NEED OF CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE IN

COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA

Submitted by:

1. Damini Mohan (15040142001)

2015-2020

Course Supervisor:

Prof. Shashank Kumar

Alliance School of Law

Alliance University, Bangalore

1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

[A] Research Questions............................................................................................ 3

[B] Hypothesis............................................................................................................ 3

[C] Research Methodology.........................................................................................3

[D] Literature Review.................................................................................................4

[E] Introduction.......................................................................................................... 6

[F] Pre Payment Charge by Banks........................................................................... 8

[G] Dominance in Real Estate Sector...................................................................... 12

[H] Dominance by Oil Companies ............................................................................ 15

[I] Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 16

[J] Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 18

2
RESEARCH QUESTIONS

(1) Whether collective dominance is leading to abuse of dominance?

(2) Whether there is a need for the implementation of the concept of collective

dominance u/s 4 of ‘The Competition Act,2002’ ?

HYPOTHESIS

It is high time that the Indian Competition Law recognises the concept of collective

dominance to prevent dominant players in the market from taking advantage of the lacuna.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology is doctrinal and descriptive as the work are mostly collected from

primary sources such as statutes, conventions and secondary resources comprising of articles,

newspapers and reports.

3
LITERATURE REVIEW

COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE, COMMERCIAL VIABILITY AND POLICY

DECISION UNDER COMPETITION ACT 2002 written by Sundhar Ramanathan

accessed on 21st Sep,2019 at 20:30

With the proposal to oust the jurisdiction of CCI in matters pertaining to acquisition and

mergers of banks gaining strength, other sectors are also not too far behind in seeking for an

exemption from the rigours competition law. It will also be pertinent to note that power to

exempt any enterprise from the purview of the Act under Section 54 of the Competition Act

2002 is available with the Central Government only if it is necessary in public interest or in

the security of the state or to comply with any of India’s obligations under an international

treaty or for enterprises performing activities that are relatable to the sovereign functions of

the state. At least as held in the Royal Energy Case, there seems to be a possibility for using

the commercial viability test because the subject investigation pertained to fixation of prices

by direct competitors under Section 3 (3) (a).

COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE AN OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL CASE LAW posted

on e-commerce on March 2014 accessed on 21st Sep,2019 at 20:30

The article speaks about the collective dominance predominance in EU and how they are

being governed with incorporating the relative concepts of dominance. The article describes

about the transaction that are conducted online. Collective Dominance can be described as a

position of two or more independent entities that together holds a position of joint dominance

where they act or present themselves as one unit. The market on which it is most likely for

the firms to achieve such position in on the oligopolistic markets. The article talks about the

current assessment in merger and various cases are being described.

4
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE IN

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MERGER REGULATION. FROM ITS

INCEPTION TO ITS CURRENT STATUS World Competition: Law and Economics

Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2007 Posted: 26 Jan 2017 accessed on 22nd Sep,2019 at 11:20am

This article investigations how the idea of aggregate predominance is applied for the situation

law of the European Control Merger Regulation and how the appraisal criteria have been

created through this case law priority. Disregarding the broad advancement of the idea of

aggregate strength joined by the improvement of the agenda of the criteria on which the

European Commission establishes its evaluation of aggregate predominance, legitimate

vulnerability still remains. This article will introduce a broad record of the improvement of

the idea of aggregate predominance under the ECMR. It will evaluate the components that

make a market helpful for aggregate strength and decide the criteria that should be applied by

experts in the appraisal of mergers prompting aggregate predominance.

CCI ABUSE ON ACCOUNT OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE IS A CONCEPT NOT

RECOGNISED BY THE INDIAN COMPETITION REGIME SO FAR published on

August 28, 2019 written by author Devika accessed on 23rd Sep, 2019 at 23:49

The article talks about the collective dominance in one of the cases alleged on the cine

industry and the author explains about the need for collective dominance in India. Collective

bargaining is a procedure by which employment related disputes are resolved cordially,

peacefully and voluntarily by settlement between labour unions and managements.The

collective bargaining in India remained limited in its scope and restricted in its coverage by a

well-defined legal structure. In reality, the labour laws systematically promoted and keep in

existence a duality of labour-formal sector workers enjoying better space for collective

bargaining and informal ones with no scope for collective bargaining.

5
INTRODUCTION

The Competition Act was instituted in 2002 because of India's quest for globalization and

advancement of the economy. Presentation of the Act was a key advance in India's walk

towards confronting rivalry – both from inside the nation and from global players. The Act

isn't planned to deny rivalry in the market. What the Act basically looks to direct, are the

practices that adverse effect rivalry in the market in India. Also, the Act plans to advance and

continue rivalry in business sectors, secure buyer premiums, and guarantee opportunity of

exchange the market in India. Notwithstanding having been instituted in 2002, the substantive

arrangements of the Act were just incompletely brought into power on 20 May 2009. At the

core of the Act are different exercises that will be disallowed as being anticompetitive. The

exercises contain:

(a) Anti-competitive arrangements;

(b) Abuse of dominant position; and

(c) Mergers and acquisitions that have an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India

In light of the encounters picked up in its activity and the working of the CCI, the

Government of India, in June 2011, comprised an Expert Committee to analyse and propose

adjustments to the Act. The corrections, affirmed by the Cabinet in October, are gone for

adjusting the guidelines to expedite standards with the common situation and in light of the

encounters increased over the previous years.In like manner, on 7 December 2012, the

Central Government presented the Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2012 in the Lower House

(Lok Sabha). Normally, a bill must be passed by both the Houses (Lok Sabha and the Rajya

Sabha) before it is sent to the President for his consent, as per which, it progresses toward

6
becoming law.1 The proposed change in area is as beneath, which is comprehensive of certain

words which may translate as 'aggregate strength'.

Section 4 of the Act precludes the abuse of dominance of predominance by any undertaking

or group2of enterprises3. The demonstration endorses a three test for the assurance of abuse of

dominance:

1) Defining the relevant market

2) Assessing the dominance in the relevant market

3) Establishing abuse of dominant position

Every one of these means is vital to building up obligation under section 4 of the Competition

Act. The strength of an undertaking is constantly decided as for a specific relevant market.

The idea of the 'relevant market'4 is basic to competition law, and on account of anabuse of

dominance of predominance examination, sets the parameters for the assurance of dominant

1
Shroff Cyril and oberoi nisha “India: Abuse of Dominance” by available on
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/60/sections/206/chapters/2342/india-abuse-dominance/ visited
on 20th Sep, 2019 at 6:09 p.m.
2
‘Group’ under the Act read with the notification of the Ministry of corporate affairs dated 4th march 2011,
has been defined to mean two or more enterprises which, directly or indirectly are in a position to exercise 50
percent or more of the voting rights in the other enterprise or appoint more than 50 percent of the members
of the board of directors in the other enterprise or control the management or affairs of the other
enterprise.In m/s Kansan news private limited v m/s fast way transmission private limited and others (case no.
36/2011) the CCI considered abuse of dominance by a group of enterprises. The CCI noted that all the opposite
parties were related enterprise and formed part of the same group in terms of section 5 of the Act. Therefore,
the CCI considered the collective market shares and economic resources of the five opposite partes
determining that the opposite parties abused their dominance. A plenty of 80 million rupees was imposed on
the dominant enterprises which amounted to 6 per cent of their average turnover from 2009-2011
3
Enterprises according to the Competition Act 2002, section 2(h) "enterprise" means a person or a department
of the Government, who or which is, or has been, engaged in any activity, relating to the production, storage,
supply, distribution, acquisition or control of articles or goods, or the provision of services, of any kind, or in
investment, or in the business of acquiring, holding, underwriting or dealing with shares, debentures or other
securities of any other body corporate, either directly or through one or more of its units or divisions or
subsidiaries, whether such unit or division or subsidiary is located at the same place where the enterprise is
located or at a different place or at different places, but does not include any activity of the Government
relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government including all activities carried on by the departments of
the Central Government dealing with atomic energy, currency, defence and space.
4
Section 2(r):” "relevant market" means the market which may be determined by the Commission with
reference to the relevant product market or the relevant geographic market or with reference to both the
markets”

7
position. Further the Act has bifurcated the Relevant Market in two sorts of Market. First is

Relevant Product Market5 and second is Relevant Geographical Market6.

Pre payment Charge by Banks

The case recorded by the Niraj Malhotra7 against driving Indian banks. The case has been

recorded under segment 19(1)(a)8 against banking and non-banking budgetary organizations.

The choice of CCI held by larger part of 4:2 and holding that the pre-instalment charges

demanded on retail home advances by banks are neither enemy of aggressive nor sum to

abuse of dominance of overwhelming position. CCI in its larger part held that there was no

understanding or any activity in show which prompted duty of pre-instalment charges9. CCI

in its majority of the decisions observed that there was no understanding or activity in show

with respect to banks/HFCs which prompted toll of PPCs.

It likewise gave point by point thinking to legitimize its choice that PPCs are not hostile to
aggressive, just based on absence of proof to build up that the banks acted in show and
impulse of benefit obligation the board. CCI apathetically forgot about the ground of apparent
antagonistic effect by featuring that retail home credit market is thriving and has been
developing with a CAGR of 24.9% between the time of 2004 - 2009. The Director General10
in its report reasoned that duty of PPC is in negation to Section 3(3)(b) 11 of the Competition

5
Section 2(t): "relevant product market" means a market comprising all those products or services which are
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of characteristics of the products or
services, their prices and intended use”
6
Section 2(s): "relevant geographic market" means a market comprising the area in which the conditions of
competition for supply of goods or provision of services or demand of goods or services are distinctly
homogenous and can be distinguished from the conditions prevailing in the neighbouring areas”
7
Neeraj Malhotra v. Deutsche Post Bank Home Finance Ltd., (2011) 106 SCL 62 (CCI)Case no 5 of 2009
accessed on 21st Sep, 2019 at 20:30
8
Section 19(1)(a) “The Commission may inquire into any alleged contravention of the provisions contained in
subsection (1) of section 3 or sub-section (1) of section 4 either on its own motion or on— (a) [receipt of any
information, in such manner and] accompanied by such fee as may be determined by regulations, from any
person, consumer or their association or trade association
9
Here in after referred as PPC
10
Here in after referred as DG
11
Section 3(3): Any agreement entered into between enterprises or associations of enterprises or persons or
associations of persons or between any person and enterprise or practice carried on, or decision taken by, any
association of enterprises or association of persons, including cartels, engaged in identical or similar trade of
goods or provision of services, which— (a) directly or indirectly determines purchase or sale prices; (b) limits or
controls production, supply, markets, technical development, investment or provision of services; (c) shares the

8
Act. It additionally saw that duty of PPC makes a boundary to new participant in the market
in way that if the new applicant is paying more loan, better benefits, and so forth. Demanding
of PPC by banks makes the exit costly along these lines goes about as a hindrance for a
borrower in benefiting the best overall financing cost of different banks/HFCs. Be that as it
may, considering the quantity of players and uniformly separated piece of the pie of the
organizations the toll of PPC was held not to be held as abuse of dominance of prevailing
position. The finding of CCI, which framed the bedrock of the majority of the share, that
there was no understanding between banks/HFCs to demand PPC on retail home credits is as
such flawed. There can be just two different ways to choose if there was an understanding
between the banks. To start with, to analyse the history and purposes behind toll of PPC and
as referred to Section 2(b)12 of the Act. The historical backdrop of marketin the India can be
followed back to late seventies when Housing Development and Finance Corporation13 was
the sole player. In the year 1993, Life Insurance Corporation14 Housing Finance Ltd. joined
the home credit advertise. It is critical to take note of that, HDFC never demanded PPC till
the year 1993, when LIC Housing Finance forayed into the business. In any case, curiously
September 2003 onwards, every one of the banks/HFCs which were a piece of this
examination began charging PPC, compliant with gathering of Indian Banks Association 15
dated 28-8-2003, which finished into approximately dated 10-9-2003, wherein it was noticed
that PPC in the scope of 0.5%-1% would be sensible, and left the issue to be at last chosen by
the banks themselves. Promptly from that point, every one of the banks began collecting PPC
at the pace of 1%-2%.16

In the contradicting conclusion the scholarly Member of CCI, saw as pursues:

(I) Prior to the gathering of IBA, there was no agreement among the banks for
requiring PPP;

market or source of production or provision of services by way of allocation of geographical area of market, or
type of goods or services, or number of customers in the market or any other similar way; (d) directly or
indirectly results in bid rigging or collusive bidding, shall be presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on
competition
12
Section 2(b): “"agreement" includes any arrangement or understanding or action in concert, — (i) whether or
not, such arrangement, understanding or action is formal or in writing; or (ii) whether or not such arrangement,
understanding or action is intended to be enforceable by legal proceedings;
13
Here in after referred as HDFC
14
Here in after referred as LIC housing finance
15
Here in after referred as IBA
16
See case details on http//www.cci.gov.in

9
 (II) Prior to the gathering of IBA, there existed no arrangement rules of banks and
HFCs nor was there any uniform practice for collecting PPP;

(III) In the gathering of IBA, a deliberate choice to receive a typical methodology was
landed at by the banks just because.

(IV) Along these lines the gathering of individuals from IBA can be treated as
gathering of brains of the individuals for making a deliberate move against the
home credit borrowers who select to prepay the advance.

(V) As obviously expressed in the roundabout of Punjab National Bank and certain in
the booklets of different banks, the choice to exact a PPP was taken (a) in
compatibility of the round of IBA; and (b) to counteract the exchanging over by
the buyers. In spite of the fact that this IBA round was not authoritative on the
banks, yet the equivalent could adequately be made to be the premise of move in
show basic methodology received in duty of PPC. The meaning of an
understanding17 under the Competition Act incorporates any course of action or
comprehension or activity in show whether formal orlawfully enforceable. Along
these lines, the arrangement itself ponders any inferred understanding which will
likewise qualify under the meaning of understanding. The judgment additionally
reasons that the toll of pre-instalment charges isn't infringement of Section 3(3)18
of the Competition Act. It is huge to take note of that even understandings,
including cartels, which, legitimately or in a roundabout way antagonistically
influence the Competition Act, hold an assumption for level understandings (like
the understanding for this situation). The component of the value of the market is
one such component under Section 3(3)19, which would conclude to an
understanding among the contending firms to rise, fix or keep up the cost of
products or administrations they are selling. A deceitful conduct of cost obsession
connivance can be induced from the accompanying variables:

(a) Prices remain indistinguishable for significant stretches of time; or

17
Section 2(b): “"agreement" includes any arrangement or understanding or action in concert, — (i) whether or
not, such arrangement, understanding or action is formal or in writing; or (ii) whether or not such
arrangement, understanding or action is intended to be enforceable by legal proceedings
18
Supra note 13
19
Ibid

10
 (b) Prices beforehand were extraordinary; or

(c) Price increments don't seem, by all accounts, to be upheld by expanded expenses.

It is intriguing to review at this phase PPCs were for all intents and purposes missing till

2003, however following that every one of the banks/HFCs began requiring PPC. It was

not the situation of banks that there was no issue of advantage risk the executives before

2003. Also, the said charges are not in any case dependent upon the variable expense of

assets. Indeed, even in a situation where loan fees are traveling southwards, no advantage

of declining cost of assets is reached out to clients. The majority of the judgment

additionally bears a quiet a few things about the act of payment of the instalments in parts

as retail advances. The Director General in his report had called attention to that

numerous private banks permit part prepayment of home credits and excluded charges on

the equivalent. It is just when the clients mean to reimburse the total office, that PPC is

collected. Subsequently, the greater part of the judgment has circumstance of benefit risk

befuddle brought about by pre-instalments payed in the prior. They told that they are in

no sort of understanding, there was an absence of proof which tells that they have shaped

the cartel and their piece of the overall industry is additionally not prompted give them

overwhelming situation in the market. As indicated by the perspective on contradicting

assessment of individuals from CCI20 , there is a cartelization of fixing PPC21 between the

banks. Not just the one situation where CCI has rejected the instance of PPC for another

situation in Yashoda medical clinic and research focus v India Bulls Financial Service

LTD22and in Usha Vaid v Sate Bank of India23 where additionally CCI had given the

20
P.N.Parashar and R.Prasad
21
The concept of PPC (the foreclosure charges): A clause in mortgage contract that says if the mortgage is
prepaid within a certain time period, a penalty will be levied. The penalty is usually based on percentage of
remaining mortgage balance or a certain number of months’ worth of interest. A prepayment penalty that applies
to both the sale of a home and a refinancing transaction is called a “soft” prepayment penalty.
22
CCI case no. 12 of 2010
23
RP No.2466/2007

11
 request for Banks. As per the scientist in bank's PPC situations where CCI end up in a

difficult situation to distinguish whether the Banks are ruled or not. As indicated by the

piece of the overall industry they are not commanding, that is where CCI discovered

vagueness in giving choices. To take care of this issue might be the provision collective

dominance will help to the CCI. CCI's undertaking would have been a lot simpler has

there been just one manage an account with enormous piece of the overall industry. By,

receiving of PPC provisions by practically all known business banks together brings the

issue of "collective dominance" under Competition Act.

Dominance in Real Estate Sector

In the case of Belair owner’s association v. DLF Limited.24 For the violation of section 4 of

The competition Act, CCI imposed 630 crore rupees on DLF. CCI gave a decision that DLF

holds a dominant position with the Gurgoan region and it also abuses its dominant position

according to section 4 of the Act. The informant for the case was Mr. Sanjay Bhasin who

happened to one of the allotee. The informant alleged that DLF has abused its dominant

position and imposed highly arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable conditions on the allottee of

the housing complex. DLF was also alleged to violate other State Housing Violation for

instance DLF had received permission to construct upto 19 floors but they went ahead with

the construction upto 29th floor without permission from the respective housing authority.

After the allegation made by the informant, DG carried out the investigation and found that

DLF is the biggest real player in market in terms of size as well as resources. DLF had a

dominant position in the Gurgoan market in terms of market share and size. DG read section

24
Belair owner’s association v. DLF limited., order dated 3rd January 2013, case 19 of 2010

12
4 with section 2(r)25, 19(6) and 19(7) to determine the relevant market and the dominant

position of DLF in Gurgoan. They also came to a conclusion that the conditions put on the

alottees were arbitrary in nature and also this was acting as a barrier for new entrant in the

market. The commission imposed a penalty of Rs 630 crose for violation of section 4(2) of

The Competition Act.

In this case, CCI is of the opinion that DLF was in a dominant position and it abused its

dominant position and hence it was penalised for the same whereas in a similar case of

Jagmohan Chabra26 CCI had a contradicting opinion to that of the DLF case. This was

another case that raised questions for researchers and academicians to look into the

provisions of The Competition Act. The informants in this case filed a complaint against

Unitech ltd which happens to be real estate firm in Gurgoan. They alleged that the Unitech

Ltd have violated section 4(1) of the Act and also for imposing unreasonable and unfair

conditions in their agreements with a malafide intent. They also alleged that Unitech Ltd is in

a dominant position in the market.

The informants also felt that the agreements with Unitech were one sided and favoured the

company. For instance one of the clauses in the agreement said that for delay in delivery of

the apartment Unitech Ltd was liable to Rs 5/sq feet per month whereas for delay in payment

of instalment towards the cost of apartment, the buyer has to pay 18% p.a of the quarterly

compounded basis. When informants were dissatisfied with a one sided agreement like this

and because of unreasonable delay in the delivery of the apartment, the buyers refused to pay

the instalments. Unitech Ltd sent a letter dated 02/05/2011 asking the buyers to pay

25
Section 2(r):” "relevant market" means the market which may be determined by the Commission with
reference to the relevant product market or the relevant geographic market or with reference to both the
markets”
26
Mr. Jagmohan Chhabra & Ors vs M/S. Unitech Ltd. Case no 27 of 2011

13
instalments towards cost of apartment with 18% interest on quarterly compound basis and on

failing to do so the flats allotted to the buyers will be cancelled.

The informants alleged that the funds were being diverted to other projects and were also

misused and hence the project was under unnecessary delay. They also believed that Unitech

had a malafide intention since the inception of the project and that is the reason why they

demanded the buyers to pay the instalments on calendar basis rather than instalments as the

project progressed. Informants alleged that Unitech Ltd were able to carry out such activities

only because they were in a dominant position.

The DG could not hold Unitech Ltd as a dominant player in the said relevant market because

it had declared DLF as a dominant in the case of Belaire owner’s association27 in the

relevant market in Gurgoan. It is also seen that all the real estate firms follow the policy set

my DLF. These real estate firms are not dominant per se in the market but they follow the

policies of DLF and also act in a collective fashion. This is a classic example of collective

dominance. The CCI can put a radar on all the builders in the Gurgoan region if we consider

this as collective dominance, moreover all these cases come under the purview of section 4 of

The Competition Act.

In another case of DLF Park Place Residents vs. DLF Limited28 DLF had announced a group

housing project which was later scrapped without any informing the buyers and started a new

project. The change in the project led to reduction in the size of the apartment and alos delay

in completion of the project.

The informants were of the opinion that DLF is a dominant player in the market and hence

had executed one sided agreements with the buyers. The CCI after considering the

27
1 Case no: 19/2010
28
Case 18 of 2010

14
information given by the informants believed that a prima facie case exists and passed it over

to the DG for further investigation of the matter. In the present case the relevant geographic

market is Gurgoan and the relevant product market is builders providing high end apartments.

After investigation DG was of the opinion that DLF has a high market share compared to the

other players in the market and has abused its dominance under section 4(2) of the act. CCI

did not impose penalty for this violation as penalty had already been imposed on DLF in

Belaire owner’s association case.

Researcher is of the opinion that the real estates in Gurgoan should be considered as a case of

collective dominance and this is being abused.

Dominance by Oil Companies

The researchers have tried to link collective dominance with floating identical tenders with

identical terms and conditions in the market to procure tank truck as well as price fixation.

The three State owned oil companies; Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Bharat Petroleum

Corporation Ltd. and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd were alleged to revise the oil

prices not only by same amount but also on the same days. They were also alleged by the

informants that they called for identical tenders.

ICC had initially written to the ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas referring this issue but

the ministry had responded saying petrol is no longer a regulated product and the price is

fixed by the company according to pricing formula. The ministry had told the regulator that it

was not responsible for fixing petrol prices and the oil marketing companies set the rates

directly using a formula.29 The competition commission refers cases to the DG for

investigation only when it is fully convinced that there is prima facie evidence for violation

29
“Delhi HC stays CCI proceedings against IOCL, BPCL and HPCL” available on
http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/delhi-hc-stays-cci-proceedings-against-iocl-hpcl-and-bpcl/1/200813.html

15
of competition norms. This approach by the oil companies was not only impacting the

consumer interest but was also acting as a trade barrier for the private companies in this

sector. The three state owned oil companies argued that the pricing was in favour of the

consumer as the fuel was available at all the fuel station for the same price on a particular

day. According to The Competition Act, 2002 a cartel is said to exist when two or more

enterprises enter into a explicit or implicit agreement to fix prices, to limit production and

supply, to allocate market share or sales quota, or to engage in collusive bidding or bid-

rigging in one or more markets.

The competition commission in this case highlighted the fact that collective dominance is not

highlighted in the Act30. According to the competition commission the allegation of

collective dominance by the informants against the three State owned oil companies does not

hold good under section 4 of the Act. Existence of two strong players in the market shows

that the competition is in the market unless they have agreed not to compete which is again

dealt under section 3 of the Act and not Section 4.

If we carefully examine their price fixing of petroleum products we can actually observe that

there is a strategic coordination between the state owned oil companies in the market and

they are collectively dominant in the market yet this does not come within the ambit of anti

competitive activities because of the absence of the concept of collective dominance in Indian

competition law.

30
The Competition Act 2002

16
CONCLUSION

It is high time that the concept of collective dominance needs to be included in Indian

Competition law. According to the existing provision dealing cartels and horizontal

agreements there must be written contracts between the parties to prove that it is anti -

competitive in nature. There are no provisions under anti - competitive agreements dealing

with collective dominance. In situation where dominant parties in the markets are misusing

this lacuna of the current law the CCI is unable to prove the case as anti competitive though it

is clearly violating the objectives of Indian Competition laws. This is because CCI either has

limited jurisdiction or it cannot interpret this with the current laws. CCI should be given

power to check the activities between the enterprises irrespective of whether there is a

required written agreement between the enterprises.

If section 4 of the Act recognises collective dominance then there is another issue that arises;

whether CCI will be able to impose penalty for the same? There is no clarity in the proposed

amendment bill as to what will be the penalty on enterprises to abusing collective dominance.

There should be a separate penalty for abuse of dominant position and collective dominance

or else mere recognition of collective dominance under section 4 of the Act will do no good.

17
BIBILIOGRAPHY/ WEBILIOGRAPHY

I. Statutes

 Treaty of European Union

 Indian Competition Act, 2002

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18
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008910702407907107109612400606712209109203112609906410911606908500807

7000117&EXT=pdf

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 https://www.lawteacher.net/search.php?q=need%20of%20the%20concept%20of%20t

he%20abuse%20of%20dominance%20in%20India%20&search-type=1

 http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/729/Abuse-o-Dominant-Position.html

 https://www.legalbites.in/abuse-dominant-position-competition-law/

 http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/668306/Antitrust+Competition/Abuse+Of+Dominan

t+Position+An+AntiCompetitive+Practice

 http://racolblegal.com/abuse-of-dominant-position-under-competition-law/

 https://www.legalindia.com/abuse-dominant-position-government-enterprise-india/

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