IISS on Vietnam’s

New Leadership
Slate: A Critique
Carlyle A. Thayer

Thayer Consultancy Discussion Paper No. 5

November 2024
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IISS’ Vietnam New Leadership Slate: A Cri8que

Carlyle A. Thayer

This IISS Strategic Comments* overview of Vietnam’s domes6c and foreign policies in 2024
contains at least seven tenden6ous asser6ons:
• Security Forces have taken over Vietnamese Poli6cs
The asser6on that Vietnam’s poli6cal system has been taken over by the security forces rests on
the fact that eight of fiFeen members of the current Politburo had careers in or rose through the
ranks of the security forces. This assumes that they represent a coherent group in Vietnam’s
poli6cal system. The author(s) of this report take it as self-evident that a career in the public
security has created a unified fac6on in the Vietnam Communist Party. In other words, it is sui
generis. What is the evidence?
A plausible alternate interpreta6on is that the security forces are divided into fac6ons such as the
Hung Yen group, Nghe An-Ha Tinh group, Ninh Binh group, Thanh Hoa group and officials in the
Ministry of Public Security who worked with Pham Minh Chinh in the Department of Economic
Intelligence, Science, Technology and Environment.
The IISS analysis fails to discuss the powerful party Central CommiXee and the role of the army
bloc and fac6ons of local provincial officials who oFen act as a brake on the party General
Secretary and Politburo. For example, General Secretary To Lam appears to have been over-ruled
three 6mes since assuming office. He was unsuccessful in ge\ng Tran Luu Quang appointed to
the Secretariat. He had to relinquish the state presidency to an army general. And his aXempt to
amend the party statutes has been postponed un6l the 14th na6onal party congress.
General Secretary To Lam does not have dictatorial powers. If he has ambi6ons to serve as party
leader for a full five-year term, he will have to build a coali6on of supporters embracing mul6ple
fac6ons including southerners, sectoral interest groups, provincial officials and the military that
extends beyond the fiFeen-member Politburo. In short, Vietnam’s poli6cal system has not been
taken over by a unified bloc of public security officials.
Finally, the IISS ar6cle argues that the takeover by the security forces “means that there is liXle
chance of further poli6cal liberaliza6on.” This raises the counter-factual ques6on: if Vietnam’s top
leadership selected at the 13th na6onal party congress remained in office for their full five-year
term what poli6cal liberaliza6on would have taken place in Vietnam? There is scant evidence that
any of the dismissed officials (Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Vo Van Thuong, Vu Dinh Hue, Truong Thi Mai
etc.) were proponents of poli6cal liberaliza6on.

*
Interna'onal Ins'tute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
 2

• Vietnam’s An6-Corrup6on Campaign was Aimed at Ridding Poli6cal Rivals

The late party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong ini6ated the an6-corrup6on campaign. One
of his statutory responsibili6es is to nominate a successor. Trong ‘s an6-corrup6on drive included
holding officials accountable under long-standing party regula6ons such as Regula6on No. 08-
QĐ/TW, Ban Chấp hành Trung ương về trách nhiệm nêu gương của cán bộ, đảng viên, trước hết
là Uỷ viên Bộ Chính trị, Uỷ viên Ban Bí thư, Uỷ viên Ban Chấp hành Trung ương (25 October 2018)
and Regula6on No. 37-QĐi/TW, Ban Chấp hành Trung ương về những điều đảng viên không được
làm (October 25, 2021).
Since Trong would have re6red at the 14th congress if he had lived, leadership dismissals under
his watch were aimed at officials that he felt had blemished records and were not qualified under
party rules cited above. Trong’s main mo6va6on wasn’t elimina6ng poli6cal rivals so much as
clearing the underbrush to make way for cleaner officials.
The IISS ar6cle argues that the main mo6va6on of officials who supported General Secretary
Trong was to marginalize and expel their poli6cal rivals. Perhaps the main mo6va6on of officials
in the Ministry of Public Security and party Inspec6on Commission was to support the party
leader in his campaign against corrup6on and nega6ve phenomena and to leave “no forbidden
areas.” The IISS analysis does not provide details of which leaders were seeking to replace General
Secretary Trong at the 14th congress. The sub-text is that it is self-evident that there must have
been a power struggle among the top poli6cal elites.
It is disingenuous to argue that all party officials in Vietnam are corrupt and protected by the
system and then cri6cize Vietnamese leaders for taking ac6on to punish or remove corrupt
officials. What is it – okay to remove an official for corrup6on but not okay if that corrupt official
is a poten6al rival who seeks higher office?
• Peaceful Evolu6on is the Greatest threat to the Vietnam Communist Party
The IISS ar6cle argues that the biggest threat to the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) is “peaceful
evolu6on.” No doubt there are officials in some quarters in Vietnam who believe this. But-high
level officials prior to past na6onal party congresses iden6fied corrup6on as the main threat to
the legi6macy of the VCP.
Nguyen Phu Trong must be credited with making progress in addressing this issue aFer his
selec6on as party leader in 2011. Transparency Interna6onal’s Percep6ons of Corrup6on Index
gave Vietnam a score of 31 in 2012 on a scale from 0 (very corrupt) to 100 (very clean). In 2022,
Vietnam improved its score rising to 42 but dropped to 41 in 2023 (83rd out of 180 countries).
This ranking is just below the global average for state corrup6on.
The IISS ar6cle argues that General Secretary To Lam “will slow the an6-corrup6on campaign”
without providing any basis for this asser6on. To Lam has repeatedly asserted that the an6-
corrup6on campaign will con6nue. For example, To Lam addressed the third mee6ng of the
Documents SubcommiXee and the Party Charter SubcommiXee on 11 November. The media
reported that To Lam “pointed out that it was necessary to… promote the work of preven6ng and
comba6ng corrup6on, waste, and nega6vity with the moXo of ‘non-stop, non-stop,’ ‘no forbidden
zones,’ and ‘no excep6ons.’”
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• Threat of Peaceful Evolu6on Will Put a Ceiling on Coopera6on with Western Democracies
As we know from Politburo Direc6ve 24, there are serious concerns held by the security
establishment in Vietnam about the role of foreign governments and non-government
organiza6ons` in promo6ng poli6cal reform, human rights and religious freedom. But as Direc6ve
24 makes clear, Vietnam can and will take steps to insulate itself from such pressures.
The argument that there is a ceiling on coopera6on with Western democracies is belied by
Vietnam’s determined steps from late 2022 to raise its rela6ons with South Korea, United States,
Japan, Australia and France to comprehensive strategic partnerships.
• Vietnam will be a Cap6ve Chinese market
The IISS ar6cle accurately reports that General Secretary Trong’s an6-corrup6on campaign led to
an opportunity cost in slowing the approval of contracts for economic projects. The ar6cle argues
this has put downward pressure on growth in recent years. Nevertheless, Vietnam has benefiXed
from the reloca6on of companies working in China to Vietnam, an increase in investment from
China/Hong Kong and growing trade with the United States.
Vietnam’s economy grew by 8.02% in 2022 and declined to 5.05% in 2023 below the
government’s target of 6.5%. This was due not just to a halt in public investment due to the an6-
corrup6on campaign but a slowdown in the global economy (including China).
According to Trading Economics, “Vietnam’s GDP expanded by 7.40% year-on-year in Q3 of 2024,
accelerating from an upwardly revised 7.09% growth in Q2 and marking the steepest yearly
increase since Q3 of 2022, flash data showed. The latest result also represented the 12th
consecutive quarter of yearly growth, despite the impact of the worst typhoon in seven decades,
which struck the country in September and halted many business operations.”
The IISS article states that China and Hong Kong are Vietnam’s largest sources of foreign
investment. According to Trading Economics, “Foreign direct investment (FDI) into Vietnam rose
by 8.8% year-on-year to USD 19.58 billion from January to October 2024, according to data from
the Ministry of Planning and Investment… The largest investors were Singapore, China, South
Korea, Japan, and Hong Kong, accounting for 76.5% of total FDI over the period. Singapore, China,
and South Korea topped foreign investments, with $7.79 billion, $3.61 billion, and $3.56 billion,
respectively.
The IISS ar6cle erroneously concludes that “the sheer size of China’s economy and its export
strength threaten to turn Vietnam into a cap6ve market.” While China is Vietnam largest two-way
trade partner, the United States is Vietnam’s largest export market. South Korea and Japan are
Vietnam’s second and third largest two-way trade partners. Collec6vely the EU is Vietnam’s third
largest trade partner. The case that Vietnam will be a cap6ve Chinese market is not proven.
• Vietnam and China have Working Compromise on the South China Sea
The IISS ar6cle argues that over the least eight years Vietnam retreated from confronta6on with
China in the South China Sea and worked out a modus vivendi with China to halt oil produc6on
within China’s claimed nine-dash line in exchange for Chinese acquiescence in Vietnam’s
construc6on ac6vi6es in the Spratly Islands. This is sheer supposi6on not back up by any
evidence.
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Since 2003, Vietnam has consistently pursued a policy of “coopera6on and struggle” with China
over the South China Sea not retreat. The IISS ar6cle does not explain what it means by
confronta6on and what risks Vietnam would entail if it resorted to physical force. The China Coast
Guard is larger and heavier than the combined coast guards of all states in East and Southeast
Asia. It is supported by an armed mari6me mili6a backed up by the People’s Libera6on Army
Navy. Directly confron6ng China would play into China’s strengths and would be counter-
produc6ve.
The IISS ar6cle also argues that “Vietnam will con6nue to seek support from powers outside the
region to help it resist Chinese pressure.” The IISS analysis falls short in leaving unexplained what
sort of support Vietnam would seek to stave off Chinese pressure par6cularly when IISS argues
that Vietnam will “adhere to the ‘Four No’s… (no ‘joining any military alliances, siding with one
country against another, giving any other countries permission to set up military bases or use its
territory to carry out military ac6vi6es against other countries nor using force or threatening to
use force in interna6onal rela6ons’).”
Vietnam’s calls for support have been limited to poli6cal and diploma6c backing and assistance
in mari6me law enforcement capacity building. Such support may be necessary but it is not
sufficient to deter China from its aggressive behaviour. Vietnam will con6nue on its course of
diversifying and mul6lateralising external rela6ons and coopera6on and struggle in its rela6ons
with the major powers.
Conclusion
Vietnam’s poli6cal leaders are currently up to their necks preparing for the 14th na6onal party
congress set for early 2026. Party subcommiXees are busy preparing key strategic policy
documents to be presented to the congress: Poli6cal Report, Socio-Economic Report, Report on
Party-Building, and Implementa6on of the Party Charter. Between now and early 2026, party
congresses will be held at all levels to select delegates to the na6onal congress.
During 2025, the party Central CommiXee will conduct a number of straw polls to determine who
will be eligible to stand for elec6on to the new Central CommiXee. The current Central CommiXee
will also have to determine who if any of the “four pillars” leadership deserves an exemp6on from
the mandatory re6rement age of 65 for exemplary service.
It will be up to the nearly 1,400 delegates from central party organs and all fiFy-eight provinces
and five ci6es to elect the new Central CommiXee. They will be given guidelines se\ng out
roughly how many seats should be given to the public security bloc, the military bloc, other
sectoral blocs, and provinces and ci6es. The thirteenth na6onal party congress in 2021 elected a
Central CommiXee of 180 full members including twenty-three members of the military (12.8%)
and six members of the police (3.3%). This rough propor6on is likely to be reflected in the new
Central CommiXee elected by the 14th congress.
AFer the delegates elect the new Central CommiXee, the Central CommiXee will meet and select
the new Politburo and party General Secretary. Vietnam’s new leadership will be reflec6ve of the
diversity of party members. Fears that Vietnam’s poli6cal system will be held cap6ve by a public
security bloc will be proved unfounded
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Rather than poli6cal liberaliza6on, the Vietnam Communist Party is poised to enter what General
Secretary To Lam terms a “new era” of massive reform, streamlining and decentraliza6on of the
cumbersome state and party bureaucracies under a “new organiza6onal model” currently being
draFed. According to To Lam, now is the make-or-break 6me “to successfully implement the
strategic goals by 2030, Vietnam will become a developing country with modern industry and
high average income by 2045.”
The legi6macy of the Vietnam Communist Party rests on successful performance of its socio-
economic development plans. Vietnam will leverage all of its comprehensive strategic
partnerships (China, Russia, India, South Korea, United States, Japan, Australia, France) to provide
assistance in science, technology, innova6on to promote digital transforma6on, green
development and energy transforma6on.
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Gaslighting, Strawmen, Red Herrings and Foolish Consistency:

A Reply to Bill Hayton’s 8 Points
Carlyle A. Thayer
Dr. Hayton responded to my critique by posting eight points on the Vietnam Studies Group home
page. His comments are reproduced below without amendment. Each of his points are followed
by my response.
1. Nowhere in the IISS article does it say that the security forces represent a ‘coherent group’ or
a ‘unified faction'. Carl has invented a straw man argument here. In fact, the division between
the public security goons and the army generals is going to be interesting to watch. But we can
be sure that political liberalisation is not on the horizon. There are still a few people who need to
be disabused of this assumption.
THAYER REPLY: Dr. Hayton’s Strategic Comments read like a hastily drawn up first draft lacking in
nuance. While he did not use the terms “coherent group” or “unified faction” in his article his
reply used the term “public security goons.”
Dr. Hayton began his first paragraph in Strategic Comments by noting “eight of the 15 members
of the current party Politburo began their careers in, or rose through, the security forces.” He
then noted that a “coalition of security personnel and orthodox Leninists [were] at the apex of
Vietnamese politics.” He then wrote about “The takeover of Vietnamese politics by the security
forces…”
My reply “If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it just may be a
duck." In other words, Dr. Hayton is referring to a coherent or unified group of public security
officials at the apex of Vietnamese poli6cs. In sum, Dr. Hayton is engaging in gaslighting.
Dr. Hayton’s comment on political liberalization is a red herring. Where is the evidence that if the
anti-corruption campaign hadn’t been conducted leaders on the Politburo would have carried
out political liberalization?
My stance has always been clear – no member of the Politburo elected at the 13th national party
congress in 2021 was an advocate of political liberalization. I do not need to be disabused of this
assumption since I don’t share it nor have I ever advocated it. This is Dr. Hayton’s trade mark, a
red herring.
2. The idea that the blazing furnace was a saintly attempt to remove corruption from the CPV
and had nothing to do with intra-party battles for power is touchingly naive. Sure, the campaign
took down some very corrupt people, but that was merely one part of the game. We only need
to look at who is still around to know that the other part of the campaign was a vicious battle for
power, in which some exceedingly corrupt people remained untouched - mainly those with
better connections in the Ministry of Public Security. Carl’s assertion that "Perhaps the main
motivation of officials in the Ministry of Public Security and party Inspection Commission was
to support the party leader in his campaign against corruption” is very sweet. I bet the boys in
the MPS are laughing into their bia hoi...
 7

THAYER REPLY: Dr. Hayton characterizes my analysis as “touchingly naïve.” Here is a dose of
reality. All the members of the Ministry of Public Service from the minister on down are
uniformed state officials who are bound to implement the directives of higher authorities. They
are professionals who are motivated to implement policy to gain recognition and promotion
within the system for their efforts. In other words, they had a duty to carry out General Secretary
Nguyen Phu Trong’s anti-corruption campaign under the direction of their boss, Minister To Lam.
Other motivations may have been at play but they were secondary.
3. Of course there is ceiling on cooperation between Vietnam and Western democracies. I’m old
enough to remember the days when Western countries were funding all kinds of democracy-
promotion activities with Vietnamese partner organisations. That just doesn’t happen any more.
The magnificently named 'comprehensive strategic partnerships' with South Korea, United
States, Japan, Australia and France are mere pieces of paper. The UK has had such a piece of
paper with Vietnam for well over a decade but there is almost nothing to show for it. What has
changed in relations between Vietnam and the US in the year since the signing of their
'comprehensive strategic partnership'? Anything?
THAYER REPLY: Dr. Hayton’s assertion that there is a “ceiling on cooperation between Vietnam
and Western democracies” is so jejune that a response is hardly necessary. The reality is that
there is a ceiling on certain types of cooperation between Vietnam and all of its external partners
because Vietnam seeks to maintain its independence, self-reliance and strategic autonomy. As
far as cooperation in science, technology, innovation and education are concerned the sky is the
limit.
Dr. Hayton dismisses Vietnam’s comprehensive strategic partnerships with western democracies
as “mere pieces of paper.” As a specialist in international relations who has long studied
Vietnam’s strategic partnerships, some now elevated comprehensive strategic partnerships
(CSP), I am amazed by the superficiality of Dr. Hayton’s assertion. All of these partnerships have
a dialogue mechanism usually at ministerial level. The partnerships usually function under multi-
year Plans of Action that are continually reviewed. The partnerships are comprehensive in the
number of sectors they cover.
The comprehensive strategic partnerships with western democracies are all relatively new, the
oldest being two years old. It would be premature to rush to judgment as they are a work in
progress. For example, the Joint Statement on the Vietnam-United States CSP, signed in
September 2023, lists ten substantial areas of cooperation which I addressed at a seminar at
VinUniversity in October 2023.
4. If anyone doubts the connection between the anti-corruption campaign and the slowdown in
public expenditure might want to read a few articles in the local press:
'Because of the mindset of waiting for decisions from above, many public assets do nothing'
https://tuoitre.vn/vi-tu-tuong-cho-quyet-dinh-cap-tren-nhieu-tai-san-cong-khong-lam-gi-ca-
2024090618190826.htm
https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/hcmc-can-hardly-attract-foreign-investments-with-public-
management-mindset-official-4786722.html
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https://vnexpress-net.translate.goog/chu-tich-tp-hcm-nhieu-giam-doc-so-khong-biet-nhiem-vu-
cua-nganh-4788918.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp
THAYER REPLY: Dr. Hayton has set up his own strawman in his fourth point. As an experienced
journalist I fail to see how he misread what I actually wrote, “The IISS article accurately reports
that General Secretary Trong’s anti-corruption campaign led to an opportunity cost in slowing
the approval of contracts for economic projects.” I am well aware of the pioneering reporting by
Reuters journalists Francesco Guarascio and Khanh Vu on this issue.
5. Carl is a bit mixed up on the foreign investment figures. His figures are for FDI disbursed in the
period (ie resulting from decisions taken in previous periods). The IISS figures are for
FDI pledged in the period and should be disbursed in future periods. In other words, if these
pledges become disbursals, China will become the largest source of foreign investment in
Vietnam. It’s already the second largest in terms of disbursals.
THAYER REPLY: Dr. Hayton is gaslighting again. I was not mixed up in foreign investment figures.
I focused on what had been disbursed rather than Dr. Hayton’s speculation of what might occur.
After all, China promised heaps in foreign investment to Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and
then didn’t deliver.
6. The general definition of a captive market is one where the potential consumers face a
severely limited number of competitive suppliers. Currently, one third of all the things that
Vietnamese consumers import - come from China. South Korea is the next largest provider of
imports at about half that level and Japan is the third largest with just 6.5% of Vietnam’s imports.
Vietnam’s market looks pretty captured.
THAYER REPLY: As noted above, Dr. Hayton’s Strategic Comments read like a hastily written first
draft. He did not offer a definition of captive market in his article. My essential point remains –
what are the implications for Vietnam of being a captive market? Dr. Hayton infers that Vietnam’s
national security will be undermined without elaborating. Until further evidence is produced, Dr.
Hayton’s assertion remains unproven.
7. Carl claims that there is no evidence that Vietnam has halted its oil and gas exploration in areas
in dispute with China. But there’s plenty of evidence. Back in 2020, I wrote about how the
Vietnamese government paid around a billion dollars to international energy companies after
cancelling their gas drills because of Chinese objections.
https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/chinas-pressure-costs-vietnam-1-billion-in-the-south-china-
sea/
Since then Vietnam has chosen not to drill in any areas inside China’s ‘U-shaped line’. None. How
much more evidence is required? Meanwhile, Vietnam has built up its bases on the rocks and
reefs and not faced any interference from China - unlike the Philippines, for example. China has
turned a blind eye to Vietnam’s activities. This looks like a modus vivendi.
THAYER REPLY: This is the third strawman that Hayton has propped up in his 8 Point reply. I did
not write that there was no evidence Vietnam halted its oil and gas exploration in the waters
around Vanguard Bank.
 9

I argued that Hayton did not provide evidence for his speculation that Vietnam and China worked
out a modus vivendi that if Vietnam halted oil and gas exploration inside China’s nine-dash line
China would acquiesce in Vietnam’s construction activities in the Spratly Islands.
China’s silence on Vietnam’s construction activities is puzzling and needs further examination.
Recently, a senior member of Vietnam’s Border Commission visited me in Canberra. He asked me
why China was treating Vietnam so lightly. In other words, there was no modus vivendi between
China and Vietnam.
8. Anyone who thinks Vietnam’s current leadership is serious about energy transition and green
energy needs to explain why the the country is building new coal-fired power stations, why the
‘Just Energy Transition Partnership’ is going nowhere and why climate change campaigners keep
getting locked up https://the88project.org/fighting-for-a-greener-future/
THAYER REPLY: This is another red herring. I concluded by offering a forecast for Vietnam’s future
that included policy proposals to be put before the 14th na6onal congress of the Vietnam
Communist Party that included energy transi6on.
Why is Vietnam building coal-fired power sta6ons? Simple my dear Hayton, because Vietnam
faces an energy shortage that must be urgently addressed.
Vietnam is also seeking assistance from its comprehensive strategic partners to assist in energy
transi6on over the next five years and beyond. Vietnam is currently mulling nuclear power.
Dr. Hayton’s Strategic Comments repeat common themes found in his past discourse on Vietnam
that are heavily norma6ve. Dr. Hayton’s Strategic Comments are a has6ly wriXen rehash of old
ideas that were not nuanced and offered liXle original analysis. As I noted in my cri6que, Dr.
Hayton made at least seven tenden6ous asser6ons that needed to be challenged. His reply to my
cri6que was based on gasligh6ng, strawmen, red herrings and foolish consistency.*

*
”A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of li;le minds, adored by li;le statesmen and philosophers and divines,"
Ralph Waldo Emerson.