SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL

HYDERABAD
CONSTITUENT OF

SYMBIOSIS INTERNATIONAL (DEEMED UNIVERSITY),

PUNE
Professional Ethics and Professional Accounting System
(Clinical Course – III)
B.B.A., LL.B.
FIFTH YEAR
Academic Year: 2022-2023
SEMESTER – IX

Name of Student (in capital): SAKETH REDDY M

PRN No.: 18010324125
Division: D
Batch: 2018 - 2023
Programme: BBA-LLB
Mobile No.: 9840498684
Official E-mail ID: [email protected]

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 INDEX
S. No Case Name Page No. Marks Signature
1. Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India 3
(2003 2 SCC 45).
2. Satish Kumar Sharma v. Bar Council of Himachal 5
Pradesh. (2001 2 SCC 365)
3. Bhupinder Kumar Sharma vs. Bar Association of 9
Pathankot. [AIR 2002 SC 41]
4. Noratanmal Chouaria v. M R Murali & Anr. 11
[2004 5 SCC 689].
5. Bar Council of MH v. M V Dhabolkar 13
6. Sambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry. 16
(AIR 2001 SC 2509).
7. P D Gupta v. Rammurthi. 18
(AIR 1998 SC 283).
8. Narain Pandey v. Pannalal Pandey. 20
(2013 11 SCC 435).
9. Ramon Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor. 22
(2001 1 SCC 118).
10. Re Advocate (AIR 1989 SC 245). 24
11. Rajendra Pai v. Alex Fernandes & Ors 26
(Civil Appeak 6142-6144 of 2001)
12. Akshay Kumar Sarangi v. Bar Council of West Bengal 28
& Anr. [WPO (P) No. 6 of 2021].
13. R.D. Saxena v. Balram Prasad. (AIR 2000 SC 2912). 30
14. Suresh Shivarao Hattingadi v. N.D. Upadhaya. 32
(2002 9 SCC 478)
15. Madhav M. Bhokarikar v. Ganesh M. Bhokarikar. 36
[(2004) 3 SCC 607]

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 1. Ex-Captain Harish Uppal v. Union of India
(2003 2 SCC 45)
FACTS –
The petitioner in this case, was an ex-army officer was assigned to Bangladesh in 1972, where he
was accused of embezzlement-related offences and extradited to an Indian military court. He faced
charges, was court-martialled, stripped of his position and titles, and sentenced to two years in
prison. After a protracted period of 11 years, when the survey's statute of limitations had passed,
he filed a pre-affirmation application in a civil court to audit the case. It was later determined that
amid a fierce attack by attorneys, documents and the application were lost. The petitioner
submitted a special petition to announce illegal advocate strikes.

This case revolves around a ‘National Conference’ of members of the Bar Council of India and
State Bar Councils which was held in September of 1994. At the time, a working paper was
circulated On behalf of the lawyers of the Bar Council of India regarding the question of strike by
the advocates. It was noted, in that particular paper that the Bar Association had gone on strike on
various occasion in the past, within the state and nationally.

ISSUE –
Whether lawyers have a right to strike?

RULE –
• Article 226
• Article 145
• Section 7, 30, 34 & 38 of Advocates Act, 1961

ANALYSIS –
The Petitioner argued that strikes were only used for collective bargaining in industrial disputes,
and that lawyers who were Court officials could not use strikes to extort the Courts or their clients.
They also claimed that the call for a strike by lawyers was a call to violate the agreements that
lawyers have with their clients. However, the legal community asserted that lawyers retained the

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right to strike in exceptional circumstances in order to have their interests represented in the event
that they were subjected to unfair treatment. The Supreme Court ruled that lawyers have no right
to strike or call for a boycott of court, even if it is a symbolic strike. If a protest is required, it must
be made through press statements, TV interviews, completion of the Court premises standards and
additionally notices, wearing dark or white or any shading arm groups, peaceful dissent walks
outside and away from the Court premises, going on dharnas or relay facts, and so on. Recognizing
that even those lawyers willing to go to the Court could not go because of the strike or boycott, the
Court asked the lawyers to strongly decline to submit to any call for strike or boycott court.

The Court also stated that no lawyer could be subjected to any adverse consequences by the
Association or the Council, and no threat or coercion of any kind, including expulsion, could be
imposed on him as a result of his refusal to participate in the strike or boycott. The Court also
recognised that an Advocate is a Court official who enjoys a unique status in the public eye. They
have commitments and obligations to ensure the smooth operation of the Court, as well as an
obligation to their customer. Strikes disrupt the organisation of equity, disrupt Court procedures,
and jeopardise the interests of their customers. As a result, the Court has prohibited lawyers from
striking.

VERDICT & OPINION –

The Supreme Court of India ruled that an advocate's strike is both illegal and immoral. A strike
may be permitted in the most unusual of circumstances where the courts' respectability, regard,
and operation are at stake. A silent disappointment can be displayed, or a press and media meeting
can be held, as long as it does not interfere with the functioning of the courts.

In my opinion, the Apex court has taken a fair stand in limiting the striking rights of lawyers &
Advocates as it is essential to prevent the same in order to maintain the integrity of the profession.
The lawyers have not been barred from voicing their opinion, they can do the same in a more
peaceful and harmonious way rather than going on strike.

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 2. Satish Kumar Sharma v. Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh
(2001 2 SCC 365)
FACTS –
The H.P. State Electricity Board assigned the appellant in this case, a law graduate, to the position
of Assistance (Legal). Later, the title of this position was changed to Law Officer II. Additionally,
by order dated 6-9-1983, the Electricity Board authorised the appellant to represent it as an
advocate and agreed to cover the costs associated with the enrolment procedure.
The H.P. State Bar Council, who is the appellant in this case, received the application. Through
directives dated 11-6-1984 and 5-7-1984, the position of "Law Officer of H.P. State Electricity
Board" was modified because it was legal for someone holding the position of "Law Officer of a
Corporate" to serve as an advocate. As a result, the appellant, Mr. Satish Kumar Sharma, received
a certificate of registration with the Bar and began practising law.
In addition to serving as the Board's advocate, the appellant managed other tasks delegated to the
Board's legal cell. He eventually advanced to the positions of Additional Secretary (Legal) cum
Law Officer of the Board, Deputy Secretary (Legal) cum Law Officer, and Under Secretary (Legal)
cum Law Officer.

The appellant's pay was subsequently raised to the range of Rs. 3700 to 5000 during the course of
his promotions, after first moving up to the Rs. 3000 to 4500 pay range. On December 5, 1996,
the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh adopted a resolution in which it revoked the appellant's
membership in the bar. The Bar provided the justification for the cancellation. The argument was
that following his advancement within the Board, the appellant no longer qualified for registration.
Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975's Part VI, Chapter II, Section VII, supported this
argument. In opposition to this, the appellant had filed a writ petition with the High Court, but it
was denied.

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A Supreme Court appeal was filed following the dismissal of the petition. Under Part 2 of Rule 49
of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975, Sections 24(1)(e) and 28(2)(d) of the Advocates Act,
1961, the defence was brought before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court issued the ruling in
this case.
ISSUE –
1. Does a full-time salaried worker for an enterprise hold a State Bar Council Advocate
enrolment?
2. If the State Bar Council has not outlined specific guidelines for a certain issue, can the
defence under paragraph 2 of Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India be utilised in conjunction
with Section 28(2)(d) r/w Section 24(1)(e) of the Advocate's Act, 1961?
3. Will the dignity of the legal profession be upheld if the advocate also works in another line
of work?

RULE –
• Section 24, 28 & 35 of Advocates Act, 1961.
• Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
• Bar Council of India Rules, 1975 - Rule 49 Part IV Chapter II Section VII.

ANALYSIS –
Each and every issue that was brought before the Supreme Court was addressed in great detail.
The court's position on every aspect was clearly expressed in the verdict, and it did not remain
silent regarding any matter. The ruling has expressed its position without employing any
ambiguous language. The Court's ruling in this case emphasises the significance of the obligations
an advocate has to his or her clients, the Court, and their fellow colleagues.
The court established the following principles: I An appellate court has full authority to review,
reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence that formed the basis of the order of acquittal; (ii) The
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CCP) imposes no restrictions, limitations, or requirements on
the exercise of such authority; and (iii) An appellate court may make its own determination based
on the evidence at hand, both on questions of fact and law.

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iii. Phrases like "significant and compelling reasons," "good and adequate grounds," "extremely
strong circumstances," "distorted conclusions," "glaring blunders," etc. are not meant to limit an
appellate court's broad discretion in an appeal against a conviction. Such expressions are more in
the nature of "flourishes of words" to underscore the appeal court's unwillingness to overturn an
acquittal than to limit the court's ability to consider the evidence and reach its own judgement.
The Supreme Court ruled that the appellant could not invoke Section 28(2)(d) r/w Section 24(1)(e)
of the Advocates Act, 1961, as a defence to the second paragraph of Rule 49. The State Bar Council
not having specifically formulated rules relating to a certain feature cannot be used as a defence,
the Supreme Court ruled in its ruling. In addition, the State Bar Councils were subject to the rules
of the Bar Council of India. Therefore, neither the estoppel principle nor the equity principle were
applicable. Additionally, there were no disciplinary actions taken against the appellant, hence the
cancellation of enrolment and subsequent deportation were not incorrect. As a result, the
respondent State Bar Council was not dismissed without cause or penalised in accordance with
Section 35(3)(d) of the 1961 Act.

The Supreme Court cited and reaffirmed one of its earlier rulings in the matter of Dr. Haniraj L.
Chulani in making its decision on the first question, which concerned whether an advocate may
hold down a job and practise law at the same time. By implication, the Court cited this decision.
In the matter of Dr. Chulani, the appellant was a practising surgeon who sought admission to the
State Bar Council after earning an L.L.B. He vowed not to let his two professions to conflict with
one another. According to Maharashtra Bar Council regulations, a person engaged in another line
of work is not eligible to enlist as an advocate. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer
cannot ride two horses at once since the legal profession requires full dedication and attention. In
contrast to the case of Sushma Suri, the Supreme Court expressed a different viewpoint in this
instance. The Court declared that the definition of "from the Bar" in connection to the appointment
of a District Judge, which calls for experience of seven years as a standing advocate or pleader,
was taken up for consideration in Sushma Suri's case. According to the ruling, if an advocate does
not represent their employer and completes additional work for the government or a private
corporation, they no longer qualify as advocates and cannot be assumed to be law officers under
Rule 49 of the BCI Rules or claim the exception thereto.

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Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the appellant could not invoke Section 28(2)(d) r/w Section
24(1)(e) of the Advocates Act, 1961, as a defence to the second paragraph of Rule 49. The State
Bar Council not having specifically formulated rules relating a certain feature cannot be used as a
defence, the Supreme Court ruled in its ruling. In addition, the State Bar Councils were subject to
the rules of the Bar Council of India. Therefore, neither the estoppel principle nor the equity
principle were applicable. Additionally, there were no disciplinary actions taken against the
appellant, hence the cancellation of enrolment and subsequent deportation were not incorrect. As
a result, the respondent State Bar Council did not receive a sanction under Section 35(3)(d) of the
1961 Act or be removed without due process.

PRINCIPLE LAID BY THE COURT –

1. An appeal court has complete authority to analyse, reassess, and re-examine the evidence used
to support the decision of acquittal;

2. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 places no restrictions or conditions on the use of this
power, and an appellate court may draw its own conclusions based on the evidence presented
to it, both on legal and factual issues.

3. Phrases like "significant and compelling reasons," "good and adequate grounds," "extremely
strong circumstances," "distorted conclusions," "glaring blunders," etc. are not meant to limit
an appellate court's broad discretion in an appeal against a conviction. Such expressions are
more in the nature of "flourishes of words" to underscore the appeal court's unwillingness to
overturn an acquittal than to limit the court's ability to consider the evidence and reach its own
judgement.

OPINION –
The Supreme Court's opinion that the legal profession is a noble profession with high traditions,
in my opinion, was justified. It is expected of an advocate to uphold these traditions. He must
follow the Bar Council of India's guidelines for professional ethics and etiquette. However, as seen
above, the profession's traditions are not held in high regard. Every member of the legal profession
owes it to his profession to take professional ethics very seriously. In no way should one party gain

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an advantage because of the close relationship shared by the advocate and the judge, and if either
party suggests that such a situation is possible, the advocate should withdraw from the case, and
the judge must ensure that such a relationship is not abused. Professional ethics must never be
compromised at any cost.

3. Bhupinder Kumar Sharma vs. Bar Association of Pathankot

(AIR 2002 SC 41)

FACTS –
A complaint was filed to the Bar Association that an attorney (the appellant) was operating a full-
fledged company, specifically that he operated a copier shop in the court complex and had a
PCO/STD booth.
Controversies of advocate- He had given the company to his father and brother after enrolling in
the State Bar roster of advocates. He was expelled after being found guilty of misbehaviour by the
Punjab and Haryana State Bar Council. A BCI appeal was lodged, but the BCI rejected the appeal.
Supreme Court appealed the matter.

ISSUES –
1. Whether the applicant is currently or has previously been actively involved in a trade,
business, or profession?
2. Is the order suspending the applicant's right to practise as an advocate under Section
35(3)(d) and removing his name from the State Roll of Advocates valid?

RULE –
• Section 35(3)(d) of Advocates Act, 1961
• Section 38 of Advocates Act, 1961

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ANALYSIS –
The court finds that the appellant was in fact operating the business beyond a reasonable doubt
after considering the evidence presented to the Disciplinary Committee and Bar Council of India,
despite the fact that it did not manage to issue any specific guidelines on the subject of advocates
operating and maintaining other businesses after enrolling as advocates. Additionally, it finds that
a temporary restriction on the lawyer, considering his medical state, is understandable. However,
it rejects the Bar Council of India's decision to permanently bar the appellant, arguing that this is
an unjust penalty. The rule of law in this case is the implementation of the rule that no advocate
can carry on a business while practicing law as stated under the rules of Bar Council of India. Also,
the findings of the Disciplinary Committee played an important role in helping the court evaluate
the evidences and reach to the conclusion.

VERDICT & OPINION –

The Supreme Court determined that there were sufficient and convincing arguments to prove his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This was corroborated by the Senior Telecommunication Office
Assistant, who testified in court that the appellant received the PCO booth as part of the disability
quota and that he never informed his brother that the PCO booth was being transferred to him.
There was no information or evidence presented to suggest that the bar members have any
animosity toward the advocate. The Supreme Court found him guilty of professional misconduct
but reduced the severity of the punishment because it felt the appellant's punitive punishment was
excessive given his disability. It is a regulation that the punishment meted out must be
commensurate with the crime and the accused's current circumstances. Therefore, the Supreme
Court changed the BCI order so that he was only prohibited from practising until December 2006
and not indefinitely.

In my opinion, the Hon'ble Court was correct in believing that the physical condition of the
appellant should play a role in determining the quantum of punishment, as it is the apex court's
duty to ensure that justice is carried out in its true form. Following the words of the law without
adding the humanitarian aspect would be useless to anyone and would result in harsh punishments

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that would not be appropriate in all situations. This decision is not legally binding, but it can be
used to persuade a judge in a similar situation to grant the same leniency.

4. Noratanmal Chouraria v. M.R. Murli & Anr.

[(2004) 5 SCC 689]

FACTS –
The case's facts concerned an advocate who, while posing as a respondent's lawyer and not an
advocate in a rent control procedure, punched and kicked the complainant and urged him not to
pursue the matter further. The fundamental question in this case was whether the advocate's actions
constituted misconduct for which the Bar Council might file a complaint, even though he was not
working in the capacity of an advocate. The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that a lawyer
must adhere to the standards of conduct required of him in order to earn the public's trust as a court
official. Consequently, his conduct was unbecoming of an advocate, even though he wasn't
operating in that position, and the Bar Council was right in moving forward with the disciplinary
proceedings against him.

ISSUE –
1. Whether the act of the advocate amounted to misconduct, the action against which could
be initiated in the Bar Council, even though he was not acting in the capacity of an advocate
2. Whether the findings of the Bar Council, be aid to be so irrational meriting interference by
this court?

RULE –
• Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

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 • Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 196

ANALYSIS –
The court considered how the concept of "Misconduct" applied to this particular situation. It stated
that the Advocates Ct., 1961 did not define the aforementioned phrase. The court then examined
the definition of the term in light of the numerous precedents established by the Honourable
Supreme Court.
The court next considered the case of Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar1, which
addressed the "Punishment of Advocates for Misconduct" provision found in Section 35 of the
1961 Advocates Act. The court ruled that no general rule could be established regarding the
starting of legal misconduct proceedings by a member of the bar since doing so would necessitate
applying the proportionality test, which would vary from case to case.

In addition, the court exercised its appellate authority under Section 38 of the Advocates Act of
1961 to review the Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council's ruling. The court ruled that despite
the vast and extensive discretion, it could not be utilised to overturn the Committee's judgement
since it carries a lot of weight. It is required to reach a conclusion regarding the complaint's facts.
The court stated that the conclusion was not illogical and that it was founded on the aforementioned
facts and relevant grounds.

The court examined the cases of "M," an advocate, Re 2, Hikmat Ali Khan v. Ishwar Prasad Arya,
and N.G. Dastane v. Shrikant S. Shivde in order to analyse the current case. The appellant provided
the court with the brief summaries of the aforementioned cases, which dealt with the issue of
professional misconduct. The court ruled that the aforementioned decisions are not relevant to the
current dispute.

1 Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, (1976) 2 SCC 291.

2 M, an advocate, Re. AIR 1957 SC 149.

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VERDICT & OPINION –
That a lawyer has a responsibility to uphold the standards of conduct required of him in order to
earn the public's trust as a court official. Consequently, his conduct was unbecoming of an
advocate, even though he wasn't operating in that position, and the Bar Council was right in
moving forward with the disciplinary proceedings against him.

5. Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dhabolkar

[AIR 1976 SC 242]

FACTS –
A charge of professional misconduct was brought against the respondents, who were criminal
court-practicing attorneys, in accordance with section 35(1) of the 1961 Advocates Act.
The respondents set up shop at the entrance to the Magistrates' Court, waiting for potential clients
to arrive. When they did, they grabbed their briefs and even got into physical altercations with one
another to lower prices and solicit clients before the other attorneys. Furthermore, they proceeded
to solicit and obtain work for themselves in the Bar Library where they repeated their behaviour.

The Maharashtra Bar Council took into account the High Court's complaint against the attorneys
and forwarded the case to its Disciplinary Committee for additional investigation. The State Bar
Council's Disciplinary Committee found the respondents guilty of professional misconduct and
placed a three-year suspension on their ability to work as attorneys.

On appeal, the Bar Council of India's Disciplinary Committee ruled that, in accordance with Rule
36 of the regulations created in accordance with section 49(c) of the Advocates Act, in order for
an advocate to be subject to the disciplinary authority, they must:

(i) Solicited word

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(ii) From a particular person

(iii) With respect to a particular case.

It was decided that until all three conditions were met, it was impossible to conclude that an
advocate had gone outside the bounds of proper decency and professionalism. As a result, it cleared
all of the responders of the professional misconduct accusation. This Court has received an appeal
from the State Bar Council.

ISSUE –
The primary issue in this matter is whether the acts of the respondent amounts to professional
misconduct?

ANALYSIS –
The main idea emphasised by the Supreme Court—and reiterated by Justice Krishna Iyer—was
that the legal profession is distinct from other commercial professions in that it does not engage in
soliciting or advertising. The prestige and sanctity of the profession are both damaged by all of
these behaviours. By amending Rule 36 of the Bar Council Rules, the Supreme Court substantially
reduced the restrictions it had placed on advertising in 2008, yet the Supreme Court's ruling is still
enforceable today. The Supreme Court further emphasised the significance of the legal profession
upholding ethics and set it apart from other money-making endeavours by declaring that the field
is a branch of the administration of justice.

The Court further found that because Rule 36 of the Bar Council Rules was only promulgated in
1965, far after the modification, and the disputed case occurred much earlier, the Appellate
Tribunal had erred in its application of the rule. The code of ethics and propriety for the legal
profession, according to Justice Krishna Iyer, "completely forbids conduct by way of soliciting,
advertising, scrambling, and other offensive tactics, subtle or crude, for the improvement of the

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legal business." The legal profession should not be debased by commercial competition or
procurement because the law is not a trade and does not include the sale of goods.

VERDICT & OPINION –

The State Tribunal's ruling was overturned by the Supreme Court on appeal. The judgement gave
the following grounds, among others:

1. The State Tribunal fell far short of standards such as proper numbering of witnesses and exhibits,
indexing and avoiding mixing up of all cases, failing to question the respondents, and taking into
account the circumstances of each offender separately for the purposes of convicting and
sentencing. This so violated the right to a fair trial.

2. Applying Rule 36, which was only promulgated in 1965, whereas the alleged misbehaviour
occurred earlier, was completely incorrect on the part of the appellant tribunal.

3. The Tribunal utterly misconstrued and abused the law by concentrating solely on the three
requirements set forth in Rule 36 and dismissing the accused as a result of their failure to meet the
standards. Snatching briefs and engaging in violent altercations with other attorneys in an effort to
secure clients and reduce costs is plainly against professional ethics and unbecoming of an
advocate.

4. Soliciting, advertising, scrambling, and other offensive acts, whether subtle or obvious, are
completely prohibited by the rules of ethics and appropriateness for the legal profession. Briefs are
not goods, law is not a commerce, hence the legal profession shouldn't be tainted by commercial
competition or procurement.

The respondent was found not guilty due to insufficient evidence and was 68 years old with no
desire to resume practising law. The Supreme Court then examined the involvement of each
respondent separately, taking into account their age, sincerity, and the length of time since the
incident, which occurred more than 8 years ago.

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 6. Sambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry

(AIR 2001 SC 2509)

FACTS –
In this case, a complaint was filed against an advocate at the Bar Council of Rajasthan. It was
alleged in this case that the advocate wrote a letter to his client in which certain suggestions were
made which became the knit and grit of this litigation. Here, the content of the letter was written
by the advocated suggested that the Judge would take the bribe amounting to Rs.10,000/- in order
to get the favourable decision.

ISSUE –
Whether the disciplinary committee, in exercise of its review powers, could alter the initial court
order of suspension?

ANALYSIS –
In this case, the respondent lawyer claimed that the money he collected from the client under the
guise of satisfaction was not actually given to the judge. It will not be regarded as a major
misconduct given that the judge was not paid the sum.

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Additionally, the Judge's employment was terminated due to allegations of receiving unlawful
gratification. These would qualify as non-serious advocacy misconduct. BCI, however, disputed
the allegation and stated that his name should be removed as the advocate, permanently prohibiting
him from ever again practising. First, an appeal was submitted, and then, in accordance with
Section 44 of the Advocate Act, a request for review was made. Later thereafter, the application
was received by BCI. Everything he tried didn't work out because nothing was going his way.
Finally, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of India under Section 38 of the Advocate
Act.

VERDICT & OPINION –

The Supreme Court examined Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules and came to the conclusion
that the first and most crucial responsibility of a lawyer is to ensure that he acts or pleads in a
respectable manner. To protect the client's interests and, most importantly, the court's reputation,
such a case should be kept alive in court.

It was emphasised once more how unique the legal profession is. It is founded on sincerity and,
more crucially, an advocate's integrity. This is the justification behind the Advocate Act's
provisions that place blame on the authorities. These obligations involve taking appropriate action
in situations when the Bar Association believes that a member's professional competence and
reputation are at risk and may be tarnished.

It was noted that the worried counsel had been practising law for more than 50 (fifty) years at this
point. Although it was noted that he was supposed to have high moral standards, this was not the
case in this instance, and he disgraced his profession. Later, he was prohibited from ever again
practising permanently. The court further emphasised that the BCI could not submit a different
viewpoint in the review petition based on the same facts and the current situation. Later, his name
was removed off the list of permitted practitioners.

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 7. P.D. Gupta v. Rammurthi
(AIR 1998 SC 283)

FACTS –
Numerous immovable properties were left behind by one Srikishan Dass after his death. One
Vidyawati, claiming to be the deceased's sister, one Ram Murti, and two other people, claiming to
be the deceased's heirs, all asserted claims to the aforementioned properties. The lawyer for
Vidyawati afterwards bought the aforementioned properties while being aware that they were in
dispute. The lawyer then gained money when he sold the property to a third party. A complaint
was lodged with the Delhi Bar Council regarding the attorney.

ISSUE –
The advocate was accused of buying some of the litigated property from the client while the lawsuit
was still pending. The matter was forwarded to the bar council of India because the investigation
was not finished within a year.

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ANALYSIS –
After hearing arguments from both parties, the BCI issued an order suspending him from practise
for one year. The court determined that an appearance of undue influence exists when an Advocate
purchases property from his client. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the major
argument in the appeal was that the client had not submitted a complaint of professional
misconduct and that the investigation based on a complaint from a third party was improper. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument and issued the following orders:
1. Anyone may bring a complaint against an attorney for professional misconduct.
2. The Bar Council shall investigate the accusation of professional misconduct, regardless of
who made the complaint, because the Bar Council is concerned with the conduct of
attorneys.
3. The Order issued by the Indian Bar Council is affirmed.

VERDICT & OPINION –

The proceedings had been referred to the Bar Council of India under Section 36-B of the Advocates
Act since the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of Delhi was unable to resolve the
complaint within a year. He was found guilty of professional misconduct by the Bar Council of
India's disciplinary body, and they suspended him from practising for a year.

In my opinion, in this case, the Honourable Supreme Court established a legal principle that, while
there is no prohibition on lawyers purchasing property, a law-knowing person, in particular, will
never prefer to purchase property where the title is in doubt. A lawyer must also recognise that he
is an officer of the Court and has a responsibility to be fair to his client, the Court, and the opposing
party, and must conduct his case in accordance with the professional conduct and ethics standards
outlined in the Code of Conduct for Advocates.

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 8. Narain Pandey v. Pannalal Pandey

(2013 11 SCC 435)

FACTS –

The Appellant in the aforementioned case filed a complaint against the Respondent, a practising
attorney in the District of Bhadohi, with the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh under section 35 of the
Advocates Act, 1961, alleging that the Respondent is engaged in a number of fictitious cases that
are being prosecuted in consolidation courts without the parties' knowledge. In these instances
involving the appellant and other complainants, the respondent secured court orders by faking their
signatures on counterfeit settlement deeds. In his written statement submitted to the Uttar Pradesh
Bar Council, the Respondent refuted all of these accusations. The Committee took into account
the submitted testimony as well as the Respondent's prior case of professional misconduct before
issuing an order on May 28, 2002, prohibiting him from practising for a term of seven years. By

20
order dated 20/06/2004, the Disciplinary Committee, BCI, modified the punishment order, which
included a reprimand and imposed a cost of Rs. 1000 and a six-month suspension if the same is
not paid, after the Respondent filed an appeal under Section 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961, in
protest of the said order.

ISSUE –

1. Whether the conduct by the Respondent amounts to misconduct which results in

sentence/penalty as provided u/s 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961?
2. Whether a proper punishment was provided to the respondent by the Bar Council of Uttar
Pradesh wide its order 28/05/2002 with respect to the misconduct of the legal profession?

ANALYSIS –

When analysing the case's merits, the Hon'ble Apex Court stated that the Disciplinary Committee,
BCI's decision was flawed because it solely relied on the oral testimony provided by the
Respondent and ignored the testimony of the seven witnesses provided by the Appellant along
with the documentary evidence. Additionally, the Respondent had not conducted any cross
examinations of these witnesses or offered to be questioned about his stance as stated in his written
statements and reply. It also stated that filing fictitious settlements and false vakaltnamas on one's
own initiative are fraudulent actions that should not be treated lightly.

VERDICT & OPINION –

The court was of the opinion that the decision of the Disciplinary Committee, BCI was flawed and
restored the decision of the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh and that the professional misconduct by
the respondent is serious in nature. The court altered the maximum punishment of suspension of
practise from a period of seven years to a period of three years.

21
 9. Ramon Service Pvt. Ltd v. Subhash Kapoor

(2001 1 SCC 118)

FACTS –

The appellant company was in occupation of a building as tenant at Barakhamba Road, New Delhi.
The defendant filed a lawsuit against the appellant for eviction from the building and other
consequential reliefs, to which the appellant responded with numerous arguments. The suit's issues
were determined by the court, and the trial date was set for August 26, 1998.

As a result of a strike announced by the relevant advocates' group, none of the attorneys from the
appellant's legal practise arrived in court on the day in question. As no representative of the

22
appellant was present, the court placed the defendant ex parte and recorded the testimony of the
plaintiff.

Upon learning of the developments, the appellant, whose seat of business was in Mumbai, filed an
application under Order 9, section 7 of the CPC (abbreviated "the Code"). However, the
application was denied, and the matter was ultimately decided on November 13, 1998.
Consequently, the appellant filed a motion to vacate the ex parte decree. The trial court denied the
aforementioned application on the grounds that a strike or boycott by the attorneys is not a valid
reason for a postponement.

The appellant accordingly filed an appeal against the aforementioned ruling with the High Court.
The High Court agreed with the trial court's reasoning and dismissed the appeal, resulting in the
appellant paying the respondent Rs. 50,000/- in costs. This was appealed to the highest court.

ISSUE –

1. Whether Courts are under obligation to adjourn matter if lawyers are on strike in order to
protect the client from being exploited?
2. Whether a litigant should suffer penalty for his advocate boycotting the court pursuant to
a strike call made by the association of which the advocate was a member?
3. Whether right to strike is available to lawyers or not?

RULE –

• Order IX Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure

• Order VII & Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure

ANALYSIS –

Every point that has come up in the case has been addressed by the Honourable Court. First,
regarding the question of whether courts are required to postpone hearings in the event of an
advocate strike or boycott, there is no doubt that when an advocate retained by a party was on

23
strike, the court was under no obligation to wait or postpone the case because advocates do not
have the authority to halt the legal process for such reasons.

Second, the Court weighs in with the option of letting the appellant realise half of the money from
the law firm M/s B.C Das Gupta & Co. or from any one of its partners on the question of the
litigant suffering a penalty for the participation of his advocate in a strike or boycott of court. This
is done because the court initially wished to adopt the position that the entire sum be recovered
from the mentioned firm of attorneys. However, they chose to be lenient because it was the first
time that such a decision had been made.

Finally, in regards to the question of whether or not attorneys have the right to strike, an attorney
has no authority to halt court proceedings due to a strike, boycott of the courts, or even a boycott
of a specific court.

PRINCIPLE LAID BY THE COURT –

The general rule established by the court is that advocates shouldn't boycott or go on strikes in a
way that would adversely affect the services they provide to clients since they are dependent on
them to assist them obtain justice. This sentiment was reflected in the following places:

“Abstaining from the courts by the Advocates, by and large, does not only affect the persons
belonging to the legal profession but also hampers the process of justice sometimes urgently
needed by the consumers of justice, the litigants. Legal profession is essentially a service-oriented
profession. The relationship between the lawyer and his client is one of trust and confidence. With
the strike by the lawyers, the process of court intended to secure justice is obstructed which is
unwarranted under the provisions of the Advocates Act. Law is no trade and briefs of the litigants
not merchandise”.

VERDICT & OPINION –

The Apex Court stated that any attorney who asserts that their right to strike must be without loss
to them and that their innocent client must bear all losses is in violation of all ethical and fair play
principles. As a result, when he/she decides to strike or boycott the court, he/she must also be

24
willing to absorb at least the financial damage experienced by the litigant client who committed
his/her brief to that advocate with the full assurance that his/her case would be secure in that
advocate's hands. In this instance, the court gives the appellant permission to collect half of the
specified sum of Rs. 5000 from the law firm M/s. B.C. Das Gupta & Co. or from any of its partners.

10. Re Advocate

(AIR 1989 SC 245)

FACTS –

In this case, the genuine act of an advocate who acted in good faith under the instructions of
someone closely connected to his client and entertained a genuine belief that the instructions were
given under the authority of their client. This particular suit was filed in order to recover Rs.

25
30,000. The complainant entrusted the brief to the appellant, who in turn entrusted it to his junior
colleague who was attached to the office and practising alongside him at the time. At the time the
suit was withdrawn, the junior lawyer was working on his own, having opened his own office. The
appellant endorsed the brief pertaining to the suit on the docket, giving instructions to withdraw
the suit.

The petitioner had charged Appellant with filing a case against Shri Anantaraju in order to recover
Rs 30,098 plus court costs and current interest. The aforementioned suit was filed by R2. The
Appellant filed a memo stating that the matter was settled out of court, which resulted in the suit
being dismissed, and he also received half of the institution court fee within 10 days of the suit's
disposition. The petitioner claims he has not received either the suit amount or the court fee refund,
and he is unaware that the suit has been dismissed as settled out of court. In this case, members of
the legal profession filed an appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act of 1961.

ISSUE –

1. Whether an 3advocate acting bona fide and in good faith on the basis of oral instructions
given by Would someone claiming to act on behalf of his client be guilty of professional
misconduct or an unwise or imprudent act, or negligence simpliciter, or culpable
negligence punishable as professional misconduct?
2. Whether a charge apprising him specifically of the precise nature and character of the
professional misconduct ascribed to him needs to be framed?

RULE –

• Section 35, 38 & 42A Advocates Act, 1961.

ANALYSIS –

26
Rule 19 of Section 2 deals with 'Duty to clients' and states that an Advocate shall not act on the
instructions of anyone other than his client or his authorised agent. If the appellant acted on Gautam
Chand's instructions in good faith, believing that he was the authorised agent to give instructions
on behalf of the client, would this constitute professional misconduct? The Supreme Court stated
The appellant must be given a reasonable and fair opportunity to show cause, and the disciplinary
committee must inform him or her of the exact charge of professional misconduct so that he or she
can rebut it. The Supreme Court was persuaded that the Advocate was not informed of the precise
nature of the professional misconduct charged against him and was not informed of the precise
charge he was required to refute. The Disciplinary Committee's conclusion in the impugned order
also highlighted that in recording the finding of facts on the three questions, the applicability of
the doctrine of benefit of doubt and the need for establishing the facts beyond reasonable doubt
were not realised, and the question of whether the facts established that the appellant was acting
with bona fides or with mala fides, whether there was any mens rea, whether the appellant was
acting with any mala fides, whether the appellant was acting with any The exact nature of the
professional misconduct and the quantum of punishment in light of the aforementioned
considerations were also not established against the appellant. As a result, the Disciplinary
Committee's contested order cannot be upheld.

Because the court did not believe it was appropriate to examine the case on its own merits without
the benefit of the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Committee of the apex judicial body of the
legal profession, it remanded the case to the Disciplinary Committee, following the principle laid
out in the case of O.N. Mohindroo v. District Judge, Delhi 4.

These issues must be resolved in light of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances, while
keeping in mind the doctrine of benefit of the doubt and the requirement to record a finding only
when satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.

VERDICT & OPINION –

The Bar Council of India will now decide the case by classifying the appellant's error and
determining whether it qualifies as professional misconduct or one of the subtypes of negligence.

4
(1971) 2 SCR 11.

27
The SC has allowed the appeal, set aside the Bar Council's order insofar as the appellant is
concerned, and remitted the matter to the Bar Council of India. The Bar Council of India was told
to give each subject due attention after giving the Advocate a fair chance to speak. The court issued
a special order stating that the appellant's name shall not be revealed in any reports of the
judgement rendered by this Court or any portion thereof that are published elsewhere because the
matter is still pending and fairness requires that the name not be specified. This is where the case's
title, An Advocate v. Bar Council or In re an Advocate without identifying the appellant, came
from. The appeal was handled in such manner.

11. Rajendra Pai v. Alex Fernandes & Ors

(Civil Appeal 6142-6144 of 2001)

FACTS –

28
The case in question, which prompted the current Supreme Court appeal, involved mass land
acquisition in a specific village. The proposed land acquisition scheme would affect the lands of
approximately 150 families. The relatives of the current appellant, who was also an Advocate,
stood to lose their lands as well. Taking up the cause and rallying the village against the land
acquisition, the Advocate took on the aforementioned task by filing an appeal against the
acquisition. As a result, the majority of the people joined him in his quest. He either won their trust
through persuasion or people blindly trusted him because of his profession. He had also shown
them the possibility of either cancelling the acquisition or receiving reasonable compensation in
the form of a settlement.

ISSUE –

Whether the money withdrawn by the Advocate from the settlement money received out of the
claim amounts to misappropriation & therefore, misconduct?

ANALYSIS –

The main contention of a small group of villagers at the time was that the Advocate
misappropriated a portion of the total settlement money received from the claim by providing false
information at the Bank while withdrawing said amount. In response, the advocate claimed that he
had simply withdrawn the funds because he had incurred litigation fees out of his own pocket,
which he was merely reimbursing himself with. However, the Bar Councils of Maharashtra and
Goa found his actions to be professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, and
thus removed him from the rolls of lawyers in those states. The Advocate chose to file an appeal
against this order. The main issue in this case was not whether the advocate was guilty of
professional misconduct, but whether a permanent ban from practising his profession was justified
in the circumstances.

VERDICT & OPINION –

29
The Supreme Court noted that the current appeal did not contest the allegations levelled against
the advocate, but instead acted as an appeal to reduce the sentence. The advocate contended that
he is over the age of 40 and the sole breadwinner, and that preventing him from practising his
profession would be extremely detrimental to his life. His argument involving reimbursement to
himself for legal costs incurred had some validity as a very small group of individuals filed a
complaint against him with the Court. However, if the Bar Council has ruled that the individual is
unworthy of continuing to practise the profession over which they are responsible, that ruling
cannot be completely overturned.

In my opinion, the Supreme Court leniently sentenced him because he not only induced several
villagers to enter into a trust-based relationship with him, but he also abused that trust to benefit
himself. If the punishment for such offences is not of the highest order, the public's trust in
advocates is jeopardised.

12. Akshay Kumar Sarangi v. Bar Council of West Bengal & Anr

[WPO (P) No. 6 of 2021]

30
FACTS-

In the current case, the complainant is an individual who works as an advocate at the High Court
of Calcutta in West Bengal. The current Writ was filed by the advocate in support of and to amplify
the concerns of four disgruntled members of the West Bengal Bar Council. The four members'
dissatisfaction stems from a letter issued by the same body, the Bar Council of West Bengal, on
June 25, 2021. These members contend that the Chairman of the Bar used the Bar's official
letterhead to promote certain views in the media about the then (Acting) Chief Justice, and that
this cannot be construed as the views of the Bar Council as a whole. Furthermore, he was accused
of gross professional misconduct for attempting to influence the media against an independently
working judiciary from a position of power, and on a letterhead that he is supposed to use
diligently. If certain points of view are supported by people in positions of power, it casts doubt
on the actual state of affairs and reinforces attitudes of separation between various classes within
the profession. Thus, the main request was that the views he disseminated not be considered the
views of the Bar, and that by engaging in such acts of commission and omission, the Chairman of
the Bar Council of West Bengal has exposed himself to prosecution for professional misconduct
under the Advocates Act.

ISSUE –

Whether or not the acts as indulged in by the Chairman amount to professional misconduct?

ANALYSIS –

The hearing, on the other hand, deviated from the actual issue at hand. Because the matter involved
the Chief Justice, the Courts were first concerned with determining who should be allowed to
preside over it. Furthermore, more time was spent arguing over procedural irregularities and other
minor details rather than whether or not the Chairman's actions constituted misconduct in the first
place. The Court also noted that this is a case that falls under the purview of the Bar Council's
disciplinary committee because it involves professional misconduct or a lack thereof on the part
of the Chairman, and thus they are well equipped to rule on the matter. The Court's final

31
observation was that the Bar Council must not act as an organisation that works against the
country's courts, but rather as one that aids and collaborates with them.

In refusing to take a position on the issue at hand in the case, the Calcutta High Court correctly
deferred the matter to the West Bengal Bar Council. This Writ would have been more maintainable
if it had been a contempt petition against the Chairman for speaking negatively about a judge.
However, by doing so, the Court has strengthened the purpose of and added legitimacy to the Bar
Council's Disciplinary Committee.

13. R.D. Saxena v. Balram Prasad

32
 (AIR 2000 SC 2912)

FACTS –

In the following case, the appellant was hired as a legal advisor to the Madhya Pradesh State Co-
operative Bank Ltd. in 1990; the appellant used to represent the bank in litigation. On 17-07-1993,
the bank terminated the appellant's legal services and requested that all bank files be returned;
however, the appellant demanded that the bank pay him the pending dues to the tune of Rs.97,100
in order to return the bank's files. Following this, the bank filed a complaint with the Bar Council
of Madhya Pradesh on December 3, 1994, in which the appellant contended that he is entitled to a
right lien on the said documents, and the bank contended that the appellant would be guilty of
professional misconduct if he did not render the bank's documents.

The matter was heard by the Bar Council of India's Disciplinary Committee, which determined
that the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct for his actions and fined him Rs.1000,
suspended him from legal practise for 18 months, and ordered the appellant to return all bank-
related documents.

ISSUE –

Whether an Advocate is entitled to a right of lien over the litigation documents that have been
entrusted to them by their client for pending fee that is owed?

ANALYSIS –

The appellant contended that there was a lapse on the part of the Bar Council of India in not taking
the appellant's defence into account, and that he was entitled to a lien over the documents due to
his owed legal dues. The appellant contended the same with Section 171 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872, which provides that in the absence of a contract, the attorneys have the right to retain
any security to maintain the balance of the account, including any goods bailed to them. The

33
respondent contended that after the appellant's legal services were terminated, he was obligated to
return the files and had no right to lien over them.

The court held that the advocate did not have a right of lien over the bank's files because there was
no delivery of the goods and the advocate had possession of the documents on his own accord; this
was explained by the court through Section 148 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which defines
the term "bailment" and states that goods transferred from one person to another must be returned
after the completion of the said transaction. As a result, the aforementioned documents do not fall
within the scope of the section, and thus Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act is null and void.
The court held that an advocate does not have a right to lien unless there is an express agreement
between the parties to the contrary. According to Rules 28 and 29 of the Advocates Act, 1961, if
the advocate has any sum of the client's money in his possession, he/she is entitled to appropriate
the same after the termination of the said proceeding, and if the legal fees have not been settled,
the advocate has the right to deduct the same from the client's money in his possession and the
remaining must be given to the client. Section 35 of the Advocates Act of 1961 defines misconduct,
and if the advocate refuses to return the client's files, he or she is punished. A client has the right
to select his own advocates to represent his interests.

VERDICT & OPINION –

In conclusion, the court determined that if any advocate commits such an offence in the future, the
Bar Council will have the authority to determine the appropriate punishment based on the gravity
of the offence. The apex court's decision is foresighted, as the relationship between the client and
the advocate must be based on trust and understanding, and that trust must be maintained
throughout the proceedings. It is recommended that clients and advocates have a prior agreement
in place that includes all of the necessary details such as fee payment and reimbursement in the
event of termination.

34
 14. Suresh Shivarao Hattingadi v. N.D. Upadhaya
(2002 9 SCC 478)

FACTS –

The appellant in this case was registered with the State Bar Councils of Maharashtra and Goa as
an advocate. The appellant accepted a job offer from M/s Vulcan Leval Ltd. as a full-time
employee while still enrolled as an attorney. A complaint was made against him for professional
misconduct after his hiring by the business, namely for violating Rule 49 of the BCI regulations,
which forbids an advocate from taking a full-time job. Because no orders were issued by the State
Bar Council within the required one-year period, the disciplinary committee of the State Bar
Council began proceedings against the appellant and moved those proceedings to the BCI. After
evaluating the case's merits, the BCI's disciplinary committee found that the appellant had engaged
in professional misconduct by taking a full-time job and changing his address without notifying
the State Bar Council. As a result, the committee issued a punishment of a 2-year practise ban. As
a result, the current appeal has been submitted to the SC under Section 38.

ISSUE –

Whether the appellant is guilt of professional misconduct for not intimating the State Bar Council
that he had taken up full-time employment and further, changed his address?

RULES –

• BCI Rules 49, Section 22 of Advocates Act, 1961.

ANALYSIS –

The Supreme Court believed that there was no allegation in the charge brought against the
appellant that the appellant had continued to practise law while also working full-time for the

35
aforementioned company. According to the SC's justification, the appellant had not breached Rule
49 of the BCI rules, and as a result, the appeal was permitted and the punishment meted out to the
BCI was overturned. The Supreme Court believed that the punishment meted out to the advocate
was excessive and unjustified given the lack of convincing evidence supporting his ongoing
employment as an advocate and gainful employment. However, the Supreme Court noted that
under to Section 22 of the Advocates Act, he was required to notify the State Bar Council of his
desire to accept a full-time position as well as the change of address. In light of this, the Supreme
Court found him guilty of violating the rule against not informing others of changes and partially
permitted the appeal while reprimanding the appellant.

VERDICT & OPINION –

The current body of case law serves to reaffirm the requirement that any claim of professional
misconduct be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. According to Section 22 of the
Advocate Act, an advocate must inform the Bar Council of any change in address as soon as it
occurs and as required by BCI Rule 49, an advocate must notify the Bar Council of any full-time
job as soon as it occurs. This case law supports the idea that when an advocate violates a mandatory
obligation to provide information, it must be determined whether the offender continued to practise
as an advocate. If this is unproven, the violations can only be viewed as technical, and harsh
punishment leading to suspension is not necessary.

36
 15. Madhav M. Bhokarikar v. Ganesh M. Bhokarikar

[(2004) 3 SCC 607]

FACTS –

The appellant in this case was registered as an advocate under the provisions of the Advocates
Act. A complaint was filed against the appellant by his own uncle, who was involved in prior
litigation. The complaint was filed with the Maharashtra and Goa Bar Councils, and the
allegation was that the appellant, while continuing to practise as an advocate, had secured a
dealership for running a retail petrol pump. The complainant alleged a violation of BCI rules
prohibiting an advocate from being an active partner in a business venture, and following the
initiation of disciplinary proceedings based on the complaint, the State Bar Council found the
appellant to be guilty of professional misconduct and thus imposed a one-year suspension from
practise. The errant advocate filed an appeal with the BCI. BCI agreed with the findings that the
appellant continued to be an active partner in the said business for a period of two years while
continuing his practise as an advocate and observed that the punishment was lenient, so the
punishment was increased from a one-year ban from practise to a five-year ban from practise.
The current appeal has been filed in opposition to the BCI's order.

ISSUE –

Whether the appellant in this case is guilty of professional misconduct for the violation of Rule
47 of BCI Rules?

RULE –

• Section 35, Advocates Act, 1961.

37
• Rule 47, Bar Council of India Rules.

ANALYSIS –

The Supreme Court held that in cases where both bar councils issued concurrent findings of the
appellant's guilt, the SC would not intervene as a matter of course. The Court stated that the
advocate's guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt because there was evidence on record
indicating that the delinquent advocate continued to be an active partner while also practising as
an advocate. The appellant contended that soon after the proceedings against him were initiated,
he entered into an agreement with his brother in which it was agreed that the brother would be
the active partner and the advocate would be the sleeping partner. Thus, the main argument was
that the aforementioned agreement corrected the professional misconduct by bringing it in line
with BCI Rule 47, which states that an advocate cannot be an active partner in any business but
may be a sleeping partner in a business that does not degrade the legal profession. The Supreme
Court considered the contention, as well as the fact that the appellant had not practised for nearly
5 years, and thus allowed the appeal with the condition that the appellant be allowed to practise
after obtaining permission from the State Bar Council to continue as a sleeping partner, as
provided for under Rule 47.

VERDICT & OPINION –

In my opinion, the Supreme Court's decision is a valuable precedent that reinforces the notion
that each and every case of disciplinary proceeding must be examined based on the facts and
circumstances, and no straight jacket formula can be used in deciding such cases of alleged
professional misconduct. Even though there was a clear violation of Rule 47 in this case, the
Court took the lenient view that the appellant had already stopped practising for a period of 5
years and thus he shall be entitled to practise as soon as he seeks permission from the State Bar
Council to continue as a sleeping partner in the said business. This case law reaffirms the

38
concept that punishment should only be used to prevent and correct professional misconduct so
that it does not occur again in the future.

39