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Why geopolitics?
a b
Geoffrey Sloan & Colin S. Gray
a
Deputy Head of the Department of Strategic
Studies and International Affairs , Britannia
Royal Naval College , Dartmouth
b
The Director of the Centre for Security
Studies , The University of Hull
Published online: 24 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: Geoffrey Sloan & Colin S. Gray (1999) Why geopolitics?,
Journal of Strategic Studies, 22:2-3, 1-11, DOI: 10.1080/01402399908437751

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 Why Geopolitics?
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GEOFFREY SLOAN and COLIN S. GRAY

The popularity of geopolitical theory from 1945 to the present has been
rather like the length of hemline on a woman's skirt; it has fallen and risen
with the vagaries of fashion. The current vogue can be traced to 1979 when
Henry Kissinger published the first volume of his memoirs titled The White
House Years. It was significant that this book made continual use of the term
'geopolitics'. This was important for two reasons: first, Kissinger used it as
a method of analysis to combat the American liberal policies of idealism;
second, it was utilised as a means of presenting an alternative to the
conservative policies of an ideological anti-Communism. Kissinger claimed
for geopolitics a synonymity with global equilibrium and permanent
national interests in the world balance of power. He defined geopolitics as
follows: 'by geopolitical I mean an approach that pays attention to the
requirements of equilibrium'.1 The revival of the word 'geopolitics' by
Kissinger resulted in two discernible paths of development. 'It led, by
example and reaction, to further reflection on global strategy in the
geopolitical tradition. Secondly, and perhaps in the end more significantly,
it popularized the word geopolitics, which entered the language in a way
which it never had before, though at the substantial price of ambiguity and
confusion of meanings.'2
This special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies has two related
aims. First to make a contribution to dispelling the ambiguity and confusion
that still surrounds the term geopolitics. Second, to illuminate the
relationships between geopolitics, geography and strategy, and to show how
the practice and study of strategy requires a continuing exchange between
history and theory. In essence, geopolitics is an attempt to draw attention to
the importance of certain geographical patterns in political history. It is a
 2 Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy
theory of spatial relationships and historical causation. From it explanations
have been deduced which suggest the contemporary and future political
relevance of various geographical concepts. Furthermore, it can be argued
that geopolitics combines historical knowledge with a sophisticated
capacity for theorising. The result has been a powerful analytical
framework.
One of the aims of geopolitics is to emphasise that political
predominance is a question not just of having power in the sense of human
or material resources, but also of the geographical context within which that
power is exercised: 'in nearly all international transactions involving some
element of opposition, resistance, struggle or conflict, the factors of
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location, space and distance between the interacting parties have been
significant variables. This significance is embodied in the maxim, "power is
local". This is to say, political demands are projected through space from
one location to another upon the earth's surface.'3
This is not to say that the geographical environment determines the
objectives or strategies of the foreign or internal policies of a particular
state. States do not find themselves in a geographical strait-jacket; instead,
geography or geographical configurations present opportunities for policy-
makers and politicians. This was recognised by one of the founders of
modern geopolitical theory, Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947). Writing in
1890 he claimed that:
the course of politics is the product of two sets of forces, impelling
and guiding. The impetus is from the past, in the history embedded in
a people's character and tradition. The present guides the movement
by economic wants and geographical opportunities. Statesmen and
diplomatists succeed and fail pretty much as they recognise the
irresistible power of these forces.4
The extent to which geographical opportunities will be exploited depends
on strategy. That is a concern with the deployment and use of armed forces
to attain particular political objectives.
Political objectives are a consequence of choices made by policy-
makers. It is from these choices that political and strategic importance is
attached to geographical configurations and locations. It also reflects the
nature of politics as a decision-making process. In this process the
geographical factors which influence politics are a product of policy-makers
selecting particular objectives and attempting to realise them by the
conscious formulation of strategies. This relationship between the
geographical environment and the decision-making process is a dynamic
 Why Geopolitics? 3
one; it is dependent upon changing levels of transport and weapons
technology. This dynamic aspect is one of the most important links between
geopolitical theory, geography and strategy. It illustrates the pivotal nature
of the continuing exchange between theory and history.
Furthermore, geography can be described as the mother of strategy, in
that the geographical configuration of land and sea, with respect to a state's
strategic policy, or an alliance between states, can exercise a twofold
strategic conditioning influence: on locations important for defence, and on
the routes and geographical configurations which favour an attacking force,
be it on land or sea. Geography, it is worth adding, is pertinent at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels of conflict, although its use or misuse by
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commanders at different levels can have very different consequences.

This special issue is divided into two parts. The first, comprising seven
essays is designed to illustrate the way that geopolitical theory derives from
interpretation of geographical configuration and historical experience.
These studies address questions of methodology and approach: what
reasonably might we expect geopolitical theory to achieve for illumination
of the relationship between geography and strategy? The second part
consists of a further five essays which offer a new focus on the relationship
between geography and strategy, a relationship often ignored in the past.
Geoffrey Sloan explains the 1904, 1919, and 1943 versions of
Mackinder's heartland theory in the context of the unique historical periods
of their formulation. He then looks at the propositions which can be
deduced to suggest future relevance for the heartland theory. Mackinder's
view of geography is interpreted as a combination of a geographical longue
duree and a theatre of military action. A good geopolitical analysis, Sloan
suggests, must present a picture of the constellation of forces which exist at
a particular time and within a particular geographical frame of reference.
This approach makes Mackinder's geopolitical theories prominent among
the most important of the twentieth century.
Jon Sumida breaks new ground with respect to the geopolitical theories
of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914). Mahan's work in the
past has been judged negatively to have been cast unduly in a deterministic
mould. Achievement of naval supremacy appeared directly linked to several
immutable geographical conditions. Sumida explains why Mahan came to
be associated with an absolutist approach to history. This was because of a
set of physical and human geographical propositions whose use in
connection with the explanation of major international political outcomes
made it easy for many people to believe that Mahan argued that geography
determined the course of history. Sumida's careful consideration of Mahan's
 4 Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy
work reveals that such a characterisation is faulty and seriously misleading.
What emerges is a view of Mahan that has not been seen before. It is one
where human affairs are complicated and outcomes dependent upon
complex interactions and contingent forces. Mahan's view of the utility of
history illuminating geography and strategy considers a range of
possibilities, including contradictory or even mutually exclusive ones.
Ben Lambeth considers air power from two innovative perspectives.
The first is what air power has become, particularly in the context and
wake of Operation 'Desert Storm' in 1991. The thesis is that it has now
become transformative in its effects and can produce strategic results in
joint warfare; space surveillance and communications are a large part of
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what has given airpower the value-added clout it offers to joint force
commanders today. The second perspective is in many ways the antithesis
of the first. As early as 1919 Mackinder claimed that air power had an
advantage over land mobility, but it had a boomerang nature since it
proceeds from and to a land base after flight, and those land bases can be
captured by land power. Lambeth also maintains that carrier-borne aircraft
cannot conduct a sustained an air campaign. Therefore the great challenge
for the future will be whether countries such as the United States can build
partnerships and otherwise plan ahead for access in many parts of the
world. This, Lambeth argues, will be critical if air power is to meet its
promise in future conflicts.
Everett Dollman's is perhaps the most ambitious of the essays on
geopolitical theory. For the first time an attempt has been made to discern
the geopolitical dimensions of space. This has led to the coining of the
adjective 'astropolitical'. Dollman uses Mackinder's heartland theory as his
geopolitical template. He argues that the vast resources of solar space
represent the heartland of the astropolitical model. Earth space, like Eastern
Europe in Mackinder's design, is the most critical arena for astropolitics.
Control of earth space not only guarantees long-term control of the outer
reaches of space, it provides a near-term advantage on the terrestrial
battlefield. From early warning and detection of missile and force
movements, to target planning and battle damage assessment, space-based
intelligence gathering assets, Dollman argues, already have proved
themselves as legitimate force multipliers.
There is also a pertinent Mahanian geopolitical analogy. Mahan argued
that control of certain bodies of water were particularly important for
economic and military reasons. Space, Dollman argues, like the sea, can be
traversed potentially in any direction, but because of gravity wells and the
forbidding cost of lifting weight into orbit, over time space-faring nations
 Why Geopolitics? 5
will develop specific pathways for the heaviest traffic. Indeed, space
highways and 'chokepoints' are clearly discernible already.
For much of the post-1945 period geopolitics has been something of an
intellectual pariah. It is worth noting that between the 1940s and the
publication of Colin Gray's The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era in 1977
(with the exception of Sen's Basic Principles of Geopolitics and History,
published in India in 1975) no book title in English used the term
geopolitics. The effect of this condition of neglect was compounded by the
advent of critical theory and postmodernism which emerged in International
Relations in the 1980s.
The emergence of these approaches was a reaction to two things: first to
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the perceived dominance of neorealist and neoliberal perspectives; second

to the disintegration of the Marxist 'dependency' critique of orthodox
thinking on the subject. This approach has generated different 'critical
studies' that have been applied to subject areas in International Relations.
Geopolitics has not been excepted from this trend. However, it is important
to understand just what this approach is attempting: 'what justified the label
"critical", is a concern with human emancipation - the goal in each case is
to re-orient their sub-discipline towards this goal, and to refuse to accept
accounts of the subject area that do not privilege emancipation'.5
Gearoid 6 Tuathail, on critical geopolitics, argues that geopolitics has a
self image as an instrumental form of knowledge and rationality. It takes the
existing power structure for granted and works within it to provide advice
to foreign policy makers. 6 Tuathail claims that its dominant modes of
narration are declarative (this is how the world is) and imperative (this is
what we must do). Critical geopolitics, it can be argued, is different in two
important respects: first it is a problematising theoretical project that places
the existing structure of power and knowledge in question; second it
critiques the superficial and self-interested ways in which orthodox
geopolitics reads the world political map by projecting its own cultural and
political assumptions upon it while concealing these same assumptions.
In addition to these two perspectives 6 Tuathail suggests that geopolitics
is mythic because it promises uncanny clarity and insight in a complex
world. This claim of clarity is sustained by the use of such binaries from the
geopolitical tradition as heartland/rimland, land power/sea power, and
East/West. In short, critical geopolitics aims to persuade strategic thinkers
to acknowledge the power of ethnocentric cultural constraints in their
perception of places and the dramas occurring within them.
The last look at geopolitical theory is also an attempt to break new
ground. David Lonsdale assesses the implications of information
 6 Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy
technology. Specifically, he argues that the defining characteristic which
identifies the 'infosphere' as a dimension of strategy is the manner in which
strategic power can be projected through and within this unique
environment. He draws an important analogy with both sea power and air
power. In both these environments the dominant operational concept is to
gain command of a particular geographical dimension of strategy. Yet
Lonsdale argues persuasively that use of the infosphere has its own
challenges. The key being to ensure your own use, yet deny your adversary
the same facility. He reminds us of the requirement for some functioning
enemy information infrastructure if deception operations are to be effected.
The primary characteristics of information power are flexibility and
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accessibility.
What has this to do with geopolitics? Lonsdale argues convincingly that
information power is unlikely to become transformative in its effects and
produce strategic results independently. Instead it will develop its own
geopolitical logic and will supplement and enable success in the other
existing environments of strategy. In short, in its own unique way it will
become territorialised.
The aim of the second part of this Special Issue is to explore the
relationship between geography and strategy and to draw geopolitical
conclusions from it. Colin Gray sets out in a comprehensive manner the
relationship between geography and strategy. He argues that geography
cannot be an optional extra for consideration by the strategic theorist or
planner, because it drives the character and potential contemporary reach of
tactical, hence operational, prowess.
What is innovative about Gray's approach is that he first fixes the nature
of strategy as the dialogue between policy and military power. He argues
that in reconciling political objectives with military ones, the strategist must
deal with a realm of great complexity and uncertainty. Policy, in a sense,
must be more important than strategy, just as strategy must be superior to
operations and tactics. Strategy would be literally senseless in the absence
of policy. Having located strategy in the hierarchy between policy and
military power, the geographical dimension of strategy is then elucidated.
He argues that strategy is inherently geographical and that even when other
dimensions are examined they are each subject to the influence of what can
be termed fairly as geographical influence. In no sense is this a claim for
geography as the 'master dimension' of strategy. Gray's argument simply is
that geography always matters for strategic experience, and on occasion it
will matter hugely.
Perhaps the most innovative aspect of this approach is the way in which
 Why Geopolitics? 1
geography and strategy are related to geopolitical theory. Gray argues that
the principal glory of the 'grand narrative' of geopolitical theory is the
ability to tie apparently disparate phenomena together in meaningful ways.
He suggests that it is exactly the meaningful character of geopolitical
theories that renders them so controversial.
Another important focus is what Clausewitz called the relationship
between a logic of policy and a grammar of war. Gray underlines the point
that the grammar of strategy literally and inalienably is dictated by the
distinctive requirements of physical geography. Furthermore, he argues that
to plan and act globally, rather than regionally or locally, is not to transcend
geography, let alone geopolitics, in fact quite the reverse. A global
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perspective is simply to plan and behave for a more extensive domain.

Strategy and politics must be 'done' within geography. Gray's thesis is that
geography is inescapable.
Nicholas Rodger sheds new light on the subtle relationship between
geography and strategic policy, a combination of conditioning influence and
the changing meaning of geographical conditions. What he illustrates in an
engaging manner is the profound influence that geographical configuration
and weather had on naval operations prior to the advent of steam
propulsion. Just moving your naval force from its base to where you wished
it to fight was an exercise often fraught with danger. There were few safe
landfalls and prevailing winds often prevented a naval commander from
taking what appeared to be the most direct route. For example, in the
eighteenth century the quickest passage normally available from Jamaica to
Barbados (a distance of just over 1,000 miles by steamer) was via London
or New York! Changes in transport and weapon technology were to have a
profound impact on the relationship between geography and naval power.
Technology was, and remains, a key dynamic factor in the relationship
between the geographical environment and the decision-making process.
This point is also well exploited by Ewan Anderson on boundaries. The
idea of a boundary is very much a product of nineteenth century
developments in cartography, which is to say in changes in the technology
of map making. The geopolitical implications of this have been profound,
especially with respect to the political claims that states would make in the
twentieth century. Anderson succinctly sums up the difference between
frontiers and boundaries. Frontiers have a spatial extent whereas boundaries
have no horizontal dimension. The crucial dimension of boundaries occurs
in the vertical plane, enabling states to claim air space and subterranean
space (though generally not overhead, extra-terrestrial space).
Significantly, he also identifies a crucial geopolitical challenge for the
 8 Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy
future. This is the issue of trans-boundary movements. It is an area where
international law is still in an early stage of development. Perhaps the most
important geographical issue concerning trans-boundary movements in the
early twenty-first century will be the transportation route of oil and natural
gas from the Caspian Sea basin. Since all the producer states are landlocked,
transportation will require both pipeline and tanker. Thus the concept of
boundaries will face a new challenge which will bind certain countries in
this area closer together than they are at present.
Williamson Murray's focus is the relationship between geography and
war from a historical perspective. Important changes occur when geography
is interpreted as a theatre of military action. First, it becomes more abstract,
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certainly simplified and schematised. The military strategist or commander

will perceive only those geographical features relevant to the military
objectives he is attempting to achieve. This perspective of geography as a
theatre of military action has a lineage traceable to antiquity.
This aspect of the military art is examined from the tactical, operational
and strategic levels. At the tactical level, geography becomes terrain, a crucial
component in war. Murray shows that for war in the twentieth century an
ability to use terrain remained crucial. He cites the example of the lack of
British tactical proficiency in World War II when they were consistently
surprised to find that the Germans had sited their positions on reverse slope
positions throughout the Normandy campaign. Also he argues convincingly
that air power, despite claims to the contrary, is a prisoner of terrain in that air
bases are the tactical framework within which an air force wages campaigns.
At the operational level, it is in the realm of logistics and intelligence that
an appreciation of geography and distance is most vital. The finest under-
standing of the role of geography at the operational level, it is suggested, is
given by the US Navy in its drive through the Central Pacific in 1943 and
1944. This superior operational performance was a product of 20 years of
wargames and study at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.
Murray shows convincingly that it is at the strategic level that geography
has exercised its greatest influence. The reason for this is rarely noticed.
Mistakes at the tactical and operational level often can be corrected
promptly. At the strategic level, however, mistakes tend to live forever - or
at least until the war changes in two respects: first, the coalition of the
participants; second, by radical change in war aims. An example of this is
the fall of France in June 1940, and the inability of the Royal Navy to use
naval bases in the south of Ireland. This created a crisis with grave potential
strategic consequences which was only averted by America's entry into the
war in December 1941.
 Why Geopolitics? 9
One aspect of the relationship between geography and strategy still
clouded in extraordinary controversy, is the impact of the German school of
geopolitics on the statecraft and strategy of Nazi Germany. The founder of
the German school, Major General Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), left a
confusing legacy for future scholars to unravel. At the heart of the German
school was the assertion of a dynamic relationship between the concept of
a natural boundary and the idea of continuous geographical expansion.
Geopolitics, wrote Haushofer 'shall and must become the geographic
conscience of the state'.6 As early as 1913 he advocated 'a transcontinental
route free of Anglo-Saxons', which would link Germany with Russia and
Japan.
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After the Second World War both Karl Haushofer - until his suicide in
1946 - and his surviving son, Heinz, claimed that after 1938 Haushofer had
worked for the Nazis only under duress. Yet Holger Herwig manages with
the use of new primary sources to reveal another reality in which Haushofer
used German geopolitics as a tool of political propaganda. For example, one
month after the launch of Operation 'Barbarossa' in June 1941 Haushofer
maintained that this operation constituted the greatest task of geopolitics,
the rejuvenation of space in the 'Old World'. Furthermore, it constituted a
bold attempt: ' positively and creatively to turn the task of forging Eurasia
and Eurafrica into reality'.
These statements contributed greatly to the tendency, since 1945, for
writers to perceive all geopolitical theory as synonymous with German
geopolitics. However, two features made German geopolitics unique: first
the subordination of all facts of political knowledge to the primacy of
geography; second, the assertion that the German Reich was a superior
polity whose destiny was quite separate from that of any other European
state. As a result of these characteristics the shadows were cast long.
Geopolitical theory became an intellectual pariah for the best part of 35
years.
In the final contribution to this Special Issue, John Erickson gives a
compelling account of the phoenix-like rise of geopolitics in a country that
formerly was in the forefront of demonising it. The former Soviet Union
currently manifests an obsessive preoccupation with geopolitics. Erickson
maintains that with the collapse of Communism Russia suffered a huge
crisis of identity and a challenge to its security requirements of truly historic
dimensions. The withdrawal from the centre of Europe, from Prague to
Smolensk, has reduced Russia in Europe to the geostrategic condition that
obtained three centuries ago. To deal with this revolutionary situation there
has been a recourse to geopolitical thinking. In particular, Erickson shows
 10 Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy
how there has been a restitution of the geopolitical approach coupled with
the introduction of the term national security. For the Russians national
security embraces the idea of the state as a tool assuring 'the best possible
conditions' for the individual, for society, and for the state itself, as
conditioned by the entire spectrum of active geopolitical factors.
In post-Soviet Russia geopolitics also has been subject to an astonishing
process of institutionalisation. The Section of Geopolitics and Security of
the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences was established for all practical
purposes by the Russian General Staff on 22 November 1991, its
membership composed of senior Russian officers associated with the
General Staff. This new institutional prominence is fused, as Erickson
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points out, with a radical revision in appreciation of Russian strategic

capabilities, replacing previous parity with the United States by an emphasis
on strategic stability. Yet it is also pointed out that the most important
factors in Russia's 'geopolitical security' are internal conditions rather than
external parameters.
In conclusion this special issue is one of the very few attempts to bring
together recent theoretical advances in geopolitical writing with strategic
analysis from a historical perspective. The resulting synthesis furthers the
debate about geopolitical theory and, more broadly, about the role of
geography in explaining the development of strategic thinking in the past
and its possible evolution in the future.
Three points emerge most prominently about the nature of geopolitical
theory: first, is its dynamic nature, a dynamism heavily attributable to the
changes in transport and weapons technology; second, is identification of
the main roles that geopolitical theory can play. First, it can fulfil an
interpretative role. It suggests a view of international politics and strategic
history which is shaped by the geographical configuration of land and sea
and the political development of particular states. Second, geopolitics can
function as a policy science. For goals to be secured certain geopolitical
perspectives have to be taken into consideration. Geopolitics can help
explain the structure of security problems. Third, geopolitics can be an
instrument of political warfare.
Furthermore, geopolitical ideas can be a convenient vehicle for
justification of political decisions taken on other grounds. The intended
effect is to give coherence to certain political aims. In the case of strategic
policy, political objectives are achieved through attention to the
geographical configuration of land and sea.
Finally, these different roles raise the question of the future utility of
geopolitical theory for those who will make strategy and policy. Sir Halford
 Why Geopolitics? 11
Mackinder, writing in 1942, provided a synthesis of the qualities that policy
makers will still find relevant in the twenty-first century:
They must have a global outlook and a quick readiness to meet
emergencies, for it was never more true than in this newly 'closed'
world that 'our stability is but balance, and wisdom lies in the
masterful administration of the unforeseen'; they must also have a
trained power of judging values and be capable of long views in
framing policies for the future; and they will, of course, still need an
understanding of the momentum with which both Man and his
environment come to the present from the past.7
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Above all else, Mackinder underlined the point that geopolitics, geography,
and strategy serve together.

NOTES

1. H. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little Brown 1979) p.914.
2. L.W. Hepple, 'The Revival of Geopolitics', Political Geography Quarterly 5/4 (Oct. 1986)
p.522.
3. H. and M. Sprout, 'Geography and International Relations in an Era of Revolutionary
Change', Journal of Conflict Resolution 6/1 (March 1960) p.145.
4. H.J. Mackinder, 'The Physical Basis of Political Geography', Scottish Geographical
Magazine 6 (1890) p.84.
5. C. Brown, Understanding International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press 1997)
p.53.
6. K. Haushofer, 'Pflight und Anspruch der Geopolitik als Wissenschaft', Zeitschrift für
Geopolitk 12 (1935) p.443.
7. H.J. Mackinder, 'Geography, an Art and a Philosophy', Geography 27 (1942) pp.129-30.