Brit.

J. Psychiat.
(1968),114, 1313—1323

The Phenomenological Approach in Psychopathology

By KARL JASPERS

Editorial Note: This article was originally published in effort. Subjective symptoms include all those
the Zeitschrzft fur die gesamte J'feurologie und Psychiatrie in
emotions and inner processes, such as fear,
1912 (Vol. 9, pp. 39 1—408). We give it here in translation
(on the initiative of Dr. J. N. Curran), in view of the sorrow, joy, which we feel we can grasp im
present interest in Professor Jaspers's work and in pheno mediately from their physical concomitants;
menology in general. these we thus take to “¿express― the underlying
emotion. Then there are all those psychic
experiences and phenomena which patients
Ti@ SUBJECTIVITY OF PSYCHIC Ev@wrs describe to us and which only become accessible
In the examination of a psychiatric patient it to us at secondhand through the patient's own
is usual to distinguish between objective and judgment and presentation. Lastly, subjective
subjective symptoms. Objective symptoms in symptoms also include those mental processes
clude all concrete events that can be perceived which we have to infer from fragments of the
by the senses, e.g. reflexes, registrable move two previous kinds of data, manifested by the
ments, an individual's physiognomy, his motor patient's actions and the way he conducts his
‘¿@ activity, verbal expression, written productions, life.
actions and general conduct, etc.; all measur It is usual to connect with this classification
able performances, such as the patient's into objective and subjective symptoms a very
capacity to work, his ability to learn, the extent definite contrast of values. According to this,
of his memory, and so forth, also belong here. It only the objective symptoms offer certainty;
is also usual to include under objective symp they alone form a basis for scientific study,
toms such features as delusional ideas, falsifica whereas subjective symptoms, though we cannot
tions of memory, etc., in other words the easily do without them for our preliminary
rational contents of what the patient tells us. assessments, are considered to be quite unreliable
These, it is true, are not perceived by the senses, for making final judgments and unfruitful for
but only understood; nevertheless, this “¿under the purpose of any further scientific investiga
standing― is achieved through rational thought, tion. There is a widespread desire to base our
without the help of any empathy into the study of mental disorder on objective symptoms
patient's psyche. alone and ideally to disregard subjective symp
Objective symptoms can all be directly and toms altogether. This is a viewpoint which has
convincingly demonstrated to anyone capable its adherents—not all equally consistent—in
of sense-perception and logical thought; but psychology, just as it has in psychiatry. An
subjective symptoms, if they are to be under “¿objectivepsychology― is set up in opposition
stood, must be referred to some process which, to “¿subjectivepsychology―. The former claims
in contrast to sense-perception and logical to concern itself with objective data only; its
thought, is usually described by the same term, natural consequence is psychology without a
“¿subjective―.Subjective symptoms cannot be psyche. The supporters of the latter (who, it
perceived by the sense-organs, but have to be should be said, have never failed to recognize the
grasped by transferring oneself, so to say, into real but different values of the former) take into
the other individual's psyche; that is, by em account self-observation, subjective analysis, the
pathy. They can only become an inner reality determination of the different modes of psychic
for the observer by his participating in the other life and of the specific nature of its phenomena,
person's experiences, not by any intellectual and ascribe value to such investigations even if
1313

This One
1314 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

they are made in the absence of any objective depend on, what are its consequences, and what
criteria. As examples of objective psychology we relationships can be discerned in it? The
may cite the whole field of sense-perception, answers to such questions are its special aims.
mnemometrics, performance curves and their But in approaching each problem subjective
components. The last will serve here to illustrate psychologists have to face the need to make clear
the fact that such investigations do lead quite both to themselves and to others what particular
systematically to the elimination of everything psychic experience is meant, for they are
that can be called mental or psychic. It is not the confronted with a manifold diversity of psychic
feeling of fatigue but “¿objective fatigue― which phenomena which cannot be surveyed or in
is being investigated. All such concepts as vestigated as a whole but from which particular
fatiguability, the power of recovery, learning elements must be selected for investigation. So
ability, practice, the effects of rest periods, etc., before real inquiry can begin it is necessary to
refer to performances that can be measured identify the specific psychic phenomena which
objectively, and it does not matter whether one are to be its subject, and form a clear picture of
is dealing here with a machine, a live but mind the resemblances and differences between them
less organism, or a human being endowed with and other phenomena with which they must
a mind. Nevertheless, those who claim to be not be confused. This preliminary work of
purely objective investigators do quite frequently representing, defining, and classifying psychic
make a secondary use of subjective psychic phenomena, pursued as an independent activity,
phenomena to further their interpretations of constitutes phenomenology. The difficult and
objective performances and make comparisons comprehensive nature of this preliminary work
possible—and, of course, they have every right makes it inevitable that it should become for
to do so. But when this happens, they are the time being an end in itself.
making use of “¿subjectivepsychology―, with So long as such independent, systematic
which this paper is to deal. Now, there is no investigations had not been undertaken, this
doubt that objective psychology produces phenomenological approach remained limited to
results which are more obvious, more convinc a number of unconnected opinions based on
ing, and easier for everyone to grasp than does chance incidents or implications and ad hoc
subjective psychology. But whereas the differ constructions; among these some useful pointers
ence in degree of certainty is simply quantitative, can certainly be found, but it is essential that
when it comes to the kind of certainty, the they should be followed up by further research.
difference is qualitative and fundamental. This Within the sphere of psychological research
is so because subjective psychology always aims E. Husserl has taken the first decisive step
at the final realization of the concepts and ideas towards a systematic phenomenology, his pre
which form the inner representation of psychic decessors in this having been Brentano and his
processes, whereas objective psychology finds school and Th. Lipps. In psychopathology, there
its ultimate aim in observation in undisputed have been a number of attempts to create a
fields such as sense-perception and the rational phenomenology,* though there has not yet been
contents of thought and by such means as constituted a generally recognized field of
graphs and statistics.
* Kandinsky's Krilisclze und klinische Betrachtwzgen im
Gebiete der Sinnestiiuschungen. Berlin, 1885, is almost entirely
The Systematic Study of Subjective Experience phenomenological in character. Oesterreich's Die Plthno
menologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen, Leipzig, 1910, and
What then are the precise aims of this much Hacker's “¿SystematischeTraumbeobachtungen―, Archiv.f.
abused subjective psychology? While objective Psych. wl. 21.1, 1911, both conduct systematic phenomeno
psychology, by eliminating everything psychic, logical investigations into phenomena particularly vital for
transforms itself into physiology, subjective psychopathology. I have myself made efforts in this
direction in two papers: “¿Zur Analyse der Trugwahmneh
psychology wishes to preserve this same psychic mungen― and “¿Die Trugwahrnehmungen―. (Reprinted in
life as its object of study. It asks itself—speaking Gesammelte Schrzften zur Psychopathologie, Springer-Verlag,
quite generally—what does mental experience Berlin, 1963.)
 BY KARL JASPERS 1315
research intended to prepare the ground sys jective― in a derogatory sense. Assertions of this
tematically for the tasks of psychopathology sort cannot be discussed or verified. We may
proper. Since phenomenology does in fact offer appreciate this type of understanding; we may
a productive field of work in which everyone can admire it for the valuable human qualities
take part, some programmatic exposition of its which it reveals; but we can never give it
aims and methods seems indicated. recognition as a “¿science―,whether we meet it
in the everyday form practised by civilized and
The Limitations of Empathy cultivated people over the centuries, or in its
In everyday life no one ever thinks in terms of clinical guise as the instinctive concern of
isolated mental phenomena, whether his own psychiatrists for their patients.
or someone else's. Our inward concern is always If, however, we still wish to develop a science
with that which is the object of our experience, of psychology, we must realize from the start,
not with the mental processes which accompany on the one hand, that its ideal is a fully con
our experiencing. We understand other people, scious understanding of mental processes, one
not through considering and analysing their that can be presented in definite terms and
mental life, but by living with them in the con forms, in contrast to the vague or unconscious
text of events, actions and personal destinies. understanding which is reached only in a
Even when we do on occasion give considera personal and subjective way through the special
tion to mental experience as such, we do this attitudes and aptitudes of particular individuals;
only in a context of causes and effects as under but we must realize also that psychology cannot
stood by us, or else we make a practice of classi hope to approach this scientific ideal; instead it
fying personalities into categories, etc. We never must engage in many promising approaches.
feel prompted to consider a mental phenomenon These, indeed, open up perspectives, but their
in isolation, e.g. a perception or a feeling per ideal solution remains infinitely remote. This
Se, and to describe it in terms of its appearance is why so many people exercise their personal
and essence. So with the attitude of a psychiatrist understanding purely for their own satisfaction,
to his patient. He can share the patient's ex and from the heights of their vague yet pene
periences—always provided this happens spon trating comprehension they look down con
taneously without his having to take thought descendingly on all attempts to define concepts
over it. In this way he can gain an essentially at a conscious psychological level, dismissing
personal, indefinable and direct understanding, these as innocuous platitudes or trivialities. Yet
which, however, remains for him a matter of the fact that only such deliberately made
pure experience, not of explicit knowledge; he psychological determinations constitute con
acquires practice in understanding, but does tributions to knowledge gives them from a
not build up a store of case material—―ex scientific point of view a unique value—but
perience― in the professional sense—which only from that point of view.
would be more useful to him than mere vague
feelings and impressions, and which he could
compare, set in order, or subject to tests. ISOLATING THE PHENOMENA
This attitude of mere sympathetic under Now this attitude, which is not satisfied with
standing, which can be enormously satisfying to understanding as mere experience but wishes
individual personalities-so much so that to one to promote it to the level of knowledge that can
so predisposed this may well become his final be communicated, investigated and argued
professional goal—is, one must admit, “¿sub about, finds itself faced with an infinity of
jective― in a very special sense; and when many-sided psychic phenomena, which are
specific assertions or formulations are made on governed by correlations which are still far from
this basis without any reference to more far clear and whose relations of dependence and
reaching study or to any regular system of con consequence have yet to be elucidated. With
cepts this well-grounded conceptualization does out doubt, the first step towards a scientific
indeed deserve to be dismissed as “¿merely sub comprehension must be the sorting out, defining,
1316 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

differentiating and describing of specific psychic also by making use of intuitive comparison and
phenomena, which are thereby actualized and symbolization, by directing our observations in
are regularly described in specific terms. whatever ways may suggest themselves (as
We must begin with a clear representation of artists do so penetratingly) and by demonstrating
what is actually going on in the patient, what he already known phenomena which appear to
is really experiencing, how things arise in his play some part in the formation of the pheno
consciousness, what are his own feelings, and menon studied. All this constitutes an incentive,
so forth; and at this stage we must put aside reinforced by these indirect hints, for others to
altogether such considerations as the relation actualize these phenomena for themselves, while
ships between experiences, or their summation we too are encouraged to make use of our
as a whole, and more especially must we avoid findings in later studies. The more numerous
trying to supply any basic constructs or frames and specific these indirect hints become, the
of reference. We should picture only what is more well-defined and characteristic do the
really present in the patient's consciousness; phenomena studied appear. Indeed, this per
anything that has not really presented itself to sonal effort to represent psychic phenomena to
his consciousness is outside our consideration. oneself under the guidance of these purely
We must set aside all outmoded theories, external hints is the condition under which
psychological constructs or materialist mytho alone we can speak of any kind of psychological
logies of cerebral processes; we must turn our work at all.
attention only to that which we can understand A histologist will provide an exhaustive
as having real existence, and which we can description of particular morphological ele
differentiate and describe. This, as experience ments, but he will do it in such a way as to make
has shown, is in itself a very difficult task. This it easier for others to see these elements for
particular freedom from preconception which themselves, and he has to presume, or else
phenomenology demands is not something one induce, this “¿seeing for oneself― in those who
possesses from the beginning, but something really want to understand him. In the same way
that is laboriously acquired after prolonged the phenomenologist can indicate features and
critical work and much effort—often fruitless characteristics, and show how they can be
in framing constructs and mythologies. When distinguished and confusion avoided, all with a
we were children, we first drew things as we view to describing the qualitatively separate
imagined them, not as we saw them; so as psychic data. But he must make sure that those
psychologists and psychopathologists we go to whom he addresses himself do not simply
through a stage where we form our own ideas, think along with him, but that they see along
in one way or another, of psychic events, and with him in contact and conversation with
only later acquire an unprejudiced direct grasp patients and through their own observations.
of these events as they really are. And so this This “¿seeing―
is not done through the senses,
phenomenological attitude is to be acquired but through the understanding. This is some
only by ever-repeated effort and by the ever thing quite special, irreducible and ultimate;
renewed overcoming of prejudice. and if we are to take even one single step forward
How then do we proceed when we isolate, in phenomenology we have to train ourselves in
characterize and give conceptual form to these it and master it—including such things as
psychic phenomena? We cannot portray them, “¿representingdata to oneself―, “¿understanding―,
or bring them before our eyes in any way that “¿grasping―
or “¿actualizing―.
Only so do we
can be perceived by the senses. We can only acquire a fruitful critical faculty which will set
guide ourselves and others by a multiple itself against the framing of theoretical construc
approach. We have to be led, starting from the tions as much as against the barren deadly
outside, to a real appreciation of a particular denial of any possibility of progress. Whoever
psychic phenomenon by looking at its genesis, has no eyes to see cannot practise histology;
the conditions for its appearance, its configura whoever is unwilling or incapable of actualizing
tions, its context and possible concrete contents; psychic events and representing them vividly
 BY KARL JASPERS 1317

cannot acquire an understanding of pheno answered on these lines: in the field of empathic
menology. experience the technical means of retaining what
has been seen but once, for later comparison and
other purposes, are so inadequate that far more
THE SEARCH FOR IRREDUCIBLE PHENOMENA difficulties are encountered than in the case of
This ultimate irreducible quality of psychic sensory perception. But in principle reliability
phenomena, which can only acquire identical is established in the same way, i.e. by com
meaning for numbers of people through the parison, repetition and verification of such
incentive and the multiple clues and leads empathic experiences as reach actualization. In
mentioned previously, may already be found in both fields there is much uncertainty; one
the case of the simplest sensory qualities, such cannot deny that in the psychological field it is
as red, blue, colour, tone; it comes into play greater than in the natural sciences, but this is
alsowith spatial awareness, object awareness, per only a difference of degree.
ception, imagery, thought, etc. In psychopatho Whether we are representing our own past
logy we have examples in pseudo-hallucination, psychic experiences or those of other people is
the déjà vu phenomenon, derealization, heau immaterial. The only important difference
toscopy, experience of the “¿double― and so on; seems to be between observations which are
though all these terms merely describe groups systematic, experimental self-observations of
of psychic phenomena which are in themselves persisting experiences, and those which are
still more subtly differentiated from each other. ordinary empathic representations. In the
For the actualization to ourselves of all these investigation of psychopathological phenomena,
phenomenologically ultimate characteristics, we only the latter can really be considered, since
have such expressions as “¿seeing―, “¿viewing―,patients can rarely be induced to carry out self
“¿feelingoneself into―, “¿empathy―, “¿under observation in the former sense, and then only
standing― and so on. These expressions always in very favourable conditions, in regard to
denote the kind of ultimate concept-fitting ex simple disturbances such as agnosias or halluci
perience which plays the same role in psychology nations in clear consciousness. However, such
as sensory perception plays in the natural empathic representations of phenomena among
sciences. Just as sense-perceptions are evoked by the mentally ill may well be furthered by con
the demonstration of an object, so this mean cepts that have been won from the more
ingful empathic actualization will be evoked in elaborate phenomenological investigations of
us by the above-mentioned hints and indications, the former kind.
by our immediate grasp of expressive pheno
mena and our self-immersion in other people's
self-description. From this terminology it follows
that empathy and understanding are by no METHODS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
means simple ultimate phenomena in them The methods by which we carry out a pheno
selves, but probably contain a whole series of menological analysis and determine what
elements yet to be defined. In the same way as patients really experience are of three kinds: (i)
perception, empathy has its tasks to set: first for one immerses oneself, so to speak, in their
phenomenology itself, of which it is the very gestures, behaviour, expressive movements; (2)
foundation, and next for the investigation of exploration, by direct questioning of the
psychogenesis. At this point we are not concerned patients and by means of accounts which they
with either of these; we need only to note the themselves, under our guidance, give of their
contribution made to our knowledge by this own experiences; (@) written self-descriptions
empathic, understanding experience, and to seldom really good, but then all the more
raise the question of the reliability of this way of valuable; they can, in fact, be made use of even
gaining access to the facts. If, on the analogy of if one has not known the writer personally. In
perceptual experience, we recognize empathic all these instances we are pursuing phenomen
experience as ultimate, the question can be ology in so far as we are orientated towards sub
 1318 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

jective psychic experience and not towards ob phenomena known to us all from our own
jective manifestations, which in this context are experience. They come into existence in the
only stages in our journey—the means, not the same way as the corresponding psychic pro
object, of our investigation. Of all these sources cesses which in normal conditions arise out of
of information, good self-descriptions have the others in an intelligible way; they differ only in
highest value.* their mode of origin from phenomena, other
When, using these methods, we try to come wise quite similar, occurring in the mentally ill,
closer to the patient's psychic life, our first im e.g. many falsifications of memory. Next, there
pression is of an unsurveyable chaos of constantly are phenomena which are to be understood as
changing phenomena. Our first aim must be to exaggerations, diminutions or combinations of
capture and delimit some particular item and phenomena which we ourselves experience, e.g.
by depicting it to form a conception of it, of the ecstasies of some acute psychoses, pseudo
which we and others can make permanent use; hallucinations, perverted impulses. How far our
and we must supply it with a name by which we “¿understanding―can go in such cases, when we
can always identify it. Psychopathological cannot base it on any conscious experiences of
phenomena seem to call for just such an a similar kind, is a question that cannot be con
approach, one which will isolate, will make clusively answered. Sometimes it seems as if our
abstractions from related observations, will understanding can go far beyond the possibilities
present as realities only the data themselves afforded by experiences, even if similar ones, of
without attempting to understand how they our own.
have arisen; an approach which only wants to The third group of pathological phenomena
see, not to explain. Under pathological con are distinguished from the two previous groups
ditions, numerous psychic phenomena make by their complete inaccessibility to any empathic
their appearance without meaningful ante understanding. We can only get closer to them
cedents; psychologically speaking they emerge by means of analogies and metaphors. We per
from nothing; seen causally they are occasioned ceive them individually, not through any
by a disease process. Vivid memories of things positive understanding of them, but through the
never experienced; ideas held with a conviction shock which the course of our comprehension
of their truth without any intelligible basis for receives in the face of the incomprehensible. In
such conviction; moods and emotions appearing this group we may perhaps include those
spontaneously and not based on any relevant “¿fabricated―
thoughts and moods which many
experiences or ideas; all these, and many patients report as undoubted experiences (pas
others, are common examples. These are the sivity experience), but which we can never
objects ofphenomenological investigation, which identify except by using such terms as these, and
determines and represents them as they actually by a series of observations designed to ascertain
are. what these phenomena are not. Some patients
Three groups of phenomena can be ascer who, notwithstanding their psychosis, have
tained in this manner. The first consists of retained the awareness of their normal mental
life readily admit the impossibility of describing
* For those interested, I lista few of the best self-descrip their experiences in ordinary language. One
tions so far published: patient explained: “¿Partly one has to do with
Schreber—Memoirs of a Neurotic. Leipzig, 1903. things which simply cannot be expressed in
Thomas de Quincey—Confessions of an Opium Eater. human language. If I am to be understood, even
Gerard de Nerval—Aurélie.
J. J. David—―Hallucinations.―
Neue Rundschau,No. i 7, to some extent, I shall have to use figures of
874. speech and analogies which can do no more than
Kandinsky—―On the study of hallucination.― Archiv. f. get somewhere near the truth; the only way is
@ Psych., ii, to make some comparison with well-known facts
Klinke—Ja/zr.f. Psych., 9.
Kieser—Allgemeine Zeitschr.f. Psych., 10, 423.
of human experience. ...“ In another con
Engelken—Ibid., 6, 586. text: “¿One has also to consider that it is mostly
Meinert—An Alcoholic Madman. Dresden, igo7. a matter of visions; I have the images in my
 BY KARL JASPERS 1319
head, but it is uncommonly difficult to describe ception of pseudo-hallucinations has been
them in words, in part frankly impossible.― attacked on the grounds of theoretical considera
Some—though not many—of the neologisms tions. However, the problem is purely a pheno
coined by patients are based on similar efforts menological and descriptive one. It might be
to give a name to their own experiences; one possible to represent the reported cases in some
patient sought to describe a sensation he felt in other more convincing way; one could adduce
his hip more precisely in this way: When asked other cases (self-descriptions, the results of other
whether what he felt was a “¿twitching―, he said: investigations); but it is only through clearly
“¿No,it isn't a twitching, it's a ‘¿plotching'.― realized representations of this kind that
From its beginnings, psychiatry has had to Kandinsky's views could be refuted, never by
concern itself with delimiting and naming these mere theoretical considerations. The task of
different forms of experience; there could, of phenomenology is an independent one, and
course, have been no advance at all without awareness of this will guard against criticism
such phenomenological definitions. Delusions, based on misunderstanding and hence unpro
sense-deceptions, depressive and expansive mood ductive.
changes and much else have thus been described. Again, it is not uncommon for patients to
All of this will remain the foundation for further report an experience, of which they are acutely
phenomenological research. Often, however, aware, of there being somebody just behind or
we have first to clear away a ballast of theories above them. When they look around, this some
concerning the supposed physical basis or body turns round, too; they “¿feel― it, there really
psychological framework of these phenomena. is somebody there. But they have no sensation
Numerous phenomenological approaches have of actual contact, or indeed any sensation, nor
been smothered almost at once by such theo can they ever come face to face with the supposed
retical endeavours. We cannot now be satisfied person. Some of these patients come to the
with just a few meagre categories, but will devote conclusion that there is nobody there, others
ourselves without any preconceptions to the remain convinced of the existence of this
phenomena themselves, and whenever we can someone whose presence they feel so vividly.
identify one we will seek to realize and describe Here it is obviously not a matter of sense
it as completely as possible, without claiming to deception, since the sense-element is lacking;
know in advance what the phenomenon is by nor of a delusional idea, since there is an actual
virtue of our knowledge of psychology. The experience which is subjected to an act ofjudg
current classification of symptoms of insanity ment, and this judgment may be either correct
into sense-deceptions and delusions may be or delusional. A third example, taken from the
useful in a rough and ready way, but these emotional sphere, will show how, simply by
terms conceal a hitherto unexplored multitude “¿sinking―
oneself in the individual phenomena
of diverse phenomena. without the aid of any theory or system, one can
A few examples will illustrate the sort of arrive at a representation and delimitation of
phenomena that can be delimited. Kandinsky such phenomena. For instance, one hears of
gave a description of pseudo-hallucinations, a “¿feelingsof ecstasy―: among these one can
particular kind of pathological imagery. They readily distinguish if not different phenomena
differ from normal images in their greater at least different shades of feeling. We are not
sensory concreteness, clarity and detail, their here concerned with whether we are right or
appearance independently of, and even against, wrong in any particular instance. One can
the subject's will, and by the accompanying distinguish in the first place a general enthusiasm,
experience of passivity and receptiveness. On emotion or rapture, embracing everything con
the other hand, they differ both from true ceivable; secondly, a deep inner happiness out
hallucination and from normal perception in of which some joy-bringing image will occasion
that they do not appear in external space as ally arise; thirdly, a feeling of exaltation and
perceptions do, but in the internal space in grace, of holiness and high significance. In
which images also are experienced. This con order to be of lasting value, such rapidly made
 1320 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

differentiations should then be subjected to followed by the bringing of phenomena into

futher phenomenological elaboration. some kind of order, so that we can become
The methods of psychopathological phenome aware of the diversity of psychic life in a system
nology have now been discussed (grasp of expres atic way, and make it possible to survey them
sive movements, exploration of patients' experi up to the limits we have progressively reached.
ence, and self-descriptions); also the indirect leads Phenomena can be arranged in quite different
by which we are guided towards our own repre ways according to the purpose one has in view.
sentation of the phenomena (noting their genesis, For example, they can be arranged according
the conditions and circumstances under which to their origin, their physical determinants,
they appear, their content, any already well their contents, their significance from some
known elements they may contain, the symbolic particular point of view, such as the logical,
indications, etc.); and the only question that ethical or aesthetic. All these principles of
remains is how we can provide an incentive for classification should be made use of in their
others to form their own representations of the rightful place; but for phenomenology itself
phenomena in the light of all that has been they are not very satisfactory. We seek a classi
brought forward. In a work on phenomenology, fication which will arrange psychic phenomena
therefore, individual cases will be presented, according to their phenomenological affinities
general descriptions will be derived from them, with each other, somewhat in the way that
and a terminology will be established. That infinite numbers of colours are arranged in the
phenomenology deals only with immediately spectrum in a manner which is phenomeno
presented data is no reproach to it, merely the logically satisfying. Now in the present state of
statement of a fact. But it will always be difficult phenomenology, it would seem that there exist
to find how one can lead from the individual numerous groups of phenomena between which
case to a more general understanding and a no relationship can be perceived. Sense
more complete delimitation. It must be borne in perceptions and ideas, hallucinations and
mind that the experiences of individual patients delusions, seem to be phenomena separated by
are infinitely manifold; that phenomenology a gulf rather than united by transitions. Such
only extracts from them some general feature totally unrelated phenomena can only be placed
which can be found equally in some other case under separate headings and cannot be organized
and therefore can be called the same feature, into any particular pattern within the psychic
whereas the infinity of individual experience life.
continues to change. We therefore have the But there are other groups of phenomena
position that on the one hand phenomenology which can be related and arranged systemati
abstracts from an infinity of constantly changing cally. Between these, transitions can usually be
constituents, and on the other hand is definitely made out (as between colours). An example
orientated towards the perceptible and the of such a systematic arrangement of related
concrete, not the abstract. Only where some phenomena can be given in the case of pseudo
thing can be reduced to “¿reality― and becomes hallucinations. On close consideration of indi
an immediate datum, i.e. becomes concrete, can vidual cases, it appears that transitions exist
it form the subject for phenomenology. between normal imagery and the completely
developed pseudo-hallucination (which never
becomes substantial but always remains in the
CLASSIFYING GROUPS OF PHENOMENA internal psychic space, that occupied by
Let us assume that, in the ways described imagery). Surveying these phenomena, it is
above, a number of phenomena can be de possible to find four main points of contrast,
lineated and clarified. We now seem to find between which they can oscillate through a
ourselves once more in the presence of a fresh whole series of transitions. If, then, we can
chaos of innumerable phenomena which have describe each phenomenon in terms of where it
been described and defined, but still cannot can be approximately located in the series, we
satisfy our scientific needs. Delimitation must be shall have satisfactorily characterized in pheno
 BY KARL JASPERS 1321

menological terms that particular phenomenon, ments, and all psychic phenomena could be
lying as it does somewhere between an image satisfactorily presented by breaking them down
and a pseudo-hallucination. These four points into those elements. To be consistent, such an
of contrast are as follows: attitude must envisage the possibility of making
Ful ly-formed pseudo-hallucination Normal imagery do with a single ultimate psychic atom, every
i. Clear-cut, complete in 1. Vague, incomplete in
thing psychic being built up from varying con
detail. detail. figurations of this particle. This ideal takes its
2. The sensory elements 2. A few sensory elements cue from the natural sciences, and certainly has
are each adequately are adequately per a meaning in relation to the origins of psychic
perceived, as in normal ceived, or none. e.g. an qualities. Just as the infinite variety of colours
perception. imagined face is neutral
in tone.
can be traced to purely quantitative differences
3. There is consistency 3. The images dissolve, dis in wave-length, so one could wish to explain the
and easy retention. perse, have constantly to origins of psychic qualities and perhaps establish
be recreated. different classifications on this basis. For
4. It is involuntary; noth 4. Itisvolitional; itcan be
invoked or changed by
phenomenology itself, however, such require
ing can be called forth
or changed by choice. choice. Feelings are ments seem quite pointless. The aim of pheno
Associated with feelings those of activity. menological analysis is to increase its awareness
of passivity and recepti of psychic phenomena by clearly delimiting
vity. them. As one procedure among others, pheno
This example, which will not be discussed menology brings to light psychic qualities that
further here, shows how we set about grouping appear as constituents of what is being studied.
related phenomena on a purely phenomeno This breaking down of complex structures into
logical basis, using only those aspects of the constituents is only one way of proceeding; but
phenomena which are really experienced as the those who adopt the point of view already
points of difference, and excluding any added described, which is valid only in relation to the
notions or theories. Further, it shows how vital origination of psychic phenomena, speak as if
it is to distinguish between phenomenological it were the only way. They would, for example,
transitions and phenomenological gaps. Tran explain perception by analysing it into the
sitions will allow us to place phenomena in their elements of sensation, spatial perception and
order, but where there are gaps we can only intentional act, whereas true phenomenology
enumerate or contrast opposites. It is at the would first compare perception with imagery,
same time evident that to recognize a group of which is composed of the same elements, and
phenomena as a phenomenologically new one, come to the conclusion that perception must be
separated by a gap from those already recog characterized as an irreducible psychic quality.
nized, is something only to be decided after Even when occasionally the conception of
careful consideration of clear evidence. At “¿analysis into ultimate elements― does, like that
present, however, when so many people seek to of “¿analysisas a delimitation of ultimate
reduce psychic data to the narrowest and qualities―, appear to present itself as purely
simplest terms possible, it is preferable to accept phenomenological and uninfluenced by the
rather too many phenomena—they can be genetic point of view, it still tends to relapse at
organized later—than to lapse into some every opportunity into confusion with genetic
shallow psychological system made up of just a considerations: once again complex psychic
few elements. structures are said to arise from combinations of
For while the ideal of phenomenology is an elements. Phenomenology, on the other hand,
infinity of irreducible psychic qualities, classified rejects the ideal of the fewest possible elements;
and ordered to permit of their survey, there on the contrary it has no wish to restrict the
exists another, opposite ideal, that of the fewest infinite variety of psychic phenomena, only, as
possible ultimate elements, as in chemistry. far as possible (for the task is, of course, bound
According to this school, all complex psychic less), to try to make them more lucid, precise
phenomena could be derived from such ele and individually recognizable at any time.
1322 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

THE BOUNDARIES OF PHENOMENOLOGY have been less of a danger than those “¿cerebral
In the foregoing we have presented, if only in mythologies― which have sought to interpret
broad outline, the aims and methods of pheno phenomenology and replace it by theoretical
menology, which has, of course, been practised constructions of physiological and pathological
since psychiatry began, but has never yet been cerebral processes. Thus Wernicke, who in fact
given its opportunity for unfettered develop did make important phenomenological dis
ment. Since it has suffered most harm from coveries, distorted them by interpretations in
being confused with other lines of research, we terms of “¿connective fibres―, “¿sejunctions―
and
will briefly restate what it is that phenomeno the like. These sort of constructs constantly
logy does not intend to pursue, and with what prevent phenomenological investigations from
phenomenology should not be confused. reaching their proper goal. At first the originators
Phenomenology concerns itself only with of such constructs must necessarily practise
actual experiences, only with the perceptible phenomenology, but having reached this theory
and concrete, not with any factors that may be they feel on safer ground, and with a remark
thought to underlie psychic events and are the able failure to recognize their own sources they
subject of theoretical constructs. For every one declare all phenomenological conclusions to be
of its findings phenomenology must ask: has “¿highly
subjective―.
this actually been experienced? Does this really Lastly, phenomenology must be kept separate
present itself to the subject's consciousness? from what we call the “¿genetic understanding―
Phenomenological findings derive their validity of psychic events, i.e. the comprehension of their
from the fact that the various elements of the meaningful relationships. This is a unique form
psychic reality can be evoked repeatedly. Its of understanding which only applies to psychic
findings can thus only be refuted if the facts of a events; it grasps as self-evident how one psychic
case have previously been wrongly represented event emerges from another; how a man
or are not represented correctly; they can never attacked should be angry, a betrayed lover
be refuted by demonstrating their impossibility jealous. We have made use of the word “¿under
or error on the basis of some theoretical proposi standing― both for the “¿representations―of
tion. Phenomenology can gain nothing from phenomenology and for this “¿grasp― of the
theory: it can only lose. The accuracy of a psychic connections. To avoid confusion the
particular representation cannot be checked by former is termed “¿static understanding―; it is
its conformity to general criteria; phenomenology the basis on which their definition must rest,
must always find its standards within itself. and comprehends only data, experiences, modes
Phenomenology, then, deals with what is of consciousness and delimitation. The latter we
actually experienced. It views psychic events “¿ascall “¿genetic understanding' ‘¿â€”the understand
from within―, and brings them into immediate ing of the meaningful connections between one
realization. It therefore does not concern itself psychic experience and another, the “¿emer
with external manifestations, with motor pheno gence of the psychic from the psychic―. Now
mena, expressive movements as such, nor with phenomenology itself has nothing to do with
any kind of objective performance. We have this “¿geneticunderstanding― and must be
already explained to what extent expressive treated as something entirely separate; yet,
movements and self-descriptions can be used as where required, it may legitimately study
the means, but not as the subject, of pheno regular sequences of psychic events, if these are
menology. actually experienced and as such together form
Further, phenomenology has nothing to do a phenomenological unit sui generis. An example,
with the genesis of psychic phenomena. Though perhaps, is the experience of the Will. But such
its practice is a prerequisite for any causal a phenomenological sequence is quite a different
investigation it leaves genetic issues aside, and thing from a meaningful flow of psychic events
they can neither refute nor further its findings. emerging one from the other. We restrict
Causal studies relating to colour, perception, phenomenology to whatever can be understood
etc. are alien to it; yet such factual investigations “¿statically―.
 BY KARL JASPERS 1323
If we look at psychopathology as a whole, found in publications on emotional changes as
obviously our most essential interest lies in what the first symptom in paranoia. The phenomeno
is “¿geneticallyunderstandable―, in extra logy of pathological emotions is unbelievably
conscious causal connections, and in the scanty. The best is contained in the excellent
ascertainment of the physical basis of psychic work ofJanet, in which, however, little value is
processes—in other words, in the way things are placed on careful delimitation or classification.
related. Phenomenology only makes known to us The subjective experience of one's own person
the different forms in which all our experiences, ality has been treated systematically by Oester
all psychic reality, take place; it does not teach reich. For all these problems phenomenological
us anything about the contents of the personal descriptions by psychiatrists with material to
experience of the individual, nor anything about hand, as well as self-descriptions more pene
the extra-conscious basis on which psychic events trating than those so far available, would be of
seem to float like a thin layer of foam on the the greatest value.
surface of the sea. Penetrating these extra In histology, when examining the cerebral
conscious depths will always be more attractive cortex, one is required to account for every
than merely demonstrating phenomenological fibre, every nucleus. In the same way pheno
findings, yet the completion of this latter task is menology demands that we should account for
an essential prerequisite for all further investiga every psychic phenomenon and every experience
tion. It is only in the setting of these pheno that comes to light in the investigation of our
menologically established forms that actual life, patients or in their own self-descriptions. We
accessible to our immediate understanding, should in no circumstances be content with a
unfolds itself; and it is, after all, in order to general impression extracted from the total
arrive at a better comprehension of this psychic picture, but should get to know, as regards each
life that we are prompted to investigate its extra detail, how it is to be viewed and assessed.
conscious relationships. Then, if we practise this method for some time,
much will appear less startling to us because it
has been frequently observed; whereas those
FUTURE TASKS FOR PHENOMENOLOGY who only go on “¿general impressions― will not
In conclusion we will indicate a few specific have made themselves aware of the phenomena
tasks for phenomenology. Not one field of in question, and so, every time these do come to
psychopathological phenomenology can as yet their notice through the momentary direction of
be regarded as fully worked over. Even where their “¿impressionability―,
they will appear as
the nature of a phenomenon is apparently novel and surprising. But the practised pheno
clear-cut, as with some kinds of hallucinations, menologist will pay attention to what is really
really good case-material that can serve to new and unknown, and may then be justifiably
enlarge and verify one's experience is so scanty surprised; one need not be afraid that surprises
that careful and detailed case-descriptions are will ever cease! Needless to say, many psychia
still of great value. Much work still needs to be trists already make it their practice to act on
done on the different types of hallucination, these lines and would rightly think it an im
especially those of the higher senses, which ought pertinence if we claimed to be telling them
to be thoroughly investigated. An obvious something new. But the phenomenological
instance is the problem of visual hallucinations approach is not yet so widespread as not to
occurring simultaneously with real perceptions require repeated efforts to promote it. One may
in objective space. The phenomenology of hope that its application will further enrich our
delusional experiences has hardly been treated knowledge of what the psychiatric patient really
at all; all that exists so far on this subject is to be experiences.