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VII.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BILL OF RIGHTS


Police Power
01. Defi e !olice !ower. W"#$ #re $"e $wo $e%$%& re'(i%i$e% or li)i$#$io % for $"e *#li+ e,erci%e of !olice !ower-

ANSWER: Police power is the power to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, ordinances whether with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the sub ects of the same! (MMDA vs . Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005) "he two tests for the #alid e$ercise of police power are: %& 'awful Sub ect ( the interest of the public in general, and not of a particular sub ect, re)uires an interference with pri#ate rights, and *& 'awful +eans, the means adopted must be reasonablnecessar- for the accomplishment of the purpose .t must not be undul- oppressi#e upon indi#iduals! (City of Manila vs. Lag io, GR No.11!12", April 12, 2005)
0.. U!o w"o) i% !olice !ower lo+/e+- 0#1 i$ 2e +ele/#$e+- W"#$ #re $"e li)i$#$io % if $"e e,erci%e of !olice !ower i% )erel1 +ele/#$e+-

ANSWER: Police power is lodged with the National 'egislature which in turn madelegate it to local go#ernment units! Congress has delegated police to the '/01s in the 'ocal /o#ernment Code of %22%! "he other limitations if the e$ercise of police power is merel- delegated are: %& the delegation is b- e$press pro#ision of law, *& it must be e$ercised within the territorial limits of the delegate, and 3& such e$ercise is not contrarto law!
03. Doe% $"e 00DA "#*e $"e !ower $o co fi%c#$e& %(%!e + or re*o4e +ri*er%5 lice ce%-

ANSWER: N4! the ++5A does not ha#e the power to confiscate, suspend or re#oke dri#ers1 licences without a traffic law or regulation #alidl- enacted b- the legislature or those of the local go#ernment units to whom legislati#e powers ha#e been delegated! 4nce there is such a law, ++5A is dut-,bound to confiscate, suspend or re#oke dri#ers1 licences in the e$ercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management! 'icense to operate a motor #ehicle is not a propert-, but a pri#ilege granted b- the state which mabe suspended or re#oked b- the state in the e$ercise of its police power, in the interest of public safet- and welfare, sub ect to the procedural re)uirements of due process! (MMDA vs . Garin, s pra.)
06. T"e 7,!# +e+ Se ior Ci$i8e % Ac$ of .003 /r# $% $o %e ior ci$i8e % .09 +i%co( $ fro) #ll e%$#2li%")e $% rel#$i*e $o $"e ($ili8#$io of %er*ice% i "o$el% # + %i)il#r e%$#2li%")e $% #% well #% !(rc"#%e% of )e+ici e%. S$#$e $"e #$(re or :(%$ific#$io of $"e l#w.

ANSWER: "he law is a legitimate e$ercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has the general welfare for its ob ect! When conditions so demand as determined b- the legislature, propert- rights must bow to the primac- of police power because propert- rights, though sheltered b- due process, must -ield to the general welfare! (Carlos # p$r Dr g Corp. vs. D#%D, GR No. 1&&'(', )an ary 2(, 200")

Power of 7)i e $ Do)#i


0;. W"#$ i% $"e !ower of e)i e $ +o)#i - W"#$ #re $"e co %$i$($io #l li)i$#$io % i e,erci%e of $"e !ower of e)i e $ +o)#i $"e

ANSWER: "he power of eminent domain is the 6rightful authorit-, which e$ists in e#er- so#ereignt- to control and regulate those rights of public nature which pertain to its citi7ens in common, and to appropriate and control indi#idual propert- for the public benefit, as the public safet-, necessit-, con#enience, or welfare ma- demand! "he e$ercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained b- two constitutional pro#isions: 8%& that pri#ate propert- shall not be taken for public use without ust compensation under Article ..., Section 2 on 9ill of Rights and 8*& the due process clause which states that no person shall be depri#ed of life, libert- or propert- without due process of law also under Article ..., Section %! (Lag*ao vs. La+ra, GR No. 155"'&, ,*to+$r 13, 200') -1C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA%
0<. Di%$i /(i%" $"e !ower of e)i e $ +o)#i fro) !olice !ower.

0P02

ANSWER: .n the e$ercise of the power of eminent domain, the taking of propert- is for public use while in the e$ercise of police power, the taking is a mere incident to a #alid regulation to promote public interest! .n the e$ercise of eminent domain, propert- or right of propert- is taken from the owner and transferred to a public agenc- to be en o-ed bits as its own while in the e$ercise of police power, the taking of propert- or a right therein is accomplished not b- transfer of ownership but b- destro-ing the propert- or impairing its #alue!
0=. Di%$i /(i%" $"e effec$% of $"e e,erci%e of !olice !ower # + $"e !ower of i))i e $ +o)#i i rel#$io $o $"e ri/"$ $o !ri*#$e !ro!er$1.

ANSWER: .n the e$ercise of police power, there is a limitation or restriction of propert- interests to promote public welfare which in#ol#es no compensable taking! Compensation is necessar- onl- when the state1s power of eminent domain is e$ercised! .n eminent domain, propert- is appropriated and applied to some public purpose! Propert- condemned under the e$ercise of police power, on the other hand, is no$ious or intended for no$ious or forbidden purpose, and conse)uentl-, is not compensable! "he restriction imposed to protect li#es, public health and safet- from danger is not a taking! .t is merel- the prohibition or abatement of no$ious use which interferes with paramount right of the public! (#o*ial ) sti*$ #o*i$ty vs. Ati$n1a, 5'5 #CRA (2)
0>. 0#1 LGU5% e,erci%e $"e !ower of e)i e $ +o)#i - 0#1 LGU5% *#li+l1 e,!ro!ri#$e %)#ll lo$% $o #cco))o+#$e o )ore $"# few $e # $% or %'(#$$er%-

ANSWER: :ES! While '/01s ha#e no inherent power of eminent domain, b- #irtue of the 'ocal /o#ernment Code, Congress conferred upon '/01s the power to e$propriate! ;owe#er, condemnation of small pri#ate lots in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random e$propriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or s)uatters is certainl- not the condemnation for public use contemplated b- the Constitution! "his is depri#ing a citi7en of his propert- for the con#enience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public! While housing is one of the most serious problems of the countr-, '/01s do not possess unbridled authorit- to e$ercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem! (Lag*ao vs. La+ra, s pra)

0?.

0#1 # 2#r# /#1 /o*er )e $ e,!ro!ri#$e # !ro!er$1 w"ic" %"#ll 2e (%e+ #% # fee+er ro#+ for $"e 2e efi$ of $"e re%i+e $% of P(ro4 P#r#i%o& 1e$ $"e P(ro4 i% wi$"i # !ri*#$e %(2+i*i%io -

ANSWER: N4! "he e$propriation was intended for pri#ate purpose! .t would benefit onl- the owners of the subdi#ision who will be able to circum#ent the commitment to pro#ide road access to the subdi#ision and relie#ed from spending their funds for a right of wa-! "he intended e$propriation of pri#ate propert- for the benefit of a pri#ate indi#idual is clearl- proscribed b- the Constitution, declaring that it should be for public use or purpose! 'ikewise, public fund can be used onl- for a public purpose! .n this proposed condemnation, go#ernment funds would be emplo-ed for the benefit of a pri#ate indi#idual without an- legal mooring! (2arangay #in3alan vs. CA, GR No. 150&'0, Mar*4 22, 200")
10. S!o(%e% H # + W were $"e le%%ee% of # !#rcel of l# + i @(e8o Ci$1. A l#w w#% e #c$e+ #($"ori8i / $"e #$io #l /o*er )e $ $o e,!ro!ri#$e cer$#i !ro!er$ie%& #)o / o$"er%& for $"e e,$e %io of 7DSA. T"e l# + le#%e+ 21 H # + W w#% !#r$ of $"o%e e,!ro!ri#$e+ ( +er $"e %#i+ l#w. T"e1 were o$ i cl(+e+ i $"e e,!ro!ri#$io !rocee+i /% 2ec#(%e $"e1 were )ere le%%ee% of $"e !ro!er$1& #ccor+i / $o $"e Solici$or Ge er#l. To 2e e $i$le+ $o :(%$ co)!e %#$io & %"o(l+ $"e +efe +# $ 2e $"e ow er of $"e !ro!er$1 e,!ro!ri#$e+-

ANSWER: N4! "he defendants in an e$propriation case are not limited to the owners of the propert- condemned! "he- include all other persons, owning, occup-ing, or claiming to own the propert-! When a parcel of land is taken b- eminent domain, the owner of the fee is not necessaril- the onl- person entitled to compensation! A lessee, mortgagee, or a #endee in possession under an e$ecutor- contract of the land has the right to take part in the e$propriation proceeding! .f a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a part-, he is gi#en the right to inter#ene and la- claim to the compensation! (5n$*4t vs. CA, GR No. 10!015, May 20 1((!) C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA% 0P03
11. A !ro!er$1 w#% co *er$e+ i $o # #ir!or$ 21 $"e Air Tr# %!or$#$io Office AATOB +e!ri*i / $"e ow er% of $"e 2e efici#l (%e # + e :o1)e $ of $"e %#)e #% e#rl1 #% 1?6> wi$"o($ # e,!ro!ri#$io !rocee+i /. I$ w#% co $e +e+ $"#$ $"ere w#% $#4i /& "e ce& :(%$ co)!e %#$io %"o(l+ 2e rec4o e+ fro) 1?6>. I% $"e co $e $io le/#ll1 $e #2le-

ANSWER: N4! As a general rule, the determination of ust compensation in eminent domain cases is reckoned from the time of taking! (Ga+atin vs. L2,, ''' #CRA 1"&) .n this case, howe#er, application of the said rule would lead to gra#e in ustice! Note that the A"4 had been using the propert- as airport since %2<= without ha#ing instituted the proper e$propriation proceedings! "o peg the #alue of the propert- at the time of taking in %2<=, despite the e$ponential increase in its #alue considering the lapse of o#er half a centur-, would be ini)uitous! A"4 cannot con#enientl- in#oke the right of eminent domain to take ad#antage of the ridiculousl- low #alue of the propert- at the time of taking that it arbitraril- chooses to the pre udice of the owners! >ustice and fairness dictate that the appropriate reckoning point for the #aluation of the propert- is when the trial court made its order of e$propriation in *??%! (6$irs of Mat$o 7i3a*an an3 Ro8ana 9igo vs. A-,, GR No. 1&2""(, ) n$ 15, 200") Co ce!$ of D(e Proce%%
1.. W"#$ i% +(e !roce%%- W"#$ #re i$% !(r!o%e%- W"o #re co*ere+ 21 $"e +(e !roce%% cl#(%e-

ANSWER: "here is no controlling and precise definition of due process but its standard ma- be described! "his standard ma- be described as responsi#eness to the supremac- of reason, obedience to the dictates of ustice, and as such, it is a limitation upon the e$ercise of police power! Among the purposes of the guarant- of the right to due process area: %& to pre#ent go#ernmental encroachment against the life, libert- and propert- of indi#iduals, and *& to secure to all persons e)ual and impartial ustice and the benefit of the general law! (City of Manila vs. Lag io, s pra.) "he guarantee ser#es as protection against arbitrar- regulation, and pri#ate

corporations and partnerships are persons within the scope of the guarant- insofar as their propert- is concerned! (.+i3.) Due Process and Right to Counsel
13. Doe% $"e +(e !roce%% cl#(%e e co)!#%% $"e ri/"$ $o 2e #%%i%$e+ 21 co( %el +(ri / # + #+)i i%$r#$i*e i '(ir1-

ANSWER: N4! .n an administrati#e proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the ser#ices of counsel or not! "hus, the right to counsel is not imperati#e in administrati#e in#estigations because such in)uiries are conducted merel- to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinar- measures against erring public officers and emplo-ees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignit- of go#ernment ser#ice! "he right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless re)uired b- the Constitution or the law! (L 8i: $3 vs. 9;$v$a, 2!2 #CRA 125 an3 R$8olana vs. C#C, 3&2 #CRA 30') Due Process and Preliminary Investigation
16. T"e c"#r/e file+ #/#i %$ !e$i$io er w#% )o+ifie+ fro) *iol#$io of Ar$. ..0 ATec" ic#l 0#l*er%#$io B of $"e Re*i%e+ Pe #l Co+e $o *iol#$io of Sec%. 3AeB # + 3A"B& RA 301?. Pe$i$io er% cl#i) $"#$ $"eir ri/"$ $o +(e !roce%% w#% +e ie+ %i ce $"e1 were o$ /i*e $"e o!!or$( i$1 $o # %wer # + !re%e $ e*i+e ce o $"e ew c"#r/e i # !reli)i #r1 i *e%$i/#$io . Deci+e.

ANSWER: "he petition lacks merit! "he right to a preliminar- in#estigation is not a constitutional right but it is merel- conferred b- statute! "he absence of a preliminar- in#estigation does not impair the #alidit- of .nformation or otherwise render the same defecti#e! "he denial of the motion for rein#estigation cannot likewise in#alidate the .nformation or oust the court of its urisdiction o#er the case! Petitioners were not denied due process because the- had the opportunit- to refute the charges b- filing their counter,affida#its! "he modification of the offense charged was based on the same set of facts and the same allegedl- illegal acts! @urthermore, the right to preliminarin#estigation is deemed wai#ed when the accused fails to in#oke it before or at the time of entering a plea on arraignment! (2 3iongan vs. 3$la Cr 1, GR No. 1"02!!, #$pt$8+$r 22, 200&) C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA% 0P04
1;. A re%!o +e $ cl#i) +e i#l of +(e !roce%% w"e %"e w#% /i*e $"e o!!or$( i$1 $o file "er #ffi+#*i$% # + o$"er !le#+i /% # + %(2)i$ e*i+e ce 2efore $"e DOC +(ri / $"e !reli)i #r1 i *e%$i/#$io of "er c#%e # + 2efore $"e I for)#$io w#% file+ #/#i %$ "er. Deci+e.

ANSWER: "here is no denial of due process! 5ue process is merel- an opportunit- to be heard! .n addition, preliminar- in#estigation conducted b- the 54> is merelin)uisitorial! .t is not a trial of the case on the merits! .ts sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether the respondent therein is probablguilt- of the crime! .t is not the occasion to the full and e$hausti#e displa- of the parties1 e#idence! ;ence, if the in#estigating prosecutor is alread- satisfied that he can reasonabldetermine the e$istence of probable cause based on the parties1 e#idence thus presented, he ma- terminate the proceedings and resol#e the case! (#antos vs. 7$opl$, GR No. 1"31"&, A g st 2&, 200!) Co ce!$ of 7'(#l Pro$ec$io
1<. W"#$ i% 1o(r ( +er%$# +i / of $"e e'(#l !ro$ec$io cl#(%e- Doe% i$ $#4e w#1 fro) $"e S$#$e $"e !ower $o cl#%%if1- W"#$ #re $"e re'(i%i$e% of *#li+ cl#%%ific#$io -

ANSWER: "he guarant- to e)ual protection and uniformit- is satisfied %& when the laws operate uniforml- on all persons under similar circumstances, and *& all persons are treated in the same manner in terms of both pri#ileges conferred and liabilities imposed, the conditions not being different, and that fa#oritism and preference are not allowed! N4! "he e)ual protection clause does not take awa- from the state the power to classif- in the adoption of police power laws, but admits of the e$ercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regards and a#oids what is done onl- when it is without anreasonable basis, and therefore is purel- arbitrar-! (R$< R$: $st for t4$ grant of #p$*ial Distortion Allo=an*$, A.M. No. 03>11>25>#C, ,*to+$r 1, 200') "he re)uisites of #alid classification are: %& there must substantial distinctions

which must make for real differencesA *& the classification must be germane to the issueA 3& it must appl- not onl- to e$isting conditions but future conditions as wellA and <& it must be applicable to all members of the same class! (7$opl$ vs. ?$ra, &5 74il 5&)
1=. T"e !e$i$io er% #%%#il $"e *#li+i$1 of A+)i i%$r#$i*e or+er No. 1& w"ic" !ro"i2i$e+ )o$orc1cle% o li)i$e+ #cce%% "i/"w#1% o $"e 2#%i% of RA .000 ALi)i$e+ Acce%% Hi/"w#1 Ac$B. T"e !e$i$io er %ee4% re+re%% fro) $"e )o$orc1cle 2# ( +er $"e e'(#l !ro$ec$io cl#(%e& 2ec#(%e AO 1 %i /le+ o($ )o$orc1cle%. Deci+e.

ANSWER: "here is a real and substantial distinction between a motorc-cle and other motor #ehicles! Not all motori7ed #ehicles are created e)ual ( real and substantial differences e$ist between a motorc-cle and other forms of transport sufficient to ustifits classification among those prohibited from pl-ing the toll wa-s! (Mirasol vs. D7%6, GR No. 15!"(3, ) n$ !, 200&)
1>. Doe% $"e VAT L#w *iol#$e $"e +(e !roce%% # + e'(#l !ro$ec$io cl#(%e% w"e i$ re+(ce+ $"e i !($ cre+i$% $o o l1 =09 of o($!($ VAT-

ANSWER: N4! .nput BA" is not a propert- or a propert- right within the constitutional pur#iew of the due process clause being merel- a statutor- pri#ilege! Persons ha#e no #ested rights in statutor- pri#ileges! "he State ma- change or take awa- rights, which were created b- laws of the State, although it ma- not take awa- propert-, which was #ested which was #ested b- #irtue of such rights! (A+a@a3a G ro 7artyList vs. 9r8ita, GR No. 1&!05&, #$pt. 1, 2005)
1?. Doe% # ci$1 or+i # ce $"#$ !ro"i2i$ )o$el% # + i % i $"e 7r)i$#D0#l#$e #re# 2($ o$ o($%i+e of $"i% #re# *iol#$e $"e e'(#l !ro$ec$io cl#(%e-

ANSWER: :ES! A cit- ordinance #iolates the e)ual protection clause where it prohibits motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments despite the fact that these establishments are all similarlsituated! @urthermore, it prohibits the business and operation of motels in the Ermita,+alate area but not outside of this area! "here is no #alid classification because a no$ious establishment does not become an- less no$ious if located outside the area! (City of Manila vs .Lag io, s pra.) C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA% Se#rc" # + Sei8(reE Pro2#2le C#(%e
.0. W"#$ #re $"e re'(i%i$e% for i%%(i / # %e#rc" w#rr# $- W"#$ #re $"e re'(i%i$e% i +e$er)i #$io of $"e e,i%$e ce of !ro2#2le c#(%e$"e

0P05

ANSWER: A search warrant shall not issue but %& upon probable clause *& in connection with one specific offense a& to be determined personall- b- the udge b& after e$amination under oath or affirmation of i& the complainant ii& the witness he ma- produce, and 3& particularl- describing a& the place to be searched and b& the things to be sei7ed i& an-where in the Philippines! 0nder the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the issuance of a search warrant is ustified onl- upon a finding of probable cause! .n determining the e$istence of probable cause, it is re)uired that: 8%& the udge must e$amine the complainant of his witness personall-A 8*& the e$amination must be under oathA and 83& the e$amination must be reduced in =riting in t4$ for8 of s$ar*4ing : $stions an3 ans=$rs. .n 7$opl$ vs. Ma8aril, GR No. 1'"&0", )an ary 22, 200', the records onl- show the e$istence of an application for search warrant, "he affida#its of complainant1s witnesses and return of the search warrant! "he prosecution failed to pro#e that the issuing udge put into writing his e$amination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching )uestions and answers before issuance of the search warrant, rendering the search warrant in#alid and the e#idence sei7ed pursuant thereto is inadmissible!
.1. 0#1 $"e co %$i$($io #l !ro$ec$io #/#i %$ ( re#%o #2le %e#rc"e% # + %ei8(re% 2e e,$e +e+ $o #c$% co))i$$e+ 21 !ri*#$e i +i*i+(#l%-

ANSWER: N4! As held in 7$opl$ vs. Marti, %23 SCRA CD, the constitutional protection

against unreasonable searches and sei7ures refers to the immunit- of one1s person from interference b- go#ernment and it cannot be e$tended to acts committed b- pri#ate indi#iduals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion! (7$opl$ vs. M$n3o1a, 301 #CRA &&)
... C# $"e !l#ce $o 2e %e#rc"e+& #% %e$ o($ i $"e w#rr# $& 2e #)!lifie+ or )o+ifie+ 21 $"e officer%5 ow !er%o #l 4 owle+/e of $"e !re)i%e%& or $"e e*i+e ce $"e1 #++(ce i %(!!or$ of $"eir #!!lic#$io for w#rr# $-

ANSWER: N4! Such a change is proscribed b- the Constitution which re)uires int$r alia the search warrant to particularl- describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be sei7ed! .t would concede to the police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, e#en if it not be that delineated in the warrant! .t would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers e$ecuting a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisel- remo#ed from them! "he particulari7ation of the description of the place to be searched ma- properl- be done onlb- the udge, and onl- in the warrant itselfA it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search! (7$opl$ vs. CA, 2(1 #CRA '00)
.3. W"#$ #re $"e i %$# ce% of *#li+ w#rr# $le%% %e#rc"e% # + %ei8(re%-

ANSWER: %& search incident to a lawful arrest *& when it in#ol#es prohibited articles in 6plain #iew!E 3& search of a mo#ing #ehicle <& consented warrantless search C& customs searches F& searches without warrant of automobiles D& 6Stop and friskE =& E$igent and emergenc- circumstances ! (7$opl$ vs. N $vas, GR No. 1"0233, A$+. 22, 200")
.0. W"#$ i% !ro2#2le c#(%e i w#rr# $le%% #rre%$-

ANSWER: Probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion! "hus, there is no 6personal knowledge of factsE where the police officers merel- relied on information gi#en to them b- others such as a report of the killing, information from a witness who saw the killing, the ph-sical description gi#en of the last man who saw the #ictim fitting the person arrested and information where this man li#ed! (7$opl$ vs. C +* +in, GR No. 13&2&",) ly 10, 2001)
.6. W"#$ i% $"e !l#i *iew +oc$ri e-

ANSWER: 4b ects falling within the plain #iew of an officer who has a right to be in the position to ha#e that #iew are sub ect to sei7ure e#en without search warrant and ma- be introduced in e#idence! C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA% 0P06
.;. W"#$ i% $"e FFr(i$ of $"e Poi%o e+ TreeG Doc$ri e-

ANSWER: E#idence obtained from illegal search and sei7ure shall be inadmissible for an- purpose in an- proceedings! GArt! ..., Sec! 38*&H Pri*#c1 of Co))( ic#$io
.<. ANDR7A # + 0ONICA "#+ co fro $#$io i $"e l#$$er5% office. ANDR7A %ecre$l1 $#!e+ $"e co *er%#$io . T"e co *er%#$io 2e$wee $"e) 2or+ere+ o "()ili#$i / # + *e,i / $"e !er%o #li$1 # + +i/ i$1 of 0ONICA for w"ic" %"e file+ # ci*il c#%e for +#)#/e%. D(ri / $"e "e#ri / ANDR7A !ro+(ce+ $"e recor+e+ $#!e $o !ro*e $"#$ 0ONICA i +ee+ i %(l$e+ "er. 0ONICA& i # co( $er%(i$ file+ # cri)i #l c#%e #/#i %$ ANDR7A for *iol#$io of RA 6.00 w"ic" !ro"i2i$% # + !e #li8e% wire $#!!i / # + o$"er *iol#$io % of !ri*#$e co))( ic#$io %. ANDR7A )o*e+ $o +i%)i%% $"e cri)i #l c#%e o $"e /ro( + $"#$ $"e #lle/#$io % +o o$ co %$i$($e # offe %e # + $"#$ $"e $#!i / of co *er%#$io 2e$wee $"e !#r$ie% i% o$ co*ere+ 21 RA 6.00. T"e $ri#l co(r$ /r# $e+ %#i+ )o$io w"ic" +eci%io w#% re*er%e+ 21 $"e Co(r$ of A!!e#l%. ANDR7A ele*#$e+ $"e c#%e $o $"e S(!re)e Co(r$ o cer$ior#ri. I% ANDR7A li#2le for *iol#$io of RA 6.00- Deci+e.

ANSWER: :ES! Section % of RA <*?? clearl- and une)ui#ocabl- prohibits an- person, not authori7ed b- all the parties to an- pri#ate con#ersation, to secretl- tape record an- communication b- means of a tape recorder! Congressional records support the #iew that the intention of the lawmakers in enacting RA <*?? is to make illegal an- unauthori7ed tape recording of pri#ate con#ersation or communication taken b- either of the parties themsel#es or third persons! Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone con#ersations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibilit- of the sub ect tapes is mandator- under RA <*??! (Ra8ir$1 vs. CA, 2'! #CRA 5(0 an3 #al*$3o>,rtan$1 vs. CA, 235 #CRA 111)

.n Ma8+a vs. ) 3g$ Gar*ia, A.M. No. M-)>(&>1110, ) n$ 25, 2001, the Supreme Court likewise ruled that the in#estigating udge1s reliance on the tape,recorded con#ersation is erroneous! "he recording of pri#ate con#ersation, without the consent of the parties, contra#enes the pro#isions of RA <*??, otherwise known as the Anti,Wire "apping 'aw, and renders the same inadmissible in e#idence in an- proceeding! "he law co#ers e#en those recorded b- persons pri#- to the con#ersation, as in this case!
.=. C# # +e$e $io !ri%o er *#li+l1 i *o4e "i% ri/"$ $o !ri*#c1 of co))( ic#$io /(#r# $ee+ ( +er Sec$io 3 of $"e Bill of Ri/"$%-

ANSWER: . )ualif-! While letters containing confidential communication between detainees and their law-ers en o- a limited protection in that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents thereof without #iolating the inmates1 right to correspondence, letters folded but not in a sealed en#elope and are not confidential communication between the detainees and their law-ers, the officials of the .SA@P 5etention Center could read the letters! .f the letters are marked confidential communication between detainees and their law-ers, the detention officials should not read the letters but onl- open the en#elopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees! (Al$Bano vs. Ca+ ay, '&! #CRA 1!!) Ri/"$ $o Pri*#c1 # + Ri/"$ A/#i %$ SelfDi cri)i #$io
.>. Doe% # Se #$e Co))i$$ee i '(ir1 *iol#$e P"ilco)%#$ Hol+i / Cor!or#$io # + S$# +#r+ C"#r$er B# 45% ri/"$ $o !ri*#c1 # + ri/"$ #/#i %$ %elfDi cri)i #$io -

ANSWER: N4! Since the in)uir- focused on the acts committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of said corporations, the- ha#e no reasonable e$pectation of pri#ac- on matters in#ol#ing their offices in a corporation where the go#ernment has interest! Such matters are of public concern and o#er which the people ha#e the right to information! "his goes to show that the right to pri#ac- is not absolute where there is an o#erriding compelling state interest!(#a+io vs. Gor3on, 50' #CRA "0') Emplo-ing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morf$ vs. M t *, 22 #CRA '2', there is no infringement on the indi#idual1s right to pri#ac- as the re)uirement to disclose information is for #alid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the go#ernment agencies in#ol#ed in regulating banking transactions ade)uatel- protect the public who in#est in foreign securities! Suffice it to sa- that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislati#e in#estigation! (#tan3ar3 C4art$r 2an@ vs. #$nat$ Co88itt$$ on 2an@s, GR 1&"1"3, D$*$8+$r 2", 200") C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA% 0P0 "he right against self,incrimination ma- be in#oked b- the said directors and officers of the corporations onl- when the incriminating )uestion is being asked, since the- ha#e no wa- of knowing in ad#ance the nature or effect of the )uestions to be asked of them! "hat this right ma- possibl- #iolated or abused is no ground for den-ing the Senate Committees their power of in)uir-! When this power is abused, it ma- be presented before the courts! What is important is that the Senate Committees ha#e sufficient R l$s to guide them when the right against self,incrimination is in#oked! (#a+io vs. Gor3on, s pra.) An accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinar- witness! Whereas an ordinar- witness ma- be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the pri#ilege as each )uestion re)uiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused ma- altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer an)uestions! .n this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in criminal case nor will thebe sub ected b- the respondent to an- penalt- b- reason of their testimonies! ;ence, thecannot altogether decline appearing before respondent, although the- ma- in#oke the pri#ilege when a )uestion calling for an incriminating answer is propounded! (#tan3ar3 C4art$r 2an@ vs. #$nat$ Co88itt$$, s pra) Free+o) of 7,!re%%io
.?. T"e N#$io #l Teleco))( ic#$io % Co))i%%io i%%(e+ $"i% !re%% rele#%eH FNTC GIV7S FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND T7L7VISION OWN7RS TO OBS7RV7 ANTID WIR7TAPPING LAW AND P7RTIN7NT CIRCULARS ON PROGRA0 STANDARDS.G Pe$i$io er C"#*e8 file+ # !e$i$io #lle/i / $"#$ $"e #c$% of re%!o +e $% #re *iol#$io of $"e free+o) o e,!re%%io # + of $"e !re%%& # + $"e ri/"$ of $"e !eo!le o i for)#$io o )#$$er% of !(2lic co cer .

ANSWER: .t is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be sub ected to the

clear and present danger rule, as the- are content,based restrictions! "he acts of the respondents focused solel- on but one sub ect ( a specific content, fi$ed as these were on the alleged tape con#ersation between the President and a C4+E'EC official! 0ndoubtedl-, these did not merel- pro#ide regulations as to the time, place or manner of the dissemination of speech and e$pression! "he records of the case at bar, howe#er are confused and confusing, and respondent1s e#idence fall short of satisf-ing the clear and present danger test! (C4av$1 vs. Gon1al$1, GR No. 1&!33!, A$+r ary 15, 200!) Free+o) of Reli/io ISe!#r#$io of C"(rc" J S$#$e
30. C# $"e co(r$%& i $"e !erfor)# ce of $"eir :(+ici#l f( c$io %& e,erci%e co $rol o*er c"(rc" #($"ori$ie% i $"e !erfor)# ce of $"eir +i%cre$io #r1 # + offici#l f( c$io %-

ANSWER: N4! "he e$pulsionIe$communication of members of a religious institution or organi7ation is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and laws and canons, of said institutionIorgani7ation! .t is not for the courts to e$ercise control o#er church authorities in the performance of their discretionar- and official functions! .n disputes in#ol#ing religious institution or organi7ation, there is one area which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinar- matters! "he amendments of the constitution, re,statement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or ab uration alleged b- the appellant, ha#ing to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and ha#ing reference to the power of e$cluding from the church those allegedl- unworth- of membership, are un)uestionabl- ecclesiastical matters which are outside the pro#ince of ci#il courts! (-ar * vs. Cr 1, '53 #CRA 123)
31. W"#$ i% "ec4ler5% Ve$o-

ANSWER: .t is an impermissible content,based restriction on speech where the speech is prohibited due to an anticipated disorderl- or #iolent reaction of the audience!
3.. W"#$ +o 1o( ( +er%$# + 21 $"e Doc$ri e of ACCO00ODATIONB7N7VOL7NT N7UTRALITK or

ANSWER: "he doctrine belie#es that the wall of separation that di#ides the church and the state is meant to protect the church from the state! "he principle recogni7es that the state is not hostile to religion because it pla-s an important role in public life! .t belie#es that the wall of separation does not re)uire the state to be ad#ersar-, rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups or religious belie#ers and non,belie#ers! 0nder the doctrine, accommodation of religion ma- be allowed not to promote the go#ernment1s fa#ored form of religion, but to allow indi#iduals and groups to e$ercise their religion C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA% 0P0! without hindrance! "hus, the Philippine Constitution pro#ides for ta$ e$emption of church properties, salar- of religious officers in go#ernment institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools! "he adoption of the bene#olent neutralit-, accommodation approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant e$emption e#ertime a free e$ercise claim comes before it! (9stra3a vs. 9s*ritor, '(2 #CRA 1) Li2er$1 of A2o+e J Tr#*el
33. W"#$ #re $"e li)i$#$io % o li2er$1 of #2o+e- W"#$ #re $"e li)i$#$io % o $"e ri/"$ $o $r#*el-

ANSWER: "he limitation on the libert- of abode is upon lawful order of the court while on the right to tra#el is in the interest of national securit-, public safet- or public health, as ma- be pro#ided b- law! 8Art! ..., Sec! F& Ri/"$ $o I for)#$io
36. Doe% $"e CO07L7C "#*e $"e co %$i$($io #l +($1 $o +i%clo%e # + rele#%e $"e $"e o)i ee% of $"e !#r$1Dli%$ /ro(!%. #)e% of

ANSWER: :ES! "he right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public or the citi7ens! "he right to information is limited to 6matters of public concernE and is further sub ect to such limitations as ma- be pro#ided b- law! Also, the polic- of public disclosure on Art! .. Sec! *=, is confined to transactions in#ol#ing 6public interest and is sub ect to reasonable conditions prescribed b- law! ;owe#er, no national securit- is in#ol#ed in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the part-,list groups in )uestion! (2antay RA "('1 vs. C,M9L9C, GR No. 1""2"1, May ', 200")
3;. Are $"e offer% )#+e 21 $"e P"ili!!i e # + C#!# e%e /o*er )e $% +(ri / $"e e/o$i#$io % of $"e C#!# DP"ili!!i e% 7co o)ic P#r$ er%"i! A/ree)e $ ACP7PAB co*ere+ 21 $"e e,ec($i*e !ri*ile/e

o +i!lo)#$ic co))( ic#$io %-

ANSWER: :ES! .n A@+ayan Citi1$ns A*tion 7arty vs. A: ino, GR No. 1"051&,) ly 1&, 200!, it was held that the >apanese representati#es submitted their offers with the understanding that J"i%$oric co fi+e $i#li$15 would go#ern the same and that thecontinue to be pri#ilege e#en after the agreement has been published! 5isclosing these offers could impair the abilit- of the Philippines to deal not onl- with >apan but with other foreign go#ernments in f($(re e/o$i#$io %. A ruling that Philippines offers in treat- negotiation should now be open to public scrutin- would discourage future Philippine representati#es from frankl- e$pressing their #iews during negotiations! "he diplomatic negotiation pri#ilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberati#e process and presidential communication pri#ilege! Ri/"$ $o For) A%%oci#$io %
3<. Doe% $"e ri/"$ $"e ri/"$ $o %$ri4e for) # !#r$ of $"e free+o) of e,!re%%io -

ANSWER: N4! "he claim that the right to strike is a part of the freedom of e$pression and the right to peacefull- assemble and petition the go#ernment for redress of grie#ances, and should thus, be recogni7ed e#en in the case of go#ernment emplo-ees, was re ected b- the Supreme Court in G#.# vs. 5apisanan ng Mga Manggaga=a sa G#.#, GR No. 1"0132, D$*$8+$r &, 200& No Di)!#ir)e $ Cl#(%e
3=. W"#$ i% $"e o Di)!#ir)e $ cl#(%e-

ANSWER: "he non,impairment clause is a constitutional prohibition for Congress and Sanggunians to enact a law or ordinance which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those e$pressed or authori7es for its satisfaction something different from that pro#ided in its term! .t impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and #oid! "o constitute impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to its other and not with respect to non,parties! (76.LR9CA vs. -4$ #$*r$tary, D.LG, GR No. 1'30"&, ) n$ 10, 2003)
3>. U i$e+ BF Ho)eow er% A%%oci#$io %& I c.& '(e%$io % $"e co %$i$($io #li$1 of # 8o i / or+i # ce recl#%%if1i / cer$#i !or$io % of BF Ho)e% P#r# #'(e fro) re%i+e $i#l $o co))erci#l 8o e 2ec#(%e i$ i)!#ir% $"e co $r#c$% 2e$wee $"e +e*elo!er # + $"e lo$ 2(1er%. O e of $"e !ro)i%e% of $"e +e*elo!er i% $"#$ $"e !ro!er$1 %"#ll 2e (%e+ for re%i+e $i#l !(r!o%e% o l1. I% $"e or+i # ce *iol#$i*e of $"e o Di)!#ir)e $ cl#(%e i $"e Bill of Ri/"$%-

C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA% 0P0" ANSWER: N4! "he Court has upheld in se#eral cases the superiorit- of police power o#er the non,impairment clause! "he constitutional guarantee of non,impairment of contracts is limited b- the e$ercise of police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safet-, morals and general welfare! (/nit$3 2A 6o8$o=n$rsC Asso*iations, .n*. vs. -4$ City Mayor, 7arana: $ City) .n ,rtigas D Co. vs. A$ati 2an@ an3 -r st Co., (' #CRA 533, "he Court held that contractual restrictions on the use of propert- could not pre#ail o#er the reasonable e$ercise of police power through 7oning regulations! Ri/"$ $o Re)#i Sile $ # + $o Co( %el
3?. W"#$ i% c(%$o+i#l i *e%$i/#$io - W"#$ #re $"e ri/"$% of # !er%o i *e%$i/#$io ( +er c(%$o+i#l

ANSWER: Custodial in#estigation is the stage of police in#estigation %& when a parson is taken into custod- and *& is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under in#estigation and 3& the police officers begin to ask )uestions on a& the suspect1s participation therein and b& which tend to elicit an admission! (7$opl$ vs. 7avillar$, GR No. 12(("0, April 5, 2000) "he 6+irandaE rights of a person under custodial in#estigation are the right %& to be informed of his right to remain silent, *& to ha#e competent and independent counsel preferabl- of his own choice and the right to be informed of such rights! .f the person cannot afford the ser#ices of counsel, he must be pro#ided with one! "hese rights, e$cept the right to be informed of such rights, cannot be wai#ed e$cept in writing and in the presence of counsel! (7$opl$ vs. Naag, GR No. 123!&0, )an ary 20, 2000) "he person under custodial in#estigation must be informed in a language known to and understood b- him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of

arrest, if an-!7$opl$ vs. Ma4inay, GR No. 122'!5, A$+r ary 1, 1(((. 7,cl(%io #r1 R(le
60. Doe% $"e e,cl(%io #r1 r(le ( +er !#r#/r#!" .& Sec$io 1. of $"e Bill of Ri/"$ #!!l1 $o #+)i%%io % )#+e i # #+)i i%$r#$i*e i *e%$i/#$io - W"#$ #2o($ e,$r#:(+ici#l %$#$e)e $% )#+e 2efore # e)!lo1er-

ANSWER: N4! "he e$clusionar- rule under paragraph 8*&, Section %* of the 9ill of Rights applies onl- to admissions made in a criminal in#estigation but not to those made in an administrati#e in#estigation! Admissions made b- a respondent during an administrati#e in#estigation ma- be used as e#idence to ustif- his dismissal! As such, the hearing conducted b- the in#estigating authorit- is not part of criminal prosecution! "he right to counsel attaches onl- upon the start of a custodial in#estigation! "he right to counsel under Section %* of the 9ill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial in#estigation! (R$8olana vs. C#C, 3&2 #CRA 30') N4! Admissions made during the course of administrati#e in#estigation b- an emplo-er 8Philippine Airlines& do not come within the pur#iew of Section %*! "he protecti#e mantle of the constitutional pro#ision also does not e$tend to admissions or confessions made to a radio announcer who was not part of the in#estigation, or e#en to a ma-or approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacit-! "he right e$ist onl- in 6custodial in#estigations,E or 6in,custod- custod- interrogation of accused persons!E And, b- custodial interrogation is meant 6)uestioning initiated b- law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custod- or otherwise depri#ed of his freedom of action in an- significant wa-!E (7$opl$ vs. Ayson, 1"5 #CRA 21&E 7$opl$ vs. -in Lan /y, '"5 #CRA 2'!< Ast 3illo vs. 7$opl$, GR No. 15("3', Nov. 30, 200&) Ri/"$ $o B#il
61. W"#$ i% 2#il- W"#$ #re $"e for)% of 2#il-

ANSWER: 9ail is a securit- gi#en for the release of a person in custod- of the law, furnished b- him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before an- court as re)uired under the conditions hereinafter specified! 8Sec! %, Rule %%<, R4C& 9ail ma- be in the form of corporate suret-, propert- bond, cash deposit or recogni7ance! C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA%
6.. W"e i% 2#il # )#$$er of ri/"$-

0P10

ANSWER: All persons in custod- shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recogni7ance as prescribed b- law of the Rules of Court %& before con#iction b- the +etropolitan "rial Court, +unicipal "rial Court, +unicipal "rial Court in Cities, or +unicipal Circuit "rial Court, and *& before con#iction b- the Regional "rial Court of an offense not punishable b- death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment! 8Sec! <, Rule %%<, R4C&
63. W"e i% 2#il )#$$er of +i%cre$io - I w"#$ co(r$ c# $"e #!!lic#$io for 2#il 2e file+-

ANSWER: 0pon con#iction b- the Regional "rial Court of an offense not punishable bdeath, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, admission to bail is discretionar-! $$$ Should the court grant the application, the accused ma- be allowed pro#isional libert- during the pendenc- of the appeal under the same bail sub ect to the consent of the bondsman! 8Sec! C, Rule %%<& Whene#er the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on recogni7ance, the application can onl- be filed in the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminar- in#estigation, trial, or appeal! 8Sec! %D, Rule %%<&
66. 7,!l#i $"e co ce!$ of +i%cre$io #r1 2#il !e +i / #!!e#l #f$er co *ic$io for o Dc#!i$#l offe %e.

ANSWER: "he discretion to e$tend bail during the course of the appeal should be e$ercised with gra#e caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact con#icted b- the trial court! Reason: 9ail should be granted onl- when it is uncertain whether the accused is guilt- or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertaint-

is remo#ed b- con#iction it would, generall- speaking be absurd to admit bail! @rom another point of #iew, it ma- be properl- argued that the probabilit- of ultimate punishment is so enhanced b- the con#iction that the accused is more likel- to escape if liberated on bail than before con#iction! (Fap, )r. vs. CA, GR No. 1'152()
6;. I% "e#ri / )# +#$or1 w"e $"e #cc(%e+ i% c"#r/e+ wi$" # offe %e !( i%"#2le 21 recl(%io !er!e$(#& or life i)!ri%o )e $-

ANSWER: :ES! "he udge shall conduct a hearing whether summar- or otherwise, not onl- to take into account the guidelines set forth under the Rules for the grant of bail, but primaril- to determine the e$istence of strong e#idence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused, onl- for purposes of the bail! .f e#idence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of right! Pre%()!$io of I oce ce
6<. Are $"e %i/ #$(re% of $"e #cc(%e+ o $"e 2o,e% # + o $"e !l#%$ic 2#/% $# $#)o( $ $o ( co( %elle+ e,$r#:(+ici#l co fe%%io % # + $"erefore i #+)i%%i2le i e*i+e ce-

ANSWER: :ES! "he- are not sanctioned b- the 9ill of Rights and are therefore inadmissible as e#idence! "he fact that all of the accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the 6E$clusionar- ruleE because the constitutional guarantee embodied in the 9ill of Rights are gi#en and e$tends to all persons, both aliens and citi7ens! (7$opl$ vs. %ong C4 $n Ming, GR No. 112!01>11, April 12, 1((&) "he accused ha#e the constitutional presumption of innocence! Ri/"$ $o S!ee+1 Tri#l
6=. W"e i% $"e ri/"$ $o %!ee+1 $ri#l +ee)e+ *iol#$e+-

ANSWER: +ere mathematical reckoning of time in#ol#ed is not sufficient in determining #iolation of right to speed- trial! .t is #iolated onl- when the proceedings is attended b- #e$atious, capricious and oppressi#e dela-s or when un ustified postponements of the trial are asked and secured, or when without cause or un ustifiable moti#e, along period of time is allowed to lapse without the part- ha#ing his case tried! (-y>Da1o vs. #an3igan+ayan, GR No. 1'3!!5>!&, )an ary 21, 2002) S(%!e %io of $"e Wri$ of H#2e#% Cor!(%
6>. W"e )#1 $"e !ri*ile/e of $"e wri$ of "#2e#% cor!(% 2e %(%!e +e+- To w"o) )#1 $"e %(%!e %io 2e #!!lie+-

ANSWER: .n case of in#asion or rebellion, when the public safet- re)uires it, the President ma- suspend the pri#ilege of the writ of habeas corpus! 8Art! ..., Sec! %C, PC& C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA% 0P11 "he suspension of the pri#ilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall appl- onl- to persons udiciall- charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directl- connected with in#asion! 5uring the suspension of the pri#ilege of the writ, an- person thus arrested or detained shall be udiciall- released within three da-s, otherwise he shall be released! 8Art! B.., Sec! %=, Cth and Fth pars! PC& Ri/"$ A/#i %$ SelfDI cri)i #$io
6?. W"#$ i% $"e %co!e of $"e ri/"$ #/#i %$ %elfDi cri)i #$io - W"#$ #re $"e )ec"# ic#l #c$% $"#$& wi$"o($ $"e (%e of i $elli/e ce& +o o$ f#ll wi$"i $"e %co!e of $"e !ro$ec$io -

ANSWER: "he scope of the right includes %& prohibition against testimonial e#idence and *& prohibition against act that re)uire use of intelligence, such as pro#iding handwriting for comparison! Some acts which are not co#ered b- the right against self,incrimination are: %& @ingerprinting, photographing and paraffin testing, ph-sical e$aminationA *& Ph-sical e$amination of a woman accused of adulter- to determine if she is pregnantA 3& 0ndergoing ultra,#iolet ra-s e$amination to determine presence of fluorescent powder on the handsA <& Subpoena directing go#ernment officials top produce official documents or public records in their custod-A and C& @itting the accused foot o#er a foot print, putting on a pair of trousers, shoes, etc!
;0. C# # #cc(%e+ i *o4e $"e ri/"$ #/#i %$ %elfDi cri)i #$io - W"#$ #2o($ or+i #r1 wi$ e%%e%-

ANSWER: An accused is e$empt from being compelled to be a witness against himself GSec % 8e&, Rule %%C, R4CH, so he could #alidl- refuse to take the witness stand! An ordinar- witness who is not the accused ma- be compelled to testif-!

;owe#er, he could claim the pri#ilege against self,incrimination and refuse to answer onl- as each )uestion re)uiring an incriminator- answer is propounded to him! (2a3iong vs. Gon1al$s, (' #CRA (0&) Do(2le Ceo!#r+1
;1. W"#$ i% $"e co ce!$ of +o(2le :eo!#r+1-

ANSWER: When an accused %& has been con#icted or ac)uitted, or *& the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated a&without his consent b& b- a court of competent urisdiction, c& upon a #alid complaint or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a con#iction and 3&after the accused had pleaded guilt- to the charge, <& the con#iction or ac)uittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution a& for the offense charged, or b& for an- attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or c& for an- offense which necessaril- includes or is necessaril- included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information! %st par! Sec! D, Rule %%D R4C&
;.. W"#$ #re $"e !ro$ec$io #ffor+e+ 21 $"e ri/"$ #/#i %$ +o(2le :eo!#r+1-

ANSWER: %& Against a second prosecution for the same offense after ac)uittal *& Against a second prosecution for the same offense after con#iction 3& Against multiple punishments for the same offense
;3. W"#$ #re $"e re'(i%i$e% for +o(2le :eo!#r+1- W"#$ #re $"e !roof% $"#$ $"e fir%$ :eo!#r+1 "#+ #$$#c"e+-

ANSWER: Re)uisites:%& the first eopard- must ha#e attached prior to the secondA *& the first eopard- must ha#e been #alidl- terminatedA 3& the second eopard- must be a& for the same offenseA b& the second offense includes or is necessaril- included in the offense charged in the first information, or is 3& an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof! (C 3ia vs. CA, GR No. 110315, )an ary 1&, 1((!) ProofsH %& court of competent urisdictionA *& #alid complaint or information 3& arraignmentA <& #alid pleaA and C& the defendant was ac)uitted or con#icted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the e$press consent of the accused! (C 3ia vs. CA, s pra.)
;6. I% $"ere +o(2le :eo!#r+1 if #c'(i$$#l *iol#$e% +(e !roce%%-

ANSWER: N4NE! "he onl- instance when double eopard- will not attach is when the trial court acted with gra#e abuse of discretion amounting to lack or e$cess of urisdiction due to a #iolation of due process, ie, that the prosecution was denied the opportunit- to C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA% 0P12 present its case, in which case certiorari ma- be resorted to cure an abusi#e denial! .n that e$traordinar- proceeding it must be clearl- demonstrated that the trial court blatantlabused its authorit- to a point so gra#e as to depri#e it of its #er- power to dispense ustice! (7$opl$ vs. #an3igan+ayan, GR No. 1'0&33, A$+r ary, 2002)
;;. I% $"ere +o(2le :eo!#r+1 (!o # co *ic$io for *iol#$io of A $iDGr#f$ L#w # + # %(2%e'(e $ c"#r/e for f#l%ific#$io of !(2lic +oc()e $%-

ANSWER: N4NE! 4ne of the elements of double eopard- that is missing is that the second eopard- 8falsification of public documents& must be for the same offense as that in the first 8Anti,/raft and Corrupt Practices&! "he crime of falsification of public documents is not necessaril- included in Anti,/raft and Corrupt Practices! "he- ha#e different elements! "he guilt or innocence of the accused in the anti,graft case does not hinge on the #alidit- or falsit- of the documents which is the sub ect of the falsification! @urthermore, it is clear that the Sandiganba-an did not rule on the #alidit- or falsit- of the public documents! (# $ro vs. 7$opl$, GR No. 15&'0!, )an ray 31, 2005)
;<. W"e i$ 2ec#)e )# ife%$ 2efore $"e :(+/)e $ $"#$ # )i%$#4e "#% 2ee )#+e i c"#r/i / $"e !ro!er offe %e #/#i %$ A& $"e fir%$ c"#r/e w#% +i%)i%%e+ $o !#*e $"e w#1 for $"e fili / of $"e !ro!er offe %e. Doe% $"e fili / of $"e !ro!er offe %e co %$i$($e +o(2le :eo!#r+1-

ANSWER: No! "he dismissal of the first case will not gi#e rise to double eopardinasmuch as the proper offense was not the one charged against A in such case! "he filing of the proper offense, therefore, does not constitute double eopard-! (Gon1al$s vs. Co rt of App$als, 232 #CRA &&")

;=.

W"#$ i% $"e %oDc#lle+ Fi #li$1DofDAc'(i$$#l Doc$ri e-

ANSWER: "he doctrine is a safeguard against double eopard- where #erdicts of ac)uittal are to be regarded as absolutel- final and irre#iewable! .n the Absence of a finding of mistrial, i!e!, the criminal trial was a sham, a udgment of ac)uittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double eopard- whether it happens at the trial court le#el or at the Court of Appeals! .n 7$opl$ vs. CA, GR No. 1'2051, A$+r ary 2', 200', the special ci#il action of certiorari seeking a re#iew and re#ersal of decision ac)uitting an accused on ground of gra#e abuse of discretion is not proper! .f the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merel- calls for an ordinar- re#iew of the findings of the court a )uo, without demonstrating that the lower court blatantl- abused its authorit- to a point so gra#e as to depri#e it of its #er- power to dispense ustice, the constitutional right against double eopard- would be #iolated! Such recourse is tantamount to con#erting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrar- to the e$press in unction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and pre#ailing urisprudence on double eopard-! (.+i3.) O*er2re#$" Doc$ri e # + Voi+ for V#/(e e%% Doc$ri e
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"he 4#erbreath 5octrine states that 6a go#ernmental purpose ma- not be achie#ed b- means which sweep unnecessaril- broadl- and thereb- in#ade the area of protected freedoms!E .n Davi3 vs. 9r8ita, the Supreme Court pre#ented the go#ernment, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation %?%D and /eneral 4rder No! C, from hunting down terrorists since 6acts of terrorismE had not been defined and made punishable b- Congress! "he Boid for Bagueness 5octrine which renders a law in#alid 6if men of common intelligence must necessaril- guess at its meaning and differ as to its application! "hus, a statute ma- be rendered #oid if its terms are uncertain or not sufficientldefinite rendering it incomprehensible to ordinar- people and thereb- making the enforcement of the law arbitrar- and sub ect to abuse! Such a #ague or ambiguous piece of legislation #iolates due process of law! .t pro#ides a rule to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinar- intelligence can understand what conduct is condemned! 0P13
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C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA%
;?.

ANSWER: N4! o#erbreadth and #agueness doctrine ha#e special application onl- to free speech cases! "he- are not appropriate for testing the #alidit- of penal statutes! When the allegation in the information is #ague or indefinite, the remed- of the accused is not a motion to )uash, but a motion for a bill of particulars! (Ro8 al3$1 vs. #an3igan+ayan, '35 #CRA 3"1) A statute or regulation is considered #oid for o#erbreadth when it offends the constitutional principle that a go#ernmental purpose to control or pre#ent acti#ities constitutionall- sub ect to State regulation ma- not be achie#ed b- means that sweep unnecessaril- broadl- and thereb- in#ade the area of protected freedoms! (C4av$1 vs. C,M9L9C, '3" #CRA '15)
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ANSWER: "he test in determining whether a criminal statute is #oid for uncertaint- is whether the language con#e-s a sufficientl- definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured b- common understanding and practice! "he #agueness doctrine merelre)uires a reasonable degree of certaint- for the statute to be upheld ( not absolute

precision or mathematical e$actitude! @acial in#alidation or an 6on its faceE in#alidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate because it would result in a mass ac)uittal of parties whose cases ma- not ha#e e#en reached the courts! Such in#alidation would constitute a departure from the usual re)uirement of 6actual case and contro#ers-E and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract conte$t ha#ing no factual concreteness! "he test in determining whether a criminal statute is #oid for uncertaint- is whether the language con#e-s a sufficientldefinite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured b- common understanding and practice! "he #agueness doctrine merel- re)uires a reasonable degree of certaint- for the statute to be upheld ( not absolute precision or mathematical e$actitude! (Ro8 al3$1 vs. #an3igan+ayan, s pra.) No 7,Po%$ F#c$o L#w
<1. W"#$ i% e, !o%$ f#c$o l#w- W"#$ #re $"e c"#r#c$eri%$ic% of e,D!o%$ f#c$o l#w-

ANSWER: E$ post facto law which penali7es a person for ha#ing committed an act which was not punishable at the time of its commission! Such retroacti#e application #iolates a person1s right to due process! An e$ post facto law is one that %& +akes an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an actA *& Aggra#ates a crime, or makes it greater that it was, when committedA 3& Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law anne$ed to the crime when committedA <& Alters the legal rules of e#idence, authori7es con#iction upon less or different testimonthan the law re)uired at the time of the commission of the offenseA C& Assuming to regulate ci#il rights and remedies onl-, in effect imposes penalt- or depri#ation of a right for something which when done was lawfulA and F& 5epri#es a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former con#iction or ac)uittal, or a proclamation of amnest-! "he prohibition against e$ post facto law applies onl- to penal laws which are gi#en retroacti#e effect! Penal law is one that prescribes a criminal penalt- imposable in a criminal trial! A law is also penal if it prescribes a burden e)ui#alent to a criminal penalt8eg! dis)ualification from the practice of a profession& e#en if such burden is imposed in an administrati#e proceeding (7as* al vs. 2oar3 of M$3i*al 9;a8in$rs, 2! #CRA 3'') Ac#+e)ic Free+o)
<.. Doe% $"e Ci*il Ser*ice Co))i%%io "#*e $"e !ower $o $er)i #$e e)!lo1)e $ of # UP !rofe%%or or o$"er #c#+e)ic !er%o el-

C,N#-.-/-.,NAL LA% 0P14 ANSWER: N4! "he Ci#il Ser#ice Commission has no authorit- to dictate to 0P the outright dismissal of its personnel! 4n its own, the CSC does not ha#e the power to terminate emplo-ment or to drop workers from the rolls! Academic freedom encompasses the autonom- to choose who should teach and, concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other academic personnel! "he 0P b- opting to retain a professor and e#en promoting him despite his absence without lea#e, e$ercised its freedom to choose who ma- teach or, more precisel-, who ma- continue to teach within its facult-! (/7 vs. C#C, 35& #CRA 5")
<3. Doe% #c#+e)ic free+o) e co)!#%% # ( i*er%i$15% +i%cre$io co ferre+ #c#+e)ic "o or%$o +e$er)i e w"o %"#ll 2e

ANSWER: :ES! Academic freedom accords an institution of higher learning the right to decide for itself its aims and ob ecti#es and how best to attain them! Academic freedom e$tends to the right to confer academic honors! "hus, the e$ercise of academic freedom grants the 0ni#ersit- the e$clusi#e discretion to determine to whom among its graduates it shall confer academic recognition based on its established standards! And the courts ma- not interfere unless there is a clear showing that the 0ni#ersit- has arbitraril- and capriciousl- e$ercised its udgments! (Moral$s vs. /7 2oar3 of R$g$nts, ''& #CRA 22")
<6. 0#1 # ( i*er%i$1 *#li+l1 re*o4e # +e/ree or "o or i$ "#% co ferre+ $o # %$(+e $ #f$er $"e

/r#+(#$io of $"e l#$$er #f$er fi +i / $"#$ %(c" +e/ree or "o or w#% o2$#i e+ $"ro(/" fr#(+-

ANSWER: :ES! Academic freedom of institution of higher learning is a freedom granted to 6institutions of higher learningE which is thus gi#en a 6wide sphere of authorit- certainl- e$tending to the choice of students!E .f such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot stud- in it, it certainl- can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates! Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a uni#ersithas the right to re#oke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred! "his freedom of a uni#ersit- does not terminate upon the 6graduationE of a student, for it is precisel- the 6graduationE of such a student that it is in )uestion! (/7 2oar3 of R$g$nts vs. CA an3 C$lin$, GR No. 13'&25, A g st 31, 1((()
<;. T"e Bo#r+ of Re/e $% of $"e Be /(e$ S$#$e U i*er%i$1 #!!ro*e+ # re%ol($io /r# $i / rice %(2%i+1 # + "e#l$" c#re #llow# ce $o BSU5% e)!lo1ee%. T"e /r# $ of $"i% rice %(2%i+1 # + "e#l$" c#re #llow# ce i $"e #)o( $ of P6.3;0 w#% +i%#llowe+ i #(+i$ 21 $"e Co))i%%io o A(+i$ %$#$i / $"#$ RA ?.>.& $"e Hi/"er 7+(c#$io 0o+er i8#$io Ac$ of 1??=& +oe% o$ !ro*i+e for $"e /r# $ of %#i+ #llow# ce $o e)!lo1ee% # + offici#l% $o $"e ( i*er%i$1. BSU #r/(e+ $"#$ $"e #($"ori$1 /i*e $o $"e Go*er i / Bo#r+ i% !le #r1 # + #2%ol($e i *o4i / $"e #c#+e)ic free+o) cl#(%e of $"e Co %$i$($io . I% $"e co $e $io of BSU le/#ll1 $e #2le-

ANSWER: N4! 9S0 cannot find solace in the academic freedom clause of the Constitution! Academic freedom as ad#erted to in the Constitution and in RA 2*=* onlencompasses the freedom of the institution of higher learning to determine for itself, on academic grounds, who ma- teach, what ma- be taught, how it shall be taught and who ma- be admitted to stud-! "he guaranteed academic freedom does not grant the institution of higher learning unbridled authorit- to disburse its funds and grant additional benefits sans statutor- basis that would ustif- the grant of these additional benefits to its emplo-ees! (2#/ vs. C,A, 52' #CRA '3")
<<. Doe% $"e #%%()!$io 21 $"e Ci*il Ser*ice Co))i%%io of :(ri%+ic$io o*er # !re%i+e $ of # %$#$e ( i*er%i$1 *iol#$e #c#+e)ic free+o)-

ANSWER: N4! A complaint against a state uni#ersit- official ma- be filed either with the uni#ersit-1s 9oard of Regents or directl- with the Ci#il Ser#ice Commission which has concurrent urisdiction! Contrar- to the matters traditionall- held to be ustified to be within the bounds of academic freedom, the administrati#e complaints filed against a state uni#ersit- president in#ol#es #iolations of the ci#il ser#ice rules! "he guaranteed academic freedom does not gi#e an institution the unbridled authorit- to perform acts without an- statutor- basis! @or that reason, a school official, who is a member of the ci#il ser#ice, ma- not be permitted to commit #iolations of ci#il ser#ice rules under the ustification that he was free to do so under the principle of academic freedom! (Civil #$rvi*$ Co88ission vs. #oBor, GR 1&!"&&, May 22, 200!) ,,oo?oo,,

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