Javier v. Court of Appeals
Javier v. Court of Appeals
Javier v. Court of Appeals
DECISION
VITUG , J : p
The issues raised in this petition for review on certiorari revolve around the validity
of Resolution No. 206 of the Provincial Board of Antique abolishing the O ce of the
Provincial Engineer. LLphil
On 19 April 1974, Provincial Engineer Maximiano Sentina and forty (40) o cials and
employees of the O ce of the Provincial Engineer led a petition for mandamus and
damages against the entire Provincial Board of Antique. The petition was anchored on the
hypothesis that the abolition of the O ce of the Provincial Engineer was a circumvention
of the constitutional mandate on security of tenure and intended only to weed out
provincial o cials and employees who opposed the Provincial Board's candidacy in the
08th November 1971 elections. Cdpr
A motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the lower court having been denied,
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 15 February 1977, the appellate court, reversing the court a quo, held that "the
passage of Resolution No. 206 was prompted in the main by reasons other than those
stated therein," and that the evidence on record "adequately justi e(d) the charge that
personal and political animosities on the part of petitioner Sentina, on (the) one hand, and
respondents, on the other, (had) caused the respondent Provincial Board to enact said
resolution." 2 The appellate court rendered judgment, 3 thus: Cdpr
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
On 14 September 1978, the Court of Appeals denied, for lack of merit, the motion for
reconsideration.
The Provincial Board thereupon instituted the instant petition for review on
certiorari.
On 18 August 1982, during the pendency of this appeal, Enrique A. Zaldivar, then
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incumbent governor of Antique, led a motion for leave to intervene, 4 which the Court
granted. 5 Governor Zaldivar contended, in his memorandum in intervention, that should
the displaced o cials and employees of the O ce be reinstated and paid their back
salaries from 01 July 1973, it would be to the great sacri ce of Antique's development
programs. 6
Critical in the instant petition are two basic questions: whether or not the provincial
board had the authority under the then existing laws to enact the questioned resolution,
and, in the affirmative, whether or not that authority was legitimately exercised.
Private respondents claim that the abolition of the O ce of the Provincial Engineer
is not only constitutionally in rm but also violative of General Order No. 3 issued shortly
after the proclamation of martial law in 1972. Private respondents explain that Section 9,
Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution —
"Sec. 9. All o cials and employees in the existing Government of the
Republic of the Philippines shall continue in o ce until otherwise provided by law
or decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines, but all o cials whose
appointments are by this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate
their respective o ces upon the appointment and quali cation of their
successors." LexLib
has been so framed as to allow the policy and purpose behind General Order No. 3 to
continue, i.e., to consolidate in the hands of the President, the power to appoint, dismiss
and control all o cials of the government, both national and local, in line with the nature
and spirit of martial law. 7 Respondents quote a portion of the Journal of the
Constitutional Convention during its 287th plenary session of 25 November 1972, where
their counsel, Arturo Paci cador, a constitutional convention delegate, stated on the oor
during the discussions on Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, that ". . . the
local government unit who may believe that an o ce they (have) created is no longer
necessary may petition the President to issue a decree abolishing the same, but it will be
beyond their power to abolish by themselves said o ce in view of the clear mandate of
the provision of the Constitution." 8
Undoubtedly, Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution did convey an authority
to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the Government, 9 recalling to
mind General Order No. 3 issued on 22 September 1972, but this general provision could
not have meant or envisioned an absolute proscription on local governments, if and when
minded, from themselves creating or abolishing positions, an authority that they
theretofore had under the then existing laws. One such law was Section 18 of Republic Act
No. 5185 (Local Autonomy Act), then still in force, which empowered provincial
governments to create, among other positions, the o ce of a provincial engineer. While
the law did not expressly vest on provincial governments the power to abolish that o ce,
absent, however, any contrary provision, that authority should be deemed embraced by
implication from the power to create it. Section 23 of the Act, in fact, expressed that an
"implied power of a province . . . (should) be liberally construed in its favor" and "(a)ny fair
and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of
local government and it (should) be presumed to exist." cdll
We must rule then that the power of the province of Antique to abolish the o ce in
question did exist at the time.
The real debatable issue focuses on the real reasons behind the questioned action
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of the provincial board. An abolition of o ce is not per se objectionable but this rule
carries a caveat that the act is done in good faith.
We have scrutinized closely the records, most especially in this case, in view of the
disagreement between the trial court and the appellate court on their factual ndings; the
result of our examination is that there, indeed, appears to be evidence to support their own
respective ndings. On the one hand, valid reasons have been shown that tend to
substantiate the need at the time for the abolition of the office in question by the Provincial
Board. Upon the other hand, it cannot be discounted that personal and political motives
did contribute in no small measure in that nal decision of the board. In sum, we see a
situation where the abolition of the o ce could have well been justi ed except for the
convexity of circumstances attendant to the decision process that clearly appear to have
greatly in uenced the nal action taken by the board. We are not prepared, however, to
conclude a clear case of bad faith on the part of respondents. LibLex
Given the peculiar factual settings heretofore expressed, we would have, under
ordinary circumstances, simply issued an order of reinstatement. The Court cannot,
however, close its eyes to the multifarious and signi cant events that have since taken
place on, among other things, the national and local government structures, as well as their
o ces and incumbents; the law itself, both constitutional and statutory; as well as the
personal and other circumstances of concerned parties, including no less than petitioners
and private respondents themselves. It is our considered view that in lieu of an order for
reinstatement of private respondents, an award for backwages, equivalent to ve (5) years
without qualification or deduction, should be paid to said respondents.
The above holding is not without precedent. The Court had an opportunity to
adjudicate similarly in Rubio, et al. vs. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, et al.
10 There, the petitioners, who were issued original and permanent appointments by the
PHHC in the Multi-Storey Tenement Projects, occupying regular and permanent positions,
were improperly separated from service in 1966 due to an alleged abolition of positions. In
awarding back salaries, in lieu of reinstatement, this Court, speaking through now Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, said: LibLex
"The Court therefore also declares that the Trial Court was correct in
directing reinstatement of the petitioners-employees to their former positions, and
the payment to them of back salaries and other bene ts they would otherwise
have earned.
I n Antiporda vs. Ticao (160 SCRA 40), the Court, citing previous cases, held that
since the reinstatement of an employee unjustly terminated was no longer feasible, the
latter should instead be awarded "backwages equivalent to ve (5) years without
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qualification or deduction."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered ORDERING petitioners, or their incumbent successors in
the Provincial Government of Antique, to cause to be paid to private respondents back
salaries, computed as of the date of their removal, equivalent to ve (5) years without
qualification or deduction. No costs. prLL
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Presided by Judge Celso L. Magsino.
2. Rollo, p. 94.
3. Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez and concurred in by Associate
Justice Delfin Fl. Batacan and Jose B. Jimenez.
4. Rollo, p. 433.
5. Resolution of September 29, 1982; Rollo, p. 437.
6. Rollo, p. 442.
7. Private Respondent's Comment on the Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 258.
8. Rollo, pp. 262-263. The existence of this portion of the Journal of the Constitutional
Convention was belied by petitioner's counsel, former Associate Justice of this Court,
Calixto O. Zaldivar, who appended to petitioner's reply brief, the letter of 1971
Constitutional Convention President Diosdado Macapagal stating that the 287th
plenary session of the Convention was held on November 26, 1972, not on November
25, 1972, that the purported interpellation or speech of Arturo Pacificador during said
plenary session did not occur at all and that there were indeed reports about fabricated
speeches inserted in the Constitutional Convention Journal (Rollo, p. 343).
9. National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration v. Civil Service
Commission, 221 SCRA 145.
10. 185 SCRA 656, 22 May 1990.