Special Proceedings 3d

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
CASE NAME
COPY THE FORMAT
FACTS:
1. Blah CTRL+F YOUR CASE TITLE, IT’S ALREADY DISTRIBUTED.
2. Blah DEADLINE: MAY 5, 2019 (SUNDAY), 11:59PM
a. Sub Blah
3. RTC ruled RULES ON PROTECTION OF LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY
4. CA ruled Writ of Habeas Corpus
1. Velasco v. CA, GR 118644, July 7, 1995 - FUEGO
ISSUES: 2. Ampatuan v. Macaraig, GR 182497, June 29, 2010 - CAPUCHINO
1. WoN Blah is blah? YES/NO 3. Enrile v. Salazar, GR 92163, June 15, 1990 - SOLCO
4. So v. Tacla, GR 190108, October 19, 2010 - CABOCHAN
RULING + RATIO: 5. Demaisip v. Cabcaban, UDK No. 14817, January 13, 2014 - SY
1. Blah 6. Tijing v. CA, GR 125901, March 8, 2001 - REMOLLO, P.
a. Sub Blah 7. Glenn Caballes v. CA, GR 163108, February 23, 2005 - DONES
2. Concept 8. Ilusorio v. Bildner, GR 139789 and 139780, May 12, 2000 - ONGSIAKO
a. Explain explain 9. Go v. Dimagiba, GR 151876, June 21, 2005 - CANDELARIA
10. Thornton v. Thornton, GR 154598, August 16, 2004 - UY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION? REVERSED? 11. People v. Caco, GR 94994-95, March 7, 1997 - TALION
12. In re: Correction/Adjustment of Penalty – Rolando Elbanbuena y Marfil,
DOCTRINE: etc etc etc GR 237721, July 31, 2018 - DOROJA
Writ of Amparo
1. Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, GR 180906 October 7, 2008 -
REMOLLO, D.
2. Roxas v. Arroyo, GR 189155, September 7, 2010 - MAGISTRADO
3. Canlas v. NAPICO, GR 182795, June 5, 2008 - HILADO
4. Razon et. al., v. Tagitis et. al., G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010 -
SANTOS, JR.
5. Boac, et. al. v. Cadapan and Empeno, G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31,
2011 - BAUTISTA
6. In re: Noriel H. Rodriguez, GR 191805, November 15, 2011 - ALCAZAR
7. De Lima v. Gatdula, GR 204528, February 19, 2013 - ALCANTARA
Writ of Habeas Data

1. Tapuz v. Del Rosario, GR 182484, June 17, 2008 - BALONAN
2. Meralco v. Lim, GR 184769, October 5, 2010 - ROMERO
3. Gamboa v. Chan, GR 193636, July 24, 2012 - FERNANDO
4. Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, GR 202666, September 29, 2014 -
DESLATE
5. Lee v. Ilagan, GR 203254, October 8, 2014 - OCAMPO
Writ of Kalikasan
1. Arigo v. Swift, GR 206510, September 16, 2014 - TAYLO
2. Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes, GR 180771, April 21, 2015 -
PELONGCO
1
Velasco v. CA, GR 118644, July 7, 1995 12. Further, on the day the detention of Larkins commenced, i.e., immediately
after the NBI was served with the Order of the Pasig RTC for his release on
FACTS: bail in connection with the BP 22 cases, no other criminal complaint or
1. On 16 September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel information had been filed or pending in any court. It was only sometime
Padolina of RTC Pasig against accused Lawrence Larkins for violations of between November 25, 1994 (when filing of the complaint was approved by
B.P. Blg. 22. the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor) and November 29, 1994 (the date appearing
2. On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before on the Urgent Motion for Bail filed by Larkin’s former counsel, said Atty.
the NBI a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly Ulep) that the complaint for rape was filed with the Antipolo RTC.
committed against her on 19 November 1994 at 2AM. in Victoria Valley 13. Contentions:
Subdivision, Valley Golf, Antipolo, Rizal. a. Petitioners: CA erred because –
3. Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special i. Larkins had already been charged with the crime of rape;
Investigators Flor. L. Resurreccion and Antonio M. Erum, Jr. proceeded to ii. The trial court had denied his application for bail.
the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, on 21 November 1994 and iii. The warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made
arrested the him. Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Taft Avenue, Manila. b. Respondent: Habeas corpus is rendered unavailing not by the mere
4. On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4k. Judge Padolina filing of an information, but by the issuance of a warrant of arrest or
forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest warrant of commitment, which are the only two processes
issued on 16 September 1993, and directing the Jail Warden of the NBI recognized by law to justify deprivation of liberty, and the order of
Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement "unless otherwise Judge Caballes of 5 January 1995 denying the petition for bail does
detained for some other cause." not qualify as such.
5. Petitioners refused to release Larkins because he was still detained for
another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he could be held ISSUES/HELD:
for inquest. 1. WON Cuyag has legal standing to file petition for issuance of the writ of
6. 2 days after Larkins’ arrest, a complaint against him for rape was executed habeas corpus – YES
by Alinea, and filed with RTC Antipolo on 2 December 1994 (court presided 2. WON CA erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus – YES
by Judge Felix S. Caballes).
7. Larkins filed an Urgent Motion for Bail, wherein he alleged that the evidence RATIO:
of guilt against him for rape is not strong, as he had no carnal knowledge of I. ON CUYAG’S LEGAL STANDING
the complainant and the medical report indicates that her hymen was neither 1. Cuyag has the personality to institute on behalf of her common- law spouse,
lacerated nor ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that Lawrence Larkins, the habeas corpus aspect of the petition, as she falls
he has no intention of going out of the country or hiding away from the law. within the purview of the term "some person" under Section 3, Rule 102 of
a. He also filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the the Rules of Court.
Complaint and for Immediate Release, principally based on the a. Some other person - any person who has a legally justified
alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. This motion met vigorous interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is
opposition from the private complainant. restrained or who shows some authorization to make the
8. Court denied the 2 motions. application.
9. Larkin’s common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed before the Court of b. CUYAG is not, however, the real party in interest in the certiorari
Appeals a petition for habeas corpus with certiorari. Impleaded as aspect of the petition. Only Larkins could institute a petition for
respondents were petitioners and Judge Felix S. Caballes. certiorari to set aside the order denying his motions for bail and for
10. CA issued a resolution ordering the respondents therein to appear and the dismissal of the complaint against him.
produceLarkins before the court, and to show cause why Larkins’ liberty is 2. It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an
being restrained. application for a writ of habeas corpus will absolutely be barred. While
11. Petitioners appeared and produced Larkins at the hearing. CA resolved to ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there is
order the immediate release of Larkins from his present confinement on the an adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it
ground that the complaint presented to the NBI by complainant Desiree may, nevertheless, be available in exceptional cases, for the writ
Alinea on the basis of which Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest should not be considered subservient to procedural limitations which
for rape did not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the glorify form over substance.
Rules of Court.
2
3. It must be kept in mind that although the question most often of Larkins. This order comes under the purview of the word order under the
considered in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is first sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102 reading: "If it appears that the person
whether an inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the former alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer . . . by
involves a collateral attack on the judgment and "reaches the body but virtue of [an] order of a court of record and that the court or judge had
not the record," while the latter assails directly the judgment and jurisdiction to . . . make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. . . ."cralaw
"reaches the record but not the body." 17. The foregoing renders untenable Cuyag’s claim, i.e. that the writ may not be
allowed only where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
II. GRANT OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS custody of an officer under process issued by the court or judge, and that
1. CA granted the writ of habeas corpus because it found that the warrantless there are only two recognized processes which justify deprivation of liberty
arrest of Larkins for the crime of rape "did not meet the legal requirements (1) commitment order and (2) warrant of arrest.
provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court." It could have in mind Section a. The contention is not only a deliberate misreading of Section 4 of
5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest. Rule 102 limiting its application to the first part of the first sentence
2. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may be bar his and disregarding the rest, but is also an undue and unwarranted
release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the restriction of the term process.
legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the b. A commitment order and a warrant of arrest are but species of
application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its judicial process.
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such 18. Malaloan v. CA: A judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant,
as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also, the
illegal at the time of the filing of the application. means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all
3. Among such supervening events are writs warrants, summonses and orders of courts of justice or judicial
a. Issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons or order issued
detained person (Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila) in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his
b. Filing of a complaint of information for the offense for which property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment, or a writ,
the accused is detained, as in the instant case. warrant, mandate or other process issuing from a court of justice.
i. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of 19. The order of 5 January 1995 of the trial court also qualifies as a process
the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of within the meaning of Section 4 of Rule 102.
habeas corpus is no longer available Section 4 of Rule 20. Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a
102 reads in part as follows: "Nor shall anything in writ of habeas corpus will not prosper because his detention has become
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the complaint against him
person charged with . . . an offense in the and by the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.
Philippines." 21. BUT even as SC decides in favor of the petitioners, it is nevertheless:
14. However, applying the last sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102, the disturbed by certain incidents relative to the warrantless arrest of Larkins.
issuance of the writ should not be allowed after the party sought to be a. Assuming that it was lawful, the facts before us disclose that the
released had been charged before any court. arresting officers failed to strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph
a. The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court requiring that the
is recommended has the same legal import and effect as the person lawfully arrested without a warrant shall forthwith be
posting of bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112; and
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of b. Article 125 RPC providing that he be delivered to the proper judicial
the court. authorities within thirty-six hours, the crime with which Larkins was
15. While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing of charged being punishable by an affective penalty. Although the
the Urgent Motion for Bail, Larkins, thru a new counsel, filed an Urgent arrest was made in Makati where there is a police station and a
Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release municipal (now city) jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention
based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, the said motion was Cell at Taft Avenue, Manila, and though the complaint of the
a mere afterthought which came too later in the day. By then, the trial court offended party was executed on 23 November 1994, it was not until
had firmly acquired jurisdiction over his person. 2 December 1994 that the said complaint was actually filed in court.
16. The trial court’s order of 5 January 1995 denying the urgent motion for bail 22. Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the arresting officers
was an unequivocal assertion of its authority to keep in custody the person with the said provisions merits by the arresting officers with the said
3
provisions merits nothing but disapproval from the Court. In the performance
of their duty and in their commendable pursuit to stamp out crimes and bring
criminals to the bar of justice, law enforcement authorities should make no
shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to safeguard the
constitutional and statutory rights of accused persons. The rule of law must
always be upheld.
23. SC also noted that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent
motion for bail, as required under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
a. The grant or denial of bail must be based upon the court’s
determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
This discretion may only be exercised after evidence is submitted at
the hearing conducted for that purpose.
b. The court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise, the order
would be defective and voidable.
c. Even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to
the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the
prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the
State’s evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. 38 It
was thus incumbent upon the trial court to receive the evidence for
the prosecution on the urgent motion for bail.
i. For this procedural shortcoming, Larkins should also be
partly blamed. He did not press for a hearing after the
scheduled hearing on 5 December 1994 was cancelled
because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge was out of
the country.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals of 1 February 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273 is hereby SET ASIDE and
ANNULLED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
4
Ampatuan v. Macaraig, GR 182497, June 29, 2010 the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other
charges/legal grounds.
FACTS: 13. Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s
1. Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a
assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of
2. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office of Manila on 22 April 2008.
Maguindanao without being informed of the cause of his restraint. 14. RTC RULED - ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding
3. PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing
made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the
the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to policemen liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.
of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary 15. Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the
Barias and General Roberto Rosales. administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP
4. A press briefing was then conducted where it was announced that PO1 and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police
Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two Commission on Elections officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan
(COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail in United has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent
Nations Avenue, Manila. however stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate
5. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while
Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and
murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the dismissed the petition.
COMELEC.
6. PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters Support ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND
7. Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY
Nelson Salva ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL
Ampatuan. The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila.
But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief RULING + RATIO:
Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan 1. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
8. This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
the RTC of Manila, inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the
filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS VERSION: is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such
9. They narrated that at around 7:08 o’clock in the evening of 10 November as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at
2007, a sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, the time of the filing of the application
Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. 2. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine
Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification
of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and
10. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD) Homicide effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty.
Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
Manila Prosecutor’s Office. specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
11. Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his Pre- liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing. On even date, a restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed against PO1 Ampatuan 3. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must
12. Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his
that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of
5
detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged
cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be
granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise,
again the writ will be refused
4. In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody.
Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also
known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of
1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the
administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP.
5. Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody,
such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This
Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements
or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors
is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.
6. Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the
ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that
would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible
precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police
officers concerned are always accounted for. Since the basis of PO1
Ampatuan’s restrictive custody is the administrative case filed against
him, his remedy is within such administrative process.
7. We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody
since 19 April 2008. To date, the administrative case against him should
have already been resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody
should have been rendered moot and academic, in accordance with
Section 55 of Republic Act No. 8551 Having conceded that there is no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we have to
dismiss the petition.
8. In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is
entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1
Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully
deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

DISMISSED for lack of merit.
DOCTRINE: Bolded
6
Enrile v. Salazar, GR 92163, June 15, 1990 DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine
enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against
FACTS: petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be
1. In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail,
Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder and before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their failed coup petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are
d'etat attempt. ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted
2. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus officio. No
information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. Enrile later filed a petition pronouncement as to costs.
for habeas corpus alleging:
3. That the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. That he was DOCTRINE: BOLDED
charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied
due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and detained on the
strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus was proper?
RULING + RATIO:
1. Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus because he was denied bail
although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would entitle one for bail.
2. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with
murder and multiple frustrated murders – the intention of the prosecution
was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty
thereof in the maximum.
3. The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile can be charged of would be Simple
Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be
necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he should be
entitled to bail.
4. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the
proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have
been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He
should have exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas
corpus.
5. The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue
for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending
trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested
with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke
that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against
him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the
review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was
also available there
7
So v. Tacla, GR 190108, October 19, 2010 attached to, and formed an integral part of, their Consolidated Return of the
Writ.
FACTS:
1. Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the ISSUE: WON the Petitions for the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are moot
criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. and academic?
a. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings before the RTC,
Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care RULING + RATIO: YES.
at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the 1. The petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the
warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla, stated criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner So’s daughter, Guisande.
that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder a. To balance the conflicting right of an accused to medical treatment
and that she was "not ready for discharge," as certified by her and the right of the prosecution to subject to court processes an
personal psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan. accused charged with a non-bailable offense, the CA directed the
b. Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the National Center for transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clare’s Medical Center,
Mental Health (NCMH), ordered that accused Guisande be while noting that because of the peculiarities of this case, there was
physically brought to the NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to a deviation from the regular course of procedure, since accused
have temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Guisande should have been confined in jail because she was
Tacla would issue the corresponding order of confinement of charged with a non-bailable offense.
Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMH’s determination 2. The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or
that she was ready for trial. omission or the threatened act or omission complained of - confinement and
2. Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s
confinement at the NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful.
and violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention and a. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is
assistance of counsel, accused Guisande and her father filed for the that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his
issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo. freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint.
a. Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process, the
life-threatening situation while confined at the NCMH. writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to
3. The SC issued a Nov. 24, 2009 Resolution issuing the writs, and referred the justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty
petition to the CA for Hearing. must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
4. CA’s 17th Division held a Hearing freedom of action.
a. The accused was found fit for the rigors of Trial. b. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus,
b. The Director Nestor M. Mantaring of NBI is politely DIRECTED to in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral,
cause the transfer from NCMH to the St. Clare’s Medical Center of illegal restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the
the subject Accused, Ma. Elena So-Guisande, and to provide two writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
(2) or three (3) security personnel to the Accused restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
5. Supervening Events: therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
a. On February 4, 2010, acting on the City Prosecutor’s January 25, freedom of action is sufficient.
2010 Motion to Withdraw Information, public respondent Judge c. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must
ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case involving Guisande. first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his
b. In view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 from liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of
which the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the
should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic. alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ
6. So vehemently opposed the dismissal of the petitions because they had filed should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state,
criminal complaints and an administrative case against respondents Judge if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
Tacla and Dr. Vicente, as well as the NCMH and an attending doctor thereat, d. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
for purported violations of accused Guisande’s rights during her confinement restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be
at the NCMH. Adding to the flurry of cases, petitioner So filed a Verified granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the
Petition to cite Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in contempt before the CA for applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
their supposed submission of an altered and falsified document, which was petition should be dismissed.
8
3. Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused

Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much
less at the NCMH.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the petitions in

G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 for the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, and
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are DENIED for being moot
and academic. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINES:
1. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that
the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of
movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the
grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in
the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action.
2. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the
person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be
dismissed.
3. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in
fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action
is sufficient.
4. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must
first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his
liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of
detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged
cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be
granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise,
again the writ will be refused.
5. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the
person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be
dismissed.
9
Demaisip v. Cabcaban, UDK No. 14817, January 13, 2014 their conversation, Cabcaban surmised that Shirly did not want to
take her daughter back, having offered to pay for her daily
FACTS: expenses at the shelter.
1. Petitioner Shirly Vingson (Shirly) alleged that Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang d. that on October 29, 2011 she decided to turn over Shang Ko to the
Ko), her 14-year-old daughter, ran away from home on September 23, 2011. Calvary Kids, a private organization that gave sanctuary and
2. On November 2, 2011 Shirly went to the police station in Bacolod City upon schooling to abandoned and abused children. On November 2,
receipt of information that Shang Ko was in the custody of respondent Jovy 2011 petitioner Shirly showed up at the police station asking for her
Cabcaban, a police officer in that station. daughter. Cabcaban told her that Shang Ko was in a sanctuary for
3. Since Cabcaban refused to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help abandoned children and that the police officer had to first
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to rescue her child. coordinate with it before she can disclose where Shang Ko was.
a. An NBI agent, Arnel Pura Pura, informed Shirly that Shang Ko was But Shirly was adamant and threatened her with a lawsuit.
no longer with Cabcaban but was staying with a private Cabcaban claimed that Shang Ko’s father was a Taiwanese and
organization called Calvary Kids. that Shirly wanted the child back to use her as leverage for getting
b. Pura told her, however, that the child was fine and had been financial support from him.
attending school. e. that 1 year later, NBI agents led by Pura went to the police station
4. Thus, Shirly filed a petition for habeas corpus against respondent Cabcaban to verify Shirly’s complaint that Cabcaban had kidnapped Shang
and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the CA instead of the RTC Ko. Cabcaban accompanied the NBI agents to Calvary Kids to talk
of Bacolod City citing as reason several threats against her life in that city. to the institution’s social worker, school principal, and director. They
5. CA, in a resolution, denied the petition for its failure to clearly allege who has provided the NBI agents with the child’s original case study report
custody of Shang Ko, CA said that habeas corpus may not be used as a and told them that it was not in Shang Ko’s best interest to return
means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person or as a means her to her mother who abused and maltreated her. Shang Ko
of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of herself told the NBI that she would rather stay at Calvary Kids
such person. CA denied the MR as well. Hence, this petition for review. because she was afraid of what would happen to her if she
6. Respondent Cabcaban’s contentions (in a comment): returned home. As proof, Shang Ko wrote a letter stating that,
a. that police officers found Shang Ko crying outside a church. Shang contrary to her mother’s malicious insinuations, Cabcaban actually
Ko refused to give any information about herself to the police. Thus, helped her when she had nowhere to go after her family refused to
they indorsed her case to the Bacolod City Police Women and take her back.
Children Protection Desk that Cabcaban headed. After the initial
interview, Cabcaban referred Shang Ko to Balay Pasilungan, a ISSUE: W/N the writ of habeas corpus is available.
temporary shelter for abused women and children.
b. that on the next day, a social worker sat with Shang Ko who said RULING + RATIO: YES.
that her mother Shirly had been abusive in treating her. Shang Ko 1. Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is
narrated that on Shirly instructed another daughter to give Shang available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
Ko ₱280.00 and take her to the pier to board a boat going to Iloilo person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful
City. Shang Ko was told to look for a job there and to never come custody over a minor.
back to Bacolod City. Since she had nowhere to go when she 2. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor
arrived in Iloilo City, Shang Ko decided to return to Bacolod City children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather
with the money given her. She went to her best friend’s house but than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their
was turned away for fear of Shirly. She called her sister so that she growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry
and her boyfriend could get her but they, too, turned her down. throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and
c. that Shang Ko pleaded with the police and the social worker not to properly counseled.
return her to her mother. As a result, the Bacolod City Police filed a 3. Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all
complaint against petitioner Shirly for violation of Republic Act 7610 residents of Bacolod City, it would be best that such issues be resolved by a
(Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Family Court in that city.
Discrimination Act). The police sent notice to Shirly inviting her to a 4. Meantime, considering the presumption that the police authorities acted
conference but she refused to receive such notice. Two days later, regularly in placing Shang Ko in the custody of Calvary Kids. The Court
however, she came and spoke to Cabcaban, pointing out that believes that she should remain there pending hearing and adjudication of
Shang Ko had been a difficult child with a tendency to steal. From
10
this custody case. Besides she herself has expressed preference to stay in
that place.
DISPOSITION:
1. WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals Resolutions in
CA-G.R. SP 07261 dated December 18, 2012 and January 8, 2013 and
ORDERS this custody case forwarded to the Family Court of Bacolod City
for hearing and adjudication as the evidence warrants. Meantime until such
court orders otherwise let the minor Shang Ko Vingson remain in the
custody of Calvary Kids of Bacolod City.
2. Further the Court ORDERS petitioner Shirly Vingson Shirly Vingson
Demaisip to pay the balance of the docket and other legal fees within 10
days from receipt of this Resolution.
DOCTRINE: Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a
minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children.
But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such
children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and
leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives unless they are
liberated from such parents and properly counseled.
11
Tijing v. CA, GR 125901, March 8, 2001 3. Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf
the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have
FACTS: rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose
1. Petitioners are husband and wife. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the behalf the application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke
laundry woman of private respondent Angelita Diamante. Bienvenida left her with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.
four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually 4. A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence
let Angelita take care of the child. Upon return Angelita and Edgardo Jr. presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is
were gone. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
whereabouts.Four years later she went to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she a. First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children.
allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second
avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do child, she underwent.
so. b. Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas
2. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez
court in order to recover their son. declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of
3. Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that the accident
at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez. c. Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John
4. The trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife
could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an d. Fourth, the child and Bienvenida had strong similarities in their
impossibility. The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a
strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of establish parentage.
petitioners. e. Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's
5. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic.
trial court. 5. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
6. A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
ISSUE: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of a minor? unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
RULING + RATIO: YES parentage testing. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
1. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. to resort to DNA testing.
Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third DISPOSITION: The petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.
involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of
liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a DOCTRINE:
remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the
right of custody over a child. It must be stressed too that in habeas In Bold.
corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject
to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
2. In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the propriety
of the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first whether the Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named
John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first
determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minor's biological
mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons,
initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed
one and the same.
12
Glenn Caballes v. CA, GR 163108, February 23, 2005 9. Trial court issued a subpoena for Dr. Marquez, requiring him to appear for
trial on July 17, 2003.
FACTS: 10. Petitioner filed an MR of the Order denying his petition for bail.
1. Glenn Chua Caballes (petitioner) was charged with rape of a minor in RTC. a. Trial court set this MR for hearing, but petitioner preempted the MR
Because he was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained. by filing a Motion to Dismiss, with ground that his right to speedy
a. He pleaded not guilty during arraignment. trial had been violated.
2. Prosecution presented two witnesses, the private complainant and her 11. Dr. Marquez was still not able to receive his subpoena; thus the prosecution
mother. Petitioner commenced cross-examination of private complainant but again failed to present him as witness during trial. Prosecution, again prayed
failed to complete it. Petitioner then engaged the services of a new counsel. for continuance, to which the petitioner objected. Trial court ordered
3. Petitioner continued cross-examination of private complainant but still failed continuance.
to terminate it. Trial on March 6, 2003 was set for petitioner to terminate said 12. Judge of the RTC then, through an Order, inhibited himself from hearing to
cross-examination however, due to illness of the private prosecutor, the trial maintain probity and objectivity. The case was re-raffled to another branch,
was reset. and hearing was set on September 8, 2003.
a. Trial was reset to March 17, 2003, in which petitioner continued a. Petitioner filed an MR of this Order, which was denied.
cross-examination. 13. During September 8, 2003 hearing, RTC Judge gave prosecution 5 days to
b. On the April 3, 2003 trial, petitioner concluded his cross- oppose petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. Trial was also set on September 18,
examination of private complainant. 2003.
c. Prosecution then declared that its next witness would be Dr. a. On September 8, 2003 hearing, Omnibus Order was issued
Marquez, the Medico-Legal Officer of PNP Crime Lab who denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, with reason that there was
conducted the examination on private complainant. Prosecution no violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial, considering that the
prayed for cancellation of the trial on April 23, 2003 to give itself apparent delays could not be attributed to the fault of the
time to subpoena Dr. Marquez. prosecution alone. Regarding the MR of the Order denying the
4. Petitioner then filed a petition for bail. petition for bail, the trial court considered the MR as abandoned by
5. Trial of April 30, 2003 did not push through because petitioner’s counsel filed petitioner upon his filing of the Motion to Dismiss.
a Manifestation that the latter’s presence was required in an execution sale 14. Petitioner then filed with the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or
in Cavite. Certiorari and Prohibition.
a. He however manifested that he reserved his right to cross-examine a. CA issued a Resolution requiring the petitioner to inform the court
any witness the prosecution would present in case trial would of his choice if remedy within 5 days.
proceed on that date. b. Petitioner chose that the petition be treated as a petition for habeas
b. He also said that in the event that the trial court would cancel the corpus without prejudice to the concomitant application of certiorari
trial, petitioner’s counsel would be available in May 2003 and during if the court considered it necessary to give effect to the writ of
the first half of June 2003. habeas corpus.
6. Trial court reset the hearing to June 19, 2003 and gave prosecution 10 days c. Petitioner averred that: (1) he was deprived of his right to a speedy
to file its opposition to petitioner’s petition for bail. Trial court also ordered trial and his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case
the issuance of a subpoena to Dr. Marquez to require him to attend trial on [first time, in CA]; (2) RTC Judge erred in inhibiting himself; (3) trial
the said date. court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his petition for
a. Petitioner filed another motion praying that the hearing on June 19, bail; and (4) current RTC Judge prejudged the case against him.
2003 be moved to an earlier date. In the meantime, prosecution 15. CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus.
filed its comment/opposition to petitioner’s petition for bail. a. CA held that while petitioner manifested his preference that the
7. Trial court then issued an Order declaring that the petition for bail was petition be treated as one for habeas corpus, the same was not the
submitted for its resolution and denying the petitioner’s motion for an earlier proper remedy to review and examine the proceedings before the
trial date. The trial court eventually issued an Order denying the petition for trial court and as a relief from petitioner’s perceived oppressive
bail, finding that the evidence of guilt against petitioner was strong. situation in the trial court. CA also said that a writ of habeas corpus
8. Dr. Marquez failed to appear before the court because he had been is not a writ of error; that it could not exercise its certiorari
assigned to a different location and thus failed to receive the subpoena. The jurisdiction over the acts or omission of the respondent judge as a
prosecution prayed for - petitioner objected - and the trial court granted a concomitant remedy; and that the remedy for habeas corpus and
continuance for this. certiorari are different in nature, scope, and purpose. Petition, the
a. Petitioner’s objection was based on his right to speedy trial. CA said, failed to present any evidence to prove that there was any
13
intentional or deliberate delay caused to prejudice him; nor was granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be
there malice in the failure of the prosecution to promptly serve the pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to
subpoena to Dr. Marquez. the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In
i. Petitioner filed an MR but the CA denied. another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued
16. Hence this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and
irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction
ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s remedy was correct. occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat
that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must
RULING + RATIO: NO, certiorari and habeas corpus are mutually exclusive and be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that
cannot be lumped together in one petition. where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and
1. Petitioner’s recourse via a Petition for Certiorari from the CA Decision irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are
dismissing his Petiton for Writ of Habeas Corpus is inappropriate. not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such
a. Period for appeal from the judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases, the restraint is not illegal.
cases is 48 hours from notice of the judgment appealed from. c. Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a
b. Petitioner should have appealed to the SC from the CA Decision proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as well as the denial having the person of restraint presented before the judge in
of the MR thereof. His Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and
premature, considering that there is a plain, speedy and adequate his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act
remedy existing, which is appeal. upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who
c. Additionally, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority.
assail the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss the Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
case, the denial of the petition for bail, and the voluntary inhibition (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody,
of the RTC Judge. and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian
2. Nature of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and as distinguished from has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ
Petition for Certiorari and Appeal (lifted directly from the case due to may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is
importance and relevance) entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
a. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a d. A writ of habeas corpus,which is regarded as a "palladium of
special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of liberty" is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter
Court, as amended. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is,
Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by
which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, proof. Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal act of
notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty,
served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be
when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if not the
freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad sub juciendum is
corpus,he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person
that court. is held.
b. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor 3. A petition for writ of habeas corpus, a special proceeding, cannot be joined
intended as substitute for the trial court's function. It cannot with a petition for certiorari, a special civil action. These two are governed by
take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ two different sets of rules, and such joinder is prohibited by Section 5(b),
cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error Rule 2, Rules of Court.
that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The a. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy different
inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the from the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order Rules of Court, as amended. The writ of habeas corpus is a
are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily collateral attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said processes,
regular course, and in the absence of exceptional orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or
circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
14
jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional

errors. It has no other use, except to bring before the court a
record material to be considered in exercising jurisdiction. A
writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand, a writ
of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also
reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record.
However, when jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus,to bring the body of the person whose
liberty is involved into court, and if it is necessary, to provide
the record upon which the detention is based, that may be
accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an ancillary
proceeding, i.e.,it is subordinate to or in aid of the primary
action for the purpose of impeaching the record. When a writ
of certiorari is issued as the foundation of jurisdiction to bring
it and direct upon the validity of a judicial determination by
any body or officer, jurisdictional questions only are reached,
and such questions pertaining to the detention made by the
officer or body particularly complained of.
4. Petitioner manifested that his petition should be treated as a petition for
habeas corpus. However, the CA rightly dismissed the petition because the
petitioner failed to establish his right to the writ. Petitioner was charged with
rape and was detained; hence if the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall
not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal prosecution.
a. Trial court indeed had jurisdiction over the offense and over the
person of petitioner. The jail warden had the authority and is
mandated to detain petitioner until granted bail by the court, or the
case is dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. Petitioner failed
to establish exceptional circumstances that his incarceration
pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional
circumstances warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
by the CA.
5. Additionally, petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to assail
the trial court’s dismissal of petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss; the proper
remedy was to appeal.
6. Finally, there were no violations of the rights to speedy trial and speedy
disposition of the case. Petitioner himself was guilty of delay and
postponement - i.e. failure to attend due to an execution sale.
DISPOSITION:
Petition DENIED.
DOCTRINE:
[SEE BOLD]
15
Ilusorio v. Bildner, GR 139789 and 139780, May 12, 2000 10. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he
is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of
FACTS: his right.
1. Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive 11. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by
property valued at millions of pesos. compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any
2. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio other process.
Country Club.
3. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and DISPOSITION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration.
begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), At any rate, the case has been rendered moot by the death of subject.
Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen.
4. They separated from bed and board in 1972. DOCTRINE: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
5. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one
Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an
6. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City. illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty
7. In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.
about 5 months in Antipolo city.
8. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother
overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate.
9. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail
health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
10. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did
not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati.
11. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the
custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands
to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
RULING + RATIO:
1. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto.
2. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
3. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal
or moral.
4. Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance of the writ.
5. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
6. He still has the capacity to discern his actions.
7. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the
subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
8. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.
9. The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child
but the right of a wife to visit a husband.
16
Go v. Dimagiba, GR 151876, June 21, 2005 corpus. Neither did he make mention of his physical state in his
memorandum and comment submitted to court.
FACTS:
1. Dimagiba issued to Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED. Petition for the writ of habeas corpus
drawee bank, were dishonored. Dimagiba was prosecuted for 13 counts of DENIED. Case remanded for the re-arrest of Dimagiba.
violation of BP 22 with the MTCC in Baguio. The court convicted Dimagiba.
His appeal with the RTC and CA were denied with finality. MTCC DOCTRINE: When a petition for the writ of habeas corpus is filed invoking arguments
subsequently issued an order directing Dimagiba’s arrest. stated in motions with the hope of circumventing the motion’s denial, it constitutes a
2. Dimagiba filed an MR, stating that a penalty of fine was more appropriate, procedural infirmity amounting to forum shopping. The proper remedy to the denial of
instead of imprisonment. DENIED. MTCC directed the issuance of a Warrant a motion to suspend execution is an appeal.
of Arrest against him.
3. Dimagiba filed with the RTC of Baguio a Petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. GRANTED. RTC ordered his release from confinement and
required him to pay a fine of Php100K in lieu of imprisonment. The court
anchored its basis on the Vaca v. CA case and SC Administrative Circular
(SC-AC) No. 12-2000 which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only
instead of imprisonment for BP22 violations if accused was not a recidivist or
habitual delinquent. RTC stated that this should apply retroactively because
it was favorable to the accused. He was found to be a first time offender and
had 200 workers under him which would be displaced by his imprisonment.
Go’s MR denied.
ISSUE: W/N the petition for the writ of habeas corpus was validly granted.
RULING + RATIO: NO.

1. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty. It is an immediate relief
for those illegally confined.
2. From his allegations, Dimagiba’s petition appeared sufficient in form to
support the issuance of the writ. However, it appears that Dimagiba has
previously sought the modification of his sentence in an MR of the MTCC’s
Execution Order and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal oF the Writ of
Execution. Both were denied. In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus,
Dimagiba raised the same arguments that he invoked in the motions.
The resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity.
3. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his
motions, in which he should have prayed that the execution of the judgment
be stayed. Dimagiba effectively used the action he had chosen with the
intent of finding a favorable court. The petition was clearly an attempt to
reopen a case that had become final and executory. Dimagiba should have
resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different
action in another forum – amounting to forum shopping.
4. The Vaca case and the SC-AC’s applications are subject to the discretion of
the Court. Therefore, it is up to the court whether to impose imprisonment or
fine.
5. Dimagiba failed to provide evidence of his alleged “unhealthy physical
condition due to a by-pass operation and hypertension” which was cited by
the RTC. He did not even make such statements in his petition for habeas
17
Thornton v. Thornton, GR 154598, August 16, 2004 another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus
case will be left without legal remedy.
FACTS: 4. The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child.
1. Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August Thus, RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the SC of their jurisdiction over
28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church, Manila. A year later, habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer 5. In ruling that the Commissioner's "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose
Delle Francisco Thornton resort to the regular courts for damages, Court was merely applying and
2. After three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and
She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the
nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. Whenever petitioner well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the
was out of the country, respondent left her daughter in the care of the letter, of the law:
househelp while out with friends. a. "Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The
3. Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she spirit of the law insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the
continued her carefree ways. Respondent left the family home with her words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth
daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that life."
they were going to Lamitan, Basilan Province. 6. It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the
4. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus but this was dismissed, Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not
presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the
then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation.
daughter. However, he did not find them there. Brgy office of Sta. Clara, 7. Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are
Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification that respondent was no longer not favored.
residing there. 8. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the
5. Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent's cellular jurisdiction of the CA and SC to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the
phone bills showing calls from different places. Petitioner then filed another custody of minors.
petition for habeas corpus, this time in the CA which could issue a writ of 9. Section 20 of the rule provides that: A verified petition for a writ of habeas
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. CA denied for lack of corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The
jurisdiction. writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court
6. CA ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family belongs…The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Xxx
of Appeals) and BP 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) 10. Finally, Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the
country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of
ISSUE: Whether the CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition.
cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369
giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for
habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division
RULING + RATIO: YES
1. CA should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369
that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the
custody of minors.
2. CA opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by
giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the
lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas
corpus.
3. CA erred in this interpretation. Such will result in an iniquitous situation,
leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody
of their children. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to
18
People v. Caco, GR 94994-95, March 7, 1997
FACTS:
1. Lilibeth Caco was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the
Dangerous Drug Act (Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs) with a sentence of life imprisonment and
fine.
2. Through PAO, Caco filed a Motion for modification of sentence stating that
she had been detained for 7 years and that the marijuana in her possession
was only 10 sticks, less than 200 grams— her sentence should be reduced.
3. The SolGen manifested that Caco was correct and that she should be
released. Since the weight of the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the
penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as interpreted in People v.
Simon and in People v. De Lara, is prision correccional, whose duration is
from six months and one day to six years. Also, it was declared in People v.
Simon that provisions of R.A. No. 7659 which are favorable to the accused
should be given retroactive effect.
ISSUE: WoN Caco should be released.
RULING + RATIO: YES
1. SC: Our decision of 14 May 1993 cannot, however, be modified because it

had long become final and the appellant is already serving the sentence.
2. It is settled that where the decision is already final, the appropriate
remedy of an accused to secure release from prison in view of the
retroactive effect of a favorable law is to file a petition for habeas
corpus.
3. Nonetheless, although the remedy availed of by the appellant is a
motion for modification of sentence, it may be treated as a substantial
compliance with the rules on habeas corpus.
4. We treat the motion in question as one for habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, considering that as of now, Caco has been in

detention for seven (7) years, or for more than the maximum imposable penalty for
the offense she committed, which is only six (6) years in light of People v. Simon and
People v. De Lara, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to
RELEASE immediately from confinement accused appellant LILIBETH CACO y
PALMARIO unless her further detention is justified by other lawful cause.
DOCTRINE: Bold
19
In re: Correction/Adjustment of Penalty – Rolando Elbanbuena y Marfil, GR e. Failure of OSG to file a comment will entitle the court to render
237721, July 31, 2018 judgment as may be warranted motu proprio or upon motion
f. Judgment should be issued no later than 10 calendar days from
FACTS: lapse of period to file comment and shall set forth (1) penalty, (2)
1. Petitioner Elbanbuena was a Disbursing Officer of a National High School length of time in confinement, and (3) whether the petitioner is
who was charged with four counts of malversation of public funds through entitled to immediate release
falsification of a document g. Judgment shall be immediately executory
2. He was convicted and the decision became final and executory h. ROC to apply suppletorily
3. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from prision mayor to reclusion
perpetua and had started serving his sentence in Bilibid in 2000 DISPOSITION: REMANDED to the RTC for the determination of: (1) the proper
4. In 2017, RA No. 10951 was promulgated which reduced the penalty (for penalty/penalties in accordance with RA No. 10951; and (2) whether petitioner
Elbabuena, this meant his sentence should only be prision correccional in its ROLANDO ELBANBUENA y MARFIL is entitled to immediate release on account of
medium and maximum periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium full service of his sentences, as modified.
periods)
5. There is a novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused, DOCTRINE: RA No. 10951 is an exceptional circumstance which warrants not only
petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet the the re-opening of an already terminated case, but also the recall of an Entry of
penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of said Judgment for purposes of modifying the penalty to be served. The Supreme Court
law has issued guidelines for such modification.
ISSUE: WON the decision convicting Elbanbuena should be modified and

Elbanbuena released
RULING + RATIO: YES & TO BE DETERMINED BY TRIAL COURT

1. RA No. 10951 is an exceptional circumstance which warrants not only the
re-opening of an already terminated case, but also the recall of an Entry of
Judgment for purposes of modifying the penalty to be served
2. Thus in a previous case (Hernan v. Sandigan), the Court re-opened the case
for the sole purpose of re-computing the proper sentence to be imposed in
accordance with RA No. 10951
3. However, petitioner Elbanbuena seeks not only a modification of his
sentence in accordance with RA No. 10951 but he also seeks immediate
release from confinement on account of his alleged full service of the re-
computed sentence
4. The determination of whether he is entitled to immediate release,
however, would necessarily involve ascertaining, among others, the
actual length of time Elbanbuena has actually been in confinement and
whether time allowance for good conduct should be allowed
5. Such an exercise would, at the first instance, be better undertaken by a
trial court, which is relatively more equipped to make findings of both
fact and law
6. However, due to the anticipated influx of similar petitions, the Court
resolved to issue guidelines
a. The PAO, concerned inmate, or his/her counsel may file
b. File with the RTC exercising territorial jurisdiction over the locality
where the petitioner-convict is confined
c. Only pleadings allowed are the petition and comment from the OSG
(within 10 days from notice)
d. Petition must be in writing and verified by the petitioner
20
Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, GR 180906 October 7, 2008 19. June 13, 2007 – Respondents were brought to Pangasinan to farm the land
of Caigas. Here, they started to save their earnings to aid in their escape.
FACTS: When they saved 1000 pesos, they were able to acquire a cellphone.
1. Feb. 14, 2006 - Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, brothers and herein 20. August 13, 2007 – Reynaldo and Raymond Manalo were able to escape
respondents, were abducted by elements of the military (AFP and Citizen and board a bus bound for Manila.
Armed Force Geographical Unit or CAFGU) from their house in Buhol na 21. The respondents were able to corroborate each other’s affidavits.
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. 22. Dr. Benito Molino also corroborated the accounts of the Manalo brothers. He
2. The abductors were looking for a certain “Bestre”. Manalo brothers were specializes in forensic medicine. He conducted a medical exam on the
suspected of being members of the NPA respondents
3. The white L300 van was driven by M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo 23. After their escape. The scars and wounds of respondents were consistent
4. The brothers were repeatedly beaten and tortured and questioned about with their account of physical injuries inflicted on them. He followed the
their knowledge of the NPA. Istanbul Protocol in the medical exam.
5. Sometime in the third week of detention, Raymond attempted to escape. He 24. Petitioners also submitted affidavits
discovered that they were in Fort Magsaysay (Palayan, Nueva Ecija). He 25. Gen. Palparan and M/Sgt. Hilario filed their affidavits late.
was however recaptured and tortured. Detention in Fort Magsaysay lasted 26. Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall and witness for the petitioner,
for 3 and a half months. conducted an investigation on May 29, 2006, from 8am to 10pm.
6. One day, Rizal Hilario took the Manalo brothers to Pinaud, San Ildefonso, 27. All 6 persons (CAFGU members) implicated in the abduction denied the
Bulacan and then beaten up. They remained there for one or two weeks. allegation. They had alibis (some were building a chapel, some were just at
7. Then brought to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan to meet Maj. Gen. Jovito home)
Palparan, Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division. 28. Discovered that “Ka Bestre” is actually Rolando Manalo, elder brother of
8. Gen. Palparan told the Manalo brother to tell their parents to not go to rallies the respondents.
and hearings regarding their disappearance. Instead, they should help in the 29. Recommendation was for the dismissal of the case.
capture of “Bestre”.
9. Respondents were then brought to their parents’ house to deliver Palparan’s ISSUE: W/N the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly given?
message. Their parents agreed out of fear.
10. Manalo brothers were given medicine named “Alive”. Gen. Palparan said RULING + RATIO: YES.
that this would make them feel better, but the real effect was drowsiness and 1. Promulgated in October 24, 2007. First time that the Supreme Court
a heavy feeling after waking up. exercised its expanded power in the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules to
11. After 3 months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson. He was protect the people’s constitutional rights (life, liberty, property)·
ordered to clean outside the barracks of the Army Rangers. 2. Coverage of which is confined to:
12. Met Sherlyn Cadapan, a UP student who was also abducted, tortured and a. Extralegal killings – killings committed without due process of the
raped by the military. law
13. Reynaldo was brought to Camp Tecson a week later. Other captives (Karen b. Enforced disappearances – an arrest, detention or abduction by the
Empeño and Manuel Merino) also arrived. government; refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
14. All the captives were chained every night. They were told that their families whereabouts places him outside the protection of the law
would be killed if they escaped. 3. “Amparo” literally means protection in Spanish. Writ of Amparo originated in
15. Cadapan, Empeño and Merino would later on be killed. Merino would even Mexico (Yucatan State). Eventually incorporated into the Mexican
be burned. Constitution in 1847. Spread across the Western hemisphere and eventually
16. November 22, 2006 – the captives were transferred to a camp of the 24th to the Philippines.
Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. They were continually beaten and made 4. Provides for swift relief because of the summary nature of its proceedings.
to do chores. Only substantial evidence is required.
17. Here, respondents witnessed how soldiers killed an old man suspected of 5. There is still a threat to the life, liberty, and a violation of their right to security
harboring the NPA and also of an Aeta who was subsequently burned. of the Manalo brothers because their captors, whom they escaped from, still
18. The captives were then brought to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. remain at large.
They were brought back to Limay on June 2007 by Caigas, the commander a. Right to security is in Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
of the 24th Infantry Battalion. b. It is the right to enjoyment of life.
6. Three ways of exercising right to security:
21
a. Freedom from fear, which is enunciated in the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 3
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
8. It is the “right to security of person” as the word “security” itself means
“freedom from fear, (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), Art. 9 (1))
9. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
10. “Freedom from fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty
or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction;
threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. (PH is a signatory to both
conventions)
11. Guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
a. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees against
search without warrant
b. ELKs and EDs involve Physical torture, force, and violence are a
severe invasion of bodily integrity.
c. It constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity
as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will
d. Note: The consti also guarantees against torture
12. Guarantee of protection of one’s right by the Government
a. The writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the
right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person under Article III,
Section 2.
b. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization
of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of
ELKs and EDs as well as their families
c. Right to security of persons can exist independently of the right to
liberty. (the court cited several cases here, Delgado Paez v.
Colombia; Bwaya v. Zambia; Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea)
d. They have a positive duty to protect right to liberty and not just a
prohibition for arbitrary deprivation of such rights. (ECHR in Kurt v.
Turkey)
13. The continuing threat on the life of the Manalo brothers is apparent. This
threat vitiates their free will because they are forced to limit their movements
and activities. Threats to liberty, security, and life are actionable through
a petition for a writ of amparo.
14. The military failed to provide protection for the respondents. They were even
the ones who actually tortured them. The one-day investigation conducted
by Jimenez was limited, superficial and one-sided.
15. “In sum, we conclude that respondents’ right to security as “freedom from
threat” is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of
person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the
government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and
protection on the part of the military.”
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
22
Roxas v. Arroyo, GR 189155, September 7, 2010 the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and
torture.
FACTS: 11. The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be
1. Petitioner Melissa Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in enjoined from harming or even approaching her and her family; (2) an order
the US, she enrolled in an exposure program to the PH with the group be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan – United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to
which she is a member. produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including,
2. During the course of her immersion, she toured various provinces and towns but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry
of Central Luzon and she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the
conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and
mission. subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from
3. In pursuit of her volunteer work, she brought her passport, wallet with the records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to
P15,000 in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and
external hard disk, iPod, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera
medicines. with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
4. On May 19, 2009, after doing survey work and while resting inside a house, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000 cash.
she and her companions were startled by the loud sounds of someone 12. In a Resolution, the SC issued the desired writs and referred the case to the
banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up. CA for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.
5. Suddenly, 15 heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside 13. The Office of the SolGen filed a Return of the Writs on behalf of the public
and ordered them to lie on the ground face down. She tried to protest the officials impleaded as respondents.
intrusion, but 5 of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands. 14. The CA gave due weight and consideration to Melissa’s version that she
Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged her towards the was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for 5 straight days. It also
van — bruising her arms, legs and knees. noted the sincerity and resolve by which Melissa affirmed the contents of her
6. After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped and they were ordered to affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling
alight. She was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the truth.
the Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). 15. However, the CA was not convinced that the military or any other person
She was then separated from her companions and was escorted to a room acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the
that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors. She abduction and torture of Melissa. The CA stressed that, judging by her own
inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Nueva statements, Melissa merely “believed” that the military was behind her
Ecija. abduction. Thus, the CA absolved the public respondents from any
7. What followed was 5 straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. The complicity in the abduction and torture of Melissa.
thrust of the interrogations was to convince her to abandon her communist 16. Hence, this appeal by Melissa.
beliefs in favor of returning to “the fold.”
8. On May 25, 2009, she was finally released and returned to her uncle’s ISSUE: WoN Amparo petition can be used as a remedy.
house in Quezon City. Before being released, however, the abductors gave
her a cellular phone with a SIM card, a slip of paper containing an email RULING + RATIO: NO
address with password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books, the [Disclaimer: I only included the relevant ruling for the Amparo petition since as
handcuffs used on her, a blouse a pair of shoes. She was also sternly far as the syllabus is concerned, the case is under the Writ of Amparo topic.]
warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something 1. It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of
untoward will happen to her and her family. command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public
9. Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect.
safety of her family, she threw away the cellular phone with SIM card. 2. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that
10. Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to
suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.
communist movement, she filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and 3. Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation
Habeas Data before the SC. She impleaded public officials occupying the of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The
obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
23
a. The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An
judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights
to life, liberty or security. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY MERITORIOUS. We
b. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial hereby render a decision: (1) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, return of her personal belongings; (2) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer
extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired — the writ for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay; (3) REVERSING the grant
does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any modification that
killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations
administrative under the applicable substantive law. submitted to it under this decision; (4) MODIFYING the directive that further
4. It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of investigation must be undertaken; (5) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the
command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, Court of Appeals.
preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
DOCTRINE: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded — not
relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be
actually on the basis of command responsibility — but rather on the ground
crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its
5. At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the
proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance,
petitioner in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of
extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired — the writ does not, by so doing, fix
responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way
liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or
or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.
administrative under the applicable substantive law.
6. However, the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not
inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police
personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.
7. In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her
abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the
military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove
that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the
exclusion of other places.
8. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to
determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in
fact committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents.
9. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of
responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be
made.
10. As to the petitioner’s prayer for the return of personal belongings, the same
cannot be granted.
11. In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the
personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive
pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only
be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full
and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability
are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.
12. As to the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort
Magsaysay, the same cannot be granted.
13. Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong
enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort
24
Canlas v. NAPICO, GR 182795, June 5, 2008
FACTS:
1. Petitioners sought the issuance of a Writ of Amparo.
2. They were settlers in a land in Pasig but their houses were either
demolished as of the time of filing, or is about to be demolished pursuant to
a court judgment.
3. They claimed that the Land officials obtained fraudulent and spurious land
titles and sought the reversal of the dismissal of their case by virtue of a Writ
of Amparo since there can no longer be a 2nd or 3rd MR in the SC.
ISSUE: WON the Writ of Amparo must be issued.
RULING + RATIO: NO
1. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that the writ is available to any
person whose right to life, liberty, or security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity.
a. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final
judgment, which in this case was affirmed with finality by the SC, is
NOT INCLUDED among the enumeration of rights as stated in
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
b. The claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite a
final and executory judgment, does not constitute right to life,
liberty, and security.
2. The factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land is not alleged in
the petition at all.
a. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear
allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right
sought to be protected.
b. Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issued the writ
upon the fling of the petition, ONLY if ON ITS FACE, the court
ought to issue said writ.
c. Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, the writ will
not be issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
25
Razon et. al., v. Tagitis et. al., G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010 2. Applying these rules in the present case, the petition amply recites in its
paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped
FACTS: out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere
1. Engr. Morced N. Tagitis was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. His disappearance was to be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its
reported to the Jolo Police Station. It was unacted upon for a month and paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable
hencee Mary B. Tagitis (Tagitis), Engr. Tagitis's wife, filed a Petition for the information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also
Writ of Amparo with the Court of Appeals against certain members of the the clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security were violated
PNP. when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of
2. The CA issued the Writ of Amparo. burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," and then taken "into
3. The PNP members appealed the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court. custody by the respondents’ police intelligence operatives since October 30,
They mainly dispute: 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his
a. the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with
before the CA; different terrorist groups.
b. the sufficiency of the legal remedies the Tagitis took before ISSUE #2: Yes
petitioning for the writ; 1. To constitute enforced disappearance:
c. the finding that the rights to life, liberty and security of Tagitis had a. arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
been violated; b. carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons
d. the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
was abducted; c. followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a
e. the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and placement
abduction; and, of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law
f. generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of 2. To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, the
proving the allegations of the petition by substantial evidence Court declares that courts in amparo proceedings should at least take
a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import
ISSUES: of every piece of evidence; and this should include those usually
1. W/N the petition for writ of amparo filed is sufficient in form and substance? considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence
2. W/N an enforced disappearance is a proper ground for issuance of a writ of 3. But the Court must take into account the surrounding circumstances and the
amparo; test of reason which shall be used as a basic minimum admissibility
requirement.
RULING + RATIO: 4. The Court gleans from all these admitted pieces of evidence and
ISSUE #1: Yes developments a consistency in the government’s denial of any complicity in
1. That a petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall the disappearance of Tagitis, which is disrupted only by the report made by
allege, among others, as stated in Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Col. Kasim to Tagitis about her husband. Even Col. Kasim, however,
Amparo: eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under
a. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Based on these
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made in an
respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits the disappearance.
b. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) of the
Rule to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or DISPOSITION: Considering the foregoing, the Court resolves to DIRECT the Court of
actual violation of a victim’s rights Appeals to submit to this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, its
c. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while 1st quarterly report and recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and
addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the PNP-CIDG Chiefs, and the respondent, as directed in our Decision of December 3,
petition should be to determine whether it contains the details 2009. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG are likewise reminded to faithfully and promptly
available to the one filing the petition under the comply with the directives in our Decision of December 3, 2009. SO ORDERED.
circumstances, WHILE presenting a cause of action showing a
violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security
through State or private party action.
26
Boac, et. al. v. Cadapan and Empeno, G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31, 2011 the decision is not ipso facto executory. The use of the term
"immediately" does not mean that that it is automatically executory.
FACTS: There is nothing in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which states that
1. At 2:00 a.m. of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn, Karen and a decision rendered is immediately executory. x x x.
Merino from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were b. Neither did the decision become final and executory considering
herded onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an that both parties questioned the Decision/Resolution before the
undisclosed location. Supreme Court. x x x.
2. Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their c. Besides, the Court has no basis. The petitioners did not file a
respective families scoured nearby police precincts and military camps in the motion for execution pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39.
hope of finding them but the same yielded nothing. There being no motion, the Court could not have issued, and did
3. Spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed a not issue, a writ of execution.
petition for habeas corpus before the Court, impleading then Generals 8. Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed the present petition for
Romeo Tolentino and Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Lt. certiorari challenging the appellate court’s denying their motion to cite
Mirabelle as respondents. By Resolution of July 19, 2006, the Court issued a respondents in contempt.
writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals. ISSUE: Whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to cause the release of
4. The habeas corpus petition was docketed at the appellate court. By Return the aggrieved parties.
of the Writ, the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino are in the custody of the military. To the Return
RULING + RATIO: NO.
were attached affidavits from the respondents, except Enriquez, who all
1. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion
attested that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; that they had
for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to
inquired from their subordinates about the reported abduction and
life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not
disappearance of the three but their inquiry yielded nothing; and that the
be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as
military does not own nor possess a stainless steel jeep with plate number
soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the
RTF 597. Also appended to the Return was a certification from the Land
very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect.
Transportation Office (LTO) that plate number RTF 597 had not yet been
2. The Solicitor General’s argument that the Rules of Court supplement the
manufactured as of July 26, 2006.
Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find
5. Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court and the Court of Appeals
suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen,
dismissed the habeas corpus petition. Petitioners in moved for a
rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule
reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision. While the CA case was
dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life,
pending, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a
liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for
Petition for Writ of Amparo against the respondents in Habeas Corpus case
execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy
and President GMA but the latter was eventually dropped as respondent in
being offered by an amparo proceeding.
light of her immunity from suit while in office.
3. In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately
6. By Resolution, the Court issued in G.R. No. 179994 a writ of amparo
release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For that
returnable to the Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court,
would defeat the very purpose of having summary proceedings in amparo
and ordered the consolidation of the amparo petition with the pending
petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately
habeas corpus petition.
executory without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom.
7. The appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration in the habeas
corpus case and ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino in the amparo case. Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño later DISPOSITION: The petition in G.R. No. 187109 is GRANTED. The named
filed before the appellate court a Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt of respondents are directed to forthwith comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of
Court for failure of the respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases the appellate court. Owing to the retirement and/or reassignment to other places of
to comply with the directive of the appellate court to immediately release the assignment of some of the respondents herein and in G.R. No. 184495, the
three missing persons. The appellate court denied the motion ruling: incumbent commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division and the incumbent
a. While the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion, both of the Philippine Army, are
"to immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the enjoined to fully ensure the release of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel
persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino," Merino from detention.
27
Respondents Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito
Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas shall remain
personally impleaded in the petitions to answer for any responsibilities and/or
accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
DOCTRINES:
1. There is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas
corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at
stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision
thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay,
even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to
immediately protect.
2. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding
if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the
writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency
in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to
state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and
expeditious remedy being offered by an amparo proceeding.
28
In re: Noriel H. Rodriguez, GR 191805, November 15, 2011 As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was dismissed for lack of merit. On
President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her immunity from
FACTS: suits.
1. Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti
Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng ISSUES/HELD:
Pilipinas (KMP). 1. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the
2. Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor. NO.
enemy of the state, making its members an easy target of extra-judicial 2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and
killings and enforced disappearances. habeas data cases. YES.
3. On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by 3. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or
Hermie Antonio Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took threatened by respondents in G.R. No. 191805. YES.
him and forced him to get inside a car where more men in civilian clothing
were waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber pistol). RATIO:
4. The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to First Issue: TRO already subsumed in the Writ of Amparo
confess that he is a member of the New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez 1. In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a
remained silent until they reached a military camp belonging to the 17th temporary protection order. It must be underscored that this interim relief is
Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. only available before final judgment.
5. Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the 2. The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that
Philippine Army. Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and
NPA member and then pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations. any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines, which it
Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and tortured. shall issue.
Rodriguez was also coerced to sign several documents to declare that he is 3. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules
a surenderree. and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
6. On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him 4. We held in Yano v. Sanchez that "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to
(accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo
They insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila. petition." Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final
7. Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that
members went inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the
despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them. protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the
8. On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious- privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary
looking men are following them on the streets, jeepney and MRT. protection order independently of the former. The order restricting
9. On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of
Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, the writ.
Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties
dated 2 December 2009. Second Issue: The president may become liable under the doctrine of command
10. The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. responsibility. However, in this case there was no evidence to prove her guilt.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, 5. To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo,
P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, Rodriguez contends that the doctrine of command responsibility may be
George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. applied
11. Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been 6. In Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility...
working as their informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels. of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
12. Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general, forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
insisted on her immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as president). domestic conflict." Although originally used for ascertaining criminal
13. Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently complicity, the command... responsibility doctrine has also found application
alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine in civil cases for human rights abuses
Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition. 7. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application
14. CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Tolentino, Santos, De Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture. 8. As we held in Rubrico:
29
9. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. As to the
hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the
disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to
the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a effectively command, control and discipline the military.
principle of international law or customary international law in accordance 18. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of
with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No.
10. If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should have
proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been... perpetrated on
first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the members of the NPA.Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue
devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the
11. Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be President, we do not automatically impute responsibility to former President
used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance.
duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to 19. Aside from Rodriguez's general averments, there is no piece of evidence
devise remedial measures to protect his rights. that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction.
12. Amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known
actors have been established by substantial evidence to have about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced to investigate, punish or prevent it.
disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that
should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the Third Issue: Right to life, liberty and property were violated.
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity 20. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation
to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with of or threat to Rodriguez's rights to life, liberty and security.
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the 21. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat
burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to to the right to life, liberty and security may be caused by either an act or an
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of omission of a public official
the enforced disappearance. 22. In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v.
13. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative Manalo that the right to security of a person includes the positive obligation
liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be of the government to ensure the observance of the duty to investigate
applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing 23. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
definitions. government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or
14. Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their... families, and
responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the bringing offenders to the bar of justice
president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or 24. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule "right to security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving
in the affirmative. liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the
15. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the right to liberty
following elements must obtain: the existence of a superior-subordinate 25. In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are
relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the responsible or accountable for the violation of Rodriguez's right to life, liberty
crime as his subordinate; the superior knew or had reason to know that the and security on account of their abject failure to conduct a fair and effective
crime was about to be or had been committed; and the superior failed to official investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera
punish the perpetrators thereof. and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory investigation, exerting no
16. The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,necessarily efforts to take Ramirez's account of the events into consideration.
possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the 26. Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the
purview of the command responsibility doctrine. claims of Rodriguez violated his right to security, for which respondents in
17. On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international G.R. No. 191805 must be held responsible or accountable.
tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such
30
27. Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any
responsibility or accountability on the part of respondents P/CSupt.
Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt.
Tolentino had already retired when the abduction and torture of
28. Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt. Santos had already been
reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six
months before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient
allegations were maintained against respondents Calog and Palacpac.
29. From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving
through substantial evidence that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa,
Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and
Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the violation of
Rodriguez's rights to life, liberty and security on the basis of (a) his
abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September 2009,
and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his
allegations. Thus, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data must
be granted in his favor.
30. It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former
President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b)
allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo
and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial
evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for
the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property.
DISPOSITION: SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case
is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George
Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
DOCTRINE: RATIO IN BOLD
31
De Lima v. Gatdula, GR 204528, February 19, 20131 yet be the proper remedy at this time since such remedy can only be availed
for a final order such as a judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on
FACTS: Amparo.
1. Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo 2. [NATURE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO] The remedy of the Writ of Amparo
in the RTC of Manila. It was raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the
Jr. people to life, liberty, and security as enshrined in the 1987
2. The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila De Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an
Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. exercise on the Supreme Court’s power to promulgate rules
Esmeralda of the NBI. Gatdula wanted De Lima et al to cease and desist concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It
from framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings
charges of Frustrated Murder against Gatdula in relation to the alleged and enforced disappearances.
ambush incident. 3. [PROCEDURE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO] Due to
3. Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was
summons and ordered De Lima et al to file an answer. He also set the case devised to afford swift by decisive relief. It is initiated through a petition to
for hearing in order to determine whether a temporary protection order may be filed in a RTC, Sandiganbayan, CA or the SC. The judge or justice
be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima et al manifested that a then makes an immediate evaluation of the facts as alleged in the
Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases. petition and the affidavits submitted with the attendant circumstances
4. Judge Pampilo insisted that since no writ has been issued, return is not the detailed. After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of
required pleading but answer. He then proceeded to conduct a hearing on Amparo or immediately dismiss the case.
the main case. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties a. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits
to file their respective memoranda within 5 working days after that hearing. do not show that the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security
Since the period to file an answer had not yet lapsed, the judge also decided is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful.
that the memorandum of De Lima et al would be filed in lieu of their Answer. b. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion
5. RTC granted the issuance of the Writ of Amparo as well as the interim relief presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The court
prayed for: temporary protection, production and inspection orders. The compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to
production and inspection orders were in relation to the evidence and reports show whether the grounds for more permanent protection and
involving an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy interim reliefs are necessary.
Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records how these pieces of 4. The respondents are required to file a Return, after the issuance of the writ
evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or security of through the clerk of court. The Return services as the responsive pleading to
Gatdula. the petition. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from
6. RTC denied MR. De Lima et al thus came to the SC via Rule 45. identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also required to detail
the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
ISSUE: WoN the RTC decision could be a judgment or final order that is appealable aggrieved party.
via Rule 45 as enunciated under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo?2 5. If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to
state the actions they have take to:
RULING + RATIO: NO. a. Verify the identity of the aggrieved party
1. The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 is an interlocutory order since it b. Recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ disappearance of the person identified in the petition
of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The "Decision" being an c. Identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or
interlocutory order is suggested by the fact that temporary protection, disappearance
production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The d. Determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or
temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final brought about the death or disappearance and
judgment is rendered. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not e. Bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
6. There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine
1 Leonen Case the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the
return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte. After the hearing, the
2 SEC. 19. Appeal. – Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. x x x
32
court will render the judgment within 10 days from the time the petition is phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of
submitted for decision. Amparo.3
7. If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant i. [PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF AMPARO V. WRIT OF
the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. AMPARO] The privilege includes availment of the
The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the
for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition
measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence
and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should
could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the detail the required acts from the respondents that will
measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the
Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the ii. A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the
judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through writ" cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of
consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil. the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the
Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ
Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete
constitutional rights. circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically
8. The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ
RTC. of Amparo."
a. [FIRST IRREGULARITY] The insistence of filing of an Answer was
inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive DISPOSITION:
pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The 1. NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge
requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intentional of the Pampilo Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a
Court to provide a speedy remedy of those whose right to life, Writ of Amparo
liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In 2. DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within 48 hours from his receipt of this
utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the
insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.
b. [SECOND IRREGULARITY] Holding of a hearing on the main case
PRIOR to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without DOCTRINE: THOSE IN BOLD.
a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
c. [THIRD IRREGULARITY] It required a memorandum in lieu of a
responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima et al. The Return in
Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject
to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not
after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the
claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required
before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for
the other since these submissions have different functions in
facilitating the suit. More importantly, a memorandum is a
prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
d. [FORTH IRREGULARITY] Decision itself. The decision stated,
“accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the
interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.” This gives the
impression that the decision was the judgment since the
3 SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
33
Tapuz v. Del Rosario, GR 182484, June 17, 2008 RULING + RATIO: No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of
habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in form.
FACTS: 1. Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following
1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of
complaint for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a habeas data:
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners and other a. The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
John Does numbering about 120. b. The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
2. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
registered owners of the disputed land; (2) they were the disputed land’s c. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the
prior possessors when the petitioners – armed with bolos and carrying data or information;
suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons – entered the d. The location of the files, registers or databases, the government
disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents’ office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the
permission and against the objections of the private respondents’ security data or information, if known;
men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure. e. The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
3. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and suppression or destruction of the database or information or files
essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the kept by the respondent.
disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; 2. Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
and (3) the private respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed property is “a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may
spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts
counterclaim for damages. of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing
4. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same”
respondents’ favor, finding prior possession through the construction of 3. These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data
perimeter fence in 1993. requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.
5. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful
6. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents’ motion for the violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction upon posting of a security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less
bond. The writ – authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police
decision – was actually issued by respondent Judge del Rosario after the authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral
private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The annexes.
petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private 4. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the
respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition. insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also
7. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners’ MR and to Defer been shown.
Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. 5. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more
8. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The than the “fishing expedition” that this Court – in the course of drafting the
respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ of Rule on habeas data – had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of
demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff’s written habeas data is not
notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the
private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the
9. The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent present petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its
Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition in CA. body and attachments.
10. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition. Hence, the present petition for certiorari with writs of amparo and
habeas data.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is
proper?
34
Meralco v. Lim, GR 184769, October 5, 2010 Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing
FACTS: Rules.
1. Petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO's Human Resource Staffing, 4. The writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely
directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO's Alabang Sector in property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
receipt of "... reports that there were accusations and threats directed 5. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due
against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent's
compromise [her] safety and security." reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern
2. Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. respecting the terms and conditions of one's employment - are what
Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCO's Human Resource prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data.
Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the
could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
"punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing 6. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners
the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent's right to
entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners'
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats
alleged threats to her security. to respondent's safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
3. No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. TC ruled in favor of employee. letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at
4. The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ all." And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work
of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and "betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move."
political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
life and security are jeopardized by petitioners' refusal to provide her with
information or data on the reported threats to her person. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September
22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is
ISSUE: May an employee invoke the remedies available under writ of habeas data hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly,
where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an DISMISSED.
anonymous letter posted therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling
for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details DOCTRINE:
thereof? See BOLD.
RULING + RATIO:
1. Petitioners maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the
implementation of the Memorandum transferring respondent's place of work
which is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-
2003 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-
related cases.
2. The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial
complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information
of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the
truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a person's right to life, liberty and security against abuse in
this age of information technology.
3. It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived
as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address
the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances.
35
Gamboa v. Chan, GR 193636, July 24, 2012 1. With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has
violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. x x x
FACTS: Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state
1. At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases,
(Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may
2. Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed
Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent legitimate and compelling.
(P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and 2. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed
Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information
Office of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and
3. On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
Country." unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
a. The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on
Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of private the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them 3. It is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim,
before the May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
in the future. dismantling them permanently.
b. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission 4. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing
released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP,
report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining
Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President" (the PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those
Report). individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
4. Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP– 5. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of
Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful
her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the a. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose
her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. of investigating the existence of these notorious groups.
5. Through local TV news and print media, Gamboa’s name had been tagged b. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to
as one of those politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate,
averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media. As a and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the 6. x x x the fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission
enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the
also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat
her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations. to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of
6. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation intelligence-gathering and investigation.
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of a. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a
habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP- validation system, which was used to update information on
Ilocos Norte. individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data
mirrored the situation on the field.
ISSUE: Whether or not the forwarding or information or intelligence report by the PNP b. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the
to the Commission is an intrusion to Gamboa’s right to privacy, thus, rendering the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
remedy of writ of habeas data proper? 7. In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but
emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the
RULING + RATIO: NO. media was regrettable, even warranting reproach.
36
a. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that

respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure.
b. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the
purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and
improper.
8. Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through
substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining
PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to
increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to
the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy
the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
9. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the
writ of habeas data must be denied.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The

assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of
the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
37
Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, GR 202666, September 29, 2014 3. RTC found the petition sufficient in form and substance and issued the writ
of habeas data and ordered respondents to file their verified written return
FACTS: together with the supporting affidavits within 5 working days from service of
1. Photos of STC Cebu students were taken and uploaded on Facebook, which the writ.
photos were allegedly in violation of the school’s rules. The students were, 4. In their verified written return, respondents laid down the following grounds
after investigation, found to have deported themselves in a manner for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to
proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit: file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the
a. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus; instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue; and (d) there
b. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts; can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable
c. Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places; expectation of privacy on Facebook.
d. Apparel that exposes the underwear; 5. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data.
e. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity;
contains sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and ISSUE: W/N a writ of habeas data should be issued.
f. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample
body exposure. RULING + RATIO: NO.
2. Petitioners (mothers of two of the students) filed a Petition for the Issuance 1. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
of a Writ of Habeas Data on the basis of the following considerations: privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
a. he photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
taken for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
occasion of a birthday beach party; regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
b. he privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
"Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
privacy which must be respected. individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
c. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
ought to have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and unlawful ends.
not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were 2. In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
called "immoral" and were punished outright; individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law
d. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as "a procedure designed to
and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." The writ,
their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized
subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook access to information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the
accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon; existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
e. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a
information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by
Laboratory; and substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
f. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before
broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum submitted the privilege of the writ may be extended.
to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To 3. Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Data was not
petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparo in
their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Habeas data,
data be issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data information age." As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal
before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be killings and enforced disappearances only.
rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images 4. Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against
accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
been illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy. data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
38
of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous. To

"engage" in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in something." It
does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of
a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries
the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in
the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no
reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from
getting to said person or entity.
5. There was no violation of the right to privacy by STC (and therefore the writ
of habeas data should not be issued).
6. In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more
precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature,
likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors
enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy
settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without
proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit
of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City
in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
DOCTRINE: IN BOLD
39
Lee v. Ilagan, GR 203254, October 8, 2014 5. Due to the insufficiency of the allegations and the lack of evidence the
petition should have been dismissed.
FACTS:
1. Lee (Girlfriend) and Ilagan (Boyfriend) were common law partners. DISPOSITION:
2. Ilagan discovered that his video camera was missing from his office. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the
a. Lee had actually kept the camera. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is hereby
3. Lee confronted Ilagan over a sextape between Ilagan and another woman REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ of
filmed with the camera. Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of
4. Ilagan denied and asked for the camera back. merit.
5. Ilagan got violent went Lee refused and left.
6. Lee filed a VAWC complaint and admin complaint with NAPOLCOM for DOCTRINE:
grave misconduct against Ilagan. In order to support a petition for habeas data you have to establish a nexus
a. Lee was going to use the sextape as evidence. between violation of right to privacy and threat to life, liberty, or security. This
7. Ilagan in turn filed a petition for writ of habeas data against Lee to must be supported with substantial evidence.
return the video.
a. Ilagan alleged that Lee’s act of distributing the video to
NAPOLCOM and the internet violated his (and the other woman’s)
right to life, liberty, and security if it gets leaked to Quiapo or the
net.
8. Lee countered saying that she only meant to use the tape as evidence
and that she did not and was not going to upload it to the internet.
a. Lee said that Ilagan was just trying to suppress evidence and Lee is
not engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing Ilagan’s data.
9. RTC granted Ilagan’s writ and required Lee to return the sextape.
ISSUE: WON the writ of habeas data was justifiably granted?
RULING + RATIO: NO. There is no threat to Ilagan’s right to life, liberty, and
security.
1. The writ of habeas data is a remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy,
specifically informational privacy. The AM establishing it says that it is a
remedy of a person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated
or threatened by a person or entity engaged in collecting or storing data
about their family, home, or correspondence.
2. Section 6 of the AM provides that there must be an allegation that the
right to privacy is violated and that it somehow threatens one’s right to
life, liberty, and security. In other words there must be a nexus between
the right to privacy and the right to life, liberty, and security which must
be supported by substantial evidence.
3. In this case while Ilagan can purport a privacy interest, there is no real
threat or connection to life, liberty, or security. Ilagan failed to explain
how a possible leakage could threaten his life, liberty, or security. There
must be a real nexus or else the petition is dismissible.
4. Even if Ilagan could make a connection the petition is still dismissible for
lack of substantial evidence. All Ilagan really offered as evidence was his
own self-serving testimony. Nothing would lead a reasonable mind to
conclude that Lee was going to use the sextape for anything but
evidence in her case against Ilagan.
40
Arigo v. Swift, GR 206510, September 16, 2014 Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
FACTS: a. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil,
1. Petition → issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. environmental laws and regulations in connection with the
No. 09-6-8-SC or Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), grounding incident.
involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation to the b. Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting
grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs. Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for
2. April 6, 2010 → Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, or the being unconstitutional.
"Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the 14. In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO
protection and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, and ocular inspection and production orders, respondents assert that:
sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into a. (1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of
perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations." Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on
a. Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly the USS Guardian were already completed;
regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized b. (2) the petition is defective in form and substance;
or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the c. (3) the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between
resources within the TRNP. the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America;
3. The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the and
US Navy. d. (4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US
4. December 2012 → the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic Government as regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests
clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the exclusively with the executive branch.
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." ISSUES/HELD:
5. January 6, 2013 → the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay. 1. W/N petitioners have legal standing to file the present petition → YES
6. January 13, 2013 → arrived after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. 2. W/N this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit
7. January 15, 2013 → the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of any pleading or manifestation in this case → NO
call in Makassar, Indonesia.
8. January 17, 2013 (2:20 a.m.) → while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground RATIO:
on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east- ISSUE #1:
southeast of Palawan. 1. Locus standi
9. January 20, 2013 → U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, a. Generally → "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
expressed regret for the incident in a press statement. question."
10. February 4, 2013 → US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a b. Specifically → "a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where
meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), "reiterated his regrets over the he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being
grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F. del Rosario that challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance."
the United States will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef c. Exception → the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court
caused by the ship." has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers
11. March 30, 2013 → the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef. subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
12. April 17, 2013 → petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
respective sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet 2. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.:
unborn, filed the present petition against respondents (see case for who the a. We recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and
petitioners and respondents are). healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional
13. Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law."
operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental b. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in
damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
41
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with b. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing
intergenerational implications. the state itself.
c. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from c. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an
impairing the environment. official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
d. On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed
in Oposa, not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded
for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
representation of their own and future generations. impleaded.
3. The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it d. The privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of
refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an
Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.
a. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the 4. This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being
traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle sued in the courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver
that humans are stewards of nature.” has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary
ISSUE #2: acts (jure gestionis).
On the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: a. State immunity extends only to acts jure imperii, not jure gestionis.
1. The immunity of the State from suit, or the doctrine of sovereign immunity or 5. Shauf v. Court of Appeals:
non-suability of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3, of a. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
the 1987 Constitution.4 invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
2. United States of America v. Judge Guinto: personal capacity as an ordinary citizen, for whatever damage he
a. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is one of may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or
the generally accepted principles of international law that we have beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2.5 b. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity
b. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by such cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
under the doctrine of incorporation. 6. In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
i. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over
such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of the USS Guardian and its crew.
every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its a. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding
membership in the society of nations. of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
c. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local performing official military duties.
jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in b. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials
parem, non habet imperium (all states are sovereign equals and will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another). government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself.
i. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a c. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations.” jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
3. Minucher v. Court of Appeals: Rice and Robling.
a. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government
done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic On jurisdiction via UNCLOS:
personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be 7. During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
consent. restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the
TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
4 SECTION 3. The State may not be sued without its consent. a. While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
5 SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
42
rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to
through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea. protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article
b. Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter 197.9
of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary
international rules on the "traditional uses of the oceans" as On jurisdiction via VFA:
codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations 13. Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the
by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in VFA.
the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd. a. They also invoke federal statutes in the US under which agencies
8. International law of the sea → generally defined as "a body of treaty rules and of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any action.
customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and b. Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that
the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes.” the respondents are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance.
9. UNCLOS → a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State 14. We are not persuaded.
sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas 15. VFA → is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and
(mare liberum). personnel visiting the Philippines to promote "common security interests" between
10. Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal the US and the Philippines in the region.
State exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of 16. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus
international law. improper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US
11. In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the
enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the exceptions stated in Arts. 30, 6 31,7 objectives of the agreement.
and 328 of the UNCLOS. 17. As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to
12. We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. a. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules 10
a. We thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation
Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which of an environmental law is to be filed separately.
adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. 18. In any case, a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
b. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
partner, which has been actively supporting the country's efforts to responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be
preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting a. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the
our internal waters. collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a
c. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal
leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the action charging the same violation of an environmental law.
6 SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions. — The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ
of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
7 SEC. 3. Referral to mediation. — At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire
from the parties if they have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the
parties or their counsel, if authorized by their clients, to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC)
unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case to the clerk of court
or legal researcher for mediation. 9 SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree. — The judge shall put the parties and their
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of counsels under oath, and they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
notice of referral to mediation. The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day The judge may issue a consent decree approving the agreement between the parties in
period. accordance with law, morals, public order and public policy to protect the right of the people to a
8 SEC. 4. Preliminary conference. — If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance balanced and healthful ecology.
of the pre-trial. Before the scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the 10 SEC. 10. Efforts to settle. — The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to
branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference for the following purposes: (a) To assist the compromise or settle in accordance with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of
parties in reaching a settlement judgment.
43
19. Section 15, Rule 711 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a 24. A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. of the violator is also a major relief that may be obtained under a
20. We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under Rule 5, Sec. 1.16
petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage operation 25. In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch
sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures through
when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. diplomatic channels.
a. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to a. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our
protect and rehabilitate the coral reef structure and marine government is committed by the Constitution to the executive
habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are and legislative — "the political" — departments of the
concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry
Guardian from the coral reef. or decision."
21. However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine 26. The present petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail
governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the the constitutionality of its provisions.
matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian.
22. Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the
proscribed by the Rules. Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.
23. As can be gleaned from Rule 3, Secs. 3, 12 4,13 5,14 and 10,15 mediation
and settlement are available for the consideration of the parties, and
which dispute resolution methods are encouraged by the court.
11 SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. — If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff
proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment
and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also
require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the
costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that
purpose subject to the control of the court.
12 Article 30 (Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State):
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is
made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
13 Article 31 (Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes): The flag State shall bear international 16 SEC. 15. Judgment. — Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for
responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of
warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and kalikasan. The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the (a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or
provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law. neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
14 Article 32 (Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial (b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or
purposes): With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships (c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or
operated for non-commercial purposes. entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
15 Article 197 (Cooperation on a global or regional basis): States shall cooperate on a global (d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or
basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended (e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and
practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the
the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features. environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
44
Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes, GR 180771, April 21, 2015 ISSUE (related to writ of kalikasan): W/N petitioners have the locus standi to file
the petition.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the RULING + RATIO: YES
petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean 1. The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they
species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are have the legal standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or
joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio injured by the judgment in this suit. Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., they also
(Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively assert their right to sue for the faithful performance of international and
known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for their benefit.
protection of, the aforementioned marine species. 2. For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their
2. On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the
DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected
(GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of the... environment since the
studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology,... sample primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the
analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.
by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and 3. In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals
gas sampling in Tañon Strait. have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires
3. On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons, viz.:
SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum a. Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only
resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be
offshore the Tañon Strait. parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff may refer to the claiming
4. JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the... third
of the project. Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the
Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-
protected seascape in 1988,[10] JAPEX... agreed to comply with the defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential 4. The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa, pointing out
Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement that the petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them
System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures And were still unborn.
For Other Purposes." 5. The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to
5. On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board[12] of the give animals and inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply
Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001,[13] with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of
wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural... or juridical persons, or
commissioned by JAPEX, and... favorably recommended the approval of entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be brought in
JAPEX's application for an ECC the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative,... It
6. It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that
Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December not only natural and juridical persons should be given legal standing
17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by
implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of... the 1987 Constitution themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in... representation
7. Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental
in the Tañon Strait, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she
aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in
was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim... that before the our jurisdiction, locus... standi in environmental cases has been given a
seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; more liberalized approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory
but after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas's paradigm
a day. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards...
"payao" also known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef." simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental
cases.
45
6. Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree
Environmental Cases,which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any No. 1586.
Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws: DOCTRINE: (IN BOLD)
a. SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of
others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an
action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue... an order
which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the
reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their
interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a... newspaper
of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected
barangays copies of said order.
7. Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed
by their respective provisions.
8. Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment,
the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their
cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases
filed enforcing environmental laws and... collapses the traditional rule
on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine
first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and
generations yet... unborn.
9. Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive position
on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we
allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet... unborn
"based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned."[56]
Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, a right that does not even need to be... stated in our
Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
10. In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals
legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any
Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are...
joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of
the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio,
having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of
laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are...
therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are
GRANTED, Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID for
46

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Writ of Habeas Data

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus was proper?

3. Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the petitions in

jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

RULING + RATIO: NO.

People v. Caco, GR 94994-95, March 7, 1997

ISSUE: WoN Caco should be released.

RULING + RATIO: YES

1. SC: Our decision of 14 May 1993 cannot, however, be modified because it

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, considering that as of now, Caco has been in

ISSUE: WON the decision convicting Elbanbuena should be modified and

RULING + RATIO: YES & TO BE DETERMINED BY TRIAL COURT

a. Freedom from fear, which is enunciated in the Universal

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The

Canlas v. NAPICO, GR 182795, June 5, 2008

ISSUE: WON the Writ of Amparo must be issued.

DOCTRINE: RATIO IN BOLD

a. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The

of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous. To

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

ISSUE: WON the writ of habeas data was justifiably granted?

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