CONRADO R. ESPIRITU, JR.

, TERESITA ESPIRITU-GUTIERREZ,
MARIETTA R. ESPIRITU-CRUZ, OSCAR R. ESPIRITU, and ALFREDO R.
ESPIRITU vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(GR No. 219070)
June 21, 2017

FACTS
On March 1, 2010, the petitioners, with their now deceased sibling,
Carmen Espiritu, filed before the RTC an Application for Registration of Title
to Land 4 covering a parcel of land with an area of 6,971 square meters,
located at Barangay La Huerta, Parafiaque City, Metro Manila, and identified
as Lot 4178, Cad. 299 of the Paranaque Cadastre Case 3.

Attached to the petitioners’ application were copies of the Special Powers

of Attorney respectively executed by petitioners Oscar Espiritu and Alfredo
Espiritu in favor of petitioner Conrado Espiritu, Jr. to represent them in the
proceedings relating to the application; Advanced Survey Plan of Lot No.
4178, Cad. 299 of the Paranaque Cadastre Case 3; Technical Description of
Lot 4178, AP-04-003281, being an advanced survey of Lot 4178, Cad. 299,
Paranaque Cadastre Case 3; and Tax Declaration No. E-005-01718-TR.

The petitioners alleged that their deceased parents, Conrado Espiritu, Sr.
and Felicidad Rodriguez-Espiritu, were the owners of the subject land; that
they inherited the subject land after their parents passed away; and that they,
by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land in the
concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years. They presented witnesses to
prove their claims.

The RTC granted the application for registration. The trial court opined that
the petitioners were able to establish possession and occupation over the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. It gave credence to Marrieta’s testimony that she had known that the
subject land belonged to their parents as early as 1940 because she was
already7 years old at that time.

The Republic moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the
RTC. Through the OSG, the Republic elevated an appeal to the CA.

The CA reversed the RTC decision. It reiterated the prevailing doctrine

that to successfully register a parcel of land, the application must be
accompanied by: (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification stating the alienable
and disposable character of the land applied for; and
(2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

It opined that the DENR-NCR certification presented by the petitioners

would not suffice to prove that the subject land was indeed classified by the
DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. The CA explained that under
Department of Agriculture Orders Nos. 20 and 38, the Regional Technical
Director of the FMS had no authority to issue certificates of land classification;
and that the petitioners failed to present a certified true copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the trial court and
dismissing the petitioners' application for registration of title

HELD
No. The Court has ruled that declaration of alienability and disposability is
not enough for the registration of land under Section 14(2) of the Land
Registration Act. There must be an express declaration that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial
property. This is only logical because acquisitive prescription could only run
against private properties, which include patrimonial properties of the State,
but never against public properties.

Registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on possession

and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was
susceptible to private ownership at that time. Thus, for registration under
Section 14(1) to prosper, the applicant must establish that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
thereof; and the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.

In the case at bar, petitioners failed to present any competent evidence which
could show that the subject land had been declared as part of the patrimonial
property of the State. The DENR-NCR certification presented by the
petitioners merely certified that the subject land was not needed for forest
purposes. This is insufficient because the law mandates that to be subjected
to acquisitive prescription, there must be a declaration by the State that the
land applied for is no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth. Thus, the petitioners failed to prove that they acquired
the subject land through acquisitive prescription.
Republic of the Philippines v. Sogod Development Corporation
[ G.R. No. 175760; 17 February 2016]
Facts:
Respondent Sogod Development Corporation (Sogod) filed an application for
registration and confirmation of land that it purchased from Catalina Rivera, averring
that “by itself and through its predecessors-in-interest[,] [it had] been in open,
continuous, exclusive[,] and notorious possession and occupation of [the land] since
June 12, 1945[.]” DENR filed an Opposition on the ground that the land was
previously forest land and was certified and released as alienable and disposable only
on January 17, 1986. Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod ruled
in favour herein respondent Sogod, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue:
Whether or not the occupation of forest lands prior to its classification as alienable
and disposable land may be considered for purposes of complying with the
requirements for judicial confirmation of title.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, 70 otherwise known
as the Public Land Act, which requires possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 for a judicial confirmation of title:
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
A similar provision is found in Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which reads:
SECTION 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives: AIDSTE
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic has clarified that the fixed date of
June 12, 1945 qualifies possession and occupation, not land classification, as alienable
and disposable. The agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicant's possession and occupation of the land dates back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thus:
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable
and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or
earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or
reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12,
1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by
judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be
respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the
requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the
determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except
that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative
intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law
as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act indicates that
Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should
have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the
applicant's imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the
property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or
title over it. Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of the period. In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now
acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to
private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. It is for this reason that the property
subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the
requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for
registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR
No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc

FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land
situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty
(30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his great- grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth
being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by
the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification

dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656
on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application
for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that

Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23
February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed
the application of Malabanan.

ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land
and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the
Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because

of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?

HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that
“those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to,
such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(2)
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public
Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin
to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish
that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—
the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with
Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status
as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.
Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
CONRADO R. ESPIRITU, JR., TERESITA ESPIRITU-GUTIERREZ,
MARIETTA R. ESPIRITU-CRUZ, OSCAR R. ESPIRITU, and ALFREDO R.
ESPIRITU vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(GR No. 219070) June 21, 2017

FACTS
On March 1, 2010, the petitioners, with their now deceased sibling, Carmen
Espiritu, filed before the RTC an Application for Registration of Title to Land 4
covering a parcel of land with an area of 6,971 square meters, located at
Barangay La Huerta, Parafiaque City, Metro Manila, and identified as Lot
4178, Cad. 299 of the Paranaque Cadastre Case 3.

Attached to the petitioners’ application were copies of the Special Powers

of Attorney respectively executed by petitioners Oscar Espiritu and Alfredo
Espiritu in favor of petitioner Conrado Espiritu, Jr. to represent them in the
proceedings relating to the application; Advanced Survey Plan of Lot No.
4178,Cad. 299 of the Paranaque Cadastre Case 3; Technical Description of
Lot 4178, AP-04-003281, being an advanced survey of Lot 4178, Cad. 299,
Paranaque Cadastre Case 3; and Tax Declaration No. E-005-01718-TR.
The petitioners alleged that their deceased parents, Conrado Espiritu, Sr.
and Felicidad Rodriguez-Espiritu, were the owners of the subject land; that
they inherited the subject land after their parents passed away; and that they,
by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land in the
concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years. They presented witnesses
to
prove their claims.

The RTC granted the application for registration. The trial court opined that
the petitioners were able to establish possession and occupation over the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. It gave credence to Marrieta’s testimony that she had known that the
subject land belonged to their parents as early as 1940 because she was
already7 years old at that time.

The Republic moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the
RTC. Through the OSG, the Republic elevated an appeal to the CA. The CA
reversed the RTC decision. It reiterated the prevailing doctrine that
to successfully register a parcel of land, the application must be accompanied
by:

(1) a CENRO or PENRO certification stating the alienable and disposable

character of the land applied for; and

(2)
a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
It opined that the DENR-NCR certification presented by the petitioners
would not suffice to prove that the subject land was indeed classified by the
DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. The CA explained that under
 Department of Agriculture Orders Nos. 20 and 38, the Regional Technical
Director of the FMS had no authority to issue certificates of land
classification;
and that the petitioners failed to present a certified true copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the trial court and
dismissing the petitioners' application for registration of title

HELD
No. The Court has ruled that declaration of alienability and disposability is
not enough for the registration of land under Section 14(2) of the Land
Registration Act. There must be an express declaration that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial
property. This is only logical because acquisitive prescription could only run
against private properties, which include patrimonial properties of the State,
but never against public properties.
Registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on possession
and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was
susceptible to private ownership at that time. Thus, for registration under
Section 14(1) to prosper, the applicant must establish that the subject land
forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof; and
the
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

In the case at bar, petitioners failed to present any competent evidence which
could show that the subject land had been declared as part of the patrimonial
property of the State. The DENR-NCR certification presented by the
petitioners merely certified that the subject land was not needed for forest
purposes. This is insufficient because the law mandates that to be subjected
tacquisitive prescription, there must be a declaration by the State that the land
applied for is no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth. Thus, the petitioners failed to prove that they acquired
the
subject land through acquisitive prescription.