The Cyprus Problem: Towards A Viable Solution: Michalis Christou

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES
The Cyprus Problem:

Towards a Viable
Solution
Bachelor's Thesis
MICHALIS CHRISTOU
Supervisor: Mgr. et Mgr. Vladimír Bízik
Department of International Relations and European

Studies
International Relations and European Politics
Brno 2021
2
Bibliographic Record
Author: Michalis Christou

Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University
Department of International Relations and Euro-
pean Studies
Title of Thesis: The Cyprus Problem: Towards a Viable Solution
Degree Programme: International Relations and European Politics
Supervisor: Mgr. et Mgr. Vladimír Bízik
Academic Year: 2021
Number of Pages: 59
Keywords: Cyprus problem, security aspect, Treaty of Guar-
antees, Treaty of Alliance, right of intervention,
UNFICYP, UN, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots,
Turkish invasion, security, guarantees
2
Abstract
The objective of the thesis is to offer a viable solution regarding the se-
curity aspect of the Cyprus problem's current phase following the Turk-
ish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The policy paper examines the deep his-
torical roots of the issue, and it further pays attention to the unsustaina-
ble security and guarantees system, which Cyprus has since its birth in
1960. Additionally, it discusses and evaluates three existing policy op-
tions related to this system. Finally, the paper presents the chosen policy
option and some practical recommendations that contribute to the real-
ization of this option.
Statutory Declaration
I hereby declare that I have written the submitted [select type of docu-
ment] concerning the topic of The Cyprus Problem: Towards a Viable
Solution independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing
this [select] have been adequately referenced and are listed in the Bibli-
ography.
In Brno 23 May 2021
.......................................
Michalis Christou
2
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Mgr. et Mgr. Vla-

dimír Bízik, for his endless willingness and patience to answer my nu-
merous questions, as well as for his friendly approach.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 5
Table of Contents
List of Images 7
List of Tables 8
List of Terms and Acronyms 9
1 Introduction 11
1.1 Definition of the policy problem: The Cyprus problem 12
1.2 Purpose, methodology, and limitations of the thesis 13
1.3 Literature review 14
1.4 Road map of the thesis 16
2 The Cyprus problem 17

2.1 Historical background 18
2.1.1 The Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, and the inter-communal
violence 21
2.1.2 The evolution of the current phase of the problem 23
2.1.3 The UN efforts and the Annan Plan 25
2.2 The current status of the problem 26
3 Policy Options 29
3.1 Framework of analysis 30
3.2 Discussion and evaluation of policy options 30
3.2.1 Zero troops and zero guarantees 32
3.2.2 Troops and guarantees 33
3.2.3 Different type of guarantees and zero troops 35
4. Conclusion and recommendations 37
Bibliography 40
Appendix A [Treaty of Guarantee] 51
Appendix B [Treaty of Alliance] 54
5
6 OBSAH
Index 59
6
LIST OF IMAGES 7
List of Images
Image 1: Cyprus as it stands today
7
List of Tables
8
LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 9
List of Terms and Acronyms
Enosis – The Greek Cypriots’ request for union with Greece
EOKA – National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
EU – European Union
RoC – Republic of Cyprus
RoT – Republic of Turkey
Taksim – The Turkish Cypriots’ request for partition
TMT – Turkish Resistance Organization
TRNC – ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’’
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
UNSG – United Nations Secretary-General
UNFICYP – United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
9
10
THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: TOWARDS A VIABLE SOLUTION
1 Introduction
The Cyprus problem, also known as the Cyprus conflict, Cyprus issue,
or Cyprus dispute, has gone through and still goes through different phases
over time and undoubtedly presents a fascinating case for the study of conflict
resolution, mainly due to the complexity that characterizes the problem per
se. Just an old joke is enough to illustrate that complexity and goes like this:
Three men are sentenced to death in a faraway country: an English-
man, a Frenchman and a Cypriot. On the day of their execution they
are asked to name their last wish. The Englishman asks for a cigar;
the Frenchman for a glass of wine. The Cypriot asks to be granted a
last opportunity to talk to the execution squad about the Cyprus Prob-
lem. On hearing this, the Frenchman and the Englishman change their
last wish and beg to be shot before the Cypriot starts talking (Con-
stantinou, 2016, p. 65).
The Cyprus conflict as a multiphase problem has entered its current phase
since 1974, in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion and occupation of the
northern part of Cyprus (Papadakis et al., 2006, p. 3). Over the almost last 50
years, the Cyprus problem has become a classic example of an intractable
international conflict and an academic challenge for analysts, who have at-
tempted for many years to offer an inclusive explanation concerning the rea-
son behind the failure to solve the 'Problem' (Adamides, 2016, p. 5; Ker-Lind-
say, 2011, p. xii). Despite the continuous efforts towards this direction, in
other words, finding a solution regarding the Cyprus conflict, by prominent
diplomats, such as the architect of the Dayton Accords, Richard Holbrooke,
and by several UN secretaries-general, with the latest attempt made by the
current Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), António Guterres, Cy-
prus remains divided, and therefore, fairly earns the title 'diplomats'
11
graveyard' (Amiel, 2021; Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. xii; Republic of Cyprus Min-

istry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). The focus of the given thesis, the security as-
pect, remains a crucial part of the problem, and by its turn, adds to this com-
plexity that characterizes the Cyprus issue.
1.1 Definition of the policy problem: The Cyprus problem
Defining the Cyprus problem was not and is still not an easy case, as
it has elapsed from various phases, and its context has changed throughout
Cyprus' contemporary history. As a result, the desire to ask a simple question,
for instance, 'How the Cyprus problem can be defined' without specifying the
decade, especially from the 1950s-1970s period, can cause severe confusion
(Chan, 2016). The problem in the 1950s was closely associated with the
Greek Cypriots' anti-colonial struggle against the British rule and their re-
quest for unifying the island with Greece, known as enosis. In the 1960s, the
content has changed from an anti-colonial struggle to inter-communal vio-
lence involving the two main ethnic groups living on the island, the Greek
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Eventually, since the 1970s, it has become
an issue of international law of invasion and illegal occupation of the northern
part of Cyprus, even though Turkey has succeeded in undermining the im-
portance of this aspect. For that reason, many present it as a matter of an
internal fight between the two communities. However, this is not the case
considering that the problem also has an international dimension (Lillikas,
2008, pp. 65-66; Mallinson, 2011, pp. 22-33).
Therefore, considering the current phase of the Cyprus problem, from
1974 and onwards, it can be defined as an international issue of invasion and
continued occupation of almost 37 percent of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC)
territory by the Republic of Turkey (RoT) (Choufoudakis, 2016, p. 19; Lilli-
kas, 2008, pp. 65-66). Any attempt to define its current phase otherwise
12
undermines Turkey's direct role and influence on the Cyprus problem and, of
course, does not consider the realities that shape and reshape the problem it-
self (Lillikas, 2008, p. 65). That does not mean that the keys for solution are
exclusively in Ankara, considering that the Turkish Cypriots can influence
the developments at least to some extent. However, the crucial question is
whether this influence is enough for the Turkish Cypriots to impose their will
concerning the solution of the Cyprus problem despite Turkey's plans.
1.2 Purpose, methodology, and limitations of the thesis
As the Cyprus problem remains unresolved and the island divided

with a profound impact on both communities, the current thesis intends to
present and evaluate policy options concerning the security of the issue,
which remains a key towards a general settlement. The current thesis format
is a policy paper written for the field of policy study, which targets readers
from experts on public policy analysis, such as policy researchers and aca-
demics, rather than for decision-makers, meaning policy-makers (Young &
Quinn, 2002).
The thesis considerably relies on qualitative data, such as primary data
gathered from the RoC government website, UN documents, international
treaties, and secondary data collected from books, journal articles, policy re-
ports, and press articles covering the most recent related events. Based on the
synthesis of the collected data and the critical thinking of the historical causes
of the problem, the thesis outlines the framework of analysis: the ideals and
values which guide the evaluation of the presented policy options. Finally,
based on this evaluation, the chosen policy option is suggested.
However, this thesis comes with some limitations that need to be
acknowledged. Solving the security dimension of the problem does not mean
that the Cyprus problem is solved too. The problem consists of additional
13
aspects, such as the political, economic, and social aspects. Hence, by con-
sidering that, one study like the current one cannot address every aspect of
the policy problem (Young & Quinn, 2002, p. 41). As a result, the chosen
policy of the thesis is a piece of the Cyprus conflict puzzle. Thus, it can con-
tribute towards this direction, but it cannot simply complete it alone. Further-
more, there are limitations regarding important UN official documents from
previous peace talks. For example, the documents concerning the Crans-Mon-
tana talks in 2017, where the involved parties were close to reaching an agree-
ment over the general settlement, are still unpublished. For that reason, it is
hard to know whether the two sides' stance on the security and guarantees
aspect has differentiated even to a small extent from their traditional position
throughout the negotiations. Therefore, the two existing policies on that mat-
ter expressed on the one side, by the Greek Cypriots and on the other side by
the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, are based on their traditional position
strongly reaffirmed by their officials' statements.
1.3 Literature review
Just as the Cyprus conflict remains an intractable international con-

flict and an interesting case study for conflict resolution, the 'problem' has
received remarkable international attention from international organizations,
such as the UN, which since the 1970s strives to reunite the island, as well
from the media. Furthermore, it has become a challenge for academics and
analysts, and for that reason, there is a significant number of academic works
dealing with the subject, especially for its current phase.
James Ker-Lindsay (2011) offers a comprehensive summary of the
conflict. He covers the historical background in which the Cyprus problem
has emerged as well as the current situation. Furthermore, Ker-Lindsay pays
particular attention to the Turkish invasion and the subsequent attempts by
14
the international community, mainly of the UN, to resolve the problem, thus
unifying the island. Finally, the final two chapters of his book attempt to ad-
dress several pressing issues that remain 'obstacles' towards an overall settle-
ment, to name the most relevant one for the thesis, whether the Treaties of
Guarantees and Alliance that made up the security and guarantee system of
Cyprus will continue to exist.
By building upon his brief, but inclusive analysis mentioned above,
James Ker-Lindsay (2016) offers new and innovative ideas about different
aspects together with thirty leading experts on Cyprus, mainly academics. As
the focus of the given thesis is the security aspect of the problem, the book's
chapter concerning this aspect receives particular attention. This chapter sug-
gests a new and viable way of dealing with the security aspect that is key to
a settlement.
Costas M. Constantinou (2017), unlike the other works presented
above, focuses exclusively on the pressing issue of security and guarantees.
By taking into consideration both communities’ concerns on that matter, as
well as the viewpoints of all involved parties, including the two communities,
Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (UK), he presents a possible policy
option and the mechanism of implementing it concerning the security aspect,
which addresses the questions of what type of guarantees Cyprus does need
and does not need. The history and the causes of the Cyprus problem play a
crucial role in shaping the policy option proposed by the author.
An alternative approach concerning the Cyprus problem is presented
by Polis Polyviou, a well-known Greek Cypriot lawyer and a former member
of the Greek Cypriot negotiating team on the Cyprus problem. In his essay
called 'The Cyprus problem- An alternative approach' written in 2018 follow-
ing the collapse of Crans-Montana talks, he discusses an intermediate solu-
tion or evolutionary and gradual course towards the solution. By gaining
15
experience during the negotiations, he offers steps to avoid potential pitfalls

and contribute towards a final solution.
1.4 Road map of the thesis
The current thesis consists of three main parts. In the first chapter, the
policy problem, the Cyprus problem, is covered in depth. The history of the
problem, mainly how the issue has evolved throughout the years, is carefully
examined. Furthermore, this part pays particular attention to the formation of
the security and guarantees system of RoC by mentioning critical provisions
of the related treaties. Finally, it briefly presents the main security provisions
of the Annan Plan and a reasonable explanation behind the Greek Cypriot's
rejection of this plan. The current status of the problem is covered briefly as
well.
In the second chapter, the focus of the thesis, the security aspect of the
problem, is further examined. Following the examination of the security as-
pect, this part discusses and evaluates three existing policies that strive to
solve that aspect of the problem, which by its turn, contributes towards the
solution of the entire issue. Finally, the chapter ends by presenting the chosen
policy among those three options discussed and evaluated earlier.
The third chapter highlights the main points from the first chapter,
problem description, and the second chapter, policy options. Finally, it offers
some practical recommendations, which contribute to the realization of the
chosen policy option.
16
2 The Cyprus problem
Often, particularly in conflicts' context, the past plays a notable role

in forming the two sides' positions. Hence, the Cyprus conflict is not an ex-
emption (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. xiii). Therefore, an overview of the 'Conflict's
related events is more than necessary. The chapter begins by examining the
formation of the two communities living on the island, namely the Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community, and it proceeds further by mention-
ing the most critical events of Cyprus' history from the 16th century till the
21st century, including as well recent events from the 2020-2021 period.
To begin with, the Greek Cypriots are the largest ethnic group in Cy-
prus. Back at the time of independence in 1960, there were 441,568 Greek
Cypriots, accounting for 78 percent of the island's residents, according to the
last official census for the entire island's population (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p.
2). Recent demographic statistics estimate that the number of citizens living
under the RoC government-controlled area, meaning the southern part of the
island, is at 888.000 for 2019. For the sake of clarification, religious groups,
such as Armenians, Maronites, and Latins, also counted to the Greek Cypriot
community (Statistical Service of Cyprus, 2020, p. 4). The arrival of Greek
settlers, namely of the Achaeans and Mycenaeans, led to the first Greek com-
munity's formation on the island during the Middle Bronze Age, approxi-
mately thirty-five hundred to four thousand years ago (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p.
2). Since then, Greek culture has prevailed on the island despite the numerous
conquerors, such as Assyrian, Egyptians, and others throughout Cyprus' his-
tory (Koumna, 1998, p .2). When it comes to the other ethnic group on the
island, the Turkish Cypriot community, compared to the Greek Cypriot com-
munity, is much smaller, and its origins are comparatively more recent. In
17
1960, there were 103,822 Turkish Cypriots, accounting for 18 percent of the
island's entire population. In the absence of new and reliable data, an accu-
rate estimation of the Turkish Cypriot community's size is not possible, and
for that reason, the 18 percent figure is still commonly used in discourses on
the Cyprus problem (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 5). The origins of the Turkish
Cypriots lie back in 1571, following the Ottoman Empire's conquest of the
island. Consequently, the first people of the community came from Anatolia,
and in the centuries that ensued, many more arrived (Encyclopædia Britan-
nica, n.d.; Jennings, 1993, p. 2). The further enlargement of the community
has taken place because of the inclusion of Greek Cypriots, who converted to
Islam, to obtain social and financial benefits as Christians used to pay higher
taxes, and in other cases, to save themselves from persecution. During the
20th century, the Islamized Christians, also known as Linovamvaki, eventu-
ally were forced to join the Turkish population of the island (Ker-Lindsay,
2011, p. 6; Mikropoulos et al., 2008, pp. 92-94).
2.1 Historical background
How and when did the problem arise? The most related events from
Cyprus' history will allow us to address this question. As was mentioned
above, following the Ottoman Empire's conquest, Cyprus was annexed into
the Empire in 1571. The Ottoman rule on the island lasted for more than three
hundred years, precisely until 1878 when it came under British control, fol-
lowing an agreement between London and Constantinople, known as the Cy-
prus Convention (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, pp. 13-14). However, the ''unsinkable
aircraft carrier'' of the eastern Mediterranean, as some politicians used to call
Cyprus back in the 20th century, was formally annexed only in 1914 by Brit-
ain since the two empires were on different sides during World War I. As a
result, Britain felt no longer tied by its agreement with the Ottoman Empire,
18
and thus a few years later, in 1925, Britain declared Cyprus as a colony (Bor-
owiec, 2000, pp. 20-22).
In 1931, the Greek Cypriots' demand for unification of the island with
Greece, known as enosis, was violently expressed when a group of Greeks
burned the colonial Government House (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 17). During
the British rule, the British have attempted to counter the enosis' demand,
mainly through the establishment of a new notion of local identity, known as
the ''Cyprus mélange'', ''positing the historical presence of an amorphous mix-
ture rather than a well-defined actor and imbuing this with a distinctly local
ancestry since antiquity'' (Papadakis et al., 2006, p. 7). Although, this new
concept of local identity did not flourish as history has proved. Following
World War II and the subsequent decline of the British Empire, the Greek
Cypriots have started to feel more suitable for governing themselves and thus
obtaining their freedom. Consequently, they renewed their demand for unifi-
cation based on their numerical superiority. In an unofficial referendum run
by the Church of Cyprus in 1950, the Greek Cypriots expressed clearly their
desire, unifying the island with their 'motherland' Greece, with approximately
95.73 percent of the entire Greek Cypriot community voting in favour of en-
osis. Despite the enormous percent who voted in favour, the British neither
recognized nor accepted the enosis referendum (Loizides, 2007, p. 175;
Christodoulides, 2012). Consequently, the British stance has led to the reali-
zation that peaceful means are not enough for reaching enosis. As a result,
their request reached a peak in 1955, when the Greek Cypriot community
accounting for 78 percent of the island's population, started an armed cam-
paign intending first to end the British rule and then to unify the island with
Greece (Ker-Lindsay, 2019, p. 9). For that purpose, the Greek Cypriots have
formed ''a nationalist, anticolonialist insurgency organization'', known as the
19
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p.

22; Paul et al., 2013, p. 94).
On 1 April 1955, several bomb explosions at official buildings around
the island signalized the beginning of this campaign. However, considering
that the Greek Cypriots were not living alone on the island, it is essential to
consider the Turkish Cypriots' reaction. Despite the conciliatory line that the
EOKA clearly expressed concerning the Turkish Cypriots by issuing a Turk-
ish-language pamphlet, which has informed that the Turkish Cypriots were
not the enemy of this campaign, the smaller community of the island was still
against it. The main factor that caused their opposition towards the EOKA's
activity was the campaign's objective itself, meaning the enosis of the entire
island with Greece. In other words, they had concerns about the future of the
Turkish Cypriot community (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 21). While their stance
towards this campaign was visible, the content of their opposition was not
crystal clear. Specifically, their response has passed through different stages
throughout this period, starting from their preference to remain under colonial
rule, or if this scenario was not the case, to the idea that Turkey should cede
the island (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 21). Eventually, the third and last intention
was to achieve the island's partition, known as taksim. As they realized, for
accomplishing taksim, they had to act. As more and more Greek Cypriots
resigned from the police force during the EOKA campaign, Turkish Cypriots
replaced them and eventually sided with the British authority. Moreover, they
established Volkan (Volcano), which later was replaced by the Turkish Re-
sistance Movement (TMT), a pro-taksim paramilitary organization. The TMT
was employing similar guerrilla tactics as the EOKA. The tension and the
further division between the two communities have flourished if not created
by the British divide and rule policy (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, pp. 21-22; Kizilyü-
rek, 2003, p. 200).
20
The reaction of Britain to the uprisings is also worth mentioning. As

the EOKA continued to operate around the island, Britain invited Greece and
Turkey in August 1955 to a conference on peace and security related to the
eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the actual objective of Britain was to
address the problematic situation of the island. That conference has illustrated
for the first time that Britain acknowledged that the affairs of Cyprus were
not merely anymore an internal issue. As a result, the two countries, Greece
and Turkey, were involved considering that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots were perceiving them as their respective 'motherlands' (Ker-Lind-
say, 2011, pp. 21-22). Finally, the participation of Turkey and Greece in the
island's affairs reached its zenith in 1959. Just one year later, with the Zurich-
London Agreements between the UK, Greece, Turkey, and the leaders of the
two communities, a new independent state, the RoC, came into existence (Ad-
ams, 1966, p. 475). The RoC had a complicated constitutional structure, pri-
marily because of its design, which had a principal objective, the balance of
power between the two communities aiming to protect the numerically
smaller community, the Turkish Cypriots, from being sidelined by the much
bigger Greek Cypriot community. For instance, the new state as a presidential
regime, its president had to be Greek and the vice-president Turk elected by
the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, respectively, according
to Article 1 (The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, n.d., p. 1). In addi-
tion to that, they both had a veto right over different aspects, such as proposals
and bills (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 26).
2.1.1 The Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, and the inter-

communal violence
However, excluding the 1960 constitution, three more treaties,
namely the Treaty of Guarantee, Alliance, and Establishment, were signed by
the UK, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus concerning the establishment of the
21
RoC. Firstly, based on the Treaty of Guarantee, the three guarantor countries,
the UK, Greece, and Turkey, were responsible to ''recognize and guarantee
the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus''
(Kyriakides, 2009, p. 429). According to Article IV of the Treaty, the guar-
antor powers were allowed to intervene collectively or unilaterally if joint
action was not possible, in the case that the political situation on the island
was in danger by internal threats, such as activities that promote enosis or
taksim of the island, and external ones, to restore the status-quo that the Treaty
has defined (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 27; United Nations Peacemaker, n.d.).
Secondly, the Treaty of Alliance, to which RoC, Turkey, and Greece are par-
ties, has permitted Greece and Turkey to maintain 'contingents' on the island
but limited to 950 and 650 soldiers, respectively (Kyriakides, 2009, p. 429;
Theophanous & Christou, 2014, pp. 74-75). Finally, with the Treaty of Es-
tablishment signed by all four countries, the RoC was established. Addition-
ally, under the Treaty, the UK ''maintains sovereignty over two Sovereign
Base Areas'' ('SBAs') (Kyriakides, 2009, p. 429). But for how long did this
complex new state with shared powers and several sovereignty constraints
survive? Just three years after the establishment of the RoC, the constitution
broke down in 1963. Before the constitutional collapse, in the same year, the
President of Cyprus, Makarios, proposed thirteen constitutional amendments,
aimed, as he said to remove ''obstacles to the smooth functioning and devel-
opment of the state'' (Souter, 1984, p. 662). The first amendment that the RoC
president proposed was as follows ''The right of veto of the President and the
Vice-President of the Republic to be abandoned'' (13 Points, 1963). A consti-
tutional crisis has taken place just three years after the establishment of the
RoC.
In December of the same year, bloody fights between the two ethnic
communities took place around the island (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 35-36). As
22
a result of the inter-communal violence, the United Nations Peacekeeping

Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in 1964 to prevent further fights
among the two communities (Souter, 1984, p. 662; United Nations Peace-
keeping Force in Cyprus, n.d.). Together with the presence of the UNFICYP,
a buffer zone, well-known as the ''green line'', was established and patrolled
by the UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, n.d.). Alt-
hough, the fights have continued to emerge. In 1964, the Turkish air force
bombarded Greek Cypriot positions, and Turkey was ready for a full-scale
invasion. However, that invasion never happened due to the intense diplo-
matic pressure. By this time, the inter-communal violence had caused a divi-
sion of the island into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas,
known as enclaves for the latter. Over the three years since 1964, Turkey and
Greece were preparing for the conflict's next round by sending men and arms
to the island. This round took place in 1967, when General Grivas, a Greek
Cypriot widely known for his activity during the EOKA's campaign as the
military leader of EOKA, and commander of the Cypriot National Guard es-
tablished by Makarios in 1964, attacked a Turkish Cypriot enclave at Ko-
phinou. The withdrawal of Grivas and most of the Greek troops prevented the
threat of Turkish invasion once again (Souter, 1984, p. 663).
2.1.2 The evolution of the current phase of the problem

However, that time, in July 1974, the Turkish invasion took place in
two phases. Specifically, following the events on 15 July 1974, when the par-
amilitary organization called EOKA-B deposed the elected government of
President Makarios by the coup organized by Athens. Besides the violent re-
placement of Makarios, the coup instigators proclaimed enosis with Greece.
As a result, based on Article VI of the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey launched
a full-scale invasion ‘’on the grounds’’ of protecting the Turkish Cypriot
23
community from the “Greeks’ campaign of terror” (Fouskas, 2001, p.

98). Following the Turkish invasion, the restoration of democracy has fol-
lowed in Cyprus and Greece. The civilian government of Glavkos Clerides
has served as an interim government until the return of Makarios. This de-
velopment, by its turn, led to the beginning of formal peace talks between the
guarantor powers in Geneva, and during the second round of negotiations,
representatives of the two communities were also present. Nonetheless, the
negotiations have proved fruitless, and with the collapse of the talks, Turkey
launched a second wave of invasion that took place on 14 August, and thus,
the current phase of the Cyprus problem as it stands today has emerged (Ker-
Lindsay, 2011, pp. 42-43; Fouskas, 2001, p. 98).
The Turkish invasion and the subsequent actual division of the island
had a significant effect on both communities. But, for the Greek Cypriot com-
munity, the consequences were disastrous. As a result of the invasion, Turkey
has seized more than 36 percent of the RoC territory, left thousands wounded
and dead. Furthermore, many Greek Cypriots are missing, and approximately
160.000 became refugees in their own country and lost their properties in the
northern part of the island (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 47; Republic of Cyprus
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Another consequence of the Turkish inva-
sion is the attempt of Turkey to alter the demographic character of the island,
which constitutes a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (Vural
et al., 2015, p. 84). For example, around 15.000 settlers came from Turkey
over the 1975-1979 period following a coordinated attempt by Turkey. While
the current number of Turkish settlers remains a subject of disagreement, the
issue itself is a real challenge for any future settlement regarding the Cyprus
problem (Hatay, 2007; Ker-Lindsay, 2011, pp. 88-89; Lillikas, 2008, pp. 56-
62). When it comes to the economic consequences, according to the Govern-
ment of Cyprus' statistics, the invasion led to a 70 percent drop in the gross
24
output of the country and a 30 percent growth in unemployment. Finally, as

was mentioned above, the Greek Cypriots lost their properties in the north,
worth around US $82,1 billion at 2009 prices (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, pp. 47-
48).
Finally, a few years later, precisely on 15 November 1983, the Turkish
Cypriot administration unilaterally declared the independence of a new state,
the so-called ‘’Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’’ (TRNC), a de facto
state only recognized by Turkey and heavily condemned by the international
community, precisely by the UN with Resolution 541 (1983) and the Resolu-
tion 550 (1984) (United Nations Security Council, 1983; United Nations Se-
curity Council, 1984). But the effects for the Turkish Cypriot were more pos-
itive considering that since the beginning of inter-communal violence in the
1960s were living isolated in enclaves. Since 1974, fifty thousand Turkish
soldiers settled with the Turkish Cypriots in the north, thus offering a secure
environment for the Turkish Cypriot community by controlling more than
one-third of the island territory. The Turkish Cypriots also lost properties
(Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 48).
2.1.3 The UN efforts and the Annan Plan

Several efforts have taken place concerning the Cyprus problem so-
lution, but all efforts have proved fruitless. In 1977, Makarios and Rauf
Denktash, the leaders of the two communities, agreed on four specific points,
known as the ' high-level agreements', which have outlined some general prin-
ciples regarding the reunification. Following several decades of negotiations
between the leaders of the two communities and the guarantor powers, the
first comprehensive plan, the fifth revision of the Annan Plan, a proposal by
the UN to resolve the Cyprus issue, was put in a referendum in 2004 (Chris-
todoulides, 2021, pp. 304-305; Ker-Lindsay, p. 49). As a result, in a
25
referendum held on 24 April 2004, the Annan Plan was rejected by the Greek
Cypriots by 76 percent, in contrast to the Turkish Cypriots approval by 65
percent (Michael, 2007, p. 597; Sarris, 2020). However, why the Annan Plan
failed to persuade the Greek Cypriot to vote for it, thus solving the Cyprus
conflict? While many factors have influenced the Greek Cypriots to vote
against the Annan Plan, polling suggests that the most influential factor was
strongly associated with their concerns over security. The Annan Plan provi-
sion allowed Turkey to keep its role as a guarantor, having it since 1960 with
the Treaty of Guarantees and maintain some of its troops on the island (Ker-
Lindsay, p. 68). Finally, several efforts have continued under the UN auspi-
ces, with the latest most promising one in 2017 at Crans-Montana (Miles,
2017).
2.2 The current status of the problem
Despite the passage of time, precisely forty-seven years since the be-
ginning of the current phase of the problem, the island remains divided, as the
Picture 1 shows. The impact for the Greek Cypriots almost remains the same.
Turkey continues to control around 36 percent of the RoC territory, and the
Greek Cypriot cannot use their properties in the north. Additionally, there are
still missing persons and internally displaced persons. However, since 2003
when the Green Line opened, Greek Cypriots are allowed to visit the northern
part of the island by showing their passports (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, pp. 61-62;
Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, 2020; Republic of Cyprus Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). When it comes to the Turkish Cypriot community,
the decision of unilateral independence since 1983 comes with some costs,
such as their continuous economic and political isolation.
26
Image 1: Cyprus as it stands today
Furthermore, since 2004, when the RoC joined the EU, the Turkish Cyp-
riots do not enjoy the benefits of the EU membership, although many Turkish
Cypriots hold a passport issued by the RoC, thus enjoy some of the EU mem-
bership benefits (Andreou, 2021; Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 7). Furthermore, Tur-
key's direct interference is becoming stronger and stronger, following the for-
mer leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Akinci's accusations
against Turkey for interfering during the elections. As a result, a pro-Turkey
right-wing nationalist political, Ersin Tatar, won the elections (Smith, 2020).
Additionally, fears over the future extinction of Turkish Cypriots are also a
subject of discussion due to the high number of settlers from Turkey (Ker-
Lindsay, 2011, p. 6; Smith, 2020). The election of Ersin Tatar and the shift of
Turkish foreign policy led to a crucial change about the future of the Cyprus
problem. Precisely, while for many decades since the beginning of the peace
27
talks, both communities agreed on a model of the solution, known as a bizonal

bicommunal federation (BBF), this is not the case nowadays. The leader of
the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, now
ask for a two-state solution (Gumrukcu, 2021; Stelgias, 2020). For the first
time since the latest attempt to unify the island in 2017 at Crans-Montana, the
UN organized a new informal meeting between the two communities and the
guarantor powers. However, the informal meeting at Geneva, taking place
from 27-29 April, has failed to find even a common ground to start the nego-
tiations between the involving parties because of Turkey and the Turkish
Cypriot community's new proposals for a two-state solution (Stamouli, 2021).
In response to this failure, the UNSG, António Guterres, has acknowledged
that he will continue to work towards a general settlement. Therefore, in 2-3
months is expected that a new round of informal talks will take place (Con-
stantinou, 2021). As he put it, ''Now, to square the circle is an impossibility
in geometry but it is very common in politics'' (United Nations Peacekeeping
Force in Cyprus, 2021). But, acknowledging the diametrically opposed views
of the involved parties, even on the solution's model (BBF) that they have
agreed and reaffirmed throughout the decades, there are no great expectations
concerning a general settlement. Someone can fairly say that currently, there
are no expectations at all.
28
3 Policy options
The security aspect of the Cyprus problem remains a crucial part of a

general settlement. Throughout the decades of negotiations between the two
communities and the three guarantor powers, the chapter concerning security,
precisely known as security and guarantees, divides the two sides, the Greek
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots (Cyprus Dialogue Forum, n.d.; UN News,
2021). Even in the case that the two communities successfully agree about
the rest of the negotiation chapters, excluding the security and guarantees
chapter, that will cause the collapse of the whole agreement due to the appli-
cation of the principle ''that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed'' on
the Cyprus talks under the UN auspices (Klokkaris, 2011, p. 82; Press and
Information Office, n.d.).
For that reason, the security and guarantees system remains a crucial
part, including as well that the two sides propose opposed options over the
security. Although, it will be naive not to include Turkey, considering that it
remains the only guarantor country that wants to keep its guarantor role, in-
cluding the right to intervene, and remains the main actor among the guaran-
tor power as its troops are still present on the islands, thus it has a strong say
over the developments (Constantinou, 2017; Kouskouvelis, 2017). This chap-
ter will first outline the framework of analysis, which will be later a guide for
evaluating the three policy options over the security dimension of the prob-
lem, based on ideals and values. The discussion and evaluation of the follow-
ing policies: 1) Zero troops and zero guarantees; 2) Troops and guarantees;
3) Different types of guarantees and zero troops, will lead to the most pre-
ferred policy option.
29
3.1 Framework of analysis
Having a rounded picture of how the current phase of the Cyprus

problem has evolved, the mutual grievances claimed by the involved parties,
and the role of the two communities as well as of the guarantor powers, it is
easier to build an opinion on what kind of solution regarding the security, will
be viable, and of course, hopefully, accepted by both communities, and the
guarantor powers for a final settlement. The first and most critical point is
that Greece and Turkey have both violated the Treaties of Guarantees and
Alliance. Instead of protecting and securing the island's independence and
territorial integrity, according to the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, they
transformed Cyprus into a field of competition. As a result, the security of
Cyprus, a sovereign and independent state, should not be subject to the guar-
antees of third countries that have their own interests. Secondly, as the Annan
Plan has shown, the citizens' opinion of the two communities matters of
whether a solution will pass or not. Thirdly and lastly, a potential solution
should create a secure environment for both communities without the security
of the one community to create insecurity to the other. There are the princi-
ples that a policy option should include, such as the actual independence, re-
spect of Cyprus sovereignty, mutual acceptance by the population of the two
communities, and finally, a secure environment for all.
3.2 Discussion and evaluation of policy options
The security dimension of the problem is strongly related to the agree-

ment between the two communities if we assume that these two communities
are independent of their 'motherlands' to decide their destiny. On the one
hand, the Turkish Cypriots usually accuse that Greece controls the Greek
Cypriots. However, this does not correspond to reality, even when it comes
30
to the Cyprus problem since 1974, ''the universally accepted principle is that
Nicosia decides, and Athens follows'' (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 5). On the other
hand, the Greek Cypriots blame the Turkish Cypriots for being controlled by
Turkey. While it is not that simple as that, it is hard to deny that Turkey has
significant power over the Turkish Cypriots. Many support that because of
the multi-dependence of the Turkish Cypriots on Turkey (Tziarras, 2020, p.
150). For the sake of clarification, this dependency includes annual economic
grants given from Turkey to the Turkish Cypriots. As a result of their decision
to declare independence in 1983, they continue to face economic isolation.
For that reason, they heavily rely and depend on those grants coming from
Turkey. Turkey also provides security to the community with its thousands
of troops (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 7; Kouskouvelis, 2017).
Therefore, it is evident that Turkey exercises significant control over
the Turkish Cypriots. That does not mean that Turkey's influence over the
Turkish Cypriot community is absolute and permanent. Many Turkish Cyp-
riots have shown their opposition against Turkey's policies throughout the
years (Smith, 2020). Although, it seems unlikely that Turkey will take a more
cooperative approach, thus contributing to the solution of the security aspect,
which remains a crucial element of its foreign policy. As Ahmet Davutoglu
put it, ''Even if there was not one Muslim Turk there, Turkey had to maintain
a Cyprus problem. No country can stay indifferent towards such an island,
located in the heart of its very own vital space'' (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 279).
31
3.2.1 Zero troops and zero guarantees

The 'Zero troops and zero guarantees' policy option is an existing pol-
icy option, heavily supported by the RoC and Greece, as they both view it as
the only pathway for achieving a viable and lasting solution. Under this pol-
icy, the Greek Cypriots support that the anachronistic security and guarantees
system of 1960, the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantees, should be abolished.
In addition, the Turkish troops should start withdrawing from the island
shortly after the two communities agree (Constantinou, 2017; Hellenic Re-
public Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.; Republic of Cyprus Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, n.d.). Unquestionably, the bitter experiences of the Turkish in-
vasion shape to a great extent the Greek Cypriots' opinion on that matter. Just
a reminder, Turkey has unilaterally invaded Cyprus by invoking Article IV
of the Treaty of Guarantee (Lillikas, 2008, pp. 250-251). The Greek Cypriots'
position is supported further by the argument that it is not acceptable the se-
curity of an independent state, member of the UN, and the European Union
(EU) since 2004, will continue to depend on third countries, whether this third
country is Greece, Turkey, or the UK. Such provisions that the two Treaties
provide are contrary to the principles of state sovereignty (Ker-Lindsay, 2011,
p. 89). Considering that the two communities' population will need to validate
a potential package of agreement via a referendum, as was the case back in
2004, the two treaties' abolishment and the traditional request of the RoC for
the withdrawal of the Turkish troops will influence the Greek Cypriots to vote
in favour significantly. As was already mentioned, the most significant factor
that shaped their vote had to do much with the provision of the Annan Plan
that Turkey was keeping its guarantor role and maintain troops, even if these
troops were subject to a drastically reduced level (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 68).
However, it remains unknown whether they suggested a new ideas concern-
ing a new security and guarantees system, perhaps under the UN or the EU.
32
For that reason, those unpublished documents from the Crans-Montana are
crucial to cover those gaps.
This option has some worth mentioning strengthens as well as weak-
nesses. Firstly, the security of both communities will not anymore depend on
third countries that have their aspirations and interests. The island cannot an-
ymore be a field of competition between Greece and Turkey. Secondly, it
fully aligns with the principle of state sovereignty, and Cyprus will finally be
able to exercise effective control around the island with the withdrawal of the
Turkish occupying troops. However, does this option take into consideration
the security concerns of the Turkish Cypriots? While the two communities
continue to interact more and more since 2003, when the Green Line opened
for the public, they still live separately. Therefore, building mutual trust be-
tween the two communities will take time, many years, especially after taking
into account the past events, from the inter-communal violence in 1963-64
until the Turkish invasion, when both sides have committed crimes against
each other. Therefore, the concerns of the Turkish Cypriots are fair concerns,
and it does not seem likely that they will accept such option, something that
the former leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Mustafa Akinci, made clear fol-
lowing the collapse of the 2017 Cyprus talks (Knews, 2018).
3.2.2 Troops and guarantees

While on the one hand, the Greek Cypriots support the option of 'zero
troops, zero guarantees', Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community support
that a viable solution requires the continuation of the Treaties, and the right
of intervention, and maintenance of troops that the number will be open to
negotiations. Again, the bitter experiences play a crucial role in shaping that
policy option, as the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey argue that they cannot trust
the Greek Cypriots unless guarantees exist, such as the right of Turkey to
33
intervene in the case that the Turkish Cypriots are in danger of similar events
like the backed coup d'état by the Greek junta. The Turkish troops 'presence
on the island will continue to offer a secure environment for the Turkish Cyp-
riots (Constantinou, 2017; Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 89). The Annan Plan had
largely fulfilled those requests. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots supported
the plan with more than 65 percent. Finally, there is still hope considering the
divergence between some Turkish Cypriots' parties from the Turkish Cypriots
community's traditional view over security and guarantees. However, Tur-
key's view on the matter remains the same, and the question for abolishing its
guarantor role and withdrawing its troops from Cyprus remains a red line
(Constantinou, 2017).
This policy option also has its ups and downs. Specifically, it seems
unlikely that Greek Cypriots will accept a solution where these anachronistic
security provisions will be an integral part of the resolution. Again, as history
matters for the Turkish Cypriots, it matters also for the Greek Cypriots who
cannot forget the unfortunate status-quo, a divided island, displaced and miss-
ing persons, and the presence of thousands of foreign troops. Additionally,
this policy option does not align with the principle of state sovereignty and
the actual independence that a state should have, not like the one that Cyprus
had back in the 1960s (Constantinou, 2017; Lillikas, 2008, pp. 250-251). An-
other weakness of this policy option is associated with the stance of the UN.
The UNSG, António Guterres, has asked the parties to ''identify solutions
while taking into account the fact that the current system of guarantees, in
particular article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, containing the unilateral right
of intervention, was unsustainable”. Finally, his suggestion for creating a new
security system reflects that the security arrangements of 1960 should be re-
placed or revised (Security Council Report, 2017, p. 6).
34
3.2.3 Different type of guarantees and zero troops

A viable pathway already exists, considering the suggestions made by
the UNSG. First of all, the abolition of the Treaty of Alliance is a step towards
a sustainable security system. Based on this Treaty, Greece and Turkey are
allowed to maintain permanent forces on the island, known as ELDYK, the
Greek Force in Cyprus, and TOURDYK, the Turkish Force in Cyprus, re-
spectively (Kollias, 2001, p. 592). Both forces have violated the Treaty of
Alliance when ELDYK has participated in the 1974 coup-d'etat and not only,
and with the TOURDYK participation during the Turkish invasion (Constan-
tinou, 2017). Additionally, the abolition of the Treaty of Guarantees is an-
other step towards a viable security system. The provision of this Treaty, es-
pecially the unilateral right of intervention, can be used by the guarantor pow-
ers according to their interests. While Turkey intervened in 1974 based on
Article IV ''with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by
the present Treaty'', such as the prohibition of the enosis that the 1974 coup-
d'état intended to achieve, eventually is the country which imposes the long-
lasting de facto partition of the island that this Treaty also prohibits. Despite
the restoration of democracy and the subsequent elimination of the enosis
threat, Turkey proceeded further into the second invasion in August (Con-
stantinou, 2017; United Nations Peacemaker, 1960).
The demilitarization of the island, precisely the withdrawal of the
Turkish occupying troops, the dissolution of the Cypriot National Guard and
Turkish Cypriot Security Force is another crucial step that this policy option
proposes (McDonald, 2016, p. 191). However, considering the security gap
that will exist following the agreement of the two communities, a new secu-
rity system is more than essential for establishing a secure environment for
both communities in the united Cyprus. Therefore, the role of the UN, partic-
ularly of the UNFICYP, for the necessary transitional period is necessary
35
until the two communities agree on a joint defence establishment. Addition-

ally, there is already an existing mechanism based on the principle of the Re-
sponsibility to Protect (R2P) that ensures that necessary actions will take
place, in cases of human rights violations and crimes against humanity, in
case of a future ethnic- conflict between the two communities (Constantinou,
2017; United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility
to Protect, n.d.).
Concerning this policy option's evaluation, as is the case with the
other two options that have been discussed and evaluated earlier, it also has
strengths and weaknesses. Firstly, starting with its striking strengthens, it
aligns with the principle of state sovereignty considering that the old system
of guarantees will not anymore allow countries to intervene unilaterally or
maintain foreign troops on the island, and the security of an independent state
will not depend anymore on third countries. Secondly, the security concerns
of both communities, especially of the numerically smaller community, are
highly considered. For that reason, the effective use of the R2P mechanism,
and the extension of the UNFICYP presence on the island will contribute to
the formation of a secure and safe environment for all Cypriots. Although, it
is not crystal clear whether the citizens of the two communities will be satis-
fied, thus inclined to vote in favour in a possible referendum. However, keep-
ing in mind that almost fifty years have passed, and still the island remains
divided, both communities should somehow accept a solution that attempts
to bridge the gaps between their views, to reunify their country. Even if the
two communities agree, it does not seem realistic to expect that Turkey will
give up its guarantor role and withdraw all its troops from an island of strate-
gic importance. The weakness of this policy option is the lack of tools neces-
sary to persuade Turkey to accept such provisions against its own interests.
36
4 Conclusion and recommendations
Having a rounded picture of the Cyprus problem, it is clear that the

three countries, the UK, Greece, and Turkey, have played a vital role in the
emergence of the Cyprus problem from its earlier phase until its current one.
In the 1950s, the UK policy of divide and rule contributed remarkably to the
further division of the two communities, which was violently expressed, es-
pecially during the 1960s. When it comes to the 'motherlands' role, they
played the most important role in the emergence of the problem during the
1960s and 1970s, especially considering the 'tools' that they had in their
hands, the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee. That does not mean that the
two communities are free from blame. By their turn, they have contributed to
the emergence of the problem.
Moreover, when it comes to the current status of the problem, it is
evident that the environment is not promising regarding the negotiations for
a final solution, considering that there is no even a common ground, some-
thing that at least during the decades of negotiations it was achieved by the
BBZ model. Therefore, the current environment is not promising, obviously,
also about an agreement in the security aspect of the problem. Nevertheless,
this policy paper has attempted to discuss and evaluate three different existing
policies on the matter in question. Based on this careful evaluation, it appears
that the first two policies, named 'Zero troops zero guarantees' and 'guaran-
tees, and troops', are relatively problematic to provide a viable solution on the
critical chapter of security and guarantees. Hence, the third and last policy
option called ‘Different types of guarantees and zero troops' offers a viable
and existing pathway on that complex topic.
37
For all the reasons stated above, the thesis supports that the third pol-
icy option- 'Different guarantees and zero troops' remains the viable pathway
that needs to be followed for solving the security aspect of the Cyprus prob-
lem. An agreement on this critical aspect is elusive, at least according to the
current developments. For that reason, some general recommendations con-
tribute to the general attempt on that matter:
• More information on the new security and guarantees system is

needed: The people of both communities that will be asked to vote in
a future referendum for a complete package, including the security
aspect, should be well informed about the new role of the UNFICYP
as well as of the R2P mechanism and the tools that can be used, from
economic sanctions to hard power depends on the circumstances, in
the case of human right violations, and crimes against humanity.
• Further engagement of the two communities is a must: Time is neither

ally of the Greek Cypriots neither of the Turkish Cypriots. While Tur-
key traditionally has control over the Turkish Cypriot community, it
seems that year by year, Turkey's control becomes stricter and stricter.
Therefore, the further engagement of the two communities is an ur-
gent need to strengthen the mutual trust between the two communities
before it is too late.
• Participation of Turkey and Greece in the UNFICYP: The participation

of Greece and Turkey in the UNFICYP will make it more likely for
the latter, who have a strong saying over the final settlement, to accept
the new system of security and guarantees. Nevertheless, their troops
will be under UN control.
38
To sum up, while there is already an existing viable pathway concern-

ing the critical chapter of the security and guarantees, away from third coun-
tries' dependencies and treaties that undermine Cyprus' sovereignty, expecta-
tions remain considerably low.
39
Bibliography
• 13 Points. (1963). 13 Points (30 November 1963). Retrieved from

https://www.pio.gov.cy/assets/pdf/cyproblem/13%20points.pdf.
• Adamides, C. (2016). A Comfortable and Routine Conflict. In J. Ker-
Lindsay (Ed.), Resolving Cyprus: New approaches to conflict resolution
(Paperback edition, pp. 5–15). Tauris.
• Adams, T. W. (1966). The first republic of Cyprus: A review of an un-
workable constitution. Western Political Quarterly, 19(3), 475–490.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177%2F106591296601900303.
• Amiel, S. (2021). Can a new round of UN peace talks solve the decades-
old Cyprus conflict? Euronews. Retrieved from https://www.eu-
ronews.com/2021/04/26/can-a-new-round-of-un-peace-talks-solve-
the-decades-old-cyprus-conflict.
• Andreou, E. (2021). Turkish side’s stand only isolating Turkish Cypriots,
Anastasiades says. CyprusMail. Retrieved from https://cyprus-
mail.com/2021/05/04/turkish-sides-stand-only-isolating-turkish-
cypriots-anastasiades-says/.
• BBC. (2017). Cyprus talks end without a peace and reunification deal.
BBC. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
40530370.
• Borowiec, A. (2000). Legend and History. In Cyprus: A troubled island
(pp. 11–27). Praeger. Retrieved from
https://books.google.com.cy/books?hl=en&lr=&id=hzEDg6-
d80MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=re-
lated:qT9L4gcXmXIJ:scholar.google.com/&ots=pk8rMJfwms&sig=9F3
liQxedrfx92rPq6a5r9kVhqQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false.
40
• Chan, S. (2016). Cyprus: Why One of the World’s Most Intractable Con-
flicts Continues. The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/world/europe/cyprus-reu-
nification-talks.html.
• Choufoudakis, V. (2016). Background to the Regional Conflict. In N.
Salem, Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution. Palgrave Macmil-
lan Limited. Retrieved from
https://books.google.com.cy/books/about/Cy-
prus.html?id=PEAWDAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_rea
d_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false.
• Christodoulides, N. (2012). Το ενωτικό δημοψήφισμα στην Κύπρο [
The union referendum in Cyprus]. Kathimerini. Retrieved from
https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/467141/to-enotiko-dimopsi-
fisma-stin-kypro/.
• Christodoulides, N. (2021). ΑμερικανοΒρετανικο Σχεδιο (1978)
[American-British Plan (1978)]. In Οι Γεωπολιτικές Πραγματικότητες
στα Σχέδια Λύσης του Κυπριακού 1948-1978 [The Geopolitical Realities
in the Plans for the Solution of the Cyprus Problem 1948-1978] (2nd
ed., pp. 297–317). Isideris publications.
• Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus. (2020). Figures and Statis-
tics of Missing Persons. Retrieved from http://www.cmp-cy-
prus.org/sites/default/files/facts_and_figures_31-12-2020_.pdf.
• Constantinou, C. (2017). Προς μια βιώσιμη λύση στο Κυπριακό [To-
wards a sustainable solution to the Cyprus problem]. Foreign Affairs-
Hellenic Edition. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/arti-
cles/71113/kostas-m-konstantinoy/pros-mia-biosimi-lysi-sto-kyp-
riako?page=show.
41
• Constantinou, C. (2021). Kυπριακό / Άτυπη Πενταμερής: Ο

τετραγωνισμός του κύκλου πήρε δύο-τρεις μήνες παράταση [Cyprus /
Informal Five-party talks: The squaring of the circle took two-three
months extension. Πολιτης [Politis]. Retrieved from
https://politis.com.cy/politis-news/kypros/kypriako-atypi-pentam-
eris-o-tetragonismos-toy-kykloy-pire-dyo-treis-mines-paratasi/.
• Constantinou, C. M. (2016). A Cypriot’s Problem. In J. Ker-Lindsay
(Ed.), Resolving Cyprus: New approaches to conflict resolution (Paper-
back edition, pp. 65–73). Tauris.
• Cyprus Dialogue Forum. (n.d.). Political Guide: Security & Guarantees.
Cyprus Dialogue Forum. Retrieved fromhttps://libguides.cydi-
alogue.org/political/security.
• Davutoğlu, A., & Sarris, N. (2010). Η εγγύης θάλασσια περιοχή:
Εύξεινος Πόντος, Ανατολική Μεσόγειος, Περσικός κόλπος, Κασπία
[The near sea area: Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Persian Gulf,
Caspian]. In N. Raptopoulos (Trans.), Το στρατηγικό βάθος: Η διεθνής
θέση της Τουρκίας [The strategic depth: Turkey’s international posi-
tion] (pp. 239–284). Poiotita publications.
• Encyclopædia Britannica. (n.d.). People Of Cyprus: Ethnic groups and
languages. In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved from
https://www.britannica.com/place/Cyprus/People.
• Fouskas, V. (2001). Reflections on the Cyprus Issue and the Turkish In-
vasions of 1974. 99–127. Retrieved from https://www.re-
searchgate.net/profile/Vassilis-Fouskas-
42
2/publication/240740340_Reflections_on_the_Cyprus_Is-
sue_and_the_Turkish_Invasions_of_1974/links/.
0deec5372a1680d886000000/Reflections-on-the-Cyprus-Issue-and-
the-Turkish-Invasions-of-1974.pdf.
• Gumrukcu, T. (2021). Turkey’s Erdogan says two-state solution only
option for Cyprus. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/turkey-greece-cyprus-int-idUSKBN2AA17X.
• Hatay, M. (2007). Is the Turkish Cypriot population shrinking? An over-
view of the ethno-demography of Cypus in the light of the preliminary
results of the 2006 Turkish-Cypriot census. International Peace Re-
search Institute. Retrieved from https://www.prio.org/Global/up-
load/Cyprus/Publications/Is%20the%20Turkish%20Cyp-
riot%20Population%20Shrinking.pdf.
• Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). The Cyprus Issue.
Retrieved from https://www.mfa.gr/en/the-cyprus-issue/.
• Jennings, R. C. (1993). Introduction. In Christians and Muslims in Otto-
man Cyprus and the Mediterranean world, 1571-1640 (pp. 1–13). New
York University Press. Retrieved from
https://books.google.com.cy/books/about/Christians_and_Mus-
lims_in_Ottoman_Cy-
prus.html?id=5UMTCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read
_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false.
• Ker-Lindsay, J. (2011). The Cyprus problem: What everyone needs to
know. Oxford University Press.
• Ker-Lindsay, J. (2019). The Cyprus Problem in an Era of Uncertainty:
Establishing a Culture of Engagement (No. 5; pp. 2–44). Peace Re-
search Institute Oslo (PRIO). Retrieved from
43
https://www.prio.org/utility/Download-
File.ashx?id=1946&type=publicationfile.
• Kizilyürek, N. (2003). The politics of identity in the Turkish Cypriot
communit: A response to the politics of denial ? 37, 197-204. Retrieved
from https://www.persee.fr/docAsPDF/mom_1274-
6525_2003_act_37_1_969.pdf.
• Klokkaris, P. (2011). The Security Issue of the Cyprus Problem. 19(2),
63–86. Retrieved from https://ejournals.lib.uoc.gr/in-
dex.php/hellst/article/view/485/403.
• Knews. (2018). Akinci dismisses zero troops and no security guarantees
for Cyprus: Turkish Cypriot leader calls on Greek Cypriots to abandon
“maximalist” positions. Knews. Retrieved from https://knews.kathi-
merini.com.cy/en/news/akinci-clears-up-the-troops-and-security-is-
sue-for-cyprus.
• Kollias, C. (2001). Country survey military expenditure in Cyprus.
Routledge Taylot & Francis Group, 12(6), 589–607. Retrieved from
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/104307101084050
04?casa_token=9ZKxSDQI1T8AAAAA:bXPY_myRGOIL-
RUA_Agld3f5ob2_9oEOo52VecIK7TXBRtXI7mnW7YviR1pECmBXwKi
F7YoYeD_NMI34.
• Koumna, E. (1998). The Origins of Greek Cypriot National Identity
[Western Michigan University]. Retrieved from https://scholar-
works.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4893&context=mas-
ters_theses.
• Kouskouvelis, I. (2017). The Fallacies of the Cyprus “Problem.” E-Inter-
national Relation. Retrieved from https://www.e-
ir.info/2017/08/12/the-fallacies-of-the-cyprus-problem/.
44
• Kyriakides, K. A. (2009). The 1960 Treaties and the search for security
in Cyprus. 11(4), 427–439. Retrieved from
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19448950903382063?
scroll=top&needAccess=true.
• Lillikas, G. (2008). Λύση του Κυπριακού Πραγματικότητες, διλήμματα
και επιλογές [Solution of the Cyprus problem Realities, dilemmas and
choices]. Livanis Publishing Organization.
• Loizides, N. (2007). Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus. 8(2),
172–189. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2007.00279.x
• Mallinson, B. (2011). Cyprus: A historical overview. Press and Infor-
mation Office, Republic of Cyprus. Retrieved from
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/Embassies/Embassy_War-
saw.nsf/All/85998E6B7AD7E574C1257AE700446FF3/$file/Cy-
prus,+A+Historical+Overview+(2011).pdf.
• McDonald, R. (2016). Security is Key to a Settlement. In J. Ker-Lindsay
(Ed.), Resolving Cyprus: New approaches to conflict resolution (Paper-
back edition). Tauris.
• Mikropoulos, T. (2008). Cyprus: Cyprus during the Ottoman domina-
tion. In Elevating and Safeguarding Culture Using Tools of the Infor-
mation Society: Dusty traces of the Muslim culture. Livanis Publishing
Organization. Retrieved from
https://books.google.com.cy/books?id=optXTg3ovBYC&printsec=fro
ntcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.
• Miles, T. (2017). Cyprus reunification talks collapse, U.N. chief “very
sorry.” Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-
conflict-idUSKBN19S02I/
• Papadakis, Y., Peristianis, N., & Welz, G. (Eds.). (2006). Modernity, His-
tory, and Conflict in Divided Cyprus: An Overview. Indiana University
45
Press. Retrieved from https://books.google.com.cy/books/about/Di-

vided_Cy-
prus.html?id=wzPG7b_m4swC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read
_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false.
• Paul, C., Clarke, C. P., Grill, B., & Dunigan, M. (2013). Cyprus, 1955–
1959: Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents). In
Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies (pp. 94–103). RAND
Corporation. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/10.7249/j.ctt5hhsjk.17?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
• Polyviou, P. (2018). Το Κυπριακό πρόβλημα- Μια άλλη προσέγγιση
[The Cyprus problem- An alternative approach. Retrieved from
https://www.offsite.com.cy/sites/default/files/pdf/ΚΥΠΡΙΑΚΟ%20-
%20ΣΗΜΕΙΩΜΑ-converted.pdf.
• Press and Information Office. (n.d.). Joint Declaration by the G/C
leader, Mr Nicos Anastasiades, and the T/C leader, Mr Dervis Eroglu, on
the re-launching of talks on the Cyprus problem. Press and Information
Office. Retrieved from https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/joint-declaration-
by-the-g/c-leader,-mr-nicos-anastasiades,-and-the-t/c-leader,-mr-
dervis-eroglu,-on-the-re-launching-of-talks-on-the-cyprus-problem-
(11-february-2014).html.
• Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.-a). The Cyprus
Question: Efforts to resolve the Cyprus question. Republic of Cyprus
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://mfa.gov.cy/ef-
forts-to-resolve-the-cyprus-question.html.
• Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.-b). The Cyprus
Question: Our vision for a reunified Cyprus. Retrieved from
https://mfa.gov.cy/our-vision-for-a-reunified-cyprus.html.
46
• Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.-c). The Cyprus

Question: Turkish military invasion and occupation. Republic of Cyprus
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://mfa.gov.cy/turk-
ish-military-invasion-and-occupation.html.
• Sarris, G. (2020). 16 χρόνια από το «Οχι»: Οταν η Κύπρος γύρισε την
πλάτη στο Σχέδιο Ανάν [16 years since “No”: When Cyprus turned its
back on the Annan Plan]. Έθνος [Ethnos]. Retrieved from
https://www.ethnos.gr/istoria/103611_16-hronia-apo-ohi-otan-i-ky-
pros-gyrise-tin-plati-sto-shedio-anan
• Security Council Report. (2017). Report of the Secretary-General on his
mission of good offices in Cyprus. Retrieved from http://www.securi-
tycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_814.pdf.
• Smith, H. (2020). Erdoğan met by protests from Turkish Cypriots dur-
ing visit. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2020/nov/15/erdogan-met-by-protests-from-turk-
ish-cypriots-during-visit-northern-cyprus.
• Souter, D. (1984). An island apart: A review of the Cyprus problem.
6(3), 657–674. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436598408419791
• Stamouli, N. (2021). Cyprus talks failed to find common ground, UN
says. Politico. Retrieved from https://www.politico.eu/article/cy-
prus-talks-failed-to-find-common-ground-un-says/.
• Statistical Service of Cyprus. (2020). Demographic Statistics 2019. Re-
trieved from https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statis-
tics.nsf/All/6C25304C1E70C304C2257833003432B3/$file/Demo-
graphic_Statistics_Results-2019-EN-301120.pdf?OpenElement.
• Stelgias, N. (2020). Turkish-Cypriot leader insists on two-state solution.
Kathimerini Cyprus English Edition. Retrieved from
47
https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/turkish-cypriot-leader-
insists-on-two-state-solution.
• The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. (n.d.). The Constitution of
the Republic of Cyprus. Retrieved from https://www.presi-
dency.gov.cy/presidency/presi-
dency.nsf/all/1003AEDD83EED9C7C225756F0023C6AD/$file/CY_Co
nstitution.pdf?openelement.
• Theophanous, A., & Christou, O. (2014). The Cyprus Question and the
Role of the UN: An Overall Assessment. 30, 73–80. Retrieved from
https://journals.sfu.ca/jmh/index.php/jmh/article/viewFile/7/6.
• Tziarras, Z. (2020). Η Κύπρος και η Ανατολική Μεσόγειος στο
σύνδρομο της Λωζάνης [Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean in the
Lausanne syndrome]. In Διεθνης πολιτικη στην ανατολικη Μεσογειο:
Τουρκια, Κυπρος και δικτυα συνεργασιας σε μια «νεα» υπο-περιφερεια
[International Politics in the Eastern Mediterranean: Turkey, Cyprus
and Cooperation Networks in a “New” Sub-Region] (pp. 145–161). Pa-
pazisis publications.
• UN News. (2021). UN chief pledges to fight for all Cypriots, as impasse
remains. UN News. Retrieved from
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/04/1090902.
• United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility
to Protect. (n.d.). Responsibility to Protect. United Nations Office on
Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. Retrieved
from https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsi-
bility-to-protect.shtml.
• United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. (n.d.-a). History. United
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. Retrieved from https://un-
ficyp.unmissions.org/history.
48
• United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. (n.d.-b). The 1967 Cri-

sis. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. Retrieved from
https://unficyp.unmissions.org/1967-crisis.
• United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. (2021). Transcript of
Press Conference by the United Nations Secretary-General António Gu-
terres on the Informal 5+ 1 Meeting on Cyprus. UNFICYP. Retrieved
from https://unficyp.unmissions.org/transcript-press-conference-
united-nations-secretary-general-antónio-guterres-informal-5-1-
meeting.
• United Nations Peacemaker. (1960a). Treaty of Alliance. Retrieved
from https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peace-
maker.un.org/files/CY%20GR%20TR_600816_Treaty%20of%20Alli-
ance%20%28with%20additionnal%20protocols%29.pdf.
• United Nations Peacemaker. (1960b). Treaty of Guarantee. Retrieved
from https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peace-
maker.un.org/files/CY%20GR%20TR_600816_Treaty%20of%20Alli-
ance%20%28with%20additionnal%20protocols%29.pdf.
• United Nations Peaeekeeping Force in Cyprus. (n.d.). UNFICYP Man-
date. United Nations Peaeekeeping Force in Cyprus. Retrieved from
https://unficyp.unmissions.org/unficyp-mandate.
• United Nations Security Council. (1983). Resolution 541. Retrieved
from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20SRES541.pdf.
• United Nations Security Council. (1984). Resolution 550. Retrieved
from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20SRES550.pdf.
• Vural, Y., Ekenoğlu, B., & Sonan, S. (2015). Politically Motivated Migra-
tion: The Case of Turkish Migration to Northern Cyprus.
49
Transnational Press London. Retrieved from

https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloud-
front.net/38825313/TMC2015Pro10.pdf?1442706510=&response-
content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DPolitically_Moti-
vated_Migration_The_Case.pdf&Expires=1621212508&Signa-
ture=dvThigmyc661pezGr2p6oi99-
Np~8Eqrmtt5l0mofxMUEDtoJmE6FQ0F1iYdaFiNjR2wnGBx7hU-
CrUzzzzdK9p413CzhOJ0JUGHSgNQ5y5Ksbqu7Sjrge7SeW-
mIY8HJlxUdfmzKkivzxHVruOkzZNt1ZDTGYffOI-
bAreI4QQnjfST6ZIZYcTwoURegeB7Jls49TMatyLUm~Z5rDtayT8zb-
j63d7k73lpegPSe0AgE~ttrj6ImtUJxzoGEY-IgqT~CE-
ODo51b0hdsvwLGluV7bCMqoV8f6O89SwB-
solSqrVB37Up80MGR2YpwXnd154R1BxCy4VIxYC0nzH-
eSLmNw__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA.
• Young, E., & Quinn, L. (2002). Writing Effective Public Policy Paper: A
Guide for Policy Advisers in Central and Eastern Europe. Local Govern-
ment and Public Service Reform Initiative,Open Society Institute.
50
Appendix A [Treaty of Guarantee]
NO. 5475. TREATY OF GUARANTEE. SIGNED AT NICOSIA ON 16

AUGUST 1960
The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,
I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence,

territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established
and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common
interest,
II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by
that Constitution,
Have agreed as follows: -
Article I
The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its inde-
pendence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitu-
tion.
It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or eco-
nomic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited
any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any
other State or partition of the Island.
Article II
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of
the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise
51
and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Re-
public of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Arti-
cles of its Constitution.
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so

far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly,
either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.
Article III
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity
of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoy-
ment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic
of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the
Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.
Article IV
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Tur-
key and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the
representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provi-
sions.
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the
three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim
of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.
Article V
52
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original
texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.
The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the regis-
tration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations in ac-
cordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
53
Appendix B [Treaty of Alliance]
No. 5712. TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF

GREECE, THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND THE REPUBLIC O F
CYPRUS. SIGNED AT NICOSIA, ON 16 AUGUST 1960
The Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus,
I. In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each
of them,
II. Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and security are
in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate for their common de-
fence and to consult together on the problems raised by that defence.
Article II
The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression,
direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity
of the Republic of Cyprus
Article III
For the purpose of this alliance, and in order to achieve the object mentioned
above, a Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the
Republic of Cyprus.
54
Article IV
Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so estab-
lished with the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No. I
annexed to the present Treaty.
The said contingents shall provide for the training of the army of the Republic
of Cyprus.
Article V
The Command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation,
for a period of one year each, by a Greek, Turkish and Cypriot General Of-
ficer, who shall be appointed respectively by the Governments of Greece and
Turkey and by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cy-
prus.
Article VI
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature.
The High Contracting Parties shall conclude additional agreements if the ap-
plication of the present Treaty renders them necessary.
The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible with the reg-
istration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in
conformity with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.
55
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL No. I
I. The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite
Headquarters shall comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non-commis-
sioned officers and men, and 650 Turkish officers, non-commissioned offic-
ers and men.
II. The President and Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in
agreement, may request the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or
reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.
III. It is agreed that the sites of the cantonments for the Greek and Turkish
contingents participating in the Tripartite Headquarters, their juridical status,
facilities and exemptions in respect of customs and taxes, as well as other
immunities and privileges and any other military and technical questions con-
cerning the organization and operation of the
Headquarters mentioned above shall be determined by a Special Convention

which shall come into force not later than the Treaty of Alliance
IV. It is likewise agreed that the Tripartite Headquarters shall be set up not
later than three months after the completion of die tasks of the Mixed Com-
mission for the Cyprus Constitution and shall consist, in the initial period, of
a limited number of officers charged with the training of the armed forces of
the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents mentioned above
will arrive in Cyprus on the date of signature of the Treaty of Alliance.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL No. II
Article I
56
A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs

of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. It shall constitute the supreme
political body of the Tripartite Alliance and may take cognizance of any ques-
tion concerning the Alliance which the Governments of the three Allied coun-
tries shall agree to submit to it.
Article II
The Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session once a year. In a
matter of urgency the Committee of Ministers can be convened in special
session by its Chair- man at the request of one of the members of the Alli-
ance.
Decisions of the Committee of Ministers shall be unanimous.
Article III
The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in rotation, and for a pe-
riod of one year, by each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold its ordi-
nary sessions, unless it is decided otherwise, in the capital of the Chairman's
country. The Chairman shall, during the year in which he holds office, preside
over sessions of the Committee of Ministers, both ordinary and special.
The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it to be

necessary for the fulfilment of its task.
Article IV
The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of Alliance shall be
responsible to the Committee of Ministers in the performance of its functions.
57
It shall submit to it, during the Committee's ordinary session, an annual report
comprising a detailed account of the Headquarter's activities.
58
Index
59
61
63

The Cyprus Problem: Towards A Viable Solution: Michalis Christou

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Cyprus Problem: Towards A Viable Solution: Michalis Christou

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Cyprus Problem: Towards A Viable Solution: Michalis Christou

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

The Cyprus Problem:

Supervisor: Mgr. et Mgr. Vladimír Bízik

Department of International Relations and European

Author: Michalis Christou

In Brno 23 May 2021

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Mgr. et Mgr. Vla-

List of Terms and Acronyms 9

2 The Cyprus problem 17

2.2 The current status of the problem 26

4. Conclusion and recommendations 37

Appendix A [Treaty of Guarantee] 51

Appendix B [Treaty of Alliance] 54

Image 1: Cyprus as it stands today

List of Terms and Acronyms

Enosis – The Greek Cypriots’ request for union with Greece

EOKA – National Organization of Cypriot Fighters

RoC – Republic of Cyprus

RoT – Republic of Turkey

Taksim – The Turkish Cypriots’ request for partition

TMT – Turkish Resistance Organization

TRNC – ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’’

UNSG – United Nations Secretary-General

UNFICYP – United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

graveyard' (Amiel, 2021; Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. xii; Republic of Cyprus Min-

1.1 Definition of the policy problem: The Cyprus problem

1.2 Purpose, methodology, and limitations of the thesis

As the Cyprus problem remains unresolved and the island divided

1.3 Literature review

Just as the Cyprus conflict remains an intractable international con-

experience during the negotiations, he offers steps to avoid potential pitfalls

1.4 Road map of the thesis

2 The Cyprus problem

Often, particularly in conflicts' context, the past plays a notable role

2.1 Historical background

National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p.

The reaction of Britain to the uprisings is also worth mentioning. As

2.1.1 The Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, and the inter-

a result of the inter-communal violence, the United Nations Peacekeeping

2.1.2 The evolution of the current phase of the problem

community from the “Greeks’ campaign of terror” (Fouskas, 2001, p.

output of the country and a 30 percent growth in unemployment. Finally, as

2.1.3 The UN efforts and the Annan Plan

2.2 The current status of the problem

Image 1: Cyprus as it stands today

talks, both communities agreed on a model of the solution, known as a bizonal

The security aspect of the Cyprus problem remains a crucial part of a

3.1 Framework of analysis

Having a rounded picture of how the current phase of the Cyprus

3.2 Discussion and evaluation of policy options

The security dimension of the problem is strongly related to the agree-

3.2.1 Zero troops and zero guarantees

3.2.2 Troops and guarantees

3.2.3 Different type of guarantees and zero troops

until the two communities agree on a joint defence establishment. Addition-

4 Conclusion and recommendations

Having a rounded picture of the Cyprus problem, it is clear that the

• More information on the new security and guarantees system is

• Further engagement of the two communities is a must: Time is neither