WORKING REPORT

JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development

The Impact of COVID-19

Sachiko Ishikawa, Ph.D.

Ritsumeikan University, Japan

This Working Report covers the mid-term results of the individual case studies in the current Human Security
and Practices of Empowerment in East Asia Research Project. Use and dissemination of this working report is
encouraged; however, the JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development requests due
acknowledgment for which this working report has provided input. The views expressed in this paper are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official positions of either the JICA Ogata Sadako Research
Institute for Peace and Development or JICA.
 The Impact of COVID-19 on Peace and Stability in Mindanao:

Nested Protection and Downside Risks

Sachiko Ishikawa1*

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a paradigm shift for the Mindanao peace process between

the Philippine national government and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (BARMM). To combat COVID-19 as a common threat, the working relationship

between the Duterte Administration and the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) was much

smoother and more collaborative than expected. The BTA and local government units (LGUs)

also reached out to each other in response to the pandemic. This was the bright side of the

transitional period for the BARMM. However, the livelihood of the BARMM as the poorest

region in the Philippines has been aggravated not so much by the pandemic itself compared to

other parts of the country but by the government’s containment measures such as the Enhanced

Community Quarantine (ECQ) and other methods of community quarantine. Among the

vulnerable communities in the BARMM, Marawi City was outstanding as a result of the siege it

endured in 2017, which battle forced more than 20,000 people to flee from their homes. Delayed

rehabilitation of the city on top of the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the situation of

insecurity for internally displaced persons in Marawi City and neighboring areas. While top-down

protection prevailed during the initial period of the pandemic, the Bangsamoro community started

helping themselves at the local level by producing their own food and by disseminating health

protection knowledge among people in their community. The top-down protection together with

some regionally customized measures could be the key to increasing the credibility of the BTA

for the forthcoming parliamentary election, although potential threats to the consolidation of

*
Sachiko Ishikawa, Faculty of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Japan
([email protected])
1
peace should always be identified and taken care of in the BARMM.

Keywords: COVID-19, human security, downside risks, protection, BARMM

2
1. The COVID-19 Pandemic as an Additional Challenge for BARMM

The COVID-19 pandemic has become an immense threat to the world since early 2020. No

country or region has escaped this invisible danger. The Philippines including the Bangsamoro

Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), the newly established autonomous region

in Mindanao, is no exception. As of 27 February 2021, 574,247 persons had reportedly been

infected, with a death toll of 12,289 in the country (WHO 2021). On the same day 4,089 residents

of the BARMM were counted as infected and the death toll reached 155 (Bangsamoro IATF

2021a). The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted not only in a health and life crisis, but also a deep

economic recession. The GDP of the Philippines declined 9.5 percent in 2020 (Nikkei Asia 2021),

which hit vulnerable population sectors harder and was anticipated to raise the poverty rate in the

country.

The peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

(MILF) had shifted to a new stage in early 2019 before the pandemic struck when the MILF-led

interim government, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) was established by approving

the Bangsamoro Organic Law through a two-part plebiscite. This marked the transfer of

administrative power from the national government to the BARMM. As a result of the pandemic

the BTA had to forgo some public services that were deemed non-urgent while it employed a

whole-of-government approach to tackle COVID-19 (Baraguir 2020). While the Enhanced

Community Quarantine (ECQ),2 equivalent to a “total lockdown” (Bajo 2020), was imposed by

the national government on the BARMM during the initial stage of the pandemic, the Bangsamoro

Inter-Agency Task Force (BIATF) released 1.9 billion pesos worth of funds for responses to the

pandemic (Baraguir 2020). Like any other government, the BTA struggled to balance the two

2
ECQ is the strictest measure of community quarantine and includes the following measures: 1) strict
home quarantine; 2) limitation of movement in accessing basic necessities; 3) regulation of provision for
food and essential health services; 4) prohibition of mass gathering; and 5) suspension of public transport.
1
values of life and livelihood in the middle of the pandemic.

The result of JICA’s early assessment on the impact of COVID-19 in the BARMM concluded

that all the residents in this region have been affected by the pandemic, regardless of occupation,

due to the strict home quarantine (JICA and Ministry of the Interior and Local Government of

BARMM 2020). Among the already vulnerable populations in the BARMM, people in Marawi

City in Lanao del Sur are highlighted due to their conflict-affected and displaced positions. In

March 2020, Marawi City, together with other parts of Lanao del Sur were placed under the ECQ,

which was the first ECQ measure imposed inside the BARMM (Jesuit Refugee Service

Philippines 2021). After a ten-month-long lockdown, Lanao del Sur and its component city,

Marawi remained under the Modified Enhanced Community Quarantine (MECQ)3 in the month

of October 2020, while other areas of the Philippines were under the General Community

Quarantine (GCQ) 4 or other more moderate measures (Arguillas 2020). The more severe

quarantine measures imposed by the national IATF aggravated the living conditions of internally

displaced persons (IDPs) on top of the destructive result of the Marawi siege in 2017.

The BARMM has also been under the pressure of the risk of the resurgence of the conflict. In

general, the risk of conflict resurgence caused by COVID-19 in post-conflict and fragile areas had

been forewarned by such complex elements as: 1) elevated anxiety over health and economy

(Mustasilta 2020); 2) strengthened system of national surveillance (Youngs and Panchulidze

2020); 3) resurgence of terrorist activities (TRT World 2000); and 4) slowdown or even

retrogression of the process of reconciliation (IDEA 2020). Some staff members of the LGUs

3
MECQ is characterized as: 1) strict home quarantine; 2) mass gathering not more than 5 people; 3)
suspension of public transport; 4) biking and non-motorized transport encouraged; and 5) work from
home except for skeleton workforce.
4
GCQ is understood as: 1) stay at home by elderly and youth; 2) mass gathering mot more than 10
people; 3) public transport allowed with strict social distancing; and 4) alternative work arrangements.
2
have, in fact, expressed their concerns over the issues of peace and order due to the insufficient

service of the BTA and LGUs (JICA and Ministry of the Interior and Local Government of

BARMM 2020).

This paper illustrates the impact of COVID-19 on people in the BARMM under the special period

of power transition. As indicated in Figure 1, a nested paradigm of response foci (Dugan 1996)

helps understand the top-down structure when facing such an issue (COVID-19), relationships

(COVID-19 and local community), subsystems (BARMM) and the system (Philippine

Government) for COVID-19 responses. The paper examines, in accordance with the nested

structure, the following three questions to articulate the impact of COVID-19 on the BARMM:

(1) What are the policies of the Duterte Administration vis-à-vis COVID-19 and how has the

Administration dealt with the BARMM under the current power transition?

(2) How has the BTA attempted to protect the local community inside the BARMM and what are

the impacts of COVID-19 on the BTA in terms of the consolidation of peace and stability?

(3) What are the downside risks to the local community in BARMM, and who are left behind and

in what contexts?

Figure 1. Nested paradigm of COVID-19 response foci

Philippine
Government

BARMM

Local
Community

COVID-19

Figure 1. 1 Nested paradigm of COVID-19 response foci

3
The methodology for this research is a literature review, data analysis and an online survey

because of the current travel restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The target groups for

survey are the leaders of civil society, NGOs, and officials of the BTA. Section 1 provides an

introduction that illustrates the general impact of COVID-19 on the Philippines including the

BARMM. This is followed by a discussion of the objectives and methodologies for this paper.

Since top-down measures have been dominant in the initial stage of the pandemic, the paper will

start with discussing the policies and implementation measures of the Philippine government as

well as those of the BTA in Section 2. The working relationship between the Duterte

Administration and the BTA will also be examined. Section 3 focuses on the downside risks to

the local community in BARMM and who are left behind and in what context. Special attention

is paid to Marawi City, which can be classified as one of the most vulnerable groups vis-à-vis the

COVID-19 pandemic. Section 4 provides some conclusions and discusses the limitations of this

research.

2. Top-down Protection for Combatting the COVID-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic as a common enemy has made the national government and the BTA

work closely in line with the policies and guidelines of the Inter-Agency Task Force for the

Management of Emerging Infectious Disease (IATF-MEID). The working relationship between

the BTA and LGUs is also collaborative in the face of the pandemic. Philippine laws have granted

President Duterte wide authority to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. The Duterte Administration

securitized the pandemic on 8 March 2020 by declaring a national public health emergency. This

was followed by the Bayanihan (communal work) to Heal as One Act5 known as the Bayanihan

Act on 25 March, granting President Duterte additional authority to tackle the COVID-19

pandemic in the country. The Bayanihan to Recover as One Act6 known as Bayanihan 2 was set

5
Bayanihan to Heal as One Act is officially designated the Republic Act No.11469.
6
Bayanihan to Recover as One Act is officially designated Republic Act No. 11494.
4
in place on 15 September 2020 which gave the President the ultimate authority to continue

combatting the pandemic. Aside from the two versions of the Bayanihan Act, the Duterte

Administration cited Republic Act 10212 known as the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and

Management Act of 2010 as the basis of the country’s measures to deal with the pandemic. There

are three significant points in Duterte’s top-down operation vis-à-vis the pandemic.

Firstly, the deployment of the military was justified under the securitized circumstances. Duterte

initially placed more importance on containment measures such as ECQ and deployed the military

as well as the police to monitor the implementation of community quarantine. By prioritizing

quarantine measures the Administration was criticized as less competent with testing, contact-

tracing, or a strategy to balance between health risks and reopening the economy (Pesek 2020).

Secondly, a whole-of-government approach was applied and cross-departmental management

was organized (IATF-MEID 2020). There are three tiers of task forces in the government. At the

policy-making level IATF-MEID, which consists of executive departments, was tasked to

orchestrate government responses. The overall chairperson is President Duterte while the actual

chairman is the Secretary of the Department of Health. Under the IATF-MEID there is a National

Task Force led by the Secretary of Defense at the operational level. At the bottom of this

mechanism at the technical level, there are Regional Disaster Risk Reduction Management

Committees (RDRRMC) together with Regional Task Forces. This mechanism endorsed and

supported Duterte’s idea on robust social control by including the security cluster in the task

forces. The whole-of-government approach also indicated that some of the government services

would be forgone while measures tackling the pandemic became the priority. Thirdly, the

President under the Bayanihan Act has power to create a social amelioration program (SAP) to

mitigate the adverse economic impact by providing emergency assistance to the poor segment of

the population (Philippine Government 2020). For example, 18 million low-income households

receive an emergency monthly subsidy (5,000-8,000 pesos) depending on regional minimum

5
wage rates (Tingo 2020).

Under such nation-wide arrangements to tackle the pandemic, the working relationship between

the Duterte Administration and the BTA is an indicator of the degree of autonomy of the BARMM

and is also a key factor for satisfactory protection given to the local community in the autonomous

region. The BTA has faced a huge challenge in how to respond to the pandemic under the

transition to a parliamentary government system, which is still reliant on the national government

(Mallari et al. 2020). In fact, the working relationship between the national government and the

BTA is deemed to be fine in the context of combatting COVID-19. Although the working

arrangements of the BARMM and the national government are defined by the Bangsamoro

Organic Law (BOL), the Duterte Administration has organized a special arrangement for the BTA

to easily access the national government’s support.7 For example, President Duterte allowed the

representative of BIATF to participate in the national IATF-MEID meetings and issued a

“marching order” to all relevant national government agencies to assist the BARMM as the region

facing many daunting challenges aggravated by the pandemic.8 As mentioned earlier, the BIATF

could allocate 1.9 billion pesos to LGUs and referral hospitals for COVID-19 responses during

the early stage of the pandemic (Baraguir 2020). The funds came from the annual block grant

given by the national government as part of the BARMM’s Quick Response Fund9. While the

Chief Minister of BARMM is directly under the supervision of the president in accordance with

the BOL, the BIATF operation for COVID-19 has semi-independent policies and protocols

without violating the national IATF policies10 due to the uniqueness of the culture and traditions

of the Bangsamoro people.11 These can be observed particularly in terms of religion related issues,

7
Author obtained written statements from Dr. Mohammad S. Yacob, Minister of Agriculture, BTA on 19
February 2021.
8
Author obtained written statements from Dr. Mohammad S. Yacob, 19 February 2021.
9
Author obtained written statements from Dr. Mohammad S. Yacob, 19 February 2021.
10
Author obtained written statements from Mr. Guiamel Alim, Chairman of CBCS on 21 February 2021.
11
Author obtained written statements from Dr. Mohammad S. Yacob, 19 February 2021.

6
such as suspension of Friday prayers and prohibition of mass gathering during the holy month of

Ramadan (Baraguir 2020).

The working relationship between the BTA and LGUs is another level of protection that matters.

It was observed that LGUs abided by the policies and guidelines provided by the BTA and the

BTA and LGUs closely worked together to mitigate daunting situations and to assist communities

despite the uncertainty of the supervisory or oversight functions of the BTA over the LGUs in its

territory.12 During the early stage of the pandemic, the BTA issued guidelines to the LGUs on

how to respond to COVID-19 including LGU adaptation of the policies during the ECQ (JICA

and Ministry of the Interior and Local Government of BARMM 2020). Food packages were

provided to all BARMM LGUs and even to those outside the autonomous region by the BTA.13

The BTA also diligently facilitated the Returning Overseas Filipinos (ROFs) and Locally

Stranded Individuals (LSIs) who were returning to the region and mandated all provincial

governments to establish isolation areas including their component cities and municipalities

(JICA and Ministry of the Interior and Local Government of BARMM 2020).

The nested structure of the Philippine administration including the BTA and LGUs seems to have

functioned reasonably in combatting the COVID-19 pandemic. The securitized responses to the

deadly virus with the strict policies and guidelines of the national IATF were vertically conveyed

to the BTA or BIATF and then to LGUs in the BARMM. While national policies and guidelines

were well abided by, the BTA and LGUs took additional customized measures without violating

the national policies. These customized measures are deemed to be the method of empowerment

of the BTA vis-à-vis the national government and those of LGUs vis-à-vis the BTA.

12
Author obtained written statements from Mr. Guiamel Alim, 21 February 2021.
13
On 8 February 2021 the author obtained written statements from Ms. Samrah Karon, a former staff
member of JICA Cotabato Project Office and currently a consultant to the BTA.
7
Effectiveness of these protection measures is another issue. In the following section, the paper

illustrates how local communities are vulnerable to the pandemic and to the strict protection

measures imposed on them.

3. Handing Vulnerability between the Containment Measures and the People’s Economic

Welfare

One of the consolations under the pandemic is that the number of infected cases has rather been

small in the Bangsamoro region compared to the rest of the country, partly because this

geographical location is away from thickly populated cities. As of 3 March 2021, the total number

of infected cases in the BARMM was 4,122 out of which 93 cases were counted as active, and

156 as deceased since the beginning of the pandemic (Bangsamoro IATF on COVID-19 2021b).

Total cases occupy only 0.1 percent of the entire population of 4 million in the BARMM area

(UNFPA Philippines 2019), while 0.5 percent of the entire population in the country has

reportedly been infected. It seems, in general, that the socio-economic impact of the ECQ was

felt to be a more serious concern by residents of the BARMM than the health threats caused by

the virus. The JICA assessment articulated daunting daily life within the economic recession in

the region due to severe measures such as ECQ imposed by the national IATF (JICA and Ministry

of the Interior and Local Government of BARMM 2020). For example, 90 percent of interviewees

claimed limited mobility due to the suspension of public transport, while 88 percent observed a

surge in the price of basic needs due to the insufficient supply of goods. The suspension of public

transport made it difficult for people to bring their goods and services to markets, which could

aggravate the poverty ratio. Overall, 81 percent claimed that their household income was not

sufficient to cover its needs, while the same claim was made by 51 percent of interviewees prior

to the pandemic. The assessment concluded that the all the people in the BARMM regardless of

their professions have been affected by the pandemic, and more precisely by the ECQ (JICA and

8
Ministry of the Interior and Local Government of BARMM 2020).

Among the provinces and municipalities in the BARMM, Marawi City in Lanao del Sur is

remembered as an entity heavily bombed and destroyed during the, so called, Marawi siege in

2017. This five-month long armed conflict was carried out in the context of a war on terrorism

from 23 May to 23 October 2017. At this time the Philippine government forces attempted to

eradicate the Maute and Abu Sayyaf groups (MindaNation 2017). On 23 May 2017 President

Duterte issued Proclamation 216 placing the whole of Mindanao under martial law, which only

lapsed two and half years later (Tingo 2020). The long battle turned the city into ruins. It was

reported that 95 percent of structures in the main battlefield were destroyed (Malicdem 2017).

More than 200,000 residents of Marawi had to evacuate to neighboring cities and towns to avoid

the hostilities (Mateo 2017). Although around 70 percent had returned home by May 2018

(Felongco 2018), the remaining population staying in tents were gradually moved to evacuation

centers and temporary shelters by January 2020 (MSF 2020). Some 12,835 individuals, as of

August 2020, were still displaced (UNHCR Philippines 2020).

The first COVID19 patient in the Philippines was reportedly a man in Lanao del Sur who came

home from Metro Manila and died on 13 March (Butardo 2020). That was why Lanao del Sur

including Marawi City was immediately placed under ECQ in March, the first ECQ in the territory

of Bangsamoro to have this happen. Under such circumstances displacement brought by conflicts

aggravated the pandemic concerns for residents (Baraguir 2020). First, on the medical side, lack

of social distancing in evacuation centers increased the risk of contagion. In the middle of

September 2020 suddenly the number of infected cases spiked up to 441 (Jennings 2020).

Although there had been outbreaks of measles, dengue fever and polio in Marawi City since the

end of the siege in October 2017, medical consultations at health facilities were suspended due to

the ECQ (MSF 2020). It was also claimed to be a challenge to access clean water. Secondly, on

9
the livelihood side, IDPs residing in Marawi claimed, as people in other areas of the BARMM

did, that there was a lack of basic items that they needed to survive the lockdown (Jesuit Refugee

Service Philippines 2021).

There is a national government task force, Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM), to facilitate the

rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in Marawi. It also seeks to help IDPs to recover from the

tragedy caused by the siege in 2017 (Kabagani 2020). The significant delay of rehabilitation

programs under its jurisdiction has been criticized by local media (Cruz 2019; Vera 2020; Umel

2020). This was partly due to a slow process of budget approvals that resulted in returning some

portions of the budget to the treasury, and partly due to the donation influx that could not be

efficiently handled by the local authority (Cruz 2019). Many IDPs have expressed their anger at

the irony that they can’t receive assistance despite ample budget funds being available (Umel

2020). The 2020 budget for Marawi rehabilitation amounting to 3.56 billion pesos was allotted in

May 2020. Out of nine planned projects within the annual budget at least four projects were

directly related to basic human needs such as shelters and water supply (Kabagani 2020).

Although the BTA is not a member of TFBM, it has created its own task force consisting of the

parliament members for IDPs in Marawi to oversee the implementation programs and projects.14

The working arrangement between the BTA and the TFBM is complementary.15 The BTA has

also created the Sagip Kabuhayan Program (Saving Livelihood Program) to provide socio-

economic assistance to IDPs in Marawi.16

It has been observed that the containment measures such as ECQ and other levels of community

quarantine affected people’s livelihood in the region, especially those IDPs in Marawi with a

14
Author obtained written statements from Mr. Guiamel Alim, 21 February 2021.
15
Author obtained written statements from Dr. Mohammad S. Yacob, 19 February 2021.
16
Author obtained written statements from Dr. Mohammad S. Yacob, 19 February 2021.

10
conflict specific background. It is thus imperative for the BTA and LGUs to maintain a good

working relationship and to carry out collaborative efforts help address the challenges of

mitigating the negative outcomes from community quarantines (Baraguir 2020). This is also

connected to the issue of consolidation of peace and stability in the region. Horizontal conflicts

such as clan wars remain prevalent regardless of the COVID-19 pandemic (Baraguir 2020).

Extremism is still a potential threat while the Ab Sayyaf group, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom

Fighters (BIFF) and IS related groups remain willing to attack communities and government

troops17 if the assistance extended by the BTA and LGUs to support the livelihood and health of

the people in the region fails. Delayed support could also affect those who have been waiting for

long time for the normalization process, which could be another threat to the BARMM.

4. Conclusions

There are two major findings from this initial stage of the research on the topic. First, on the bright

side, the COVID-19 pandemic as a common enemy has made the national government and the

BTA work closely in line with the policies and guidelines of the IATF-MEID. The working

relationship between the BTA and LGUs is also collaborative toward the pandemic. The top-

down effect of the whole-of-government approach is observed in the BARMM. This top-down

approach also leaves some room for the BTA and LGUs to take their own measures in specific

local contexts. Second, the socio-economic impact of ECQ and other modes of community

quarantine are classified as presenting greater downside risks than the pandemic in a medical

sense. These risks adversely affect the level of livelihood of people in the BARMM. While the

number of infected cases is rather small in the BARMM, community quarantine limits the

movement of people and goods, which affects the daily life of people and economy in the region.

Under such a helpless situation, the IDPs of Marawi City who fled from hostilities during 2017

17
Author obtained written statements from Ms. Samrah Karon, February 2021.

11
Marawi siege have been spotted in more vulnerable positions. Community quarantine hinders the

rehabilitation projects and the difficult social distancing in temporary evacuation centers has

increased the threat of contagion. Delayed service-delivery to people could be a potential threat

to the consolidation of peace and stability in the region where a number of triggers for further

conflict have already been recognized.

Lastly, some limitations of this research should be indicated. Due to the travel restrictions

resulting from the pandemic, this paper was written mostly based on information available in

papers, through online media reports, and by the author’s own correspondence with local resource

persons in the BARMM. The paper also concentrates on top-down protection by the national

government, the BTA and the LGUs as well as the downside risks of local communities in the

BARMM. Assistance from donors needs to be included in this network to illustrate a complete

picture of combatting the pandemic in the BARMM in the next stage of research.

12
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