Christian cannot become a follower of either Hitler or Sta
and it is true that morality as such is in jeopardy wheneve
faith in God who gave the Ten Commandments is no lon
secure. But this is at most a condition sine qua non, noth
which could positively explain whatever happened afterw
Those who conclude from the frightening events of our times
we have got to go back to religion and faith for political reas
seem to me to show just as much lack of faith in God as t
opponents.
Mr. Voegelin deplores, as I do, the "insufficiency of theoretical
instruments" in the political sciences (and with what to me ap-
peared as inconsistency accuses me a few pages later of not hav-
ing availed myself more readily of them). Apart from the
present trends of psychologism and sociologism about which I
think Mr. Voegelin and I are in agreement, my chief quarrel
with the present state of the historical and political sciences is
their growing incapacity for making distinctions. Terms like
nationalism, imperialism, totalitarianism, etc. are used indiscrim-
inately for all kinds of political phenomena (usually just

brow" words for aggression) and none of them is a
understood with its particular historical background.
is a generalization in which the words themselves los
ing. Imperialism does not mean a thing if it is used
inately for Assyrian and Roman and British and Bol
tory; nationalism is discussed in times and countries wh
experienced the nation state; totalitarianism is discov
kinds of tyrannies or forms of collective communities,
kind of confusion - where everything distinct disa
everything that is new and shocking is (not explain
plained away either through drawing some analogies or
it to a previously known chain of causes and influe
to me to be the hallmark of the modern historical a
sciences.
In conclusion, I may be permitted to clarify my state
in our moder predicament "human nature as such is
a statement which provoked Mr. Voegelin's sharpest cr
cause he sees in the very idea of "changing the natu
or of anything" and in the very fact that I took th
totalitarianism at all seriously a "symptom of the
breakdown of Western civilization." The problem of th
ship between essence and existence in Occidental tho
to me to be a bit more complicated and controversi
Voegelin's statement on "nature," (identifying "a
thing" and therefore incapable of change by definit
but this I can hardly discuss here. It may be enough to
terminological differences apart, I hardly proposed mo
of nature than Mr. Voegelin himself in his book o
Science of Politics; discussing the Platonic-Aristotelian
soul, he states: "one might almost say that before th
of psyche man had no soul." (p. 67) In Mr. Voegeli
I could have said that after the discoveries of totali
ination and its experiments we have reason to fear
may lose his soul.
In other words, the success of totalitarianism is ide
a much more radical liquidation of freedom as a p
as a human reality than anything we have ever witnes
Under these conditions, it will be hardly consoling to
unchangeable
unchangeable nature of
nature
man andof
conclude
manthat
and
either
conclude
man him- that eit
self
self is being
is being
destroyed
destroyed
or that freedom
or that
does notfreedom
belong to man's
does not belo
essential
essential capabilities.
capabilities.
HistoricallyHistorically
we know of man'swe nature
know
only of man
insofar
insofar as it as
has it
existence,
has existence,
and no realm of andeternal
noessences
realm will
of eterna
ever
ever console
console
us if manus loses
if man
his essential
loses capabilities.
his essential capabilit
My
My fear,
fear,
when when
I wrote the
I wrote
concluding thechapter
concluding
of my book,chapter
was
was notnot
unlikeunlike
the fear the
whichfear
Montesquieu
which already
Montesquieu
expressed alrea
when
when he saw
he that
saw Western
that civilization
Western wascivilization
no longer guaranteed
was no long
by
bylaws
lawsalthough
although
its peoplesits
werepeoples
still ruledwere
by customs
stillwhich
ruled by c
he
hediddid
not not
deem sufficient
deem sufficient
to resist an onslaught
to resist
of despotism.
an onslaught
He
Hesays
saysin theinPreface
the to Preface
L'Esprit des
toLois
L'Esprit
"L'homme,des cet etre
Lois "L'hom
des
desautres,
autres,est egalement
est egalement
capable de connaitre
capable sa propre
de connaitre
nature sa p
flexible,
flexible, se pliant
se pliant
dans la societe
dans auxlapensees
societe
et auxaux
impressions
pensees et au
lorsqu'on
lorsqu'onla lui la
montre,
lui montre,
et d'en perdre
etjusqu'au
d'ensentiment
perdrelorsqu'on
jusqu'au sentim
la
laluilui
derobe."
derobe."
(Man, this
(Man,
flexiblethis
being,flexible
who submits
being,
himself who sub
in
insociety
society
to theto
thoughts
the thoughts
and impressions
and
of his
impressions
fellow-men, is of his fel
equally
equally capable
capable
of knowing
of his
knowing
own naturehis
whenown
it is shown
nature
to when i
him
him as it
asis it
andis
of and
losingof
it tolosing
the pointitwhere
to the
he haspoint
no realiza-
where he ha
tion
tion that
that
he is robbed
he is of
robbed
it.) of it.)
CONCLUDING REMARK
By Eric Voegelin
It does not happen often these days that a work
science has sufficient theoretical texture to warrant an examina-
tion of principles. Since Dr. Arendt's book was distinguished by
a high degree of theoretical consciousness, I felt obliged to
acknowledge this quality and to pay it a sincere compliment by
criticizing some of the formulations. The criticisms had the fur-
ther pleasant consequence of stimulating the preceding, more
elaborate explanation of the author's views concerning method.
But this should be enough as an aid to the reader of the book.
My word in conclusion, requested by the Editors of the Review,
will therefore be of the briefest -a ceremony rather than an
argument.
I shall do no more than draw attention to what we agree is
the question at stake, though Dr. Arendt's answer differs from
mine. It is the question of essence in history, the question of how
Teaching Schedule
of
History of Modern India -II
for
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)/LL.M.
Second Semester
Session 2019-2020
Compiled By :
Rachna Sharma
0
Table of Contents
1. Objectives 2
2. Syllabus 3-4
2. Tentative Teaching Schedule 5-6
3. Additional Recommended Readings 7-8
Books, Journals, Articles
Webliography
5. List of Assignments 9-10
6. Important Points 11
1
OBJECTIVE
This syllabus focuses upon the significant developments that took place in
India after Independence. This subject will introduce the students of B.A. LL.B
(Second Semester) to the Making of the Indian Constitution, the Linguistic Re-
organization of the states after independence and the concept of
Regionalism. Besides focussing on the Political and Economic History which
covers the Nehruvian Era and the Emergency Period, Zamindari Abolition and
Agrarian Struggles, it will also help the students to find solutions to the present
problems faced by our country like Communalism, Casteism, Position of
women, Disarray in the Institutions of the Governance. As it is well said “the
solution to present problems lies in the past”. The students would also learn
about the History of Legal Education and Legal Profession in India. Besides,
the students would also learn how the writing of history has been used, both
to arbitrarily validate contemporary agendas, as well as to acquire an
understanding of the present through more insightful explanations of the past.
For example, in recent times, the violence triggered by the Ramjanma bhumi
movement reached its climax on December 6, 1992, when the Babri Masjid
at Ayodhya was destroyed by thousands of angry volunteers eager to
avenge what they believed was a historical wrong. The ongoing debate
about the ‘truth’ about the Ramjanmabhumi has thrown up several questions
that require us to understand the nature of history and its uses in
contemporary times.
2
Syllabus
HISTORY OF MODERN INDIA- MINOR II
ACADEMIC SESSION (2017-2018)
MODULE I
THE FRAMING OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION
SOURCES AND SALIENT FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTION
THE LINGUISTIC REORGANIZATION OF STATES IN INDIA
REGIONALISM
MODULE II
THE YEARS OF HOPE AND ACHIEVEMENT (1951-1964)
THE J.P. MOVEMENT AND THE EMERGENCY (1975)
THE PUNJAB CRISIS
COMMUNALISM IN INDIA
MODULE III
ZAMINDARI ABOLITON IN INDIA
TENENCY REFORMS AND BHOODAN MOVEMENT
AGRARIAN STRUGGLES SINCE INDEPENDENCE
CASTE, UNTOUCHABILITY, ANTI- CASTE POLITICS AND STRATERGIES
3
MODULE IV
WOMEN IN POST-COLONIAL INDIA
DISARRAY IN THE INSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT IN THE POST-COLONIAL INDIA
HISTORY OF LEGAL PROFESSION IN INDIA
HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN INDIA
4
Tentative Lecture/Teaching Schedule
Sr. Topic Number of

No. Lectures
Module I
1. Framing of Indian Constitution 3
2. Sources and Salient Features of the 3

Constitution
3. Linguistic Reorganization of States in India 4
4. Regionalism 3
Total Lectures 13
Module II
6. The Years of Hope and Achievement 3
7. J.P. Movement and the Emergency 5
8. The Punjab Crisis 3
9. Communalism in India 3
Total Lectures 14
Module III
10. Zamindari Abolition In India 4
11. Tenancy Reforms and the Bhoodan 3

Movement
12. Agrarian Struggles Since Independence 2
13. Caste, Untouchability, Anti-Caste Politics 2

and Strategies
Total Lectures 11
14. 2
Women in Post Colonial India
15. 3
Disarray in the institutions of Governance
in Post Colonial India
18. History of Legal Profession in India 3
19. History of Legal Education in India 1
5
Total Lectures 9
6
Recommended Readings
Module I
Books:
Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford

University Press, 1999.
Granville Austin, Working of a Democratic Constitution: A History of the India

Experience, Oxford University Press, 2003.
Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai (eds), Speeches and Documents on

Indian Constitution (1921-1947), Vol.2, London, 1957.
Jawahar Lal Nehru, The Discovery of India, Penguin Books, 2004.
D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, Lexis Nexis, Nagpur, 2008.
Subhash. C. Kashyap, Our Constitution, National Book Trust, Bombay, 1994.
Bipan Chandra, India After Independence, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2000.
Module II
Books:
S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru- A Biography, Vol. II, Janathan Cape, London,

2014.
Bipan Chandra(et.al), India’s Struggle for Independence, Penguin Books,

New Delhi, 1988.
Tariq Ali, The Nehrus and The Gandhis - An Indian Dynasty, London, 1985.
K.N. Pannikar, Communalism in India: History, Politics and Culture, Manohar

Publications, New Delhi, 1991.
Harkishan Singh Surjeet, Deepening Punjab Crisis: A Democratic Solution,

Patriot Publishers, 1992.
K.P.S. Gill, The Knights of Falsehoood, Har Anand Publications, New Delhi,
1997.
7
Module III
Books:
Shalendra Sharma, Development and Democracy in India, Lynne Rienner

Publishers, London, 1999.
Pramod Kumar Agarwal, Land Reforms in India: Constituional and Legal

Approach, M.D. Publishers, New Delhi, 1993.
S. Narayanasamy, The Sarvodaya Movement: Gandhian Approach to Peace

and Non Violence, Mittal Publications, New Delhi, 2003.
AkshayaKumar Ramanlal Desai, Agrarian Struggles in India After

Independence, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1986.
Gail Omvedt, Dalits and the Democratic Revolution, Sage Publishers, New
Delhi, 1994.
Module IV
Books:
Bharati Ray(ed), Women of India: Colonial and Post Colonial Periods, Centre
for Studies in Civilization, New Delhi, 2005.
Bipan Chandra(et.al), India’s Struggle for Independence, Penguin Books,

New Delhi, 1988.
Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: History of World’s Largest

Democracy, MacMilan, New Delhi, 2011.
M.P. Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal and Constitutional History, Lexis Nexis,
Nagpur, 2008.
M. P. Singh, Outlines of Legal and Constitutional History, Universal Law

Publishers, New Delhi, 2010(reprint)
8
TEACHNIG PEDAGOGY
Lecture Method
Lecture cum Discussion Method
Presentations
Showing Documentaries on the Subject and discussing the same.
LIST OF PROJECT TOPICS
HISTORY OF MODERN INDIA
MINOR-II
1. The Constituent Assembly of India: A Detailed Study

2. Salient Features of the Indian Constitution
3. Linguistic Reorganization of States in India
4. Regionalism in India: A Critique
5. Communalism in India: A Critique
6. Crisis of National Unity in India with Special Reference to Punjab
7. Jawaharlal Nehru As a Leader: A Detailed Study
8. Impact of Indira Gandhi on Indian Political System
9. Jayaprakash Narayan and His Political ideology
10. Economic Reforms in the Post Independent India
11. Agricultural Indebtedness in Pre Independent India: A Detailed
Study
12. Agricultural Indebtedness in the Post Independent India: A Detailed
Study
13. Role of Women in the Indian National Movement
14. Caste and Indian Politics
15. Role of Indian Women in Protecting Environment
16. Women in Religious Scriptures
17. Culture and Customs in Modern India
18. Zamindari Abolition and Tenancy Reforms in India
9
19. Bhoodan Movement: A Critical Appraisal
20. Social Movements in India: A Detailed Study
21. Gurudwara Reform Movement: A Reassessment
22. History of Origin of Hindus: Issues and Challenges
23. Rehabilitation After Partition
24. History of Minorities in India: A Detailed Study
25. The Indigenous Socialist: RamManohar Lohia
26. The Wise Democrat: B.R. Ambedkar
10
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE STUDENTS
 All the students are required to be in time for the class.

 The students are expected to maintain discipline in the class.
 The students are required to carry note book and pen with them.
 The students are advised to go through the topic before it is covered in
the class so that they can participate effectively.
 The students should keep themselves ready for the surprise test to be
conducted at the end of each module.
 The above teaching schedule is tentative and is subject to change as
per the need and requirements of the session.
11

Teaching Schedule
of
Political Science
for
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)
Second Semester (Minor)
Session 2019-2020
Compiled By :
Dr.Shveta Dhaliwal
(Course Instructor)
Table of Contents
1. Syllabus 1
2. Tentative Teaching Schedule 1
Recommended Readings
3. Books, Journals, Articles 2
5. List of Assignments 3
6. Instructions to Students 3
1.0 Syllabus
Module I
1. Plato: Ideal State, Theories of Knowledge and Justice

2. Aristotle: Classifications of States
3. Aristotle: Moral Action and Best Constitution

4. Aristotle: Views of Property and Slavery, Theory of Revolution
Module II
5. Christian Political Thought in the Middle Ages: Augustine and Thomas Aquinas
6. Augustine: Theory of State in the City of God, Justification of Slavery
7. Thomas Aquinas: Classification of Law, Justification of Slavery

8. Machiavelli: Humanism and Republicanism
Module III
9. Social Contractualists: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau

10. Bentham: Representative Government as the Maximiser of Utility
11. John Stuart Mill: Concept of Liberty
12. Hegel: State and Civil Society
Module IV
13. Karl Marx: The State and the Class Struggle

14. Lenin: State and Revolution
15. John Rawls: Distributive Justice
16. Hannah Arendt: Totalitarianism, Human Condition
2.0 Tentative Lecture/Teaching Schedule
Sr. No. Topic Number of
Lectures
Module I
1
1. Plato: Ideal State, Theories of Knowledge and Justice 3
3. Aristotle: Classifications of States 2
4. Aristotle: Moral Action and Best Constitution 1
5. Aristotle: Views of Property and Slavery, Theory of 2
Revolution
Total Lectures 8
Module II
6. Christian Political Thought in the Middle Ages: Augustine 2

and Thomas Aquinas
7. Augustine: Theory of State in the City of God, Justification 2

of Slavery
8. Thomas Aquinas: Classification of Law, Justification of 2

Slavery
9. Machiavelli: Humanism and Republicanism 2
Total Lectures 8
Module III
11. Social Contractualists: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau 3
12. 2
Bentham: Representative Government as the Maximiser of
Utility
13. John Stuart Mill: Concept of Liberty 1
14. Hegel: Dialectics 1
15. Hegel: State and Civil Society 1
Total Lectures 8
Module IV
16. Karl Marx: The State and the Class Struggle 2
17. Lenin: State and Revolution 2
18. John Rawls: Distributive Justice 1
19. Hannah Arendt: Totalitarianism, Human Condition 2
Total Lectures 7
3.0 Recommended Readings
Module I and II
1. The Republicof Plato, http://www.idph.net/conteudos/ebooks/republic.pdf.
2. The Politics of Aristotle, http://files.libertyfund.org/files/819/0033-02_Bk_SM.pdf
3. Bluck, R. (1959). Plato's 'Ideal' State. The Classical Quarterly,9(2), 166-168.
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/637646

4. Demos, R. (1957). Paradoxes in Plato's Doctrine of the Ideal State. The Classical
Quarterly, 7(3/4), 164-174. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/637456
5. Shorey, P. (1914). Plato's Laws and the Unity of Plato's Thought. I. Classical
Philology, 9(4), 345-369. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/261448
6. Ogochukwu Okpala, “Plato’s Republic vs. Democracy”,
http://www.neumann.edu/about/publications/NeumannBusinessReview/journal/revie
w09/okpala.pdf
7. “The Communism of Plato and Marx”,
http://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1689&context=luc_theses.
1. Klosko, G. (1981). Implementing the Ideal State. The Journal of Politics, 43(2), 365-
389. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2130373
2. Loos, I. (1897). The Political Philosophy of Aristotle. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 10, 1-21. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1009646
3. Kort, F. (1952). The Quantification of Aristotle's Theory of Revolution. The American
Political Science Review, 46(2), 486-493. doi:10.2307/1950842
4. Goldstein, L. (2001). Aristotle's Theory of Revolution: Looking at the Lockean
Side. Political Research Quarterly, 54(2), 311-331. doi:10.2307/449159
5. “Natural Right and the Problem of Aristotle's Defense of Slavery“,
http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/documents/Dobbs-JOP1994-Slavery.pdf
6. https://www3.nd.edu/~pweithma/professional_website/My%20Papers/Augustine%20
and%20Aquinas%20on%20Political%20Authority.pdf.
7. Urmila Sharma and S. K. Sharma, Western Political Thought (Vol.1&2)
8. R.S. Chaurasia, History of Western Political Thought (Vol. 1&2)

9. Andrew Heywood, Political Theory
10. Shefali Jha, Western Political Thought: From Plato to Marx
11. Nelson, Western Political Thought: From Socrates to the Age of Ideology
12. O.P. Gauba, Western Political Thought
13. Subrata Mukherjee, A History of Political Thought: Plato to Marx
14. Rousseau, Discourses on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among Men
(available for free under The Gutenberg Project on the internet)
15. Aristotle’s Theory of Justice, A PDF article made available to the students.
16. “Augustine and Aquinas on Original Sin and the Function of Political Authority”,
https://www3.nd.edu/~pweithma/professional_website/My%20Papers/Augustine%20
and%20Aquinas%20on%20Political%20Authority.pdf
17. “Augustine of Hippo: The Relevance of His Life and Thought Today”,
http://d3pi8hptl0qhh4.cloudfront.net/documents/sbjt/SBJT_2008Summer4.pdf
18. The History of Rome,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Lieber_Collection/pdf/History-of-Rome_Vol-
1.pdf
19. Aquinas Political Writings,
http://www.inp.uw.edu.pl/mdsie/Political_Thought/Political%20Writings%20(Cambridg
e%20Texts%20in%20the%20History%20of%20Political%20Thought)%20-
%20Thomas%20Aquinas.pdf
Module III and IV
20. Ritchie, D. (1891). Contributions to the History of the Social Contract Theory. Political
Science Quarterly, 6(4), 656-676. doi:10.2307/2139203

21. Murphy, A. (1997). The Uneasy Relationship between Social Contract Theory and
Religious Toleration. The Journal of Politics,59(2), 368-392. Retrieved from
22. “The Inevitable Social Contract”, http://www.bu.edu/av/core/journal/xxv/Parks.pdf.
23. “Theory of Justice”,
http://www.csus.edu/indiv/c/chalmersk/econ184sp09/johnrawls.pdf
24. “John Rawls' Theory of Justice as Fairness”, http://www.follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-
2014-Rawls-JasF.pdf
25. https://www.utilitarianism.com/jeremy-bentham/index.html
26. “Happiness and Utility: Jeremy Bentham’s Equation “,
https://www.utilitarianism.com/jeremy-bentham/greatest-happiness.pdf
27. GRAY, J. (1981). JOHN STUART MILL ON LIBERTY, UTILITY, AND
RIGHTS. Nomos, 23, 80-116. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/24219089.
28. Wisdom, J. (1940). Hegel's Dialectic in Historical Philosophy. Philosophy, 15(59),
243-268. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3746718
29. “Hegel's Dialectic in Historical Philosophy”
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3746718.pdf
30. Sabine, G. (1932). Hegel's Political Philosophy. The Philosophical Review, 41(3),
261-282. doi:10.2307/2179784
31. Brooks, T. (2007). Hegel's Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the
Philosophy of Right. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1r2cb6
32. Mahapatra, D. (2007). Political Philosophy of Hegel and Sri Aurobindo : A
Comparison. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 68(3), 483-496.

33. “Hegel's Political Argument and the Problem of Verwirklichung”,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/190686?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
34. Muravchik, J. (2002). Marxism. Foreign Policy, (133), 36-38. doi:10.2307/3183551.
35. Patnaik, P. (2014). Lenin, Imperialism, and the First World War. Social
Scientist, 42(7/8), 29-46. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/24372919
36. Barfield, R. (1971). Lenin's Utopianism: State and Revolution. Slavic Review, 30(1),
45-56. doi:10.2307/2493442.
37. Treadgold, D. (1981). The Journal of Modern History, 53(1), 157-159. Retrieved from
38. “Understanding the Political in Hannah Arendt’s Thought”,
http://docsdrive.com/pdfs/medwelljournals/sscience/2016/343-348.pdf.
1. Urmila Sharma and S. K. Sharma, Western Political Thought (Vol.1&2)
2. R.S. Chaurasia, History of Western Political Thought (Vol. 1&2)
3. Andrew Heywood, Political Theory
4. Shefali Jha, Western Political Thought: From Plato to Marx
5. Nelson, Western Political Thought: From Socrates to the Age of Ideology
6. O.P. Gauba, Western Political Thought
7. Subrata Mukherjee, A History of Political Thought: Plato to Marx
Documentaries:
1. Socrates, Plator and Aristotle, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nke9geV7g98
Documentaries:
1. Socrates, Plator and Aristotle, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nke9geV7g98
2. John Rawls, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5-JQ17X6VNg

3. Hannah Arendt Final Speech, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wmBSIQ1lkOA.
4. Jeremy Bentham on Utilitarianism as a Moral Theory - Philosophy Core
Concepts, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thuAEeJCcck
5. A History of Philosophy, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ARarjQYOhA4
6. Marxism-Leninism, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-OaToU2Zobs
7. Augustine Documentary, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nz7C0Kr9OA.
4.0 Teaching Pedagogy
Lectures, classroom debates, home assignments, article reviews, screening of

documentaries and interviews, What’s New (weekly news discussion) and surprise tests.
5.0 List of Project Topics
1. Plato: Ideal State
2. Aristotle: Best Practicable State
3. Comparison between Plato and Aristotle: Theory of Knowledge
4. Comparison between Greek and Roman Thought: Foundations
5. Comparison between Greco-Roman and Hebrew Thought: Reason and Faith
6. Augustine: The City of God
7. Aquinas: Synthesis of Reason and Faith
8. Comparison between Luther and Calvin: Protestant Reformation
9. Machiavelli: The Prince
10. Comparison between Locke and Bentham: Theory of Rights
11. Marx and Engels: Communist Manifesto

12. Hannah Arendt: The Human Condition
6.0 Instructions to Students
 No electronic gadget, phone or computer is allowed in the class.
 Only those students who are interested in learning should attend the class.
 All students are expected to participate in classroom activities, including debates,
assignments and What’s New.
 Besides the recommended readings, students should read all the materials uploaded
on the ERP and watch all the videos shared on the WhatsApp group by the Course
Instructor.
 There will also be regular seminars, workshops and movie screenings related to the
subject.
 Questions in the exams can be asked from any of the above formal or informal
sources.
 The above teaching schedule is tentative and is subject to change as per the need
and requirements of the session.

Teaching Schedule
of
Sociology
for
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)
2nd
Semester
(Minor)
Session 2019-2020
Compiled By :
Dr. Honey Kumar
Table of Contents
1. Preface 3
2. Objectives of the Course 4
3. Syllabus 5
4. Teaching Schedule 7
5. Reading Material 9
Page 2 of 16
1. Preface
The course introduces the students with specialization in the discipline of sociology. It
talks about the issues related to social stratification, social differentiation and social
inequalities. The term stratification in the field of sociology usually applied to studies
of socially structured inequalities. It looks into systematic inequalities between
different groups which arise as the unintended consequences of social processes and
relationships. When we ask, why there is caste, why one caste people maintain distance
from other caste, why there is poverty, why black people, women, lower class people
are disadvantaged, we are posing questions about social stratification. Thus, social
stratification and social differentiation is concerned in different ways with the issues of
class, caste, race, tribe, village, minorities etc. and related problems. For complete
understanding of social stratification phenomenon, the course syllabus is divided into
four modules namely social stratification, process of change and stratification, types of
society and theoretical perspectives on social stratification.
Page 3 of 16
Objectives of the course
 To introduce students with specializations of this subject.
 To develop critical understanding and sensitivity among students about
stratification issues.
 To enable students of law for developing understanding of sociological
perspectives on social stratification.
 To motivate students to identify problems related to stratification and find out
possible solutions with the help sociological theories.
Page 4 of 16
SYLLABUS
SOCIOLOGY – MINOR 2
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION
ACADEMIC SESSION
(2019-20)
Course Credits: 3
MODULE I
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION
Social Stratification and Social Differentiation: Definition, Meaning and Difference,

Types
Caste System: Definition, Features and Theories of Origin
Class System: Meaning, Features, Difference Between Caste and Class
Jajmani System: Concept, Definition and Features
MODULE II
PROCESSES OF CHANGE AND STRATIFICATION
Sanskritization: Concept, Meaning, Features, Impacts

Modernization: Concept, Meaning, Features, Impacts
Westernization: Concept, Meaning, Features, Impacts
Globalization: Concept, Meaning, Features, Impacts
MODULE III
TYPES OF SOCIETIES
Tribal Society: Concept, Features

Rural Society: Concept, Features, Issues
Urban Society: Concept, Features and Urban life
Page 5 of 16
Rural-Urban Dichotomy: Conceptualization
Difference between Tribal, Rural and Urban Societies
MODULE IV
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL STRATIFICATION
Functional Perspective
Marxian Perspective
Weberian Perspective
Page 6 of 16
Teaching Schedule
S. No. Topic Number of
Lectures
MODULE – I
1. Social Stratification and Social Differentiation: Definition, 6

Meaning and Difference, Types
2. Caste System: Definition, Features and Theories of Origin 2
3. Class System: Meaning, Features, Difference Between Caste 2

and Class
4. Jajmani System: Concept, Definition and Features 2
Total Lectures 12
MODULE – II
1. Sanskritization: Concept, Meaning, Features, Impacts 2
2. Modernization: Concept, Meaning, Features, Impacts 2
3. Westernization: Concept, Meaning, Features, Impacts 2
4. Globalization: Concept, Meaning, Features, Impacts 3
Total Lectures 09
MODULE – III
1. Tribal Society 2
2. Rural Society 3
3. Urban Society 3
4. Rural-Urban Dichotomy 2
5. Difference Between Tribal, Rural and Urban Societies 2
Page 7 of 16
Total Lectures 12
MODULE – IV
1. Functional Perspective 3
2. Marxian Perspective 3
3. Weberian Perspective 3
Total Lectures 09
Page 8 of 16
Suggested Readings
1) Anthony Giddens and Philip W. Sutton, Sociology, Wiley, New Delhi, 2013.
2) David Jary and Julia Jary, Dictionary of Sociology, Harper Collins Publisher,
2005.
3) David G. Mandelbaum, Society in India, Popular Prakashan, Mumbai, 2014.
4) H.M.Johnson, Sociology: A Systematic Introduction, Allied Publishers, New
Delhi, 2003.
5) Rajni Kothari, Caste in Indian Politics, Orient Longman, Hydrabad, 2004.
6) Rosemary Cropton, Class and Stratification, Rawat, Jaipur, 2013.
7) Sukhant K. Chodhury and Soumendra Mohan Patnaik, Indian Tribes and the
Mainstream, Rawat, Jaipur, 2008.
8) Surinder S. Jodhka, Caste, Oxford, New Delhi, 2012.
9) Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Globalization: The Key Concepts, Berg Publications,
New York, 2007.
10) T.B. Bottomore, Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature, Routledge,
New Delhi, 2014.
11) T.K. Oommen and C.N. Venugopal, Sociology of Law, Eastern Book, 1993.
12) Upendera Baxi,Towards the Sociology of Law, Satwahain Publications, New
Delhi, 2009. V. Nath, Urbanization Urban Development and Metropolitan
Cities in India, Concept Publication, New Delhi, 2007.
13) Yogendra Singh, Social Change in India, Har Anand Publications, New Delhi,
2010.
14) Yogendra Singh, Culture Change in India, Rawat, Jaipur, 2009.

Page 9 of 16
15) Yogesh Atal, Changing Indian Society, Rawat, Jaipur, 2008.
Teaching Pedagogy
 Use of Modern Technologies for teaching such as Power Point Presentation
 Lecture Method
 Group Discussion Method
 Question Answer Sessions
 Extra Classes for Academic Problems of students
 Project Viva
Page 10 of 16
List of Assignments/Projects
 The Issues Related to Caste System in India.
 A Sociological Study on the Resurgence of Caste System in India.
 A Discourse on Social Stratification
 Various Forms of Social Stratification.
 Indicators of Social Mobility.
 Sociological Understanding of Social Mobility.
 A Discourse on Sanskritization, Globalization, Westernization and
Modernization
 Sociological Study on Various Types of Societies.
 Discourse on Factors of Social Change.
 A Sociological Study of Rural-Urban Problems in India.
 Role of Various Peasant Movements in the Development of Rural India.
 A Discourse on Class System.
 A Discourse on Caste, Race and Class in India.
Page 11 of 16
Instructions to Students
 The students are advised to go through the topic to be undertaken in the class
one day prior to the scheduled class.
 Lecture will be delivered through power point presentation. Students are
advised to collect the hard copies of presentation after the lecture.
 The list of suggested readings is only illustrative and new suggestions may be
added to it during the semester.
 Some reading material shall be uploaded on ERP for students during the
semester. The students are advised to download the reading material and use it
for their preparation.
 All students shall carry the instructed reading material in class along with their
short notes so as to enable a meaningful discussion.
 The above teaching schedule is tentative and is subject to change as per the
need and requirements of the session.
Page 12 of 16
Page 13 of 16
Page 14 of 16
Page 15 of 16
Page 16 of 16
Teaching Schedule
of
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
for
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)

SECOND SEMESTER
Session 2019-2020
Compiled By
Dr. Sukhwinder Kaur Virk

Assistant Professor of Law
RGNUL, Punjab
2
Table of Contents
Sr. No. Contents Page
No.
1. About the Subject 03
2. Objectives of the Course 04-05
3. Learning Outcomes 06
4. Syllabus and Suggested Readings 07-08
5. Teaching Schedule and Reading 08-36
Material
6. Teaching Pedagogy and 37
Ssignments
7. Instructions to Students for Study 37
8. Project Topics 30-41

3
ABOUT THE SUBJECT
The subject is intended to introduce basic concepts and problems of public

international law and international legal system to law students. Public international
law, which is traditionally considered to encompass the binding normative rules and
principles dealing with the conduct of states and of international organizations and
with their relations inter se.
International law is about trying to control and maintain the relationships of states and
everything in it. It brings a lot of concepts like war and war crimes, aggression and
settlement of disputes between States, protection of the environment, state
responsibilities and obligations to each other, human rights protection, humanitarian
law, status and protection of refugees of different States. Globalization has forced us
to interact with each other, making it essential to have common rules to guide and
sustain relationships (of trade, investment, technology, etc.) between individuals and
States from different regions and continents. Moreover Maritime law, Air and space
law is part and parcel of international law and cover a broad range of this subject.
Now, many of domestic laws are highly influenced and molded by the rules of
international law.
International law provides mandatory principles, norms and rules that regulate the
relations between States as well as with other non-State actors, like international
organizations and individuals
This subject will introduce you to the structures, processes, and rules of the international
legal order. We will explore how, by whom, and with what results law has been used to
shape or attempt to shape the world in which we live. We are concerned, in this subject,
not with any domestic legal order but with the law formed by and governing the conduct
of states and other international actors.
4
HAPPY LEARNING!!!!!
OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE
The objective of the subject will not only be to develop the knowledge and
understanding of the basics of Public International Law but will also focus on
developing the subject specific Intellectual and Research skills and Transferable and
generic skills.
The students will not only be made familiar with the basic traditional concepts of the
subject :
- to develop an understanding of the nature, theory, rules, and principles of
international law, the processes by which the law is made and applied, the means
of determination of the law as well as the various processes for the settlement of
disputes;
- to develop an appreciation of the political, institutional and economic context of
international law and the interplay of the various factors, including ethical
considerations, and actors involved;
- to provide an introduction to specific sectors of the law, to research methods and
instruction on how to access a broad range of materials on the internet;
- to provide an opportunity to develop skills of analysis and synthesis of a wide range
of both traditional legal and other primary sources, including United Nations and
governmental publications.
Students will also be trained so that they can develop their research skills in public
international law and can construct arguments clearly and coherently;
a. express and assess the limitations of international law in a state-centred system and
the challenges posed by political considerations to the rule of law in international
affairs;
b. demonstrate independence of mind in the presentation and defense of an
argument, both orally and in writing present arguments in terms of international
legal concepts, couched in appropriate terminology;
c. locate and analyze relevant primary and secondary source materials;
d. distinguish relevant from irrelevant materials;
e. identify and analyze key issues of international legal policy;
f. think critically, develop, communicate and defend coherent arguments;
BEST WISHES!!!
6
LEARNING OUTCOMES
The course will cover the traditional major topics in the field of public international
law such as the sources and subjects of international law, the jurisdiction of states,
and the relationship between international law and the internal law of states. The
subject will review and discuss a number of international law cases decided by
national and international tribunals, as well as certain treaties, resolutions and other
international legal instruments of importance.
After completion of the syllabus, students will be able to demonstrate knowledge and
understanding of:
- The nature and functions of the international legal system;
- The key sources of public international law;
- Fundamental principles of the law of treaties and of state responsibility;
- The relationship between international and national law and an appreciation of

the significant differences and similarities of international law and domestic
law;
- The concept of international legal personality and recognition;
- The privileges and immunities that are enjoyed by the diplomats;
- The set up and working of the United Nations and its various organs;
- The methods of settlement of International disputes employed under Public

International Law;
- An understanding of the methodology and procedures of international law and

the possibilities it provides for international dispute resolution;
- An awareness of how and why it is that political realities often constrain the
application of international law and marginalise it where it might have been
thought to be at its clearest and most significant;
- Apply their knowledge to analyse complex legal questions and problems;
- Critique a range of legal materials and arguments;
HAPPY
UNDERSTANDING!!!!
7
SYLLABUS
MODULE---I
Introduction and Sources

1. Nature and Scope of International Law
2. Definitions of International Law
3. International Conventions and Customs
4. General Principles of International Law, Judicial Decisions and other sources
5. Relationship between International Law and Municipal Law
MODULE---II
State: Recognition and Responsibility
1. Subjects of International Law

2. Theories and Kinds of State Recognition
3. Consequences and Exceptions to Non-Recognition
4. Nature and Kinds of State Responsibility
5. Consequences of Internationally Wrongful Acts
MODULE---III
Diplomatic Relations and Law of Treaties
1. Meaning, Privileges And Immunities of Diplomats

2. Classification and Functions of Diplomats
3. Extraditions and Asylum
4. Making of Treaties and Reservations to Treaties
5. Amendments, Interpretation, Termination and Suspension of Treaties
MODULE---IV
International Institutions and Settlement of International Disputes
1. League of Nations
2. United Nations; Preamble, Objects and Principles
3. Organs of United Nations
4. Role of United Nations in the development of International Law
5. Mechanisms for Settlement of International Disputes
8
SUGGESTED
READINGS
th
1. Shaw Malcolm N., International Law 8 Edn., Cambridge University Press
2. Rosedar S.R. A., Public International Law, Second Edition , 2016, Lexis
Nexis
3. Lowe Vaughan, International Law: A Very Short Introduction, 2016, Oxford
University Press
th
4. Crawford James, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8 Edn.,
2012, Oxford University Press
5. Jain Shilpa, Introduction to International law, Edn 2015, Eastern Book
Company Lucknow
6. Singh Gurdip, International Law Third edition 2015, Eastern Book Company
Lucknow
7. Ahuja V.K, Public International Law, 2016, Lexis Nexis
8. Wallace Rebecca M.M, International Law 5th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2005
9. Malanczuk Peter , Modern Introduction to International Law, Seventh Revised
Edition, 2000, Routledge, London.
10. Evans, International Law Fourth edition 2010, Oxford University Press
11. J.G. Starke: Introduction to International Law, Aditya Books, 10th Edition,
1989.
12. J.I. Brierly: The Law of Nations, Oxford Publishers, London.
Additional Recommended Readings:
International Conventions, Treaties and

Covenants
1. Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969
2. The Charter of United Nations, 1945

3. Statute of International Court of Justice, 1945
4. Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,

2001
9
5. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961
TOPIC WISE TEACHING

SCHEDULE AND
RECOMMENDED READINGS
NATURE AND SCOPE OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW
No. of Lectures: 02
Here the intention is to define and understand what international law is, how it differs
from domestic legal systems and the significance of these differences. Also the
analysis of the different areas covered under the subject and drawing an analogy that
it is a law as International law fulfills all the essentials in the same way as any
municipal system.
Points of Discussion:
1. Why study International Law?

2. What is the basis of International Law?
3. Impact of different Municipal systems on the development of the subject
4. Understanding International Law as law.
Readings :
• James F. Hogg, “What is International Law?” Readings in international law

from the Naval War College review, 1947-1977: role of international law and
an evolving ocean law by Moore, John Norton, 1937- available at
https://archive.org/details/readingsinintern61moor
• L. Eslava, ‘Istanbul Vignettes: Observing the Everyday Operation of

International
Law’ (2014) 2 London Review of International Law 3. Available on SSRN at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2385658
• R. McCorquodale, ‘Defining the International Rule of Law: Defying Gravity?’

(2016)
65:2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 277.
10
• J. Katz Cogan, ‘The Regulatory Turn in International Law’ (2011) 52 Harvard

International Law Journal 322.
• Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the

Congo)
Merits, 2010 ICJ Reports 639, paras. 1 – 4; 15 – 25; 49 – 52; 63 – 69.
• S. Neff, Justice Among Nations (Harvard University Press, 2014).

11
DEFINITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

No. of Lectures: 01
1. Analyzing the views and definitions of different scholars and eminent jurists
putting forward various definitions of international law.
2. Critical analysis of the definitions.
3. Factors that led to the addition of new dimensions in each definition.
4. Finding out the most appropriate definition as per the present status of
international law.
Readings:
• Oliver,J Lissitzyn, International Law To-day and Tomorrow (Oceana

Publications Inc. Dobbs Ferry Newyork, 1965)
• W.Friedman , The Changing Structure of International Law (1964)
• Myres McDougal “International Law and Social Science : A mild plea in
Avoidance”, A.J.I.L Vol 66
• Starke’s International Law, Eleventh Edition, Butterworth
12
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

No. of Lectures: 05
(International Conventions and Customs - No. of Lectures: 03, General
Principles of
International Law, Judicial Decisions and other sources - No. of
Lectures: 02 )
A rule of international law must derive from one of the recognized sources namely
treaties and conventions, international custom, general principles of law, subsidiary
sources of judicial decisions and legal teachings. The sources of international law are
numbered in Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice, 1945.
Points of
Discussion:
1. What is meant by “formal” and “material” sources of international law?

2. What rules govern the formation and identification of the sources of
international law?
3. What are the principal elements of customary international law?
4. What is the meaning of opinio juris, and how is it ascertained?
5. To what extent, if any, can a treaty between two countries create rights or
obligations for third states?
6. What happens if a state enters into two treaties which binds the state to
two opposing, and mutually exclusive, obligations?
7. What is meant by a peremptory norm of international law?
8. What are the important legal effects of peremptory norms of international
law?
9. What is meant by general principles of law?
10. How important are general principles in the making of international law?
Readings:
• D.P O’Connell, International Law, Vol I, 2nd Edn. Steve & Sons, London
1970
• Georg Schwarzenberger and Edward D.Brown , A Manual of International
Law ,6th Edn. 1976

• U N Doc A/RES/2625, 24 October 1970
• Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process, International Law and How We Use
It ,Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995
13
• Professor Christopher Greenwood, Sources of International Law: An

Introduction.
• Shagufta Omar, Sources of International Law in the light of the Article 38 of
the ICJ SSRN- id 187712.pdfv
• International Law Commission, Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral
Declarations of States (2006)
• G. M. Danilenko, Law-making in the Intermational Community (1993)
• V. Vereshchetin and R. Mullerson, Ìnternational Law in an Interdependent
World’ (1990) 28 Columbia Journal of Transnational law,291)
• I.L.C. Draft Conclusions on Customary Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.872 (2016)
• Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), arts. 26-28, 46
• Odrakhelashvili and S. Williams, Forty Years of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (2010)
• Friedmann, “The Uses of ‘General Principles’ in the Development of
International Law,” 57 American J. Int’l L. 279 (1963)
• G. M. Danilenko, Law-making in the Intermational Community (1993)
Cases :
Anglo Norwegian Fisheries Case: United Kingdom v Norway (1951)
Asylum Case : Colombia v Peru 1950
North Sea Continental Shelf Case: Netherlands and Denmark v. West
Germany, I.C.J.1969
Nicaragua Case : Nicaragua v. U.S.A., I.C.J., 1986
Icelandic Fisheries Case : U.K. v. Iceland, I.C.J., 1974
Malta-Libya Continental Shelf Case I.C.J., 1985
South China Sea Arbitration (Merits) Philippines v. China, PCA, 2016
Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) 1960
S S Lotus Case: France v Turkey
Chorzow factory Case (Indemnity) (Merits) : Germany v Poland
Corfu Channel Case (Merits) : United Kingdom v Albania
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain)
14
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL

LAW
No. of Lectures: 02
The relationship of international and municipal law is the most crucial issue and
warrants a clear understanding of the subject. These two systems of the law often
represent two distinct legal systems. The ways in which they operate are totally
separate, independent and sometimes, even interdependent with each other. The study
of relations between international law and national law is instrumental in
understanding the changing dynamics of these two legal systems and shall also help
the students to identify the new challenges emerging in the domain of global regime.
In this lecture an understanding will be provided of the place and effect of
international law in domestic legal systems and how these differ in different states.
1. What is the relationship between international and national law?
2. What are the significant differences and similarities of international law and
domestic law?
3. What are the theories relating to the relationship between international and
national law?
4. What are the diverse practices of the states to embrace the notions of the
international law with internal law of the land?
5. Discussion on the problems & prospects pertaining to relationship of
international and national law.
Readings:
• Crawford James, 'Brownie's Principles of Public International Law', 8th
Edition, Oxford University Press, 2012.
• Kelsen Hans 'Theory of Law and State' (1945)
Cases:
Solomon V. Commissioners of Customs and Excise (1967) 2 Q.B.116

Ostime V. Australian Mutual Provident Society (1960) A.C 459
International Tin Council Case (J.H. Rayner Ltd V. (Mining Law) Dept. of
Trade and Industry (1990) 2.A. C. 418)
Fothergill V. Monarch Airlines Ltd. (1981) A. C. 251
Philippson V. Imperial Airways Ltd. (1939) A. C. 332
The Paquete Habana Case
Brazilian Loans Case: France v Brazil (1929)
15
SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
No. of Lectures : 02
An entity which possesses international personality is an international person or a

subject of International Law. In the basic understanding of International Law, it is
clear that not only the states, but individuals and International organisations as well,
are the subjects of international law. However, they enjoy lesser rights than states
under international law. According to Oppenheim, “it is no longer possible, as a
matter of positive law, to regard states as the only subject of international law, and
there is an increasing disposition to treat individuals, within a limited sphere, as
subjects of international law”.
1. What is meant by International personality?
2. What are the various subjects of International Law as per the definitions given
by eminent writers and jurists?
3. Which subject enjoys more rights and why?
4. What is the position of Individuals under International Law?
5. What is the legal status of International Organisations?
6. What are the other subjects of International Law ?
Readings:
Law ,6th Edn. 1976

• Article 1, Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933
th
• Crawford James, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8 Edn.,
2012, Oxford University Press
• David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (2010)
• Shilpa Jain, Introduction to Public International Law, 2015
• Mark Weston Janis, “Individuals as Subjects of International Law” 1984,
Cornell International Law Journal available at SSRN
16
STATE RECOGNITION
Recognition is one of the more difficult concepts in international law, particularly

given its tangled relationship with politics. To operate in the realm of international
law and international relations the achievement of statehood is insufficient. Entities
must also achieve recognition as a State in order to have any real engagement with
other States.
‘Recognition’ means that the recognizing State views the entity being recognized as a
State and therefore is able to enter into a formal relationship with such State.
Recognition refers to the willingness of a State to accept and respect the legal
personality, including the geographical territory, of another State.
Thus, the recognizing State does not claim the territory of the recognized State for
itself, nor will it, expressly or obliquely, accept that any part of the recognized State’s
territory belongs to another State.
The term ‘recognition’ in the context of public international law relates to two distinct
but related concepts: recognition of States and recognition of governments.
1. What is statehood and recognition?
2. What is the difference between statehood and recognition?
3. How is recognition obtained?
4. Is there more than one type of recognition?
5. What is the legal effect of recognition and may it be withdrawn?
6. What is recognition of governments?
7. What are the consequences of non- recognition?
8. What are the exceptions to non- recognition?
9. Is recognition a political decision or a matter of law?
10. How do international relations and politics influence recognition
17
 Cai, ‘New Great Powers and International Law in the 21st Century’(2013)
European Journal of International Law.
• Brad R.Roth, “Succession, Coups and the International Rule of Law:
Assessing the decline of the effective control doctrine”.Wayne State
University Law School Research Paper No 10-15. Available at SSRN
• Martin Dixon, “ Recent development in United Kingdom Practice concerning
the recognition of states and governments”
• J. Vidmar, 'Explaining the Legal Effects of Recognition' (2012)
61International and Comparative Law Quarterly.
• D.J. Devine, ‘The Requirements of Statehood Re-Examined’ (1971) Modern
Law Review.
• Stefan A.G Tolman, “The Constitutive versus the Declaratory doctrine of
Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?”(2004) 75 British Yearbook of International
Law.
• Oscar Schachter, ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for
International Law’ 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 7-23, 1998
• R Cohen, ‘The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice’ (1961)
University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
• Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Wonderful Artificiality of States’ in Proceedings of
the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) vol.88, p.22-29.
• T.D. Grant, ‘Territorial Status, Recognition, and Statehood: Some Aspects
of the Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)’ (1997)
Stanford Journal of International Law 305.
Cases:
1. Tinoco Concessions Case,(1923) 1 RIAA 369

2. Republic of Somalia v Woodhouse Drake Carey Suisse S.A., (1993) Q.B 54
3. Luther v Sagor, (1921)3K.B.532
4. Civil Air Transport Inc v Central Air Transport Corporation, (1953)AC 70
5. Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v
Netherlands (1969) ICJ Rep 3 (The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases),
6. Haile Selassie v Cable and Wireless Ltd (No.2) [1939]
7. ALB v Austrain Federal Ministry for the Interior (1922) 1 ILR 20
Readings:
STATE RESPONSIBILITY
In international law, the law of state responsibility determines the consequences of a

states’ failure to comply with its international obligations. In general, it requires a
state that breaches an international obligation to cease the violation and provide
reparations for any harm caused to another state.
The law relating to state responsibility is one of the core areas of international law.
Legally speaking, state responsibility is ‘the principle which establishes an obligation
to make good any violation of international law producing injury’.
Whenever a duty established by any rule of international law has been breached by
act or omission, a new legal relationship automatically comes into existence. This
relationship is established between the subject to which the act is imputable, who
must respond by making adequate reparation, and the subject who has a claim to
reparation because of the breach of duty.
Thus when a State is failed to comply with an international obligation and causes
harm to another State- by invading its territory, refusing to grant privileges and
immunities to its diplomats, detaining its citizens illegally, or sinking its ships – it is
obliged to make reparations.
Thus it is necessary to have an appropriate legal framework under international law to
deal with the issue of state responsibility so that we can ensure states sovereignty and
equality among nations irrespective of their power in international community.
1. How is Responsibility defined under International Law?
2. What is State Responsibility?
3. What is the purpose of the law of state responsibility?
4. What are the different theories on State Responsibility?
5. What are the Constituents of State Responsibility?
6. What constitutes Internationally Wrongfully Act?
7. Is the state bound by the consequences of Internationally Wrongfully Act?
8. Are there any defenses available for precluding wrongfulness?
9. Are these defenses available in case of a breach of peremptory norms?
• Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol.
1, 502 (Pearson Education Ltd., Singapore, 9th Edn.- 1996)

• ILC, “Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, with commentaries 2001”, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two.
• Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 359 (The Lawbook Exchange
Ltd., New Jersey, Third Printing 2009).
• Alexandre Kiss, “State Responsibility and Liability for Nuclear Damage”,
Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y, Vol. 35:1, (2006 )
• Antonio Cassese, International Law, 242 (Cambridge University Press, UK,
2nd Edn. - 2005).
• P Allott, “State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law”
(1988) 29 Harvard Int’l L J 1
• James Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries,1(Cambridge University
Press, UK, 2002).
• Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga & Attila Tanzi, “International State
Responsibility”, in Mohammed Bedjaoui (ed.), International Law:
Achievements and Prospects, 347 (Martinuss Nijhoff Publishers, USA, 1991).
• Eduaro Fimenez de Arechaga, “International Responsibility”, in Max
Sorensen (ed.), Manual of Public International Law 531-604 (Macmillan,
London, 1968).
• Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 176
(Cambridge University Press, 1995)
• F.V. Garcia- Amador, Louis B. Sohn, & Richard R. Baxter, Recent
Codification of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 14
(Library of Congress Publication Data., USA, 1974).
• Professor Edwin M. Borchard, “Theoretical Aspects of the International
Responsibility of States”.
• Derek Jinks, “State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups”
(March 2003) 4 Chicago Journal of International Law.
Readings:
Cases:
1. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986
2. Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) I.C.J. Reports 1997
3. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949. Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1949
4. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1980
5. Rainbow Warrior Case (New Zealand v France)
6. La Grand Case
7. Nicaragua v United States of America I.C.J. Reports 1986
8. Jurisdictional Immunities of the state (Germany v Italy; Germany Intervening)
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
No.of Lectures :03
Diplomacy as a method of communication between various parties,

including negotiations between recognised agents, is an ancient
institution and international legal provisions governing its
manifestations are the result of centuries of state practice. In ancient
times diplomacy was considered the anchor of international or
interstate relationship.The role of diplomats in the unfolding
narrative of international legal developments is unique. India's
interest in international law has always been profound. Centuries
before the west came to accept the need for a systematized pattern of
rules governing international relations, the rulers of different
territories in this subcontinent has already evolved a substantially
uniform code of principles regulating the mutual intercourse of
States.
1. Why do states enter into diplomatic relations?
2. What are the functions of a diplomatic mission?
3. What are the various classes of the Heads of Mission?
4. What are the various rights and immunities enjoyed by the diplomatic mission?
5. Is the diplomatic mission granted civil, administrative and criminal
immunities by the receiving state?
6. Is the waiver of these immunities possible?
7. Is the immunity from the jurisdiction of the third state during transit also available
to the diplomtic mission?
8. What are the various duties imposed on the diplomatic agent and other staff members
under international law?
9. When does the function of a diplomatic agent come to an end?
10. Can the receiving state send back the diplomatic agent?
• Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961
Law ,6th Edn. 1976

• V K Ahuja, Public International Law, Lexis Nexis , 2016
• Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 2008
• Rebecca M.M. Wallace, International Law, 1997
• Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 2008
• Dinesh Patel and Amikar Parwar, “Growing Threat of Terrorism and
Diplomatic Immunity” available at SSRN
• Sanderjin Duquet and Jan Wouters, “Legal Duties of Diplomats Today: The
continuing relevance of Vienna Convention”.
• Tania Sebastian, “Diplomatic Immunity versus Harm to the Individual: Am
N Attempt to Appraisal”.
Cases:
1. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of
America v Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980
2. Congo v Uganda, ICJ Reports 2005
3. La Grand Case (Germany v United States of America), ICJ Reports 2001
Readings:
LAW OF TREATIES
No.of Lectures: 03
Treaties are the agreements between states on the international plane,

bestowing binding rights and obligations upon the parties. States interact with each
other and formulate rules and principles for their smooth interaction, which are
generally codified in form of agreements or treaties. In the modern world, states
transact vastly and variedly with other states creating numerous agreements or
treaties and thereby, developing international law. The rights and obligations
created by a treaty are collectively known as ‘treaty law’.
A treaty can be made between two states (bilateral) or few/limited number of
states on a specific subject matter of their common interest (plurilateral) or
between many/large number of states on an important subject matter relevant for
all (multilateral). Depending upon their extent of application and signatory
parties, a treaty may be described as universal, regional, intergovernmental, inter
ministerial or administrative.
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969 is an authoritative statement
codifying the law relating to treaties, i.e. rules, procedures for making, applying
of treaties and to study their legal effect.
1. What is a treaty?
2. What is the applicable law with regard to governance of treaties?
3. When does a treaty become binding on a state?
4. How do treaties relate to national law?
5. What are the different types of treaties?
6. How is a treaty formed?
7. How do reservations and interpretative declarations differ?
8. What role does the ability to make reservations and interpretative declarations
play in the exercise of state sovereignty?
9. What are the key areas of conflict with the rules on reservations?
10. How do reservations impact the overall effectiveness of treaties?
11. What is the ultimate objective of treaty interpretation?
12. Does the ‘type of treaty’ to which it belongs influence a treaty interpretation?
13. Can a treaty once formed be terminated or suspended?
• Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties,1969
• United Nations Charter
• Wali Ullah, “The Treaty Making Power under the Constitution of India”
(1971) 2 SCC J-20
• W.E Conklin, ‘Peremptory Norms of the International Community’ (2012)
23:3 European Journal of International Law
• Hameed, ‘Unravelling the Mystery of Jus Cogens in International Law’ (2014)
84 British Yearbook of International Law 52.
• O. Corten & P. Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties
(OUP 2011), 2 vol. (article by article commentary)
• W.M. Reisman, ‘Unratified Treaties and Other Unperfected Acts in
International Law: Constitutional Functions’ (2002) 35 Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law 729
• J. Klabbers, Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer 1996)
• Orakhelashvili, ‘The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and
Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions’ (2005) 16 EJIL
59
• J.E. Alvarez, ‘The New Treaty Makers’ (2002) 25:2 Boston College
International and Comparative Law Review 213
• ILC, Guide to Practice on Reservations To Treaties, UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011),
para. 75.
• Pellet, ‘The ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties: A General
Presentation by the Special Rapporteur’ (2013) 24:4 EJIL 1061.
• U. Linderfalk. On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International
Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Springer, 2007).
• R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (OUP, 2008).
• M.E. Villiger, The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – 40
Years Later (Chapter V: Interpretation of Treaties), Recueil des Cours
(Académie de Droit International de La Haye) vol. 344 (2011), 113-34.
• J. Arato, 'Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of
Treaty Interpretation' (2010) 9 Law & Practice of International Courts and
Tribunals 443.
• D.J. Bederman, ‘Medellin’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation’ (2008)
102 AJIL 529.
Cases:
1. Qatar v. Bahrain case(1994) ICJ Rep
2. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (1973)ICJ Rep.3
3. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (1997) ICJ Rep.
4. Military and Para Military Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
U.S.A.(1986) ICJ Rep.
EXTRADITION AND ASYLUM
Extradition is the delivery of an accused or a convicted individual to the state on

whose territory he is alleged to have committed or to have been convicted of a crime,
by the state on whose territory the alleged criminal happens to be for the time being.
The term ‘extradition’ denotes the process whereby under treaty or upon the basis of
reciprocity one state surrenders to another state at its request a person accused or
convicted of a criminal offence against the laws of the requesting state, such
requesting state being competent to try the alleged offender. In practice, however,
states do not accept such obligation. Under international law, extradition is mostly a
matter of bilateral treaty.
Asylum means shelter and active protection extended to a political refugee from
another state by a state which admits him on his request. According to the Article 14
of the UDHR, “Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum
from prosecution”. It may, however, should be noted that the Declaration simply
recognizes the right of asylum, it does not grant right to receive asylum. “The so-
called right of asylum is probably nothing but the competence of every state to allow
a prosecuted alien to enter and to remain on, its territory under its protection.
1. How is Extradition defined under International Law?
2. What are the legal bases for Extradition?
3. What are the general principles of Extradition Law?
4. Are there grounds under International Law for refusing Extradition requests?
5. What is the position of Individuals in the Extradition process?
6. How is Asylum defined under International Law?
7. Is Asylum guaranteed as a right under International Law?
8. What are the different types of Asylum?
9. Non-refoulement and Asylum seekers
Readings:
• J.G. Starke, Introduction to International Law, 10th Edition (Butterworths,

Singapore, 1989)
• A. Jones, Jones on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance, Sweet &
Maxwell, London (2001)
• Convention on Reduction of Statelessness, 1961
• Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, Edited by Sir Robert Jennings and Sir
Arthur Watts, Ninth Edition Longman Group UK Ltd. And Mrs. Tomoko
Hudson, 1992
• Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1945
• Sibylle Kapferer, UNHCR Consultant , Legal and Protection Policy Research
Series
The Interface between Extradition and Asylum Department of International
Protection , PPLA/2003/05, November 2003.
• Ananya Chakraborty and Dr.Manoj Sinha, “Extradition – Analysis of National
Legal Regime” (2014) Calcutta Law Times.
• Selina Trevisanut, “The Principle of Non-Refoulement at sea and the
effectiveness of Asylum protection”, (2008) 12 Max Planck Yearbook of
United Nations Law.
• Vladislava Stoyanova, “The Principle of Non-Refoulement and the rights of
Asylum Seekers to enter State Territory”,2008 Interdisciplinary Journal of
Human Rights Law.
• I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edn., Clarendon Press,
Oxford (1998)
• European Convention on Extradition, 1957
• Extradition Act, 1962
• SAARC Accord on Extradition, 1987
• India Canada Treaty on Extradition, 1987
• India-UK Pact on Extradition, 1993
• India-US Treaty on Extradition, 1997
• India-Hong Kong Pact on Extradition, 1997.
Cases:
1. Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) Haya De la Torre Case
2. U.S. v. Rauscher, (1886) 119 U.S. 407
3. Re Castioni case, Q.B. 1891
4. U.S. v. Rauscher, US, 1886
5. Hans Muller of Nuremberg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta AIR
1955
6. Rex v. Godfrey, K. B., 1923
7. Savarkar’s Case ( France v. UK) 1911
8. Mubarak Ali Ahamad v. State of Bombay, AIR, 1957
9. Dharam Teja’s Case, AIR 1970
10. Sucha Singh’s Case, SCC 2001
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
No. of Lecture – 1
League of Nations was the outcome of the First World War. Although the desire for
the establishment of an effective international organization had been expressed long
before the First World War yet it took the real form in the Treaty of Versailles, 1919.
Due to various defects of this international organization it could not performed its
work successfully. Main defect and weakness of this, it was unsuccessful to prohibit
war. However, it made the first important attempt to establish a general and
comprehensive global international organization.
Point of Discussion:
1. Why League of Nations was established?
2. What were the reasons of failure of League of Nations?
3. What were the important factors and events that led to decline and dissolve the
League of Nations?
Readings:
• Covenant of League of Nations
• Ahuja V.K, Public International Law, 2016, Lexis Nexis
• Wallace Rebecca M.M, International Law 5th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2005
• Malanczuk Peter , Modern Introduction to International Law, Seventh Revised
Edition, 2000, Routledge, London.
• Evans, International Law Fourth edition 2010, Oxford University Press
• J.G. Starke: Introduction to International Law, Aditya Books, 10th Edition,
1989.
• J.I. Brierly: The Law of Nations, Oxford Publishers, London.
• Crawford James, 'Brownie's Principles of Public International Law', 8th
Edition, Oxford University Press, 2012.
• Kelsen Hans 'Theory of Law and State' (1945)
• Kapoor S.K., ‘International Law and Human Rights’, Central Law Agency,
AllahabUNITED NATIONS; PREAMBLE, OBJECTS AND
PRINCIPLES
ORGANS OF UNITED NATIONS
ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
No. of Lectures: 05
League of Nations failed in its objectives and could not check the Second World
War. During the Second World War big powers started its work for the establishment
of United Nations. The untiring efforts bore fruits for formulation of definite plans
when the UN Charter was adopted and signed on 26th January 1945. Finally UN
Charter came into existence 24th October 1945 with the purpose of international peace
and security and friendly relations among states. Keep in mind UN is not a super-
national organization like federal government, actually it is an association of nations
and UN can only do what its members are wanted to do.
1. What are the efforts and factors to the establishment of the United Nations?
2. What is the importance of Preamble of UNs Charter?
3. What are the purposes and Principles of United Nations Organisations?
4. Compare and Contrast of League of Nations and United Nations.
5. What are the organs of the United Nations?
6. What is the role of Security Council for maintaining peace and security in the
world?
7. What is the jurisdiction of International Court of Justice (ICJ) and contribution
of ICJ for the development of international law through the decisions of ICJ?
8. What is the legal significance of General Assembly’s Resolutions?
9. What is the legal significance of Security Council’s Resolutions?
10. What is the contribution of UNs for the development of international Law?
Readings
• Charter of the United Nations, 1945

• Statute of International Court of Justice, 1945
• General Assembly Resolution 217 (III), 10 December 1948
• General Assembly Resolution 260 (III), 9 December 1948.
• Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992
• Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993
35
• Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993

• Security Council Resolution 877 (1993) of 21 October 1993
• Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) of 31 March 2005
• Security Council Resolution 1859 (2008) of 22 December 2008
• Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009) of 24 September 2009 Georg
• Schwarzenberger and Edward D.Brown , A Manual of International Law,
6th edn. 1976
• Crawford James, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th
edn., 2012, Oxford University Press
• David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (2010)
• Shilpa Jain, Introduction to Public International Law, 2015
• Aggarwal H.O., International Law, Allahabad Law Agency, Fridabad,
India, 2007.
Cases:
Anglo Norwegian Fisheries Case: United Kingdom v. Norway (1951)
Asylum Case : Colombia v Peru 1950
North Sea Continental Shelf Case: Netherlands and Denmark v. West
Germany, I.C.J.1969
Nicaragua Case : Nicaragua v. U.S.A., I.C.J., 1986
Icelandic Fisheries Case : U.K. v. Iceland, I.C.J., 1974
Malta-Libya Continental Shelf Case I.C.J., 1985
South China Sea Arbitration (Merits) Philippines v. China, PCA, 2016
Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) 1960
S. S. Lotus Case: France v Turkey
Chorzow factory Case (Indemnity) (Merits) : Germany v Poland
Corfu Channel Case (Merits) : United Kingdom v Albania, ICJ, 1951
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain)
Qatar v. Bahrain case(1994) ICJ Rep
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (1973)ICJ Rep.3
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (1997) ICJ Rep.
Military and Para Military Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
U.S.A.(1986) ICJ Rep Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda (Armed
Activities in the territory of
Congo), 2005
Advisory opinion on Reparation of the injuries suffered in the service of the
United Nations, 1949
37
Advisory opinion on International status of South West Africa,1956

Mechanisms for Settlement of International Disputes
No. of Lectures: 03
Dispute resolution is a crucial aspect of any legal system or legal order. The growth
and complexity of judicial and legal methods of dispute settlement reflects the
evolution of the international legal order. Settling disputes is not just about ‘settling
disputes’ it is also about how issues are addressed, regulated and engaged with. There
are numerous different means and methods including judicial and quasi judicial and
extra judicial means. Courts, tribunals, arbitral panels, committees, inspection panels
and other UN organs are playing significant role to settle the disputes among states.
This subject is about how law is generated, about what law is generated and about the
manner in which it is engaged with and responded to. It is also about the means and
mechanisms for resolving problems and adjudicating outcomes, of securing remedies
and securing the interests of those who it is there to serve. The aim of this chapter is
to provide an overview of legal, judicial and quasi- judicial methods of settlement of
disputes in the field if public international law.The This content of the course
provides comprehensive analysis of the foundation and techniques of the international
dispute settlement.
1. What are international Disputes and conflicts?
2. What are the Pacific means and methods of settlement of international
disputes between States?
3. Compare and contrast of Arbitration and judicial settlement.
4. Doctrine of Forum Prorogatum and the Advisory proceedings of the
international Court of Justice.
5. Discussion on Article 2, Article 14 and Article 33 to 38 of Chapter VI of the
UN Charter.
6. What are the compulsive methods of settlement of disputes?
7. Role of International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
8. Role of ICJ for the settlement of international disputes between states
Readings:
• J. Collier V. Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law, Oxford
University Press, Oxford
• J. Marrills, International Dispute Settlement, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
• A.K. Kaul, Dispute Settlement under WTO, Satyam Books Publication, New
Delhi
• Official website of the Dispute Settlement Bodies. (WTO, ICSID, ICJ,
UNCITRAL, UN Convention on Law of Seas, 1982
• Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 1969
• Charter of United Nations, 1945
• Statute of International Court of Justice, 1945
• The Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 1958 (New York Convention)
• Permanent Court of Arbitration, Arbitration Rules 2012
• Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN,
1971 ( G. A. Res. 2625, XXV of 24th October 1970).
Cases:
1. Albama Claims Arbitration,1872

2. North Atalantic Fisheries case, 1910
3. Russian Indemnity case, 1912
4. The Island of palmas case, 1928
5. Honduras v. Nicaragua (18 November 1960)
6. The Kutch Arbitration Award (1968)
7. South China Sea Arbitration, (12 July 2016) Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the
Western Sahara Case,ICJ Rep. 1976
8. Advisory Opinion of ICJ on the International Status of South west Africa, ICJ, Rep.
1950
9. Advisory Opinion on Nambia, ICJ, Rep.1971
10. Asylum ( Colombia V. Peru) Case, ICJ Rep. 1950
11. Corfu Channel Case, ICJ, Rep. 1949 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, ICJ,
Rep. 1962
12. North Sea Continental Shelf Case,( Germany V. Denmark and Netherlands) ICJ, Rep.
1969
13. Anglo- Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ, Rep. 1951
14. Case Concerning Military and Para- Military Activities in and Against
15. Nicaragua ( Nicaragua V. U. S. ) ICJ, Rep. 1986
16. Case Concerning the Ariel Incident of 10 August 1999 ( Pakistan V. India) ICJ, Rep.
2000
40
17. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Services of United Nations, ICJ, Rep.
1949
18. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case ( Spain V. Canada) ICJ. Rep. 1998
19. Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ, Rep. 1996
20. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (The United
States of America V. Iran), ICJ, Rep. 197
Teaching Pedagogy and Assignments
Total thirty seven Lectures Proposed to be delivered for completing this course.
The course will be taught through lectures focusing on the main concepts of international
law such as the sources and subjects of international law, the jurisdiction of states, and
the relationship between international law and the internal law of states. The subject will
review and discuss cases and issues between states, decided by different international
tribunals and international court of justice, as well as certain treaties, resolutions and other
international legal instruments of importance. The working sessions aiming at discussing
specific procedural and jurisdictional issues based on case laws. Student will be asked to
prepare brief assignments, find and analyze case law and prepare for moot court exercises
also.
7.0 Instructions to Students:
 The above teaching schedule is tentative and is subject to change as per the need and
requirements of the session.
 Charter of United Nations and Statute of ICJ are mandatory in the class.
 Class-room discussion and Case analysis
PROJECT TOPICS
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
JANUARY-2020
41
1. Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law (Different Theories)

2. Subjects of International Law
3. Responsibilities of States in different fields under International Law
4. Case Study:
a. Portugal Vs/. India (Right to Passage Over Indian Territory, 1960);
b. Barcelona Traction Case, 1959
c. Columbia V. Peru (Asylum Case, 1949);
d. Hostages Case (United States Vs/. Iran) popularly known as US Diplomatic and
Consular staff in Tehran Case;
e. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara case, 1975;
5. Case Study:
a. UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Vs/. Albania (Corfu Channel case, 1949)
b. India- Pakistan Conflict Relating To Kashmir,
c. Cambodia Vs/. Thailand (Temple Preah Vihear Case, 1962)
d. Nicaragua vs/. United States (Case concerning Military and Para-Military Activities,
1986);
e. Libya Vs/ Malta ( Case concerning the Contenental Shelf, 1985);
6. Recognition of States in International Community
7. International Court of Justice as a World Court
8. Security Council as A Tool of Maintaining International Peace and Security in Gl obe
9. Treaties in International Law
10. Role of Customs and Conventions for the development of International law
11. Rethinking International Law is a Law?
12. Position and Status of Individuals under International Law
13. The League of Nations and First World War
14. The United Nations Organization and Charter of United Nations
15. International Disputes and Methods of Settlement International Disputes in International
Law Traditional and New International Law: A Comparison
16. Basis of International Law and Theories of International Law
17. Nature and Scope of International Law and Future of International Law
18. Is International Law a Week Law? A challenge before International Community
19. Classification of Sources of International Law
20. Naturalists vis a vis Positivists
21. Development and growth of International Law in last Centuries
22. Codification and Development of International Law
23. Status and Position of Diplomatic Envoys under Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations
42
24. Role of International Organisations in the Development of International Law

25. UN Charter and Human Rights Protection
26. Emerging Trends in International Law and Globalization
27. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter vis-a vis Chapter VII of the UN Charter
28. Purposes and Principles of United Nations under UN Charter
29. Evolution of United Nations and Role of World Powers
30. Analysis of Preamble of the Charter of United Nations and The High Contracting Parties
vis a vis We the People of United Nations
31. Extradition and Asylum in International Community and International Law
32. Case Study:
a. Federal Republic of Germany Vs/. Denmark (North Sea Continental Case, 1969)
b. Democratic Republic of Congo Vs/. Uganda, ( Armed Activities in the Territory of
Congo, 2005);
c. Spain Vs/. Canada, (Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, 1998);
d. Analyze the North Korean attack on South Korea, 2010;
e. Analyze the intervention of The United States of America in Iran, 2003;
33. Global Terrorism and International Law

34. Contribution and Significance of Universal Declaration of Human Rights in modern
scenario
35. Compare and Contrast of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International
Covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR)
36. International Court of Justice and Environment related cases
37. Regional Conventions and Their Roles in the Development of International Law
38. Principal Organs of United Nations Organization
39. General Principles and jus cogens in International Law
40. State Sovereignty vis a vis International Law
43
44

2nd Sem PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

2nd Sem PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

2nd Sem PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

RAJIV GANDHI NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LAW,

SR. NO. CONTENTS PAGE NO.

2. OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE 3

4. TEACHING SCHEDULE 6-7

5. REFERENCE MATERIAL 8-10

7. LIST OF ASSIGNMENTS / PROJECTS 11-14

Different sections of the schedule elaborate upon the objectives,

The syllabus comprises of four Modules: I/Literature, II/Writing

The teaching schedule will facilitate the students to understand the

THE CRUCIBLE — Arthur Miller

NO MAN IS AN ISLAND — Minno Masani

OF STUDIES — Francis Bacon

ANTONYMS & SYNONYMS AND IDIOMS & PROVERBS

ONE WORD SUBSTITUTES

TENSES (SUBJECT – VERB AGREEMENT)

COMMON ERROR IN ENGLISH

LEGAL REFORM — Thomas Gunn

THE HANGING JUDGE — Eavan Boland

PUNISHMENT — Seamus Heaney

THE RING AND THE BOOK — Robert Browning

HAMATREYA — Ralph Waldo Emerson

(1) Miller Arthur, The Crucible, Penguin Classics. (1988)

(2) Sophocles, Antigone (Translated by Reginald Gibbons), Oxford

(3) Bibu, Douglas, Longman Student’s Grammar of Spoken and Written

(4) Bloomfield, Leonard, Language, University of Chicago Press (1984)

(5) Collins, Cobuild English Grammar, Harper Collins Publishers, London

(6) Collins, English Thesaurus, Harper Collins Publishers, Glasgow (2001)

(8) Eastwood, John, Oxford Practice Grammar, Oxford University Press,

(9) Greenbaum, Sidney, Oxford English Grammar, Oxford University

(10) Kirkpatrick, E.M., Wordsworth Dictionary of Idioms, Hertfordshire

(11) Lewis, Norman, Better English, Goyal Publishers, Delhi (2004)

Sr. Topic Number of

2. THE CRUCIBLE — Arthur Miller* 08

3. NO MAN IS AN ISLAND — Minno Masani* 02

4. OF STUDIES — Francis Bacon** 02

8. ANTONYMS & SYNONYMS AND IDIOMS & 01

9. ONE WORD SUBSTITUTES*** 01

12. TENSES (SUBJECT – VERB AGREEMENT)* 02

13. FORMATION OF WORDS** 03

14. COMMON ERROR IN ENGLISH ** 02

15. LEGAL REFORM — Thomas Gunn* 01

16. THE HANGING JUDGE — Eavan Boland* 01

17. PUNISHMENT — Seamus Heaney** 02

18. THE RING AND THE BOOK — Robert Browning* 02

19. HAMATREYA — Ralph Waldo Emerson** 02

Total Lectures Proposed to be Delivered 46

*Dr Tanya Mander

*** Students shall do it regularly

Note: The above teaching schedule is tentative and is subject to change as

1. DeWitt, Norman W. 'Character and Plot in the "Antigone". The

1. Fender, Stephen. ‘Precision and Pseudo Precision in "The Crucible"’

1. Edwards, Beverly Sigler, “The Therapeutic Value of Reading.”

1. Fitzmaurice and Ciara O'Farrell. Handbook of Academic Writing.

1. Baldick, Chris. Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms. Oxford

1. Miller, John. ‘The Stipulative Imagination of Thom Gum.’ The Iowa

1. "The Irish History." https://www.theirishstory.com/2015/02/09/the-

THE RING AND THE BOOK

1. Peckham, Morse. Historiography and “The Ring and the Book”

1. D. Pertinni. ‘Maitreya in Hamatreya: Religious Analysis on