Evidence 3d

EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
CASE NAME
COPY THE FORMAT
FACTS:
1. Blah CTRL+F YOUR CASE TITLE, IT’S ALREADY DISTRIBUTED.
2. Blah DEADLINE: SUNDAY (MAR. 17, 2019), 11:59PM
a. Sub Blah
3. RTC ruled RULE 130
4. CA ruled Section 44.
1. DST Movers Corp. v. People’s General Insurance Corp., G.R. No.
ISSUES: 198627, January 12, 2016. - ANTE
1. WoN Blah is blah? YES/NO 2. People v. Pateño, G.R. No. 209040, December 9, 2015. - CAPUCHINO
3. Dimaguila v. Sps. Monteiro, Supra.
RULING + RATIO: 4. Sabili v. COMELEC, Supra.
1. Blah
a. Sub Blah Section 45.
2. Concept 1. MERALCO v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000. -
a. Explain explain REMOLLO, P.
2. PNOC Shipping & Transport v. CA, G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998,
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION? REVERSED? 297 SCRA 402. - HILADO
DOCTRINE: etc etc etc

Section 46.
Section 47.
1. Ambray v. Tsuorous, G.R. No. 209264, July 5, 2016. - MONTES
2. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011, 662
SCRA 152. - ROMERO
3. Manliclic v. Calaunan, G.R. No. 150157, January 25, 2007, 512 SCRA 642.
- BALONAN
Section 48.
Section 49.
1. Rosit v. Davao Doctors Hospital, G.R. No. 210445, December 5, 2015. -
SY
2. Casumpang v. Cortejo, G.R. No. 171127, 171217, 171228, March 11,
2015. - FERNANDO
3. Gepulle-Garpo v. Sps. Garabato, G.R. No. 200013, January 14, 2015. -
ALCANTARA
4. Dela Llana v. Biong, Supra.
5. Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., Supra.
6. Tabao v. People, G.R. No. 187246, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 216. -
ALCAZAR
Section 50.
1. Dela Llana v. Biong, Supra.
2. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 186533, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 452. -
CABUSORA
3. Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, G.R. No. 166470 & 169217, August 7,
2009, 595 SCRA 464. - CANDELARIA
1
Section 51.
1. CSC v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 578. -
BAUTISTA
2. People v. Lee, G.R. No. 139070, May 29, 2002. - REMOLLO, D.
2
DST Movers Corp. v. People’s General Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 198627, Report. It asserts that reliance on this Report was misplaced as it was
January 12, 2016 supposedly "improperly identified [and] uncorroborated.
FACTS: ISSUE/HELD: Whether it was an error for the Metropolitan Trial Court to admit
1. In a Complaint for Sum of Money filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of and lend evidentiary weight to the piece of evidence chiefly relied upon by
Manila, PGIC alleged that at about 10:30 p.m. on February 28, 2002, along respondent People’s General Insurance Corporation: the Traffic Accident
the South Luzon Expressway and in the area of Bilibid, Muntinlupa City, a Investigation Report prepared by PO2 Tomas. YES.
Honda Civic sedan with plate number URZ-976 (sedan) was hit on the rear
by an Isuzu Elf truck with plate number UAL-295 (truck). People’s General RATIO:
Insurance Corporation (PGIC) underscored that the sedan was on a stop 1. They consistently ruled that the proximate cause of the damage sustained
position when it was hit. by the sedan was the negligent driving of a vehicle owned by petitioner. This
2. The sedan was then allegedly pushed forward, thereby hitting a Mitsubishi conclusion is founded on the misplaced probative value accorded to a traffic
Lancer. The driver of the truck then allegedly escaped. accident investigation report. In the first place, this Report should not have
3. PGIC relied on a Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Report) prepared by been admitted as evidence for violating the Hearsay Rule. Bereft of
PO2 Cecilio Grospe Tomas (PO2 Tomas) of the Muntinlupa City Traffic evidentiary basis, the conclusion of the lower courts cannot stand as it has
Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police. This was attached as been reduced to conjecture.
Annex "E" of PGIC’s Complaint and also as Annex "E"of its Position Paper, 2. Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the
which states: Hearsay Rule. It renders inadmissible as evidence out-of-court statements
a. “It appears that while V1 was on stop position facing north at the made by persons who are not presented as witnesses but are offered as
aforesaid place of occurrence when the rear portion of the same proof of the matters stated. This rule proceeds from the basic rationale of
was allegedly hit/bumped by V3 which was moving same direction fairness, as the party against whom it is presented is unable to cross-
on the same place due to strong impact V1 pushed forward and hit examine the person making the statement
the left side rear portion of V2 causing damages and injuries a. The Hearsay Rule, however, is not absolute. Sections 37 to 47 of
thereon. After the impact, V3 escaped towards undisclosed Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence enumerate the
direction and left V1 & V2 at the place of accident. During exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. Of these, Section 44—regarding
investigation V1 & V2 driver gave voluntary handwritten statement entries in official records—is particularly relevant to this case:
and they were advised to submit medical certificate, i. SECTION 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in
estimate/photos of damages as annexes.” official records made in the performance of his duty by a
4. The truck was supposedly subsequently discovered to be owned by DST public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
Movers. The sedan was covered by PGIC’s insurance under Policy No. performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
HAL-PC-1314. As a result of the February 28, 2002 incident, the sedan’s facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
owner, Fidel Yuboco, filed a total loss claim with PGIC b. Precisely as an exception to the Hearsay Rule, Rule 130,
5. Asserting that it was subrogated to Fidel Yuboco’s rights and that the Section 44 does away with the need for presenting as witness
proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of the driver of the truck, the public officer or person performing a duty specially
PGIC, through counsel, sent DST Movers demand letters. PGIC demanded enjoined by law who made the entry. This, however, is only
from DST Movers the amount of P90,000.00, which represented the true, for as long the following requisites have been satisfied:
difference between the P320,000.00 paid by PGIC to Yuboco and the i. (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by
salvage price of P230,000.00, at which PGIC was supposedly able to sell another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
what remained of the sedan. ii. (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
6. Its demands not having been satisfied, PGIC proceeded to file its Complaint performance of his duties, or by such other person in
for Sum of Money before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
7. MTC Manila: DST Movers liable and
8. RTC and CA: Affirmed MTC iii. (c) that the public officer or other person had
9. DST Movers filed the present Petition insisting that its liability was not sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
established by a preponderance of evidence. Specifically, it faults the must have been acquired by him personally or
Metropolitan Trial Court for ruling in favor of PGIC despite how its version of through official information.
events was supported by nothing more the Traffic Accident Investigation c. Respondent, the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court,
and the Court of Appeals are all of the position that the Report
3
prepared by PO2 Tomas satisfies these requisites.1âwphi1 Thus, motor vehicle and/or the person responsible for the damage
they maintain that it is admissible as prima facie evidence of the sustained by the sedan. For this purpose, the testimony of G.
facts it states. Simbahon was necessary.
d. This despite the admitted fact that neither PO2 Tomas, nor the 4. Of course, we are aware that this case was decided by the Metropolitan Trial
person who supposedly reported the events of February 28, 2002 Court pursuant to the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (considering
to PO2 Tomas – the person identified as "G. Simbahon of that petitioner’s total claims amounted to less than P200,000.00).
PNCC/SLEX" – gave a testimony in support of the Report. They Accordingly, no trial was conducted as, after the conduct of a preliminary
are in serious error. conference, the parties were made to submit their position papers. There
3. The statements made by this court in Standard Insurance are on point: was, thus, no opportunity to present witnesses during an actual trial.
a. [F]or the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible a. However, Section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the calls for the submission of witnesses’ affidavits together with a
following requisites must be present: party’s position paper and after the conduct of a preliminary
b. (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another conference
person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made b. These affidavits take the place of actual testimony in court and
by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by serve to expedite the resolution of cases covered by the Revised
such other person in the performance of a duty specially Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, it was still insufficient for
enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person respondent to have merely annexed the Report to its Position
had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which Paper.
must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.
c. Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third requisite The assailed May 11, 2011 Decision and September 8, 2011 Resolution of the Court
cited above. As correctly noted by the courts below, while the of Appeals Former Twelfth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 109163 are REVERSED and
Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as evidence, the SET ASIDE. Respondent People's General Insurance Corporation's Complaint is
investigating officer who prepared the same was not presented in DISMISSED.
court to testify that he had sufficient knowledge of the facts therein
stated, and that he acquired them personally or through official
information. Neither was there any explanation as to why such
officer was not presented. We cannot simply assume, in the
absence of proof, that the account of the incident stated in the
report was based on the personal knowledge of the investigating
officer who prepared it.
d. Respondent presented proof of the occurrence of an accident that
damaged Fidel Yuboco’s Honda Civic sedan, that the sedan was
insured by respondent, and that respondent paid Fidel Yuboco’s
insurance claims. As to the identity, however, of the vehicle or of
the person responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan, all
that respondent relies on is the Report prepared by PO2 Tomas.
e. It is plain to see that the matters indicated in the Report are not
matters that were personally known to PO2 Tomas. The Report is
candid in admitting that the matters it states were merely reported
to PO2 Tomas by "G. Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX." It was this "G.
Simbahon," not PO2 Tomas, who had personal knowledge of the
facts stated
f. To be admitted as evidence, it was thus imperative for the person
who prepared the Report—PO2 Tomas—to have himself presented
as a witness and then testify on his Report. However, even as the
Report would have been admitted as evidence, PO2 Tomas’
testimony would not have sufficed in establishing the identity of the
4
People v. Pateño, G.R. No. 209040, December 9, 2015 1. As in the aforestated case, AAA did not immediately report the incident to
her teacher and instead, she suffered for four more similar incidents before
FACTS: she broke her silence. AAA was only able to report the incident when she
1. Except for the dates, the five (5) Informations identically charge accused- was away from the custody of accused-appellant and when she felt safe.
appellant of rape committed as follow: 2. AAA's credibility was upheld by the trial court, which is in a position to
a. “March 25, 2002 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening at x x x, observe the candor, behavior and demeanor of the witness. Findings of the
Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this lower courts with respect to credibility of the rape victim are conclusive.
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the father of 14-year old 3. The RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the twin qualifying circumstances
[AAA], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by of minority and relationship. Accused-appellant admitted during the pre-trial
force, threat or intimidation, insert his penis into the vagina of his conference that AAA was his daughter. Thus, relationship between accused-
said daughter and had carnal knowledge of her against her will and appellant and AAA is established. Anent the element of minority, the
consent”. prosecution presented a certification from the UCCP Office in Ayungon,
2. On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Negros Occidental stating that AAA was baptized according to the rites and
3. AAA related that she was only four years old when her parents left her to the ceremonies of the UCCP.
care of her aunt, BBB. AAA started living with accused-appellant only in 4. The certification shows that AAA was born on 10 September 1987 to
2000 in a two-bedroom house. On 25 March 2002 at around 10:00 p.m., accused-appellant and a certain Nely Fabel. A page of the UCCP
AAA, then 14 years old, was awakened by accused-appellant who removed Membership Book was submitted bearing the same information. It was held
her short pants and underwear. that a birth certificate, baptismal certificate, school records or documents of
4. Accused-appellant likewise took off his clothes. He threatened AAA with a similar nature can be presented to prove the age of a victim.
scythe and ordered her to stay quiet. He then mounted her and made 5. (IMPORTANT) In this case, the Membership Book, which is considered
pumping motions. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant left without an entry in official records under Section 44,Rule 130 of the Rules of
saying a word. He proceeded to perform this bestial act on AAA for the four Court, is admissible as prima facie of their contents and corroborative
(4) succeeding nights of AAA's testimony as to her age. Moreover, entries in public or official
5. (IMPORTANT FACTS): A pastor of the United Church of Christ of the books or records may be proved by the production of the books or
Philippines (UCCP) testified on the contents of the Membership Record records themselves or by a copy certified by the legal keeper thereof.
Book which show that AAA was born on 10 September 1987 and was
baptized on 5 June 1988. Said document also listed accused-appellant DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Rodolfo Pateño y Dayapdapan is
as AAA's father. found GUILTY for each count of the crime of rape, qualified by minority and
6. He denied raping AAA and claimed that AAA is taking revenge because relationship, charged under Criminal Case Nos. F-03-12-A, F-03-13-A, F-03-14-A, F-
during a beauty contest in April of that year, he pinched AAA in front of her 03-15-A, and F-03-16-A and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
fellow contestants and barangay councilors. perpetuawithout eligibility for parole, in lieu of death. He is also ORDERED to pay
7. Accused-appellant's nephew, Rene testified that accused-appellant lived AAA the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
with him but AAA was living with his sister. Rene's sister Arly corroborated and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape, plus legal interest at
Rene's statement that AAA was living with her on the dates of the alleged the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Resolution until the amounts due are
rape incidents. fully paid.
8. Both witnesses speculated that AAA wrongfully accused her father of rape
because she harbored a grudge towards accused-appellant who would DOCTRINE: Bolded
always scold her.
9. RTC RULED: ccused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of five (5) counts of rape.
10. CA RULED: the assailed judgment affirming with modification as to the
damages
ISSUE/HELD: W/N the Membership Book is considered an entry in official records to

be admissible as prima facie of their contents and corroborative of AAA’s testimony
as to her age? YES.
RATIO:
5
Dimaguila v. Sps. Monteiro, Supra reflected in the cadastral map of Liliw, which were claimed by an
heir of Vitaliano and Perfecto himself.
FACTS: c. Dimaguilas admitted this fact in their original answer.
1. Sps Monteiro along with others, filed a complaint for partition and damages d. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the ROC provides that an admission made
before the RTC against the Dimaguilas claiming that they were all co-owners by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does
of a residential house. not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it
2. Sps Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor was made through palpable mistake.
by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila. i. Their contention that it was the mistake of their former
3. The DImaguilas claimed that there was no co-ownership since the property counsel since the latter was in a rush to file the answer
was already partitioned equally between the 2 sons of Maria Buenaseda, was unacceptable.
Perfecto and Vitaliano with the Dimaguilas being heirs of Vitaliano. ii. Such position was also adopted only almost 8 years after
4. Sps Monteiro amended their complaint and sought the recovery of their original answer was filed.
possession of a portion of the property sold to them instead of a partition. iii. The claim that there was already a partition into north and
5. Sps Monteiro in their amended complaint adopted the admission of the south portions was the essence of their defense.
Dimaguilas that the property was already partitioned with Perfecto being the e. Since an admission does not require proof, the admission of the
owner of the southern half and Vitaliano the owner of the northern half. Dimaguilas was already sufficient to prove the partition even
6. Sps Monteiro claimed that Perfecto was survived by Esperanza, Leandro, without the documents presented by Sps Monteiro.
and Pedro, who divided Perfecto’s portion into ⅓ each and that Pedro’s 2. The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map and the
share was the one sold to them. list of claimants presented by the respondent spouses, on the ground that
7. Dimaguilas admitted that the property was inherited by and divided equally they violated the rule on hearsay and the best evidence rule.
between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their original 3. Anent the best evidence rule
answer that it had been actually divided into southern and northern portions. a. Section 3 (d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when
They even argued the existence of a co-ownership. the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
8. RTC ruled for Sps Monteiro and ordered Dimaguilas to turn over the shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except
possession of the subject ⅓ portion of the southern half of the property. RTC when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer
appreciated the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of or is recorded in a public office.
claimants which showed that property was registered under an heir of b. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a
Vitaliano. It also held that the manner of partition was admitted by the document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
Dimaguilas on their original answer. public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued
9. CA affirmed the ruling. by the public officer in custody thereof.
10. Dimaguilas claim that the original allegation on the partition of the property c. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public
into north and south portions was a mistake of their former counsel and even documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer
assuming that an admission was made, such was made only by some but having the legal custody or the record.
not all of the co-owners. d. Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the
corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the map
ISSUE: WON there was a partition were presented by two public officers.
i. The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal
RULING + RATIO: Assessor's Office, a repository of such documents.
1. YES. ii. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee,
a. Sps Monteiro presented the ff: 1) Deed of Extrajudicial Partition who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records of
executed by and between Perfecto and Vitaliano; 2) Cadastral map surveyed land involving cadastral maps.
of Liliw; and 3) the Municipal Assessor’s records showing that the e. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true
said lots were respectively claimed by Buenaventura and Perfecto. copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best
b. The Deed of Extrajudicial PArtition stated that Perfectio and evidence rule.
Vitaliano agreed “to divide between them into 2 and share and 4. As to the hearsay rule
share alike” the subject property, including the house situated a. Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides
thereon. However, it appeared that the property was actually that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The
partitioned into definite portions, north and south portions, as rule provides that entries in official records made in the
6
performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines,

or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and
difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to
testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his
duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
b. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is
the department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the
conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the
cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as
entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as
mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule
and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
c. Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition,
they presented no evidence to contradict the evidence of the
respondent spouses. Thus, even without the admission of the
petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of
evidence that there had indeed been a partition of the subject
property.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 15, 2011 Decision and the March
15, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G .R. CV No. 92707 are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that:
a. The award of rent at the rate of ₱500.00 per month shall be reckoned from January
2, 2001 until the property is vacated; and
b. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on the total amount of rent
due from finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: In bold
7
Sabili v. COMELEC, Supra. Palomares, particularly regarding her assertion that the Lipa property had
been purchased solely with petitioner’s money.
FACTS 5. If the COMELEC accepts the registration of the Lipa property in her name to
1. Petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections where be accurate, her affidavit disavowing ownership thereof in favor of petitioner
he stated that he had been a resident of the city for 2 years and 8 months. was far from self-serving as it ran counter to her (and her children’s) property
2. Private respondent filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel COC interest.
claiming that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in his COC 6. Moreover, it is notable that Palomares’s assertion in her affidavit that she
and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency. and petitioner have been living in Lipa since April 2007 is corroborated by
3. Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had other evidence, including the affidavits of barangay officials and neighbors.
already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to
the scheduled local elections. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED.
4. In support of his allegation, private respondent presented (1) Certificates
regarding ownership of real property; (2) petitioners Voter Registration and
Certification (common exhibits of the parties); (3) petitioners COCs in
previous elections; (3) Certifications regarding petitioners family members;
and (4) Affidavits of Lipa City residents.
5. Petitioner also presented evidence, among which was an affidavit
executed by his common-law wife Palomares, wherein the latter swore
that she and petitioner began residing in Lipa City in 2007, and that the
funds used to purchase the Lipa property were petitioner’s personal
funds.
6. COMELEC declared petitioner disqualified.
7. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, during the pendency of which he was
elected. MR denied.
8. Petitioner argues that since the property regime between him and
Palomares is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code (based on the
parties actual contribution) as the COMELEC stressed, then Palomares’s
Affidavit expressly stating that petitioners money alone had been used to
purchase the Lipa property (notwithstanding that it was registered in her
name) was not self-serving, but was in fact, a declaration against interest.
ISSUE/HELD: WON Palomares’s affidavit was a declaration against interest -- NO
RATIO:
1. Petitioner’s argument that Palomares’s affidavit was a declaration against
interest is, strictly speaking, inaccurate and irrelevant.
2. A declaration against interest, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, refers to a
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify against the
interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time
it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed
it to be true. A declaration against interest is an exception to the hearsay
rule.
3. As such, it pertains only to the admissibility of, not the weight accorded to,
testimonial evidence.
4. Nevertheless, the court saw logic in petitioners claim that the COMELEC
had committed GADALEJ in being inconsistent in its stand regarding
8
MERALCO v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000 party should act oppressively against the other or impair the interest or
convenience of the public.
FACTS: 2. CBA arbitral awards granted after six months from the expiration of the last
1. This is an MR of the SC’s decision in G.R. No. 127598. January 27, 1999. CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer and the
You may skip the parts not in bold. IMPORTANT PARTS IN BOLD. employees or their union. Absent such an agreement as to retroactivity, the
2. In 1999 the SC promulgated a decision directing the parties to execute a award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the
CBA which provided for increase in wages and retroactive application of expiration of the last day of the CBA should there be one. In the absence of
arbitral awards. MERALCO filed this petition arguing that an increase in a CBA, the Secretary’s determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his
wages will result in higher rates of electricity which will be passed to the discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.
consumers. The Union likewise asks for reconsideration in so far as the 3. There is no merit in the union’s claim that it is no different from housing
1999 decision denied them the benefit of being granted loans to set up a loans. The award of loans for housing is justified because it pertains to a
cooperative. Finally, the Union questions the right given to MERALCO in basic necessity. In contrast, providing seed money for the establishment of
contracting out jobs without need to consult the Union. the cooperative is a matter in which the employer has no business interest or
3. Basically the issue in this MR stems from the difference of the legal obligation.
projected net operating income of MERALCO that the UNION has 4. The employer is allowed to contract out services for six months or more.
compared to the figures generate by the former. However, a line must be drawn between management prerogatives
4. The focal point in the consideration of the wage award is the projected regarding business operations per se and those which affect the rights of
net income for 1996 which became the basis for the 1996 wage award, employees, and in treating the latter, the employer should see to it that its
which in turn - by extrapolation - became the basis for the (2 nd Year) employees are at least properly informed of its decision or modes of action
1997 award. in order to attain a harmonious labor-management relationship and enlighten
5. MERALCO: projected that the net operating income for 1996 was 14.7% the workers concerning their rights. Hiring of workers is within the employer’s
above the 1999 level or a total net operating income of 4.171 Billion inherent freedom to regulate and is a valid exercise of its management
6. UNION: while the union placed the 1996 net operating income at 5.795 prerogative subject only to special laws and agreements on the matter and
Billion. the fair standards of justice. While there should be mutual consultation,
7. MERALCO based its projection on the increase of the income for the first 6 eventually deference is to be paid to what management decides.
months of 1996 over the same period in 1995. The union, on the other hand, 5. (RELEVANT TOPIC) The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union
projected that the 1996 income would increase by 29% to 35% because the relies to support its position regarding the wage issue cannot be an
consumption of electric power is at its highest during the last two quarters accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage
with the advent of the Yuletide season. The union likewise relied heavily increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:
on a newspaper report citing an estimate by an all Asia capital financial a. "Commercial lists and the like. - Evidence of statements of
analyst that the net operating income would amount to 5.795 Billion. matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation
contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
ISSUES: compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any
1. W/N increase in wages will result in higher prices of electricity relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for
2. W/N grant of arbitral awards retroactive use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally
3. W/N cooperative may demand for the loan for a cooperative used and relied upon by them therein."
4. W/N contracting without need to consult Union valid provision 6. Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a
5. W/N the All Asia Capital report is considered an accurate basis and periodical may be admitted only "if that compilation is published for
conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase? (RELEVANT TOPIC) use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated
January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and not
RULING + RATIO
even a commercial list.
1. This is a non sequitur. An increase in the prices of electric current needs the
7. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive
approval of the appropriate regulatory government agency and does not
weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it
automatically result from a mere increase in the wages. Collective
were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot
bargaining disputes "requires due consideration and proper balancing of the
be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in
interests of the parties to the dispute and of those who might be affected by
their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the
the dispute."It should be noted that the relations between labor and capital is
impressed with public interest which must yield to the common good. Neither
9
publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the

market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable.
8. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not
admissible. In the same manner, newspapers containing stock
quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source of the
reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of
such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report
in this case can be easily made available considering that the same is
necessary for compliance with certain governmental requirements.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is partially granted and the assailed
Decision is modified as follows: (1) the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1,
1995 to November 30, 1997; and (2) the award of wage is increased from the original
amount of One Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P1,900.00) to Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) for the years 1995 and 1996. This Resolution is subject to the monetary
advances granted by petitioner to its rank-and-file employees during the pendency of
this case assuming such advances had actually been distributed to them. The
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
DOCTRINE:
1. Statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only "if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and
is generally used and relied upon by them therein." The cited report is a
mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list.
2. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight
for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were
presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation.
Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly
prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally
regarded as trustworthy and reliable.
10
PNOC Shipping & Transport v. CA, G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998, 297 SCRA of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of
402 the contents since he was not the author.
4. The price quotations presented partake of the nature of hearsay evidence
FACTS: considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as
1. MV Maria Efigenia, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corp (MEFC), collided witnesses. Any evidence, oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative
with the vessel Petroparcel, which was owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corp value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the
(LSC) while on its way to Navotas. knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay
2. Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI) made a decision finding Petroparcel at fault. evidence, objected or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can
3. After unsuccessful demands on PNOC, MEFC sued LSC and the captain of show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
Petroparcel, Doruelo, and prayed for damages. rule. The pieces of evidence did not fall under any of the exceptions under
4. MEFC amended its complaint for failure to plead for recovery of the lost Sec 37 to 47 of Rule 130.
value of the hull. It alleged that MV Maria Efigenia had an actual value of 5. The CA considered it as an exception to the hearsay rule under Sec 45 of
P800k and after deducting the insurance payment of P200k, the amount of Rule 130 regarding commercial lists. However, a document is a commercial
P600k should likewise be claimed and it was further amended to include list if 1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
PNOC as defendant. occupation; 2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical, or
5. During the pre-trial, the stipulation of facts showed that LSC executed a other published compilation; 3) said compilation is published for the use of
Deed of Transfer in favor of PNOC over several of its properties, including persons engaged in that occupation; and 4) it is generally used and relied
Petroparcel. There was also an Agreement of Transfer wherein LSC upon by persons in the same occupation. In this case, the evidence are not
transferred all the business properties to PNOC and that the latter also commercial lists under Sec 45. The evidence are mere price quotations
assumed all the obligations arising from the Petroparcel. issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of
6. The decision of the BMI was affirmed by the Ministry of National Defense. equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the 2 vessels. These are
7. Lower court ordered PNOC to pay MEFC taking into account the testimony not published in any list, register periodical or other compilation on the
of the MEFC’s general manager Rosario stating that MEFC owned MV relevant subject matter. Neither are these market reports or quotations within
Maria. the purview of commercial lists as there are not standard handbooks or
8. As to the award of P6.4M, the lower court considered several documentary periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in
evidence from MEFC, while PNOC only presented its senior estimator the work of the occupation.
without any other documentary evidence. 6. Even if CA correctly ruled on the admissibility of these letters or
9. CA affirmed ruling that the alleged inadmissible documentary evidence were communications, it still should not be given probative weight. Being mere
never satisfactorily rebutted by the sole witness of PNOC and that such hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letters renders its
witness heavily relied on the very same pieces of evidence (quotations). contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to
10. PNOC claimed that the amount of P6.4M damages was not adequately or not, has no probative value.
proven by the pieces of evidence produced.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated
ISSUE: WON the award of actual damages was adequately proven. October 14, 1992 in CA-G. R. CV No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual
RULING + RATIO: NO. damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount of
1. To recover actual or compensatory damages, the injured party is required to P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. Considering the fact, however,
prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty that: (1) technically petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. adequately and properly proved, and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two
2. In this case, the pieces of documentary evidence proffered by MEFC with decades, we believe that an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) in favor of private
respect to items and equipment lost show similar items and equipment with respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.
corresponding prices 10 years after the collision. PNOC did not object to the
evidence in terms of the time index for valuation of the lost goods and
equipment but only that it was not duly authenticated and the witness did not
have personal knowledge on the contents.
3. However, the SC ruled that the price quotations are ordinary private writings
which under the ROC should have been proffered along with the testimony
11
Ambray v. Tsuorous, G.R. No. 209264, July 5, 2016 merely concluded that the prosecution failed to establish petitioners'
participation in the alleged falsification.
FACTS: 11. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision and found that respondents were able to
1. Petitioners and respondents are siblings. With the exception of Sylvia, they sufficiently discharge the required burden of proof that the subject Deed of
are the children of the late Ceferino, Sr. and Estela, who passed away on Sale is spurious. MR denied.
February 5, 1987 and August 15, 2002, respectively.
2. During their lifetime, Ceferino, Sr. and Estela owned several properties, ISSUE: whether or not the Deed of Sale should be nullified.
one of which was a parcel of land located in San Pablo City, Laguna
denominated as Lot 2. In 1977, Ceferino, Sr. mortgaged Lot 2 with Manila RULING + RATIO: No.
Bank. The mortgage was discharged in 1984. 1. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive
3. Prior to the discharge of the mortgage or sometime in 1984, Lot 2 was and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
subdivided into three (3) lots: Lot 2-A, Lot 2-B, and the subject property, Lot forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his case by a
2-C, resulting in the cancellation of the TCT. Lot 2-C was registered in preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more
Ceferino, Sr.' s name. convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The fact of forgery
4. In June 1996, Maristela discovered that the TCT covering Lot 2-C had been can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged
cancelled and in its stead, a new TCT was issued in the name of petitioners. signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose
It appears that by virtue of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of signature is theorized to have been forged.
Sale) dated January 16, 1978, Ceferino, Sr., with the consent of Estela, 2. Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of
allegedly sold "a portion of lot 2 of the consolidation subd. plan (LRC)" handwriting may be proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who
to petitioners for a consideration of P150,000.00. The Deed of Sale was believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
registered with the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City only on February 5, person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
1996. witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the
5. This prompted respondents to file a criminal case for falsification of public witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
document against petitioners. MTCC acquitted petitioners for failure of the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. satisfaction of the judge. Corollary thereto, jurisprudence states that the
6. Thereafter, respondents filed the instant complaint for annulment of title, presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and
reconveyance, and damages against petitioners and Estela (defendants), , fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness
alleging that the new TCT and the Deed of Sale were null and void because who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had
the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela thereon were forgeries. personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes
7. In a motion to dismiss, defendants (petitioners) claimed that the issue on the indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.
authenticity of the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale 3. In this case, the only direct evidence presented by respondents to prove
had already been passed upon in the falsification case where petitioners their allegation of forgery is Questioned Documents Report dated March 24,
were eventually acquitted; hence, the matter was res judicata. The RTC 1997 issued by NBI Document Examiner II Magbojos, stating that the
granted the motion and dismissed the case on said ground. CA reversed the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale, when compared
decision finding that res judicata does not apply. Thus, it remanded the case to standard sample signatures, are not written by one and the same person.
to the RTC for further proceedings. 4. In refutation, petitioners offered in evidence, inter alia, the testimony of
8. Before the RTC, petitioners filed their answer and disclosed the death of their mother, Estela, in the falsification case where petitioners were
their co-defendant and mother, Estela, who passed away on August 15, previously acquitted. In the course thereof, she identified the signatures on
2002. By way of defense, they averred, inter alia, that respondents were the Deed of Sale as hers and Ceferino, Sr.' s, which was fully corroborated
aware of the conveyance of Lot 2-C to them through the Deed of Sale. They by Atty. Tanalega, the notary public who notarized the subject Deed of Sale
also claimed that respondents' action has prescribed, and maintained that it and was present at the time the Ambray spouses affixed their signatures
was barred by prior judgment and res judicata. thereon.
9. The RTC nullified the Deed of Sale as well as the TCT in the name of 5. Between the Questioned Documents Report presented by respondents and
petitioners and rendered judgment in favor of respondents. the testimony given by Estela in the falsification case in support of
10. The RTC also said that with respect to the issue of forgery of the signatures petitioners' defense, the Court finds greater evidentiary weight in favor of the
of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the subject Deed of Sale, the RTC took note latter. Hence, respondent's complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance,
of the CA's opinion in that the MTCC, in the falsification case, made no and damages in the Civil Case should be dismissed.
categorical finding as to the existence of falsification. Instead, the MTCC
12
6. While the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of likewise verified her signature thereon. By virtue of these declarations, she
judgment, as espoused by petitioners, is of doubtful application in this confirmed the genuineness and authenticity of the questioned signatures.
case - considering that the MTCC, in the falsification case, failed to Thus, it follows that the Deed of Sale itself is valid and duly executed,
categorically pronounce that the Deed of Sale was not falsified and contrary to the finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that it was of
merely concluded that petitioners had no participation in any alleged spurious nature.
falsification - the Court nonetheless observes that petitioners, through the 12. Further lending credence to the validity of the Deed of Sale is the well-
testimony of Estela thereat, were able to establish the genuineness and due settled principle that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie
execution of the subject Deed of Sale which effectively conveyed title over presumption of authenticity and due execution as well as the full faith and
Lot 2-C to them. Estela's testimony constitutes direct evidence of the credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn this legal presumption,
authenticity of the signatures on the Deed of Sale, having personal evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant to
knowledge thereof, which undeniably prevails over the written findings of a establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract.
purported handwriting expert that can only be considered indirect or 13. Hence, for the above-state reasons, whatever inferences the RTC had
circumstantial evidence. observed tending to defeat the existence of a valid sale in favor of petitioners
7. Notably, the admissibility of Estela's former testimony in the present case are rendered inconsequential.
finds basis in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence or the "rule on
former testimony". DISPOSITION:
8. [DOCTRINE] Case law holds that for the said rule to apply, the following WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed April 25, 2013 Decision and
requisites must be satisfied: the September 24, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95606
a. (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant complaint for annulment of title,
b. (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or reconveyance, and damages is DISMISSED.
proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or SO ORDERED.
those representing the same interests;
c. (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present
case, although on different causes of action;
d. (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the
same issue involved in the present case and
e. (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness in the former case.
9. [DOCTRINE] The reasons for the admissibility of testimony taken at a
former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the testimony and its
trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony can be introduced in
evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the
party must establish the basis for the admission of testimony in the realm of
admissible evidence.
10. Records show that Estela died during the pendency of these proceedings
before the RTC or on August 15, 2002. Her death transpired before the
presentation of the parties' evidence could ensue. However, she was able
to testify on direct and cross-examination in the falsification case and
affirmed that the alleged forged signatures appearing on the Deed of Sale
were, indeed, hers and her deceased husband, Ceferino, Sr.'s. The parties
in the falsification case involved respondents and petitioners herein,
and the subject matter therein and in this case are one and the same,
i.e., the genuineness and authenticity of the signatures of Ceferino, Sr.
and Estela.
11. Clearly, the former testimony of Estela in the falsification case, being
admissible in evidence in these proceedings, deserves significant
consideration. She gave positive testimony that it was Ceferino, Sr. himself
who signed the Deed of Sale that conveyed Lot 2-C to petitioners. She
13
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 152 i. The stated purpose of Bane Deposition is for Bane to
(This was also a case in Section 1, Rule 129 -- original digest slightly edited, with identify and testify on the facts set forth in the affidavit…
discussion on current syllabus topic added) so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of PCGG
and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for
FACTS: sequestration of ETPI’s stock in support of the Urgent
1. Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint against a Jose L. Africa, Petition. It is also stated that PCGG shall use the Bane
Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand Deposition in evidence, in the main case of Civil Case No.
R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the 0009.
respondents) before the Sandiganbayan (SB). ii. Only Africa was present on the deposition date, where he
2. The complaint is specifically for: econveyance, reversion, accounting, was able to cross-examine Bane.
restitution, and damages. b. SB granted the Urgent Petition. Africa went to the SC, through a
a. RP alleges that respondents manipulated the purchase of major petition for certiorari, questioning SB’s grant of the Urgent Petition
shareholdings of ETPI1. (G.R. No. 147214). SC jointly resolved G.R. Nos. 107789 and
3. Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject. Other cases were spawned 147214 by referring both petitions to SB for reception of evidence to
from this same case, among them Civil Case no. 0130: determine whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the
a. This 0130 case involves two competing board of directors. The first sequestered shares are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger
board was conducted by PCGG. The second was conducted at a of dissipation to entitle PCGG to vote them in a stockholders
special stockholders meeting. meeting to elect the ETPI Board of Directors and to amend the
b. Africa was a registered shareholder of ETPI. He filed a petition for ETPI AoI for increasing its authorized capital stock
certiorari with the SB against the PCGG orders, that ordered: 7. At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, PCGG filed a Motion where it is stated
i. Africa to account his sequestered shares that in the hearings of the incidents of Civil Case No. 0009 (including Civil
ii. To cease and desist from representing himself as a Case No. 0130), one of the witnesses was Maurice Bane, and that PCGG
director wishes to adopt in Civil Case No. 0009 the testimonies and documentary
iii. To no longer participate in the management of ETPI exhibits presented in the incidents of Civil Case No. 0009, and that the
4. While Civil Case No. 0130 was pending, Africa filed a motion with the SB, adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses.
alleging that the PCGG had been illegally exercising the rights of a. To this Motion, respondents filed their Opposition.
stockholders of ETPI, especially in the election of the members of the board b. SB denied this Motion in a 1998 Resolution. As regards Bane, the
of directors. Africa prayed for a stockholders meeting to be held under the SB denied the Motion for the reason that Bane as deponent is not
court’s control and supervision. available for cross-examination.
i. SB favored Africa’s motion. PCGG brought this resolution 8. PCGG did not in any way question the 1998 Resolution; instead it made a
up to the SC in a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 107789), Formal Offer of Evidence which excluded the Bane Deposition. Later on,
but the SCt enjoined Sandiganbayan from implementing PCGG filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice.
the assailed resolution. a. Prayers of Urgent Motion: (1) order re-opening the plaintiff’s case
5. SB then ordered consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among others, with and setting the same for trial for the sole purpose of introducing
Civil Case No. 0009. additional evidence and limited only to the markin and offering of
6. During the pendency of G.R. No. 107789, PCGG filed with the SC an urgent the Bane Deposition which already forms part of the records and
petition to hold a special meeting to increase the authorized capital stock. used in Civil Case No. 0130; and (2) in the alternative, the
Said Urgent Petition was then referred to SB, and the SB included the Sandiganbayan to take judicial notice of the facts established by
Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130. the Bane Deposition, together with the marked exhibits appended.
a. To resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Maurice V. Bane, b. The Sandiganbayan denied this Motion, holding that admission of
former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI, was taken, - at the Bane Deposition should be through ordinary formal offer of
PCGG’s instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking evidence wherein the respondents could be given the opportunity
on respondents - by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane to cross-examine.
Deposition) before the Consul General of the Philippine Embassy in 9. PCGG filed a third Motion, seeking to admit the Bane Deposition. This was,
London, England. however, denied by the Sandiganbayan, for being a Motion for
Reconsideration filed beyond the reglementary period.
10. Hence the present petition to the Supreme Court where PCGG argues that
1 Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not taking judicial
14
notice of the Bane Deposition in Civil Case No 0130, the Bane Deposition the “parent” case - Civil Case No. 0009 - or of the whole family
being evidence already adduced in the “parent” case - Civil Case No. 0009. cases.
Respondents counter that the Bane Deposition cannot be a proper subject of b. The Court STRONGLY DISAGREES. The petitioner admits that the
judicial notice under Rule 129. present case has spawned a lot of cases, which involve issues of
varying complexity. Agreeing with petitioner’s contention would
ISSUES: espouse judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing admission of
1. W/N judicial notice may be taken to include evidence adduced in another evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and
case? NO, as a general rule. Subject, however, to certain EXCEPTIONS relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of
which do not exist in this case. (previous syllabus topic for Section 1, the cases. It is petitioner’s duty, as a party-litigant, to properly lay
Rule 129) before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it
2. W/N the Bane deposition is admissible in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of seeks.
the ROC? (current syllabus topic) (start from #5 of ratio, if in a rush) i. Lopez v. Sandiganbayan: “...the Judge in trying a case
sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing
RULING + RATIO: about the facts of the case, except those which have been
1. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly adduced judicially in evidence… it is incumbent upon the
take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to litigants to the action to establish by evidence the facts
them. It is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further upon which they rely…”
traditional evidentiary support. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter 5. The petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence
is so notorious that it would not be disputed. without observing the provisions of S47, R130. The former case or
2. A party-litigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the proceeding that S47, R130 speaks of no longer exists in light of the prior
court may allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial consolidation.
notice of the matter involved. 6. The SC discussed that In the context of legal procedure, the term
a. Here, respondents were able to file their oppositions. consolidation is used in three different senses:
3. In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take a. Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried,
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such in which case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such
that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the (quasi-consolidation)
same judge. This rule, admits of exceptions: b. Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate
(1) a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment is
a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are
before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection pending between the same parties stating claims which might have
from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)
name and number or in some other manner by which it is c. Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate
case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a
court’s direction, at the request of or with the consent of the parties, single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the
and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending; and other. (consolidation for trial)
(2) court should take judicial notice of the records of another case 7. The SC ruled that petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely
of cases where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case a consolidation for trial.
before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case 8. The consolidated actions were originally independent of one another.
4. Petitioner argues that since the Bane Deposition had already been a. In the present case the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009
previously introduced and admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the (an action for reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages)
Sandiganbayan ought to have taken judicial notice of the Bane Deposition are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a special civil action filed by
as part of Civil Case No. 0009. an ETPI stockholder involving a corporate squabble within ETPI),
a. Petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a 9. To impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation
genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in (which find no clear support in the provisions of the ROC, jurisprudence, and
any of the “children” cases - Civil Case No. 0130 - as evidence in even in the proceedings before the SB itself and despite the aforementioned
considerations) results in an outright deprivation of the petitioners right to
15
due process. We reach this conclusion especially where the evidence justify the use of the same deposition in another case or proceeding, even if
sought to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one of the several the other case or proceeding is before the same court.
cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another jurisdiction 3. Since the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition, in principle, being
and whose admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on necessity, the burden of establishing its existence rests on the party who
evidence. seeks the admission of the evidence. This burden cannot be supplanted by
assuming the continuity of the previous condition or conditions in light of the
Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under general rule against the non-presentation of the deponent in court.
Section 47, Rule 130
1. Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending
action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due
observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as a condition
for admissibility, compliance with the rules on evidence.
2. Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied
reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition
may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner
failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition
under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section
47, Rule 130.
3. Since depositions are principally made available to the parties as a means of
informing themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are not meant as
substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness.
Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open
court at the trial or hearing..
4. That opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the
deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-examination
must normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence
is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing of a case.
5. The opportunity to cross-examine in S47, R130 is not the ordinary cross-
examination. The rule requires that the issues involved in both cases must,
at least, be substantially the same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that
the former statement was - or would have been - sufficiently tested by cross-
examination or by an opportunity to do so.
6. What the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan found, for
purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid
down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to
those of Section 47.
.
DISPOSITION: Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.
DOCTRINES:
1. Where the deposition is taken not for discovery purposes, but to
accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be rejected in
evidence
2. The SB’s reliance on the Bane deposition in the other case (Civil Case No.
0130) is an argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the witness.
For purposes of the present case (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the SB
would have no basis to presume that the previous condition, which
previously allowed the use of the deposition, remains and would thereby
16
Manliclic v. Calaunan, G.R. No. 150157, January 25, 2007, 512 SCRA 642 liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not
parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
FACTS: 5. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said
1. Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and owner-type criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on
jeep owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
Mendoza. 6. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an
2. The two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the
the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely
right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the
damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the
collision. provisions of the law. Even assuming that these documents are inadmissible
3. By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may
Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently on 2 7. Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but,
December 1991 when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be
4. Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and considered and given the importance it deserves.
PRBLI. 8. In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs
5. Counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza
(TSNs) of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered
Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil in evidence in the trial court.
case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil 9. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were
case. admitted by both petitioners. Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in
evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the
ISSUE/HELD: WON the transcripts may be admitted in evidence? Yes, criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of
plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant
RATIO: case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was
1. Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos should not be admitted cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the
in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for
2. For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of
a. the witness is dead or unable to testify the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
b. his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of
proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same Ganiban would be unfair.
parties or those representing the same interests
c. the former case involved the same subject as that in the DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is
present case, although on different causes of action DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is
d. the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be
issue involved in the present case reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to
e. the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
witness in the former case
3. Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites
set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to
be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
4. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no
opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The
criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic,
petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary
17
Rosit v. Davao Doctors Hospital, G.R. No. 210445, December 5, 2015 Gestuvo negligent and ruled, ordering him to pay. The trial court applied the
res ipsa loquitur principle holding that "the need for expert, medical
FACTS: testimony may be dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof
1. This is a suit for damages which Nilo B. Rosit (Rosit) commenced against of negligence."
Dr. Rolando Gestuvo (Dr. Gestuvo). 9. CA: deleted the awards made by the RTC for “lack of basis.” Unlike the
2. On January 15, 1999, Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident. RTC, the CA ruled that the res ipsa loquitur principle is not applicable and
a. The X-ray soon taken the next day at the Davao Doctors Hospital that the testimony of an expert witness is necessary for a finding of
(DDH) showed that he fractured his jaw. Rosit was then referred to negligence. The CA gave credence to Dr. Pangan's letter stating the opinion
Dr. Gestuvo, a specialist in mandibular injuries who operated on that Dr. Gestuvo did not commit gross negligence in his emergency
Rosit. management of Rosit's fractured mandible.
b. During the operation, Dr. Gestuvo used a metal plate fastened to 10. Rosit’s MR was denied. Thus, this case.
the jaw with metal screws to immobilize the mandible. As the
operation required the smallest screws available, Dr. Gestuvo cut ISSUES:
the screws on hand to make them smaller. Dr. Gestuvo knew that 1. [EVIDENCE-RELATED ISSUE] W/N an expert witness is necessary in this
there were smaller titanium screws available in Manila, but did not case. — NO, an expert witness is NOT necessary in this case as the res
so inform Rosit supposing that the latter would not be able to afford ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable.
the same. 2. [TORTS-RELATED ISSUE] W/N the CA correctly absolved Dr. Gestuvo from
3. Following the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and close his mouth liability? — NO, CA incorrectly absolved Dr. Gestuvo, who, as SC held, is in
and was in pain. fact liable.
a. X-rays done on Rosit 2 days after the operation showed that the
fracture in his jaw was aligned but the screws used on him touched RULING + RATIO
his molar. Given the X-ray results, Dr. Gestuvo referred Rosit to a 1. NO, an expert witness is not necessary as the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is
dentist (Dr. Pangan). applicable.
4. Dr. Pangan (dentist), opined that another operation is necessary and that it 1. To establish medical negligence, this Court has held that an expert
is to be performed in Cebu. testimony is generally required to define the standard of behavior by which
a. Rosit alleged that the dentist told him that the operation conducted the court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the
on his mandible was improperly done, thus Rosit went back to Dr. requisite duty toward the patient.
Gestuvo to demand a loan to defray the cost of the additional 2. Solidum v. People of the Philippines, provides an exception where the Court
operation as well as the expenses of the trip to Cebu. Dr. Gestuvo explained that where the application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur is
gave Rosit P4,500. warranted, an expert testimony may be dispensed with in medical
5. Rosit went to Cebu on February 19, 1999, still suffering from pain and could negligence cases.
hardly open his mouth. 3. Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following
a. In Cebu, Dr. Pangan removed the plate and screws thus installed situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an
by Dr. Gestuvo and replaced them with smaller titanium plate and operation, among others (see the case original for other examples).
screws. Dr. Pangan also extracted Rosit's molar that was hit with a 4. Resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as an exception to the
screw and some bone fragments. requirement of an expert testimony in medical negligence cases may
b. 3 days after the operation, Rosit was able to eat and speak well be availed of if the following essential requisites are satisfied:
and could open and close his mouth normally. a. (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur
6. On his return to Davao, Rosit demanded that Dr. Gestuvo reimburse him for unless someone is negligent;
the cost of the operation and the expenses he incurred in Cebu amounting to b. (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was
P140,000, as well as for the P50,000 that Rosit would have to spend for the under the exclusive control of the person charged; and
removal of the plate and screws that Dr. Pangan installed. Dr. Gestuvo c. (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
refused to pay. action or contribution of the person injured.
7. Thus, Rosit filed a civil case for damages and attorney's fees with the RTC 5. In this case, the CA refused to acknowledge the application of the res ipsa
against Dr. Gestuvo and DDH. loquitur doctrine on the ground that the foregoing elements are absent.
8. RTC: absolved DDH from liability ruling that it exercised the proper diligence a. CA said: the post-operative pain is not unusual after surgery and
in the selection and supervision of Dr. Gestuvo and dismissed the complaint that there is no proof that the molar Dr. Pangan removed is the
against DDH (as well as defendants’ counterclaims), but adjudged Dr. same molar that was hit by the screw installed by Dr. Gestuvo in
18
Rosit's mandible. A second operation was conducted within the 5- 3. Citing Li v. Soliman, the Court said that there are four essential elements a
week usual healing period of the mandibular fracture so that the plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of
second element cannot be considered present. Lastly, the CA informed consent, which are present in this case:
pointed out that the X-ray examination conducted on Rosit prior to a. (1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; — present as
his first surgery suggests that he had "chronic inflammatory lung Dr. Gestuvo clearly had the duty of disclosing to Rosit the risks of
disease compatible," implying that the injury may have been due to using the larger screws for the operation.
Rosit's peculiar condition, thus effectively negating the presence of b. (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; —
the third element. Dr. Gestuvo failed to disclose, deciding by himself that Rosit could
6. SC: disagrees with CA as it is at once apparent that the essential requisites not afford to get the more expensive titanium screws.
for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present. c. (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the
7. 1st element of res ipsa loquitur present. patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have
a. As evident when Rosit proved that one of the screws installed by consented to; — Had Rosit been informed of the risk of the
Dr. Gestuvo struck his molar, as in the affidavit of Dr. Pangan inappropriate use of larger screws that an additional operation
presented by Dr. Gestuvo himself before the trial court. Clearly, had replacing the screws might be required to replace the same, as
Dr. Gestuvo used the proper size and length of screws and placed what happened in this case, Rosit would not have agreed to the
the same in the proper locations, these would not have struck operation.
Rosit's teeth causing him pain and requiring him to undergo a d. (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." — due to the
corrective surgery. larger screws, Rosit experienced pain and could not heal properly
b. In any event, whether the screw hit Rosit's molar because it was because one of the screws hit his molar. This was evident from the
too long or improperly placed, both facts are the product of Dr. fact that just 3 days after Dr. Pangan repeated the operation
Gestuvo's negligence. An average man of common intelligence conducted by Dr. Gestuvo, Rosit was pain-free and could already
would know that striking a tooth with any foreign object much less a speak. This is compared to the one 1 month that Rosit suffered
screw would cause severe pain. Thus, the first essential requisite is pain and could not use his mouth after the operation conducted by
present in this case. Dr. Gestuvo until the operation of Dr. Pangan.
8. 2nd element of res ipsa loquitur present: it is sufficient that the operation 4. Conclusion: Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of withholding material information which
which resulted in the screw hitting Rosit's molar was, indeed, performed by would have been vital in the decision of Rosit in going through with the
Dr. Gestuvo. No other doctor caused such fact. operation with the materials at hand. Thus, Dr. Gestuvo is also guilty of
a. CA: Rosit is guilty of contributory negligence in having Dr. Pangan negligence on this ground.
operate on him during the healing period of his fractured mandible. 5. Dr. Pangan's Affidavit is not admissible
b. SC: What the CA overlooked is that it was Dr. Gestuvo himself who a. The CA absolving Dr. Gestuvo of negligence was also anchored on
referred Rosit to Dr. Pangan. Nevertheless, Dr. Pangan's a letter signed by Dr. Pangan who stated the opinion that Dr.
participation could not have contributed to the reality that the screw Gestuvo did not commit gross negligence in his emergency
that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit Rosit's molar. management of Mr. Rosit's fractured mandible. Clearly, the
9. 3rd element established: It was not shown that Rosit's lung disease could appellate court overlooked the elementary principle against hearsay
have contributed to the pain. What is clear is that he suffered because one evidence as per the oft-repeated rule that “an affidavit is merely
of the screws that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit Rosit's molar. hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness
10. SC: the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies. No expert testimony is required to stand.” Here, Dr. Pangan never took the witness stand to affirm the
establish the negligence of defendant Dr. Gestuvo. contents of his affidavit.
b. Thus, the belief of Dr. Pangan whether Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of
2. NO, CA incorrectly absolved Dr. Gestuvo, who, as SC held, is in fact liable. negligence or not will not bind the Court. The Court must weigh and
1. In Flores v. Pineda, concept of a medical negligence case and the elements examine such testimony and decide for itself the merits thereof.
required for its prosecution, was explained, with 4 elements involved namely: 6. As discussed above, Dr. Gestuvo's negligence is clearly demonstrable by
duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and informed consent.
2. Petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to make an "informed consent”.
Dr. Gestuvo failed to inform Rosit that such smaller screws were available in DISPOSITION: SC reversed the CA decision and the RTC decision was reinstated
Manila, albeit at a higher price. As testified to by Dr. Gestuvo himself. and affirmed.
19
DOCTRINE: Resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as an exception to the

requirement of an expert testimony in medical negligence cases may be availed of if
the following essential requisites are satisfied: (1) the accident was of a kind that does
not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency
that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3)
the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of
the person injured.
20
Casumpang v. Cortejo, G.R. No. 171127, 171217, 171228, March 11, 2015 7. Dr. Casumpang contends that he gave his patient medical treatment and
care to the best of his abilities, and within the proper standard of care
FACTS: required from physicians under similar circumstances.
1. On April 22, 1988, at about 11:30 in the morning, Mrs. Cortejo brought her 8. Dr. Miranda argued that the function of making the diagnosis and
11-year old son, Edmer, to the Emergency Room of the San Juan de Dios undertaking the medical treatment devolved upon Dr. Casumpang, the
Hospital (SJDH) because of difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain, doctor assigned to Edmer. Dr. Miranda also alleged that she exercised
and fever. Thereafter, she was referred and assigned to Dr. Casumpang, a prudence in performing her duties as a physician, underscoring that it was
pediatrician. At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang, upon her professional intervention that led to the correct diagnosis of Dengue
examination using only a stethoscope, confirmed the diagnosis of Hemorrhagic Fever.
Bronchopneumonia. Mrs. Cortejo immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that 9. SJDH, on the other hand, disclaims liability by asserting that Dr. Casumpang
Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds or cough but Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Miranda are mere independent contractors and consultants (not
merely told her that her son's bloodpressure is just being active and employees) of the hospital; hence, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not
remarked that that's the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm. apply.
2. Dr. Casumpang next visited the following day. Mrs. Cortejo again called Dr.
Casumpang's attention and stated that Edmer had a fever, throat irritation, ISSUE/HELD: W/N Casumpang had committed inexcusable lack of precaution in
as well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs. Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang diagnosing and in treating the patient YES
about the traces of blood in Edmer's sputum. Despite these pieces of
information, however, Dr. Casumpang simply nodded and reassured Mrs.
Cortejo that Edmer's illness is bronchopneumonia.
RATIO:
3. At around 11:30 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer vomited phlegm
1. Expert testimony is essential to establish not only the professional
with blood streak prompting the Edmer's father to request for a doctor. Later,
standards observed in the medical community, but also that the
Miranda, one of the resident physicians of SJDH, arrived. She claimed that
physician's conduct in the treatment of care falls below such standard.
although aware that Edmer had vomited phlegm with blood streak she failed
Expert testimony is crucial in determining first, the standard medical
to examine the blood specimen. She then advised the respondent to
examinations, tests, and procedures that the attending physicians should
preserve the specimen for examination. Thereafter, Dr. Miranda conducted a
have undertaken in the diagnosis and treatment of dengue fever; and
check-up on Edmer and found that Edmer had a low-grade fever and
second, the dengue fever signs and symptoms that the attending physicians
rashes.
should have noticed and considered.
4. At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again vomited blood. Dr. Miranda then
2. If the patient was admitted for chest pain, abdominal pain, and difficulty in
examined Edmer's sputum with blood and noted that he was bleeding.
breathing coupled with fever, dengue fever should definitely be considered.
Suspecting that he could be afflicted with dengue, Dr. Miranda conducted a
If the patient spits coffee ground with the presence of blood, and the
tourniquet test, which turned out to be negative. Dr. Miranda then called up
patient's platelet count drops to 47,000, it becomes a clear case of dengue
Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and told him about Edmer's condition. Upon
fever, and bronchopneumonia can be reasonably ruled out. The standard of
being informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered several procedures done. Dr.
care according to Dr. Jaudian is to administer oxygen inhalation, analgesic,
Miranda advised Edmer's parents that the blood test results showed that
and fluid infusion or dextrose.
Edmer was suffering from Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever. Dr. Casumpang
3. We find that Dr. Casumpang, as Edmer's attending physician, did not act
recommended Edmer’s transfer to the ICU, but since the ICU was then full,
according to these standards and, hence, was guilty of breach of duty. We
the respondent, insisted on transferring his son to Makati Medical Center.
do not find Dr. Miranda liable for the reasons discussed below.
5. At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr.
4. It will be recalled that during Dr. Casumpang's first and second visits to
Casumpang, was transferred to Makati Medical Center. Upon examination,
Edmer, he already had knowledge of Edmer's laboratory test result (CBC),
the attending physician diagnosed Dengue Fever Stage IV that was already
medical history, and symptoms (i.e., fever, rashes, rapid breathing, chest
in its irreversible stage. Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988.
and stomach pain, throat irritation, difficulty in... breathing, and traces of
His Death Certificate indicated the cause of death as Hypovolemic
blood in the sputum). However, these information did not lead Dr.
Shock/hemorrhagic shock/Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV.
Casumpang to the possibility that Edmer could be suffering from either
6. Believing that Edmer's death was caused by the negligent and erroneous
dengue fever, or dengue hemorrhagic fever, as he clung to his diagnosis of
diagnosis of his doctors, the respondent instituted an action for damages
broncho pneumonia.
against SJDH, and its attending physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr.
5. To our mind, Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated some, and not all of the
Miranda.
symptoms; worse, he casually ignored the pieces of information that could
have been material in detecting dengue fever.We also find it strange why Dr.
21
Casumpang did not even bother to check Edmer's throat despite knowing
Edmer had blood streaks in his sputum. Dr. Casumpang only used a
stethoscope in coming up with the diagnosis that Edmer was suffering
from... bronchopneumonia; he never confirmed this finding with the use of a
bronchoscope. Furthermore, Dr. Casumpang based his diagnosis largely on
the chest x-ray result that is generally inconclusive.
6. Even assuming that Edmer's symptoms completely coincided with the
diagnosis of bronchopneumonia (so that this diagnosis could not be
considered "wrong"), we still find Dr. Casumpang guilty of negligence.In the
present case, evidence on record established that in confirming the
diagnosis of bronchopneumonia, Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated
some and not all of the symptoms presented, and failed to promptly conduct
the appropriate tests to confirm his findings.
7. Although Dr. Casumpang presented the testimonies, we cannot consider
them expert witnesses either for the sole reason that they did not testify on
the standard of care in dengue cases. Aside from being self-serving, his
claim is not supported by competent evidence.
8. Dr. Jaudian, the expert witness was admittedly not a pediatrician but a
practicing physician who specializes in pathology. He likewise does not
possess any formal residency training in pediatrics. Nonetheless, both the
lower courts found his knowledge acquired through study and practical
experience sufficient to advance an expert opinion on dengue-related cases.
9. We agree with the lower courts. Ramos and Cereno reveals that the Court
primarily based the witnesses' disqualification to testify as an expert on their
incapacity to shed light on the standard of care that must be observed by the
defendant-physicians.
10. That the expert witnesses' specialties do not match the physicians'
practice area only constituted, at most, one of the considerations that
should not be taken out of context. In the case and the facts before us,
we find that Dr. Jaudian is competent to testify on the standard of care
in dengue fever cases. Although he specializes in pathology, it was
established during trial that he had attended not less than 30 seminars
held by the Pediatric Society, had exposure in pediatrics, had been
practicing medicine for 16 years, and had handled not less than 50
dengue related cases.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court PARTLY GRANTS

the consolidated petitions. The Court finds Dr. Noel Casumpang and San Juan de
Dios Hospital solidarity liable for negligent medical practice. We SET ASIDE the
finding of liability as to Dr. Ruby Sanga-Miranda. The amounts of P45,000.00 as
actual damages and P500,000.00 as moral damages should each earn legal interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the date of the judgment of
the trial court. The Court AFFIRMS the rest of the Decision dated October 29, 2004
and the Resolution dated January 12, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56400.
22
Gepulle-Garpo v. Sps. Garabato, G.R. No. 200013, January 14, 2015 can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged
signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose
Petitioner: Betty Gepulle-Garbo, represented by Attorney-in-Fact, Minda G. Rosales signature is theorized to have been forged.
(no represented by her new Attorney-in-Fact, Gary LLoyd G. Rosales) 3. Both the RTC and CA found that Albacea did not explain the manner of
Respondents: Spouses Victorey Antonia Garabato and Josephine Garabato examination of the specimen signatures in reaching his conclusion. Albacea
did not point out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in
FACTS: and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily
1. On June 17, 1977, a Deed of Sale was executed between Eduviges and escape notice or detection by an untrained observer.
Florence, her daughter, where Eduviges sold to Florence a 303-square 4. Courts are not bound by expert testimonies especially that the
meter parcel of land in Pasay City. The deed of sale was signed by Nick examination was upon the initiative of Nick and Betty and they had
Garbo, Eduviges’s husband and Florence’s father. complete control on what documents and specimens to be examined
2. In 1996, Victorey, Florence’s son out of wedlock, registered the subject by the NBI. Betty, in coming before us, had the onus of showing that
property in his name by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Florence in his the signatures were forged. She fell short of demonstrating that her
favor. case fell within the limited exceptions for disturbing conclusiveness of
3. On August 2, 2001, Betty, Nick’s second wife, filed a petition for cancellation factual findings of lower courts. The petitioner having not shown any
of Victorey’s title. She impugns the validity of the 1977 Deed of Sale on the reason for us to disturb the ruling of the courts a quo, we are
ground that the signatures of Nick and Eduviges were forged by Florence. constrained to affirm the decision of the CA.
Betty also assailed the deed of sale between Florence and Victorey.
4. Betty presented as witness, Mr. Albecea, a handwritting expert and DISPOSITION: Petition for Review on Certiorari DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
retired employee of the NBO, who at the time of the conduct of the
examination of the subject deed of sale was a Document Examiner of DOCTRINE: The opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the
the NBI. He stated that in 1992, he was requested to examine the court, the expert’s function being to place before the court data upon which the court
signatures of Nick. He concluded that the questioned and the standard can form its own opinion This principle holds true especially when the question
signatures of Nick were NOT written by one of the same person. involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a
5. On the other hand, Victorey denied that Florence forged the signature of visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the
Nick. He admitted that he purchased the property from Florence for a valid currently existing ones. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the
consideration and registered it late because he had no money. Victorey testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent
presented an Affidavit of Waiver dated June 17, 1977, executed by Nick examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion
stating that Eduviges acquired the parcel of land and that Nick did not as to its authenticity.
contribute a single centavo to buy the land. It further stated that Nick
waived all his rights, title and interest and possession to land in favor
of his wife, Eduviges.
6. RTC dismissed the complaint for cancellation of title for failure to prove by
preponderance of evidence her cause of action.
7. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the signatures of Nick and Eduviges appearing on the

instruments were forged?
RULING + RATIO: NO.

1. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is
the duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in
issue by the amount of evidence required by law.
2. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive
and convincing evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The fact of forgery
23
Dela Llana v. Biong, Supra ISSUE: W/N Primero’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela
Llana’s whiplash injury
FACTS:
1. Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car. His sister, Dra. dela RULING + RATIO: NO
Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat, while a certain Calimlim was 1. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code → the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict
at the backseat. case are:
2. Juan stopped the car. A few seconds after, a dump truck containing gravel a. Damages to the plaintiff
and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car b. Negligence by act or omission, of the defendant or by some other
forward. Car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty
3. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana, but she has no other visible c. The connection of cause and effect between such negligence and
physical injuries. the damages
4. The dump truck driver is Joel Primero. His employer was Rebecca Biong, 2. Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the 3
doing business under the name and style of “Pongkay Trading” and was elements of quasi-delict before we determine Biong’s liability as Primero’s
engaged in a gravel and sand business. employer.
5. Few months after, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on a. Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that
the left side of her neck and should. The pain became more intense, to the Biong did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
extent that she could no longer mover her left arm. the selection and supervision of Primero - arise.
6. Dr. Rosalinda Milla → Dra. dela Llana suffered a whiplash injury, an injury cause 3. He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegations by preponderance
by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Physical therapy of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence
was required. a. Mere allegations are not evidence.
a. No improvement to Dra. dela Llana’s condition 4. Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the
7. Dr. Eric Flores → Dra. dela Llana should undergo a cervical spine surgery to release evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be
the compression of her nerve. established
a. The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but 5. Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on 3 pieces of evidence:
incapacitated her from the practice of her profession. a. The pictures of her damaged car → BUT these pictures demonstrate only
8. Dra. dela Llana demanded from Biong compensation for her injuries → REFUSED the impact of the collision, and it is a far-fetched assumption that the
9. Dra. dela Llana sued Biong for damages before the RTC. whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures
10. Biong filed a counterclaim → no cause of action against her exist as no reasonable b. The medical certificate → BUT this was not admitted in evidence by the
relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury, and that RTC, as evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly
Dra. dela Llana’s illness became manifest 1 month and 1 week before the vehicular considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments. IF considered, the
accident. certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. At any rate, the
11. AT TRIAL medical certificate did not relate the vehicular accident to Dra. dela
a. Dra. dela Llana Llana’s whiplash injury.
i. Presented herself as an ordinary witness → Identified and c. Her testimonial evidence → BUT courts do not immediately accord
authenticated a medical certificate issued by Dr. Milla to prove probative value to an admitted expert testimony, much less to
her claim an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special
ii. Presented Primero as a hostile witness → His truck hit the car knowledge, because the probative value of an expert
because the truck’s brakes got stuck testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert’s
b. Biong → Testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when opinion; rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the expert
they met several days after the vehicular accident + She observed witness may afford the courts by demonstrating the facts
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on
Primero which the logic of his conclusions is founded. In the present
12. RTC → In favor of Dra. dela Llana case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given
13. CA → Reversed → Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection probative value for the reason that she was not presented as
between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of an expert witness, As an ordinary witness, she was not
evidence competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects
of the whiplash injury. She did not even provide a medical
24
explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of

whiplash injury in her testimony during trial.
6. Ultimately Dra. dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary
evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular
accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. There was deficiency of evidence.
7. Courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries →
NOT public knowledge, NOT capable of unquestionable demonstration, and NOT
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions as they have no
expertise in the field of medicine.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated

February 11, 2018 and Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
25
Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., Supra by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a
witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason
FACTS: of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness
1. Spouses Navarro, Sr. and Mrs. Navarro died and left behind several by reason of privileged communication.
parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject lot) located in 3. In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, we have held that the specific enumeration of
Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate. disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other
2. The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, and than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to
Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. include an exception not embodied therein. We said:
The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein. a. The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is
3. Luisa and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming apparent. Interest in the outcome of a case, conviction of a crime
exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not
on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where grounds for disqualification.
Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. 4. Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications.
4. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children
Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being
PNP handwriting expert PO2 Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on
written by one and the same person. privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
5. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for ANNULMENT OF THE disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may
DEED OF DONATION before the RTC of Masbate. be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
6. After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a 5. There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default
witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not
examination of the affidavit. Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s report is a worthless provide default as an exception. The specific enumeration of disqualified
piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant. witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those
7. The motion was granted; thus, PO2 Alvarez was disqualified as a witness. mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the
8. MR got denied. The sisters appealed the case to the CA but was denied construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving
also. MR denied. The CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of clause excludes other exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are
another CA Division which reinstated the Civil Case. The CA held that a express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of
CA Justice cannot take judicial notice of decisions or matters pending a statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules should not
before another Division of the appellate court where he or she is not a be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. (Emphasis
member. Hence, this appeal. supplied; citations omitted.)
6. As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and
ISSUE: Whether PO2 Alvarez is disqualified to be a witness. make known her perception to others.1âwphi1We have no doubt that she
is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she
RULING + RATIO: No. possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
1. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the
System v. Republic of the Philippines, we said that a witness must only RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and
the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence weight of her testimony.
provides: 7. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that
a. SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can a. SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training
b. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a 8. For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that
ground for disqualification. Tamani’s signature was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP
2. Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery,
24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of the
26
opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of

whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may
afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.
9. Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be
hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2
Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document
examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset
that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is
offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances,
the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the
RTC ruling.
10. True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. 23 Jurisprudence is
also replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the testimony
of expert witnesses to prove forgeries.24 However, we have also
recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses
considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged
documents.25 More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the
deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the
resolution of the case.
11. In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness.
She has the qualifications of witness and possess none of the
disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an expert
witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the opinion of an
expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be
determined if P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting
examination she conducted.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1)

Decision dated February 28, 2011 and Resolution dated July 29, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460, and (2) Orders dated August 19, 2004 and
October II, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 5215. We DENY
respondents' motion to disqualify P02 Mary Grace Alvarez as a witness.
No pronouncement as to costs.
[Note: Study the other sections as well.]
27
Tabao v. People, G.R. No. 187246, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 216 4. RTC: Convicted Petitioner and Mendez for the crime charged and gave
more credence to the Prosecution’s version of facts. It held that the
FACTS: petitioner was not attentive to his driving such that he failed to see the island
1. Version of Prosecution: divider and bumped Rochelle; Mendez was driving his car too fast at night
a. Petitioner was driving his car along Governor Forbes corner G. time such that he was unable to avoid running over her as her body lay
Tuazon Street towards Nagtahan when it suddenly ramped on an prone on the street.
island divider, bumping Rochelle Lanete who was crossing the 5. Only the petitioner filed an appeal.
street. 6. CA: Affirmed RTC decision.
b. As a result of the impact, Rochelle was thrown into the middle of
the road on her back.Thereafter, Leonardo Mendez speeding car ISSUE/HELD: Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Petitioner for reckless
ran over Rochelle’s body. Bystanders armed with stones and imprudence resulting to homicide. NO. Guilt of Tabao was proven beyond
wooden clubs followed Mendez car until it stopped near the reasonable doubt. He was positively identified by a witness and was proved to
Nagtahan Flyover. lack caution when he was driving his car.
c. Francisco Cielo, a newspaper delivery boy, pleaded with the
bystanders not to hurt Mendez. Cielo went inside Mendez car, sat RATIO:
beside him, got his driver’s license, and ordered him to move the 1. In order for conviction to be decreed for reckless imprudence, the material
car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but his car hit the center damage suffered by the victim, the failure in precaution on the part of the
island twice while backing up. accused, and the direct link between material damage and failure in
d. Cielo went out of the car and approached the sprawled body of precaution must be established beyond reasonable doubt. All three elements
Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought Rochelle’s body inside were established in this case.
Mendez car. 2. Despite a slight inconsistency in the witness affidavit and testimony the court
e. The three of them (the petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought still gave due credence to the testimony because the petitioner was
Rochelle to the UST Hospital,where she eventually died. positively identified by an eyewitness. Victor Soriano saw the whole incident
2. Version of Petitioner: happen. Victor positively identified the petitioner as the person who drove
a. He stated that while driving his car ramped on an island at the foot the car that ramped on an island divider and hit Rochelle.
of the Nagtahan Flyover. He tried to move the car backwards, but 3. The petitioner failed to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle. He did
failed to do so. He alighted from his car and then saw that its two not notice the island divider at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. As a
rear wheels had been elevated. result, his car ramped on the island so that all four wheels of his car, not just
b. He returned inside his car to turn off its engine; he then noticed that the two rear wheels mentioned in his earlier testimony, lost contact with the
many people were approaching his car. He again alighted from his ground. The entire vehicle, therefore, ended up on top of the island divider.
vehicle and saw a person lying on the road. He puts the blame for the ramping and, essentially, his failure to notice the
c. He looked at his left side and saw a car that was running fast like a island on the darkness of nighttime and the alleged newness of the island.
wind pass by. He approached the person lying on the road, and 4. SC: the fact that the petitioners entire vehicle ended up ramped on the island
noticed that she was still breathing and moaning. Afterwards, he divider strongly indicates what actually happened in the unfortunate incident.
saw Mendez car backing up; he carried the victim towards that car. The vehicle could not have ended up in that condition had the petitioner
Thereafter, he, Mendez and Cielo brought the victim to the UST been driving at a reasonable speed in an intersection.
Hospital. 5. The petitioner insists that his car could not have bumped the victim because
3. Version of Mendez: his car was coming from the right side (i.e., from Espana), while the victim
a. Mendez stated that another vehicle overtook his car from the right was hit on the left side of her body. He argues that if the victim was on her
and cut his lane. He slowed down his car when he saw a rug-like way to her house on Mabini Street coming from the corner of Governor
object fall from the car that overtook him, and stopped when he Forbes Street and G. Tuazon Street (where she alighted), then the
realized that what had fallen was a person. People approached his responsible vehicle could only have come from the left (i.e., from Nagtahan)
car. He alighted from his car and inquired from them what had as only those vehicles coming from this direction could hit the victim on the
happened. The people replied that someone was run over; some of left side of her body. He further claims that his car had no dents or
them pointed to him as the culprit. He denied having run over the scratches.
victim when they tried to hurt him. The petitioner carried the victim 6. Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., the attending physician, testified that the victim
and placed her inside Mendez car. Thereafter, the two of them suffered multiple injuries compatible and consistent with a vehicular
brought the victim to the UST Hospital. accident. He did not state that the injuries suffered by the victim were
28
only on her left side. In fact, a perusal of Dr. Altezas initial medical should prevail over the denial of the accused whose testimony is not
report shows that the victim suffered injuries both on the left and right substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
sides of her body. 15. In addition, petitioner frequently visited the hospital when the victim was
7. In addition, Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr., the National Bureau of Investigation confined there but would immediately leave whenever he saw members of
medico-legal officer who conducted an autopsy on Rochelle’s body, the victims family. We find it highly unusual for a person who allegedly had
confirmed that the victim suffered injuries on various parts of her lower right no participation in the incident to be overly concerned with the victims well-
and left extremities as a result of the initial or primary impact. being. What puzzles us even more is why the petitioner would evade
8. The absence of a dent or a scratch on the petitioners car, assuming it to be members of the victims family whenever he was seen by them at the
true, does not conclusively prove his non-participation in the incident. The hospital.
absence of any dent or scratch is influenced by several factors: repairs he
already made, the type of paint, the speed of the car, the points of impact, DISPOSITION: DENY the motion with FINALITY
and the material used on the cars exteriors.
[EVIDENCE - EXPERT TESTIMONY] DOCTRINE: The use of the word ‘may’ in Section 49, Rule 130 signifies that the use
9. The petitioner likewise claims that the CA violated Section 49, Rule 130 of of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the
the Revised Rules of Court when it disregarded the testimony of defense courts. Allowing the testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound by the
witness Police Senior Inspector Danilo Cornelio who testified that the testimony of the expert witness. The testimony of an expert witness must be
petitioners car could not have bumped the victim because the latters body construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties,
was not thrown in line with the car, but on its side. The petitioner argues that but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for the court to
P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio is highly qualified in the field of traffic accident adopt or not to adopt depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts and the
investigation, and as such, his statements are backed-up by [the] principles applicable law.
of applied physics, engineering, and mathematics.
10. The use of the word ‘may’ in Section 49, Rule 130 signifies that the use of
opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of
the courts. Allowing the testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound
by the testimony of the expert witness. The testimony of an expert witness
must be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in
favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination
of the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or not to adopt
depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts and the applicable
law.
11. The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of
weight given to his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose
ruling is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of discretion.
12. P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the incident; his
testimony was merely based on the Traffic Accident Report prepared
by SPO4 Edgar Reyes who himself did not witness the incident. At any
rate, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio’s testimony did he conclusively
state that the petitioner could not have been involved in the incident.
13. P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio also did not discount the possibility that the victim
could have been thrown on the side. He likewise admitted that the
location of an accident victim in relation to the vehicle would also
depend on the speed of the vehicle and the point of impact.
14. The bare denial of the petitioner stating that he did not hit the victim and his
car merely ramped on the island divider will not hold water against Victor’s
positive and specific testimony identifying him as the one who hit the victim.
The positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent,
and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the testifying eyewitness,
29
Dela Llana v. Biong, Supra ISSUE: W/N Primero’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela
Llana’s whiplash injury
FACTS:
1. Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car. His sister, Dra. dela RULING + RATIO: NO
Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat, while a certain Calimlim was 1. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code → the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict
at the backseat. case are:
2. Juan stopped the car. A few seconds after, a dump truck containing gravel a. Damages to the plaintiff
and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car b. Negligence by act or omission, of the defendant or by some other
forward. Car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty
3. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana, but she has no other visible c. The connection of cause and effect between such negligence and
physical injuries. the damages
4. The dump truck driver is Joel Primero. His employer was Rebecca Biong, 2. Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the 3
doing business under the name and style of “Pongkay Trading” and was elements of quasi-delict before we determine Biong’s liability as Primero’s
engaged in a gravel and sand business. employer.
5. Few months after, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on a. Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that
the left side of her neck and should. The pain became more intense, to the Biong did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
extent that she could no longer mover her left arm. the selection and supervision of Primero - arise.
6. Dr. Rosalinda Milla → Dra. dela Llana suffered a whiplash injury, an injury cause 3. He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegations by preponderance
by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Physical therapy of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence
was required. a. Mere allegations are not evidence.
a. No improvement to Dra. dela Llana’s condition 4. Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the
7. Dr. Eric Flores → Dra. dela Llana should undergo a cervical spine surgery to release evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be
the compression of her nerve. established
a. The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but 5. Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on 3 pieces of evidence:
incapacitated her from the practice of her profession. a. The pictures of her damaged car → BUT these pictures demonstrate only
8. Dra. dela Llana demanded from Biong compensation for her injuries → REFUSED the impact of the collision, and it is a far-fetched assumption that the
9. Dra. dela Llana sued Biong for damages before the RTC. whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures
10. Biong filed a counterclaim → no cause of action against her exist as no reasonable b. The medical certificate → BUT this was not admitted in evidence by the
relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury, and that RTC, as evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly
Dra. dela Llana’s illness became manifest 1 month and 1 week before the vehicular considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments. IF considered, the
accident. certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. At any rate, the
11. AT TRIAL medical certificate did not relate the vehicular accident to Dra. dela
a. Dra. dela Llana Llana’s whiplash injury.
i. Presented herself as an ordinary witness → Identified and c. Her testimonial evidence → BUT courts do not immediately accord
authenticated a medical certificate issued by Dr. Milla to prove probative value to an admitted expert testimony, much less to
her claim an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special
ii. Presented Primero as a hostile witness → His truck hit the car knowledge, because the probative value of an expert
because the truck’s brakes got stuck testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert’s
b. Biong → Testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when opinion; rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the expert
they met several days after the vehicular accident + She observed witness may afford the courts by demonstrating the facts
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on
Primero which the logic of his conclusions is founded. In the present
12. RTC → In favor of Dra. dela Llana case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given
13. CA → Reversed → Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection probative value for the reason that she was not presented as
between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of an expert witness, As an ordinary witness, she was not
evidence competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects
of the whiplash injury. She did not even provide a medical
30
explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of

whiplash injury in her testimony during trial.
6. Ultimately Dra. dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary
evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular
accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. There was deficiency of evidence.
7. Courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries →
NOT public knowledge, NOT capable of unquestionable demonstration, and NOT
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions as they have no
expertise in the field of medicine.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated

February 11, 2018 and Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
31
People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 186533, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 452 Buenavista, Agusan del Norte when he knew of the case filed against him
thus he went home. Two months after his return, he, together with his father
FACTS: and Eddie Camus went to AAAs place to have the case settled. When asked
1. (10 July 2000) AAA, assisted by her mother, BBB, charged appellant Efren why BBB filed the case when Efren did nothing to AAA, BBB replied “Just
Castillo in a Complaint with the crime of rape. Complaint stated that forgive me because the case was already filed in court.” He alleged that he
appellant knows AAA to be mentally retarded. voluntary surrendered and that he does not know of any reason why AAA
2. Appellant pleaded not guilty. No stipulation of facts were reached during the would impute such a grave offense against him. The only thing he could
pre-trial conference. remember was BBB got angry at him when he told her to get married since
3. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, the private she is a widow now.
offended party; Dr. Thessa Marie Antillon-Malimas, the doctor in Gingoog 10. Rolando: He admitted that AAA is mentally retarded. He corroborated his
District Hospital who examined AAA; BBB, the mother of AAA, who was also son’s claim that BBB told them the case can no longer be withdrawn as it
presented as rebuttal witness; and Myrna delos Reyes-Villanueva, the was already filed in court.
Guidance Psychologist at the Northern Mindanao Medical Center who 11. BBB (rebuttal): She said that that even prior to the filing the case the
conducted psychological tests on AAA to determine her mental capacity. appellant already admitted that he truly molested AAA. The appellant, went
4. (Mar 2000) AAA approached the appellant in order to collect his debt for the to their house in August 2000 asking forgiveness from her but she told him
rice cake he bought from her mother. Instead of settling his account, the that the case was already in court. BBB also clarified that the house of Atok
appellant cuddled AAA until they reached the house of a certain Atok located where the first rape incident happened was demolished only in 2000. She
in Barangay Agay-ayan, Gingoog City. Once inside, the appellant raped her. was certain about this because during the demolition she was there
This was repeated again when AAA was on her way to her aunt’s house gathering firewood.
somewhere outside the chapel. This time, AAA told BBB about what 12. TC: Found appellant guilty.
happened. 13. CA: Affirmed TC ruling.
5. [NOT IMPORTANT but just in case] Dr. Antillon-Malimas: The results showed that 14. Appellant contends that the records are bereft of any evidence that would
AAA had a 7x6 cm. contusion hematoma lateral aspect of the right buttocks which conclusively show that AAA was suffering from mental retardation. BBBs
could have been caused by a blunt force or violence applied on the area possibly declaration that AAA is a slow thinker does not sufficiently establish AAAs
sustained two days prior. AAAs genitalia, particularly the vulva, revealed no swelling,
mental retardation and that the expert witness qualification of Reyes-
no tenderness and no contusion. AAAs hymen showed healed lacerations at 3 oclock
and 9 oclock positions which could have been caused by a blunt object or by violence Villanueva is highly questionable because she had not acquired any
or by reason of sexual intercourse. AAAs vaginal canal yielded negative result for doctorate degree in the field of psychology or psychiatry. More so, the
spermatozoa but another contusion was found therein. The result of AAAs physical psychological tests administered by her on AAA were inadequate to
examination was reduced into writing as evidenced by Medico-Legal Certificate. establish AAAs mental capacity.
6. Subsequently, AAA executed her sworn statement before Senior Police 15. Appellant anchors his argument for acquittal on the alleged failure of
Officer 4 Myrna Z. Palad. the prosecution to establish AAAs mental retardation to make him
7. Reyes-Villanueva: AAA was also subjected to psychological tests to guilty of rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(b), RPC. Appellant concludes that
determine her mental capacity - Draw-A-Person Test and the Bender Visual his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Motor Test. AAA has poor visual motor coordination and low level mental
functioning not within her chronological age (21 years old) and that AAA is ISSUE: WON it was conclusively shown that AAA was suffering from mental
suffering from mild to moderate mental retardation with a mental age of 8 to retardation.
12 years old and can be educated up to Grade VI level. AAA lacked
personal hygiene and has a vague concept of big numbers and time, like RULING + RATIO: YES.
days of the week. She further declared that AAAs instinct to resist any 1. In rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a
sexual assault is always there; however, with her low level mental woman against her will or without her consent. Art. 266-A, par. 1, RPC,
functioning she could easily be deceived or persuaded by a man to engage as amended by R.A. No. 8353 mandated the prosecution to prove that (1)
into sexual intercourse. The result of AAAs psychological tests was also the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished
reduced into writing as evidenced by a Psychological Report. such act through force or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason
8. Defense witnesses were Rolando Castillo, father of appellant and appellant or otherwise unconscious, or when she is under 12 years of age or is
himself. Their defense was mainly alibi. demented. The term woman deprived of reason includes one suffering
9. Appellant claimed that he was away harvesting coconuts on the land owned from mental retardation. Clearly, carnal knowledge of a woman who is a
by Elizabeth Camus from 7:00 am to 5:00/6:00 pm everyday and that the mental retardate is rape under the said provision. Proof of force or
alleged house of Atok has been demolished since 1998. He was in intimidation is not necessary as a mental retardate is not capable of
32
giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of or immunity to infection, dependency on others for protection and care
sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental and inability to achieve intelligible speech may be indicative of the
retardation of the latter. degree of mental retardation of a person. All these may be testified on by
2. People v. Dalandas citing People v. Dumanon: Mental retardation can be ordinary witnesses who come in contact with an alleged mental
proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the retardate.
testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court. 9. Deprivation of reason contemplated by law need not be complete; mental
3. (Sec. 50, Ruled 130, Revised Rules on Evidence) It is competent for the abnormality or deficiency is sufficient. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing
ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a that AAAs impaired learning capacity, lack of personal hygiene and
person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe difficulty in answering simple questions, as testified to by her mother and
the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. the Guidance Psychologist who had an opportunity to observe her
4. Commonly, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons appearance, manner, habits and behavior, are indicative that she is truly
upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. suffering from some degree of mental retardation.
However, Supreme Court of Vermont stated that a non-expert witness may 10. More telling is the trial courts own observation on AAAs manner of testifying
give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon that confirms the fact that AAA is a mental retardate. For purposes of
conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his determining the mental capacity of a person, this Court held that the
appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the personal observation of the trial judge suffices even in the absence of
witness own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such an expert opinion. Hence, the aforesaid findings of the trial court are
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis entitled to great weight and respect being in the best position as it had
for his opinion. the opportunity to hear and observe the demeanor, conduct and
5. The mother of an offended party in a rape case, though not a psychiatrist, if attitude of AAA while testifying.
she knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, 11. It should also be noted that Rolando testified that AAA was mentally
what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to retarded. Also, as testified by Rolando, they asked for forgiveness when they
testify on the matter. Thus, even though the Guidance Psychologist who went to BBBs housel Court ruled that an act of asking for forgiveness is
examined AAA may not qualify as an expert witness, though the undeniably indicative of guilt.
psychological tests conducted by her on AAA may not be accurate to 12. The straightforward narration of AAA of what transpired, accompanied by
determine AAAs mental capacity, such circumstance is not fatal to the her categorical identification of appellant as the malefactor, sealed the case
prosecutions cause. for the prosecution.
6. BBB testified that AAA has been suffering from epilepsy since she was nine
years old, which is one of the reasons why AAA was not able to finish her DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of
Grade I level. AAA also had to stop schooling because she had difficulties Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00030-MIN dated 7 November 2008 finding herein
understanding her lessons in school, she cannot write well, she had poor appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is hereby AFFIRMED.
memory and she had difficulty answering even the simplest question asked
of her. BBB further stated that AAA is the eldest of her four children; DOCTRINE: [In bold]
however, compared to her younger siblings, AAA had a hard time
comprehending the instructions given to her at home and in school.
7. Guidance Psychologist who examined AAA may not be qualified as an
expert witness, her observations, however, as regards the appearance,
manner, habits and behavior of AAA, is also admissible in evidence as an
ordinary witness testimony. (see Fact#7 for observations) She also stated
that she was not able to administer the Purdue Non-Language Test, which is
an Intelligence Quotient Test, on AAA due to the latters inability to identify
the items therein.
8. People v. Dalandas: A mental retardate, in general, exhibits a slow rate
of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired
learning capacity. Further, the mental retardation of persons and the
degrees thereof may be manifested by their overt acts, appearance,
attitude and behavior. The dentition, manner of walking, ability to feed
oneself or attend to personal hygiene, capacity to develop resistance
33
Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, G.R. No. 166470 & 169217, August 7, 2009, 595 affirmed, stating that Jovita presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lulu
SCRA 464 needed assistance in taking care of herself and managing her affairs.
11. Lulu was subsequently abducted from her Marikina apartment. The Police
FACTS: Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) division of the PNP. PACER
1. Lulu San Juan Hernandez (Lulu) was the daughter of spouses Felix subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in
Hernandez (Felix) and Maria San Juan Hernandez. The mother died due to Rizal. Petitioners subsequently contacted the PACER to inform them that
complications during childbirth. Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal Lulu voluntarily left with her half-sister because her guardian had allegedly
uncle, Sotero San Juan. been maltreating her. Jovita filed a petition for habeas corpus. CA granted.
2. Felix remarried to Natividad Cruz, and had three children (petitioners). 12. Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari, alleging that the opinions
3. Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family, at the value of Lulu’s attending physicians regarding her mental health were inadmissible
of Php 50M. Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She in evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry. She should have been
stopped attending school due to her “violent personality” when she reached presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of her mental
Grade 5. She never finished her education. capacity. Jovita argues that Lulu had been confined in Recovery.com, a
4. Upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate. psychosocial rehabilitation center and convalescent home care facility in QC,
However, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s due to her violent behavior. She also had delusions of being physically and
properties. Upon Felix’s death, petitioners took over the task of administering sexually abused by “Boy Negro” and imaginary pets. The medical report
Lulu’s properties. stated that Lulu has unspecified mental retardation with psychosis but
5. Felix and petitioners undertook various projects involving Lulu’s properties claimed significant improvements in her behavior.
during their administration (Development of the Marilou Subdivision; Sale of
property to Manila Electric Company; Lease of property to Oxford Concrete ISSUE: W/N the opinions of the physicians were admissible in evidence.
Aggregates). Lulu executed a special power of attorney, authorized the sale,
believing that it was to authorize her half-sister to appear in court on her HELD: YES.
behalf. 1. R130, S50 states that an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the
6. Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu's
San Juan-Santos (Jovita), after learning that the petitioners had been attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed
dissipating her estate. Lulu confided that she was made to live in mistreated them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence
by petitioners. Jovita observed that Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt level was below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions
ans smelled of urine. After bringing Lulu to several physicians for medical were admissible in evidence.
examination, she was found be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and 2. Where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary.
diabetes. The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
7. Jovita demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulu’s estate from person's state of mental sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given
petitioners. Petitioners refused. ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before the
8. Jovita filed a petition for guardianship, alleging that Lulu was incapable of RTC.
taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was weak of 3. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of
mind. Petitioners opposed. Petitioners denied the allegation that they herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak
mishandled Lulu’s estate. They also argued that the issue of Lulu’s mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent
competency had been settled in 1968, upon her emancipation when the would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts, it
court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle to deliver the properties involves questions of fact.
for her to manage. They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate, and was
aware of executing the SPAs in favor of petitioners. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED. Petitioners are
9. Medical specialists testified that the results of Lulu’s examinations which furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulu's legal guardian, an accurate and
revealed the alarming state of her health. They unanimously opined that in faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for
view of Lulu’s intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30)
mental state, she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer days from receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be
her medications. filed against them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria
10. RTC ruled in favor of Jovita, stating that due to her weak physical and Lourdes San Juan Hernandez's estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody
mental condition, Jovita should be appointed as Lulu’s guardian. CA of her legal guardian.
34
CSC v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 578 indignities or harassments committed against Ligaya; and 2 counts of sexual
advances or indignities against Magdalena. He was ordered dismissed from the
FACTS: service.
1. The instant case stemmed from 2 separate complaints filed respectively by 6. Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), promulgated a resolution
Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the Mother and Child Learning Center, affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in the case filed by Magdalena but
and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, dismissing the complaint of Ligaya. Respondent seasonably filed a motion for
against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of reconsideration, contending that he has never been charged of any offense in
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena his 37 years of service. By contrast, Magdalena was charged with 22 criminal
charged respondent with sexual indignities and harassment, while Ligaya offenses before the MTC of Baguio City. In addition, Magdalena was the
accused him of sexual harassment and various malfeasances. respondent in several complaints filed with the Barangay Chairmen of Barangay
2. Magdalena’s sworn complaint alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed an Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, both in Baguio City.
application with the DECS Office in Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre- 7. The CSC denied respondents motion for reconsideration, holding that: “The
school. One of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual assault is of minor
the school premises by the DECS Division Office. Since the officer assigned to significance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the person accused
conduct the inspection was not present, respondent volunteered his services. A of having committed the offense. This is so because even a prostitute or a
few months later, respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course woman of ill repute may become a victim of said offense.”
of the inspection, while both were descending the stairs of the second floor, 8. Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for review and the CA reversed the
respondent suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her CSC Resolutions and dismissed Magdalena’s complaint. The Appellate Court
cheek. Dumbfounded, she muttered, Sir, is this part of the inspection? Pati ba held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable.
naman kayo sa DECS wala ng values? Respondent merely sheepishly smiled. Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, she is not one whom any
At that time, there were no other people in the area. male would attempt to steal a kiss. In fact, her record immediately raises an
3. Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS Division Office and asked alarm in any one who may cross her path. Unsatisfied, the CSC, through the
respondent, Sir, kumusta yung application ko? His reply was Mag-date muna Solicitor General, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
tayo. She declined, explaining that she is married. She then left and reported
the matter to DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter Ngabit. Magdalena never ISSUE/HELD: Whether complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is credible. – YES.
returned to the DECS Division Office to follow up her application. However, she
was forced to reveal the incidents to her husband when he asked why the
RATIO:
permit has not yet been released. Thereupon, they went to the office of the
1. Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in
respondent. He merely denied having a personal relationship with Magdalena.
determining a controversy. One statutory exception is Section 51 (a) 3, Rule
Thereafter, respondent forwarded to the DECS Regional Director his
130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. It will be readily observed that the above
recommendation to approve Magdalenas application for a permit to operate a
provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. And
pre-school.
even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be applied here, still, we
4. Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that
cannot sustain respondents posture.
certain female employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging a high-
2. Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved
ranking DECS official with sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that
under this provision. Only those which would establish the probability or
the official being complained of was respondent. She then wrote a letter-
improbability of the offense charged. This means that the character evidence
complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to former DECS Secretary
must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense
Ricardo Gloria. On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her complaint that
charged. Thus, on a charge of rape - character for chastity, on a charge of
on four separate occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek,
assault - character for peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of
touched her groins, embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his
embezzlement - character for honesty.
organ pressing the lower part of her back.
3. In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not
5. Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers’
offer evidence that has a bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What he presented
salaries; (2) failing to release the pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3)
are charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical
willfully refusing to release the teachers’ uniforms, proportionate allowances and
injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of
productivity pay; and (4) failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board,
evidence are inadmissible under the above provision because they do not
as required by the DECS rules and regulations. The DECS conducted a joint
establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
investigation of the complaints of Magdalena and Ligaya. The DECS Secretary
rendered a Joint Decision finding respondent guilty of 4 counts of sexual
35
4. Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to 10. But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the
establish is Magdalena’s lack of credibility and not the probability or the CSC is the fact that it is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out
improbability of the charge. In this regard, a different provision applies. by the Solicitor General, Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and
5. Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony spontaneous manner. Her testimony is replete with details, such as the number
given. It refers to a person’s integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. of times she and respondent inspected the pre-school, the specific part of the
A witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for stairs where respondent kissed her, and the matter about her transient boarders
truth, honesty or integrity as provided by Section 11, Rule 132 of the same during summer. Magdalena would not have normally thought about these
Revised Rules on Evidence. details if she were not telling the truth. The testimony of Magdalena does not
6. Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf, stand in isolation. It is corroborated by Peter Ngabit, DECS Assistant Division
opened herself to character or reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a Superintendent. Ngabit testified that Magdalena reported to him that respondent
party who becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in the same kissed her and asked her for a date.
position as any other witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his 11. With Magdalena’s positive testimony and that of Ngabit, how can we disregard
character or reputation. the findings of the DECS and the CSC? Surely, we cannot debunk it simply
7. With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that because of the Court of Appeals outdated characterization of Magdalena as a
the character or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a woman of bad reputation. There are a number of cases where the triers of fact
proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question is Magdalenas believe the testimony of a witness of bad character and refuse to believe one of
derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility? A careful review of the good character. As a matter of fact, even a witness who has been convicted a
record yields a negative answer. number of times is worthy of belief, when he testified in a straightforward and
8. First, most of the 22 cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts convincing manner.
committed in the 80s. With respect to the complaints filed with the Chairmen of 12. At this juncture, it bears stressing that more than anybody else, it is the DECS
Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts complained of took investigating officials who are in a better position to determine whether
place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense was Magdalena is telling the truth considering that they were able to hear and
committed in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable observe her deportment and manner of testifying.
proofs of Magdalenas character or reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore,
erred in according much weight to such evidence. Settled is the principle that DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to a time not of Appeals dated January 8, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44180 is REVERSED. The
too remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be CSC Resolution Nos. 966213 and 972423 are AFFIRMED, subject to the modification
determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the that respondent ALLYSON BELAGAN is SUSPENDED from office without pay for
trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement ONE (1) YEAR, with full credit of his preventive suspension.
of the suit. Hence, to say that Magdalenas credibility is diminished by proofs of
tarnished reputation existing almost a decade ago is unreasonable. It is unfair to
DOCTRINE: See text in bold.
presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral righteousness
can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to change
or reform.
9. Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the
criminal cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great
majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness
has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a
criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his
credibility. This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following
grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the witness does
not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often
arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to
be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may not
be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct. As it
happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut each of the
charges against her listed by respondent.
36
People v. Lee, G.R. No. 139070, May 29, 2002 c. Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and
drug addict.
DOCTRINES: THERE ARE A BUNCH. SEE RATIO ON BOLD d. (6 days before Lee’s death): Lee caught Joseph inside his car
trying to steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered away.
FACTS: e. As proof of the victim’s bad reputation, Lee presented a LETTER
1. Herminia Marquez and her son, Joseph Marquez, were in the living room of handwritten by his mother, Herminia, addressed to Mayor Rey
their house located at Gen. Evangelista St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan. Malonzo of Caloocan, and sent through PO3 Willy Tuazon and his
2. In their living room, mother and son were watching a basketball game on TV. wife, Baby Ruth.
Herminia was seated on an armchair. Across her, Joseph sat on the end i. Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor for
most of the sofa against the and window. rehabilitation because he was hooked on shabu, a
3. Herminia looked away from the game and casually glanced at her son. To prohibited drug, and was a thief.
her surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open window ii. Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might not just
behind Joseph. She looked up and saw Noel Lee peering through the steal but kill her and everyone in their household because
window and holding the gun aimed at Joseph. of his drug habit
4. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window, f. Basically defense tried to say that Joseph had a bad reputation who
and simultaneously, Lee fired his gun hitting Joseph’s head (TWICE). had lots of enemies therefore its possible another person killed him.
5. When no more shots were fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw Lee, in 13. RTC: Lee is GUILTY of MURDER. Sentenced him to death.
a blue sando, flee towards the direction of his house. Herminia shouted for a. Appreciated the presence of the generic aggravating circumstance
help and with the aid of her kumpare brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital of dwelling but without any mitigating circumstance to offset it
where he later died. 14. On automatic review to SC
6. Police investigators arrived at the hospital and Herminia told them that her a. Lee claims that TC should not have accepted Herminia’s testimony
son was shot by Noel Lee. because it is biased, incredible and inconsistent.
7. Post-mortem exam: In Sum: Deceased sustained 2 gunshot wounds—1 to b. He also claims that TC erred in hastily tagging him as the assailant
the right of the forehead, and the other, to the L side of the back of the based merely on the biased declaration of the mother without
victim’s head. 2 slugs were recovered from the victim’s head. considering the shady character of the victim against whom others
8. Herminia filed a complaint for murder against Lee with the Prosecutor’s might have an axe to grind.
Office.
9. Prosec found no probable cause. Appeal to DOJ granted. An Information (SYLLABUS ISSUE)/HELD: Whether TC erred in not considering the victim’s
was filed against Noel Lee charging him with the murder committed (offended party’s) shady character which raises the probability that there was a
through treachery and evident premeditation. different assailant? (NO)
10. Lee pleaded not guilty to the charge.
11. PROSECUTION presented: (a) Herminia (b) a resident doctor at the MCU RATIO:
Hospital; (c) a police officer who examined the crime scene; and (d) a SUMMARY OF RATIO
medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Lab. – who testified to the facts 1. Lee: Joseph had a bad reputation in their community. His drug habit led him
presented above. to commit other crimes and he may have been shot by any of the persons
a. Lee is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several from whom he had stolen.
criminal cases pending against him in Caloocan City. 2. SC: Proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to
b. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted determine the probability or improbability of his killing.
murder in 1989
12. DEFENSE presented 2 witnesses: (a) Orlando Bermudez, a neighbor; and CHARACTER EVIDENCE
(b) the accused himself. 1. Sec. 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence : Character evidence
a. From 8 to 10 PM of Sept. 29, he was in his house 2 blocks away not generally admissible; exceptions:--
from victim’s house, having some drinks and singing with the a. a) In Criminal Cases:
videoke with his neighbor, Bermudez, and his driver, Columba. i. 1. The accused may prove his good moral character which
b. 10 PM: Orlando & Nelson went home so Lee went to sleep. When is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
he woke up, he learned that Joseph was shot to death. Lee had charged.
known Joseph since childhood and their houses are only 2 blocks
apart.
37
ii. 2. Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his 1. It was the prosecution that first presented evidence of the bad moral
bad moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait character of Lee by citing the 2 criminal cases pending against him. The
involved in the offense charged. presentation of this evidence, however, was not objected to by Lee.
iii. 3. The good or bad moral character of the offended party 2. Character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of the act
may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable charged, e.g., on a charge of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of
degree the probability or improbability of the offense assault, character for peacefulness or violence; on a charge for
charged. Xxxx embezzlement, character for honesty and integrity.
2. CHARACTER: possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and 3. Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be
morals, distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally entertained proved “if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
of a person derived from the common report of the people who are improbability of the offense charged.”
acquainted with him and his reputation. 4. Philippine setting: Proof of the moral character of the offended party is
3. REPUTATION: community estimate of him. applied with frequency in sex offenses and HOMICIDE.
5. EXAMPLE: RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS or in any prosecution
DOCTIRINE #1: involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a woman where the
1. GENERAL RULE: Character or reputation of a party is legally irrelevant in willingness of a woman is material
determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is NOT
admissible. DOCTRINE #2:
a. REASON: If issues were so influenced by person’s character, trial 1. HOMICIDE CASES: a pertinent character trait of the victim is
would have aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual admissible in 2 situations:
inquiry into the merits. a. (1) as evidence of the deceased’s aggression;
b. The business of the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a b. (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the accused.
very bad man may have a righteous cause. (Yes naman). 2. The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the
2. EXCEPTIONS: Sec. 51, Rule 130 in both criminal and civil cases. deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case
may be, is relevant in determining whether the deceased or the
CHARACTER EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES (Sec. 51 (1) & accused was the aggressor.
(2) of Rule 130) 3. When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the known violent
1. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER [Sec. 51 (a) (1)] : The accused may prove character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it produced a
such if pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a
a. When the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.
strengthens the presumption of innocence, and where good
character and reputation are established, an inference arises that CASE AT BAR:
the accused did not commit the crime charged. 1. Proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
b. This view proceeds from the theory that a person of good character probability or improbability of his killing.
and high reputation is not likely to have committed the act charged a. LEE has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the
against him. killing was made in self-defense. No connection between the
2. BAD MORAL CHARACTER [Sec. 51 (a) (2)] : Prosecution may not prove deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent death.
the bad moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when b. Defense sought to establish the victim’s bad character to raise the
such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. inference that he could have been killed by any one of those from
a. WHY? To avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who might whom he had stolen, is speculative.
otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a
person of bad character DOCTRINE #3:
3. NOTE: Once the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the 1. MOREOVER, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary
prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the defendant’s bad in cases of murder committed with treachery and premeditation.
character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation, would have a a. While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid
license to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal to determine the probability or improbability of the
CASE AT BAR: commission of an offense (Sec. 51 (a) (3), Rule 130) such is
NOT NECESSARY in the crime of murder where the killing is
committed through TREACHERY or PREMEDITATION.
38
b. The proof of such character may only be allowed in HOMICIDE 8. Affidavits are generally considered inferior to open court declarations
cases to show “that it has produced a reasonable belief of because affidavits are taken ex-parte and are almost always incomplete and
imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable inaccurate
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary” 9. No motive for Herminia to point at Lee, particularly because she acted as
(Moran). This rule does not apply to cases of MURDER. agent for him before. It was Lee who had strong motive to harm Joseph bec.
of latter’s attempt to steal his stereo.
CASE AT BAR: 10. Medico-legal report: Judging from the location and number of wounds
1. Lee is charged with murder committed through treachery and evident sustained, Dr. Cosidon theorized that the assailant could not be more than 2
premeditation. feet away from the victim
2. Treachery Present: Joseph was sitting in his living room when Lee peeped
through the window and, without any warning, shot him twice in the head. No DISPOSITION: RTC decision Affirmed insofar as Lee is found guilty of murder for the
opportunity for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. The suddenness of death of Joseph Marquez. The death sentence imposed by the TC is reduced to
the attack ensured his death without risk to Lee. reclusion perpetua,
3. The presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery negates the
necessity of proving the victim’s bad character to establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged and, at the same time, qualifies the
killing of Joseph Marquez to murder.
(NOT IMPORTANT) ISSUE # 2: Whether Herminia’s testimony should not have been
believed because it is biased, incredible and inconsistent? (NO)
1. Herminia’s testimony on direct examination is positive, clear and

straightforward.
2. She was subjected by defense counsel to rigorous cross and re-cross
examinations and yet she stuck to her testimony given in the direct
examination.
3. She readily gave specific details of the crime scene.
4. A son’s death in his mother’s house and in her presence is a painful and
agonizing experience that is not easy for a mother to forget, even with the
passing of time.
5. Herminia’s testimony shows that she was living with a conscience that
haunted and blamed her own self for failing to protect her son or, at least,
save him from death.
a. Herminia was emotionally upset at the time while testifying and
stated “di ko man lang naipagtanggol ang anak ko” (huhuhu)
6. Lee: Inconsistent testimony. She said “butas na bintana” in her sworn
statement before the police but testified on cross-examination that it was a
“bukas na bintana”
a. Also, in the affidavit, she stated that she just saw a hand holding a
gun. She did not see the person holding the gun, let alone who fired
it
7. SC: Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in open court on cross-
examination that she saw the hand and the gun coming out of the open
window, not from a hole in the window.
a. “Mali po ang letra, Bukas hindi butas” She also presented during
her direct testimony, a photograph of her living room just the way it
looked from her side on the night of the shooting
39

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

DOCTRINE: etc etc etc

ISSUE/HELD: W/N the Membership Book is considered an entry in official records to

performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines,

ISSUE/HELD: WON Palomares’s affidavit was a declaration against interest -- NO

publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the

DOCTRINE: Resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as an exception to the

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court PARTLY GRANTS

ISSUE: Whether the signatures of Nick and Eduviges appearing on the

RULING + RATIO: NO.

explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated

opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1)

[Note: Study the other sections as well.]

explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated

1. Herminia’s testimony on direct examination is positive, clear and

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