Cybercon 2 3 Cyber Security Governance and Cyber Crime Governance Prof Basie Von Solms
Cybercon 2 3 Cyber Security Governance and Cyber Crime Governance Prof Basie Von Solms
Cybercon 2 3 Cyber Security Governance and Cyber Crime Governance Prof Basie Von Solms
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major
part
Security is to fix
of
Cyber
broken
software
A
broken software
Common Factor :
Broken Software
http://www.csoonline.com/article/712640/hackers-increasinglyaim-for-cross-platform-vulnerabilities
I believe that cyber security policy must focus instead on solving the
software security problem fixing the broken stuff from the beginning
(or not creating broken stuff) instead of simply watching the broken
stuff and reporting when it is attacked.
We must refocus our energy on fixing the glass house we find
ourselves in. We must begin to solve the software security problem
Frankly the target-rich environment filled with broken software
makes it far too easy and tempting to misbehave criminally.
In the end, someone must pay for broken software and someone
must be rewarded for good software
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/opinion/Congress-should-encourage-bug-fixes-reward-secure-systems
VS Conclusion 1
Creating (and selling)
broken software is as a
cyber crime!
Lets investigate
How is cyber crime advanced by the complexity of software
systems consisting of millions of lines of code, too big to
comprehensively test?
Analogy
`The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly called Star Wars after
the popular science fiction series, was a system proposed by U.S.
President Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983 to use space-based
systems to protect the United States from attack by strategic nuclear
missiles.
It was never implemented and research in the field tailed off after the end
of the Cold War.'
Analogy
Prof David Parnas, one of the pioneers in the development of Computer Science
and Software Engineering, was at that time a consultant to the Office of Naval
Research in Washington, and was one of nine scientists asked by the Strategic
Defense Initiative Office to serve on the panel on computing in support of battle
management".
Analogy
Parnas resigned from this advisory panel on antimissile defense, asserting
that it will never be possible to program a vast complex of battle management
computers reliably or to assume they will work when confronted with a salvo of
nuclear missiles.
Analogy
In his letter of resignation he said that it would never be possible to test
realistically the large array of computers that would link and control a system
of sensors, antimissile weapons, guidance and aiming devices, and battle management stations. Nor, he protested, would it be possible to follow orthodox
computer program-writing practices in which errors and bugs are detected
and eliminated in prolonged everyday use.
Analogy
I believe," Professor Parnas said, that it is our duty, as scientists and
engineers, to reply that we have no technological magic that will accomplish
that. The President and the public should know that."
Analogy
In 1984 (a year later) the ACM Council passed and published an important
resolution. It begins:
Contrary to the myth that computer systems are infallible, in fact computer
systems can and do fail. Consequently, the reliability of computer-based systems
cannot be taken for granted. This reality applies to all computer-based systems,
but it is especially critical for systems whose failure would result in extreme risk
to the public. Increasingly, human lives depend upon the reliable operation of
systems such as air traffic and high-speed ground transportation control systems,
military weapons delivery and defense systems, and health care delivery and
diagnostic systems.
VS Conclusion 2
Creating (and selling) massive
untestable big software
systems is a cyber crime
VS Conclusion 3
Cyber Security will be
massively improved
if there are less broken
software
Cyber Crime will be massively
reduced if there are less
broken software
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Cyber Crime
Cyber Security
I believe that Government can and should play a role in building more
secure systems. The US Government should develop incentives for vendors
to build security in (to software) and break the endless loop.
Perhaps the government should even grant tax credits for creating better
more secure software.
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/opinion/Congress-should-encourage-bug-fixes-reward-securesystems
Thanks
[email protected]
adam.uj.ac.za/csi