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Case No. 10: Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs Judge Mendez

<GR 103702, December 6, 1994>

TOPIC: < DE Facto Municipal Corporations>

<Gelindon>

DOCTRINE: Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result
of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in
this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to
have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact
attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation.

FACTS:
● On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections
68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No.
353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the
municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres,
Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
● Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President
and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San
Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24 May 1959.
● By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President
Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially
recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July
1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. The executive order added
that "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in
House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives."
● On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the
Municipality of San Andres. Docketed Special Civil Action No. 2014-G, the petition
sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the
respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to
refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. Invoking
the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the petitioning municipality
contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of
the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the
Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and
functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to the corresponding
officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.

RTC RULING: In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court finally dismissed the
petition for lack of cause of action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State,
adding that "whatever defects (were) present in the creation of municipal districts by the
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President pursuant to presidential issuances and executive orders, (were) cured by the
enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991." In an order,
dated 17 January 1992, the same court denied petitioner municipality's motion for
reconsideration.

CA RULING:

ISSUE:
Whether or not existence of a municipality created by a null and void presidential order may
be attacked either directly or even collaterally by anyone whose interests or rights are
affected.

ARGUMENTS

PETITIONER (NAME): RESPONDENT (NAME):

SC RULING:
● The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the
Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a
public office or exercises a public franchise."  When the inquiry is focused on the
legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding
for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be brought "in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal
"when directed by the President of the Philippines " Such officers may, under certain
circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of another
person" with the permission of the court.  
● The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo
warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be "entitled
to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another." While
the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only
the officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however,
a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres
to exist and to act in that capacity.
● At any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of the
Municipality of San Andres, the Court shall delve into the merits of the petition.
While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act
No. 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de
facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto had
been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a
vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any
attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce
be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
● Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on
20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that
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the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the
executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of
San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly
created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to
question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period
can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with greatest
imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a
political subdivision be timely raised.
● Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result
of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to
consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status
uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de
facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise.
Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres
had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v.
Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be
the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's
recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after
more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the
Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the
income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as
municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country,
certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under
Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this Court pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San
Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San
Andres for the province of Quezon.
● At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be
dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats
of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality
of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities
composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the
Local Government Code is proferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if
made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the
legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the
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Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity

to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have
been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual
qualification against impairment of vested rights. 
● All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the
province of Quezon must now be conceded.
● WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioners.
● SO ORDERED.

ADDITIONAL NOTES (DOCTRINES)

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