Ethio Sudan Bilateral Diplomatic Relation Since 2011 Review On Economic Relation-1
Ethio Sudan Bilateral Diplomatic Relation Since 2011 Review On Economic Relation-1
Ethio Sudan Bilateral Diplomatic Relation Since 2011 Review On Economic Relation-1
To cite this article: Tamirat Dela Wotango & Muluken Ayele (2023) Ethio–Sudan bilateral
diplomatic relation Since 2011: Review on economic relation, Cogent Social Sciences, 9:2,
2241264, DOI: 10.1080/23311886.2023.2241264
© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on
which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in
a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
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investment inflow from Sudan also increased in general since 2011; however, it has
been low in comparison with their potential.
1. Introduction
Ethio–Sudanese relations, refer to the bilateral relationship between the Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia (FDRE) and the Republic of Sudan (RoS), have had a very long history dated back to, the
ancient times of Axum and Merowe. The history of Ethiopia and Sudanese relations exhibits an age-old
political, economic, social and cultural bond. Apart from their relations as neighbors, Ethiopia and Sudan
have many common features. As Yacob (2007: 193) noted, the term “Ethiopia” is a Greek word for “dark”
or black”. Similarly the term “Sudan” is an Arabic word for “dark” or “black”. Some ethnic group like Nuer,
Anwak and Berta live in both Ethiopia and Sudan along the border areas. Tributary rivers like Atbara, Blue
Nile (Abay), Mereb and Sobat flow to Sudan from the highlands of Ethiopia.
However, despite the long history, the commonalties that beget age-old bond had never yielded
progress and fraternal relations to the people of the two nations. In the modern history, in particular,
the last king of the Solomonic Dynasty, Emperor Haile Selassie and the military Dergue regime’s
foreign policy and strategies, which took Ethiopia’s neighbors as historic enemies, failed to nurture
the historic relation between the two nations. Worse still, the siege-mentality that sprang from the
view that considers our neighbors as opponents, forced the two countries into a destructive policy of
harboring and supporting the other’s rebels until the downfall of the Derg regime in 1991 (Ethio-Sudan
Growing Ties Paving A Way to Economic Integration, n.d.). Destabilization and mutual intervention
largely remained the characterizing features of Ethio–Sudanese relation. In other words, the idiom
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend” became the hallmark of the relationship between the two
countries. For instance the fact that Ethiopia’s foreign policy during Haile Selassie’s imperial rule was
dominated by religious view which was contributed to the deterioration of relations between the two
countries. While the Marxist-Leninist Derg’s rule was also underpinned by ideological outlook, and
supported the SPLM/A while the Sudanese government established a strong link with the ELF and later
EPLF in their fight against the Ethiopian government.
Conversely, after the downfall of the Dergue regime, Ethiopia saw a paradigm shift in its foreign
policy approach. Militarism and siege-mentality driven foreign relation was replaced by a forward-
looking policy that upholds a win-win approach and mutual benefit. As a result, since 1991, Ethiopia
has given due attention and prime focus to engagement with its neighbor countries, Africa as
a continent, and South-South cooperation in general. As it stated in the current Ethiopian foreign
and national security document, Ethiopia places utmost consideration to working closely with its
neighboring nations to promote trade, investment, development, and infrastructure with a view to
hasten economic integration. (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and
National Security Policy and Strategy, 2002: 57–59).
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Due to this policy shift, Ethiopia and Sudan’s bilateral relation has seen dramatic change. Over
the past decade in particular, the two sisterly nations were working together to elevate their
relation in bilateral, regional, continental and international levels. In recent years, the cooperation
has taken the form of increased volume of trade and flow of foreign direct investment. This
research would investigate the increasingly complex and dynamic relationship between Ethiopia
and Sudan since 2011 by giving due attention to their economic relation.
Therefore, the researcher conducted in-depth interview purposively with selected officials from
MoFA two, two from EFRSSI, and one from MoT. However, the total numbers of higher official
interviewed were accounted five. In addition the researcher conducted the key-informant inter
view with two experts from MoT, and one expert from EIC. Further, extra interview was held with
one academician and researcher on the issue from Center for Dialogue and Research Center
(CDRC) and one expert from MoFA totally four in number. All the samples were selected purpo
sively, in which the researcher identified respondents who were believed to be an appropriate
person to provide reliable information. Generally, total the key informant interviews held with nine
selected informants from total population of selected five institutions.
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opportunities to be raised during the session of discussion. In light of this, semi-structured in-depth
interview is employed to explore the views of the selected key informants. Key informants are those
individuals who have a privileged social position in the research setting, which in turn gives them
specialist knowledge about other people, processes and happenings (Payne & Payne, 2004).
Information from key informants is valuable and useful, since it is likely to be more extensive, detailed
and privileged than ordinary peoples (Ibid).
For this study, the key informants were selected purposively on the basis of their area of
expertise of knowledge and positions they occupy from Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ethiopian Investment Commission, Ministry of Trade, Ethiopian Foreign Relation Strategic Study
Institute (EFRSSI) and Center for Dialogue and Research Cooperation (CDRC). Whereas, secondary
data sources was another sources for the study and it was collected from books, internet sources,
and journal articles, published and unpublished materials, news releases, agreements, magazines,
thesis, reports and other documents dealing with Ethio–Sudanese diplomatic relations were
exhaustively referred and these have significance in data analysis and triangulation.
3.1.1. Introduction
In this section, the Post 2011 Ethio–Sudan economic relations is analyzed by taking trade and
investments as points of analysis. This section is divided into three sections. The first section
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discusses about the crucial factors which enhanced the progressive growth of Ethio–Sudanese
diplomatic and economic relations since 2011. The second section examines the Post-2011 Ethio–
Sudan trade relations. This section provides a broad picture of data regarding Ethiopia’s import
products from Sudan and Ethiopia’s export products to the Sudanese market. The third section
discusses about an overview of the Post-2011 Sudanese investment in Ethiopia.
3.2. Major factors that encourage the bilateral diplomatic and economic relations between
Ethiopia and Sudan
3.2.1.1. Strong political support from both governments. First, the bright and promising develop
ment of relations between the two countries has been facilitated by the strong political support
from both governments. Both Sudan and Ethiopia have shared similar historical background and
both of them are on the same developing levels. Mutual cooperation’s in the time of hardship from
both Ethiopia’s and Sudan’s perspective whatever is going on in each other is crucial not only
because of their vicinity but also because of their special, long standing relations between them.
Hence, if Sudan catches a cold, Ethiopia sneezes, and vice versa. In difficult times, the two peoples
have helped each other consistently. Some of such scenarios expressed in many ways, even more
specifically as follows: the two countries have had very close relations for years, ever since the
days of the last Emperor that reigned here for decades. In fact when there was the civil war
between north and south Sudan, it was the Emperor who had taken the initiative to bring the two
parts to the round-table discussions and peace talks leading a delegation of the then Organization
of African Unity member states in 1972 (Young, 2007, p. 12). Ethiopians have been taking refuge in
Sudan for decades and there are still thousands of Ethiopians who have made their home in
Sudan. Similarly, there have been thousands of Sudanese nationals taking refuge here during
moments of crisis and violence in Sudan. Ethiopia has always welcomed home Sudanese brothers
and sisters as has Sudan to Ethiopians.
In political perspective, the two countries support one another. Ethiopia stood on the Sudanese
side when the International Criminal Court (ICC) accused the Sudanese president Al-Bashir.
Ethiopia has argued that ICC has been interfering in African and other developing countries’
internal affairs under the pretext of Human Rights violations and human crimes. The Ethiopian
government seriously rejected the attempts of the ICC to hijack the Sudanese president while he
were in South Africa to attend African meeting. Besides, the two countries have been cooperating
to maintain peace and stability in the region. As a result of their cooperation, a terrorist group
trained in Eritrea and attempted to cross the Sudanese border to Ethiopia were caught and taken
to justice before they hit their targets which was destroying the Ethiopian Tekeze hydro-power
Dam (ibid).
The continuous support of the Sudanese government for the accomplishment of the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project is another demonstration of the kind of relations the two
countries enjoy. Here the support of Sudan is key because it gives a sense of belongingness and
mutual trust and friendship between the two nations.
Following the demise of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in August 2012, Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister
Hailemariam Desalegn was required to immediately step up to the plate. Earlier planned negotia
tions between Sudan and South Sudan started immediately in Addis Ababa after the funeral. He
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has vowed to continue the active engagement with the Sudan’s in the spirit of Meles. Ethiopia is
positioning itself actively in relation to the development of Sudan and South Sudan. This is
enlightened self-interest. The stakes for Ethiopia are high, given the tremendous development
challenges it faces, ranked as the 173 out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index. An
active engagement with the two Sudan’s and a constructive relationship with the international
community will be instrumental to developing and managing Ethiopia’s potential. The develop
ment of Ethiopia’s economy is contingent on territorial and political integrity of the Ethiopian state
as well as on the ability to extract its natural resources (UNISCI Discussion Papers, 2013).
Therefore, Ethiopia should continue to develop its dams program on the Blue Nile, based on an
active engagement with all relevant countries including Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan and western
countries for financial support. The most visible engagement with Sudan and South Sudan is the
UNISFA peacekeeping mission. By making its military intervention conditional to UNSC approval,
Ethiopia has demonstrated that it can play a constructive part alongside the more traditional
“international community”. The mandate area of the Ethiopian staffed peacekeeping mission
UNISFA was expanded from initially the region of Abyei to include the complete border area or
Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) in December 2011. As it balances its role as a peace
mediator and a peace keeper, Ethiopia carries a special responsibility. Ethiopia’s most significant
interests are in Sudan. Through building an active and constructive relationship with Khartoum,
Ethiopia will want to have Sudan’s support vis-à-vis Egypt on its dam construction program.
Through offering the export of electricity and market potential for Sudanese agricultural products,
this can be an interesting premise.
The growing internal problems undermined Hailemariam’s premiership, however, and, after
losing control of growing Oromo and Amhara resistance to the central government, he was
compelled to resign in February 2018. On 2 April, it was announced that Abiy Ahmed an Oromo,
would be prime minister of Ethiopia and chairperson of the EPRDF.
In the early period of coming to the power, Prime minister Abiy deeply understand geopolitics of
its neighboring countries and developed the philosophy of synergy or Medemer to financially,
politically and socially collaborate with the countries of the Horn. This is evidenced by his role of
Eritrea peacemaking with Ethiopia and peace deal of north Sudan conflict between the opposi
tions. Among the efforts of the philosophy of Medemer for neighboring countries are as follows,
avoiding conflict, attracting financial support, coordinating efforts on security matters, promoting
capacity-building and knowledge exchange, and enhancing Ethiopia’s international profile with
neighboring countries of south Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia in particular and the horn of Africa in
general to the minimal the idea help Ethiopia to strengthen its (Girma et al., 2021).
But with nature of regional dynamism, Abiy’s role as prime minister introduced an element of
uncertainty into Ethiopian–Sudan relations, because Sudanese political and military officials had
developed close relations with the Tigrayans who dominated the spheres until then. At first things
looked positive on 1 May 2018 Ethiopia and Sudan agreed to set up joint forces to protect the
Renaissance Dam, which is only 20 Km from the Sudanese border with Ethiopia, and two days later
Abiy made a two-day visit to Khartoum, however Abiy warned al-Bashir and his government not to
meet with TPLF, which was now held to be politically defunct (John, 2020).
On 9 July 2018, two month after Abiy’s visit Khartoum, it was announced that Ethiopia and
Eritrea had reached a peace agreement, and in September the border that had been closed
between the countries since 1998 was reopened. Sudan initially felt threatened by these rapid
developments and claimed Eritrean interference in its domestic affairs.
Ethiopia has taken a pro-active role since the ouster of Bashir, while in the TMC’s
(Transitional Military Council) entreaties, Ethiopia has clearly been identified as a key country
to influence. The Ethiopian prime minister quickly issued a statement after Bashir’s overthrow
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expressing support for the protestors, while “appreciating” the military council for overseeing
the transition. The first foreign delegation from the TMC visited Addis Ababa, and held talks
with both the Ethiopian Government and the AU. Newly appointed Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Gedu Andargachew also visited Khartoum in early May and held meetings with both the TMC
and the Declaration of Freedom and Change civilian opposition. Furthermore, TMC leader
Burhan stopped in Addis Ababa on 28 May 2019, as part of his first major trip abroad.
The transitional government’s approach to foreign policy is yet to be revealed, but past experi
ence suggests that the Sudanese people would like it to be independent and balanced against this
background it is noteworthy. The great unknown is the shape of the Sudanese transitional
government. The question remains as to whether the civilians and generals who make up the
government can work constructively with each other, and there are doubts as to whether the
government will survive as its designated. The roughly 20 years of cooperative and stable relations
between Ethiopia and Sudan have come to an end, and both countries are entering unpredictable
territory that will also have a marked impact on the wider region (John, 2020).
Leaders of the two countries have recently met on several occasions and discussed on a range
of bilateral and regional issues of common concern. The Sudanese Head of State and Chairman of
the Transitional Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan paid a visit to the Ethiopian
capital, Addis Ababa where he held talks with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Abiy and al-Burhan held
the discussions on the sidelines of the Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa, which is took
place in Bahir Dar city of the Amhara region. The two leaders met on the sidelines of the UN
climate change summit in Egypt last week and at an IGAD meeting held in Kenya on 5 July 2022.
Also, at 21 November 2022 (NAIROBI) Ethiopian Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, on Monday discussed
bilateral relations with Ibrahim Gabir a member of Sudan’s military-led Transitional Sovereign
Council who is touring the IGAD countries. According to the Office of the Ethiopian Prime
Minister, Abiy Ahmed and the visiting Sudanese delegation led by General Gabir discussed bilateral
and issues of mutual concern. Gabir further briefed Ahmed about a road map prepared by Sudan,
the Chairman of IGAD, to activate the role of the east African bloc in the areas of security,
economic integration, and expanding the cooperation with non-traditional partners, read,
a statement released by the Sovereign Council in Khartoum (Sudan Tribune,29 October 2022).
Bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Sudan are founded on common democratic princi
ples and are marked by a high degree of trust and mutual respect. Relations grew signifi
cantly following the South Sudanese referendum in 2011. In the last decade, both economic
and political interaction between Ethiopia and Sudan has enhanced. Today, Ethiopia is
amongst Sudan’s most important partners both bilaterally and in the regional context. This
is strengthen by the frequent high level official visits of both countries. (Interview 19 March,
2019)
Contemporary diplomatic relation between Ethiopia and Sudan encompassed bilateral politi
cal consultations and various bilateral and multilateral negotiations through regional and
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global frameworks. Both Ethiopia and Sudan jointly work to ensure peace and stability in the
great horn region through IGAD regional framework. Ministry of foreign affairs of the two
countries signed the protocol of cooperation in 2012 which laid a framework for political
consultation.
To remedy such tragic occurrences, a number of peace building initiatives have been
attempted among which the most significant ones include the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord
Agreement signed between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and rebel groups in South Sudan
(El-Gaili, 2004). It also helped Under the IGAD’s forerunner, the Intergovernmental Authority
on Drought and Development (IGADD), Ethiopia launched a peace initiative in Sudan at Addis
Ababa summit of 7 September 1993. A Peace Committee made up of the heads of State of
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya was established. This initiative issued the 1994
Declaration of Principles that identified the essential elements necessary for a just and
comprehensive peace settlement to end the civil war in Sudan. Ethiopia have played a role
in assisting the Sudanese government and the SPLA to reach out an agreement signed in
2006, under the helps of the AU and IGAD. IGAD, at the initiative of Ethiopia, promoted the
CPA and later worked closely with partners such as the US, the EU and the UN, towards the
implementation of the CPA. CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) and finally to be held
a referendum in Southern Sudan in 2011. The referendum held in 2011 to decide the fate of
the Southern Sudanese heralded their secession from the North. Such process witnessed
a great role played by Ethiopian governments (Martell, 2010, p. 18).
Interview with Thomas G/Mariam, Expert on Ethiopian Foreign Relation Strategic Study Institute,
18 March 2019 consecutively Ethiopia initiated Sudanese to engage in the discussion with its
Southern counterpart. But it did not bring any fruitful result initially and as a time went on
Sudanese engaged themselves by understanding Ethiopia’s genuine interest in mediation process.
At the core of the Ethiopian government’s interest in Southern Sudan’s referendum process is its
aim to create peace and stability in the region to reduce its vulnerability. This stands from
Ethiopia’s stance on its foreign policy. Because of this Sudanese developed positive attitudes
toward Ethiopia. In this regard, Belete Belachewe (PhD) rightly stated that:
There was ups and downs on Ethio-Sudanese bilateral diplomatic relations. But onwards
2011 there was development of friendly relationship, which was resulted by Ethiopia played
impartial, active and leading role in settling two sedans civil war which brought catastrophe
to both conflicting parties.
Moreover, Addis Ababa’s Agreement on Abyei expressed the trust Ethiopia enjoys from both the
Sudanese parties in Khartoum and Juba signatories to the July 2008 Arbitration Agreement on
Delimiting the Abyei were each prepared to accept Addis Ababa’s good offices (Mehari, 2017:31).
For the AU and the UN as well as the IGAD, the presence of Ethiopia’s peacekeeping troops in Abyei
confirms the credibility of its partnership with the international community and the country’s
continuing important role in global efforts to resolve the crisis in Sudan. The agreement on Abyei
also paved the way for the rapid deployment of UNISFA forces. (Marta M and Nicoletta P, Edi.
2015:52–53).
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From Ethiopia’s perspective whatever is going on in Sudan is crucial not only because of its
vicinity but also because of the special, long standing relations between the two. Hence, if Sudan
catches a cold, Ethiopia sneezes, and vice versa. In difficult times, the two peoples have helped
each other consistently. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed lost no time to mediate on the
Sudanese crisis in cooperation with the AU, helping to resolve African problem in the African way.
In immediate mediation by Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, who spoke separately to the two sides in
Khartoum with the country’s ruling military council and leaders of the Declaration of Freedom and
Change Forces, an alliance of protesters and opposition parties (Reuters, 8/30/2019).
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed became the first foreign leader to meet with members of
Sudan’s ruling military council and pledged his support for the neighboring country.In attempting
to resolve the crisis, Ethiopia took a firm and meaningful stand by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed
appointing a higher official, Ambassador Mohammed Dirir as a chief negotiator in the entire
process. Ethiopia Supports Sudan on Principles of Non-Intervention, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister
Dr Abiy Ahmed on April 16th met a delegation headed by General Galaledin Alsheikh, Member of
the Transitional Military Council of the Republic of Sudan. The Sudan delegation called on the
Government of Ethiopia to continue its longstanding support to the country, particularly in this
time of transition, according to the Prime Minister’s office. Prime Minister Abiy reaffirmed the
support of the Government of Ethiopia to the people of Sudan, stressing that this support is
based on respect for Sudan’s sovereignty and on the principles of non-intervention (7Dnews
17 April 2019).
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Sixth, Ethiopia has long realized the tactical maneuvering of terrorists in larger Horn of Africa
including Al-shabab and ISIS. The crisis in Sudan could have been a breeding ground of terrorists
as in the case of Libya. Therefore, Ethiopia was determined to curb any expansion of terrorist
organizations in Sudan which can use the country as a spring board from which they can make
disruptive activities in Ethiopia. Last, Ethiopia and Sudan are located in a strategically volatile
area in which a number of countries are already competing for the control of the Horn of Africa
and creating a sphere of multiple influences in the countries of the Horn. This could sooner or
later affect the domestic political and economic developments in the area. Pushing for peace
process in Sudan will help to create conducive environment for the social and economic
development of the two countries.
The current relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan saw a healthy and continuous development with
a number of mutual visits at high levels and increasing interchange of personnel being done by both
sides. There were a number of visits by high level officials of the two countries. This list includes the head
of the states of the two countries. This joint official visit had resettled in a number of cooperation
agreements between the two countries that covered a wide area of cooperation such as those in the
fields of border security, trade, investment, economy, culture, and military affairs. The multi-dimensional
relation between the two Horn of African countries are now producing practical results. Over the past few
years they have signed a number of agreements to enhance their bilateral diplomatic relations some of
the most important cooperation agreements signed between the two countries include:
Source: (Sudan Tribune 7 June 2011, Xinhua| 03–01, 2019, Port Strategy, 11 May 2018, Sudan Tribune,
13 March 2019, Sudan Tribune, 22 February 2017, Sudan Tribune, 23 February 2012, The Reporter
2 March 2019,Addis Chamber, 23 January 2017, The Africa Report, 17 May 2012, Tigrai Onlne,
v 9 April 2014, Sudan Vision, 17 June 2015, Geeska Afrika, 24 August, Geeska Afrika, 30 October 2016,
2016).
The successful implementation of these agreements will enable to achieve common objectives
and further deepen the existing relations. This of course requires trust, confidence and tireless
efforts from both sides at all levels.
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Ethiopia is the only country in the Horn that shares a border with all the other countries in the
region. Its long and porous borders with countries such as in the east by Djibouti (349 km), in the
south-east by Kenya (861 km), in the north by Eritrea (912 km), in the south-west by Somalia (1
600 km) and in the west by Sudan (769 km) and South Sudan (837 km) this mean that Ethiopia is
more affected by regional issues than any other state in the Horn.
International borders in the Horn of Africa region have been a major source of conflict between
state and non-state actors over the past century, and the international boundary between Ethiopia
and Sudan makes no exception. The most persistent threat to Ethiopia’s national security is the
frequent border clashes with Sudan and the continual ethnic military conflicts among various
groups in border areas created sleepless nights for the Ethiopian military. In spite of their
differences, intensive efforts have been made to improve the relationship between the two
countries. Accordingly, since 2011, there are tremendous reduction of tension between Ethiopia
and Sudan could thus be described as follows:
The diplomatic stance adopted towards the Sudanese border was far less direct, however.
Bilateral negotiations began in 1965, a few months after the first armed clashes between
Ethiopian and Sudanese forces along the frontier (Puddu, 2017, p. 36).
Accordingly, Amhara regional militias and Liyu Police (sometimes referred to as “Special Forces”/
Liyu Hayl or as Amhara Regional Forces) have since responded, attacking Sudanese forces in areas
occupied by Amhara farmers since the mid-1990s. These actions have placed Ethiopian Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed in a difficult position. On the one hand, Abiy depends on his alliance with the
powerful Amhara elite to continue military operations in the Tigray region. On the other, he can
hardly afford an international conflict that would certainly involve other actors like Egypt given
contestations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). It is likely that the leadership of
the Sudanese army is utilizing the conflict for internal political gain, and is unlikely to be as
invested as it claims it is in the actual matter of land ownership. Whilst this would suggest that
neither Khartoum nor Addis has an interest in escalating the fighting, there is a risk that continued
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The matter remained suspended until the 1991 regime change in Ethiopia. Relative understanding
between the two countries after 1991 facilitated the continuation in serious of the demarcation
process. The May 2001 agreement to establish a Joint Boundary Commission with the task of
demarcating the common boundary symbolized the latest effort. Subsequently, a Joint
Commission was set in Khartoum, in December 2001.
The Joint Commission was delegated with the task of demarcating the boundary based on the
1902 and 1907 Ethio-British Agreements and the letters the two countries exchanged in 1972. On
11 April 2005 the two sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding contentious
settlement areas and farm lands between Metema (Galabat), Guang (Atbara) and Angreb
(Bahreselam) Rivers. The Memorandum of Understanding provided for the establishment of the
Joint Field Work Committee—JFWC.
Serious talks on the Ethiopia–Sudan boundary resumed in deep following 2011 which affirmed
the readiness of both parties to respect the boundaries as defined in the existing treaties, agree
ments or protocols. This agreement also provided for the establishment of the Joint Boundary
Commission of Experts composed of surveyors and administrators, was created with the mandate
to demarcate and to fix boundary marks covering the whole frontier between Ethiopia and Sudan.
According to Abebe Aynete research directorate in Ethiopian Foreign Relation Strategic Studies
Institute expressed that till now the countries had no comprehensive agreements to manage their
Source: https://epo.acleddata.
com/al-fashaga-border-
dispute/ accessed at 11/28/20
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border. Rather they put different mechanisms or apparatus to follow up their border
developments.
Friction along the two countries’ borders had considerably reduced as a result of bilateral
meetings held at various governmental levels and joint committees. Increased cooperation
between Sudan and Ethiopia has led to fruitful joint efforts in policing the borders.
Consequently, criminals operating around the borders e. g. armed robbers and car snatchers
find it difficult to dispose of stolen goods.
The relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan has been spoiled over the years by the
frequent occurrences of border clashes between the two countries. This led to
a deterioration of political relationship between them. Consequently, Ethiopia and Sudan
established different joint committees among these Border demarcation committee,
Security committee, Ethio-Sudanese joint defense committee and joint border committees
are the major ones. These joint committees give the chance to both countries the oppor
tunities to address their common boundary problems. (19 March, 2019)
Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir on the state funeral on 1 September 2012 late Ethiopian Prime
Minister MelesZenawi said that
Sudan and Ethiopia despite tensions along the border between farmers and because of
cross-border attacks by Ethiopian rebel groups developed good relations and established
a number of joint projects. Also regular meetings are held between the governors of
bordering states from the two sides.
In the meantime, the two countries continued to exploit every opportunity and for a better part of
their relations and intensified their mutual cooperation’s through joint mechanisms. For instance,
many institutions are functional such as Border Demarcation Committee, Joint Security
Committee, Joint Border Committee, Ethio-Sudanese Defense Committee, Joint Military Force,
and Ethio-Sudan Joint Steering Committee, are work hand in hand into each other’s borders. So
Ethiopia and Sudan have made boundary an issue of development and cooperation rather than of
conflict. But the boundary of Ethiopia and Sudan is not actually demarcated, yet the actual work
on the ground remains a homework to both countries only because it is beyond their financial
capacity.
4.7. A UNISFA delegation of Ethiopia’s role in ensuring peace versus Sudan claim
Primarily, it has a crucial place in the maintenance of peace in the region. It serves as a trusted
partner for peacekeeping in the border areas of South Sudan and Sudan. Ethiopia is playing a vital
role in the process to build a viable state in South Sudan and serving as a trusted partner for
peacekeeping in the border areas of South Sudan and Sudan. Facilitated by Thabo Mbeki, chief of
AU-High-level Implementation Panel, the Addis Agreement on Abyei was signed by the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) forces and the Government of Sudan (GoS) in Addis Ababa on
20 June 2011. The main objective of the Addis Agreement on Abyei is to ensure that this border
area remains demilitarized until proper demarcation is undertaken. The same agreement provided
for the deployment of the UNISFA under the UN Security Council Resolution 1990.
UNISFA entirely composed of 4250 Ethiopian troops, includes civilian police and is unique for
many reasons. Unlike most peacekeeping missions in the World, UNISFA as a mono-troop con
tingent is entirely composed of Ethiopian peacekeeping troops. Under normal circumstances, the
deployment of troops takes a long time, as it requires convincing troop contributing countries,
mobilizing resources and deployment. UNISFA was deployed on 22 July 2011, a month after the
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authorization of the mission by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under Resolution 1990
on 25 June 2011.
A delegation of United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) led by Colonel Mack Tok
has visited the 24th motorized battalion of peacekeeping force mission post. During the visit, Head
of the delegation, Colonel Mack Tok said Ethiopia has been applying its longs standing and
profound experience in peacekeeping in ensuring peace in the region. Ethiopia is bringing about
incredible results in restoring peace and stability in the region and addressing communal dis
agreements in the Abyei and surroundings. The Ethiopian peacekeeping force has played indis
pensable role in bringing normalcy and creating peaceful environment for communities of the
area, he added (A UNISFA delegation commends Ethiopia’s role in ensuring peace in Horn region—
Welcome to Fana Broadcasting Corporate S.C fanabc.com (accessed at 18/1/22).
However, Sudan has demanded that the United Nations to replace the Ethiopian soldiers
deployed in the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in the disputed Abyei region on the
Sudan-South Sudan border with other soldiers, because “it is not reasonable to have Ethiopian
forces in the strategic depth of Sudan at a time when the Ethiopian forces are gathering on the
eastern borders of Sudan”, Minister of Foreign Affairs Maryam El Sadig El Mahdi has confirmed.
Minister El Mahdi also referred to “the Ethiopian encroachment on the eastern borders”, under
lining that “there are great interests for Ethiopia in Sudan that must be preserved” Dabanga Radio
TV Online (dabangasudan.org) accessed at 19//1/2023.
Since 2021, Sudan has requesting the withdrawal of UNISFA forces from Abyei after having then
began to consider Addis Ababa as a non-neutral party. The border strip between the two countries
is witnessing a military build-up, in light of fears that the situation will slip into an armed conflict,
which could then spread to the entire region. The relationships between both Sudan and Ethiopia
have soured recently due to the Renaissance Dam issue, and Sudan’s restoration of its lands in al-
Fashaga from the grip of the Ethiopian forces and militias. UN to withdraw over 3,000 Ethiopian
troops from Abyei—AlTaghyeer accessed at 19 January 2023.
Ethiopia is an important economic partner for Sudan. As the most populous country in the Horn
of Africa, and the closest neighbor to some of the most developed parts of Sudan (in particular,
Khartoum, Gezira and Gedaref states), Ethiopia offers business and trade opportunities that Sudan
can ill afford to ignore. One example of the deepening ties between the two countries is the
electricity exports from Ethiopia to Sudan. In late 2013 a 296 km electricity transmission
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connection was inaugurated between Metema, near the border in Ethiopia, and Gedaref in Sudan.
The transmission line was built with the help of a US$41 m loan from the World Bank and enables
Ethiopia to export up to 100 mw of electricity to Sudan. Conversely, Sudan exports fuel to Ethiopia
additionally Ethiopia is the largest landlocked country in the Horn of African region needs Port
Sudan from its growing economy and also Ethiopia needs Sudanese diplomatic as well as eco
nomic support for its huge hydroelectric power project on Nile. So Sudan maintain cordial relations
with Ethiopia, for the sake of both economic and political benefits vice versa (The Economist,
18 July 2014).
In economic term, most Ethiopians who had moved abroad, moved to Sudan. And of those,
many have settled there and established themselves among the working class. These people are
still sending back remittances to their families which provide an increasing level of foreign currency
income to Ethiopia. The fact though, that remittances are a growing source of foreign currency
income, still ought to be a good reason to further develop and sustain the relationship to both
Sudan and Ethiopia.
Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt have been involved in conflicts and wars at different times through
their stories. Mostly, the main cause of their dispute is the Nile River (Zewede, 2002). The Nile River
flows in ten countries, crosses Egypt and ends in Mediterranean Sea. 85% water comes from Blue
Nile, Ethiopia and 15% from Lake Victoria. Egypt needs to control and utilize it does not want the
upper countries to share it. Whereas Sudan and Ethiopia together with the other seven countries
demand their share. The three counties tried to solve the issue through negotiations, but later
Sudan changed its mind and cooperate with Ethiopia whereas Egypt still took a firm stand and
rejected any kind of development over the Nile River by any of the basin countries.
In 31 March 2011, Ethiopia launched one of the biggest hydroelectric power dams in the world
on the Nile River called The Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The dam is 170 meters high
and contain 63 billion cubic meters of water and that can generate 6,000 MW. It costs USD
5 billion. According to Ethiopian government the cost will be covered by Ethiopian government
and fund raising by selling bonds and public contribution. The dam is the first in Africa and one of
the biggest ones in the world.
Immediately, Egypt and Sudan reacted and opposed the construction of the dam. Their concern
is the dam will reduce their water share and violates colonial era treaties. Egypt also strongly
argued that its existence is fully dependent on the Nile River and anything, which is constructed on
the river directly affects its sovereignty.
According to Dessalegn (2016), Egypt has depended upon the waters of the Nile from times of
antiquity. However, on the other hand, Ethiopians have been claiming that Ethiopia has the right to
use Nile waters as long as it not affects the interest of Egypt. Ethiopia’s approach to the GERD
Project, as it has repeatedly emphasized, is essentially based on the principles of four pillars: a win-
win approach, equitable and reasonable utilization, no significant harm and genuine cooperation.
The sole objectives of the GERD are poverty eradication and support for regional integration (Ejegu,
2014).
Interview with Ojige Osso, Neighboring Countries Affair Director in Ethiopian MoFA,
21 March 2019 Sudan, first opposed the construction by fearing the reduction of the volume of
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water and it fluctuates the regular flow of water, but later after detail discussions and dialogues
with Ethiopia, Sudanese reformed their mind and supported the construction of the dam. The
Sudanese government understand that the dam would not affect its water share. It also said that
it would keep the constant flow of the river throughout the year. In this regard Abebe Aynete
Research Directorate in Ethiopian Foreign Relation Strategic Study Institute rightly stated that:
Both Ethiopia and Sudan are a close ally of the huge project, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
under construction on the Nile (Interview 15 March 2019). The leaders of Sudan and Ethiopia have
been on the same wave length in this project and whatever uncertainties entertained regarding it
have been cleared thanks through repeated discussions. This tradition needs to continue despite
regime change anywhere: Khartoum or Addis Ababa. For instance When Ethiopia changed govern
ment just a year ago, the leaders made it clear that they give maximum priority to the enhance
ment of the relations between the two peoples and governments.
The continuous support of the Sudanese government for the accomplishment of the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project is another demonstration of the kind of relations the two
countries enjoy. Here, the support of Sudan is key because it gives a sense of belongingness and
mutual trust and friendship between the two nations. In line with this Thomas expressed that the
support of Sudan on the dam is not only favoring Ethiopia. Ruther it is for the sake of their own
economic benefit of its people.
To sum it all up, the silent diplomacy followed by the governments of Ethiopia and Sudan and
the refrain from unfaithful public rhetoric against each other when disagreements arise has
definitely contributed to most smooth relationship they achieved than ever in their history. The
economic and security interdependence Ethiopia and Sudan built since 2011 has so far shown to
be a far sighted investment for both and The GERD has a potential to take this mutual inter
dependence to a higher level and come to be an irreversible point for a lasting partnership
between these two neighbors. It is also a model for other nations of the region as well as the
continent with regard to pursuing the win-win approach of cooperation to sustain regional
integration through economic cooperation.
The Joint Ministerial Committee is the highest one which is responsible for political, economic
and social issues and also manages the implementation of agreements and decisions made at the
Head of State and Ministerial levels. The second institutional arrangement to facilitate the Ethio–
Sudanese diplomatic relation is the institutional arrangement to administer the most sensitive part
of their bilateral diplomatic relation that is the border issue. In regards to this both countries
organized different joint border committees to examines border security, immigration, refugee and
health matters; and the Joint Border Sub-Committees, which react and give on the spot solution to
problems that may arise along the common border. In general, since 2011, this institutional
arrangements widened and deepened and they have their summit meeting mechanism between
the political leaders of Ethiopia and Sudan. Ethiopia and Sudan have good political and diplomatic
relations and cooperation’s.
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different factors for growing of trade relations between Ethiopia and Sudan. Among others, the
main factors that contributed largely to the consolidation of the bonds between Ethio–Sudan trade
relations were:
The Ethio-Sudanese economic cooperation is historical and age old. Within this time, various
bilateral agreements have been signed between Ethiopia and Sudan. As Fikiru (29 March 2019)
stated, The economic relation between Ethiopia and Sudan is highly supported by strong political
facilitation from both governments.
Since 2011, Ethiopia and Sudan signed many agreements in different areas, but specifically the
agreements focuses on trade and boosting economic activities, these agreements include:
These agreements have enabled to increase trade and investment between the two countries.
As stated by Andarge, Ethiopian government has made a fruitful effort in creating conducive
economic environment for the economic relation with Sudan. Ethiopia and Sudan have conducted
many higher level official exchanges and they signed number of agreements, concerning trade and
investment. (Interview 13 March 2019).
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So during the last decade, Ethiopian government has provided a stable political environment
for the investors to do business smoothly. At the same time, the Ethiopian government
continuously provided FDI incentives, such as tax holidays and tariff-free policies for FDI
equipment imports.
Most of the investors choose Ethiopia for their investment activities because of many factors
among this the incentives we are provided for investors is very much interesting EIC provides
experts without any price for investors to advise them on their visibility study and also we
are giving plane ticket and two weeks hotel facilities in the time of searching places and
licensing for those in need of investing Ethiopia. More importantly most investors interested
because of the relative peace and stability we have and economic development we have
witnessed attract and choose Ethiopia for their investment. (Interview on 08 March 2019)
These incentives have proved to be a large motivation for Sudanese firms ‘investment in Ethiopia,
especially for the manufacturing industry.
5. Infrastructural facilities
Public Transport Quality Assurance Director with the Authority, Tesfaye Belachew, said that
Ethiopian and Sudanese people are strengthening ties in trade, tourism, and agriculture
since the commencement of the new road public transport; and promoted the Sudanese
Investors to feeling home and thereby facilitate trade as well. (Walt News, June 4,2018)
. . . the significant achievements registered in the security of the border were sources of
inspiration to redouble joint efforts . . . The completion of the Metema-Galabat-Gadarif road
and the micro-wave link project and public transport from Addis Ababa to Khartoum as well
as Ethiopia’s plan to connect with railway have paved the ground for enhanced cooperation
between the two sisterly countries economically. (Interview 21 March 2019)
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with a slight improvement to 1.4% in 2012. Though GDP growth rates started to slowly pick up and
reached 4.9% in 2015, the basic fundamentals of the economy remain very weak, with only
modest growth of about 3% and 3.5% projected in 2016 and 2017, respectively.
While, the economic impact of Southern Sudan secession on the economy of North results
indicate that the economy of the North has been badly affected by the Southern Sudan secession.
Hence, the value of the Sudanese Pound against the dollar has deteriorated drastically, while the
balance of payment deficit has even widened, and at the same time inflation rates rise steadily to
around 28%. In contrast, per capita income has increased, but this was due mainly to the
reduction in number of population that took place as a result of Southern Sudan secession.
Alternatively, public debt still remains high at 38 billion dollar, with the two parties yet to reach
to an agreement over debt apportionment issue (Hassan Khalid, 2013).
According to (Mahjoub Ebaidalla, 2016), the trade between Sudan and Ethiopia has declined after
2011, which can be explained by the loss of 75% of Sudanese oil after the secession of South Sudan.
. . . .the two countries have agreed to establish a free economic zone very shortly. He further
revealed the plan for a new railway line that connects the two countries. The railway line
accelerates the existing strong trade relations the two nations possess. He added, “We work
together through a shared vision especially in security, military and economic cooperation,”
pointing that “any threat to Sudan is a threat to Ethiopia’s national security”. (The Ethiopian
Herald, 13 April 2017)
The history Ethio–Sudanese trade relations is very old. Economically, both countries have been faced
with similar economic problems of mass poverty and misery. In the same vein, the bilateral relations
between the two countries, Ethiopia and Sudan, have come a long way. According to Tages Alemu,
Sudan and Ethiopia have been trading in various goods and services for the past many years. As
the two largest economies in East Africa, the relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan is
a crucial one for the countries particularly and the region in general. (Interview 18 March, 2019)
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Both Ethiopia and Sudan are increasing their horizons through different socio-economic and
political cooperation since 2011. The notion of South-South Cooperation, the bilateral trade
relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan is increasing from time to time. The data from
Ethiopian Ministry of Trade (MoT) (2019) shows that both import and export between Ethiopia
and Sudan increased from 2011 to 2018 tremendously.
As illustrated in Table 1, within seven years, the value of Ethiopian exports to Sudan increased
from USD 2,443,726,245 in 2011 to 2,742,088,167 in 2017; while the amount of imports rose from
USD 8,616,504,842.53 in 2011 to 14,735,196,988.99 in 2017.Today, the bilateral trade relation
between the two countries has grown gradually and as there has been no pause in the dialogue
between them, one has observed an advancement of this tie.
It is quite obvious that Sudan’s exports to Ethiopia have been far greater than its imports from
Ethiopia, resulting in a large trade surplus in favor of Sudan (Table I).
Bilateral trade between Ethio-Sudan has grown over a period of time. In Table 1, we can see
total trade between two countries increased. Share of import is greater than export in Ethiopia’s
total trade with Sudan. Ethiopia’s trade balance with Sudan was became deficit and increased
further. The main reason behind the increase in Ethiopia’s trade deficit with the Sudan is an
increase in the prices of petroleum products and oil.
Evidence from this study indicated that there is a huge trade deficit between Sudan and Ethiopia
which favoring Sudan. However, trade deficit has been become constant and increased from time
to time and Ethiopia could not equally benefit from trade with Sudan. Among others, one of the
main reasons for trade deficit between the two countries was that the nature of export-import
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Table 2. Major top 10 exported products from Ethiopia to Sudan and Imported products from
Sudan (MoT, 2019)
Major Exported products to Sudan Major Imported products from Sudan
Coffee, Not Roasted or Decaffeinated Benzene Regular or Super
Tropical wood Petroleum Oils
Ox Waters (Incl. Minerals and Aerated)
Natural Gums, Resins, Gum-Resins Natural Oleo. Ins/ Instruments and Apparatus for Medical, Surgical,
Balsams(Excl. Gum Arabic) Laboratory sterilizers, Dental, Veterinary Sciences
Camels Furniture
Natural Honey Textile Products
Live Sheep, Goat Edible Sunflower and Safflowers Oil
Footwear with Rubber Seat Nest
Beer made from Malt Machines, Having Individual function use for
Industries
Upper and Parts Thereof (Excl. Stiffeners) Soap in powder
Source: EIC 2019 Softcopy.
items of the two countries. Ethiopian exports were highly dominated by primary agricultural
commodities and raw materials which have been negative implications on Ethiopian trade perfor
mance and resulted in trade deficit (Table II).
In another ways, primary commodities were vulnerable to price instability as their prices were
determined in world markets and export of primary resources were economically detrimental and
can be resulted in trade deficit. Also Ethiopia imports from Sudan in general, comprised finished
manufactured goods. Generally speaking, regarding to the implication of the dominance of Sudanese
trade relations with Ethiopia in the short and long term, the major point was that the perception that
Sudan benefits more and Ethiopia less in the short term and long term although the two countries
must considered themselves as strategic partners and not to put each other’s interests in problems.
However, given their relatively small and undeveloped markets, Ethiopia’s foreign policy
strategy plays down the role that its poor neighboring countries (Sudan) can play in the
economic development of the country. Despite the fact that the Strategy also plays down
their role in this respect, it does mention a number of areas where the two countries’
geographies and industries can complement each other. Relative to the region, particularly
northern Sudan is still a potentially significant market for Ethiopian produce and according to
the Strategy: “has the potential to go far in development” (World bank Final Report June 30,
2019).
Regarding to trade deficit, although some observers believe Ethio–Sudanese relations are also
based on oil imports by Ethiopia from Sudan, there is little evidence to back this up. Over the last
years, Ethiopia has received petroleum products from Sudan at below cost price. However, these
imports were quite limited in scale and because of the bad road connections between the two
countries, these products largely still need to pass through Djibouti to reach the industrial centers
of Ethiopia (UNISCI Discussion Papers, 2013).
However, the two states using informal economic activities and sector to come up these
problem and advancing economic bilateral relationship these can be seen in first, the con
struction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in Benishangul-Gumuz, which is being built
with support of the World Bank and various other international partners is another incentive
to further develop the Ethio–Sudanese relations. Second, the recent construction of the
Merowe Dam in 2009 and the heightening of the Sudanese Roseires Dam in 2013 (only 20
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km from the Ethiopian border) indicate that Sudan would be reluctant to become dependent
on Ethiopia for a significant part of its power supply. Lastly, the dictatorial regimes and wars
in the region have caused many displacements across the borders over the last decades.
Most Ethiopians who had moved abroad, moved to Sudan. And of those, many have settled
there and established themselves among the working class. These people are still sending
back remittances to their families which provide an increasing level of foreign currency
income to Ethiopia. The fact though, that remittances are a growing source of foreign
currency income, still ought to be a good reason to further develop and sustain the relation
ship with both Sudan’s (World bank Final Report June 30, 2019).
The relations between Ethiopia and Sudan have been strengthened day by day, particularly
the cooperation between the two countries has significantly increased in the last few years
in areas of trade and investment. In this regard Sudanese investments in Ethiopia have
benefits for growth of the economy, creation of markets for export items, generation of
foreign exchanges for investments and creation of jobs.
To attracting massive amount of FDI Ethiopia had plentiful comparative advantages in terms
of human capital, land resource and investment incentives to materialize this plan of attract
ing foreign investment. In addition to attracting investment, the Ethiopian Government gives
a due attention to make projects operational within short period of time. The idea of provid
ing incentive by the Ethiopian Government is well honor by Kewi in his exclusive interview
with the researcher described that; Ethiopia provides different incentives to investors coming
from Sudan or elsewhere. The incentives provided by the government are like tax-free,
accessible land leases, clear and fast custom duty, strong and accountable civil services,
accessible industry zones and others (Interview; 8 March 2019).
Clarifying this argument, Awad al-Kareem, president of the Sudanese Investors Society in Addis
Ababa explained:
The amount of capital investment made in Ethiopia by Sudanese firms has reached around
$2.4 billion. Al-Kareem said more and more Sudanese firms are investing in Ethiopia due the
favorable investment opportunities created by the government comparing the existing
difficulties in Khartoum to acquire investment licenses among others. (Sudan Tribune, 2014)
Consequently, foreign direct investment projects are on the increase since 2011. Reports released
by international organizations dealing with international investment and trade activities also
affirm Ethiopia’s effort to attract FDI. For instance, the report released by the United Nations
Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD) showed that Ethiopia was the third largest reci
pient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa (UNCTAD, 2015) (See Table 2).
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Some of Sudan’s investment projects are conducted through joint ventures with Ethiopia and
different other countries. The largest joint ventures of the Sudanese investors are made with
Ethiopian investors. They are participating both in rural and urban development in Ethiopia.
This has been accelerating in the last few years. Besides, out of the licensed 246 Sudanese
projects in the period 2011–2019, only 63 has gone operational 41 under implementation and
142 are under pre- implementation (EIC, 2019). Accordingly, Sudan’s foreign direct investments
in Ethiopia are showing significant expansion. Sudanese companies have invested in areas such
as manufacturing (74 projects), construction (28 projects), business and engineering consul
tancy (25 projects), star designated resort and hotel (17 projects), and establishing medical
sector (14 projects), respectively, has priorities.
As Kewi (2019) explained, Sudanese investments are creating hundreds of job for Ethiopians.
Referring to this, possible to say that Ethio-Sudanese investment cooperation is good example of
South-South Cooperation because it is driven by the countries’ overall struggle to boost their socio-
economic and political development. The cooperation between Sudan and Ethiopia has been
assisted by political commitment of the two Governments; and it has both economic and political
considerations from both sides.
Table 3. Summary of Licensed Sudanese Investment projects in Ethiopia by sector and status
since 2011
Sector No. of projects Pre- Implementation Operation
implementation
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6. Conclusion
Ethio–Sudanese formal diplomatic relations have been established in early twentieth century.
However, this study mainly elaborated the development of Ethio–Sudan diplomatic and economic
relations, especially with particular reference to post 2011. Accordingly, the study identifies the
number of factors that positively affect historical and contemporary bilateral relations. Ethio-
Sudan economic cooperation is historical and strategic based on mutual friendship and non-
interference principle of South-South Cooperation and their respective foreign policies. Since the
initiation of official diplomatic relationship immediately after Sudanese independence, Ethiopia
and Sudan has signed different agreements to strengthen their economic cooperation in general
and increase trade in particular. Trade between the two countries is surging and investment is
increasing.
This paper mainly elaborated the development of economic and political relations between
Sudan and Ethiopia especially post 2011. In this paper, four main factors driving the bilateral
relations between Sudan and Ethiopia have been elaborated: First, the bright and promising
development between the two countries has been facilitated by the strong political support from
both governments. Ethiopian government provided a stable political environment for the investors
to do business smoothly. Second, mutual economic interest is indeed the strongest wing of the two
countries ‘cooperation. On the one hand, Sudan needed markets. On the other hand, Ethiopia
needs to open to international trade to develop her economy to implement Ethiopia‘s endeavor at
poverty reduction and alleviation. Third, Sudan and Ethiopian relations have been the result of
common political and economic strategic interests that were bolstered by common experiences
base on principles of mutual respect. Sudan and Ethiopia also developed political interactions
through exchanging high level visits, consultation mechanisms and mutual support on regional
and international issues which offered immense opportunities for strengthening their ties. Fourth,
the energy linkage and Ethiopia’s strong commitment to build infrastructural facilities like road
which is already started Addis-Khartoum and there is a plan to link the two countries with railway,
taken as a factor to boost the relationship.
With regard to trade relations, the values of Ethiopian exports have shown progress and
growth in recent years. It is also noted that the imports of the country have shown even
more pronounced increase during the same period and causes deficit on Ethiopia. The major
reason for the trade imbalance is that Ethiopia continued to export agricultural products
which realized lower price as compared to manufacturing goods that Ethiopia imports from
Sudan. This means the sector is dominated by few primary products that account for a lion’s
share of the country’s export earnings have contributed for this trade imbalance. To reduce
this trade imbalance, Ethiopia has tried various strategies, including export diversification,
import substitution, export oriented liberalized approach which may help to promote invest
ment from Sudan.
When it comes to politics, a cordial political relation is also manifestation of the post 2011
Ethio– Sudan relations. Frequent diplomatic contacts between higher officials of the two
nations and cooperation over regional peace and security have witnessed strong political
relations between the two states. High-level officials’ visits have improved diplomatic ties in
the meantime opening the way for expanded interaction on development cooperation and
trade.
However, positive relations continued after Meles’ death in 2012, but with the 2018 rise to
power in Ethiopia of Abiy Ahmed and the coming to power of a joint military—civilian
government in Sudan in August 2019 after al-Bashir’s overthrow, these countries’ ties are
once more uncertain. External actors—including the Gulf States, Egypt, China, and the United
States—continue to influence relations between the two countries in complex ways.
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List of abbrevations
Revolutionary Community
AU African Union
Council
AEC African Economic
SPLA Sudanese People
Community
Liberation Army
CDRC Center for Dialogue of
SSC South South Cooperation
Research Cooperation
TPLF Tigrean People Liberation
COMESA Common Market for East
Front
and South Africa
UNISFA United Nation Interim
CPA Comprehensive Peace
Security Force Abyei
Agreement
UNCTAD United Nations
EDU Ethiopian Democratic
Conference on Trade and
Union
Development
EFRSSI Ethiopian Foreign Relation
US United State
Strategic Study Institute
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist
EIC Ethiopian Investment
Republic
Commission
ELF Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF Ethiopian People’s Acknowledgments
Liberation Front Praise to almighty God! As such, our best gratitude goes
to all our informants who helped us to accomplish this
EU European Union research work in wondering manner. Lastly, we ever fill
unforgettable moment of their effective encourage
EPRDF Ethiopian People ment, brotherhood and humble character of our friends
Revolutionary Democratic Berhanu Milku (Commander-Batala), Tadesse Eyasu
(Basha) and Natnael Lea (Gittanchchaawu) to accom
Front plish our research work.
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
Funding
FTA Free Trade Agreement The authors received no direct funding for the research
work.
GATT General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade Author details
Tamirat Dela Wotango1
GERD Grand Ethiopia E-mail: [email protected]
Renaissance Dam ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7327-1731
Muluken Ayele2
GoE Government of Ethiopia 1
Civics and Ethical Studies Department, College of Social
GOS Government of Sudan Science and Humanities, Wolaita Sodo University,
Wolaita Sodo, Ethiopia.
HoA Horn of Africa 2
Civics and Ethical Studies Department, College of Social
Science and Humanities, Mizan Tepi University, Mizan-
HRM Human Resource Aman, Ethiopia.
Management
ICBT Informal Cross Border Disclosure statement
Trade Hereby we declare that this research work is entitled the
Ethio–Sudan diplomatic relation since 2011: Review on
JFWC Joint Field Work economic relation is our original work and has not been
Committee presented anywhere. The authors declare that they have
no known competing financial interest or personal com
MNC Multi-National Corporation plain that could have appeared to influence the work of
this paper.
MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoT Ministry of Trade Citation information
Cite this article as: Ethio–Sudan bilateral diplomatic rela
NIF National Islamic Front tion Since 2011: Review on economic relation, Tamirat
Dela Wotango & Muluken Ayele, Cogent Social Sciences
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How do you describe the historical diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Sudan? What unique
characteristic does it have?
What are the major factors encouraged the bilateral political and economic relations between
them since 2011?
How does the relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan manifested through diplomacy, trade
and investment since 2011? How do you generally describe their relations, in all these areas?
How about balance of payments? What did it indicate? (If deficit) what should be done to
improve?
What are challenges and/or prospects of their relations? What would you recommend to reduce
challenges and tap on the prospects?
How do you see the nature and capital of FDI inflow from Sudan?Types/sectors and areas of
investment?How do you see the trend since 2011? Rapidly growing or slowly growing? What
factors are responsible for such trends?
What are the challenges that Sudanese investors facing in Ethiopia? What they expect from
Ethiopia (prospects)? What are the efforts to attract further investment from Sudan?
How would you describe Ethio–Sudan trade relations? When did it start and how it is going?
What are the major items of trade between the two countries? What Ethiopia import from Sudan
and export too?
What are the different factors that help for the improvement of trade exchanges between the
two countries?
While the trade relation between Ethiopia and Sudan is growing, it is largely in favor of
Sudan. What are the major factors for this trade imbalance? In relation to this, what are
different measures that your Ministry may take to minimize this trade imbalance? What are
the different commodities that Ethiopia can export to the Sudanese market and it imports
from Sudan?
What are the factors which enhanced the bilateral economic relations between Ethiopia
andSudan since 2011?
What measures your ministry may take to increase the export of Ethiopian products in order to
exploit Sudanese market?What are the challenges/prospects?
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