The Suffering of The Roma in Serbia Duri PDF

Milovan Pisarri
THE SUFFERING OF THE ROMA IN SERBIA

DURING THE HOLOCAUST
Milovan Pisarri
The Suffering of the Roma in Serbia during the Holocaust
Publisher:
Forum for Applied History, Belgrade
Editing:
Rena Rädle
Review:
Dr. Olga ManojloviÊ Pintar
Translation:
Nataša DiniÊ
Proof reading:
Paul Murray
Design:
Ana Humljan
Prepress:
Dejan DimitrijeviÊ
Cover design:
Rena Rädle
Printing:
KIZ Centar, Belgrade 2014
Print run:
400
The project was supported by Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe.
Original title of the publication: Stradanje Roma u Srbiji za vreme Holokausta

Cover illustration: Linocut by Arpad Balaž from the portfolio Jatagan Mala from 1934,
dim. 29,5×37cm, Inv. No. 1283 from the collection of the Museum of Contemporary Art
in Belgrade. Courtesy of the Museum of Contemporary Art in Belgrade.
The quotation on the book cover is taken from the testimony of Leposava IliÊ from
Jatagan mala published in: Dragoljub AckoviÊ, Romi u Beogradu, Belgrade, 2009,
pp. 250^251.
About the author: Milovan Pisarri (1980) obtained his doctorate in history at the
University of Venice. He deals with the suffering of civilians during the 20th century,
the Holocaust and nationalism with a focus on the Balkans.
Milovan Pisarri
THE SUFFERING OF THE ROMA IN SERBIA
DURING THE HOLOCAUST
Belgrade, 2014
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Structure of the paper, historical sources 13
II. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN EUROPE 17

Attack on the Soviet Union and genocide against the Roma 22
In collaborating countries: Italy, Romania, Independent State of Croatia 25
III. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN SERBIA 35

The April War and instatement of authority 35
Anti-Jewish and anti-Roma legislature 41
The communist uprising 52
Chetniks 55
Battle and situation in the summer of 1941;
formation of “The Government of National Salvation” 57
German reinforcements 62
Jews and Roma: distinct categories for execution 66
The perpetrators 73
IV. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN BELGRADE 77

Instatement of German and quisling authorities 77
Anti-Roma legislative in Belgrade 85
First arrests of the Roma 94
Collecting the Roma from Belgrade and vicinity:
genocide against the Roma 101
At the concentration camp Topovske šupe 110
Executions 116
Internment of women and children 120
Data collection, victims, perpetrators 130
V. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN OTHER SERBIAN CITIES:

CONCISE OVERVIEW 143
Šabac 143
Kragujevac 147
Niš 149
Leskovac and other towns 152
VI. CONCLUSION 155
VII. ARCHIVAL MATERIALS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 165

I. INTRODUCTION
In one of the first substantial studies devoted to genocide against the

Roma,1 journalist and writer Christian Bernadac presents testimonies
of two female concentration camp survivors, because, as he says,
Collecting certain stories and papers on deportation, I reached the
conclusion that the Roma were avoided by all representatives of de-
ported peoples, of which there were around thirty-two or thirty-five.
As an illustration, it is sufficient to refer to some of the rare sentences
mentioning the Roma in the survivors’ testimonies. “Gypsy women,
dirty thieves, utter cowards, crybabies full of vermin...”, “A herd of bo-
hemians, disgustingly dirty, obtuse, thieves...”, “One tall Gypsy, thief
and liar: just like others of his race, all he needed was one cue by an SS
member to become a killer...”.2
The author, in the paragraphs that follow, admits to having felt very
disappointed when he noticed that even writers, university professors
and priests from different countries share the same thoughts, quot-
ing several of their statements from the post-war period. Also, it was
frightening to discover that the massacre of Roma was being ignored.
“How is it possible to forget all those victims, to delete them from
memory?”, he asks himself and others.3
The answer is, of course, not simple, but nonetheless, it should be
acknowledged that, from that moment onwards, especially in recent
1 Christian Bernadac, L’holocauste oublié: les massacre des tsiganes, Éditions

France-Empire, Pasir, 1979. In the present text, the translation into Serbo-Croa-
tian has been used: Zaboravljeni holokaust. Pokolj Cigana, (translated from French
by Selma OruË), Globus, Zagreb, 1981
2 Ibid, p. 18
3 Ibid, p. 19
INTRODUCTION │ 1
years, numerous efforts have been made so as to wrest, at last, the gen-
ocide against the Roma in World War II from the abyss of mass am-
nesia. Essential papers pertaining to this matter which represent the
first significant publication on the suffering of the Roma, appeared
in Great Britain as long ago as 1972, entitled The destiny of Europe’s
Gypsies,4 as well as the book Rassenutopie und Genozid. Die nationalso-
zialistische „Lösung der Zigeunerfrage“5, considered by one of the most
influential experts on the subject of Roma in World War II, Gilad Mar-
galit, to be the most significant work on genocide against the Roma.6
The text that lies before the reader should be interpreted in the
spirit of a “battle against forgetting”.
Writing about unfamiliar topics, opening up new research studies
and asking new questions in historiography is always a difficult task. The
historian who does not have literature at his/her disposal is compelled to
pore over material kept in archives, without any specific indication as to
where to direct one’s attention, where to seek written documents on the
topic s/he is addressing or even whether or not such documents actual-
ly exist. It’s a delicate task, especially when it comes to such a large and
problematic issue as genocide against the Roma in World War II.
Accessing archival resources without prior knowledge brings a risk
that the endeavor might be too great, and results too small; especially
bearing in mind that the rare mentions of suffering of the Roma in ex-
isting scientific papers always underscore the lack of sources for suita-
ble treatment of the topic.
Nevertheless, hope for success and the moral obligation to invest
the greatest extent of commitment in the work must ultimately lead to
4 Donald Kenrick and Grattan Puxon, The destiny of Europe’s Gypsies, Heinemann,
London, 1972
5 Michael Zimmermann, Rassenutopie und Genozid. Die nationalsozialistische
„Lösung der Zigeunerfrage“, Christians, Hamburg, 1996
6 Gilad Margalit, The uniquess of the Nazi persecution of the Gypsies, in Romani stud-
ies, vol 10. no. 2/2000, p. 186. For an overview of the most important works on
genocide against the Roma, see the bibliography at the end of the text.
2 │ THE SUFFERING OF THE ROMA IN SERBIA DURING THE HOLOCAUST

certain answers to the myriad of questions the historian asks him/her-
self before and during research. It is never possible to find an answer
for each question, but this is precisely where the complexity of histor-
ical science lies; truth will never be found in documents alone, a topic
will never be exhausted, it will never be possible to isolate one seg-
ment of history and bind it within the limits of dogmatic statements.
Topics are opened up, nurtured and developed, generating a life of
their own and rousing interest among others, not only those within
the scientific field, but also within the fields of morality, politics and
general understanding.
Holocaust, Roma holocaust, Porajmos?; unlike other mass extermina-
tions in the 20th century, what happened to the Roma in Europe during
World War II has still not been defined distinctively with one specific
term. This fact is sufficient to illustrate the very vague picture that we
have to today regarding the mass, systematic killing of the Roma.
In order to single out the unique National Socialist terror against
Jews from the general legal category of genocide, during the nineteen
fifties, the word Holocaust became more frequent. It was created by
Elie Wiesel, a Jewish survivor. Shortly, however, the same term start-
ed being coined by various scientists so as to define the extermination
of other groups by the Nazis. The expression Holocaust, thus, expand-
ed to include mass killing of “the racially inferior” (Roma), political
and ideological opponents (primarily communists), religious enemies
(Jehovah’s Witnesses) and the undesirable (the disabled, homosexu-
als). In the Serbian language, this term is written in lower case letters,
while capitalization began recently so as to single out the Holocaust
against Jews from holocaust against other groups. Due to existing risk
from banalization of terror against Jews, in western countries (but not
in the Anglo-Saxon world) the term Shoah is now being used more
and more frequently.
It was in mid nineteen-nineties that the extermination of the Roma
was named for the first time. The Roma linguist and activist Ian Han-
cock introduced the word Porajmos (destruction) so as to signify the
INTRODUCTION │ 3
National Socialist policy of extermination of the Roma and the Sinti
in World War II. From then on, the term gained presence, not only in
scientific, but also in political language, even though it cannot yet be
considered fully accepted. Some people, for instance the anthropolo-
gist Michael Stewart, decisively oppose the term because of the mean-
ing it has among the Roma in Eastern Europe.7 In Serbia, the term
Porajmos is not used at all, just mentioned occasionally.
The fact that extermination of the Roma and the Sinti can be de-
fined as genocide in the legal sense, but also as holocaust and ultimate-
ly as Porajmos, has led, in the symbolic sense, to a situation whereby
on the European and Global level there is still no unique manner of
usage for these terms. This becomes evident not only in scientific pa-
pers, but in the language of State and international institutions: for
instance, in September 2012, European MPs proposed that an Inter-
national Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Holocaust against the
Roma be established, while at the International Holocaust Remem-
brance Alliance (IHRA, former ITF) the expression “genocide against
the Roma” is in use.
In Serbia, authors of Roma origin, who belong to the small number
of those devoting their attention to genocide against the Roma, une-
quivocally utilize the term holocaust.8
7 Cf.: Michael Stewart, Remembering without commemoration: The mnemonics and

politics of holocaust memories among European Roma, in The Journal of the Royal An-
thropological Institute, vol. 10, no. 3/2004, pp. 561-582. In certain dialects of the
Romani language, especially those spoken in the Balkan peninsula, the word Po-
rajmos has the same root as many other words, which is why it is brought into re-
lation with several possible meanings, among which are “to open”, “to scream“, “to
deceive”, “to open one’s eyes”, “to set up a tent” etc. One of the meanings which
makes the word Porajmos unsuitable and even offensive for definition of genocide
against the Roma and the Sinti is “rape”. Therefore, other words have been sug-
gested, among which the most frequently used is “Samudaripen” i.e. “mass killing”
or “all killed”. The term was first coined by the linguist Marcel Courthiade.
8 The best known authors, thanks to whom the issue of genocide against the Roma
has received at least some attention in the public, are Dragoljub AckoviÊ and Raj-
ko –uriÊ. Their works have been used in the present text.

Nevertheless, the lack of suitable definition impacts on marking
the remembrance of genocide. In the year 2009, the Roma National
Congress and International Romani Union proposed the introduction
of a ‘Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust against the Roma/ Pora-
jmos’, selecting the 2nd of August as the date, in remembrance of the
day when the last 2,897 prisoners at the concentration camp for the
Roma in Auschwitz were executed. As already mentioned, in Septem-
ber 2012 at the European Parliament, MPs proposed that an ‘Interna-
tional Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Holocaust against the
Roma’ be established. Although the European Parliament has not yet
released an official statement, that date is already being commemo-
rated in some countries. In addition to the central commemoration
in Auschwitz, this date is being marked, for example, in neighboring
Croatia where, in Uštica next to Jasenovac, the first commemoration
took place on the 2nd of August 2012, in the presence of representa-
tives of Roma communities from the country and the region, as well
as Croatian state officials. Elsewhere, however, a different date has
been chosen. In Serbia, for instance, the Day of Remembrance of the
Roma killed in World War II is marked on the 16th of December, in
memory of that date in 1942, when Himmler ordered the systematic
deportation of Roma to concentration camps and their extermination.
In 2010, a commemoration was held at Arapova dolina near Leskovac,
followed in 2011 by one at Bežanijska Kosa near Belgrade, and in 2012
and 2013 near the memorial complex in the village of Jabuka, close to
PanËevo. Those commemorations had, unfortunately, more of a pri-
vate rather than public character, usually attended by representatives
of the government, Roma communities and local community, as well
as descendants of the victims. Additionally, upon the initiative of local
Roma associations, the 11th of December each year, at the monument
devoted to victims from Leskovac and the vicinity (located at Arapo-
va Dolina), a commemoration is held in memory of the firing squad
shooting that the occupational forces, strengthened by the quislings,
executed on the 11th of December 1941, when 310 civilians were shot,
of which 293 were Roma.
INTRODUCTION │ 5
The case is similar with memorialization as part of monument cul-
ture. Namely, it is rare to find monuments dedicated to the Roma in
Europe. It was only on the 24th of October 2012, in Berlin, that the first
monument to Roma victims9 was unveiled near the Reichstag, where
a monument to Jews (unveiled 2005) and homosexual victims of Na-
zism (2008) already located. This fact should not be regarded with any
great surprise since greater interest in the issue of genocide against the
Roma only really began at the beginning of the 1990’s, even though
some people had attempted to address the issue about ten years be-
forehand. Specifically, after the protest of Roma activists in 1980 in
Dachau, who protested because genocide against the Roma was being
negated and the Roma in Germany continuously being discriminated
against (through further use of dossiers drawn up by Nazis during their
rule) in 1982, Germany admitted genocide against the Roma.
In Belgrade, the Serbian city with the most Roma victims, the sole
visible trace of genocide is a plaque set up by the Association of Jewish
Municipalities in Serbia in 2006 at the location of former concentra-
tion camp Topovske šupe, with the inscription:
From August to December of 1941, this place was a Nazi concentration
camp for Jews and Roma people from Belgrade and the Banat region.
All were declared hostages, and each day hundreds were transported
elsewhere to be shot.
Nonetheless, the memory of the Roma victims of genocide is still

alive. Namely, many streets in the vicinity of former concentration
camp Topovske Šupe to this day carry the same names they had in
1941, while the appearance of Marinkova Bara, as well as other parts
of the city from which the Roma were led to their deaths, probably
doesn’t differ much from what it used to be like seventy years ago.
These city districts continue to be poor, inhabited by many Roma. It
9 On diverse polemics around the monument, cf.: Michael Zimmermann, The Ber-
lin Memorial for the Murdered Sinti and Roma: Problems and Points for Discussion,
in Romani Studies, vol. 17, no. 1/2007, pp. 1-30.

is possible that descendants of victims or even survivors are among
today’s residents.
Genocide against the Roma is a historical phenomenon which en-
compasses the period from 1934 to 1945, i.e. the period from introduc-
tion of first anti-Roma measures in Nazi Germany up until the end of
World War II.
As in the case of anti-Semitism, there already existed a long tra-
dition of anti-Gypsyism in Europe. Since the Middle Ages, in differ-
ent European countries, the Roma and the Sinti have been subjected
to segregation, persecution, even massacres; in the 19th century, race
theories were created which view the Roma as a lower race and rep-
resented the groundwork for a theory whereby the Roma were con-
sidered criminals by nature. However, just like in the case of Jews,
their systematic mass destruction occurred later on, during National
Socialism. In interpreting the circumstances that enabled this, it is
worth referring to Zygmunt Bauman’s book Modernity and the Holo-
caust.10 From the mid-thirties of 20th century, based on existing laws
from Weimar Germany, which, among other things, envisaged con-
stant police control over Roma and Sinti, the National Socialists be-
gan the selection of Roma and Sinti to be sent to concentration camps
in Dachau, Dieselstrasse, Sachsenhausen, Marzahn and Vennhausen.
Unlike in the case of the Holocaust, the Nazis had a clear picture
of the fate of Roma and Sinti as early as 1938. This year is considered
to mark the commencement of “the final solution to the Gypsy issue”
in Germany. As foreigners, and “by nature” dangerous criminals (thus
a menace to Aryan pureness of the German race) the Roma began
being subjected to mass imprisonment and transportation to various
concentration camps. In addition, they started being subjected to ster-
ilization. The year 1940 saw the start of mass deportation of German
Roma and Sinti to occupied Poland, where Germans established a so-
10 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell University Press, New
York, 1989
INTRODUCTION │ 7
called General Protectorate. That same year, the poisonous gas Zyklon
B was tested on a group of 250 Roma children, later to be used in gas
chambers. With the German invasion of the USSR, Einsatzgruppen,
that is - special squads comprising mostly SS members, were ordered
to exterminate communists, Jews and “dangerous elements”; a phrase
‘specific’ enough for the commencement of the killings of the Roma.
That is when mass firing squad shootings started operating in entire
Eastern Europe, but many Roma, such as, for instance, around 5.000
who had been imprisoned at the Łódź ghetto, were murdered in mo-
bile gas chambers (dushegubkas). Starting from 1942, the Roma were
imprisoned at almost all of the most notorious death camps, often hav-
ing various experiments performed on them, such as those Mengele
carried out in Auschwitz.
As it can be assumed, the fates of Roma and that of the Jews were
often shared. Consequently, the study of mass extermination of Roma
is in many cases an accompanying issue of the Holocaust, in the sense
that the suffering of the Roma is mentioned as part of research and
papers devoted to the Jews. Partial explanation lies in the fact that, ac-
cording to National Socialist plans, both groups had to be wiped off the
face of the earth, so they had the same fate, not only in the legislative
system, but also on the issue of ghettoization, mass executions and kill-
ings in death camps. If we take Serbia as an example: it was mandatory
for the Roma to wear yellow badges (with the letters “Gypsy” on them),
to go into forced labour, and to abstain from public life. Later, male
Roma were interned at Topovske Šupe in Belgrade, at Crveni Krst in
Niš and elsewhere, where they were killed in mass retaliations during
Autumn of 1941. Ultimately, Roma women and children were interned
at Sajmište, although most were released after a certain period.
The fact that the issue of persecution of the Roma is almost always
linked to persecution of Jews, prevents it from being treated as an au-
tonomous subject of scientific research, and consequently as a histor-
ical phenomenon that should be contemplated independently of other
events.

The necessity for such a standpoint was underscored almost fifteen
years ago by Gilad Margalit. Although the Jewish narrative is frequently
the same as the case of Roma, it should nonetheless be pointed out that
there are salient differences between them. Specifically, both have their
particular characteristics on the basis of which they can be defined as
“distinct”.11 The presumption that “race”, which was commonly given
as the reason for extermination of the Jews and of Roma, is sufficient
in their interpretation, does not allow, in the case of Roma, for numer-
ous other aspects to be taken into consideration that differentiate them
from the compact and consistent process of decision making that was
made in relation to the total elimination of Jews. Nazi policy towards
the Roma was often confusing, at some moments even “romantic”. The
main difference is that Jews were considered responsible for an attempt
to take control of the world, mobilizing, at the same time, communism
and western plutocracy. The war against the Soviet Union was thought
to be, among other things, a war against Jews. In the Holocaust itself,
anti-Semitic ideology was a more important component than biological
racism, i.e. than the threat of Jews defiling the German race.12
This step is necessary towards the aim of affirming distinctiveness
of the phenomenon of Roma suffering, through analysis of the Roma
before the war and especially afterwards, up until today. In brief,
even though in the methodological sense it is useful to study genocide
against the Roma together with the Holocaust, it must not, as a phe-
nomenon, remain in its “shadow”. It is clear that this step is of a purely
scientific nature and must not cross that boundary; genocide against
the Roma must therefore not be viewed separately, with the aim of a
value comparison with the Holocaust, i.e. in order to determine whose
suffering was greater and more horrible, since in such a manner a dan-
gerous political relativizing would be made of both one and the other
phenomenon.
11 Gilad Margalit, ibid., p. 188

12 Ibid, p. 193
INTRODUCTION │ 9
Concerning genocide against the Roma in Serbia, there are only
fragmentary traces which most frequently appear and are repeated in
scientific works devoted to other, kindred topics, such as and above all
the Holocaust. Although this issue has been addressed by historiog-
raphy in Serbia rather seldom and superficially,13 and despite the fact
that certain authors attempted to include suffering of the Jews in the
category of significant topics worthy of permanent attention, it can be
noticed that since the very outset of their prominence in the public
sphere, the Roma have been relegated to a place which has, to a cer-
tain extent, always been secondary in relation to the suffering of the
Jews. Accordingly, in the publication Crimes of Fascist Occupiers and
their Collaborators against Jews in Yugoslavia, published by the Associ-
ation of Jewish Municipalities in Yugoslavia as long ago as 1952,14 we
come across mention of the Roma in connection with mass executions
at the village Jabuka (Autumn 1941), with concentration camps at Top-
ovske šupe and at Sajmište in Belgrade, since in all those cases the fate
of Roma population was very similar to the fate of Jews.
Other papers in historiography which dealt, in the subsequent
years and especially in the past decade, with the issue of the Holo-
caust do not differ much from the above mentioned standpoint. Ex-
actly forty-four years ago, the monograph Terror and Crimes of Nazi
Germany in Serbia 1941Ω1944,15 was published in which the second
chapter is directly devoted to suffering of Jews and Roma (entitled
“Persecution and annihilation of Jews and Gypsies“). Unfortunately,
genocide against the Roma has remained a phenomenon mentioned
only alongside other topics, and has not become the subject of deeper
13 On historiography and the Holocaust in Yugoslavia and Serbia, cf.: Jovan Δuli-
brk, Istoriografija Holokausta u Jugoslaviji, Institut za teološka istraživanja, Bel-
grade, 2011
14 Zdenko Levental (ed.), ZloËini fašistiËkih okupatora i njihovih saradnika protiv Je-
vreja u Jugoslaviji, Savez jevrejskih opština Jugoslavije, Belgrade, 1952
15 Venceslav GlišiÊ, Teror i zloËini nacistiËke NemaËke u Srbiji 1941Ω1944, Institut za
istoriju radniËkog pokreta Srbije, Belgrade, 1970

analysis in its own right. The same fleeting traces of genocide against
the Roma can be found in one of the first publications on suffering of
Yugoslav Jews that was published as late as 1980, entitled Jews of Yu-
goslavia 1941Ω1945. Victims of Genocide and Participants of the Nation-
al Liberation War.16 Although the focus of attention is the suffering of
Jews in all parts of Yugoslavia, there are occasional mentions of the
Roma suffering. The situation did not change much during the nine-
teen-nineties nor since the year 2000, because despite the fact that
works dealing with the Holocaust have expanded and deepened their
research (opening up new significant issues) genocide against the
Roma has been regarded as just an occasional new piece in the overall
mosaic. In the book “German Concentration Camp at Belgrade Fair-
grounds 1941Ω1944”,17 published in 1992 (which to this day represents
a seminal work in the study of the Holocaust in Serbia) for the first
time the issue of Roma suffering and its scope is raised clearly, as well
as implications as to how significant, but also neglected, the issue ac-
tually is. Unfortunately, despite this example, the overall trend where-
by it is again considered an accompanying issue to the suffering of the
Jews has continued in this publication, thus failing to rouse interest in
further research studies.
It was not until the year 2006 that an article by a younger gener-
ation historian drastically shifted perceptions towards this issue: six-
ty-five years after the commencement of genocide against the Roma in
Serbia, The Roma in the Jewish Concentration Camp Zemun 1941Ω194218
is the title of the paper by Danijela JovanoviÊ, whose greatest merit is
that the paper directly addresses genocide against the Roma, without
16 Jaša Romano, Jevreji Jugoslavije 1941Ω1945. Žrtve genocida i uËesnici Narodnooslo-

bodilaËkog rata, Jevrejski istorijski muzej, Belgrade, 1980
17 Milan Koljanin, NemaËki logor na beogradskom sajmištu 1941Ω1944, Institut za
savremenu istoriju, Belgrade, 1992
18 Danijela JovanoviÊ, Romi u Jevrejskom logoru Zemun 1941Ω1942, Balkanski knji-
ževni glasnik, 5/2006 (www.balkanliteraryherald.com/broj5/danijelajovano-
vic5.htm, last accessed: 9 April 2014
INTRODUCTION │ 11
mediation of the Holocaust or other topics that are already present in
historiography. The significance of this paper does not lie necessari-
ly in the utilization of new materials from archives or elsewhere, but
in the shift of perspective that had previously been used to approach
such familiar materials: laws on race, concentration camps, execu-
tions that encompassed not only Jews but also the Roma in occupied
Serbia, especially in Belgrade, were now being read from the stand-
point of Roma victims. For the first time the frightening fact surfaced
that there is an enormous group of people in Serbia who had been the
victims of racial persecution, yet who have been forgotten by all, not
only institutions, but also by historians, sociologists, anthropologists
and other members of the scientific and cultural elites.
The sole exception to this trend are authors of Roma descent, who
have grappled with the issue of genocide in publications of wider
scope. In particular, Dragoljub AckoviÊ should be singled out with the
books Ašunen Romalen! Listen up people! and The Roma in Belgrade, as
well as Rajko –uriÊ, with his book History of the Holocaust of Roma,
published in collaboration with the historian Antun MiletiÊ.19
The present text that lies before the reader should also be consid-
ered in continuity with the article by Danijela JovanoviÊ, whose plea
we accept and support in its entirety:
This paper certainly provides just a partial answer to the many que-
stions that exist in relation to this topic. I hope that in the entire
Balkan peninsula a bit of effort will be invested in answering these
questions as well as that the work will not be taken on solely by Roma
associations.20
19 Dragoljub AckoviÊ, Ašunen Romalen! Slušajte ljudi!, Rominterpress, Belgrade,

1996; and Romi u Beogradu. Istorija, kultura i tradicija Roma u Beogradu od naselja-
vanja do kraja XX veka, Rominterpress, Belgrade, 2009. Rajko –uriÊ and Antun
MiletiÊ, Istorija Holokausta Roma, Politika AD, Belgrade, 2008
20 Danijela JovanoviÊ, ibid., last accessed: 9 April 2014

Structure of the paper, historical sources
Taking as a starting point the fact that this is the first research from
an archival institutions which aims to study of a topic that has been
almost disregarded up until now, the present paper is divided into cer-
tain sections which can be read independently.
In the first section, the wider European context is considered,
above all on the ideological plane. This is where National Socialist
policy towards the Roma is presented, its implementation in the Third
Reich and occupied territories, as well as similar policies in collabo-
rating countries (Italy, Croatia, Romania). In writing the first chapter,
both foreign and local literature has been used, since in the recent
years this topic has gained attention and sources have become availa-
ble (at least partly) in Serbia.
The second section addresses the situation in Serbia. Although it
would be significant, the decision was not to take into account the po-
sition of Roma in pre-war Serbia, taking instead, as the starting point,
the disintegration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and establishing of
occupation and quisling apparatuses after the 6th of April 1941; the
policy of those apparatuses towards the Roma and anti-Roma meas-
ures and, ultimately, the carrying out of genocide. In this section also,
most use was made of literature of general interest and partly archival
materials.
The third section is devoted to genocide against the Roma in Bel-
grade, and could be said to represent the core of the entire paper. Based
on research in archival institutions in Belgrade, it was possible to re-
construct, with a substantial degree of certainty, the phases of Roma
suffering and, for the most part, to let the victims “speak for them-
selves”. Relations between German and quisling authorities, the issue
of victims and perpetrators, restitution, are also at least partly present-
ed. The materials used originate from three main archives. The fourth
archive, the Archive of Serbia, even though it surely contains signifi-
cant material pertaining to genocide against the Roma in Serbia, was
INTRODUCTION │ 13
not possible to take into account because of the lack of time. We hope
that those materials will be the subject of further research which will
complete, alter, expand or critique the present paper.
The Archive of Yugoslavia, at the archival fund of the State Com-
mission for Determining the Crimes of Occupiers and their Collab-
orators (fund no. 110), is where the most valuable material is to be
found. It contains numerous statements, around eight hundred, col-
lected by local branches of the commission in 1945 from Roma wom-
en survivors whose husbands, sons, fathers, brothers and friends had
been killed in the genocide. Many of these women were also victims
of persecution, since almost all had been interned at the concentration
camp at Sajmište, but survived due to the possibility of release.21
The work of occupation and quisling bodies, primarily of the City
of Belgrade Municipality and the City of Belgrade Administration, has
been examined via materials kept at the City of Belgrade Archives and
at the Military Archives.
One of the significant results of this research work is the fact that
after more than seventy years since these events Ω throughout which
time the sentence “there are no materials on genocide against the
Roma” has been frequently repeated by historians Ω it is now possible
to draw up a list of victims from Belgrade, which will, at least in the
most modest and most simple manner, honour all the victims; wrest-
ing them from obscurity and placing them, at last, side by side with
other victims.
Accurate lists of killed and surviving Roma, if the issue were to be
pursued further, could be compared to other lists. Knowing, for in-
stance, that based on the statements in the State Commission for De-
termining the Crimes of Occupiers and their Collaborators collected
after the war, many Roma had held jobs as coach-drivers, it is possi-
ble to compare their names with the names of the Horse-Drawn Cab
and Ox-Drawn Cart Drivers Association of Belgrade members, kept at
21 The chapter on genocide in Belgrade will provide more details on this.

the fund of the same name in the City of Belgrade Archive. In such a
manner, which, of course, demands careful and thorough work, ad-
ditional important details can be found in the complex endeavor of
reconstructing their lives, or better still, their social and economic po-
sition in Belgrade at the time. In the present paper, the comparison of
those data had not been planned, simply due to lack of time. Therefore
we leave such a possibility to subsequent works, in the same spirit with
which we compiled this first, more encompassing text on genocide
against the Roma in Belgrade and Serbia i.e. in the hope that it will
pave the way for various questions and that others will accept them
as suggestions, stimuli or moral obligations to continue studying this
topic. This means that part of the work devoted to Belgrade should be
considered a case study, whose applied methodology can serve for oth-
er case studies, which would, for example, address genocide against
the Roma in other Serbian towns, by approaching the issue in a proper
manner, i.e. by local history taking on the responsibility for research,
study and public presentation of the genocide.
In the fourth and final section, and for the very reason previously
mentioned, already known cases are presented, without greater pre-
tensions and with the aid of existing literature, in which Roma were
victims of genocide in other towns of Serbia. This section should be
considered a kind of appendix, intended to show the scope of genocide
in the country through certain examples, on the one hand, while on
the other as possible groundwork for exploration on the local level. It
is understood that cases taken into account should by no means be
considered the only ones that are known about.
As in every scientific publication, what follows then is the conclusion.
In this paper, no use at all (or rare use) has been made of testimo-
nies by Roma survivors or eyewitnesses collected thanks to some initi-
atives since the mid-eighties. Consequently, special significance lies in
the methodological approach of oral history, based on which a certain
part of testimonies by Roma who have survived genocide has been
collected in previous years. USHMM was among the first who began
INTRODUCTION │ 15
collecting interviews with Roma survivors in various parts of Europe,
including Serbia.22
In Belgrade, during the mid-eighties, Milan Koljanin and Milena
RadojËiÊ had conversations with three male Roma survivors. Their
testimonies can be found in the Historical Archive of the City of Bel-
grade and, to this day, represent the richest source of information on
genocide against the Roma in Belgrade.
Another example of oral history is the work of Paul Polansky, who
published, in 2007, three volumes of testimonies by Yugoslav Roma
survivors. The entire first volume is devoted to the Roma from Niš
and contains over twenty interviews. The remaining two volumes deal
with other parts of Yugoslavia. The suffering of the Roma in Niš and
Leskovac has been portrayed in short documentary films, “This Life,
it’s a Gift I got” and “11 December 1941. Mass Execution”.
The immense potential that exists in the abovementioned and sim-
ilar initiatives with the aim of reviving the issue of genocide against
the Roma in Serbia, lies in the fact that, although they cannot be con-
sidered reliable sources, (at least not at this moment in a strictly his-
toriographical sense) they certainly are living proof of what has been
kept aside up until now, what has constantly been forgotten or ig-
nored. In that sense, the explosive force they possess should become
part of the everyday and permanent honoring of the suffering of the
Roma in this region, wherever possible: on the internet, in the future
memorial at Sajmište, in other publications, in school textbooks, in
the media and in culture.
22 The interviews can be found at www.ushmm.org.

II. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA
IN EUROPE
At the moment when the first measures against the Roma and the Sinti
in Nazi Germany were made public, anti-Gypsyism, just like anti-Sem-
itism, had already existed for a long time, not only in the Third Reich,
but also in many other European countries. In various works on geno-
cide against the Roma (following the narrative of the Holocaust), the
authors’ starting point is often an engrained anti-Gypsyism, used to ex-
plain the motivation to the last, most atrocious act carried out by Nazis.
Christian Bernadac, for example, speaks concisely but clearly about
crimes perpetrated against the Roma in various parts of Europe dur-
ing the previous nine centuries, claiming that it was this very “prima-
ry intoxication” that paved the way for genocide against the Roma in
World War II. Being French, he primarily speaks about examples from
France Ω the king’s proclamation against “Bohemians” from the year
1682, for instance,1 but also from other countries: mass deportation to
Louisiana in America (France 1802), taking away children from the
Roma (Germany 1830), enforced exile by force of arms (Great Brit-
ain 1912), the ban on Roma language and clothing (several regions in
France, Spain, Portugal), prohibition of marriages among the Roma,
prohibition of nomadism, automatic enslavement (Romania), annul-
ling marriages between Roma and non-Roma (Hungary), confiscating
property, ban on ownership of horses and carriages, banning the per-
forming of certain jobs, buying houses (Portugal), mandatory showing
1 Christian Bernadac, Zaboravljeni holokaust. Pokolj Cigana, Globus, Zagreb, 1981,

p. 24
GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN EUROPE │ 17

of anthropological identity card (France), plan for branding (Hungary)
or sterilization (Norway 1930), and, of course, The Law against the
“Gypsy Menace” in Germany from December 1939.2 According to the
same author, gas chambers were the sole innovation.
That anti-Gypsyism had played a certain part, this is beyond doubt.
However, it certainly wasn’t sufficient to start up the entire machinery
of death, which, in the subjugated Europe, devoured the lives of hun-
dreds of thousands of Roma.
In 1899, the functionary Alfred Dillman established “The Service
for Information on Gypsies”3 in Munich as part of the police service.
Six years later, he published The Book about Gypsies (Zigeuner-Buch),
in which 3,500 Roma from the Munich county were registered. Twen-
ty-one years later, after destruction and annihilation wrought by World
War I, Bavarian authorities introduced special measures in the battle
against “Gypsies, drifters and freeloaders”, which spread, three years
later, to the entire Weimar Republic territory. They envisaged specific
restrictions in movement, introduction of specific documents, assigned
time that could be spent in each location, as well as police control over
them; offences were to be punished by two years of forced labour.4
With Hitler’s accession to power, the Nazis took up existing laws
on the Roma. In 1936, within the Ministry of Health in Berlin, “The
Institute for Research on Racial Hygiene and Biology of the Popula-
tion” was founded, which became the major Nazi body for studying
the Roma. At the moment of founding, its chief, the psychiatrist Rob-
ert Ritter, received from the Service of Munich 19,000 already drawn
up dossiers. What followed were genealogical examinations and the
Roma census, which encompassed 20,000 persons in February 1941,
and 30,000 people in the Spring of 1942 Ω almost the entire Roma
2 Ibid, p. 30
3 Ibid, pp. 35Ω36;
4 Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial State. Germany
1933-1945, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003 (ninth printing), pp.
114-115

population of Germany at that time.5 Ritter’s thesis was that the Roma
and the Sinti had come from India, but that their original Aryan back-
ground had been lost, since during the centuries they had mixed with
the inhabitants of those territories where they settled. From a pure
race they had thus become an inferior one. This category, according to
Ritter, contained over 90 percent of the Roma in Germany. Pertaining
to the asocial and criminal behaviours attributed to the Roma up until
then, Ritter offered as an explanation the impact of racial character-
istics: simply, their genes were responsible for it. As a way to combat
that “problem”, Ritter proposed confinement and sterilization of the
most dangerous elements.6
The key year for the Roma was in 1936, when the Research Insti-
tute for Racial Hygiene was established. From that moment onwards,
the position of the Roma was regulated on the national level: they
were ordered to take up permanent residence in one place, while plac-
es were often designated that were kept under special control; some-
thing which had happened previous year but only at a local level.
They were also sent to forced labour, while being denied social wel-
fare. That same year anti-Roma measures gained a clearer racist tone,
where from the Roma were considered a foreign element in the Ger-
man national body.
In July 1936, during the lead-up to the Olympic Games, the hunt for
the Roma began in Berlin. Around 600 of them were evicted from their
homes and banished to the outskirts, then rounded up at the concen-
tration camp Marzahn.7 At the same time, about 500 Roma from Ba-
varia were sent to Dachau for re-education and “possible sterilization”.
In July 1937, the “Central Office for Fighting the Gypsy Menace”
was founded.
5 Christian Bernadac, ibid., p. 36

6 Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, ibid., pp. 119-120
7 Luca Bravi, Lo sterminio degli zingari, in Alessandra Chiappano and Fabio Mi-
nazzi (eds.), Il paradigma nazista dell’annientamento. La Shoah e gli altri stermini,
Giuntina, Firenze, 2006, p. 113

A year later, the Gauleiter of Styria, Tobias Portschy, who considered
the issue of Roma more urgent than that of the Jews, stated that “all
Gypsies (should be sent) to concentration camps for forced labour, since
they are a danger to German racial purity, and because a developed state
such as the Third Reich can have solely those who are working and pro-
ducing as its inhabitants”.8 His book The Gypsy Issue (Die Zigeunerfrage)
was a kind of foundation for racial persecution of the Roma, which made
it to the agenda of National Socialist political rulers in 1938.
From the research by Dr. Ritter and his assistant Eva Justin, con-
ducted at the concentration camp at Marzahn (and other places desig-
nated for the Roma), Himmler drew his most significant conclusions,
resulting in him issuing the key decree9 on the racist interpretation of
future policy towards the Roma. In such a manner, on the 8th of De-
cember 1938, he issued a circular notice in connection with the battle
against the “Gypsy Menace”. The Mischlinge, i.e. “impure” Roma, of
which, according to Ritter’s notions, represented over 90 percent of
the entire Roma population in Germany, were the focus of attention.
The orders were to carry out a registration of all Roma, while Ger-
mans were forbidden to marry them. In addition, a special law on the
Roma was proposed which would regulate their position within Ger-
man living space. For the first time, the expression “final solution to
the Gypsy issue” 10 appeared.
The Roma were then officially allocated to certain categories: “Z”
(Zigeuner), that is Ω pure blooded Roma, “ZM+” for those who had
over 50 percent of Roma blood, “ZM” for those who had half of Roma
blood, “ZM-” for those who had less than 50 percent of Roma blood
and, finally, “NZ” or non-Roma.
8 Christian Bernadac, ibid., p. 35; Michael Zimmermann, The National Socialist

„Solution of the Gypsy Question“, in Ulrich Herbert, National Socialist Extermi-
nation Policies. Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies, Berghahn
Books, 2000, p. 196
9 Luca Bravi, ibid., pp. 113-115
10 Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, ibid., pp. 120-121

These divisions, in the chaos of commands and conceptions in force
among Nazi leaders on the issue of Roma, was not always respected. At
the moment of mass deportation to Auschwitz, in 1943, the difference
between “pure” and mixed Roma was not taken into account.11
Himmler’s orders represented a key historical moment since they
meant a definitive shift from a policy towards the Roma based on a
socio-geographical view of them as a foreign body in German com-
munity, to the racist-biological notion that Roma are an inferior race.12
At the conference on racial policy organized by the RSHA chief Hey-
drich on the 21st of September 1939, it was decided that all Roma from
Germany, just like Jews, were to be relocated to Poland. In that same
period, Roma women began being subjected to sterilization for the
purposes of preventing their further reproduction.
It is noteworthy at this stage to point out that since the 19th cen-
tury, i.e. since the creation of modern race theories, none of the race
theorists ascribed to the Roma the wish to dominate Germany or the
Christian world, unlike the Jews, and no-one seemed overly interest-
ed in creating a race theory on the Roma.13 Similarly, unlike anti-Se-
mitic propaganda, anti-Gypsyism wasn’t overly present in discussions
among Nazi leaders. The Nazi attitude towards the Roma was not
always of purely racial type, since they were primarily regarded as
a “social problem” for the German national community, only being
considered a racial issue14 later, since the year 1938. That same year,
around 2,300 Roma and Sinti from Germany and Austria were arrest-
ed and interned at various concentration camps as “asocial”, but with
the official explanation that this action represented a preventive bat-
tle against crime. Nonetheless, due to protest by Governor-General of
Poland, Hans Frank, the operation was suspended.
11 Luca Bravi, ibid., p. 115

12 Michael Zimmermann, The National Socialist..., p. 194
13 Ibid, p. 189
14 Ibid, pp. 193Ω194

Attack on the Soviet Union and genocide
against the Roma
According to Nazi principles from the end of the thirties, the behavior of
social groups had their roots in biological and genetic factors. The Roma
were divided into two categories: so-called “Mischlinge”, i.e. persons of
mixed blood, who had strayed from their original biological nature, and
pure blooded Roma, who hadn’t mixed with other peoples and who kept
their pureness by remaining as nomads. In occupied territories, howev-
er, the inverse policy was applied, so that most suffering befell nomadic
Roma, while there were less victims among the permanent residents.15
This phenomenon was the result of the picture created about nomads
just before and during the German attack on the Soviet Union; since at
the time they had been represented as dangerous for German security,
as enemy agents. The very reasons that led to the radicalization of un-
derstanding and the adopted solution to “the Gypsy issue” were the war
against the Soviet Union and the extermination of Jews.
Although there was no specific command which envisaged the ex-
termination of Roma on the territory of the Soviet Union, the Einsatz-
gruppen probably interpreted Hitler’s directives on killing all political
commissaries of the Soviet army and all potential dangerous elements
as sufficient for killing of “asocial” Roma as well. Einsatzgruppen A,
B, C weren’t systematically targeted at the Roma, but nevertheless it
resulted in around 3,500 of them being killed in Baltic countries. Ein-
satzgruppe D also killed between 2,000 and 2,400 Roma on the terri-
tory under its jurisdiction.16. In the report by that Einsatzgruppe dated
the 8th of April 1942, they proudly claimed that up until that moment
in the Crimea 92,000 Jews, Crimeans and Roma were killed and that
in the entire peninsula there is not one Roma left.17
15 Michael Zimmermann, The Wehrmacht and the National Socialist persecution of

the Gypsies, in Romani studies, vol. 11, no. 2/2001, pp. 111Ω112
16 Michael Zimmermann, The National Socialist..., p. 201
17 Guenter Lewy, The Nazi persecution of the Gypsies, Oxford University Press, New
York, 2000, p. 121

In the Soviet Union, the nomadic Roma were regarded as danger-
ous primarily because of their movement across war territories, where
they were able to convey important information and act as “spies”. The
Roma nomads which Einsatzgruppen came across were therefore treat-
ed as enemies and killed:18 even though unlike Jews and communists,
at least in that moment, they didn’t belong to the category of Germany’s
arch-enemies. The difference between nomads and those able to prove
permanent residence was based on the very idea that nomads could be
a threat due to espionage. A similar concept and differentiation of those
categories of Roma was also applied in the occupied Serbia.
It was this stereotypical attitude concerning Roma “spies” that was
the reason for the first mass deportation in May 1940 from north-west-
ern parts of the Reich in the lead-up to the attack against France.19 In a
way, France was ahead of the Third Reich in solving the “Gypsy issue”,
at least temporarily. Two months before Marshal Petain signed the ca-
pitulation on the 17th of June 1940, the prefects received instructions
whereby a rounding up and imprisonment of the Roma20 was to follow.
In numerous concentration camps 3,000 French Roma were interned.21
It was not until July 1942 that the Ministry for the Occupied East-
ern Territories deliberated on the order that all Roma, regardless of
whether they were nomads or permanent residents, must be made
equal with Jews. However, for reasons unknown to this day, after a
year the decision was partly changed and instead of extermination of
the Roma, it was proposed that they instead be interned. It was not
until the 15th of November 1943 that the final text of the order was is-
sued, in which a differentiation between the Roma remained, but ac-
cording to which they were to be treated the same way, regardless of
18 Ibid, p. 118
19 Michael Zimmermann, The Wehrmacht..., pp. 115-116
20 Christian Bernadac, ibid., pp. 40-41. On pages 44-47, the author published the
decree dated 6 April 1940 which forbids the movement of nomads during war
operations and prescribes forced lodging for them under police supervision.
21 Denis Peschanski, The Gypsies in the Upheaval, in Roma and Sinti. Under-Studied Vic-
tims of Nazism. Symposium Proceedings, USHMM, Washington D.C., 2002, pp. 55-56

whether they are traveling Roma or “Mischlinge”, and they were to be
made equal with Jews.22
Despite this, because of the chaotic and incoherent Nazi policy to-
wards the Roma, many had already become victims of “the final solu-
tion”. In January 1942, the first Roma were gassed at the concentration
camp at Chelmno. The victims were Austrian Roma, who had earlier
been deported to the Łódź ghetto. In nearby Latvia, an important role
was played by the special quisling squad under the command of Vik-
tors Arājs, which was killing Roma and Jews.23 As early as the 4th of
December 1941, the Reichskommissar for Baltic countries issued the
command whereby the Roma were made equal with Jews, since they
represent a twofold threat: as carriers of dangerous diseases, especially
typhoid, and as disobedient elements which don’t listen to German or-
ders and refuse to take up useful jobs. Also, they became the subject of
serious suspicion that they were working as agents against Germany.24
In that same period in Serbia, male Roma, together with male
Jews, were the victims of mass executions applied by German occu-
pation forces as retaliation for partisan combat, whereas women and
children, at least from Belgrade, were interned at the concentration
camp in Sajmište.
In his journal, Himmler wrote on the 20 of April 1942 that the ex-
termination of Roma should be discontinued everywhere. The ques-
tion arises as to why he did this and what was the significance of this
command, considering that the killing continued all the way up until
the end of the war. According to some historians, Himmler’s order
was connected to the release of 292 Roma from Sajmište, while others
consider these two things unrelated, since release of the Roma from
Sajmište had started earlier, while killing those from concentration
camps began as early as March of that same year.25
22 Guenter Lewy, ibid., p. 127

23 Ibid., p. 123
24 Ibid., pp. 123Ω124
25 Gilad Margalit, ibid., p. 207

In September 1942, Goebbels decided that “the asocial life of Jews
and Gypsies should simply be destroyed”. Up to that moment, it seems
that the idea about total annihilation of Roma had not appeared. On
December the 16th 1942, Himmler issued orders that all Roma be de-
ported to Auschwitz. It was a definite turnaround in the policy of per-
secution against the Roma and commencement of mass deportations,
with the aim of their total annihilation.
In Auschwitz, the Roma and the Sinti were interned in a separate
section of the camp, in the so-called “Gypsy camp” (Zigeunerlager)
or “Family camp” (Familienlager), separated from other prisoners. It
was exactly where Doctor Mengele’s laboratories were located, and he
performed most of his experiments on imprisoned Roma. Deported
Roma were mostly from Germany, Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hol-
land, Belgium and northern France, totaling around 23,000. Some-
what over 3,000 survived.26 In addition to Auschwitz, the Roma
suffered in many other death camps, such as Majdanek, Bergen-Bels-
en, Treblinka, Sobibor and Ravensbrück.
In collaborating countries: Italy, Romania,

Independent State of Croatia
It was not just in Germany, that the Roma were victims of special laws;
segregation and even genocide took place in all other fascist countries.
In this paper, it is important to take into consideration the context of the
policy towards the Roma in fascist Italy, i.e. in the country where fascism
was born, as well as in neighboring countries to the west and east of Ser-
bia, since that was where genocide reached destructive dimensions.
In continuity with the policy of liberal Italy, in February 1926, fas-
cism introduced the first serious measures against the Roma, who
were considered from then on to be foreign citizens and, due to their
life-style, a peril to the security and hygiene of the country. In an order
sent to all counties, the Ministry of Internal Affairs prescribed that at
border crossings all Roma caravans should be prevented from entry,
26 Guenter Lewy, ibid., pp. 26Ω27

regardless of whether their passengers own passports and regular doc-
uments or not. Furthermore, it was prescribed that all Roma caravans
that are already present in Italy should be dispatched to border cross-
ings as soon as possible. Italian embassies were ultimately ordered to
stop issuing visas for these “undesirable foreigners”.27
Eleven years later, Chief of Police Arturo Bocchini ordered that all
Roma with Italian citizenship be rounded up in designated places and
be kept under control. The reasons indicated, at first glance, seem mo-
tivated by the similar social stereotypes about the Roma which were
present almost throughout Europe: in particular, that the most severe
crimes perpetrated in north-eastern border regions, in nature and
manner of being committed, could be attributed to the Roma.28
During this period, the influence of the growing racist view of the
Roma in National Socialist Germany was also felt in Italian fascism.
Although race laws adopted in 1938 related solely to Jews, in fascist
newspapers displaying views closer to biological racism, the “Gypsy
race” was also reflected on: nomadism and criminality were consid-
ered racial characteristics of Roma and Sinti.29 Despite the fact that
their Aryan origin had been recognized, their inferior psychological
and moral characteristics were considered dangerous to the purity of
the Italian race.30 In the magazine La difesa della Razza (Protection of
the Race), known for its “scientific” approach to analysis and glorifi-
cation of the Aryan, but also the Italian race, the issue of Roma was
presented as a problem of poisoning true European blood.31
27 The document is published online at www.porrajmos.it, last accessed: 21 March

2014
28 Paola Trevisan, The internment of Italian Sinti in the province of Modena during
fascism: From ethnographic to archival research, in Romani studies, vol. 23, no.
2/2013, p. 143
29 Renato Semizzi, Gli Zingari, in Rassegna di clinica, terapia e scienze affini,
XXXVIII, no. 1/1939, pp. 66Ω67.
30 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
31 Guido Landra, Il problema dei meticci in Europa, in La difesa della Razza, no.
2/1940, pp. 11Ω15

In the lead-up to Italy entering the war, on the 11th of September
1940, Bocchini ordered the internment of resident Roma and Sinti,
because of “their innate tendency towards crime, due to inability to
oversee them otherwise, as well as due to the possibility that there
are elements among them who will organize antinational activities”.32
Places of forced containment and concentration camps for Roma and
Sinti were organized throughout Italy, most of all in Sardinia.33
Scant publications on the relation of Italian fascism towards the
Roma do not provide information about the fate of those Roma who were
on the territory controlled by the Italian Social Republic; a puppet state
proclaimed after the capitulation of Italy in 1943, in the north of Apen-
nine peninsula. Considering the fact that, in this puppet state many reg-
ulations were in force similar to those in the Third Reich and that the
fate of many Jew residents was sealed in death camps across occupied
Europe, it is not difficult to assume that many Roma also suffered there.
On the territory of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Srem, in April
1941, the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was proclaimed under
the leadership of Ante PaveliÊ and the Ustachi movement, whose ide-
ology propagated the idea about ethnically pure Croatia and saw, in
National Socialism and in the Third Reich, the model to be adhered to
in action. Consequently, the “Aryan” Croatian people were to take on
a new role in the Balkans, as well as throughout Europe. Fanatic Ca-
tholicism was also an integral part of Ustachi ideology, which result-
ed in participation of part of the local Catholic priesthood in carrying
out racial policies and propagating Ustachi principles.34 Since the very
beginning, it was clear, as openly said by Ustachi adherents, that a
32 The document is published online at www.porrajmos.it, last accessed: 21st of

March 2014
33 Mirella Karpati, La politica fascista verso gli Zingari in Italia, in Lacio Drom. Ri-
vista bimestrale di studi zingari, no. 2Ω3/1984, pp. 41Ω47. The author published
several testimonies of the Roma who had been in those concentration camps.
34 For more on this, cf.: Marco Aurelio Rivelli, Le génocide occulté: État indépendant
de Croatie, 1941Ω1945, L’Age d’Homme, Losanna, 1998; Viktor Novak, Magnum
Crimen. Pola vijeka klerikalizma u Hrvatskoj, Nakladni zavod Hrvatske, Zagreb,

confrontation would be necessary with other national elements, who
made up almost half of the population of the NDH itself. The biggest
problem, in the eyes of Ustachi, were Serbs, of which there were al-
most two million, around 40,000 Jews, as well as between 26,000 and
40,000 Roma, as opposed to three and a half million Croats, 150,000
Volksdeutsche and 800,000 Muslims, who were counted as Croatian
peoples by the Ustachi.
Since the very proclamation of NDH, basic anti-Semitic and an-
ti-Roma laws were introduced into the new legislative system that had
been in force in the Third Reich. Adapting them to the local situation,
the Ustachi also expanded them to a third racial category which was,
in a way, meant to be eradicated from the “pure Croatian living space”,
meaning Ω the Serbs. On the 30th of April 1941, the “Legal Decree on
Racial Origins“ and “Legal Decree on the Protection of Aryan Blood
and the Honour of the Croatian People” were adopted, regulating the
social status of Jews, Roma, and subsequently Serbs.
In the Law on racial origins, whereby the Croatian people were de-
fined as Aryan, it was stipulated that “for the purposes of this legal de-
cree, a person shall be deemed a Gypsy if he is the descendant of two
or more ancestors twice removed from Gypsies according to race”,35
and the Law on protection of blood banned entry into marriage, i.e.
“mixing” between Aryans and non-Aryans.36
During the month of May, a series of other decrees were issued
against Serbs, Jews and Roma, which led to their complete separation
from the Croatian national body. Unlike Germany, in that same pe-
riod, the first mass murders of Serbs started, as well as the founding
of a network of concentration camps, where alongside Serbs, certain
categories of Jews were also interned. It was during that period that
the first death camp was founded near the town of GospiÊ, at the lo-
1948; Stella Alexander, The tryple myth: a life of archibishop Alojzije Stepinac, East
European Monographs, Boulder 1987
35 Narodne novine, no. 4, 17 April 1941
36 Ibid.

cality Jadovno, which, within four months, together with other linked
subcamps in GospiÊ and Pag island, took the lives of around 40,000
people; the vast majority being Serbs.37 In August 1941, due to the re-
occupation of the region where the camp was located by the Italian
army, the genocidal policy against Serbs and Jews was continued by
the Ustachi at Jasenovac. In that village, just a few hours away from
the capital of Zagreb, a new death camp was built in which, during
its existence, until the end of the war, over 130,000 people met their
death.38
Extermination of Roma population, just like in the case of Serbs
and Jews, was carried out by Ustachi completely autonomously and in-
dependently of German genocidal endeavors in other parts of Europe.
On the 19th of May 1942, Ustachi authorities issued the command to
all territorial units to “round up all Gypsies on the territory of all dis-
tricts and turn them over to district areas which will treat the Gyp-
sies according to the issued order”. Regular army, i.e. “Home Guards”,
helped in that task, which ultimate goal was sending all Roma to Jase-
novac camp.39 At the end of that same month, according to the com-
mand by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, (and as suggested by certain
representatives of Muslims), the Roma of Islamic faith were exempted
from that order, and were to be considered “Aryans” from that mo-
37 On the camp Jadovno, cf.: –uro Zatezalo, Jadovno Ω sistem ustaških logora, Muzej
Žrtava Genocida, Belgrade, 2007
38 The concentration camp Jasenovac has been the subject of severe disputes not
only in Croatian but also in Serbian historiography for two decades. On Jaseno-
vac, cf.: Antun MiletiÊ, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac 1941-1945. Dokumenta, vol.
I and II (1986), vol. III (1987), vol. IV (2007), Narodna knjiga-Gambit, Beograd-
Jagodina; Egon Berger, 44 mjeseca u Jasenovcu, GrafiËki zavod Hrvatske, Zagreb,
1966; Jaša Almuli, Jevreji i Srbi u Jasenovcu, Službeni glasnik, Belgrade, 2009;
Nataša MataušiÊ, Jasenovac 1941-1945. Logor smrti i radni logor, Jasenovac-Zagreb,
2003 and by the same author Jasenovac, fotomonografija (Jasenovac, photo mono-
graph), Spomen podruËje Jasenovac, Jasenovac-Zagreb, 2008; Dragan CvetkoviÊ,
Stradanje civila Nezavisne države Hrvatske u logoru Jasenovac, in Tokovi istorije,
no. 4-2007, pp. 153Ω168
39 Narcisa Lengel-Krizman, Prilog prouËavanju terora u takozvanoj NDH: sudbina
Roma 1941-1945. godine, in »asopis za suvremenu povijest, no. 1/1986, pp. 32-33

ment onwards40. Namely, as early as during the year 1941, Muslim re-
ligious leaders organized a special committee for defense of Muslim
Roma: despite that, not all were saved.41
All other Roma were transported mainly by trains to concentration
camps in larger or smaller groups. Since the daily transported crowds
were too numerous for the camp to accept all, Ustachi grouped them
in the nearby village of Uštice, which was named the “Gypsy concen-
tration camp”. Nonetheless, soon it became clear that not even this
would suffice, so new arrivals were taken directly to Gradina to be
killed where the largest execution field connected to Jasenovac camp
was located.42 At one moment, the procedure of liquidating the Roma
resembled the selection typical for German death camps, since the
arrivals were divided into two groups: the first, consisting of wom-
en, children, the elderly and infirm, was immediately sent into death,
while men capable of work were detained for a certain time in a sep-
arate part of the camp, in the direst conditions, and used for certain
tasks. In July, however, even the men were all killed, so that no Roma
at all remained in Jasenovac, apart from some individual exceptions.43
During that short period, from April until July 1942, between 22,000
and 28,000 Roma were systematically killed.44 For the vast majority,
over 22,000 of them, there identity has been determined.45
To the east of Serbia, terrifying genocide against the Roma was
also unfolding. Just like in the case of NDH, Romania was an inde-
40 Ibid., p. 34
41 Marko Biondich, The Persecution of Roma-Sinti in Croatia 1941-45, in Roma and
Sinti. Under-Studied Victims of Nazism. Symposium Proceedings, USHMM, Wash-
ington D.C., 2002, pp. 37-38
42 Narcisa Lengel-Krizman, Prilog prouËavanju..., pp. 37-38
43 Ibid., pp. 38-39
44 Narcisa Lengel Krizman, Genocid nad Romima, Spomen-podruËje Jasenovac,
Jasenovac-Zagreb, 2003, p. 41
45 Rajko –uriÊ and Antun MiletiÊ, ibid., p. 131. The authors published a list of Roma
victims at the end of the book.

pendent country so the persecution of the Roma was the result of an
internal decision.
In September 1940, after Romania was forced to yield a large part
of its territory to the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria, King Carol
appointed general Antonescu his Prime Minister.
Shortly, Antonescu established a regime with clear fascist traits and
signed an alliance with Germany. The regime immediately showed its
anti-Semitic face. Between 1941 and 1942, numerous laws and regula-
tions against Jews were adopted; already near the end of June 1941, Ro-
manian authorities carried out a massacre at the town of Iaşi, where,
within two days, over 13,000 Jews were murdered because of alleged
subversion and support of the Soviet Union. That same year, while Ro-
manian troops were making their way towards the Caucasus, in a joint
campaign with Germany, Italy and other fascist forces against the So-
viet Union, Antonescu ordered the deportation of Jews from Bessara-
bia and Bukovina to the recently occupied Transnistria. Many of them
were killed just before deportation, while numerous others died in
camps formed specifically for them. Up until the year 1942, ostensibly
because of retaliation for the attack on Romanian troops, over 100,000
Jews were killed in various other attrocities; in the city of Odessa alone,
near the end of October 1941, over 25,000 Jews were killed.
It is calculated that in these bloodsheds, as well as at concentration
camps in Transnistra, around 270,000 Jews met their death.46
The Romanian fascist regime, however, also carried out a special
policy towards the Roma. In his speeches, as early as 1941, General
Antonescu proposed severe measures against the Roma who lived in
larger Romanian cities. His idea was that they should be relocated
and rounded up in certain places of residence and kept under control,
46 Raul Hilberg, La distruzione degli ebrei d’Europa, Einaudi, Torino, 1999, p. 813.
On the Holocaust in Romania, cf.: Radu Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania: the
destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu regime, 1940-1944, USHMM,
Washington D.C., 2000

so that, on the one hand, cities would be “cleaned” from them, while
on the other, they could be used as a work-force.47 In Autumn of that
same year, the idea appeared among Romanian authorities that Roma
should be deported to Transnistria. For reasons unknown, it was not
until several months later that Antonescu paid attention to this. In the
year 1942, on the 17th of May, he ordered the registration of all Roma,
primarily nomads and those who had had problems with the police or
who lacked sustenance. The figures show that, in 1942, the territories
under Romanian control were populated by roughly 210,000 Roma,
not counting nomads. The exact number could not, however, be de-
termined, since many had lived together with Romanians, in the same
villages, with the same customs and had started families together.48
Motivated by reasons of “public safety”, but in actuality due to ra-
cial persecution, between 25,000 and 26,000 Roma were deported
from different regions of Romania to Transnistria.49 That region was
selected allegedly because it needed an agricultural “work-force”, as
well as due to the fact that Marshal Antonescu knew that Romania
didn’t have ambitions for its permanent annexation, i.e. that Romani-
an forces would abandon it after the war.50
The Roma were deported by trains, while each person was given a
basic quantity of bread for the five-day journey. When it comes to per-
sonal belongings, they were allowed to bring only the bare necessities.
Their property was confiscated.
47 M. Benjamin Thorne, Assimilation, invisibility, and the eugenic turn in the „Gypsy
question“ in Romanian society, 1938-1942, in Romani studies, vol. 21, no. 2/2011,
pp. 194-196
48 Michelle Kelso, Gypsy Deportations from Romania to Transnistria 1942-44, in Karo-
la Fings and Donald Kenrick (eds.), The Gypsies During the Second World War: In
the shadow of the swastika, vol. II, University of Hertfordshire Press, Hartfield,
1999, p. 98
49 Viorel Achim, Romanian Memory of the Persecution of Roma, in Roma and Sinti.
Under-Studied Victims of Nazism. Symposium Proceedings, USHMM, Washington
D.C., 2002, p. 59
50 Michelle Kelso, ibid., p. 100

The first transport of groups already began in June 1942. They con-
tained all the registered Roma nomads, of which there were about
11,400. The second transported groups arrived to Transnistria in
September 1942 and contained “the most dangerous” Roma, around
13,000 of the permanent residents. Other groups were targeted for
transportation in the Spring of 1943, but wartime circumstances pre-
vented this; consequently just several hundreds of Roma were taken
away.51
After deportations, protests of many people followed, among which
were representatives of political parties, as well as inhabitants of vil-
lages whose Roma had been designated for deportation. Nevertheless,
the protests pertained solely to deportation of Roma permanent res-
idents, whereas nobody stood up for the nomads.52 Among the Roma
themselves, there was also a protest: in September 1942, Gheorghe
Niculescu, president of the General Union of Romanian Roma, sent
a plea to President Antonescu for the measures of arrest and deporta-
tion to Transnistria to bypass the permanent residents who are prop-
ertied and employed, so that the measures be applied solely in the case
of nomads.53
In the midst of inhumane living conditions, poverty and approach-
ing winter, many Roma had already died by the end of 1942 from
hunger and disease. During 1943, many attempted to return to their
homes by any means, while the unsustainable situation for the local
population, as well as the presumption that Germany will lose the
war, led the Romanian authorities to allow certain categories of Roma
to legally leave Transnistria.54
The survivors returned home in the Summer of 1944, several
weeks before dictator Antonescu was overthrown. According to avail-
51 M. Benjamin Thorne, ibid., p. 201; Michelle Kelso, ibid., p. 110

52 Viorel Achim, ibid., pp. 59Ω60
53 Ibid., pp. 60-61
54 Michelle Kelso, ibid., pp. 126Ω128

able data collected by the authorities after the war, of the total number
of those deported, around 6,000 survived.55
Estimates concerning the numbers of Roma killed in World War
II fall in the range between 219,600 to over 900,000.56 Analyzing the
data which were published, often solely on the basis of estimates, by
historians Kenrick and Puxon, the greatest percentage of fatalities was
in the Independent State of Croatia, where, out of a total of 28,500
Roma who had lived there in 1939, 28,000 were killed. In Romania,
36,000 out of 300,000 were killed; in Germany 15,000 out of 20,000;
in Italy 1,000 out of 25,000; in France 15,000 out of 40,000 etc.; in to-
tal 219,700 were killed throughout Europe. According to the same esti-
mates, in Serbia 12,000 Roma were killed out of a total of 60,000 who
lived in the country in 1939.57 Christian Bernadac evaluated the total
number of Roma killed in Serbia to be 16,000.58 It is not clear, howev-
er, whether that number relates to entire Serbia, parts of which were
under Ustachi and Hungarian control during World War II, or just to
NediÊ’s Serbia. According to other estimates, 150,000 Roma had lived
in Serbia, whereas between 1,000 and 10Ω20,000 were killed.59
55 Ibid., p. 130
56 Ibid. The lowest figure was provided by Kenrick and Puxon, ibid., pp. 183Ω184,
whereas the highest by Zimmermann, ibid., pp. 248-292
58 Ibid, p. 411
59 Ibid. The author quotes estimates given by Zimmermann, ibid., p. 258, and Ken-
rick and Puxon, ibid., p. 119

III. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA
IN SERBIA
The April War and instatement of authority

By bombing main cities of the then Kingdom of Yugoslavia and es-
pecially its capital, Belgrade, Germans and their allies commenced
war operations on the 6th of April, which, in the span of several days,
led to the occupation and division of the entire Yugoslav space. Ital-
ian troops took possession of the east coast of the Adriatic, part of
Slovenia and Montenegro, whereas west Macedonia and large part of
Kosovo was annexed by Albania. On the territory of Croatia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina and today’s north-western Serbia (Srem), a fascist
entity was created under the name Independent State of Croatia. At
the same time, Hungarians annexed part of Croatian territory and a
sizeable portion of Vojvodina, i.e. BaËka, whereas Bulgarians occupied
central and eastern Macedonia, as well as south-eastern Serbia. Cen-
tral Serbia, with Belgrade as its centre, i.e. from the rivers Sava and
Dunav in the north to Kosovska Mitrovica and Niš in the south, was
occupied by Germans with the intention of establishing direct control
of the region, whereas Banat was taken over by the German national
minority or Volksdeutsche.1 At the time, that territory, i.e. the terri-
tory under direct control of German and Volksdeutsche authorities,
was populated by 3,773,000 people, of which 3,367,000 were Serbs,
23,000 Croats, 51,000 other Slavic nationalities, 102,000 Hungarians,
1 On the division of Kingdom of Yugoslavia, cf.: Ferdo »ulinoviÊ, Okupatorska po-

djela Jugoslavije, VojnoizdavaËki zavod, Belgrade, 1970
GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN SERBIA │ 35

146,000 Germans, 66,000 Romanians and 18,000 other.2 Although
it is not possible to determine how many Roma lived in Serbia at the
time, it can be estimated that there were roughly 60,000,3 taking into
account the fact that in the entire Yugoslavia before the war there
were about 300,000 Roma.4
Immediately after the capitulation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
army, an occupational system was established in Serbia. At the head
of that apparatus was the Military Commander in Serbia, (Militärver-
waltungskommandant, later Bevollmächtigter Kommandierender General
in Serbien): during 1941, that function was held in succession by Gen-
erals Hermann Förster, Ludwig von Schröder, Heinrich Danckelmann
and Paul Bader.5 Two headquarters were subordinate to the Military
Commander: the Command Headquarters, responsible for tasks of a
solely military nature, and Administrative Headquarters, which rep-
resented the most significant structure of the entire occupational ap-
paratus. The Administrative Headquarters Chief, SS-Brigadenfuhrer
Harald Turner, was in charge of local commands as well, i.e. of Feld-
kommandantur, Kreiskommandantur, Ortskommandantur and ulti-
mately Platzkommandatur6.
In cooperation with the Military Commander, but directly account-
able to the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin (RSHA), a special Op-
erative Group of Security Police and Security Service or Einsatzgruppe
(Einsatzgruppe der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdiensts für Serbi-
en, or EG Sipo und SD) was active in Serbia, with SS- Standartenführer
Wilhelm Fuchs as its head. Within Einsatzgruppe there was Depart-
2 AVII, NdA, 3-1/13-1.

4 Dragoljub AckoviÊ, Ašunen Romalen!..., p. 17
5 On the occupational system, cf.: Valter Manošek, Holokaust u Srbiji. Vojna oku-
paciona politika i uništavanje Jevreja 1941Ω1942, Službeni list SRJ, Belgrade, 2007;
Jovan MarjanoviÊ, The German occupation system in Serbia 1941, Belgrade, 1963;
Cristopher Browning, The Final Solution in Serbia. The Semlin Judenlager. A case
study, in Yad Vashem Studies, XV, 1983, Jerusalem, pp. 55Ω90
6 Ferdo »ulinoviÊ, ibid., pp. 398Ω402; Cristopher Browning, ibid., pp. 55Ω56

ment IV Ω Gestapo, and within it Bureau IV B4 for Jews (and later for
the Roma), whose leader was SS-Untersturmführer Fritz Stracke.7
The German occupational structure continued to be divided some-
what clumsily into various other apparatuses. The Economic Affairs
Department was headed by the Plenipotentiary General for Economy,
Franz Neuhausen, whereas the advisory function was performed by
the Plenipotentiary of the Third Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Felix Benzler.8
According to Harald Turner, (who, it can be concluded, played a very
important role in Serbia during the entire year of 1941) the instatement
of German authority wasn’t sufficient for governing the occupied terri-
tory efficiently. In his opinion, Serbian authorities were also necessary,
so as to seem, in front of the people, much more acceptable than Ger-
man authorities; on the other hand, his prior experience in organizing
military administrations in western occupied territories, i.e. Belgium,
Luxembourg and Holland,9 showed that, for purely technical reasons Ω
familiarity with the language, culture, customs etc. Ω it is much more
useful to act in cooperation with local authorities than set up direct
control over the entire territory, also meaning Ω the people.
Turner’s understanding of the relation between occupational au-
thority and quisling government was based on the concept that gov-
erning an occupied country without its own bodies of authority was
not possible. It was therefore necessary to form a kind of self-rule
structure overseen and advised but also instructed by the occupier.10
Furthermore, as stated by Harald Turner himself, the first and most
important problem after occupation was the lack of “regular state gov-
ernment”. Since the king and government had gone abroad, whereas
7 Milan Koljanin, ibid., pp. 22

8 Ibid, p. 24 and p. 32
9 AVII, Military Courts, case Harald Turner and others, 3/III, book 1, Military Ad-
ministration in Serbia, p. 1
ministration in Serbia, str. 6.

the king was the only one who could appoint ministers and govern-
ment, “the king’s place had to be taken by occupational authority to
name ministers and consequently the government”.11
While the local municipality authorities reorganized themselves
and continued with their regular work, Turner decided, as early as the
beginning of May, to make up a so-called “commissary government”,
which would act as a real government in many ways. According to his
words, he worked in this manner primarily so that local authorities in
the country would “receive their instructions from their own minis-
tries, whose officers were mostly right there”.12
The appointed head of the commissary government was Milan AÊi-
moviÊ, who was one of the people German authorities trusted, togeth-
er with City of Belgrade Governor, Dragi JovanoviÊ.
Specifically, AÊimoviÊ had already been known in German circles
thanks to, on the one hand, his work in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in
the years leading up to the war, and, on the other hand, the fact that
in those years he had established close cooperation between Yugoslav
and German police. His pro-German, pro-fascist and anticommunist
standpoint had also been known. At the time while he was the head of
the City of Belgrade Administration, when in 1936 and 1937, repres-
sion against communists reached its peak, and every public protest
was stifled by way of violence.13
As members of the Commissary Government, AÊimoviÊ selected
people he already knew from political life during the Kingdom of Yu-
goslavia, especially those ideologically close to himself. Government
members were, for instance, former adherents of Milan StojadinoviÊ’s
11 AVII, Military Courts, case Harald Turner and others, 3/III, book 1, problems
and their solutions, p. 1
ministration in Serbia, str. 7. On restoring the old administrative apparatus, cf.:
Milan BorkoviÊ, Kontrarevolucija u Srbiji: Kvislinška uprava u 1941Ω1944, book 1,
Sloboda, Belgrade, 1979, pp. 38Ω45
13 Branislav BožoviÊ, Uprava i Upravnici grada Beograda: (1839Ω1944), Prosveta, Bel-
grade, 2010, pp. 101Ω103; and 203

Yugoslav radical community called Zbor, but also some representa-
tives of the democratic party.14
On the 16th of May 1941, AÊimoviÊ and other Commissary Govern-
ment members presented, via a newspaper, the reason for forming the
Government and its tasks:
By the Decision of the Military Commander in Serbia, civilian admini-
stration has been established in our country and we have been entru-
sted with being in charge of certain areas of state administration, with
the aim of preserving peace and order as well as for the sake of the qu-
ickest possible revival of economy in the country.
Domestic laws remain in force, which our administrative and judicial
authorities will abide by, if German military authorities, in the interest
of their military security, are not compelled to order that they be tem-
porarily suspended.
We have embarked upon this difficult task with the aim of helping our
people and easing their position in this fateful time.
We believe that the entire nation will approve of our decision, since it
was in favour of sincere and loyal cooperation with its big neighbour,
the German people, with whom it has enjoyed friendship and always
kept close economic and cultural ties. The fact that our people have
been brought into this position in relation to the German Reich was
not the wish of the German Reich, which had always stressed amica-
ble intentions towards our fatherland, nor is it our people’s fault, but
rather it is the fault of several of their leaders, who drew the people into
war without actual need and against their interests.
Resolute that we will devote all our efforts to rebuilding the country,
we are aware of the responsibilities and difficulties that lie ahead of us,
but we believe that, with the cordial help of all layers of society, those
difficulties will be overcome. It is necessary to discard all politicizing
and to be aware that a new time is coming when all strengths must be
mustered and many sacrifices sustained, so that the country can rise
from the rubble in which it has found itself.
The Military Commander has promised us that he will assist us in our
future effort willingly and cordially. We are thankful for this promise,
as well as for his statement that nothing will be required from us which
14 AJ, 110-102-763, Decision on Determining the Crimes of Occupiers and their Col-
laborators, Harald Turner, p. 3; Milan BorkoviÊ, ibid., p. 34

would oppose our national honour and dignity, that cooperation in the
government is being entrusted to us as people of the nation, that our
service should be to the country and the people, while being sincere
and loyal to the German government. We have given our word that we
will act on our own behalf as well as on the behalf of our people. We
are thankful for the proper deportment of the German army towards
our people, fully convinced that the entire nation feels the same way.
We are therefore addressing the Serbs, to assist us in carrying out the
difficult task that lies ahead of us. By helping us, our people will help
themselves. We invite our people to go back to their regular work and
unconditionally keep the peace and order. We have been presented
with an opportunity to steer our country towards new life ourselves,
without coercive measures. Let us use that opportunity and accept the
proffered hand, with that high national awareness which has graced
our people throughout their history.15
In relation to occupational authorities, AÊimoviÊ’s understanding of

Commissary Government had a different and more explicit connota-
tion. Expressing his satisfaction due to the new situation, he clearly
expressed hope that his government will be the nucleus of a new Ser-
bian state, which would be an integral and loyal part of the new Na-
tional Socialist world order.
Already in June, the Commissary Government tried to act as the
real government of an independent state, demanding, for example,
from occupational authorities, the expansion of Serbian borders at the
expense of the just proclaimed NDH, as well as Kosovo and Macedo-
nia. Shortly, Turner himself let the commissaries know that they had
not been appointed heads of government to deal with such political is-
sues, but rather to act in accord with the needs and orders of the Ger-
man authorities. In that sense, alongside the organization of accepting
Serbian refugees from NDH, reorganization of administrative appara-
tus, revival of the economy and other key tasks, one of the first fields in
which the occupational and quisling authorities showed perfect syner-
gy in action was the adoption of anti-Jewish and anti-Roma measures.16
15 Zbornik NOR, vol. I, book 2, doc. 89

16 More on the Commissary Government of Milan AÊimoviÊ: Milan BorkoviÊ, ibid.

Anti-Jewish and anti-Roma legislature
Side by side with the strengthening of the occupational apparatus,
which above all meant the creation of administrative-police and mili-
tary apparatuses, German authorities introduced into Serbia a part of
the legislative system that had already been in force in other occupied
regions. This action was primarily necessary so that the population,
which had lost its state and political head within several days, could
calmly be placed under the auspices of new masters and continue their
lives without further substantial change. The second aspect of this new
legislature was the passing of all those ordinances and regulations ap-
plied by German military and police authorities, thus expressing loy-
alty to National Socialism. During the first days of occupation, one
of the German authorities’ concerns was to clearly let it be known to
Belgrade citizens, as well as to the inhabitants of entire Serbia, that lo-
cal Jews were now deprived of the rank of human being as well as that
special laws will apply to them. Similarly, from the very beginning it
was clear that they would be the victims of economic plundering, phys-
ical exploitation, abuse and maltreatment. Germans waited just a few
days from entry into Belgrade before issuing the first regulation that
pertained to Jews only: on the 16th of April, all Jews were ordered to
sign up at a designated place by no later than the 19th of April, for the
purposes of registration, with a death penalty envisaged for those who
failed to do so. Reactions were probably different, but the vast major-
ity of Jewish population nevertheless reported to the Serbian police,
which was in charge of the registration. It was then that the Holocaust
began for them: they received yellow badges with the word “Jude” on
them and were assigned to forced labour, whilst their property became
the subject of the occupier’s economic interests.
During the months of April and May, legal regulations were adopt-
ed concerning Jews, which, according to the model of the Nuremberg
laws, completely separated Jews from other citizens, practically ghet-
toizing them in their own city, although freedom of movement through-

out the city itself, at least in that period, was not entirely denied them.
They were forbidden to use public transport and visit public places,
they were not allowed to go to the open market before ten in the morn-
ing, they had to queue at every fountain and wait for everyone else
to finish drinking before they could drink, electrical appliances were
taken from them and their shops were placed under commissary rule;
which primarily meant expropriation. Finally, they were compelled to
set up their own healthcare institutions, since neither as doctors nor
patients were they allowed to set foot in the public hospitals. Germans
controlled the Jewish community, on the one hand, through the Ser-
bian police which was in charge of applying the new legal regulations,
as well as punishing disobedient elements, while on the other hand,
through Jewish community representatives, i.e. through a special body
consisting of top-ranking representatives of the Jewish community,
which, just like any other Judenrat in Eastern Europe, executed Ger-
man commands and took care of the entire Jewish community.
Once everything had been defined, the new legislative system that
had been introduced by the occupiers in Serbia fixated on another cat-
egory of people, which was incompatible with the new order, accord-
ing to Nazi ideology, that is Ω the Roma. On the 20th of May 1941, the
Military Commander in Serbia issued the Regulation on the Press in
Serbia. Among other things, it says the following:
§2 A permit for performing the editorial profession may be issued so-
lely if the person is:
1. Not a Jew or a Gypsy or if he is not married to a Jewish or Gypsy
woman;
2. If he is older than 21;
3. If he is not limited in his professional capacity;
4. If he has been professionally educated and;
5. If his personality is such that it provides assurance whereby he can
fulfil the duties of an editor17.
17 Nove naredbe i Uredbe, “Novo vreme”, 24 May 1941, p. 6

Two days later, i.e. on the 22nd of May, the Military Commander issued
three regulations concerning work in the field of arts and publishing:
Regulation on theatre management, Regulation on the operation of
cinemas and film rentals, and Regulation on cabarets and variétés.
The content of these regulation are similar, especially when it comes
to the Jews and Roma, who are mentioned in certain items, so that
any type of work in these activities and enterprises is forbidden to
them. In the first Regulation, that pertains to theatres, opera and bal-
let, the following is stipulated:
§2. [...] Jews and Gypsies, as well as persons married to Jews and Gypsi-
es, cannot obtain a permit for managing an enterprise from §1.
§3. Applications for a permit must be submitted in the German langua-
ge in three copies to the Military Commander in Serbia. The applicati-
ons are to contain the following data:
[...]
2. The applicant’s written statement that neither he nor his lawful wife
is a Jew or Gypsy;
[...]
8. The applicant’s written statement that neither his deputies nor their
wives are Jews or Gypsies.
§5[...] Jews and Gypsies, as well as persons married to Jews or Gypsies,
shall not work or be employed at enterprises in accordance with §118.
These were the first regulations in which specific reference was made
to “Gypsies” as it was made to Jews. However, just several days later,
specifically on the 30th of May, the Military Commander issued “The
Regulation concerning Jews and Gypsies”, which definitively regulat-
ed their status within Serbia. The regulation consists of 22 articles
and it is important to quote it in its entirety so as to understand the
position of Roma and Jews at that moment in history. The first 17 arti-
cles relate expressly to Jews:
18 Nove naredbe i Uredbe, “Novo vreme”, 25 May 1941, p. 6

On the grounds of authorization issued by the Military Force Comman-
der-in-chief, I hereby order the following:
I Jews
§1. For the purposes of already issued regulations and those that will
be issued by the Supreme Military Commander for Serbia, a Jew is
deemed to be any person who descends from at least three Jewish
ancestors (implying parents of father and mother). The ancestors
shall be deemed Jews if by race they are full-blooded Jews or be-
long or belonged to the Judaic faith. Jews shall also be deemed to
be those Jews who are half-breeds between one or two Jewish an-
cestors (implying parents of father and mother) who belonged, af-
ter the 5th of April 1941, to the community of Judaic faith or joined
it. In addition, Jewish half-breeds shall also be deemed Jews, who
are married to a Jewish woman or who enter into marriage with a
Jewish woman.
§2. Jews must report within two weeks after the issuing of the present
regulation to Serbian police authorities in charge of reporting, to
whose precinct their place of residence or temporary dwelling be-
longs, so as to be entered into the lists of Jews. Reporting by the ho-
usehold head is sufficient for the entire family.
§3. It is the Jews’ duty to wear insignia. They must wear a yellow band
on the left arm with the word “Jevrejin” (“Jew”).
§4. Jews cannot be public servants. Their removal from institutions
must be carried out by Serbian authorities immediately.
§5. Jews shall not be allowed to hold the practice of lawyer, doctor,
dentist, veterinary and pharmacist.
Jewish lawyers who had had their own practice are not to appe-
ar before the court or authorities as representatives. Jewish doc-
tors and dentists will have their practice taken away, unless it deals
with treatment of Jews only. At the office entrance, a notice must
be put up stating Jewish origin and ban on treatment of Aryans.
The operation of Jewish veterinaries and pharmacies is prohibited.
§6. For the purposes of repairing war-induced damage, Jews of both
genders aged 14 to 60 shall be sent to forced labour. The number of
Jewish participants in this type of work shall be decided by County
command headquarters in charge or those departments appointed
by the Supreme Military Commander for Serbia.

§7. Jews are banished from theatres, cinemas, all entertainment venues,
public baths, sports events and public fairs. Visiting inns is also for-
bidden to Jews, unless certain facilities have received permission
from the Supreme Military Commander for Serbia, allowing acce-
ss to Jews. These facilities must be designated by a particular mark.
§8. Jews are not allowed to own educational or entertainment institu-
tions or to be employees thereof.
§9. Jews who had escaped from occupied Serbian territory are forbid-
den to return. No Jew is allowed to leave his place of permanent or
temporary residence without approval by the County command he-
adquarters in charge. Every Jew must remain in his own apartment
from 8 p.m. until 6 a.m.
§10. All radio sets and material owned permanently or temporarily by
Jews must immediately be reported to the County command he-
adquarters via the municipality in charge of their permanent or
temporary place of residence.
§11. Jews and their spouses must, within 10 days from issuing of the
present regulation report to the County command headquarters,
via the municipality in charge of their permanent or temporary
place of residence, their property and its accurate location. It is
forbidden to utilize property without charge or with a reimburse-
ment. Arrangements agreed on a legal basis that are contrary to
this regulation are to be annulled. The sole exemption from this
ban are expenses for procuring the basic life supplies.
§12. Jewish economic enterprises or those enterprises which conti-
nued to be Jewish after the 5th of April 1941 must be reported to
the County command headquarters in charge by the 15th of June
1941. The County command headquarters which shall be deemed
in charge are those in which county the persons reside while le-
gal entities have their legal seats. This also holds true for Jewish
economic enterprises with their legal seat outside the occupied
territory, applying to that part of the enterprise’s operation which
is carried out on occupied territory. The registration must conta-
in: a) names, legal seat of enterprise owner or lessee, specifying
the circumstances on the basis of which the enterprise is Jewish
or continued to be Jewish up to the 5th of April 1941; b) in the case
of enterprises that are no longer Jewish, the circumstances why
these premises are no longer valid: c) type of enterprise according
to the type of goods sold, made or managed, specifying the major

item; d) branch offices, workshops and auxiliary shops; e) turno-
ver according to latest taxation; f) value of owned warehoused go-
ods, existing quantities of raw materials, real estate and money.
§13. For the purposes of the present regulation, an economic enter-
prise shall be deemed to be every enterprise that participates in
production of goods, processing of goods, alteration of goods, and
management, regardless of the legal form of the enterprise and re-
gardless of entry into the registry. This also includes banks, insu-
rance companies, notary’s offices, exchange offices and real estate
enterprises. An enterprise is Jewish if its owners or lessees are: a)
Jews, or b) societies whose one member is a Jew, or c) limited lia-
bility societies whose one third of members are Jews or over one
third of the shares are in the hands of Jewish members, or whose
one manager is a Jew, or more than one third of the supervisory
board members are Jews, or d) shareholder societies whose board
of directors chairman or one of the deputies is a Jew, or over one
third of the board of directors members are Jews. The Plenipoten-
tiary General for Economy in Serbia can proclaim an enterprise
Jewish if it is under primarily Jewish influence.
§14. All Jewish economic enterprises as well as all legal entities that
are not economic enterprises and that have over one third of Jews
among members or in the management, must report, by the 15th of
July 1941, to the County command headquarters in charge: their
own or entrusted stocks, shares, secret participation in economic
enterprises, as well as real estate owned and rights to property.
The County command headquarters which shall be deemed in
charge of accepting applications are those in which county the en-
terprise has its legal seat or in which the real estate is located that
is subject to this regulation.
§15. Legal operations from the time after the 5th of April 1941, based on
the usage of property of persons mentioned in §11 and §14, can be
annulled by the Plenipotentiary General for Economy in Serbia.
§16. For Jewish economic enterprises, a commissary-director may be
appointed and provisions of the Regulation on managing opera-
tions (Regulations sheet no. 2, page 19) are applied to him. Until
the commissary-director is appointed, the director must manage
operations tidily.
§17. The County command headquarters can order that governors
of cities and municipalities with many Jews appoint one Jew to
whom the execution of measures would be transferred.

The following three articles relate to the Roma:
II Gypsies
§18. Gypsies are made equal to Jews. Suitable provisions of the present
Regulation apply to them.
§19. A Gypsy is considered to be that person who descends from at le-
ast three Gypsy ancestors. Gypsy half-breeds are made equal to
Gypsies, having descended from one or two Gypsy ancestors as
well as those married to a Gypsy woman or who enter into marri-
age with a Gypsy woman.
§20. Gypsies shall be marked by wearing armbands which must also be
yellow and bear the word “Ciganin” (“Gypsy”). Based on applica-
tions, Gypsies are to be registered into Gypsy lists.
Ultimately, the remaining articles pertain to duties of Serbian author-

ities and punitive measures:
III Duties of Serbian authorities
§21. Serbian authorities are responsible for carrying out orders stipula-
ted in this Regulation.
IV Punitive measures
§22. Whoever objects to the orders stipulated in this Regulation shall
be punished by prison and monetary fine, or either of the two pu-
nishments. In severe cases, he shall be punished by hard labour
or death.
Belgrade, 30th of May 1941
Military Commander in Serbia19
German authorities issued these orders and from then on Serbian au-
thorities executed them. Amongst their subsequent duties Serbian au-
thorities were required to keep Jews and Roma legally distant from
other Serbian citizens: it was a role they accepted and executed seri-
ously, thus becoming an integral and necessary part of the racial per-
secution of the Jewish and Roma populations.
19 Naredba koja se odnosi na Jevreje i Cigane (Regulation that concerns Jews and Gyp-
sies), “Novo vreme”, 2 June 1941, p. 2

In the subsequent period, alongside the expulsion of all remain-
ing Jewish employees and from now on Roma too, from state appa-
ratuses, the final registration of entire Jewish and Roma population
was conducted. In Belgrade, up until the 13th of July, 9,435 Jews and
3,050 “Gypsies” registered themselves.20 In other cities, registration
was also carried out thoroughly: according to the census by munici-
pality authorities. The results of this census showed for instance, 38
Jews and 652 “Gypsies” living in Obrenovac,21 around 1,500 Roma
and 80 Jews marked and living in Leskovac in June 1941,22 in Užice
56 “Gypsies” and 9 Jews were recorded;23 in Δuprija there lived about
200 domestic, but also around 300 Russian Roma (60 families), the
vast majority of whom moved to Belgrade during the last days (just 5
families remained in Δuprija).24 In Aleksinac, 238 Roma were regis-
tered, in Mladenovac 120, in Jasenica county 788, of which 190 were
in Smederevska Palanka, and 1,943 in Požarevac.25
During the same period, specifically up to the 14th of June, Jews and
Roma submitted applications about their property. In the capital city,
the municipality legal department entered all the data in a separate
“List of Jews and spouses of Jews who submitted applications about
their property to the municipality of Belgrade, in accordance with the
regulation issued by the Military Commander in Serbia dated the 30th
of May 1941“. The fact that Roma are not mentioned in that title, al-
though there are about 150 on the list (from a total of 3,474 names,
20 Milan Koljanin, ibid., p. 23

21 U Obrenovcu ima 38 Jevreja i 652 Ciganina (In Obrenovac there are 38 Jews and 652
Gypsies), “Novo vreme”, 20 June 1941, p. 4
22 Priraštaj stanovništva u Leskovcu (Population accretion in Leskovac), “Novo vreme”,
28th of June 1941, p. 4
23 Užice, grad sa 14.364 stanovnika.... i samo 9 Jevreja (Užice, a city with 14,364 inhab-
itants....and just 9 Jews) , “Novo vreme”, 18th July 1941, p. 4
24 Δuprijski Cigani veÊ dobijaju trake (Gypsies of Δuprija are already getting armbands),
“Novo vreme”, 21 June 1941, p. 4
25 Olivera MilosavljeviÊ, Potisnuta istina. Kolaboracija u Srbiji 1941Ω1944 (The re-
pressed truth. Collaboration in Serbia 1941Ω1944), The Helsinki Committee for Hu-
man Rights, Belgrade, 2006, pp. 146Ω147, 151

along with about twenty who were added subsequently),26 speaks, once
again, about one of the main differences between the persecution of
Jews and Roma. It partly explains the great attention paid in the reg-
ulation dated the 30th of May primarily to Jews: economic plundering
of real estate as well as movable property belonging to the Jewish com-
munity, who were allegedly to be regarded as an ordinary citizen group
in the class sense, i.e. that they should not be given special attention in
the economic life of the then Serbia, was a very important point in the
process of exterminating Jews, whereas in the case of Roma, who had
mostly been the poorest layer of urban population, it was known, to
put it bluntly, that there wouldn’t be any economic profit.
In the month of June, additional measures were adopted against
the Roma and Jews, but this time by the Serbian authorities, who had
become adapted to the new situation. An example is the provision dat-
ed the 19th of June, by way of which the Musicians’ Union for Ser-
bia, registered as a section of “Jugoras”, the only allowed syndicate,
informs musicians who are Jews and Gypsies that their music-relat-
ed operation is in opposition to the existing rules, thus they won’t be
allowed to work and that it’s pointless to address the union on this
issue.27 In the subsequent period, other anti-Jewish and anti-Roma reg-
ulations were issued, but those were mostly addenda to the regulation
dated the 30th of May.28
Suddenly, on the 11th of July, the Administrative Headquarters Chief
Turner issued a regulation redefining the position of Roma. Specifical-
ly, in the communique forwarded near the end of that same month by
26 Particular attention has been paid to the significance of that list by Jovanka Ve-
selinoviÊ, Spisak Jevreja i supružnika Jevreja koji su prema naredbi Vojnog zapoved-
nika u Srbiji od 30. maja 1941. godine podneli opštini grada Beograda prijave o imovi-
ni, in Zbornik. Studije, arhivska i memoarska graa o istoriji Jevreja u Beogradu,
no. 6/1992, pp. 372-406. In that study, the author also published the integral list.
27 Iz Jugorasa Ω MuziËari Jevreji i Cigani, “Novo vreme”, 19 June 1941, p. 3
28 For example, Uredba o štampanju knjiga i spisa, 23 July 1941, or addenda.... Osnov-
na uredba o Univerzitetu, 21 October 1941, cf.: Olivera MilosavljeviÊ, ibid., pp. 155
and 188

the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs to city of Belgrade municipal-
ity, as well as probably to other municipalities in Serbia, among other
things, it says:
[...] “The Military Commander in Serbia, by his Act no. 2051-2142/41
dated the 11th of July this year, has communicated the following:
“For the purposes of removing certain ambiguities which have arisen
in the implementation of my Regulation on Jews and Gypsies dated the
30 of May 1941, Regulations sheet, p. 84, I hereby order the following:
Serbian citizens of Gypsy descent, who have honest jobs, lead proper
lives and whose ancestors had been permanent residents at least since
the year 1850 Ω which needs to be proven Ω shall not, for the time be-
ing, be treated in accordance with §§ 18 to 20 of the abovementioned
Regulation. Evidence concerning residence is to be submitted to the
municipality mayor in charge, who will confirm it”.29
Although there is a theoretical possibility that Serbian authorities had

affected that decision,30 since the measures stipulated by the Regula-
tion dated the 30th of May encompassed a large part of the population,
(especially in some Serbian towns, despite still not having sufficient
gendarmerie and policemen) it is more probable that German authori-
ties themselves assessed it was better not to waste too much energy on
the Roma at that moment. According to Turner, the measures stipu-
lated in the Regulation dated the 30th of May should “for the time be-
ing” not be applied to those who can prove their permanent residence;
from which it could be inferred that the solution to the Roma issue
was simply delayed, i.e. divided into two phases.
According to Georg Kiessel, who was Harald Turner’s right hand
at the time,
(…) Einsatzgruppe had the task, received from Berlin, of arresting
Gypsies on the territory of Serbia. However, the Administrative He-
adquarters explained to Dr. Fuchs that Berlin’s intentions for the
29 The document has been published in Dragoljub AckoviÊ, Romi u Beogradu...,

p. 244
30 Venceslav GlišiÊ, ibid., p. 82

solution of the Gypsy issue were to arrest travelling Gypsies, not those
with permanent residence, who could be considered an integral part of
the population to a certain extent. Fuchs respected this and the arrest
of Gypsies was not effected.31
Shortly, the Subsection for Freemasons, Jews and Gypsies, within the
Department for Foreigners of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, sent a
communique to all county administrations explaining which Roma
the Regulation dated the 30th of May should apply (according to the
Military Commander’s decision dated the 11th of July.32)
While anti-Jewish propaganda was increasing on the one hand,
there were also a growing number of anti-Roma articles in quisling
newspapers in which the criminal traits of Roma were unambiguously
portrayed, in accordance with official Nazi ideology: on June the 15th,
“Novo Vreme” published a story about a “Gypsy” gang which robbed
two houses in the village of Umka within two days.33 About ten days
later, a story was published about a Roma woman and her daughter
who tricked a village woman near Kuršumlija and stole everything
from her house.34
During the summer of 1941, just like in the case of the Jews, the
quisling newspapers were also publishing short news items on meas-
ures introduced regarding the Roma in other quisling states. For in-
stance, while in Belgrade and other Serbian towns a Roma census was
being conducted for the purposes of compiling lists of “Gypsies” and
handing out yellow armbands, “Novo Vreme” was reporting that a
census of Gypsy children was in progress in Slovakia.35
31 AVII, Military Courts, case Harald Turner and others, 3/III, book 1, Georg Kies-
sel, minutes concerning the hearing, 18th of October 1946, p. 3; minutes concern-
ing the hearing, 25th of October 1941, p. 3
32 AVII, NdA, 26-1-3/1.
33 Nova kradja na Umci, “Novo vreme” , 15 June 1941, p. 5.
34 Ciganka “VraËara” pokrala lakovernu seljanku, “Novo vreme” , 26th of June 1941,
p. 5
35 Popis ciganske dece u SlovaËkoj, “Novo vreme” , 20th of June 1941, p. 6

The communist uprising
With the attack on the Soviet Union, which Germany and its allies
commenced on 22nd June 1941, the situation suddenly changed in
Serbia. In agreement with Milan AÊimoviÊ, occupational authorities
first decided to carry out a series of preventive arrests of all promi-
nent communists and Spanish fighters in the country. Even though
initially they were intended to be detained in the existing prison at
Ada Ciganlija, on the outskirts of the capital, it was quickly decided
that they should be kept in a separate camp.36 The decision was made
by German authorities, while construction of the concentration camp
was entrusted to the City of Belgrade Governor, Dragi JovanoviÊ.
The fact that the task was conceded to local authorities indicates the
trust that they enjoyed in the eyes of occupational authorities: Jova-
noviÊ, AÊimoviÊ and all other top-ranking representatives of the quis-
ling authorities were prominent anticommunists and had developed,
throughout previous years, special skills for breaking up and pursuing
communist groups, which had long been forbidden. Namely, since the
mid-thirties, i.e. from the start of the economic and political approxi-
mation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to forces of the future Axis, their
work, as well as the work of the entire state apparatus in preventing
the spread of communism, included the utilization of special prisons
and even concentration camps for communists. For example, camps
in Višegrad, in BileÊa and in Kotor were well known, as well as prisons
in Sremska Mitrovica and Belgrade. Due to this experience and conti-
nuity in the bureaucratic and police apparatus, JovanoviÊ was capable
of organizing a new camp within just several days. Thus, on the 9th of
July, the arrested communists and Spanish fighters were taken to the
concentration camp at Banjica.
After German authorities’ decision about establishing concentra-
tion camps, the City of Belgrade Governor Dragi JovanoviÊ, who had
been entrusted with the organization of these camps, chose as the lo-
36 Milan BorkoviÊ, ibid., p. 57

cation the barracks of the former 18th Infantry Regiment in Belgrade.
Captives were brought from Belgrade, as well as from throughout Ser-
bia, primarily because of their belonging to the communist party or
as its supporters, and shortly partisans too, as well as many civilians
were interned there. The Banjica concentration camp had a twofold
administration: German authorities kept two thirds of the camp un-
der their direct control, while the remaining third was managed by
the City of Belgrade Administration, through Svetozar VujkoviÊ. The
ultimate control over the camp was carried out by the Gestapo.37
At the same time, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) was
given the ‘green light’ from Moscow to organize armed resistance
against fascist occupiers and their collaborators. The MolotovΩVon
Ribbentrop Pact, (which meant the international ban on any commu-
nist party linked to the Soviet Union commencing any act against Ger-
man forces) automatically ceased to be in force. At that moment, the
Soviet Union needed all available forces in the country and abroad, so
as to confront their mighty enemy.
In Serbia, the call to battle was accepted by all members of the
Communist Party and its organizations; primarily those consisting of
youth. At the moment when the Communist Party Central Commit-
tee issued a decree to all peoples of Yugoslavia to rise up “all as one
and go into battle against the occupier and his local servants”,38 armed
action, sabotage and other actions had already started. It was the be-
ginning of a battle which the KPJ conducted continuously until the
end of the war and which led to the liberation of the country and the
creation of socialist Yugoslavia.
37 More about Banjica concentration camp: Sima BegoviÊ, Logor Banjica 1941-1944,
Institut za savremenu istoriju, Belgrade, 1989; Evica MickoviÊ and Milena Ra-
dojËiÊ (eds.), Logor Banjica: Logoraši, knjige zatoËenika Koncentracionog logora Be-
ograd-Banjica 1941Ω1944, Istorijski arhiv grada Beograda, Belgrade, 2009; Branislav
BožoviÊ, Specijalna policija u Beogradu, Srpska školska knjiga, Belgrade, 2003
38 Concerning those moments, cf.: OslobodilaËki rat naroda Jugoslavije, book 1, Voj-
noistorijski institut, Belgrade, 1963, pp. 41Ω45

Reactions by occupational forces in an attempt to quell the upris-
ing, developed in two directions. On the one hand, military units re-
inforced by quisling gendarmerie and police charged into pursuit and
frontal combat with the insurgents, while on the other hand, punitive
measures were applied with the aim of intimidating the population,
intended by the occupiers as deterrents for all who planned to join the
insurgents or to assist them in any way. The objective of these meas-
ures was also to influence the mostly passive population, which was
meant to remain loyal to the new authorities and, in fear of retalia-
tion, to help break up the anti-fascist uprising.
The first executions by shooting were carried out in Belgrade as
early as the start of July, when 13 communists and Jews were shot
in retaliation for an attempted attack on the Military Commander in
Serbia. In Obrenovac, on the 4th of July, 10 communists were shot be-
cause of sabotage, while two days later, in Belgrade, 16 communists
and Jews were executed.39 Executions were conducted during the fol-
lowing days as well, while on the 28th of July the first mass execution
was carried out, in which, out of 122 hostages shot, 100 were Jews.40 It
was similar in other towns and parts of Serbia: on the 10th of August,
in Užice, 81 persons were shot; on the 15th of August the village Ske-
la near Obrenovac was burnt down, while 50 hostages were shot who
had been brought from the Banjica camp; on the 18th of August, 38
people were executed near Požega; in Prnjavor, in western Serbia, on
the 20th and 21st of August, over 140 peasants were killed.41
39 Streljanje deset komunista, “Novo Vreme”, 15 July 1941, p. 3; Streljanje 16 komuni-

sta i Jevreja u Beogradu, “Novo Vreme” , 17 July 1941, p. 3
40 Stroge mere protiv Jevreja i komunista u Beogradu, “Novo Vreme” , 29 July 1941,
p. 3
41 Milan BorkoviÊ, ibid., p. 78

Chetniks
During those months, alongside the communists, there was another
group of people who had the ambition to stand up to the Germans
and who will be remembered as “Chetniks”. In May1941, colonel
Draža MihailoviÊ rounded up a part of the Yugoslav Royal Army of-
ficers who, having refused capitulation, wanted to continue their fight
against the occupier. Consequently, they represented military field
force continuity with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia army,42 whose polit-
ical existence was represented by the government and royal family in
exile in London. The liberation of the fatherland and reestablishing
the rule of KaraoreviÊ family, on the grounds of political, economic
and social order which had existed up until the collapse in April 1941,
were initially the main goals of that movement.
Draža MihailoviÊ was also joined by representatives of pre-war par-
ties, who gave a political dimension to the Chetnik movement; among
them being Dragiša VasiÊ, Stevan MoljeviÊ, Mladen ZujoviÊ and oth-
ers, who formed the Central National Committee, which played the
most important role in the movement. Despite the Committee, the
Chetnik movement survived, mostly due to the convictions of its lead-
er Draža MihailoviÊ who believed that political work shouldn’t be al-
lowed to overpower military organization, without having a true and
clear political programme: in actuality, it the organization relied on
the programme of Serbian Cultural Club, which had been active up
until the beginning of the war.43 In that spirit, Stevan MoljeviÊ had al-
ready created the “Greater Serbia” project near the end of June 1941.
Taking as its starting point the need for all regions of the Kingdom
of Yugoslavia to unite into a whole, MoljeviÊ also expressed the need
for Greater Serbia to become homogeneously pure, primarily by re-
locating the non-Serbian element (especially Croats) outside the bor-
42 Branko PetranoviÊ, Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939Ω1945, VojnoizdavaËki i

Novinski centar, Belgrade, 1992, p. 363
43 Ibid, p. 379

ders of that new unit, but also by cleansing it of ethnic minorities and
non-national elements (i.e. communists). Accordingly, the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia was to be reorganized so that Serbia and Serbs would have
central, but also absolute power at last, whereas other units (Croatia,
Slovenia, etc.) would be subordinate. Thus Serbia would gain a central
place in the entire Balkans.44 Revenge against Croats and Muslims, be-
cause of crimes already perpetrated against Serbs in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina and Croatia, was also an important factor of that project.
The lack of a clear ideological determination against fascism and
Nazism, on the one hand, as well as a continuation of the implementa-
tion of nationalization policy, (which the ruling Serbian circles had be-
gun violently during the wars in 1912 and 1913) brought the Yugoslav
Army in the fatherland to the place somewhere in between anti-oc-
cupier attitudes and opportunistic collaboration with the occupiers
and quislings. With the aim of realizing their plans, it was possible,
in many cases, to adapt to their new situation without any great prob-
lems. Between Chetnik and quisling forces, there was a shared stand-
point that communists are the greatest enemy: if, for the quislings,
they represented an evil that should be destroyed (since they were the
greatest enemy against the National Socialist order) for Chetniks they
were a serious and tangible threat to reestablishing a centralized mon-
archy within Serbia with Serbs at its head. Wartime circumstances
permitted that, for the sake of that shared interest, weapons be point-
ed at the communists, on several occasions, up until the end of the
war. It was in the name of anti-communism, following negotiations
with the Germans in November 1941, that a special kind of coopera-
tion started between the government of Milan NediÊ and the Yugoslav
Army of the Fatherland, which MihailoviÊ allowed by way of legaliza-
tion of a certain number of his squads, through receiving weapons, fi-
nancial aid, food or joint action in regions endangered by partisans.45
44 Ibid, p. 381
45 Ibid, p. 391

Legalized Chetniks became a problem for the military efficiency of
Draža MihailoviÊ’s army, but at the same time, by way of the ease with
which they became accustomed to the new duty, they showed that
among many officers, sub-officers and soldiers of Yugoslav Army of
the Fatherland there was no awareness about the battle against the oc-
cupier, nor were there ideological obstacles against cooperation with
Germans. Thus the Yugoslav Army of the Fatherland effectively be-
came part of the quisling apparatus, which was, in fact, part of the
new National Socialist order.
The idea about creating the homogeneous Greater Serbia and col-
laboration with quisling and occupational formations created ide-
al possibilities for Draža MihailoviÊ’s forces to commence with the
implementation of their plan for cleansing territories from ethnic
minorities. In addition to mass crimes they perpetrated in Bosnia-Her-
zegovina and Montenegro as early as September 1941, they carried
out, in February 1943, a massacre of the Muslim population in east-
ern Bosnia, while in Sandžak they killed over 8,000 innocent people,
mostly women and children.46
Battle and situation in the summer of 1941;

formation of “The Government of National Salvation”
During July and August 1941, the uprising against the Germans spread
to various parts of occupied Serbia. It covered MaËva, Posavina and
part of Šumadija, where the Communist Party and Chetniks already
started liberating villages, towns and large regions, striking consider-
able blows to occupational and quisling forces.47 In other parts of Ser-
bia also, battles were fought and acts of sabotage organized, especially
46 For more on Chetniks of Draža MihailoviÊ and their crimes against civilians, cf.:
Jožo TomaševiÊ, »etnici u Drugom svetskom ratu, Liber, Zagreb, 1979; Ivan Ma-
toviÊ (ed.), ZloËini ËetniËkog pokreta u Srbiji 1941-1945, Zbornik radova sa okruglog
stola održanog 25. septembra 2012, SUBNOR Srbije, Belgrade, 2012; Fikreta
JeliÊ-ButiÊ, »etnici u Hrvatskoj 1941-1945, Globus, Zagreb, 1986
47 OslobodilaËki rat..., pp. 52Ω55

with the objective of disabling railway traffic and communications. In
Belgrade, during July and August 1941, communist activists, mostly
belonging to the younger generation, carried out about fifty actions
against German and quisling forces, attacking enemy soldiers and of-
ficers, as well as “national traitors”; burning their vehicles, destroying
warehouses with fuel and ammunition, cutting down telegraph and
telephone poles etc.48
The Commissary Government did not prove stable and strong
enough to destroy the forces of the People’s Liberation Movement, nor
to win the sympathy of the citizens. This led the German occupational
authorities to find an alternative which would somewhat change the
situation to their advantage. After negotiating with Berlin and gaug-
ing the political situation on site, they reached the decision that a Ser-
bian government should be formed with a greater extent of autonomy
than had been the case with the Commissary Government. Adminis-
trative Headquarters Chief Turner, who was once again the brains of
the operation, wanted the German administration to be visible to the
citizens’ eyes as little as possible, meanwhile the Serbian government
would be supported in its work. “If orders were necessary from the oc-
cupier’s side, then those same orders were discussed with ministries
before being issued, and issued solely when the situation was avoided
whereby other tasks would be severely threatened, the same held true
for the ministries’ intentions to issue orders”,49 testified Turner after
the war. At the same time, during mid-August in Belgrade, there was
a meeting of politicians, representatives of various pre-war parties,
chambers, associations, universities and other organizations, where
Milan AÊimoviÊ formally resigned and explained the situation. It was
proposed that the Prime Minister of the new government i.e. “the
Government of National Salvation” be army general Milan NediÊ.50
48 Ibid, pp. 62Ω63

ministration in Serbia, p. 8
50 Milan BorkoviÊ, ibid., pp. 96Ω97

The new Serbian government was formed on the 29th of August
1941. Political legitimacy requested as early as May by Milan AÊimoviÊ
was also requested by Milan NediÊ, who invited representatives of
prewar political parties to participate in its work.51
Each ministry in the Serbian government was assigned a Ger-
man clerk, who reported to the Military Commander’s Administra-
tive Headquarters about the work of that ministry. This relationship
existed on the local level as well. Between the Administrative Head-
quarters, Feldkommandantur, Ortskommandantur, the Gestapo and
Feldgendarmerie, on the one side, and administrative and self-rule
bodies of Serbian government administration on the other, there were
special bodies that functioned as a connection: they controlled the
operation of Serbian institutions, provided support and assistance, is-
sued orders each time it was necessary, “so that there was full cooper-
ation”, as Milan NediÊ himself said after the war.52
NediÊ’s perception of the role of Serbia is clear from one simple
sentence of his: “the Serbian people have a calling to be the guardian
and gendarme in the Balkans for the centre of Europe, i.e. for the Re-
ich and its European plans.”53 In his first address to the Military Com-
mander, he clearly underscored the continuity with the Commissary
Government and the need for establishing an “autonomous” Serbia
within the new National Socialist order:
51 AJ, 110-102-763, Decision on Determining the Crimes of Occupiers and their Col-
laborators, Harald Turner, p. 3. For biographies of ministers in the government
of Milan NediÊ, cf.: Biografije novih ministara, “Novo vreme”, 30 August 1941,
pp. 3Ω4
52 AVII, Military Courts, case Harald Turner and others, 3/III, book 1, Excerpts
from minutes concerning the hearing of Milan NediÊ, p. 4
53 NemaËka obaveštajna služba (German Secret Service), volume VIII, Državni sekre-
tarijat za unutrašnje poslove FNRJ, Uprava državne bezbednosti (State secretar-
iat for internal affairs of FPRY, State Security Administration), Belgrade 1956;
doc. no. 145, NediÊ’s perceptions of the role of Serbia (note by Hans Rexeisen, SS
captain, after a conversation with NediÊ 17th of June 1943).

Accepting the authorization that You have entrusted me, I would like,
foremost, to thank You on the behalf of the Serbian people and my
own behalf, for making it possible for the Serbian people to get their
own government, which will autonomously conduct its operations and
attend to their fate. I also thank You on the accurate observation expre-
ssed here that Serbian people neither have nor want to have anything
in common with communist troublemakers, who — incited by forei-
gn propaganda — are killing and plundering their own Serbian people
solely with the aim of wreaking havoc in the country and imperiling
the lives of innocent citizens and the most pressing interests of the pe-
ople. Introducing to You, on this occasion, my associates, I kindly ask
of You, Mr Military Commander, to trust my own and my associates’
firm will to crush anarchy in the country, providing instead comple-
te peace, order and security. As part of the new opportunities You are
providing us, to autonomously conduct operations of the Serbian peo-
ple, we will endeavor to build the future of the Serbian people in loyal
and amicable cooperation with the German Reich, as well as with its
representatives in Serbia, believing that the German people will pro-
perly comprehend and assess the inevitable needs of the Serbian peo-
ple. We hope that, in the shortest possible period, by implementing the
necessary reforms and organizing Serbian armed forces, by our own
means we will guarantee peace and order in the country, thus enabling
the withdrawal of German troops so they can devote their energies to
their own tasks. The Serbian people won’t forget that the German sol-
dier, even though the victor, has not taken revenge on anyone after
war operations ended, and has behaved properly towards the Serbian
people. With the return of peace and order, my government will com-
mit to further building the country in the economic and social aspects,
so that the country could recover, as soon as possible, from the seve-
re losses that it has sustained. I myself, as well as my colleagues, are
aware of the responsibility we are taking on by accepting to govern the
country, but we will invest all our efforts solely and exclusively towar-
ds the national interest, in loyal cooperation with You, Mr Military
Commander.54
The government of Milan NediÊ, which lasted, with certain recon-

structions, until the liberation of Serbia in October 1944, developed
its own kind of National Socialist ideology. Consequently, the Minis-
54 Quoted from Milan BorkoviÊ, ibid., p. 108

ters Council Chairmanship of Milan NediÊ contained a State Propa-
ganda Department where renowned pre-war Germanophiles worked.
Propaganda was also being spread via the Serbian Journalists Associa-
tion and around forty quisling papers of diverse content, such as Novo
Vreme (New Era), Obnova (Reconstruction), Naša borba (Our Battle) and
Srpski narod (Serbian People), but also by way of the Serbian Literary
Cooperative, which appointed as its head the well-known ideologist of
Serbian fascism Svetislav StefanoviÊ, who primarily supported the fa-
vouring of German books.55 Radio Belgrade was directly in the hands
of Germans, who made decisions about the programming, while there
were also various propaganda departments at headquarters and legal
seats of German occupational forces. Propaganda above all dealt with
communist “villains”, or with Jews and freemasons and their joint en-
deavours, against which Germany was “fighting bravely”. At the same
time, there was propagation of National Socialism ideas and the place
which Serbia and the Serbian people ought to have in the new order,
through the “cult of national awareness” and “cult of labor”.56 Even
Milan NediÊ proclaimed National Socialism to be “the ideal social or-
ganization” and he modeled the internal structure of Serbia after Nazi
Germany.57
In addition to the government of Milan NediÊ, there was also an
independently active group of the most ardent adherents of National
Socialism in Serbia, Dimitrije LjotiÊ’s “Zbor” (Rally), the basic tenets
of which were battle against freemasons, Jews, communists and west-
ern capitalism. Their ideology was close to National Socialism, ac-
cording to which, Serbia was to become an independent state attached
to Germany, with the king as its head.58 Armed squads of volunteers
55 Branko PetranoviÊ, ibid., p. 424

56 Ibid., p. 428
57 Olivera MilosavljeviÊ, ibid., p. 18. It is worth mentioning that this book repre-
sents the most valuable contribution to the understanding of NediÊ’s regime and
his ideology.
58 Branko PetranoviÊ, ibid., p. 416

“Zbor” were formed in September and October 1941 under the name
“Srpska dobrovoljaËka komanda“ (Serbian Volunteer Command), lat-
er to become “Srpski dobrovoljaËki korpus” (SDK) (Serbian Volunteer
Corps). Their ranks were open solely to ideologically aware persons,
while each unit had teachers or “educators” who taught the volunteers
in the spirit of Zbor principles.59 Germans trusted the “party army”
the most, especially in the fight against communism.
In the ideology of Serbian adherents of Nazism, from Milan AÊi-
moviÊ to Milan NediÊ and Dimitrije LjotiÊ, the attitude towards the
Roma was never defined so clearly as the attitude towards Jews. The
question arises as to whether it was the result of generally accepted
standpoint that had already prevailed in pre-war Serbia or perhaps the
Roma were indeed considered citizens of Serbia, albeit “second rate”.
All in all, they didn’t represent the major concern of Serbian rulers, at
least not until the autumn of 1941.
German reinforcements
Despite reorganization of the authorities, in the first half of September
it was clear that three German divisions and quisling forces weren’t suf-
ficient to quell the uprising. The situation was disquieting for the oc-
cupational apparatus, since actual danger existed that, at the moment
when the attack against SSSR was in full swing, it might lose control
over parts of the Balkan peninsula, and thus over communications with
the Aegean sea. Therefore, in addition to deployment of other military
units, on the 16th of September, Hitler personally appointed General
Franz Böhme to be the head of all military troops on the territories of
South-Eastern Europe in which uprising had broken out, so that it could
be quelled. Böhme was subordinated solely to the commander for the
South-East, Generalfeldmarschall List, while his Supreme Command
was compelled to be stationed in Serbia.60 That same day, Supreme
59 Ibid., pp. 415-416

60 Zbornik NOR (People’s Liberation War Anthology), volume I, book 1, doc. 158

Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) Chief Wilhelm Keitel signed a
command whereby 100 communists were to be shot for each German
soldier killed and 50 for each one wounded. The command pertained to
all occupied territories in which, according to German estimates, there
was activity by the mass movement directed by Moscow.61
German authorities allowed NediÊ to increase the number of mem-
bers of the Gendarmerie to up to 5,000 people, so that at the moment
of Hitler’s decision to appointing Böhme the head of all forces in com-
bat against the People’s Liberation Movement, quisling formations
could count on roughly 11,000 people, including LjotiÊevci and the
Chetniks of Kosta PeÊanac.62
Despite the fact that, even then, the major goal of occupational
forces was the pacification of the country and destruction of the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Movement, the clumsy apparatus in Belgrade contin-
ued to regularly perform its functions, among which was the issue of
Jews, and now also the issue of the Roma.
Male Jews from Banat and some of those from Belgrade were al-
ready interned in the concentration camp at Topovske šupe63 and the
fate of their families was already being discussed, not only in Belgrade
but also in Berlin. Plenipotentiary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Felix Benzler, requested from Ribbentrop, in mid-August, that Jews
from Serbia be deported to the general governorship in Poland,64 but
his impact and role in Belgrade weren’t sufficient for the National So-
cialist authorities in Berlin to initiate that “evacuation”. The position
of Administrative Headquarters Chief Harald Turner was different.
He portrayed the situation clearly in a memorandum sent on the 21st
of September to general Böhme, who had just arrived in Serbia, and
61 Zbornik NOR, volume I, book 1, doc. 159

62 OslobodilaËki rat..., p. 65. The Chetniks of Kosta PeÊanac were active mostly in
southern Serbia and were in the service of German occupier.
63 Cf. chapter about Belgrade.
64 Zbornik NOR, volume XII, book 1, doc. 299

proposed certain measures for future steps of the occupational au-
thorities. Starting from his firm standpoint that local the quisling gov-
ernment represents a very useful, even necessary apparatus in ruling
Serbia, he first proposed that General NediÊ withdraw, at least tem-
porarily, since it was clear that a large number of civilians would be
killed in mass retaliations, and that by doing so, NediÊ would maintain
his credibility in front of the people. Existing ministries, as well as the
entire structure of clerks, would in that case be directly subordinate
to the Military Commander, whereas the squads of Kosta PeÊanac in
south-eastern Serbia and LjotiÊ’s volunteers in the space between Bel-
grade and Gradište, would continue to be active as separate police/
military units. With the aim of quelling the uprising, Turner proposed
strict measures against the civilian population in those territories that
had been most engulfed by the uprising. First and foremost, it was
necessary to carry out “a complete evacuation in the space west of
Šabac, in the arc between the Sava and the Drina”, thus punishing
all the inhabitants who were providing assistance to the insurgents.
In Turner’s opinion, the consequences would be twofold: on the one
hand, the action would be an intimidating example for other regions
of Serbia, while on the other hand, it would prevent the insurgents
from using the produce from that most bountiful area of the country.
Belgrade was considered another space where exemplary measures
were to be carried out. “Cleaning” the capital, whence “undoubtedly
the means are easily passed on to the insurgents”, meant the confine-
ment and liquidation of intelligentsia active in certain organizations,
which Turner himself mentioned in the memorandum, as well as ele-
ments which were proven to be assisting the communists. In addition,
it was suggested that all officers and sub-officers be arrested, except
those placed at the disposal of NediÊ’s government, and ultimately:
“There should also be severe forms of arrests of all Jews, which are al-
ready in progress, as well as simultaneous arrests of Gypsies”.65
65 Zbornik NOR, volume I, book 1, doc. 167

That same day, probably partly accepting Turner’s suggestions,
Böhme ordered the evacuation of inhabitants from the space in be-
tween the rivers Sava and Drina, west of Šabac. For the male popu-
lation aged between 15 and 60, it was envisaged that they be sent to
camps to the north of the river Sava, whereas the female population
was to be banished towards the south, while the villages were burnt.66
Meanwhile, during the counseling held in Dulene on the 16th
of September 1941, the headquarters of NOP (PLM) squads of Ser-
bia reached a decision on the creation of a large liberated territory in
western parts of the country, from the mountain Cer in the north, to
Sandžak in the south, and from the river Drina in the west to Šumadi-
ja in the east.67 The partisan units’ endeavor, at that moment support-
ed by Chetniks, led to the creation of the so-called “Republic of Užice”,
i.e. the first liberated territory in the entire subjugated Europe. Short-
ly, however, the occupational forces organized a large offensive for the
purposes of reestablishing authority. The pressure exerted by German
and quisling forces from the north, from MaËva, and from the east,
from the direction of Kraljevo, Kragujevac and Požega, soon led to the
surrounding of the republic of Užice. Meanwhile, the Chetnik forces
of Draža MihailoviÊ turned their weapons against partisans and com-
menced serious negotiations with quislings and with Germans. The fi-
nal break up between partisans and Chetniks occurred because Draža
MihailoviÊ rejected the partisans’ proposal about the continuation of
the joint fight against the occupier, under rigorous rules, on the 27th
of October 1941. This moment also marked the beginning of an un-
ceasing conflict between anti-fascists gathered around KPJ (CPY) and
Draža MihailoviÊ’s nationalists, who, in a desperate attempt to win in
the fight for power and creation of Greater Serbia as part of a monar-
chist Yugoslavia, started intensively cooperating with occupiers and
quislings, not only on the territory of Serbia, but also on the territo-
66 Ibid., doc. 168. More on those events in the chapter on genocide against the
Roma in other towns of Serbia.
67 DojËilo MitroviÊ, Zapadna Srbija 1941, Nolit, Belgrade, 1975, p. 145

ry of NDH (ISC), especially in regions under direct control of Italian
forces. After unsuccessful attempts to attack and break up the parti-
san strongholds at Užice and Ivanjica, Chetniks succeeded in captur-
ing 325 partisans from various NOP squads and as a token of loyalty
(resulting from agreements just made with the occupier), they turned
them over to German forces, who shortly executed them. The battle
for Užice started on the 25th of November and lasted until the 30th of
November. With the entry of strong enemy forces into the city, par-
tisan units were pushed towards the south, to Sandžak, and shortly
towards Bosnia.68 From that moment on, the KPJ led the People’s Lib-
eration Battle mostly on the territory west of the river Drina, whereas
in Serbia smaller squads were active, and the situation relatively calm
up until the summer of 1944.
The collaborationism entered into by the Chetniks at that time and
which characterized their demeanor throughout the war, justified by
the need to put an end to ferocious intimidation that Germans applied
in Serbia against the civilian population, enabled the occupational and
quisling authorities to implement their programmes in relative peace.
Jews and Roma: distinct categories for execution

With the arrival of General Böhme in Belgrade and defining the ratio
of 100 hostages in return for one killed and 50 for a wounded German
soldier (later for Volksdeutsche as well), the military authorities found
themselves in a new situation. As had been the case up until then,
they had the task of directly clashing with the insurgents, assisted by
other forces Ω police and security services, above all, quislings Ω but
at the time they were also responsible for mass intimidations which
were carried out against civilians as retaliation for the People’s Liber-
ation Battle. Up until then, duties related to executing hostages were
the responsibility of SD (Sicherheitsdienst) and the order police.69
68 On the course of the battle to seize Užice, cf.: OslobodilaËki rat…, pp. 117-121
69 Valter Manošek, ibid., p. 86

The new role that Wehrmacht had in the Balkans, i.e. in Serbia,
wasn’t something foreign or new in the German army; a fact which
can explain the efficiency with which the officers and soldiers com-
mitted themselves to their assignments. Mass executions of war cap-
tives, civilians, Jews and Roma had already been performed large-scale
in eastern Europe and especially in the Soviet Union, where close co-
operation existed between the regular army and Einsatzgruppe, not
only in relation to providing logistics but also in participating in mass
executions themselves as a sign of retaliation for partisan attacks.70
The opportunity to implement the new policy arose for occupational
authorities in Serbia during the start of October.
Near the town of Topola, on the 2nd of October, partisan forces
carried out an attack on a German column and killed 21 soldiers. Two
days later, general Böhme ordered, at the initiative by his subordi-
nate officers, Captain Faulmüller and Colonel Pemsel, the execution
of 2,100 Serbian prisoners from concentration camps in Šabac and in
Belgrade, primarily Jews and communists.71 Although at first glance
the command didn’t pertain to the Roma, several days later, specifi-
cally on the 9th of October, in the report by Security Police Chief and
SD from Berlin, it was registered that “with the objective of retaliation
for 21 German soldiers who were killed near Topola several days ago,
2,100 Jews and Gypsies (will be) executed (...) 805 Jews and Gypsies
70 E.g. cf.: Omer Bartov, German Soldiers and the Holocaust: Historiography, Research
and Implications, in History and Memory no. 9 (1/2)1997; Jürgen Förster, The Wehr-
macht and the War of Extermination Against the Soviet Union, in Michael Marrus,
The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews. (tome
3, vol. 2, The “Final Solution”: The Implementation of Mass Murder), Meckler Press,
Westpoint, 1989; Jürgen Förster, Complicity or Entanglement? The Wehrmacht, the
War and the Holocaust, in Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, The Holocaust
and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined, Indian Uni-
versity Press, Bloomington, 1998; Geoffrey P. Megargee, War of Annihilation: Com-
bat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941, Roman and Littelfield, Lanhman, 2007
71 Christopher Browning, Fateful Months. Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solu-
tion (revised edition), Holmes & Meier, New York-London, 1991, pp. 47Ω48;
Zbornik NOR, volume I, book. 1, doc. 189

will be taken from the camp at Šabac, while the rest from the Jewish
temporary detention camp in Belgrade“.72
That change, which marks the beginning of extermination of the
Roma (extermination of Jews was already in progress), occurred be-
cause of the intervention by Military Administration Chief Turner,
who altered Böhme’s command about executing primarily Jews and
communists into “Along with Jews, instead of communists, the Roma
should be shot”.73 It was a personal success of the Military Adminis-
tration Chief, who had shown, on several occasions, as for instance in
the memorandum dated the 21st of September, the wish to solve the is-
sues of Jews and the Roma as soon as possible. That same day, the first
executions were carried out in the vicinity of the village of Deliblato
in Banat; then on 11th of October in Jajinci and on the 14th of October
in Rakovica, near Belgrade, and then on the 11th and 12th of October
in Zasavica, in the vicinity of Šabac.74 Roma nationality victims were
mostly from Šabac. It is not clear as to whether the Roma from Bel-
grade had been shot or not, they probably had not, since German au-
thorities had at their disposal numerous Jewish hostages.
After the partisan attack near Valjevo on the 16th of October, in
which 10 German soldiers were killed and 24 wounded, Turner fore-
stalled Böhme and suggested the execution of 2,200 Serbs, of which
600 were to be shot by the 64th Police Reserve Battalion, which was
directly subordinated to Turner at the time, whereas the remaining
1,600 hostages were to be shot by the sentinel regiment of Belgrade.75
Ten days later, a day before Wehrmacht units started executing
hostages, Turner sent a communique to all Feldkommandanturs and
Kreiskommandanturs, explaining the manner in which hostages nec-
72 Ibid, doc. 200

73 Valter Manošek, ibid., p. 98, footnote no. 185.
74 Rena Rädle and Milovan Pisarri (eds.), Mesta stradanja i antifašistiËke borbe u Beo-
gradu 1941-1944. PriruËnik za Ëitanje grada, Milan RadanoviÊ, Belgrade, 2012, pp.
209-229
75 Valter Manošek, ibid., p. 103

essary for executions were to be arrested. In that order, among other
things, the position of male Roma was definitively determined:
The starting point should be the general postulate that Jews and Gypsi-
es are, overall, an unreliable element, thus representing a threat to pu-
blic order and security. Jewish intellect is what started this war; it must
be destroyed. Gypsies can’t be useful members of the national commu-
nity, taking into account their spiritual and physical build. It has been
determined that the Jewish element has participated considerably in le-
ading gangs, while Gypsies themselves are responsible for remarkable
atrocities and for secret service duty. Thus, all Jewish and Gypsy men
must essentially be placed at the disposal of the troops as hostages. Be
that as it may, there is an intention whereby women and children of
Jews and Gypsies would be collected at a detention camp so that this
element of disturbance be evicted and thus removed from Serbian spa-
ce. Necessary preparations ought to be undertaken accordingly.76
Of course, Turner’s command could not be adopted without Böhme’s

approval. But, whereas for the representative of military occupational
apparatus and SS member, Turner, it was a political issue, for the com-
mander-in-chief of military forces engaged against partisans, it was all
about reaching the quotas for executions.77
During the subsequent days, large-scale arrests of male Roma pop-
ulation were conducted in Belgrade, who were detained for a short
time at the Topovske šupe camp before together with Jews, being ex-
ecuted at the village Jabuka,78 while similar actions were suggested
for Serbia proper as well. Once again, the proposal originated from
Turner. On the 3rd of November, citing Böhme’s order about taking
hostages from communist ranks, Jews, as well as nationalists, he again
ordered all Feldkommandanturs to arrest “as hostages all Jews and
Gypsies”. His intentions were already geared towards solving the issue
of women and children: “Further, a substantial number of Jewish and
76 Zbornik NOR, volume I, book 1, doc. 234; origninal in German in AVII, NA, 27II-
1-36/1 and 36/2
77 NemaËka obaveštajna služba, volume IV, p. 157
78 Cf. chapter on Belgrade.

Gypsy women and children should be sent, from their place of resi-
dence, and the preparation completed for their relocation to a deten-
tion camp in the vicinity of Belgrade”.79
In the days that followed, Jews and Roma from Serbia proper were
arrested as hostages in a greater numbers. However, Nazis weren’t so
rigorous towards the Roma as they were towards Jews, because they
didn’t have anything to plunder (since the Roma were primarily poor)
as well as because of their greater mobility and “lack of discipline”,
and who, unlike Jews, didn’t respond to summonses for reporting”.80
In some cases, local authorities had to protest in front of Turner
himself since Serbian cantons weren’t capable of supporting the ar-
rested Roma and Jews, as was the case with the Brza Palanka canton81.
Executions certainly continued over the subsequent period, and the
Roma were victims just like Jews. According to data collected at the
end of the war by the State Commission for Determining the Crimes
of Occupiers and their Collaborators, around 1,000 Roma were shot in
Belgrade,82 around 300 in Leskovac, 150 in Šabac, 70 in Kruševac, 250
in Kragujevac,83 etc.
After a month, genocidal measures also encompassed women, at
least in Belgrade. They were imprisoned at the Sajmište camp, to-
gether with Jewish women and children, although they were mostly
released after three months. Nonetheless, a certain number of them
died at the camp itself from starvation, disease and winter cold, while
it is also logical to suppose that others died after returning home from
the consequence of concentration camp life.84
79 Zbornik NOR, volume I, book 1, doc. 226; in German, AVII, NA, 27II-1-40/1
(NOKW 801).
80 Sima BegoviÊ, ibid., p. 32
81 Venceslav GlišiÊ, ibid., p. 88
83 AJ, 110-613-541. Cf. chapter on genocide against the Roma in other towns of
Serbia.

By allowing still alive women, children and men to be erased from
lists of “Gypsies”, on the grounds of an order issued by the Military
Commander on the 11th of July 1941, effective for all who were already
in the concentration camp, German authorities obviously opted for a
different solution to the “Gypsy issue” in Serbia. Like Kiessel testified
after the war: an order came from Berlin that just nomads be arrest-
ed, “not those with permanent residence, who could be considered
an integral part of the population to a certain extent”,85 Occupation-
al authorities also automatically erased the very existence of Roma in
Serbia by erasing them from lists of “Gypsies”, at least in the bureau-
cratic sense. From the moment of erasure, these Roma were consid-
ered Serbs and, at least theoretically, again enjoyed all the rights they
had had prior to the introduction of anti-Roma measures. Therefore,
on the 29th of August 1942, Turner proudly informed the newly ap-
pointed Commander of the South-East, General Loehr, that “the Jew-
ish issue, as well as the Gypsy issue, had been completely liquidated.
Serbia is the only country in which the Jewish issue and the Gypsy
issue have been solved“.86 Jews were exterminated, men and women
alike, whereas the Roma, after the mass executions of autumn 1941
and their internment at Sajmište and other concentration camps, and
subsequent release, were definitely turned into Serbs Ω although it
should never be forgotten that a considerable number of them died at
the camp itself or immediately after leaving it.
Despite this, the bureaucratic apparatus continued publishing, just
like in many other occupied territories, provisions against Jews and
Roma. The quisling Ministry of Education ordered, on the 5th of Sep-
tember, that schools must stop enrolling children of Jewish and “Gypsy”
background if they belong to the territory of the Military Command-
er in Serbia (including Banat), until a new directive is issued about
85 Cf. footnote 23.

86 Quoted from: Valter Manošek, ibid., p. 197

their schooling87; while the mass execution of Jews was already in pro-
gress, and the execution of Roma had just been ordered, on the 21st of
October 1941, quisling authorities issued the Main directive about the
University, within which article 27 stipulated that “Jews and Gypsies
cannot attend University (colleges)”.88 After mass executions of men
and just several days after internment of women at Sajmište camp, in
the Directive about the introduction of national service, which NediÊ’s
government adopted on the 16th of December, article 3 reads that “the
following people are exempt from national service duty: (…) Jews,
Gypsies and those persons who do not enjoy honourable civil rights”;89
and ultimately, when the mass killing by poisonous gas at the so-called
“dushegubka” was in progress of women and children interned at Sa-
jmište, in the Rules of procedure of the Serbian work community dated
the 3rd of April 1942, article 20 stipulated that: “Jews and Gypsies can-
not be members of the Serbian work community.”90
Similar commands were issued even after “the final solution to
Jewish and Gypsy issue”: in the Directive on Organization of Film
Screenings, issued on the 23rd of February 1943, article 3 stipulates,
among other items, that “Jews and Gypsies as well as persons married
to Jews or Gypsies cannot be granted a permit for running a cinema”,
and that “Jews and Gypsies as well as persons married to Jews or Gyp-
sies cannot be employed by cinemas“.91 The Directive on national work
service for rebuilding Serbia, adopted as late as the 16th of May 1944,
art. 7 reads that “Jews and Gypsies do not have the right to service at
the National work service for rebuilding Serbia”.92
87 AJ, 110-908-554, Nadleštvo Podbana za Banat, Prosvetno odeljenje Direktorima

gimnazija i uËiteljske škole, Upraviteljima graanskih škola i školskim Nadzorni-
cima, IV no. 2728, 5th of September 1941
88 Olivera MilosavljeviÊ, ibid., p. 188
89 Ibid., p. 194
90 Ibid., p. 224
91 Ibid., p. 267
92 Ibid., p. 392

The perpetrators
Even though, regarding the activities of the occupational authority and
quisling apparatus, the issue of Roma was solved as early as 1942, it is
probable that the attitude towards them did not change. They contin-
ued to be considered “Gypsies”, as had been the case before the war and
during the first two years of war, that is Ω second rate citizens, so that
the word “Gypsies” itself went on appearing in quisling apparatus doc-
uments. However, wartime circumstances led to a different situation,
which proved to be fateful for many Roma in Serbia because of the role
which Draža MihailoviÊ’s Chetniks had until the end of the war.
As had already been clear in autumn of 1941, their major enemy of
the Chetniks was not the occupier but rather partisans led by the KPJ.
Therefore Chetniks commenced and accelerated the battle for power,
increasingly attacking partisans and being more frequently in the po-
sition of collaborator of the ocuppiers and quislings. In Serbia itself,
their targets were all partisans, their families and adherents, includ-
ing, of course, those under suspicion of supporting the communists.
In certain cases, the Roma belonged to that category and they were
assigned a horrible fate: nonetheless, legitimate doubt remains that
they were being killed just for being Roma, or whether as partisan con-
cealers and helpers. Δuprija municipality mayor, an adherent of LjotiÊ,
displaced the remaining Roma to neighbouring villages during 1942.
A group of Russian Roma, who had not sought refuge in Belgrade the
previous year, were in the village Vlaška at the time. That is where they
were surrounded by a group of Chetniks, during the night between the
8th and 9th of September 1942, and chased to the Morava riverbank:
their clothes were removed and all were slaughtered Ω 28 of them in-
cluding women and children Ω and thrown into the river.93
The other known case occurred in central Serbia. In the village Ko-
pljare, near Aranelovac, during the night between the 25th and 26th
93 Dimitrije –uliÊ and Miodrag MilaËiÊ, Na Moravi Δuprija, opštinski odbor SUB-
NOR, Δuprija, 1977. pp. 366, 403 and 438

of December 1943, Chetnik units subordinate to commander Nikola
KalabiÊ, slaughtered 24 persons, of which 20 were Roma, since they
had allegedly been communist concealers. In his report to Draža Mi-
hailoviÊ, KalabiÊ wrote: “In Kopljare, 24 active communists were cap-
tured while sleeping and slaughtered, of them 20 were Gypsies, who
admitted they were so-called ‘jarugaši’ (‘ravine dwellers’), minding
their household chores by day, staging action by night. I slaughtered
them all.”94 The event was also marked by NediÊ’s gendarmerie, which
provided additional information on the killed Roma: “In the night of
25/26 of the current month, in the village of Kopljare, in Orašac can-
ton, DM’s Chetniks slaughtered GavriloviÊ Milutin, the municipality
registrar, MilanoviÊ Radojica and SavkoviÊ Tihomir, farmers, as well
as 15 male Gypsies and 4 female Gypsies, burning down all Gypsy
houses in the village, and in addition the houses of two farmers whose
family members are in partisan ranks. The act has been carried out
because those killed had cooperated with partisans.“95
The Chetniks were, on the one hand, desperately attempting to es-
tablish some kind of control over certain territories in Serbia and oth-
er parts of Yugoslavia, while on the other hand, they ventured several
times into the process of realizing the political programme of creating
an ethnically pure Greater Serbia. Consequently, the Chetnik forces
carried out various crimes against the Roma of Islamic faith, who,
together with other Muslims, were to be exterminated or removed in
some manner from the future Serbian national territory. In this sec-
ond case, the crimes were the most extensive and affected the greatest
number of inhabitants in south-western Serbia, i.e. in Sandžak. There
are serious indications that in these massacres where over 8,000 wom-
en and children were killed, many Roma were also victims.96
94 Zbornik NOR, volume XIV, book 3

95 Zbornik NOR, volume I, book 21
96 Rajko –uriÊ and Antun MiletiÊ, ibid., pp. 409-410. The authors published a list of
92 Roma children killed in Priboj srez in the year 1943, exactly the time of Chet-
nik slaughters in that region.

The Roma who were victims of the terror perpetrated by forces
under Draža MihailoviÊ’s command, even if they cannot be consid-
ered victims of the National Socialist extermination plan, were still
the victims of genocide carried out by Chetniks against Muslims and
which also encompassed areas of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na in addition to south-western Serbia. How many Roma were killed
there by Chetniks? And whether or not there had been a plan of ex-
terminating Roma, i.e. what was supposed to be their position in the
future Greater Serbia? remain open questions, which other research
studies need to explore.
In the trials conducted after the war in front of Military Courts
of Yugoslav Authorities against war criminals, the issue of genocide
against the Roma seems to have never been taken into consideration.
In the court ruling against Turner, Kiessel and others, although
their responsibility for killing Jews is frequently mentioned, the killing
of Roma is never brought up. This also happens when the regulation
dated the 30th of May 1941 is mentioned,97 even though it pertained
to Jews and Roma alike. Forgettance of genocide against the Roma is
even more obvious in the ruling against Wilhelm Fuchs and others, in
which the following is written, among other things:
[they are guilty]
[...]
10. Because they directed all measures undertaken against Jews, or-
dered the gathering of all Jews from the Serbian territory in the con-
centration camp at Autokomanda, carried out the destruction of male
Jews, organized on the 8th of December 1941 a Jewish camp at Sajmište
for women and children and, from February until May 1941, directed
the destruction of Jewish women and children (...).98
Further, in the explication:
97 –ore LopiËiÊ, NemaËki ratni zloËini 1941-1945. Presude Jugoslovenskih vojnih sudo-
va, Muzej žrtava genocida, Belgrade 2009, pp. 51-54, 66
98 Ibid., p. 102

The concentration camp at Sajmište was founded by Dr. Fuchs in the
summer of 1941. It was founded for the purpose of rounding up Jews.
Therefore it represented a kind of Jewish ghetto. Solely Jews were sent
to that camp up until spring 1942.99
It is astounding that the Roma, who had passed through the same con-
centration camps and had been killed in the same execution fields, to-
gether with Jews, were literally erased from the accusation and from
the explication, although Yugoslav authorities were well aware that
a distinct policy of extermination had been carried out against this
group.
Where the Roma do appear, they remain just a momentary note.
Thus, for instance, in the ruling against Fuchs and others, it says that
in the second half of 1941, following Gestapo orders, Jews and “Gyp-
sies” from Belgrade were brought en mass by trucks near the village
Jabuka, in the vicinity of PanËevo, as well as to Deliblatski Pesak,
where they were executed by the Schutzpolizei;100 furthermore, in the
verdict against Karl von Bothmer, Feldkommandant of Niš, there is
mention of his responsibility for submitting lists of “suspicious per-
sons”, Jews and “Gypsies”, according to which the Gestapo conducted
arrests and internments at the camp Crveni krst.101 Those who had
planned and executed the genocide against the Roma were freed from
responsibility, it could be said, at the very beginning.
99 Ibid., p. 127
100 Ibid., p. 114
101 Ibid., p. 55

IV. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA
IN BELGRADE
Instatement of German and quisling authorities

During the first days after the bombing, Belgrade was a city in ruins,
not in a physical, but also in a political sense. Many buildings, espe-
cially in the city centre, were razed by the force of German bombs,
while around 2,500 citizens lost their lives. It was not the first time
that such scenes were witnessed in Belgrade, since Austro-Hungarian
and German grenade attacks from 1914 and 1915 were still fresh in
memory. However, in those April days of 1941, disaster struck so sud-
denly and so destructively that it was hard for anyone to grasp what
was going on. Alongside ruined buildings and dead citizens, the polit-
ical authority, or at least what remained of it at the time in the capital
of Kingdom of Yugoslavia, was also definitely demolished.
According to the census conducted by occupational and quisling au-
thorities on the 18th of May 1941, at that moment Belgrade had 253,729
inhabitants. The census excluded Zemun, neighboring villages, pris-
oners, the German army and patients in hospitals. Since the state of
emergency measures were still in force, the opinion was that it would
ultimately turn out that Belgrade had roughly 300,000 inhabitants.1
How many Roma lived in the capital of Serbia is difficult to deter-
mine, but it is known that they mainly lived in parts of the city called
Jatagan mala, Marinkova bara, Pašino brdo, »ubura, Zvezdara and
1 Beograd ima sada 253.729 stanovnika, prema najnovijem popisu Beogradske opštine,
“Novo vreme”, 25th of May 1941, p. 5.
GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN BELGRADE │ 77

amongst others. In addition to those with permanent residence in Bel-
grade for several decades or longer, many were newcomers from vari-
ous Serbian towns. They made their way towards the capital primarily
in the aftermath of World War I, because of the utter poverty that the
war and occupation had left behind. Therefore the Roma were mov-
ing to Belgrade, just like many other Serbian citizens, in the hope that
they would find better living conditions in the capital. However, the
large number of newcomers and impossibility of the city absorbing all
of them resulted in the natural development of big settlements, where
people lived in the most impoverished conditions. Consequently, the
Roma didn’t differ from many other Belgrade inhabitants fighting dai-
ly for survival.2 The Roma “original settlers”, who had lived there be-
fore World War I, started the process of self-organization through the
operation of associations, cooperatives and even their own assembly.
In the mid-thirties, the Roma newspaper “Romano Lil”3 started being
published, whereas in the year 1939, just before the war, “Belgrade
Roma Club” was founded.
The Roma who lived in Belgrade were left, at that time, without a
country, just like other citizens, while the only ones capable of react-
ing were members of the police and bureaucratic apparatus. Actually,
they didn’t react, but rather carried on, applying the usual diligence
that characterizes those apparatuses worldwide, with their work even
during the state of emergency Ω during and after the bombing. Al-
though without a political body, the city’s bureaucracy used the Roma
strengths, as they both counted their dead and continued fulfilling
their assignments related to the organization and management of the
city’s administrative and political life.
The occupier’s arrival just partly changed the situation in that as-
pect, because, viewed from the standpoint of bureaucracy, during
those first days, it was all about the change of who was issuing orders
2 On the Roma in Belgrade cf.: Dragoljub AckoviÊ, Romi u Beogradu....

3 Ibid., pp. 197-216.

and holding executive authority, while the essence of moral and pro-
fessional duty of each officer, clerk, policeman, firefighter and others
remained the same.
It meant that the structure of the apparatus remained almost un-
changed even after the occupier’s entry, with the only changes in
numbers of personnel stemming from a certain number of employees
being put in prison after the April battle, and Belgrade municipality
firing others near the end of May and start of June, due to reduced
finances.4
At the moment of the Nazi-fascist attack on Yugoslavia, Belgrade
was run by two basic administrative bodies, the city municipality and
the City of Belgrade Administration (UGB). While the municipality
dealt with the everyday tasks necessary for the normal functioning of
social and economic life in the capital of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,
the Administration represented a unique system in the entire coun-
try, the objective of which was to assure state and public security. Its
members were forbidden any political affiliation,5 which was meant
to underscore its purely state-oriented character. The Administration
was subordinate solely to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, while its
jurisdiction encompassed not only the City of Belgrade Municipality,
but also all neighbouring municipalities, including Zemun and PanËe-
vo. Since 1929, i.e. from the moment dictatorship was introduced and
clear approximation to a state regime typical for authoritarian and na-
tionalistic countries began, its jurisdiction when it comes to “certain
jobs” expanded to the entire country. Even though during the thir-
ties it had been the subject of several reorganizations, the City of Bel-
grade Administration strengthened its police function: specifically, in
its service, in addition to general, penal, technical and traffic police,
4 AVII, NdA, 20a-2-2/1 and 2/3. On the 26th of June 1941 the number of employ-
ees of all types (registrars, clerks, workers etc.) at the municipality amounted to
7,000 people.
5 Branislav BožoviÊ, Uprava i upravnici..., p. 90.

there was also a gendarmerie regiment and a squadron of mounted
gendarmerie.6
A major turnabout in the existence and role of City of Belgrade
Administration occurred in 1936, when the well-known Germano-
phile and anticommunist Milan AÊimoviÊ was appointed its head, the
same man to whom German authorities later entrusted power in Ser-
bia at the commencement of occupation. On the one hand, AÊimoviÊ
politicized the Administration, establishing an open liaison with the
government of Milan StojadinoviÊ, which increasingly strove to grow
closer to National Socialist Germany and fascist Italy, while, on the
other hand, he established close ties and official cooperation with the
German police, aided by his loyal associates,7 primarily Dragi Jovano-
viÊ; the future City of Belgrade Governor under German occupation.
It was the leading men of those institutions, especially Dragomir
Dragi JovanoviÊ and Milan AÊimoviÊ, who were among the most sig-
nificant elements the German authorities could rely on uncondition-
ally. As early as the 21st of April, less than ten days from their entry
into Belgrade, Dragi JovanoviÊ was appointed Extraordinary Commis-
sary of the City of Belgrade by SS Major Hans Helm, (an appoint-
ment which was officially confirmed the next day by colonel Ernst
Moritz von Kaisenberg, city commander) and on the 9th of May, from
the newly elected Commissary Government of Milan AÊimoviÊ, he
received the function City of Belgrade Governor.8 Simultaneously, he
received the function Belgrade Municipality Governor, which he held,
with the exception of one short period, until the end of the war.
During that short interval, many clerks who had escaped from the
German bombing (or had been far from their place of residence due to
6 Ibid., pp. 96-97.

7 Ibid., pp. 102 and 202Ω203. At the end of December 1938, Milan AÊimoviÊ be-
came Minister of Internal Affairs at Milan StojadinoviÊ’s government. He re-
mained in that function somewhat over a month, i.e. until that same government
resigned.
8 Ibid., p. 338.

some other reason) mostly returned to service. For those who had been
captured by Germans, JovanoviÊ and AÊimoviÊ requested, and were
often granted, special permits from occupational authorities to be lib-
erated and to return to service, since they were needed at the Admin-
istration or municipality. In the hearing before Yugoslav authorities in
1945, when asked “How did you carry out the organization of City of
Belgrade Administration and Belgrade Municipality?” and “(...) Have
you thus kept the clerks who had worked in those institutions before
the war?”, JovanoviÊ himself responded that he completely kept the
old organization of City of Belgrade Administration, according to ex-
isting directives, just changing the name of the General Police Depart-
ment to the Special Police Department, while on the city of Belgrade
territory, and instead of the gendarmerie regiment he introduced the
Serbian State Guard of CBA. At the municipality he kept the old or-
ganizational statute and old clerical apparatus.9 When it comes to the
administrative division of the city, as early as the 18th of May, a de-
tailed description was issued of the structure of police commissariats
and quarters,10 in which the only crucial difference from the prewar
order was the obligation to cooperate closely with local German au-
thorities. Continuity between prewar and war administrative and po-
lice apparatus is often apparent: “The personnel at the quarters mostly
stayed the same as before the war, since almost all people returned to
their duties”, it was claimed in the quisling newspaper “Novo Vreme”
in mid-May 1941.11 It was not only departments and personnel that
stayed unchanged, but also relations, duties and functions of the Ad-
ministration and municipality, as well as their place in the hierarchy,
9 IAB, b. 595-11 „Dragi JovanoviÊ“, Documents and hearing of Dragi Jovano-

viÊ, pp. 5-6.
10 Uspostavljanje i organizovanje podruËja Uprave grada Beograda, “Novo vreme” the
18th of May 1941, p. 5. It is noteworthy that the city of PanËevo was singled out
from CBA jurisdiction immediately following occupation, whereas the same
happened with Zemun several months later.
11 Kvartovi Uprave grada Beograda uvedeni su odmah praktiËno u život, „Novo vreme“,
19th of May 1941, p. 4.

according to which the Administration was subordinate to the Minis-
try of Internal Affairs, while the municipality was subordinate to oth-
er administrative bodies of that same Ministry. Naturally, everything
was strictly controlled by the German occupational authorities, which
conducted strict oversight of all quisling institutions and frequently
directed their operation, all the time leaving them with substantial au-
tonomy, under the condition that their work be performed in accord-
ance with the needs of National Socialist Germany.
Similarly, all municipality departments, especially those most nec-
essary after the bombing, were quickly in a completely functioning
state again. A good example that illustrates the great capacity for re-
generation of the bureaucratic and police apparatus, (although its old
political “head” had been severed, for the purposes of establishing a
new system in accordance with, the National Socialist military, po-
lice and political apparatus just arrived in Belgrade) is the efficient
reconstruction of the fire brigade. Specifically, on the 14th of April, the
acting City of Belgrade Municipality Governor ordered that the city’s
firefighting department be reactivated. The following day, the newly
appointed director set to cleaning the “Firefight Command” building,
i.e. the headquarters of Belgrade firefighters, as well as gathering fire-
fighters and volunteers and acquiring of new vehicles. Within several
days, the building was functioning, all vehicles were at their disposal,
and there were about fifty firemen and fifteen volunteers in service.12
In the first period of the City of Belgrade Administration’s exist-
ence, roughly up until the formation of the “National Salvation” gov-
ernment, near the end of August 1941, Dragi JovanoviÊ had at his
disposal a considerable number of people: CBA guards could count
on 52 officers and 1,550 sentinels (gendarmes, as they continued to
be called by the people), whereas civilian police had 180 clerks and
300 agents. Within the police force, a distinctive place was held by
12 IAB, OGB, b. 216, Izveštaj o naenom stanju u zgradi Požarne komande u Beo-
gradu (Report on the situation found at the Belgrade Firefight Command build-
ing), on the day of the 15th of April 1941 until the 24th of April 1941

the Special Police, in which 28-30 clerks were engaged and half of the
total number of agents: 150.13 Its main task was to battle against com-
munists, in which the majority of agents already had substantial expe-
rience, since they had been performing that same assignment in the
previous years, in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The “Serbian Gestapo”,
as the Special Police could be described, consisted of several depart-
ments, of which the most significant one was IV anticommunist de-
partment, where 14-18 clerks and 90 agents were engaged.14 Although
Special Police duties were performed within the Serbian regime, the
Gestapo decided that, starting from the 1st of June 1941, it would addi-
tionally finance its work, sending it 16,000 dinars every month for the
purposes of “repression of Jewish-communist action”. The money was
collected from mandatory “contributions” that the Gestapo imposed
on the Jewish community at the time.15
Needs imposed by the National Socialist head via its peripheral
bodies, including the military-occupational system in Serbia, required
that within the quisling regime, police authorities be in charge of
overseeing Jews and later Roma; therefore, already in April, as part
of Special Police, a distinct “work group” for Jews was formed, which
in May grew into Sector VII of the Special Police, also known as the
police for Jews or commissariat for Jews, becoming, on the 7th of June
that same year - Sector VII of Special Police for Jews and Gypsies.16
Its task was to oversee the Jewish and Roma population, so as to re-
spect the new order, which had placed those two categories of citizens
outside the law and prescribed separate rules for them. Furthermore,
Sector VII had to carry out the registration of Jews and Roma, as well
as their property. It performed these assignments in close cooperation
13 IAB, b. 595-11 „Dragi JovanoviÊ“, Dokumenti i saslušanje Dragog JovanoviÊa,

p. 8 and p. 10.
14 IAB, b. 595-11 „Dragi JovanoviÊ“, Dokumenti i saslušanje Dragog JovanoviÊa, p. 15.
15 Branislav BožoviÊ, Stradanje Jevreja u okupiranom Beogradu 1941-1944, Muzej žr-
tava genocida, Belgrade, 2012, p. 236.
16 Branislav BožoviÊ, Upravnici…, p. 121.

with the Jewish department of Belgrade Gestapo, as well as with the II
special sector of the State Protection Department operating as part of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Government of Serbia.17
Above all the local institutions was German authority. Belgrade
held the seats of the most important bodies of occupational and quis-
ling apparatus in Serbia, starting from the Military Commander and
president of quisling administration Milan AÊimoviÊ and later Serbian
Government Prime Minister Milan NediÊ.
The highest city body was Feldkommandatur 599. Its first com-
mander was von Kaisenberg, while on the 9th of February 1942 he was
succeeded by Major Adalbert Lontschar. Adhering to the same struc-
ture of main occupational administration, the Feldkommandantur
was divided into Command headquarters and Administrative head-
quarters, while it also had its own military courts, military police and
prison.18 As early as the beginning of May, the Feldkommandantur
was renamed City of Belgrade Command (Stadtkommandantur Bel-
grad), but it also kept its old name, as well as control over Kreiskom-
mandanturs 834 and 838.19
With the aim of thorough surveillance of the city, Belgrade city ter-
ritory was divided into seven sentinel sections, each with two infantry
troops at their disposal. The first six sections each covered two quar-
ters, i.e. administrative units of Belgrade, while the seventh encom-
passed the outskirts.20
In the occupational system, a special place was enjoyed by those be-
longing to the German national minority. Although in Belgrade itself,
in April 1941, there lived slightly over 5,000 domestic Germans, their
number soon rose to 25,000, of which the majority had moved from
17 Rena Rädle and Milovan Pisarri (eds.), ibid., pp. 86-88.

18 Muharem Kreso, NjemaËka okupaciona uprava u Beogradu 1941-1944, Belgrade,
Istorijski arhiv Beograda, 1979, pp. 84-85.
19 Ibid., p. 86.
20 Ibid., pp. 87Ω88.

Banat. It wasn’t accidental: alongside the fact that they were needed
by the occupational authorities, as thoroughly knowledgeable about
the Serbian language and situation in the country, they served in var-
ious police formations, managed Jewish shops21 and performed other
important duties. The influx of Volksdeutsche from Banat, but also
from Srem and BaËka, was favoured for another reason. In the Third
Reich plans, Belgrade was supposed to become a German fortress and
German garrison in the future German Danubian state,22 from where
territories up to the Danube delta would be ruled.
Anti-Roma legislative in Belgrade

After “cleansing” the Belgrade municipality from undesirable Jews,
which was carried out already at the beginning of May, (when all sec-
tors reported to the City of Belgrade Administration whether or not
they have Jews among employees),23 the same procedure was followed
for the “cleansing” of Roma employees. Their categorization first ap-
peared on the 21st of May, when there appeared, in a form sent by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Commissary Government to City of
Belgrade Municipality, for the purposes of keeping records on all em-
ployees, the question: “Racial belonging: among ancestors of 1st and
2nd degree i.e. was one of his parents or grandparents (maternal and
paternal) Jewish, or Gypsy and who was it?“24 The inquiry was prob-
21 Ibid., pp. 29Ω32.

22 Ibid., pp. 101Ω102.
23 Cf. E.g.: IAB, OGB, b. 211, unnumbered, City Governorship, Governing depart-
ment, procurement request for blue identity cards at the Ortskommandantur,
for clerks at the corporals who live outside the district, 10th of May 1941; City
Governorship, General department, T. V. No. 882, 7/V/1941, to the Director of
Governing department, procurement request for identity cards; List of clerks and
staff of the court department of Belgrade municipality for whom transit passes
are requested, unnumbered and undated; etc.
24 IAB, OGB, b. 211, City of Belgrade Administration, administrative department I
no. 390, 23 May 1941 (Ministry of Internal Affairs regulation no. 39, 21st of May
1941)

ably also sent to other Serbian municipalities, since regulations con-
cerning Jews and Roma were in force nationally.
In the days following the issuing of the first anti-Roma regulations,
dated the 22nd of May, and especially after the regulation dated the
30th of May 1941, “which concerns Jews and Gypsies”,25 quisling au-
thorities above all had to determine whether in various departments
of the municipality and City of Belgrade administration there are
Roma employees or not, so as to take suitable measures, that is Ω fire
them. Similarly as one month earlier, when he ordered that Jews em-
ployed at public services be identified, on the 10th of June, Dragi Jova-
noviÊ ordered that all municipality departments check if they have
“Gypsy” employees26 and report it within twenty-four hours to the au-
thorities in charge at the City of Belgrade Administration.
Already that same day, certain sectors checked the racial back-
ground of their employees and immediately sent a response to those
in charge. “I hereby report that this department does not have any em-
ployee of Gypsy origin”, wrote the Administrative department chief,
while the Governing department chief wrote that “in the Governing
department’s archive there is no clerk of Jewish or Gypsy origin”.27 In
the same or similar manner, all other departments and sectors acted
in accordance with Dragi JovanoviÊ’s order and so determined that
the entire bureaucratic structure of the City of Belgrade municipality
is “clean” from non-Aryan clerks.28
Results of the mandatory registration of Roma showed that out of
the 3,044 Roma registered up until the 26th of June, 2,080 were over
25 Cf. chapter on genocide against the Roma in Serbia.

26 IAB, OGB, b. 211, no. 4546, Belgrade City Governorship, Governing department,
10th of June 1941.
27 IAB, OGB, b. 212, br. 344362, Belgrade City Governorship, Administrative de-
partment, to the Governing department, 10th of June 1941; no. 4546, Belgrade
City Governorship, Governing department, 10th of June 1941.
28 IAB, OGB, b. 212, 45-46/41, Legal department to the Governing department, 11th
of June 1941; no. 4546/41, Personnel department to the Governing department,
10th of June 1941; etc.

the age of 14, while 964 were younger. In total, there were 1,081 men,
of which 326 were farmers and labourers, 261 musicians, 71 crafts-
men, 407 had miscellaneous jobs and 16 were unemployed.29
After the regulation dated the 30th of May, the Roma were left
without personal identity cards, just like Jews. The bureaucratic ap-
paratus constantly paid attention to this, as can be seen from all the
documents that pertain to citizens’ personal data. On the 3rd of June,
the City of Belgrade Administration ordered that all Belgrade citizens
of both genders of “Aryan origin” over the age of 16 must possess an
identification card.30 It had already been well known that Jews had
been excluded from the “Aryan origin”, but exclusion of the Roma,
based on a regulation issued several days before, was probably yet to
be accepted, at least in administrative language. Nevertheless, almost
two months later, the situation was much clearer. In the regulations
on issuing personal identity cards dated the 27th of July, in addition to
all provisions about the content of personal cards, as well as their ap-
pearance, it was underscored that “Jews and Gypsies must not be is-
sued identity cards”.31
Unlike Jews, who practically all lived in the city centre and who
were used for forced labour and exploited economically during that
period Ω at least the men, the Roma were in a different situation
where their social belonging was once again crucial, in the negative
sense, to their position. While the regulations on issuing identity cards
were being drawn up, the city of Belgrade municipality, probably in
agreement with German authorities, practically divided the city ter-
ritory into two parts, not allowing those who lived in the outskirts to
move freely in the city centre anymore without additional documents.
The provision pertained not only to distant districts, but also to those
29 Document published in Dragoljub AckoviÊ, Romi u Beogradu..., p. 253.

30 IAB, OGB, b. 2, no. 406, City of Belgrade Administration, Administrative de-
partment, 3rd of June 1941.
31 IAB, OGB, b. 2, Regulations on issuing identity cards.

where many Roma lived, such as, for instance »ubura or Pašino brdo.32
Criteria for issuing those documents were probably rather strict, while
the objective of the measure undertaken, it can be assumed, was an
attempt to place the inhabitants under firm control for security rea-
sons in those initial chaotic phases of occupation. Many Serbs were
surely affected by these measures, while for those who had jobs in the
city itself but didn’t succeed in procuring those additional documents,
it must have been a great setback in an economic sense. What is per-
haps the most significant to note however, is that those Roma who had
all their rights taken away and who were compelled to live marked by
a yellow armband, were practically ghettoized in their districts, since
they couldn’t even obtain plain identity cards, let alone the mentioned
additional documents. Simply put, the musicians, coach-drivers and
common labourers were compelled to stay in their homes and get by
to the best of their ability in order to survive.
The situation that ensued after the 30th of May regulation, follow-
ing a series of administrative measures and new assignments for the
police force in charge of overseeing Jews, (as well as Roma from then
on), led to protests within the Roma community itself. Although the
community wasn’t structured and didn’t have its representative insti-
tutions, that is Ω even though it couldn’t qualify as a separate auton-
omous community, certain groups of Roma nonetheless stood out in
the attempt to somehow be exempted from anti-Roma measures.
The local authorities registered that
After the census was conducted, a substantial number of Romanian
Gypsies asked to be deleted from the registry on the basis of permits
they had received from the Romanian Consulate here, claiming that
they are of Romanian nationality and, as such, should be deleted. This
issue was solved by requesting proof from the applicants concerning
nationality and origin to be issued by the municipality in charge.33
32 IAB, OGB, b. 211, no. 5631, List of citizens of city of Belgrade municipalities
from the outskirts, who were issued permits and passes for free movement, 2nd of
June 1941.
33 Document published in Dragoljub AckoviÊ, Romi u Beogradu..., p. 253.

On the other hand, a letter sent already on the 5th of June to Dragi Jova-
noviÊ by a group of twenty-six Roma “original settlers” is indicative:
To Sir City of Belgrade Governor
On the third of the current month, a regulation concerning Jews and
Gypsies was published in the paper “Novo Vreme”. According to the re-
gulation, Gypsies are made equal with Jews in almost everything. This
equation of us Gypsies with Jews is obviously unfounded, especially
when it comes to us, Belgrade Gypsies, and generally city Gypsies in
Serbia. Families of those Gypsies in Serbian cities have been living the-
re in many cases over a hundred years, so that we have almost always
been considered not newcomers but original settlers. Nearly 90% of
our families residing in cities have been of Serbian Eastern Orthodox
faith since the earliest times and we, as citizens, have almost always
had the same rights and the same obligations as other citizens, while
our national feeling, among Gypsy natives, has been exclusively Serbi-
an. It’s blatant that we, the Gypsies, have always been the most loyal
citizens of our country. We have done army service, paid taxes and dis-
charged all our other obligations towards the state as all other Serbs.
By way of honest and quiet work, the majority of us, city Gypsies, have
made ourselves modest households and settled down to family life. A
large number of us Gypsies are trained in various crafts, especially in
Serbia proper, while the greatest number of us are exclusively musici-
ans. As craftsmen, we have been earning daily bread for our families
honourably and honestly.
All the above also holds true because in the racial-biological aspect,
not one country Ω except Croatia nowadays Ω has singled out Gypsies
from Aryans, therefore, Sir Governor, on the behalf of Serbian Gypsies
Ω especially Serbian Gypsies who are Belgrade natives, we hereby most
kindly request the following:
1) that the regulation dated this 3rd of June, which equates us with
Jews, be changed;
2) that Gypsies musicians be allowed to work at common taverns, so as
to be able to earn their daily bread for their families in an honest way,
using their craft, with the proviso that we will strictly respect regulati-
ons that ban work on the radio, in theatres, variétés, bars and cinemas.
Finally we would like to point out: that in Belgrade there are a lot of
Gypsies newcomers, who are beggars, thieves and the like. Those Gypsi-
es don’t have any connection with us natives, either in the religious or

national or any other aspect, so we would like to request that they be
banished from Belgrade so that we, proper citizens, wouldn’t be bla-
med because of them.
Up until now, authorities have appointed from our ranks the chieftain
of Belgrade Gypsies. This has been of general usefulness so we request
from Sir Governor to appoint one chieftain now, so that he would pro-
vide the authorities with all explanations and assist them in governing
Gypsies in Belgrade. We will take the liberty to propose for that purpo-
se our most renowned man, Mr. Zdravko MilosavljeviÊ, musician, resi-
ding at the address BanjaluËka 4.
Hoping that Sir Governor will take our request into consideration, we
remain, respectfully Yours,
June the 5th 1941

In Belgrade
(signatures of 26 people)34
It is difficult to comprehend the circumstances in which such a letter

was written, as it is difficult to interpret whether the text was written
out of fear or if the undersigned had perhaps foreseen what would be-
fall them; or maybe it was the need of a group, among the most eman-
cipated Roma, to show their loyalty towards the new authorities and
be accepted as such; or maybe it was just an attempt to protect their
selfish interest. The class difference stressed in the letter, according to
which the newcomers are second-rate in comparison with the original
settlers, probably had a crucial meaning in later application of geno-
cidal measures: subsequently, killing poor, “uncivilized” and “improp-
er citizens” didn’t rouse any empathy among native Roma, or among
other Belgrade citizens.
Whether or not that letter had any impact on quisling authorities
is hard to determine, as it is hard to determine if quisling authorities
attempted to gain something to that effect from German occupational
34 Document published in Dragoljub AckoviÊ, Romi u Beogradu..., pp. 252-254. The

letter has its version in German: IAB, OGB, b. 590 „An Herrn Polizeipräsident
der Stadt Belgrad”.

authorities. The fact that the decision on the fate of Roma was none-
theless made by Administrative Headquarters Chief Turner on the 11th
of July,35 i.e. that it arrived from Berlin36 Ω according to which the
Roma nomads were to be separated from natives and become the sole
victims of anti-Roma measures Ω indicates that the letter probably
didn’t affect the stance of occupational authorities, who were the only
ones capable of making a relevant decision.
It was after the the 11th of July regulation that many Roma had the
opportunity of being deleted from lists of “Gypsies”. In other words, it
meant that they were automatically able to regain all citizens’ rights
they had enjoyed up to the 30th of May and to stop wearing the yellow
armband. Thanks to these measures they could once more move free-
ly about town, visiting public places, ride on trams and, most signifi-
cantly, return to their jobs. In this manner, many of those musicians
who earned by playing, for instance, at taverns and other public ven-
ues and who succeeded in proving their permanent residence in Bel-
grade, could return to those places and continue a more or less normal
life (it should never be forgotten that in his regulation, Turner stressed
that “for the time being” the measures should not apply to perma-
nently residing “Gypsies”); furthermore, coach-drivers and cart-driv-
ers were again able to make a living by transporting people and goods.
The few Roma employed in city structures also demanded to return to
work, which was approved for some. In certain cases, they wrote an
application directly to the Ministry of Internal Affairs:
By the City of Belgrade Governorship Decision VII No. 24974/41, da-
ted the 5th of June 1941, I was fired as a “Gypsy” from the D.T.C. Servi-
ce where I had been employed as a driver since 1928 up until the day
of this regulation. The Decision about my dismissal followed on the
35 Cf. chapter on genocide in Serbia.

36 AVII, Military Courts, case Harald Turner and others, 3/III, b. 1, Georg Kiessel,
minutes concerning the hearing, 18 October 1946, p. 3; and minutes concerning
the hearing, 25 October 1941, p. 3.

grounds of regulation by the Military Commander in Serbia on the
declaration of Jews and Gypsies.
By way of order by Military Commander in Serbia D.N. no. 2051.2142/41
dated the 11th of July 1941, I was deleted from the list of Gypsies to
which the abovementioned Military Commander’s regulation applies,
which proof by the City of Belgrade Administration I also have in wri-
ting. On the grounds of the above, since I have a notice of dismissal, I
kindly request to return to my job where I spent 13 years as an honest
worker, driver at the Tram and Lighting Authority.37
Over the following two months, up to several days before genocidal

measures took the lives of many Roma and Jews, the City of Belgrade
Administration initiated a new wave of checks on personnel and em-
ployees in municipality services. In a separate regulation dated the
22nd of September, Dragi JovanoviÊ again ordered that a check be car-
ried out so as to determine if any employees are of Jewish or “Gyp-
sy” origin, but, unlike at the start of June, the deadline was probably
much longer this time. Thus, for instance, while the Department for
cemeteries informed the authorities, already on the 23rd of Septem-
ber, that “during the past two years, not one Jew has been hired”, the
Governing department sent a response of similar content rather late,
on the 27th of October. At about the same period, other departments
followed suit, paying attention not only to Jews, but to Roma as well:
“Further to the request of that Department and regulation by Mr. Pre-
siding II No. 16252 dated the 22nd of September 1941”, wrote the Le-
gal department chief on the 24th of October, “the Department is being
informed that in the service of the present Sector there is no Jewish
or Gypsy clerk, with request for further authority”.38 Other depart-
37 IAB, OGB, b. 2, unnumbered, Božidar StojanoviÊ’s plea to the Ministry of Inter-

nal Affairs, the 18th of September 1941
38 IAB, OGB, b. 214, no. 704, Belgrade City Governorship, Department for ceme-
teries to the Governing department, 23rd of September 1941; no. 19889, Belgrade
City Governorship, Governing department to the Personnel department, 27th of
October 1941; no. 16252, Belgrade City Governorship, Legal department to Gov-
erning department, 23th of October 1941.

ments responded similarly, among which were the Cultural depart-
ment, Museum department and Library department.39
At the same time, in other administration segments, racial belong-
ing i.e. “Aryan” belonging, represented one of the most salient attrib-
utes that all other employees were compelled to prove. An example
of the application of anti-Roma and anti-Jewish regulations is the ap-
pointment of “Municipality Newspaper” director in October 1941. At
the time, City of Belgrade Administration sent a communique to the
Serbian Journalists Association about the decision on reestablishing
the municipality gazette, as well as about the appointment of future
editor-in-chief. One of the prerequisites for successfully holding such a
job, in addition to, of course, substantial experience and professional
education, was proof that the candidate wasn’t a Jew or “Gypsy”. As
a kind of necessary addendum to the submitted résumé, the selected
candidate had to write, in his own hand, the following statement:
Pursuant to Art. 2 item 1 of the Directive concerning the press in Ser-
bia, I hereby state that neither I myself, nor my wife, are Jews or Gypsi-
es nor have any of our ancestors been Jews or Gypsies. I make this
statement accepting full legal responsibility.40
“Racial” belonging, or rather Ω non-belonging to the Jewish or Roma

people became, just like in the Third Reich and other occupied or
quisling countries, one of the most important pieces of information in
the personal description of each citizen. Another example is an ordi-
nary communique between two departments of the city municipality,
in this case the Firefighter and Governing department, which relates
to validation of the identity card of a Firefighter Command clerk. In
concise sentences, bureaucratically written, the Firefighter depart-
39 IAB, OGB, b. 214, no. 19870, Belgrade City Governorship, Cultural department
to Governing department, 23rd of October 1941; no. 198, Belgrade City Governor-
ship, Museum department to Governing department, 24th of October 1941; no.
666, Belgrade City Governorship, Library department, 24th of October 1941.
40 IAB, OGB, b. 214, unnumbered, Serbian Journalists Association Chairman.

ment chief, requesting validation, guarantees that “the above person
is of neither Jewish nor Gypsy origin”.41
In the period when the racial belonging of city of Belgrade mu-
nicipality clerks was being checked, the situation in the city regard-
ing Jews was already being steered towards their extermination, while
soon the same was to hold true for the Roma.
First arrests of the Roma

The situation in Belgrade stayed rather calm up to the start of July,
when an uprising broke out across the country under the leadership of
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Much like in other towns and vil-
lages all over the country, in Belgrade too, the representatives of Ger-
man and quisling authorities became the target of communists, where
traffic and communication connections, garages and other places
were subjected to sabotage daily. As a response, as early as the start of
July, the occupiers introduced measures for intimidating the citizens;
primarily executions of communists and Jews.42
The concentration camp at Banjica, founded in the beginning of
July, for the purposes of internment of communists and Spanish fight-
ers, quickly became a place where smaller or larger groups of prisoners
were brought daily from Gestapo and Special Police prisons, as well as
directly after raids and arrests. A certain number of Roma from Bel-
grade and the vicinity started arriving at that camp.
The first documented cases of Roma interned at the Banjica camp
relates to groups of Roma from two villages near Belgrade, Meljak and
SremËica, mid-September 1941.
41 IAB, OGB, b. 213, no. 987, Belgrade City Governorship, Firefight command de-
partment to Governing department, 4th of September 1941.
42 Cf.: Radomir BogdanoviÊ, –ore O. PiljeviÊ (eds.), Beograd u ratu i revoluciji
1941-1945, I-II, Istorijski arhiv grada Beograda, Belgrade, 1984; Rena Rädle and
Milovan Pisarri (eds.), ibid.

During that period, despite the attempts of Administrative Head-
quarters Chief Turner to get the “Gypsy” issue solved as soon as possi-
ble, together with the Jewish issue, the Roma were still not an integral
part of bureaucratic arithmetic by which the occupational authorities
were sending Jews to their deaths (as well as captured partisans and
their supporters) as a sign of retaliation for killed and wounded Ger-
man soldiers. The question thus arises as to why the two mentioned
Roma groups were arrested and taken to the Banjica camp and then
executed within several days. The scenario tends to overlap with what
started happening a month and a half later in the streets of Belgrade’s
outskirts, however, a deeper analysis yields a different explanation.
Specifically, on the 12th of September, in the village of Meljak, par-
tisans carried out an attack against the Valjevo gendarmerie squadron.
During the clash, as thoroughly reported by its commander, one com-
munist was killed, while many were wounded, whereas one gendarme
from the squadron was missing, and another wounded; according to
the same commander, “roughly 40 bandits participated in the battle,
assisted by villagers (Gypsies) of Meljak”.43 The next day, following or-
ders by the City of Belgrade Administration, fifteen male Roma from
the same village were interned at the Banjica camp.44 All were executed
three days later, probably as part of larger retaliation because of a parti-
san attack against German soldiers at the TopËider train station, in the
capital’s outskirts, when a total of 91 captives from Banjica were shot.45
The Roma from Meljak were therefore arrested by the quisling au-
thorities and taken to Banjica just like many other civilians charged
with helping the partisans or suspected to be their adherents. As such
they were executed at the orders of German authorities, but as part of
a larger group of Banjica internees: they were not subjected to the ra-
43 Zbornik NOR, volume I, book 21, doc. 3.

44 Evica MickoviÊ and Milena RadojËiÊ (eds.), ibid., pp. 76-77 (prisoners from no.
219 to no. 233).
45 Venceslav GlišiÊ (ed.), Beograd u ratu i revoluciji, book 1, Istorijski arhiv Beograda,
Belgrade, 1984, p. 243.

cial policy of extermination, nor did they represent a separate group
from other victims. They were killed primarily as communist con-
cealers, as confirmed by NediÊ’s government itself in the document
on measures to be undertaken against renegades “who refuse to turn
themselves in”, in which it is also written that “when capturing ren-
egades such as e.g. gypsies from Meljak (they should be) immediate-
ly photographed and published in the press so that the world can see
who these are who are pretending to be national heroes. The same
thing should be done when catching runaway convicts, Jews and ren-
egades of other nationalities”.46
What is also noteworthy regarding that event and which provides
important elements for interpreting that period is that the group from
Meljak was taken to the Banjica camp, which functioned, among oth-
er things, as a container for hostages of “political” orientation, not to
the Topovske šupe camp, which represented a container for hostag-
es of a “racial” background and where solely Jews were detained at
that time. In a way, that situation mirrored the order concerning the
execution of hostages, which overlooked primarily communists and
Jews as categories of persons to be the subject of retaliation. Contact
between those two concentration camps occurred only in extraordi-
nary circumstances: when for some reason it was necessary to trans-
fer a certain number of hostages from Topovske šupe to Banjica Ω
but never vice versa Ω or when smaller groups of arrested “runaway”
Jews were brought to Belgrade from Serbia proper, and were then in-
terned at Banjica. In the first case it is illustrative that a group of about
200 Jews had been transferred, on the 14th of September 1941, to Ban-
jica because of overcrowding at Topovske šupe camp and remained
there until the 17th of that same month. The ill were then allowed to
be transferred to the Jewish hospital at DorÊol, while the majority of
them, 186 people, were shot near Zemun, at Bežanijska kosa.47

47 JIM, k.24-2a-1/2; Evica MickoviÊ, Milena RadojËiÊ (eds.), ibid., pp. 77-88 (prison-
ers from no. 234 to number 420); Milan Koljanin, ibid., pp. 34-35.

The second case pertains to the group of 47 Jewish refugees from
Skoplje, whom Bulgarian authorities turned over to the Gestapo at
the end of November 1941 and who were shot at the beginning of De-
cember after several days spent at Banjica.48 In both cases, Jews were
retained for a rather short period, since they were allocated, usual-
ly within several days, to hostage groups for execution, whereas the
women were transferred to Sajmište at the beginning of December;
in both cases, that transfer was the result of decisions by German au-
thorities. Nevertheless, during the existence of concentration camp
Topovske šupe and later Jewish camp at Sajmište, Jews and Roma were
interned at Banjica camp individually or in small groups: but in that
case as well, it should never be forgotten that the concentration camp
itself had a police and political function in the occupational and quis-
ling apparatus. Banjica camp served, among other things, as a place
where runaway Jews or Roma were detained for a certain time, proba-
bly as much as was needed for an investigation to discover the possible
network of concealers or “communists”, before execution or transferal
to Sajmište.
As in the case of the group of Jews, in the autumn of 1941, group
or individual arrests of Roma were registered. It is difficult, at least
for the time being, to determine the reason why they were interned at
Banjica, but in any case it is important to underscore that they were
entered into detainee books as “Gypsies”, and that some of them were
released after several days. It is possible that they had been brought
in, as was the case with the Roma from Meljak, as partisan conceal-
ers, and then released after investigation in which it was proven that
they had not aided partisans in any way; alternatively they had already
been brought in as Roma, but were then released since they were able
to prove permanent residence, and so be deleted from lists of “Gyp-
48 Evica MickoviÊ, Milena RadojËiÊ (eds.), ibid., pp. 163-166 (prisoners from no.
1557 to no. 1603). Sima BegoviÊ, ibid., p. 29. More on that: Milovan Pisarri, La
Shoah in Serbia e Macedonia, in Laura Brazzo-Michele Sarfatti, Gli ebrei in Albania
sotto il fascismo: una storia da ricostruire, Giuntina, Firenze, 2010, pp. 169-198.

sies”. Ultimately, it should be kept in mind that the month of Octo-
ber was the period in which Turner’s proposals on expelling Roma
from Serbian territory, i.e. primarily the decision on executing male
Roma as hostages, received more realization under Böhme. However,
if we take into consideration that possibility, which would, in other
words, mean the start of raids and arrests of male Roma on the city
of Belgrade territory in order to be shot, certain fundamental ques-
tions remain unclarified Ω why were they interned at the police-polit-
ical camp at Banjica, not the “racial” reservoir of hostages at Topovske
šupe, where a large number of Belgrade Roma were soon collected?
Why did internment pertain solely to smaller groups or individuals
and why was it started in certain villages outside of Belgrade? Finally,
why was there no mention in German documents of the separate hos-
tage category of “Gypsies”, which became considerably more visible as
late as October in the orders of German authorities?
If we remain on that hypothetical level, the internment of Roma
as well as their fate can only be noted. For example, on the 11th of Oc-
tober, the City of Belgrade Administration arrested 19 people from
SremËica, in the vicinity of Belgrade. Of them, the first four men were
marked as “Gypsies”, while others weren’t, although their last names,
professions, places of birth and residence, as well as possible family
ties with the four Roma, indicate the possibility that they too were
Roma who simply reported to the authorities as Serbs.49 Despite that
difference, their fate was the same: they were shot in a large group on
the 17th of October, when German authorities ordered the execution
49 Evica MickoviÊ, Milena RadojËiÊ (eds.), ibid., pp. 115-116 (prisoners from no. 829
to number 843). Pp. 118-119 (prisoners from no. 877 to number 900) contain
another 23 names of SremËica inhabitants who were arrested on the 16th of Oc-
tober. Among them were two women released on 24th of that same month; out
of the rest, 11 were released in the upcoming days, while the remaining ten men
were shot on the 17th of October probably together with their neighbors arrested
on the 11th of October. Not one of them was listed as “a Gypsy”, but in that case
it is difficult to determine whether there were among them those Roma who had
signed up as Serbs earlier.

of 200 hostages (100 Jews and 100 communists) because two soldiers
had been killed the previous day.50
Mass arrests in SremËica continued over the following days: on the
th
16 of October, the City of Belgrade Administration brought 22 men
and two women to Banjica. Ten men were shot the next day, togeth-
er with others arrested on the 11th of October, while others were re-
leased, mostly on the 24th of October.51 Another group of 12 men from
SremËica were arrested on the 18th of October, but this time by the
German army; all were released after slightly over a month, specifical-
ly on the 26th of November, thanks to the intervention of City of Bel-
grade Administration.52 Although in the two groups there was no-one
listed as “a Gypsy”, it is entirely possible that many of them were in-
deed Roma who had not reported as such to Serbian authorities. Why
were they brought in and why were some shot while the majority were
released, it is hard to determine, but it is nonetheless important to no-
tice certain details. The fact that the second group was brought in by
CBA indicates a possibility that they had also been arrested for retali-
ation, due to an event of local character, as had been the case a month
earlier in Meljak. The third group from SremËica was nevertheless
brought in by the German army, i.e. upon direct orders of German,
not Serbian authorities, which implies a possibility that those Roma,
if they were indeed Roma, were arrested during implementation of
genocidal measures (in which many Roma from Belgrade and vicin-
ity were killed during the following days). Their release also leads to
several interpretations: according to one, they were released because
they introduced themselves as Romanians, since they were speaking
the Romanian language.53

51 Evica MickoviÊ, Milena RadojËiÊ (eds.), ibid., pp. 118-119 (prisoners from no. 877
to no. 900).
52 Ibid., pp. 119Ω120 (prisoners from no. 901 to no. 913).
53 Dragoljub AckoviÊ, Romi u Beogradu..., p. 245. On the same page, the author men-
tions that the Roma who passed themselves off as Romanians were spared reprisals.

In addition to the Roma known by name, who were brought to
Banjica in that period as well as later, it should be noted that there was
another group of people recorded as “Gypsies” who were brought in on
the 31st of October by the German army. The fact that it consisted of
male Roma from several places Ω 8 from BoleË, from the outskirts of
Belgrade, 6 from Senaja, from the vicinity of Mladenovac, also near
Belgrade, and 1 from Belgrade itself (Marinkova bara)54 Ω and that,
except in two cases, all were shot on the 3rd of November, indicates
that they too were the victims of genocidal measures systematically
implemented in Belgrade and vicinity, during those days, by German
and Serbian forces. The fact that they were brought to Banjica, not to
Topovske šupe, in a way confirms the function that the camp had dur-
ing the Holocaust against Jews and during genocide against the Roma:
in those “extraordinary” circumstances, when a substantial number of
people were being arrested, while the detainment capacities at Topo-
vske šupe were rather limited, smaller groups were interned at Banjica
and shot within several days.
In addition to these cases, it is possible that a certain number of
Roma passed through Banjica even though they were not entered into
data files, which are anyhow incomplete. Friedrich Willi, the Ger-
man sub-officer in charge of certain assignments related to Banjica
camp, stated that “(...) Besides him, Sergeant Edgar Enge and Ensign
Wilhelm Boden also carried out the executions, mostly of Jews and
gypsies”.55
54 Evica MickoviÊ, Milena RadojËiÊ (eds.), ibid., pp. 125 and 129 (prisoners from no.
994 to no. 1008).
55 AVII, Military Courts, case Wilhelm Fuchs and others, 3/III, b. 1, the hearing of
Willi Friedrich, p. 5.

Collecting the Roma from Belgrade and vicinity:
genocide against the Roma
The date that marks a dramatic turnabout in the lives of all civilians
in Serbia, especially Jews and Roma, is the 16th of September 1941. On
that day, when Keitel issued the order about mass retaliations on all
occupied territories, Hitler personally appointed General Böhme to be
the head of all military forces in Serbia. The decision for his supreme
command to be placed in Belgrade wasn’t the outcome of coincidence
but of a clear awareness that the battle against insurgents must be
fought in the heart of the then most dangerous uprising wave in the
Balkans, that is Ω in Serbia.56
Jews, already victims of mass executions, were joined by the Roma.
Because 21 German soldiers had been killed near Topola on the 2nd
of October, the decision was made by Administrative Headquarters
Chief Turner and general Böhme to shoot 2,100 “Jew and Gypsy”
hostages; 805 from the concentration camp in Šabac, while the rest
from the transit camp in Belgrade,57 i.e. from Topovske šupe; a de-
cision which marked the commencement of mass extermination of
male Roma. Although it is clear that a certain number of Roma from
Šabac were killed in those executions, it is not clear whether or not
Belgrade Roma were also shot: on the one hand, in some testimonies,
it is claimed that there had been arrests in Belgrade on the 10th of
October and that the victims were executed at Jabuka on 13th of that
month,58 on the other hand, available German documents don’t men-
tion any other victims except Jews.59
During those days, political and racial prison camps of hostages
were being emptied at great speed. For everyday mass executions, the
numbers of male Jews quickly became exhausted, and at the end of

57 Zbornik NOR, volume I, book I, doc. 200, pp. 171-172.
58 Cf. e.g.: AJ, 110-273-9,10 and 11; 21, 22, 23, 24; IAB, „Sajmište“ files.
59 Cf. e.g.: Zbornik NOR, volume 1, book 1, doc. 212, pp. 200-203.

the month just a small number remained alive. For that very reason,
German authorities ordered that those belonging to other “racial”
categories be arrested. Male Roma from Belgrade were then subject-
ed to mass arrests in the following period and shot in order to meet
Böhme’s quotas, as well as to carry out the first phase of the final
solution against them, the same way that, the first phase of the final
solution was carried out against Jews. Arrests of the Roma in Belgrade
were planned solely when the Topovske šupe camp had almost emp-
tied, for the second time (the first time had been after the execution
of the majority of Banat Jews, while the second after the execution of
Belgrade Jews).60 Therefore, shortly after Turner’s order to arrest all
of the remaining male Jews and all male Roma in Serbia, as hostages
intended for execution,61 German and quisling authorities in Belgrade
“set into action”. The operation was most likely run by Fritz Stracke,
chief of sector IV B4 for Jews (and “Gypsies”).62
Arrests in Belgrade began on the 28th of October, on the territory
of the IX quarter. The well-known area of Jatagan mala was then the
target of joint efforts between German and quisling forces. Soldiers
and policemen of occupational authorities had a kind of logistic as-
signment in that action. Early morning, at 4 a.m., while the major-
ity of citizens were still asleep in their homes, not even suspecting
what would happen, they blocked the streets and districts in which
the Roma lived. Simultaneously, Serbian Special Police agents and lo-
cal station gendarmes knew which houses they would barge into and
where they would find all the persons intended for arrest. They had
accurate data, based on existing “gypsy” lists made as early as the pre-
vious June, although they probably didn’t adhere to them, so that they
arrested all the Roma they found. Whether or not they knew what the
objective of that big endeavour was can only be presumed, but no re-
sponse can lessen the extent of their responsibility. They indeed knew,
60 AJ, 110-908-219.
62 AJ, 110-908-219.

with a rather great deal of certainty, that they would take these people
to the nearby concentration camp at Autokomanda, and they knew
that those arrested would most likely be sent somewhere else, as had
been the regular procedure with Jews. There was still hearsay that
Jews were being sent to Germany for labour, but there was more fre-
quent proof they had been taken by trucks to execution at JabuËki rit.
Not many people participated in the action, perhaps just several
dozen. Greater forces weren’t even necessary; since there had obvious-
ly been no fear of any revolt or mass fleeing. The ease with which the
authorities always subdued the Roma, even before the war, as well as
the image of Roma in society and before the authorities themselves
Ω squalid, uneducated, politically ignorant Ω didn’t indicate possibil-
ities for any reaction by the victims. Substantial forces weren’t neces-
sary due to the fact that there was no need for great organization: the
destination of the captives, the concentration camp, was just several
hundred meters away, a couple of kilometers at the most, from the lo-
cation where the action was carried out.
Outside occupational and quisling circles, as well as outside of po-
lice and gendarmerie forces engaged in the action, it was difficult to
foresee that what was happening to Jews would soon happen to the
Roma as well; despite the fact that they had been marked and placed
under strict legal regulations, there were no concrete indications of
such mass arrests.
When barging into houses, the agents and gendarmes weren’t cru-
el, except in rare cases. They entered houses and quickly woke up the
household members, asking that males exit and come with them. So
as to prevent panic, they often used false promises or explanations:
one of the more frequent ones was that males are being rounded up
for the purposes of felling trees at Ada or some other location and that
it wouldn’t last long.63 The lie was obviously chosen so as to seem the
most convincing and most efficient, being that, at the time, city of Bel-
63 AJ, 110-273-31, 43, 147, 434, 470 etc.

grade municipality was organizing the cutting down of forests in var-
ious locations at the outskirts due to great demand by the population,
refugees and the municipality apparatus itself.64 In some other cas-
es, policemen said that it’s just an identification check and that they
would be taken to the local gendarmerie station to be checked, after
which they would be let go.65
The raid was carried out quickly, efficiently and without complica-
tions. Gendarmes and German soldiers didn’t come across resistance,
either by the Roma or others present, in the vast majority, Serbs. The
Roma exited their houses calmly, while gendarmes grouped them and
led them into already prepared trucks. Some victims knew the gen-
darmes who arrested them, while their countenance burnt into the
memory of their wives, daughters, mothers:
(...) The arrest was carried out by a civilian I know was the scribe at
IX quarter, I don’t know his name, but he is of middle height, stocky,
swarthy, with trimmed moustache, around 33 years old. Of the guar-
ds, one had the rank of sergeant, while the other was a private. I don’t
know their names but I remember they were both tall, stocky and fa-
ir-skinned. Regarding age, the sergeant could be about 45, while the
other one around 25. (...)66
Those intended to be collected were given the opportunity to bring

the barest necessities with them, some food, money, clothes and oth-
er items that would be useful while “cutting down the forest”. Trucks
made their way towards the seat of the IX quarter, where they made
about an hour’s stop, then continued towards Topovske šupe. During
that break, the Roma were probably registered in separate lists, which
the quarter administration later sent to their seniors, or at least sent
the information on the number of captives, so that the German and
quisling administration would know how many people had been re-
64 IAB, UGB, b. 214, no. 19743, Poglavarstvo grada Beograda graanstvu Beograda
(City of Belgrade governorship to the citizens of Belgrade), 25 October 1941
65 AJ, 110-273-145, statement of Cveta MarinkoviÊ; and 149, statement of Zagorka
NikoliÊ.
66 AJ, 110-273-130, statement of Živka StanojeviÊ MandiÊ.

moved, i.e. sent to the concentration camp with the final destination
Ω execution field Ω and how to proceed further.
Side by side with the raid at Jatagan mala, the German army and
Serbian gendarmerie did the same at »ukarica, the city district in
south-western Belgrade. According to the same pattern, the Roma
were first taken to the seat of the local XIV quarter and immediately
afterwards to Topovske šupe.67 That same day, a raid was also conduct-
ed in Žarkovo.68
The following day, on the 29th of October, new raids led to mass ar-
rests in the IV quarter, specifically in CvijiÊeva Street,69 as well as on
the territory of the VIII quarter, at »ubura.70 Gendarmes from those
two quarters didn’t have a big job like their colleagues the previous
day at Jatagan mala, since in those areas the Roma marked for arrest
lived in just several streets. Unlike CvijiÊeva Street and »ubura, many
more police forces were needed for the raid carried out the same day
at Marinkova bara, where the inhabitants were primarily Roma (as in
the parts of Pašino brdo that belonged to XI quarter).
The action started early morning, like the previous day at Jatagan
mala, at »ukarica and Žarkovo. Around four o’clock, the German army
surrounded the entire area, after which the gendarmes and policemen
went from house to house and took away the men, saying that they
are going to a hearing at the local gendarmerie station after which
they would shortly return home, or would be taken to Ada for fell-
ing trees.71 Although they found the majority asleep, some had already
known they would be taken away, probably because news about the
raids carried out the previous day in neighbouring areas had spread
over Marinkova bara too:
67 AJ, 110-273-472; and 739, statement of Draginja BošnjakoviÊ.

68 IAB, „Sajmište“ files, statements of Miodrag PetroviÊ and Milutin PetroviÊ.
69 AJ, 110-273-419, statement of Mara MarinkoviÊ.
70 AJ, 110-273-534, statement of Nada SaviÊ; and 535, statement of Anton Tepeh.
71 AJ, 110-273-124, statement of Mileva StojanoviÊ; and 141, statement of Ljubica
MartinoviÊ.

(...) They ordered that my husband get dressed and go with them. My
husband got dressed, he had his new black suit on, new shoes, new
winter coat and in addition he brought two pairs of underwear and a
kilim to use as a blanket, which he had prepared in advance because
we knew that the police were rounding up Gypsies. (...)72
In those chaotic moments, some tried to hide under the bed or at a

neighbour’s, but they too were found or snitched on and taken away by
force.73 The fact that snitches turned in the victims contributed to the
thoroughness and efficiency of rounding up of male Roma from the XI
quarter. It seems that certain members of the local gendarmerie were
the most zealous in this task, as even before the arrest they had abused
the Roma in different ways and kept close ties with Germans and Spe-
cial Police agents. One of them, –ore UzunoviÊ:
(...) In the lead-up to taking of male Gypsies to the concentration camp,
all night he paced the whole street and stood near Gypsy houses, cer-
tainly with the intention of guarding them and watching lest someo-
ne should escape, because he knew they would be taken away. Then,
in the morning, around 4 o’clock, together with his wife and daughter-
in-law Adela, he entered all Gypsy houses with the German police and
denounced them. What is more, it seems that he was the person who
gave to the Germans an accurate list of Gypsy houses, since Germans
didn’t enter other, Serbian houses.74
The Roma from Marinkova bara were taken by trucks to the gendar-
merie station, located in the primary school “Branislav NušiÊ”, while
the captives from Pašino brdo were transferred to the seat of the XI
quarter at Ibarska Street.75 In both cases, they were detained a short
time before being sent to Topovske šupe.
In the report by the Military Commander in Serbia to the Com-
mandant of the South-East, written at 1:15 p.m. on that same 29th of
72 AJ, 110-273-132, statement of Draga LekiÊ; cf. AJ, 110-273-143, statement of Na-
talija SaviÊ; and 141, statement of Ljubica MartinoviÊ.
73 AJ, 110-273-167, statement of Mileva –uriÊ; and 75, statement of Mara JovanoviÊ.
74 AJ, 110-273-833.
75 AJ, 110-273-141, statement of Ljubica MartinoviÊ.

October, it was concisely written: “Belgrade: 250 Gypsies arrested
(Belgrad: 250 Zigeuner verhaftet)”.76
As a result of these raids, women and children were left without
their husbands, fathers and sons:
On the 29th of October 1941, during the surrounding of Marinkova
bara by Germans, two agents and two S.D.S. gendarmes barged into
our apartment at 9, Zajcova Street and demanded that all the men who
were in the apartment at the moment get ready. My husband, Velimir
StankoviÊ, C.B.M. employee, 53 years old, married, 1 child, born in
Ub, brother-in-law, Živorad RadosavljeviÊ, musician, 20 years old, born
in Meljak, married, the father of 1 child, brothers: Aleksandar MatiÊ,
worker, 30 y.o., married, with three children and Žika MatiÊ, worker
at C.B.M., 20 y.o., married, with two children, both born in Ub, all of
Eastern Orthodox faith, Serbian nationality. From the apartment they
were taken to the camp at Autokomanda, where they were detained for
two days and then taken to an unknown destination. I haven’t received
any news from them to this day.77
On the third and last day of taking away the Roma, the German and
quisling authorities focused on the remaining parts of the city, pri-
marily the outskirts, as well as on nearby villages. They continued
the action above all at Pašino brdo, from where those who lived in
the part that belonged to the XI quarter were taken the previous day,
blocking the other section, which belonged to the VII quarter, as well
as in Bulbulder.78
It is unclear whether or not anyone succeeded in escaping in the
meantime, if anyone was preparing to flee, if they hid or whether they
simply waited for their fate. They were certainly able to presume that
their turn would also come, since their neighbours from adjoining
quarters and streets had already been taken away and transferred to
76 AVII, NA, NAV-N-T-312, 452/8037695; and Zbornik NOR, volume I, book I, doc.
238.
77 AJ, 110-273-113, statement of Milena StankoviÊ.
78 AJ, 110-273-914, statement of Slavka StojanoviÊ; 807, statement of Zagorka
TodoroviÊ; etc.

the camp at Autokomanda. What is certain is that in this case as well,
the local gendarmerie played the crucial role, carrying out thorough
searches and arrests. Testimonies of women from Pašino brdo, outline
the role of the gendarmerie played in these events even more clearly.
Already at Jatagan mala and at Marinkova bara, the presence of scribes
from local quarters was noticed during the arrests, but at Pašino brdo,
for days before the raid, the commander of the gendarmerie station
carefully catalogued all “Gypsy” houses, as many female witnesses at-
tested: “In the lead-up to the arrests, the commander of Pašino brdo
station, Dragi IsakoviÊ, made a list of Gypsy houses”79; “I would like
to point out that on the eve of that day, Dragi IsakoviÊ, commander of
Pašino brdo station, made a list of all the houses in that area”80; “(...) but
I will mention that, just before the arrests, Dragi IsakoviÊ, commander
of Pašino brdo station, made a list of all Gypsy houses.”81.
Similarly to the role that the snitch UzunoviÊ had at Marinkova
bara, the raid site was obviously prepared according to clear directives
by the City of Belgrade Administration superiors. The detailed pro-
cedure described in the case of Pašino brdo, as well as the identical
manner in which the Roma were taken away, indicates that two days
before the arrests, the same preparations had been carried out, as well
as that UzunoviÊ wasn’t just a snitch, but rather had clear instructions
on what he should do and that he had accepted the job proudly, per-
forming it diligently. Was he the only one or were there more such
cases, it is not known, but the efficiency which the gendarmerie, bu-
reaucracy and, of course, the German army showed, once again indi-
cates that cases of refusing duty or “turning” one’s head away so as to
save someone, were rare. The vast majority of gendarmes, municipal-
ity clerks and policemen were doing their jobs, even when they had
the opportunity, at least theoretically, not to do them, thus saving at
79 AJ, 110-273-759, statement of Stanica PeriÊ.

80 AJ, 110-273-771, statement of Katarina RadosavljeviÊ.
81 AJ, 110-273-793, statement of Ljubica SremËeviÊ.

least someone who is their fellow citizen: the case of one of the rare
attempts to escape is illustrative; a man from Bulbulder succeeded in
reaching »ukarica on the day of the raid, but was then captured by the
local gendarmes and turned in to the Germans.82
The last day of arrests of the Roma in Belgrade included surround-
ing villages which were under the jurisdiction of the City of Belgrade
Administration. Gendarmes of the V quarter carried out a raid at
Višnjica, assisted by LjotiÊ’s volunteers83 and most likely with the sup-
port of the local municipality governor. There were no Germans, as
the municipality governor himself testified after the war.84
During the same period, arrests were conducted at Banjica,85 at
DorÊol86 and at Mirijevo.87 In the upcoming days, the gendarmerie and
police drew their job to a close, carrying out individual arrests around
town, probably with the objective of arresting runaway Roma or those
that could be “added” to the already immense numbers of those taken
away. Such cases were registered on the 31st of October at a tavern in
Bulevar Osloboenja, while on the 3rd of November at Sveti Klimentije
Street, south of Pašino brdo.88 That same day, several Roma were cap-
tured at BoleË and Senaja and taken to Banjica.89
According to stories that went round town, in the autumn of 1941,
about 12,000 Roma and Jews were arrested.90
82 AJ, 110-273-570 and 571.

83 AJ, 110-273-967 and 970, statements of Jovanka PaunoviÊ, Marija RadomiroviÊ,
Draga RadimiroviÊ.
84 AJ, 110-273-976, statement of Aleksandar DimitijreviÊ.
85 AJ, 110-273-817, statement of Leposava JovanoviÊ; and others.
86 AJ, 110-273-858, statement of Ružica StojkoviÊ ZlatkoviÊ; and 860, statement of
Olga PetroviÊ.
87 AJ, 110-273-942, statement of Nikolija MariÊ and Mileva MihajloviÊ; 944, state-
ment of Mira KostiÊ; and others.
88 AJ, 110-273-537, 625 and 626.
89 Cf. footnote no. 54.
90 AJ, 110-273-826, statement of Živomir –oreviÊ.

At the concentration camp Topovske šupe
In mid-August 1941, in agreement with the German occupational au-
thorities in Belgrade, the Volksdeutsche made a decision to “cleanse”
Banat from Jews. Although some of them had already been shot in indi-
vidual executions, often together with Serbs, there was no mass exter-
mination or deportation to the Reich; rather it had been planned that
the entire Jewish population, around 3,000 people, be transferred to
Belgrade. Jews from PanËevo, Petrovgrad (Zrenjanin), Vršac and other
towns were arrested and interned at temporary camps and after sev-
eral days, the majority of them were transported by barges to Serbia’s
capital. In Belgrade they were received by Jewish Chairmanship repre-
sentatives, whose assistance was all they could count on; except those
who had relatives in Belgrade. German authorities had not designated
a particular place where the newcomers would be lodged, rather they
ordered that the captives be received at privately owned Jewish houses
or as assigned by the Jewish Chairmanship. Difficulties, primarily of
an economic nature, regarding the circumstances in which the Chair-
manship operated, as well as ghettoization to which the Jews, even
though still free, had been subjected, did not provide many possibilities
for accommodation. Banat Jews were therefore lodged at the Jewish
hospital, at the synagogue and in the “Oneg Shabbat” building.
Such numbers of compelled arrivals drastically impacted on the
already delicate position of Belgrade Jews, rousing fear among occu-
pational authorities that it could lead to unrest, strengthening of the
anti-fascist movement or simply the outbreak of disease because of the
conditions in which these people were forced to live. Consequently,
men were separated from women and interned at the newly formed
“Jewish transit camp” in Topovske šupe buildings, which were an inte-
gral part of the big barracks “KraljeviÊ Andrija”, at the location known
as Autokomanda,91 in the part of the city bordering Jatagan mala and
91 The only study that exists on Topovske šupe is the short article: Nenad ŽarkoviÊ,
Prolazni logor Topovske šupe, in Naslee, no. 10/2009, pp. 103-112.

Marinkova bara. In some manner, probably by way of barbed wire,
the buildings were separated from the rest, in which Serbian refugees
from the Independent State of Croatia were lodged, among others; but,
because of the camp’s location in the urban context, the Jewish cap-
tives and their suffering were visible daily not only to onlookers, but
also to passers-by. The newly formed camp for Jews, which was also
one of the first concentration camps for Jews in Europe, was located in
a densely populated part of the city: Marinkova bara and Jatagan mala
were located at its southern and south-eastern side, while in the north,
where the camp entrance was, there was an important traffic artery
of Belgrade, primarily the tram route. That way, from the moment the
camp was founded, the Roma looked at those buildings every morn-
ing, every afternoon, every evening, without a hint that for many of
them Ω for all men Ω it would be their last residence before death. At
the same time, other Belgrade citizens commuted to the city centre
and back for work, shopping or simply entertainment. Pupils regularly
went to nearby schools, football fans cheered for their favourite team
every Sunday at the BSK stadium, just five hundred metres away from
Topovske šupe, while patrons filled taverns and restaurants.
Jews were taken from the concentration camp to forced labour,
which had been mandatory for them since April. They cleared away
ruins, unloaded goods at the docks, repaired the sewage pipes and wa-
terworks, often serving German and quisling masters. Topovske šupe
looked like a prison, a place of forced lodging, maybe even a labour
camp, but it was still not clear that its existence was in the function of
destruction of Jewish male population. In addition to the internment
of Banat Jews, the first group of Belgrade Jews was brought to the
camp, made up of those incapable of labour.92 Even though Jews had
already been the victims of executions, from the moment when retali-
ation was introduced in the ratio 100:1 and 50:1 respectively, and Jews
included in one of the first categories of hostages for execution (the
92 AJ, 110-593-161, statement of Alfred Kazes.

second category being communists) Ω all of them actually became
dead captives, whose fate had already been sealed and who were just
waiting for the moment when Germans, under the pretense that they
have to pay for partisan battles, would take them from the camp and
lead them down the road of no return. When the camp was emptied
enough, the Germans would bring an even bigger group of Jews. Up
until the 20th of September, the remaining Banat Jews were brought
in, who had still been at Banat camps,93 while the last mass arrest of
Belgrade Jews was carried out on the 18th of October.94
On average there were up to 1,500 captives at the camp, whereas
at the moment of the aforementioned last arrest of Belgrade Jews, it
contained over 3,000 people. Living conditions were very harsh; the
Jewish Chairmanship was compelled to supply the camp with food,
while every attempt to flee was punished by death:
(...) For some time I was working outside the camp in the daytime,
while at night I returned to the camp to sleep. In the beginning of Oc-
tober there were roughly 1,000 to 1,500 people at the camp. That num-
ber was increasing constantly up until the 19th of October when all the
men from Belgrade were rounded up and when I ran away, there were
at least 3,000 to 4,000 people at the camp. We lived at the barracks and
in three to four stables. The rooms were so overcrowded that you could
hardly lie down at night. People were lying down in hallways and paths
left for passing through. Germans didn’t give us any bed linens. All we
got from them was straw and it was insufficient.95
Women and children were allowed, at least initially, to come to the

concentration camp entrance and give their dear ones food, until one
day they were told that their husband, son, father or relative had been
sent to Germany for labour.96 Of course it was a lie, just like the story
93 Zdenko Löwenthal (ed.), The crimes of the fascist occupants and their collaborators
against Jews in Yugoslavia, reprint of the first edition, Jasenovac research Insti-
tute, Belgrade-New York, 2005, p. 15.
94 Ibid., p. 15.
95 JIM, k. 24, 2a-1/2, statement of Alt Kalman.
96 Ibid.

intended for internees themselves had been a lie, that they are going
to a labour site outside of town, while they were being loaded into
empty trucks and given work tools, and then driven towards the exe-
cution fields. The sole ones who knew what was going on, in addition
to camp administration, BdS, Military Commander, Administrative
Headquarters Chief Turner and some German senior officers and rep-
resentatives, were the quisling authorities. The police for Jews and
Gypsies, keeping files on Jews designated for forced labour and organ-
izing labour in the quarters, had to know which labour force it had at
its disposal daily. It also had to know how many Jews there were that
it needed to control. Therefore, after each taking away of Jews from
Topovske šupe, the police received a report on the number of those
taken away, with lists of names and surnames. At the back of each file,
they then wrote the sign LS, “Logor streljan” (“Camp executed”), so
they would know the person is no longer at their disposal, labour-wise
and in the economic sense.97 Bureaucratically, they had to keep track
of the available work force.
All Roma who had been arrested in raids at the end of October
were transported by trucks to Topovske šupe after short stops at the
seats of quarters or gendarmerie stations. They didn’t travel much, to
be exact, it could be said that they didn’t travel at all, they just stayed
in the area where they had lived, but now in a completely new world
that they had only seen from the outside until recently. Cramped in
the camp, they took the places of those Jews who had been executed
the previous days, while they were subjected to perfidious treatment:
When a certain number of Jews from the concentration camp were
liquidated during the first days of November, they started bringing in,
by trucks, larger groups of Gypsies from Belgrade and Serbia proper,
allocating them to the places of liquidated Jews. Gypsies were grouped
in a horse stable and one room on the upper floor and there were about
1,000 of them. I remember there were Gypsies from Požarevac, Vranje,
97 AJ, 110-593-160, statement of Salomon Altarac; and 154, statement of Moša

SimonoviÊ.

Niš etc.98 (...) However, the German camp guards often barged into the
stables and rooms at night, taking wristwatches, fountain pens, mo-
ney and other items. They did so mostly while inebriated, while firing
guns. It was a very frequent occurrence that the German camp guards
got drunk at the sentry box, held orgies and then, drunk and shooting
their guns, assailed certain Jews. There were also occasional fights (be-
atings) of Jews, but they beat Gypsies much more.99
Beatings were probably frequent, in that short time span while the
Roma were at the camp.100 Food was probably not given to them or
maybe the Jewish Chairmanship increased the number of meals
served in those days, so as to provide at least something for them too.
Many had brought something with them from home, while many mu-
sicians had also brought their instruments. What is certain is that
their wives immediately saw to it that they brought something to eat,
as the Jewish women were doing:
(...) As soon as the blockade of our street ended, I went to the XI quar-
ter but they told me there that they don’t know anything. The next day,
when I was passing by, Dušan Depalo, shoe repairman, saw me and
told me my husband is in the concentration camp at Topovske šupe.
I came home immediately, prepared food and went there so as to give
him the food. However, since the mass of people who came to visit was
greater than the number of internees, Germans and gendarmes didn’t
let us approach, so crowding ensued and Germans shot in the air whi-
le gendarmes beat the mass of people with poles and their gun butts.101
The Roma stayed in the concentration camp just several days, in

some cases just one, while three days were more frequent. Then, in
the morning, larger groups of them would be led down Franša D’Ep-
erea Street to the “Mostar” crossroads, and then in an unknown direc-
tion.102 Unlike the treatment of Jews, when each night in the lead-up

99 Ibid.
100 AJ, 110-273-538, statement of Milija NikoliÊ. The witness had seen, in passing,
Germans beat two male Roma at the camp.
101 AJ, 110-273-520, statement of Jelica VasiÊ.
102 AJ, 110-273-55, statement of Darinka MilosavljeviÊ.

to being taken away, the camp would be visited by Stracke or some
other German police representative who would issue orders on how
many people were to be singled out the following day for transport,
the Roma were being separated into groups immediately:
As soon as Gypsies arrived, they immediately started transporting
them together with Jews by trucks to the ferry near PanËevo bridge.
When taking away Gypsies, no lists were made, nor were they assigned
individually by name to prepare for the trip, rather they were grouped
together by 50 up to 200.103
Their destination was most frequently Jabuka, which had already been
known as an execution field.
The last moments of their time spent at the camp were remem-
bered, after many years, by a witness who left a remarkable image:
After about ten days, around a thousand Gypsies were brought in, who
were gradually being taken away from the camp over the following
days. A lot of them came in with musical instruments; a day after arri-
val, they organized an orchestra in the barracks courtyard, played the-
ir farewell concert Ω among others, the overture of the opera “The
Barber of Seville” by Rossini. After the concert, Germans broke the-
ir instruments and burned them in a big bonfire, while trucks drove
away a large group in an unknown direction.104
Within those several days, individual cases of release from camp were
registered. Thus, for instance, it seems that Sava SremËeviÊ from Bel-
grade, with 11 members of his family, were released from Topovske
šupe, thanks to the fact that he succeeded in proving that they are
Romanian, since the regulations which were in force for “Gypsies”105
didn’t pertain to them.

104 Pavle Minh, »etiri godine pod senkom smrti, in Aleksandar Gaon (ed.), Mi smo
preživeli... Jevreji o Holokaustu, vol. 3, p. 265.
105 Dragoljub AckoviÊ, Romi u Beogradu..., p. 245. Still, in other cases, “Romani-
ans” were killed together with others: cf. AJ, 110-273-137, statement of Tonka
GašpareviÊ.

Executions
At the sixth kilometer on the road from PanËevo to the village Jabu-
ka is one of the locations that the Germans chose in the autumn of
1941 for mass executions of Jews and Roma, probably Serbs as well.
The frequency of executions, and in addition other technical reasons,
for example, repair of the bridge over the Danube near Belgrade or
sabotage and diversions by partisan fighters, were frequent problems
which the German administration had to overcome so as to perform
its task in the best, bureaucratic manner: killing a certain number of
people, burying corpses, calculating the number of soldiers or police-
men needed for each action, the number of trucks that needed to be
utilized, fuel, ammunition and all the other things. At the time, exe-
cutions were conducted at several locations in the vicinity of Belgrade:
at Jajinci, Deliblatska pešËara, Bežanija (Trostruki surduk), Rakovica,
Kumodraž and, ultimately in the village of Jabuka.106 The report that a
German lieutenant wrote about executions of Jews (and maybe Roma
too) on the 9th and 13th of October, provides detailed insight into how
the actual executions unfolded:
(...) After detailed reconnaissance of the place and performed prepa-
rations, the first execution was carried out on the 9th of October 1941.
The detainees were brought from Belgrade camps, carrying the barest
necessities, at 5:30 a.m. By handing out shovels and other tools, the
impression of a community action was created. Each truck had just 3
guards so that the number of guards wouldn’t let on the true intention.
The transport was completed without any difficulties. The mood of deta-
inees was good during the ride and preparation. They were glad to be le-
aving the camp, where the conditions apparently didn’t suit their wishes.
We set the detainees to work at 8 km from the place of execution and
then brought them in as needed. The place was secure enough for
preparation and execution. The execution was carried out by way of
powder at a distance of 12 m. For each detainee, five gunmen were
assigned. In addition, the doctor had at his disposal two gunmen, for
cases in which he deemed it necessary, who would shoot the victims in
the head, thereby causing sure death. Objects of value and remaining
106 Cf.: Rena Rädle and Milovan Pisarri (eds.), ibid., pp. 208-229.

items were seized under supervision and later turned in to N.S.V., i.e.
Security Police.
On the day of the 9th of October 1941, 180 people were executed.
The execution was completed at 6:30 p.m. There were no distinct
events. Units returned home satisfied.
The second execution could not be conducted before the 11th of Octo-
ber 1941 due to repairs on the Danube ferry. Because of those works,
the following execution had to be carried out in the vicinity of Belgra-
de. For that purpose, it was necessary to find a new place and double
the caution. The following execution was carried out on the 11th of Oc-
tober 1941 near the shooting range. It went according to plan. 296 pe-
ople were executed. During both executions, no detainee escaped and
the troops didn’t record any particular events or incidents. For increa-
sing security, another platoon was used from major Pongruber’s unit,
under the command of Lieutenant Hau. In total, on the 9th and 11th of
October 1941, those units shot 449 people.
Unfortunately, those units were compelled, due to official reasons,
to end further executions and transfer the assignment to Major
Pongruber’s unit.
Signed by Liepe
Lieutenant and unit commander107
A report also exists by another German lieutenant in charge of op-

erations, concerning the place where Belgrade Roma were executed
at the end of October and beginning of November 1941. i.e. concern-
ing Jabuka. Thanks to that document it is possible to reconstruct the
last moments in the lives of Belgrade Roma who were first arrested
and interned at Topovske šupe, afterwards loaded into trucks and tak-
en down Franša D’Eperea street towards the “Mostar” crossroads and
further on in an unknown direction:
In accord with the agreement with the SS in charge, I led the singled
out Jews i.e. Gypsies from the detainee camp Belgrade. Trucks of Po-
lish kommandatur 599, which I had at my disposal, proved to be unsu-
itable for two reasons:
1. They were driven by civilians. Thus secrecy is not guaranteed.

2. All were without a cover or awning so the citizens were able to see
whom we have in the vehicles and where we are driving. In front of
the camp, wives of Jews gathered, bemoaning and screaming when we
were leaving.
The place where the execution was conducted is very appropriate. It
lies to the north of PanËevo and immediately alongside the PanËevo-
Jabuka road, at a slope which is so high that a person can only climb it
with great effort. Opposite this slope is swampland with the river be-
hind it. When the water level was high (29th of October), the water al-
most reached the slope. Escape of captives can thus be prevented with
few people. Similarly, it is favourable that the soil is sandy, which faci-
litates digging of holes, thus shortening the working hours. While arri-
ving, about 1.5-2 km before the designated place, captives got off the
trucks, walked to the place of execution, while the trucks with civilian
drivers returned immediately, so as to have little opportunity for suspi-
cion. Then I closed off the road to all vehicles for the purpose of secu-
rity and maintaining secrecy. The execution spot is secure with three
light machineguns and 12 gunmen.
1. Against the detainees’ escape attempts
2. For self-protection against possible forays by Serbian gangs.
Digging of holes takes up the greatest part of time while the shooting
itself proceeds very quickly (100 people Ω 40 minutes).
Pieces of luggage and valuables have previously been collected and bro-
ught by my truck so as to be turned in to NSV.
Execution of Jews is simpler than that of Gypsies. One must admit that
Jews went into death very composedly Ω they stood very calmly while
Gypsies moaned, yelled and constantly fidgeted even when already at
the place of shooting. Some jumped into the hole even before the salvo
and tried to feign death.
Initially my soldiers didn’t show that the execution unsettled them.
The second day, it could already be observed that the occasional gun-
man doesn’t have the stomach to carry out the execution for a longer
period. My personal impression is that during the shooting itself, there
are no psychological inhibitions. Nonetheless, they occur in the eve-
ning while contemplating in peace.
Valter,
Lieutenant108

In his bureaucratic style, Lieutenant Valter succeeded in recording
with disdain the desire to live that the Roma were expressing, desper-
ately trying to save themselves. None of them, however, like none of
the Jews, succeeded in that feat. Their lives ended, while their wives
and children, not knowing what had happened to them, had to go on
fighting so as to survive. While the Belgrade Roma were executed at
Jabuka, the PanËevo Roma were forced to bury their corpses:
About harvesting corn in 1941, one day, I don’t remember the date,
they called us to the city police with the order that we go and dig gra-
ves. That day, they took us 36 Gypsies to the Jabuka road and threate-
ned that we must not tell anything to anyone or else we’d be shot. They
ordered that we dig a hole around 15-20 steps long and 3-4 steps wide
and about 1 meter deep. Around 10 o’clock, the German army brought
in three trucks with about 100-120 people, among whom were Serbs,
Gypsies and Jews, while the victims were brought in from the direction
of Belgrade. (...). The victims were marshaled in groups of roughly 20
facing the grave, and after the better ones had had their suits and fo-
otwear removed, then one of the German soldiers placed some kind of
circle on each one’s back where the soldiers were later shooting. When
they shot all the victims they had brought, they ordered that we place
them side by side in two or three rows, after which we buried them.
Of the perpetrators of this crime who were present, I recognized one
single face, (...). This policeman killed, with his own hands, one of the
victims who addressed him with the plea not to shoot him because
they know each other and he has five or six children (...). The executi-
on of remaining victims was carried out by the German army. Every
day we dug just one hole as big as they ordered, keeping in mind the
number of victims they were to shoot. In one hole there was water be-
cause of the proximity of the Tamiš, so the perpetrators poured lime
on the arranged victims, after which we buried them. If someone had
dug holes before my first arrival, that I don’t know. I was there roughly
6-7 times with interruptions and I reckon during that time about 1500-
1600 victims were killed (...). I know that the perpetrators of the crime
later brought the things Ω suits and shoes removed from the victims,
to the municipality and handed them out to domestic Germans (...).109
109 AJ, 110-691-106, statement of Jovan Šajin.

Internment of women and children
No one can imagine how the women and children felt without hus-
bands and fathers. One whole community, it could be said, was left
without men in just several days. It was the second time something
like that happened in Belgrade: about ten days before that, the last re-
maining Jewish families were left without their men.
Roma women from Marinkova bara, Jatagan mala, Pašino brdo, as
well as from surrounding villages “cleansed” from Roma men, who
were already living in extremely harsh circumstances, also lost the
possibility to meet, in the economic sense, their barest existential ne-
cessities. In their often very poor houses, just before the winter, they
were compelled to struggle with feelings stemming from the loss of
their dear ones, to care about children, find the means to survive, find
how to obtain food, firewood for heating, and deal with the fear that
they too might be taken away one day, together with their children.
It is not known whether or not they tried to go somewhere else and
if they helped each other out; it is not known if they received any as-
sistance from “Aryan” neighbours; it is not known if they were already
dying of hunger and winter cold; but that November must have been
one of the hardest periods in their lives.
While Roma and Jewish women were struggling to survive in such
horribly difficult conditions and raise their children, whose future in
the best case scenario meant growing up without male figures, amidst
hostile surroundings, German occupational authorities had intensive
negotiations with Berlin on the issue of “the final solution to Jewish
and Gypsy issue” in Serbia. Women and children were also to be re-
moved; all that was needed was the appropriate manner.
As early as the 11th of October, the chief of Jewish department at
the German Ministry of Internal Affairs, Fritz Rademacher, arrived in
Belgrade, accompanied by two Gestapo representatives. During talks
with occupational authorities, as suggested by him, the decision was
made to gather women and children, not only Jewish, but Roma as

well, in one ghetto in Belgrade and to engage 500 Jewish men for the
purposes of maintaining order, organizing a supply and healthcare
system, while all others were to be executed (it should be kept in mind
that executions were already underway). The ghetto would represent
just a temporary solution, before sending them to the concentration
camp, which was to be built on an island near Sremska Mitrovica, or
further, to some other camp in the east.110
Near the end of October, however, it turned out that the chosen lo-
cation near Sremska Mitrovica didn’t suit the need for constructing a
concentration camp, which was, among other things, according to the
German occupier, supposed to receive, in addition to the remaining
Jews and Roma (i.e. Jewish and Roma women), another 50,000 Ser-
bian hostages. Therefore, on the 28th of October, while arrests of the
Roma in Belgrade were in full swing, general Böhme ordered that the
construction of that camp be suspended, and using the existing build-
ings of Belgrade Fair (Sajmište) for that purpose instead.111
In the period from the 8th to the 12th of December, in accordance
with German orders, Jewish women and children reported to the Po-
lice for Jews. Early morning, they would start off from their homes in
groups to the nearby Džordža Vašingtona Street, where Serbian po-
licemen waited for them. It was the last “walk” in Belgrade for all
of them. At the police station they were registered, then transferred
by German trucks to the concentration camp at Sajmište. What few
personal belongings they could carry with them they were also trans-
ported to the camp, but by other trucks. Everything unfolded calmly,
well organized, in the heart of the city, in front of the eyes of all citi-
zens who could watch the procession of women and children with yel-
110 Milan Koljanin, ibid., pp. 36-37. More about the Sajmište camp: Kristofer Braun-
ing, KonaËno rešenje u Srbiji: Judenlager na Sajmištu, studija sluËaja, in Zbornik
Jevrejskog istorijskog Muzeja, no. 6/1992, pp. 407-428; Jovan Bajford, Staro Saj-
mište. Mesto seÊanja, zaborava i sporenja, Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, Bel-
grade, 2001.
111 Milan Koljanin, ibid., pp. 46-47.

low armbands, without men, as they passed through Belgrade, first on
foot, then in trucks. A heartrending testimony concerning those last
moments remained recorded in the words of Hilda DajË, a young vol-
unteer nurse from the Jewish hospital:
Nada, my dear,
Tomorrow morning I leave for the camp. Nobody’s forcing me to go

and I’m not waiting to be summoned. I’m volunteering to join the first
group that leaves from 23 George Washington Street tomorrow at 9
a.m. My family are against my decision, but I think that you at least
will understand me; there are so many people in need of help that my
conscience dictates to me that I should ignore any sentimental rea-
sons connected with my home and family for not going and put myse-
lf wholly at the service of others. The [Jewish] hospital will remain in
the town, and the director has promised that he will take me in again
when the hospital moves to the camp. I am calm and composed and
convinced that everything is going to turn out all right, perhaps even
better than my optimistic expectations. I shall think of you often; you
know - or perhaps you don’t - what you have meant to me - and will
always mean to me. You are my most beautiful memory from that most
pleasant period of my life - from the [Literary] Society.
Nada, my dear, I love you very, very much.

Hilda
December the 7th 1941112
Side by side with the internment of Jewish women and children, at the
other end of town, in those parts the outskirts and surrounding villag-
es where, near the end of October, a raid had been carried out against
Roma men, another series of numerous arrests of women and children
was in progress. The manner and dynamics of arrests were rather dif-
ferent, but their reasons and the destination of the detainees were the
same as in the case of Jews from the city centre. On the 10th and 11th of
112 JIM, k.24-2-1/1. Letters of Hilda DajË (a total of 4) have been published in dif-
ferent languages. The original ones in Serbian and translation into English can
be downloaded freely from the website: www.open.ac.uk, last accessed: 24th of
March 2014.

December, Roma women and children were taken to Sajmište, after
their men had been killed in mass executions a month earlier.
The scenario was practically the same as in the case of the arrests
of the men. Serbian gendarmes and policemen went from door to door
and led all women and children outside and into trucks, taking them
to gendarmerie stations or seats of quarters and, after less than an
hour, transferred them to Sajmište. German forces didn’t participate
directly, but were mainly overseeing the activity so that everything
would unfold in the greatest order:
(...) We were taken from our apartment at 58a Jaše IgnjatoviÊa Street
Ω I, my brother, Ljubomir MatiÊ, 16 years old, and my sisters: Katica,
7 y.o., Olivera, 4 y.o., all born in Belgrade, of Eastern Orthodox faith,
Serbian nationality, and our mother Mileva StojanoviÊ, housewife, 58
years old. We were taken away by three agents and two gendarmes,
of which one was called Bora, subsergeant, commander of Marinko-
va bara station, while the other was called Nikola GvozdeševiÊ. I don’t
know the names of agents and I don’t recall their faces. From the apar-
tment, they took us to the school Branislav NušiÊ where we stayed one
hour, then they drove us by trucks to the camp at Sajmište (...).113
When they arrived in front of the newly founded camp, the Roma de-
scended from trucks and passed through camp gates in large groups.
Those days, there was probably much crowding since the buildings of
the former fair had to receive roughly 5,300 people of all ages at once,
with a lot of children among them. Jews and Roma weren’t mixed,
rather a separate section of the camp complex was allocated to the
Roma. While Jews were interned at the first and third pavilion, the
biggest building in the entire complex, the Roma were crammed into
pavilion number 2.114 According to estimates of the camp commander,
there were about 600 of them.115
113 AJ, 110-273-119, statement of Nadežda MatiÊ.

114 Milan Koljanin, ibid., pp. 77 and 99.
115 Kristofer Brauning, KonaËno rešenje u Srbiji..., p. 410.

The camp was governed by Einsatzgruppe from Belgrade, while
guard was kept by the 64th Police Reserves Battalion. The supply of
camp with food, medications, heating materials and other necessities
was entrusted to the city of Belgrade municipality. Internal control,
i.e. internal order, was the duty of the Jewish Chairmanship, which
continued to perform its functions among internees themselves. Out-
side the camp, the Jewish hospital was still operating, where the pa-
tients and staff were under strict surveillance of German and quisling
forces. There were no free Jews left anymore, except rare individuals
who had been spared for some reason or those who were hiding. The
same couldn’t be said of the Roma, since a considerable number of
them, i.e. all those who were no longer “Gypsies” in the eyes of Ger-
mans and quislings, since they had succeeded in proving permanent
residence in Belgrade, continued to enjoy full freedom. On the other
hand, from Marinkova bara, Jatagan mala, »ubura, Pašino brdo and
all other city parts and surrounding villages, the poorest segment of
the population had completely been removed.
In addition to three big pavilions where women and children were
interned, the camp consisted of several other buildings that made it
practically independent and completely separate from the city.116 The
conditions were inhuman for all, especially for the Roma. Among many
Roma women, difficult moments remained etched in their memory:
(...) At the camp they beat me and made me work, they made me drink
water with sand. Beneath our beds ran water, so we were freezing with
cold. For food we received just one meal per day.117
(...) Life at the camp was hard, I was abused by someone named Kraus,
who was overseeing Gypsies. I was all swollen from the beating. They
gave us some injections from which numerous women died.118
(...) In addition to what we were subjected to at the camp, my dau-
ghter and I were physically abused by Kraus, warden, as follows: on
116 Cf.: Milan Koljanin, ibid., pp. 76-98.

117 AJ, 110-273-179, statement of Jelena SimiÊ.
118 AJ, 110-273-181, statement of Grozdana MilosavljeviÊ.

one occasion he hit me in the face with his fist and knocked out my 2
teeth while I was waiting for a portion of bread but he suspected that
I had already received it. He beat my daughter on two occasions with
a whip because she couldn’t leave the children when she was supposed
to bring out, with the others, the dead from the camp.119
More details about life at the camp are provided in another letter by
Hilda DajË:
(...) Here it’s so - I don’t know how to describe it - it’s quite simply a huge
cowshed for 5,000 people or more, without walls, without barriers -
everyone sharing the same quarters. I described the details of this ma-
gic castle to Mirjana and I really don’t feel like repeating them. We
get either breakfast or supper accompanied by the most abusive of
words - on top of that, one’s appetite passes and one’s no longer hun-
gry. Over the past five days we’ve had cabbage four times. Otherwise,
everything’s wonderful. Especially as far as our neighbours are concer-
ned - the Gypsy camp. Today I went there to shave and grease the heads
of fifteen people with lice. However, although after this my arms were
burning up to the elbows from the cresol, my work is in vain, because
as soon as I finish the second group, the first have got lice again. (...)120
Hunger was the foremost source of suffering. The kitchen was locat-
ed far from the pavilion where the Roma were interned, so that food
was brought and handed out to them once a day.121 The city of Belgrade
municipality participated consciously in starving and indirect killing
of internees, regarding them as persons whose needs are to be met
only at the end or maybe never. It was a kind of recognition or accept-
ance of the special place in the categorization of humankind that was
attributed to the Roma by National Socialism in their new order: the
behaviour of the bureaucratic structure of the Belgrade municipality,
specifically the Supply Directorate (DIRIS), didn’t differ at all from
119 AJ, 110-273-192, statement of Natalija ObradoviÊ.

120 The third letter of Hilda DajË. www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/semlin/sr/pis-
mo-3.php, last accessed: 27th of March 2014.
121 Danijela JovanoviÊ, ibid., (www.balkanliteraryherald.com/broj5/danijelajovano-
vic5.htm, last accessed: 9th of April 2014).

the activities of other Nazi or pro-Nazi bureaucracies. Another prob-
lem probably lay in the potential profit that some clerks and suppliers
saw in the large undertaking, which soon resulted in stealing, resale
or appropriation of products intended for the camp. The problem, of
course, pertained to the relations with German authorities, primarily
with the camp administration, which often had to intervene so that
the camp would get the agreed quantity of groceries, medications and
other necessities.122 A shortage of those items could mean increased
mortality, maybe even riots, i.e. problems in “solving the Jewish and
Gypsy issue” in Belgrade and in Serbia, which was supposed to pro-
ceed uninterruptedly.
Hunger and winter quickly began reaping death not only among
the Roma, but also among Jews. Most often the victims were children
and the elderly; the weakest among the detainees. Mothers watched
helplessly as their newborns died in their arms. In the worst cases,
the children were just several months old or had even been born at
the camp itself: Cveta IbiševiÊ, born at the camp and died after one
month;123 Ljubomir MirkoviÊ, 9 months old;124 –ura StanojeviÊ, a
4-year-old child; Petka IbrahimoviÊ, 13 years old;125 then, Milena Dra-
ganoviÊ, 60 years old; Stana TodoroviÊ, 55 years old.126 Those were just
some of the names of the Roma who died in Sajmište.
Unlike Jewish women, for whom, except in the mentioned cases,
no possibility to be saved existed, the Roma women and their children
122 Concerning the relations between city of Belgrade municipality and the camp
there is very important correspondence from February and March 1942: AVII,
NdA, b. 36-1 doc. 21-58.
123 IAB, OGB, b. 216, Department for the cemetery to the Governing department,
report on the funeral of those who died and were killed on the 11th of April 1942.
124 AJ, 110-273-72, statement of Natalija MirkoviÊ.
125 IAB, Sajmište files.
126 IAB, OGB, b. 216, Department for the cemetery to the Governing depart-
ment, report on the funeral of those who died and were killed on the 31st of
December 1941; and report on the funeral of those who died and were killed
on the 9th of January 1941.

could at least repeatedly attempt to escape the clutches of their exe-
cutioners. Although for men there was practically no time to quote
the earlier order issued by Administrative Headquarters Chief Turner,
whereby all those capable of proving their permanent residence in Bel-
grade were envisaged to be deleted from lists of “Gypsies”, in the case of
women and children from Sajmište, the experience they had with their
husbands, sons, fathers and neighbours, as well as more time at their
disposal, played a key role in saving many lives. Specifically, just sev-
eral days after arrests, the first groups of Roma women were released
from the camp, since they had succeeded in procuring the necessary
permit, thereby proving permanent residence in the Serbian capital.127
Most frequently, relatives were the ones who addressed the municipal-
ity governor or local quarter chief, with birth certificates of interned
women and children, which was to prove the validity of submitted doc-
uments. The application was forwarded to the Special Police, that is Ω
the Police for Jews and Gypsies, from where it was sent to the German
authorities in charge, i.e. Einsatzgruppe, which controlled the camp.
The last step was the signing of the permit by the Sajmište camp com-
mander, based on which the people for whom “amnesty” was pleaded
were deleted from lists of “Gypsies” and released.128
Based on that, it is perfectly visible how much power in the case
of Roma women and children lay in local, quisling authorities: mu-
nicipality governors were de facto able to decide on the life or death of
Roma, because it was solely on their positive opinion, i.e. their con-
firmation of residence that someone’s release from camp depended.
The frightening face of that situation, which had constantly appeared
even before, but never with such clarity, is the fact that Roma women
and children were sent to camp with the necessary help of the lowest
level of police and bureaucratic apparatus. These low level police and
127 AJ, 110-273-92, statement of Natalija StojanoviÊ; and 96, statement of Milka
SimiÊ.
128 Original permits for release from camp have been kept, or their copies: AJ, 110-
273-105, 110, 153 etc.

bureaucratic apparatuses consisted of people who knew well those
they were sending to camp and with whom they had probably lived in
community a long time. This same apparatus could save them, return
them home, albeit without men, could help them obtain the suitable
residence permits in some way, even counterfeit them.
It is probable that, during those moments, a considerable number
of people, members of that apparatus, took advantage of others’ des-
peration. There is suspicion that residence permits were being issued
in return for certain sums of money, just like City of Belgrade Munici-
pality officials profited in the procurement of goods for concentration
camps or like Italian mission clerks were selling fake identification
cards to Jews who wanted to escape from Belgrade and were able to do
so.129 Still, however that may appear today, it enabled those Roma who
could pay to save their dearest ones from camp. Women and children
in villages around Belgrade often had a strange fate, because the lo-
cal municipality governor first led the arrests, like in Resnik, but then
confirmed that they were indeed residents of Belgrade, thus ensuring
their release.130 In other cases, nevertheless, it did not happen. “The
village didn’t guarantee” is a phrase that will remain in the memory
of the survivors.131
At the concentration camp itself, a Jewish woman, remembered
solely by her name Ω Matilda Ω played a significant role in saving
the Roma. Matilda was appointed manager of the pavilion where the
Roma were interned and urged the Roma to spread the word among
those who had already been deleted from lists of “Gypsies” to write
pleas for the release of all others from the camp.132
129 Milovan Pisarri, La Shoah in Serbia e Macedonia..., pp. 192-193.

130 AJ, 110-273-960, statement of Jelena –oreviÊ.
131 Reminiscences of DekiÊ Milorad and DekiÊ Pavle from Mirijevo, published in
Dragoljub AckoviÊ, Romi u Beogradu.... Original reminiscences are kept at the
City of Belgrade Historical Archives. They were collected from Milan Koljanin
and Milena RadojËiÊ on the 9th of May 1986.
132 Ibid., pp. 251-253 and 282.

Liberation was carried out in groups, during January and February.
The greatest number of camp internees spent three months in captiv-
ity. From the start of March, it was not possible to exit the camp,133
probably so as not to disturb the planned killing of all male and female
internees which followed after the decision to finally “solve the Jew-
ish issue in Serbia”. For that purpose, a so-called dushegubka was sent
from Berlin, that is Ω a special truck with poisonous gas, which was
already being used in Chełmno and elsewhere, serving as a moveable
gas chamber. Its notorious work commenced at the Jewish hospital
on the 19th of March, and then went on to Sajmište. Daily, except on
Sundays, drivers, accompanied by the camp commander, took away
groups of one hundred people, suffocated them on the way, during
the drive, and then unloaded them at Jajinci, where they were buried
in mass graves. So as everything could run smoothly, before setting
off, the convicts were being convinced that they would be transported
further, to Poland. The last group was driven out on the 15th of May,
after which date the Sajmište camp served as a camp for imprisoned
partisans and civilians until the end of the war.134
Since mid-March until mid-May, the Roma were also killed who
could not succeed in securing their own release. It is not known if
they too were suffocated or killed at the camp itself, nor is it known
how many there were. Whereas on the one hand, on the 5th of May
1942, the Jewish Chairmanship informed the City of Belgrade Gover-
norship that, from December until April, 56 Gypsies of both genders
died at the camp,135 the report by the State Commission for Determin-
ing the Crimes of Occupiers and their Collaborators their number rose
to 400.136
133 Ibid., pp. 271 and 280.

134 Milan Koljanin, ibid., pp. 120-124.
135 AVII, NdA, 36-1-54.
136 AJ, 110-613-541.

It can reliably be said only that in the second half of April there
were Roma still alive, since at the time, the quisling police went in
search of two Roma who had succeeded in escaping from the camp:
MatiÊ Ruža, a Gypsy woman escaped from the camp in Zemun.
Description: 22 years old, nothing else has been sent regarding the
appearance. She is to be found and handed in to the Special Police
department of the City of Belgrade Administration citing no. 935/42.
JovanoviÊ Dušan, Gypsy man escaped from the camp in Zemun. Des-
cription: 14 years old, nothing else has been sent regarding the appea-
rance. He is to be found and handed in to the Special Police department
of the City of Belgrade Administration citing no. 935/42.137
Data collection, victims, perpetrators

After three years under fascist authority, Yugoslav National Libera-
tion Army units, supported by the Red Army, liberated Belgrade on
the 20th of October 1944. Street clashes, in which a substantial num-
ber of soldiers from both sides were killed, but also civilians, went on
for eight days and the result was the retreat of German and quisling
forces towards the north-west. Several further months were needed
before German capitulation, before the entire Yugoslavia was liber-
ated. During those months in the liberated Serbia and Belgrade, the
Communist Party instated authority and formed a network of state
and local structures according to the model of the Soviet Union. A
State Commission for Determining the Crimes of Occupiers and their
Collaborators was already functioning as a separate temporary body.
Its major task was to thoroughly investigate all crimes perpetrated on
the territory of Yugoslavia, identifying not only victims but also per-
petrators, as well as the circumstances in which the crimes had been
committed. The State Commission was divided into country commis-
sions Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro,
Macedonia, as well as area commissions for Vojvodina, Kosovo and
137 Policijski glasnik, no. 853, 25th of April 1942

Sandžak. Each country commission further divided into county, can-
ton (district), city, municipality and local (sector) commission, which
covered every populated part of Yugoslavia. Separate survey commis-
sions existed also, which usually investigated crimes perpetrated at
camps, such as, for instance, at Sajmište. The operation of the com-
mission lasted somewhat under five years.138
In Belgrade, which was simultaneously the seat of State Commis-
sion, Country Commission of Serbia and county commission, also ac-
tive were canton, municipality and local committees. Thanks to their
thorough work, many personal testimonies about crimes against all
civilians have been collected, alongside numerous original German
and quisling documents. As can be seen from the correspondence be-
tween commission bodies, as well as on the basis of the pure scope of
collected testimonies, the issue of Roma was treated separately. In one
communique dated the 8th of March 1945, for example, during the
period when the commission under the VII sector (Jatagan mala) was
collecting data on persons killed on the territory for which they were
in charge, the city commission returned to the representatives of the
same sector the case of a victim, with the following explanation:
The case is being returned for further work, with the note that in the
Commission’s decision nothing was said about the damage that resul-
ted from this crime, although the injured party mentioned in her char-
ges the damage she had sustained, besides, the injured party did not
provide a statement about whether or not her husband was a Gypsy.
The latter was necessary so that all cases of Gypsy victims could be
grouped together and separated from other victims.139
Sector commissions operated according to plan in all quarters whence

the Roma were taken and murdered. In that manner, in February
and March 1945, all data from Jatagan mala was collected, where-
138 Mladenko ColiÊ, Rad i rezultati komisija za utvrivanje zloËina okupatora i njihovih
pomagaËa u Jugoslaviji 1941-1945. godine, in Istinom protiv revizije NOB u Jugoslaviji
1941-1945, Društvo za istinu o NOB, Belgrade, 2009, pp. 215-217.
139 AJ, 110-273-4.

as in June and July, the XI sector commission proceeded to collect
data from Marinkova bara. On special forms, commission members
recorded all the necessary personal data of witnesses, as well as state-
ments pertaining to killed or interned family members or acquaint-
ances, or testimonies of personal experience in the Sajmište camp. In
addition to name and surname, place and date of birth or age, place
of residence, employment, property status of the witness (which was
most often described as “weak”, “poor” or “meager”), the forms con-
tain those same data about the victims. Frequently, but not always, the
amount of damages was recorded that the commission envisaged for
the witness or it was mentioned that, in the witness’ own words “re-
garding the damages claim, I leave to the Commission to determine it
freely”.140 Although for everyone the mentioned nationality is Serbian,
on each form it was written that these are “Gypsies”.
Two months after the operation of the Commission for Deter-
mining the Crimes of Occupiers and their Collaborators, the newly
instated national authorities proceeded with thoroughly collecting
submissions regarding war damages. Each sector, which later became
a municipality, sent a fieldwork committee whose task was to collect
data from each citizen concerning damage of property, as well as casu-
alties. All data was collected in special forms, in which besides the
name, surname and other personal data of the claimant, the date and
circumstances in which the victim died, was killed or went missing,
were also written.
The most significant thing about this process is that, based on the
family and their economic situation, the Commission proposed the
amount of damages, which was later confirmed by a special decision
of the Canton Commission for War Damages.
Many submissions, specifically, most submissions from Marinko-
va bara, relate to the Roma. The same women who testified in June
140 Cf. e.g.: AJ, 110-273-65, statement of Danica ManËiÊ; and 88, statement of Marija
MilanoviÊ.

and July about their husbands, sons and fathers being taken away and
missing, received in September and October, certificates that a cer-
tain sum in dinars had been granted them by way of an official deci-
sion, for the endured loss of a male family member (or a female and
even a child, if the victims had been killed, for example, at Sajmište).
In addition, a certain sum was allocated to them for the upkeep of
their remaining family members. These figures differ greatly.
Similarly to what had happened with statements collected by the
Commission for Determining Crimes, which were allocated to the
separate category of “Gypsies” and who were thus, the same as Jews,
granted a special status of victim within German and quisling policy
during World War II, in the case of submissions about war damages,
local sectors left the freedom to claimants to state their nationality. In
some places the claimants are reported as Serbs-Gypsies, while else-
where just as Serbs. It is possible that many didn’t want to apply as
Roma, i.e. in the fear because of everything they had undergone in
the previous years overpowered the trust they could have in the new
authorities, about which, like many others, they knew almost nothing.
Just in rare cases the victims were listed as “Gypsies”,141 whereas most
often the victim’s nationality was “Serbian”, while the reason of death
or disappearance given was “sent away as a Gypsy”.142
The collected data provides more details which should be the sub-
ject of deeper analyses and research. In those applications, for in-
stance, it’s not rare to find data about children who had died from
hunger or winter cold during 1942.143 Their names and surnames, as
well as addresses and particulars about other family members indi-
cate that, in many cases, these were Roma children. Thus, the ques-
tion is raised if perhaps these were children who died because of what
they had been subjected to at Sajmište or because there was no one to
141 IAB, INOO, VI Reon, k. 26/5 R „V“/1345

142 IAB, INOO, VI Reon, k. 26/5 R „V“/1347, 1348 etc.
143 IAB, INOO, VI Reon, k. 26/5 R „V“/1355, 1356, 1357 etc.

take care of them after release; as their fathers had been killed, while
mothers were physically and psychologically exhausted from experi-
ences at the camp. It was probable that the surviving women couldn’t
find any jobs, so that they too, like their children, died from hunger
and cold: the fact that they had been released from camp, didn’t auto-
matically mean that they saved their lives.
Thorough work of the bodies of Commission for Determining the
Crimes of Occupiers and their Collaborators, as well as the people’s
committees, represents the most valuable material for studying the is-
sue of genocide against the Roma in Belgrade. The fact that it was ap-
proached so thoroughly in the capital indicates a possibility that data
about Roma victims in other Serbian cities has been collected in the
same manner. This could be proven solely by additional research. The
paradox of those documents lies in the fact that there is frequent men-
tion of the lack of material in historiography which would enable the
study of genocide against the Roma in Serbia, despite the fact that, at
least in the case of Belgrade, there is plenty of data on Roma suffering,
which is probably lacking when it comes to other victims, for exam-
ple Jews. The explanation is simple: unlike Jews, who were almost all
killed, the committees in the case of Roma had at their disposal nu-
merous witnesses, that is Ω the victims’ relatives. Wives, mothers and
daughters were thus given a key role in saving victims of Roma nation-
ality from being forgotten. Unfortunately, it was because of historical
circumstances that over seventy years were to pass before this data
could be the focus of a research study.
According to data from the City Board of Trustees of the Commis-
sion for Determining the Crimes of Occupiers and their Collabora-
tors, about 1,000 Roma were shot or killed in some other manner in
Belgrade.144 Many victims were newcomers from Bukovik, Garaš and
other places in Šumadija, who had moved to the capital like many oth-
144 AJ, 110-55-901. In the communique sent to the Country Commission of Serbia, it
is stated that about 9,000 Jews were killed.

er citizens of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after World War I or later.
Regularly registered inhabitants, they lived in the poorest conditions.
Their children, who were in many cases killed with them, had been
born in Belgrade.
The question of so-called “drifters” remains open, i.e. Roma who
lived a nomadic life and who, unlike other Roma, didn’t even have the
possibility of proving their residence and being saved that way. Al-
most nothing is known about them and their fate, so that, at least for
the time being, things can only be assumed on the basis of rare doc-
umented traces. For example, in June 1941, when Δuprija municipal-
ity authorities carried out a census of the Roma, about 200 local and
around 300 Russian Roma (60 families) lived there, who had, howev-
er, in the vast majority (except 5 families), moved to Belgrade several
days earlier.145 It is possible that those Russian Roma, who had moved
from Δuprija to Belgrade just before the introduction of anti-Roma
and anti-Semitic measures stipulated in the regulation dated the 30th
of May 1941, were those very drifters who later lost their lives in the
mass executions and at Sajmište. Similarly, it is possible that among
the so-called drifters, there were Roma who sought refuge in Belgrade
during the autumn of 1941, so as to avoid persecution in their native
town, not suspecting that they would soon be arrested and shot.146
In statements collected by the Commission for Determining the
Crimes of Occupiers and their Collaborators, there is valuable data
about the perpetrators. Although at the end of each statement, the
witness indicates the responsibility of those issuing orders, such as,
for instance Dragi JovanoviÊ, Milan AÊimoviÊ, Milan NediÊ, Heinrich
Dankelmann and others, the names of executioners provide many
more elements for interpreting genocide against the Roma in Bel-
grade. The difference between those two categories is clear: while in
the case of those issuing orders the pressure of committee members
145 Δuprijski Cigani veÊ dobijaju trake, “Novo vreme” , 21st of June 1941, p. 4.
146 AJ, 110-273-901 and 902.

was felt, as it seems that they “suggested” the names of perpetrators,
since they are repeated in the same formulation in almost all state-
ments. In the case of executioners, personal recollections of witnesses
emerged, who had in many cases been familiar with their assassins.
Connections existed between them just like between any citizen of
a town and representatives of local police or administrative appara-
tuses: they all lived or worked in the same part of town, often near
each other; they probably often met in the streets, at the market or a
tavern. At Marinkova bara, Jatagan mala, Pašino brdo and all other
locations where the Roma were arrested and taken away, the victims
and criminals met on a daily basis and knew each other, at least being
nodding acquaintances. Consequently, due to those connections, we
found out that in the arrests of men at Marinkova bara near the end
of October 1941, the following people participated: Subsergeant Bora
JankoviÊ, commander of local gendarmerie station, Gendarme Nikola
GvozdeševiÊ,147 agents DuliÊ and “Selja”,148 the scribe of the XI quar-
ter PopoviÊ,149 Dragi IsakoviÊ, (who led the arrests at Pašino brdo, and
was the commander of local gendarmerie station),150 Sergeant VesoviÊ
(who was one of the participants in the raid at DorÊol)151 and Sergeants
MandiÊ and JovanoviÊ, (both in service at V quarter) who were among
the gendarmes who arrested the Roma in Mirijevo.152
The aforementioned people, as well as many others, were direct-
ly responsible for participating in the mass arrests of the Roma for
the purpose of their extermination. They were part of the machinery
which ordered, organized and carried out genocide. What their fate
147 AJ, 110-273-119, statement of Nadežda MatiÊ; 173, statement of Javorka ŽivkoviÊ
and others
148 AJ, 110-273-132, statement of Draga LekiÊ.
149 AJ, 110-273-185, statement of Zorka JovanoviÊ.
150 AJ, 110-273-759, statement of Stanica PeriÊ; and 771, statement of Katarina
RadosavljeviÊ.
151 AJ, 110-273-860, statement of Olga PetroviÊ.
152 AJ, 110-273-742.

was after the war, if they were pronounced responsible for the crimes
perpetrated, will probably be shown only by deeper research. Still, it
can be assumed with a rather substantial dose of certainty that, be-
cause of their participation in arrests and the internment of neigh-
bours, acquaintances or just fellow citizens, they haven’t paid a high
price, or any price for that matter. From some statements or reports
it can be seen that they just transferred from one, quisling apparatus,
to another, new, revolutionary one. Among those responsible for the
raid at Resnik, at the moment of writing the report on arrests of Roma
from that village, which dates from the 14th of November 1945 Ω more
than one year after liberation Ω the then municipality governor Ta-
nasije Tasa ŽivojinoviÊ was killed (but it is not known how, by whom
and why), while peasants Borivoje MatiÊ and Milan LazareviÊ, as well
as treasurer Žarko StojanoviÊ, were free, in their houses.153 Similarly,
one gendarme who had participated in arrests at »ubura was seen by
one female witness after the war in the service of the newly formed
traffic police:
(...) One of the criminals who were collecting our people I now see in
the traffic force and within 7 days I’ll try to find out his name and whe-
re he works. He attacked us Gypsies for not wearing the armbands that
the occupier had imposed.154
In addition to those belonging to police and administrative appara-

tuses, the issue of snitches and others who helped or participated in
the crime in any way, confirms the need for further research. In one
letter from the Gypsy Cultural-Educational Association from Voždo-
vac, (an organization that included Roma from Marinkova bara and
probably represented an attempt to take certain steps, in addition to
emancipation and improvement of Roma’s living conditions, towards
punishing the perpetrators who had participated in genocide against
the Roma), sent to the State Commission for Determining the Crimes
153 AJ, 110-273-954.

154 AJ, 110-273-558, statement of Anka JovanoviÊ.

of Occupiers and their Collaborators, it is clearly visible how impor-
tant this issue is:
Recently, I, the undersigned, have been visited by many members of
the association from Marinkova bara demanding that I report the
following people to the authorities in charge:
1) –ore UzunoviÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 76, Marinkova bara (VI sector)
2) ... UzunoviÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 76, his wife, name unknown
3) Adela UzunoviÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 76, his daughter-in-law.
1) People in the whole neighbourhood, Gypsies as well as Serbs, are
talking about –ore UzunoviÊ, that many Germans and Gestapo
members visited him openly, that he was on excellent terms with the
German commander and German authorities, that one German was
even his guest of honour at Christmas, as well as that he is certainly of
German descent too, because he speaks perfect German.
What is most important for the association, he is claimed to have rui-
ned almost all Gypsies from Marinkova bara, that he constantly thre-
atened them, beat them, and finally, that he snitched on them so they
would be taken to the camp, i.e. execution fields.
Thus, for example, one elderly woman, Jovanka BeškiÊ, residing at Jaše
IgnjatoviÊa 67, complains that this UzunoviÊ person first urged a po-
liceman to check the identification papers of her son Stojan and beat
him up, then he went to find a German patrol, but when he didn’t find
them, he brought two gendarmes, who took her sons, Stojan and Bo-
risav, to the gendarmerie station and beat them senseless, even across
the palms of their hands and soles of their feet. Later he ordered them
to dig a toilet hole free of charge and told them to be thankful that he
hadn’t brought them the German patrol. Besides, he always boasted of
having been appointed Marinkova bara commander and that he would
judge the Gypsies. Those two, as well as all Gypsies from that neighbor-
hood, he constantly threatened that he would send them all off as
“communists” to the concentration camp and that he would be the end
of them, he persistently used foul language against them, calling them
communists and assaulting them personally or by way of our police or
the German one. In the lead-up to taking Gypsy men to the camp, all
night he paced the entire street and stood near Gypsy houses, certainly
with the intention to watch over them lest someone should escape, sin-
ce he knew there would be removals. In the morning, around 4 o’clock,

together with his wife and daughter-in-law Adela, he entered all Gypsy
houses with the German police and denounced them. What is more, it
seems that he was the person who gave to the Germans an accurate list
of Gypsy houses, since Germans didn’t enter other, Serbian houses. In
addition to all those threats, cursing and snitching, he even took some
things from a Gypsy woman called Persa, while she was in the camp
and sold some of them, while others are still at his place. Even so, Per-
sa never returned from camp, nor did her children, and it is not known
what happened to them.
2) His wife also snitched on Gypsies, called them communists, cur-
sed them and threatened them. Besides, she personally attacked and
slapped a Gypsy woman.
3) Daughter-in-law Adela, whose husband the Germans had taken to
Germany, and who had also behaved towards Gypsies like her father
–ore, snitched to German authorities not only on Gypsies but on
many Serbs as well. What is more, from a Gypsy woman called Nata
PetroviÊ, she took a large sum of money, promising she would hide her
and keep her from being taken to camp, but in actuality she herself re-
ported her to the police, who came and took her and her 4 children
to camp, whence they never returned. Besides, the whole Marinko-
va bara knows, and would openly say so, that she was of very immoral
behavior, that she had the most intimate liaisons with Germans and
that the whole neighbourhood was afraid of her and watchful. Now it
seems she has run away somewhere and vanished from the area, certa-
inly out of fear she might be accused.
Regarding all those claims, as well as many other things, the witnesses
listed below will testify as association members, and if needed, we will
submit other names, even from among Serbs.
We request from the addressee hereof to call the named persons to
account as soon as possible and after determining if guilty, to see to it
with authorities in charge that they be apprehended and sentenced to
the punishment they deserve, taking into account the fact that for their
snitching on Gypsies from door to door, they are to be blamed for the
death of numerous breadwinners and even entire families. This is all
the more necessary, since the association has already been informed
that all Gypsies taken away from Belgrade were executed and killed in
Germany; which is why many families, women and children, are left
without their breadwinner and defender.
Witnesses for the above are:

1) Jovanka BelkiÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 67, whose two sons were beaten and
then taken away
2) Žika DobrosavljeviÊ, Peke PavloviÊa 76,
3) Natalija TodoroviÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 82,
4) Živko MilovanoviÊ, Peke PavloviÊa 57,
5) Darinka StankoviÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 67,
6) Desanka KostiÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 65,
7) Mitra TodoroviÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 67,
8) Radovan AÊimoviÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 84,
9) Mileva StojanoviÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 60a,
10) Nata FirizeviÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 60a,
11) Zorka RadosavljeviÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 72,
12) Leposava PaunoviÊ, Jaše IgnjatoviÊa 67.
DEATH TO FASCISM Ω FREEDOM TO THE PEOPLE!
Association chairman,
(Illegible)
(law school graduate)155
Several months later, the same association sent another letter, this
time to the court authorities (Public Prosecutor for Serbia), clearly de-
manding that Dragi JovanoviÊ, who was then already in prison of the
security police (OZNA), be questioned about the issue of mass killing
of the Roma. In the letter, the following was stated:
The association has found out that Dragi JovanoviÊ is now in Belgra-
de, being a well-known war criminal, who ought to be brought before
the court.
Being that JovanoviÊ is one of the biggest culprits for the horrible fate
of our fellow citizens Ω Gypsies, and being that the association has
not been able to find out, to this day, what happened to them, as not
even the State Commission for Determining the Crimes of Occupiers
and their Collaborators has any data about it, we kindly ask the Pu-
blic Prosecutor to receive this act as a kind of accusation by all Gypsi-
es in Serbia, especially Gypsies from Belgrade, who suffered the most.
In addition, we ask the investigating authorities to question the above
named criminal on the following: what happened to the Gypsies, whe-
re were they sent and are they still alive or were they all shot? We are
155 AJ, 110-273-833.

convinced that he knows all that as one of the occupier’s main associa-
tes and helpers, who persecuted us Gypsies the most.
At the same time, we ask Comrade Public Prosecutor to inform us, if
possible, in every way, about the results of the investigation on this
issue, i.e. if the Gypsies who were taken away are still living and where
they were sent by the occupier. This is because many mothers, wives
and sisters who are wearing weeds are uncertain to this day about the
fate of their dear ones.156
Unfortunately, nothing was done. As in the case of German war crimi-

nals who were tried in front of Yugoslav military courts, neither Dragi
JovanoviÊ, nor other domestic fascists were charged with the respon-
sibility for genocide against the Roma. It is solely in the indictment
against other members of NediÊ’s regime, Tanasije DiniÊ, Velibor
JoniÊ and –ura DokiÊ, that their role was mentioned in carrying out
the extermination of Jews and “Gypsies”, but it was left at that.157 Ac-
cordingly, the report is indicative which the Belgrade Board of Trus-
tees of Serbian Country Commission for Determining the Crimes of
Occupiers and their Collaborators sent on the 27th of November 1945
to the Country Commission:
Because of a shortage of concrete data about the manner of crimes
committed in Belgrade, in certain cases also because of unilateral pro-
ceedings, a collective determining of all crimes committed against
Gypsies is being undertaken. As these crimes were committed rather
long ago, mostly in 1941, so impressions have faded, while on the other
hand, citizens don’t see a need for determining these crimes and crimi-
nals or a reason to press charges because the criminals are unfamiliar
by name, absent or for the most part liquidated. Therefore this commi-
ssion has succeeded in collecting relatively few data.158
156 IAB, box „JovanoviÊ Dragi“, 595-611, no. 10, Gypsy Cultural-Educational Associ-
ation to the Public Prosecutor for Serbia, the 16th of February 1946
157 Miodrag ZeËeviÊ (ed.), Dokumenti sa suenja Draži MihailoviÊu, SUBNOR Jugo-
slavije, Belgrade, 2001, p.163.
158 Report no. 7562 sent by the Belgrade Board of Trustees of Serbian Country Com-
mission for Determining the Crimes of Occupiers and their Collaborators on the
27th of November 1945 to the Country Commission of Serbia, the 27th of Novem-
ber 1945, published in Miodrag ZeËeviÊ (ed.), ibid., p. 1732.

The collected data, as well as reports and determinations outlining
the damages for each victim have disappeared from the discourse on
war crimes. As in other European countries, the Roma were forgotten.

V. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA
IN OTHER SERBIAN CITIES:
CONCISE OVERVIEW
Measures against the Roma population were introduced and applied

in all the cities of occupied Serbia. Just like in Belgrade, the Roma
were victims of mass executions during the autumn of 1941 in many
other cities although relatively little data exists in the literature about
it. Fragmentary traces indicate the fact that new, more thorough re-
search must be undertaken, so as to obtain a more complete picture
about genocide against the Roma in Serbia. In this short chapter,
which can be considered an appendix, solely “the best known” cases
are considered. The objective is to show, without excessive ambition,
that suffering of the Roma is an issue that encompasses the whole of
Serbia, although it attained its greatest scope in Belgrade.
Šabac
Occupational forces entered Šabac on the 13th of April 1941. After the
final breakdown of the Yugoslav Army and division of the territory of
Yugoslavia, Šabac county became an area bordering with the newly
created Independent State of Croatia.
Since the commencement of the armed battle against the occupier
and quislings, strong national resistance and action of partisan units
developed in that region. Already in August, the MaËva squad was
formed and the first big armed action carried out, that is Ω an attack
against the village BogatiÊ, which was exceptionally successful.1
1 On that, cf.: Dragoslav Parmakovic: MaËvanski (Podrinski) narodnooslobodilaËki par-

tizanski odred, 1941-1944, Fond narodnooslobodilaËke borbe Podrinja, Šabac, 1973.
GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN OTHER SERBIAN CITIES │ 143

After that attack and quick strengthening of partisan forces, the
occupational forces in Šabac county received re-enforcements. The
first armed conflict between partisan and German units happened on
the 14th of August near the village of Duvanište, after which the battle
spread to other territories of the county. In the second half of Septem-
ber, it became clear to occupational authorities that the reaction to
resistance in Šabac county had to be more adequate.
In was during that period that general Böhme was appointed plen-
ipotentiary commanding general in Serbia, and among his first acts,
he ordered the cleansing of that territory from enemy elements.2 In
that order it stated, among other things, that “unscrupulous measures
must be an intimidating example, which will shortly be heard about
all over Serbia.”3
The cleansing of MaËva encountered the insurgents’ resistance. In
the order issued by German Military Commander for Serbia, it is stat-
ed that on the 23rd of September, arms were fired against German pa-
trol, which suffered losses. Further it is mentioned that immediately
the next day “342 division is to collect, by foray, all men in Šabac be-
tween the ages of 14 and 70 and transfer them to the concentration
camp, which the division will erect west of the river Sava.” In addi-
tion, it was mentioned that members of the population participating
in battles should be executed on the spot.4
The action of carrying out arrests lasted three days. In the daily re-
port of the headquarters of 342nd infantry division, dated the 25th of
September 1941, there is mention of the fact that 3,500-4,000 men
from Šabac were arrested during the action of cleansing.5 In the daily
report for the following day, it is stated that 4,410 people were arrested6.
2 Cf. chapter on genocide in Serbia

4 Ibid., doc. 170.
5 Ibid, doc. 175.
6 Ibid, doc. 176.

This number of arrestees was confirmed in the report of German Mili-
tary Commander in Serbia dated the 27th of September 1941.7
For all arrestees, on the grounds of regulation issued on the 25th of
September by the German Military Commander in Serbia, a separate
camp was to be formed west of the river Sava, at the locality of Jar-
ak, 20 kilometers north of Šabac.8 The next day, transport of roughly
5,000 people began, including Jews from the Šabac camp on the Sava,
i.e. Jewish men from Šabac who were part of “Kladovo transport”.9
During the relocation of convicts, German soldiers on horses and
bicycles imposed an impossible pace on the exhausted convicts. First
they were interned in the village of Klenak, where they were left with-
out food and water for two days, after which they continued making
their way towards Jarak. A certain number didn’t survive the reloca-
tion. When they arrived at Jarak, it was assessed that the position was
not the most favourable for a camp, so that those same convicts were
sent back, toward Šabac. The return was equally hard and a certain
number of convicts didn’t survive the trip.
After the partisan attack against German soldiers near Topola on
the 2nd of October, Böhme ordered the execution of 2,100 hostages,
of which 805 “Jews and Gypsies” were to be taken from the camp in
Šabac.10
The execution of Jews and Roma was carried out on the 12 and 13th
of October in the village Zasavica.
7 Ibid, doc. 178.

8 Ibid, doc. 174.
9 “Kladovo transport” is the name that relates to the group of about 1,200 Jewish
refugees from Austria and other Middle-European countries, who were tempo-
rarily in Šabac at the moment war with Yugoslavia erupted, hoping they would
succeed in making their way to Palestine. All but several exceptions were killed
in Serbia. On “Kladovo transport” cf.: Milica MihajloviÊ (ed.), Kladovo transport.
Zbornik radova sa okruglog stola, Jevrejski istorijski muzej, Belgrade, 2006.
10 Cf. chapter on genocide in Serbia.

According to a witness from the group of villagers assigned by Ger-
man authorities the task of digging a grave and burying the executed
Jews and Roma:
On the first day, i.e. the 12th of October 1941, Germans shot a certain
number of Gypsies, whereas the following day, the 13th of October, they
shot, as far as I can assess, about 7-800 Jews. The execution procedure
was as follows: in front of the grave, Germans had driven 50 small sta-
kes into the ground, so that for each stake they set up one victim. The
stake was placed at a distance of no more than 1 metre from the grave
and each victim fell onto the turf, not the grave. Each victim was shot
from immediate proximity by two Germans, at the command issued by
an officer. After firing a volley, the soldiers retreat, while German offi-
cers approach and kill with handguns every victim that shows signs of
life. We follow closely and throw the killed people into the grave with
utmost speed. (...)11
The word about mass executions already spread two days later all over
Šabac. It was found out that the Wehrmacht had shot all male Jews
from the camp, as well as around 200 Roma. About a month later,
according to witnesses, 600 Jews were executed and 100-120 Roma.12
After the war, the Country Commission of Serbia for Determin-
ing the Crimes of Occupiers and their Collaborators formed a special
committee in charge of exhumations in the village Zasavica. Stevan
JoviËiÊ, a clerk from Šabac, who participated in that work, testified
that, during the disinterment, the committee found the remains of
868 killed persons, of which around seventy had been Roma from
Šabac. Nationality was determined on the basis of identity cards found
among some, while others were recognized by their families.13
11 AJ, 110-908-1025. According to the testimony of another witness, on the second

day, Germans shot more Roma than Jews: AJ, 110-593-133. Regardless of the dif-
ference between these two testimonies, it is striking that in both cases the wit-
nesses remember that a certain number of Roma were shot during the course of
one day.
12 Milan Koljanin, Poslednje putovanje Kladovskog transporta, in Andrej MitroviÊ
and Milica MihajloviÊ (eds.), Kladovo Transport. Zbornik radova sa okruglog stola,
Jevrejski istorijski muzej, Belgrade, 2002, p. 80 (footnote no. 33).
13 AJ, 110-908-1032.

During the operation of “cleansing” the MaËva region (the con-
fluence of the Drina and Sava rivers), which lasted somewhat over
a month, evidence was discovered of executions of over 3,600 peo-
ple, not only captured partisans, but also civilians, and in total about
22,000 people passed through the concentration camp in Šabac.14
By the outset of November 1941, just a small number of free Roma
remained in Šabac; there were no more Jews left at liberty. Neverthe-
less, on the 7th of November, the order was issued that all free Jews and
Roma were to report themselves. Soon there were no more free Roma
in Šabac either, except those who had succeeded in being erased from
lists of “Gypsies”.15
Kragujevac
While the action of cleansing MaËva and mass crimes against civil-
ians were still in progress, the military heads demanded that a sim-
ilar operation, with the same brutality, be conducted in central and
western Serbia, where partisan forces and Chetniks held important
towns and wider territory, known as Republic of Užice. During the
first days of October, general Hoffmann, commander of the 717th Di-
vision, whose task was to carry out the action of “cleansing” primarily
around Gornji Milanovac and Rekovac, envisaged certain measures
against the population, in the spirit of what was going on during those
days in north-western Serbia: threats, fires, arrests of hostages and
the entire male population, except children and the elderly.16 Draco-
nian measures, whereby all Serbian people were to be considered in-
surgents’ accomplices, and which, after additional orders issued by
general Böhme, envisaged primarily the arrests of communists, Jews
and Roma as hostages, were the main regulations which German of-
ficers applied during actions against insurgents and which led to mass
crimes in different cities of Serbia.
14 Venceslav GlišiÊ, Teror i zloËini..., p. 55.

15 Stanoje FilipoviÊ, Logori u Šapcu, Dnevnik, Novi Sad, 1967, p. 77.
16 Venceslav GlišiÊ, Teror i zloËini..., p. 53.

The city of Kraljevo, in central Serbia, was in German hands then,
and it contained the majority of troops which had retreated from the
Užice region. Awaiting a partisan attack and fearing that the insur-
gents would be joined by the working class of Kraljevo (employed at
local airplane and locomotive factories as well as on railways) the Ger-
man authorities ordered their arrest.
Several days later, specifically in the night between the 14th and
15th of October, partisan forces carried out an attack against Kraljevo,
but were warded off, with casualties of 14 dead and 10 wounded. The
following day, German authorities ordered and carried out arrests of
all men they could find between the ages of 14 and 60 years old. In the
following three days, all the arrested 1,736 men and 19 women were
shot by German army. During the following days, all male refugees
kept at the Kraljevo train station were also executed.17
After the partisan attack on the units of the 3rd Battalion of the
749th regiment in the vicinity of Gornji Milanovac, during which the
German forces suffered 10 fatalities, with 26 injured, the regiment
commander, following Böhme’s instructions, ordered retaliation
against the civilian population. In the villages around Kragujevac,
on the 19th of October, 422 men were executed, while during the fol-
lowing days, German forces, together with quisling formations, car-
ried out mass arrests in Kragujevac itself. Among the arrestees there
were entire year groups of local secondary school children, such as the
first and second grade of the Teaching School and fifth grade of the
Gymnasium. All detainees were collected at the local detention camp
buildings, where all male Jews from Kragujevac, around 80 of them,
had been kept since the 18th of October. They were all shot on the 21st
of October, at three localities in the vicinity of the city, the majority at
a place known as Šumarice. That day, a total of 2,300 civilians were
executed.18
17 Ibid., p. 64.
18 Ibid.

Several days before the execution, LjotiÊ’s 5th volunteer squad ar-
rived at Kragujevac, under the command of Marisav PetroviÊ. Their
task was primarily to recruit new volunteers from the city. In addition
to helping Germans, during the day of the 20th of October, the squad
carried out arrests independently, while its members plundered Jew-
ish shops and apartments together with Germans.19
It was one group of the 5th volunteer squad, under the leadership
of MomËilo ZdravkoviÊ, called “Izrila”, that had the assignment to
collect the Roma.20 Among the arrestees were four immobile elderly
men, who were thrown into trucks “just like sacks of things”.21 The
next day, on the date of the execution, LjotiÊ’s squads (LjotiÊevci) tried
to single out, from the big group of arrested Kragujevac citizens, those
whom they considered capable of becoming the new “volunteers”. In-
stead, they gave Germans other hostages, mostly Roma, in an even
greater number than was necessary.22 According to some estimates,
roughly 200 Roma were executed.23
Niš
As the second largest city in Serbia, Niš was the most important city in
the southern part of occupied Serbia. Just before the war, it was home
to 40,000 people, among which there were 950 Roma on the territory
of the city itself and another 350 in its rural area.24 With the arrival
of the occupier, it became the seat of Feldkommandantur 809, led by
19 AJ, 110-908-683.
20 Branislav BožoviÊ, Poruke streljanog grada, Spomen park-Kultura, Kragujevac,
1966, pp. 123-124.
21 AJ, 110-102-777, Decision on determining the crimes of occupiers and their col-
laborators, Harald Turner, p. 17.
22 Branislav BožoviÊ, Poruke streljanog..., pp. 130-131.
23 Valter Manošek, ibid., p. 165.
24 –okica JovanoviÊ, …»uo je da su Cigani streljani na Bubnju…Kultura zaborava ili
Romi u Nišu u vreme II svetskog rata, in Sulejman Bosto, Tihomir Cipek and Olive-
ra MilosavljeviÊ (eds.), Kultura sjeÊanja: 1941. Povijesni lomovi i svladavanje prošlo-
sti, Disput, Zagreb, 2008, p. 84.

Karl Freiherr von Bothmer. Through the Feldkommandantur, the Mil-
itary Commander’s Administrative Headquarters exerted control over
all quisling and collaborator forces in south-eastern Serbia: NediÊ’s
gendarmerie, Kosta PeÊanac’s Chetniks, LjotiÊ’s volunteer squads, and
from 1942, the Bulgarian occupational corps. The Kreiskommandan-
tur in ZajeËar and in Leskovac, and until December 1941, also the
Kreiskommandantur in Kruševac and Kosovska Mitrovica, were sub-
ordinate to Feldkommandantur 809.25
Just like in other cities of Serbia, the existing local administrative
apparatus continued to operate in the occupier’s service. They report-
ed on the one side to the German authorities, and on the other to the
quisling Ministry of Internal Affairs 26.
The battle against insurgents and the regulation issued by the mil-
itary authorities in September 1941 led to the formation of the con-
centration camp Crveni krst, under the administration of the Gestapo
from Niš. Around 30,000 people passed through the camp, of which
about 750 were Jews: men were shot, while women and children were
taken to the Sajmište camp.27 Camp detainees who were designated
for killing were taken to the execution field at Bubanj.
Shortly after the regulation dated the 30 of May 1941, various de-
partments of the Niš municipality fired fifteen Roma clerks.28 The
Roma in Niš were mostly of Islamic faith. Consequently, it was the rep-
resentatives of the Albanian national group who primarily interceded
on behalf of the Roma, taking advantage of the Roma’s fear of arrest
in order to recruit them for Albanian quisling formations; on the oth-
er hand, some priests baptized groups of Muslim Roma and gave them
Serbian names and surnames, thus saving them from persecution.29
25 Miroslav MilovanoviÊ, NemaËki logor na Crvenom krstu u Nišu i streljanja na Bub-

nju, ISI-opštinski odbor SUBNOR Niš-Narodna knjiga, Belgrade, 1983, pp. 17-18.
26 Ibid., p. 29.
27 Ibid, p. 92.
28 –okica JovanoviÊ, ibid., p. 85.
29 Ibid., p. 89.

Several days before the big raid in Belgrade, on the 20th of October
1941, quisling forces blocked all five Roma neighbourhoods, i.e. “ma-
halas” Ω StoËni trg, Beograd-mahala, Stambol kapija, »air and Ra-
badži-mahala Ω and arrested all men over the age of 16 they could
find. The Roma serf whose task was to walk in front of soldiers, yelled
in Serbian “People, wake up and come out”, but at the same time in
Romani “Run away, wherever you can”. A total of about 370 Roma
were arrested.30 All were taken to the camp at Crveni krst.
The group of Roma who succeeded in avoiding arrest on the 20th
of October, established a connection with the head of Albanian quis-
lings in Kosovo, Džafer Deva, who interceded on behalf of the Roma
before the Gestapo in Niš and saw to it that they are released from
the camp. They were released in groups, primarily those who worked
at factories, but a group of 90 people was, nonetheless, transferred to
the penal bureau and shot at Bubanj on the 23rd of February 1942.31 A
report was also drawn up on that event by the county committee of
CPY for Niš:
(...)
2) Two days ago, mass executions were carried out here. 850 people
were shot. Over 600 were led out of the penal bureau, then almost all
male Jews, some Gypsies and one part of the remaining people from
the camp. It was the occupier’s retaliation for actions undertaken in
the vicinity and revenge because of the convicts’ escape from the camp
and the murder of several German soldiers. There is great fear in the
city and many are running away just to save their bare lives. (...)32
In the upcoming period, 170 Roma were also brought to the camp
from surrounding towns, that is Ω from Prokuplje, Aleksinac, Svrljig,
Bela Palanka and other places, and executed.33
30 Ibid., p. 87.
31 Ibid., pp. 87-88.
33 Miroslav MilovanoviÊ, ibid., pp. 194-195.

According to the calculation by –okica JovanoviÊ, 298 Roma were
shot in Niš, some at the Crveni krst camp, others at the Bubanj execu-
tion field.34 Although, on the one hand, it is claimed that the number
isn’t final, on the other it is not mentioned if those were victims of ra-
cial persecution and genocide, or, as in the case of Roma interned in
the Belgrade camp at Banjica, those people were killed as partisans
or their adherents, regardless of their background. Furthermore, for
many Roma who were deported to the Bor mine or to Germany for
forced labour, it is not clear whether they were victims of racial perse-
cution or deported as “Serbs”, just like many of their fellow citizens of
Serbian nationality.
Leskovac and other towns

In April 1941, a Kreiskommandantur was established in Leskovac,
subordinate to Feldkommandantur 809, while from that summer, a
branch of BdS was also active. As elsewhere, even though they had
absolute military and civilian authority, German forces relied on quis-
lings, primarily on the local branch of the Special Police, on the gen-
darmerie, the LjotiÊevci and administrative apparatus members.35 In
the Leskovac region, Kosta PeÊanac’s volunteers were also active.
From 1941 onwards, the Bulgarian army was also present in the
region, which had initially been engaged for the purposes of railroad
protection, while later, together with all other occupational and quis-
ling formations, it was utilized in the battle against partisans.36 All
those formations were responsible for many crimes committed against
the civilian population during occupation.
From the attack on the Soviet Union until the end of 1941, occu-
pying forces activity mainly developed through individual or group
34 –okica JovanoviÊ, ibid., p. 89.

35 Hranislav RakiÊ, Teror i zloËini okupatora i domaÊih izdajnika u LeskovaËkom i
Vranjskom kraju 1941-1944, Narodni Muzej Leskovac i meuopštinski odbor SUB-
NOR-a Južnomoravskog regiona, Leskovac, 1986, p. 42.
36 Ibid., p. 46.

arrests of communists and their adherents. However, on the 3rd of
December of that same year, a big offensive was organized against
partisan forces on the liberated territory of Pusta Reka and Jablanica.
During the battle, several German soldiers and quislings were killed.
Retaliation was quick.
Two days after the offensive, German authorities ordered the arrest
of hostages in Leskovac itself. NediÊ’s gendarmerie blocked the Roma
districts of Podvorci and Sat-Mala. Similarly to what had happened
two months earlier in Belgrade, they went from house to house and
collected all men over the age of 16, telling them they must unload
goods at the railway station. All arrestees were taken to the nearby
school and detained there. However, since they succeeded in arrest-
ing only 120 Roma, they decided to let several of them go, so as to
show that all the rest would also soon be released. Since the situation
was calmed at least temporarily, on the 9th of December, gendarmes
blocked Roma districts again, this time including Vinarce and PeËen-
jevac. Together with Germans, they captured men and pushed them
into trucks by force. The following day, all were shot at a place called
Gavrina dolina, on Hisar mountain near Leskovac. In total, 293 Roma
were killed, together with 11 Serbs and 6 Jews.37
According to traces that exist in the literature or in archival materi-
als, a month after the occupier’s entry into Bor, a group of “Gypsies” and
one Jew were arrested and transferred to ZajeËar.38 In the indictment
against Ernst Ludwig Langemann Schulze, the German army major,
who was the head of Kreiskommandantur in ZajeËar from the 20th of
April 1941 until the 5th of August 1943, it says, among other things, that:
over 1,000 Gypsies from the county territory were arrested and tor-
tured in camps, upon orders of the accused, a considerable number of
them died and were shot, while the rest were released at last.39
37 Ibid., pp. 51-53. The author also includes a list of names of those executed.
38 AJ, 110-908-387.
39 AVII, Military Courts, case Harald Turner and others, 3/III, book 1, Commu-
niques, Criminal proceedings against Schulze Langemann Ernst Ludwig, p. 2.

Additionally, Fritz Müller, German army major and former Kreiskom-
mandant in ZajeËar, when asked by Yugoslav authorities after the war,
“Was the order for arrests of Gypsies issued via the Feldkommandan-
tur or not?”, he responded: “I remember that the order for arrests of
Gypsies came near the end of 1941, and then it was transferred by the
Feldkommandantur to the Kreiskommandantur. I don’t recall the de-
tails now”.40
In Kruševac, a town in central Serbia, the Roma were also victims
of mass executions. In a report by the county committee of CPY for
Kruševac county, dated October 1941, it says as follows:
(...) The most important action was an armed uprising and five-day
siege of the town. Mobilization of peasants was carried out by Major
KeseroviÊ as a chetnik, but it wasn’t known if it was for a battle against
partisans or Germans. Before the attack, in a short period he impar-
ted that he was leading them into battle and attack against the town,
at the same time asking for the cooperation of our squad (...). Germans
responded by way of reprisals. They killed roughly 130 people in the
town, on the streets and in houses alike, additionally executing about
56 Gypsies and some citizens. (...)41
40 AVII, Military Courts, case Wilhelm Fuchs and others, 3/III, book 1, the hearing
of Fritz Müller, p. 3.
41 Zbornik NOR, volume I, book I, doc. 39.

VI. CONCLUSION
If one were to chronologically define the period in which genocide

against the Roma in Serbia was carried out, one could say, with cer-
tain reservations, that its beginning lies in the introduction of the first
anti-Roma measures in May 1941, while its completion is marked by
dissolution of the Jewish camp at Sajmište in May 1942. Specifically,
during that period, the Roma were victims of racial and social dis-
crimination, mass executions and suffering at the camp.
By way of the regulation dated the 30th of May 1941, Roma were
equated with Jews. From that moment, they no longer had any civil
rights, while a separate legislation was in force for them, whereby they
were compelled to wear yellow armbands and report their property;
at the same time being banned from public places and prevented from
doing their jobs.
In Belgrade, mass executions ensued after partisan attacks in Oc-
tober of that same year. As a result of the attack near Topola at the
beginning of the month, following which General Böhme ordered
the execution of 2,200 hostages (800 from the camp in Šabac), or
the case of the attack near Valjevo in the middle of that same month,
followed by the execution of another 2,200 hostages Ω there was a
drastic decrease in the total number of available hostages from the
“racial” reservoir, i.e. from the Toposvke šupe camp. There were sim-
ply not enough Jews anymore, and the enormous need for hostages
couldn’t be met by the “political” reservoir, i.e. Ω the Banjica camp.
It was therefore necessary to find a substantial number of people im-
mediately who could be sent into death, without it bothering anyone
in Belgrade too much, (just as the extermination of Jewish men hadn’t
CONCLUSION │ 155
seem to bother them). The mass of victims was already prepared, at
its disposal; their arrest didn’t even require greater forces, since they
lived next to the camp. Because they were needy, poor and marginal-
ized, their removal would certainly not represent a problem for fellow
citizens and would perhaps even ease the position of City of Belgrade
Administration as well as that of municipalities, which grappled with
many social and health problems. In the second half of October, Turn-
er’s proposals concerning the arrests of Roma received a suitable re-
sponse from Böhme.
A similar situation whereby male Roma were used for “filling up”
quotas for execution existed in other Serbian towns as well.
Accordingly, it is interesting to note that after mass executions in
Kraljevo and Kragujevac, which mostly affected Serbian citizens, pres-
ident Milan NediÊ interceded before the German authorities, asking
that the retaliation policy be ended. In principle, Böhme agreed, es-
pecially due to the consequences that the executions had had on the
local inhabitants.1 Nevertheless, in the following days, the remaining
male Jews from Belgrade and Banat were shot, except one group the
German authorities utilized for labour at Sajmište. The Roma in entire
Serbia became new victims of retaliations. Nobody protested.
At the moment General Böhme was released from duty, on the 5th
of December 1941, his successor General Bader was left with a sim-
ple calculation about executions carried out until then, as well as the
number of additional hostages who must be shot. Although data wasn’t
completely accurate, it was calculated that, up to that date, 11,164 hos-
tages had been shot, while 20,174 more people were to be killed so as
to meet the quota.2
Of the total number of victims, roughly 5,000 were Jews, while
about 2,500 were Roma.3
1 Christopher Browning, Fateful months..., p. 54.

2 Ibid., p. 55.
3 Milan Koljanin, NemaËki logor..., pp. 39-40.

Due to the new situation in the country and retreat of the majori-
ty of partisan forces to Bosnia, General Bader reduced the number of
hostages designated for execution, but the Roma, just like Jews, re-
mained in the category of those hostages who were to be shot first,
even though, to put it simply, there were no more left. Under the re-
vised calculations for each German who was killed, 50 people were to
be executed, while 25 for each one wounded. Victims were still to be
taken from the ranks of communists, Roma, Jews, criminals etc.4
Killing of the Roma went on rather painlessly for the remainder of
the population. The position of the Roma, although they had been vic-
tims of segregation, especially after the regulation dated the 30th May
1941, probably didn’t change much in the eyes of other citizens, since
even before the war they had been the victims of social and economic
segregation. Unfortunately, their position didn’t change subsequently.
In the process of making the decision about executing male Roma,
two main currents converged. On the one hand, after Keitel’s order
to execute 100 hostages for one killed German and 50 for a wounded
one, the German army had the constant need for new victims. Just
like a factory which needed to realize production necessary for fur-
ther operation, the Wehrmacht demanded more and more raw mate-
rials so as to continue producing death of the innocent and fulfil its
revengeful policy. The fact that as early as summer of 1941 executions
of Jews were carried out and didn’t have any adverse effects either on
quisling authorities or the people, implied that primarily Jewish men
could be taken as hostages. Nevertheless, their relatively small num-
ber required that already near the end of October new victims had be
sought elsewhere; at the same time avoiding further taking of Serbi-
an nationality hostages, so as not to overly disturb the citizens. The
solution was to turn to the Roma, who were also “compatible victims”
according to Nazi principles and for whom no one would defend. Exe-
4 Christopher Browning, Fateful months..., p. 55.
CONCLUSION │ 157
cution of Jews and Roma provided a guarantee that retaliations would
be conducted in the most secure and peaceful manner.
Of the impact felt of the overall local German authorities, Harald
Turner, played perhaps the most significant role.
National Socialist Party member since 1930 and SS member since
1932, with experience stemming from occupied territories of Poland
and France, Turner was appointed, in accord with Hitler’s wishes, as
chief of Administrative Headquarters of the Military Commander in
Serbia during April 1941. His policy was founded, on the one hand,
on building a Serbian quisling apparatus, while on the other, on de-
struction of all unreliable elements.5 In that spirit one should view the
speed with which measures against Jews and especially Roma were
introduced in Serbia. Adopting the regulation dated the 30th May 1941
represents Turner’s wish to treat Roma, as soon as possible, like they
were treated in the Third Reich, i.e. the same way as Jews. It should be
kept in mind that in Nazi Germany itself, at least at the time, no dis-
tinct plan existed for extermination of the Roma, rather it depended
on local circumstances. Therefore the persecution of Roma was dif-
ferent to that of the Jews and didn’t happen simultaneously or consist-
ently throughout Europe.6
Turner’s decision isn’t completely clear, being that the Roma in Serbia
resided outside of the borders of German living space, or “Lebensraum”,
and accordingly having a different place in the plans of Nazi ideology.
Still, his regulation, which pertained to all Roma in Serbia, indicates his
adoption of a racial interpretation of “the Gypsy issue” which was gain-
ing momentum during those years in the circle around Himmler.
It was only after the attack against Soviet Union and the establish-
ing of a clear difference between Roma nomads, i.e. Ëergari, as they
were called in Serbia, and original settlers, that Turner was compelled
5 Christopher Browning, The Path to Genocide. Essays on Launching the Final Solu-
tion, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 128-129.
6 Michael Zimmermann, The Wehrmacht ..., p. 112.

to revise his policy. Racial theory, that was still in force in Germa-
ny, according to which nomads were the sole Aryans who had kept
their purity without mixing with other peoples, receded in front of
the notion that they represented a political threat, especially in oc-
cupied eastern territories, because with their mobility and potential
to be informants, they could severely undermine the security of Ger-
man troops. For the same reasons, by way of regulation dated the 11th
of July, only nomads were pronounced dangerous, not permanently
residing Roma, as in other occupied countries of Eastern Europe, so
that only they were on the receiving end of all the adopted anti-Ro-
ma measures, at least “for the time being”. The statement by Turn-
er’s right-hand man Kiessel, according to whom the decision had been
made in Berlin, indicates the intervention of the central authority for
the purposes of regulating the situation in Belgrade and Serbia.
However, Turner used every opportunity so as to continue carry-
ing out his original policy. In addition to his wish for the Jewish issue
“to be solved” as soon as possible, he demonstrated through his three
speeches to the German Plenipotentiary of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs in Belgrade, and by an announcement by Felix Benzler, in August
and September 1941, that Serbian Jews be deported to Romania, Po-
land or Russia.7 The Roma issue came into focus again with the arrival
of general Böhme in Belgrade. Adapting his standpoint to the needs of
the German army in Serbia, which was engaged the most in fighting
against communists, and using suitable phraseology, near the end of
October, Turner proposed to Böhme the extermination of male Jews
and Roma. Both one and the other he considered to be “an unrelia-
ble element”, while for the Roma he especially underscored that “they
can’t be useful members of a community of peoples, taking into ac-
count their spiritual and physical constitution”, but that they are also
“responsible for particular atrocities and carrying out secret service”.8
7 Christopher Browning, The Path..., pp. 128-129.

8 Zbornik NOR, volume I. book 1, doc. 234; origninal in German in AVII, NA, 27II-
1-36/1 and 36/2.
CONCLUSION │ 159
After mass executions in autumn of 1941, the Wehrmacht no longer
had direct contact with Jews and Roma in Serbia. In Berlin, the idea of
“the final solution” to these issues started being more clearly defined,
that is Ω to their technical realization, which was solved on the 20th of
January at the Wannsee conference. On the basis of communication
between local occupational authorities in Belgrade and representa-
tives from Berlin, the decision was reached about the final liquidation
of Jewish and Roma women and children from Serbia. The first phase
was supposed to take place in the camp in Belgrade itself, up until
further decisions were made. From that moment, the Einsatzgruppe
became the sole master of the lives of about 7,500 Jewish women and
about 800 Roma women and their children.
As early as the outset of December 1941, the entire “non-Aryan” pop-
ulation was removed from Belgrade, not only by execution, but also by
being grouped and interned at the camp, which was to represent solely
a temporary phase en route to their extermination. Racial aims were at-
tained solely thanks to efficient cooperation between all Nazi actors in
Belgrade, of German, Austrian, Volksdeutsche and Serbian provenance.
The position of the Roma at the Sajmište camp was very difficult.
Still, the possibility to obtain suitable permits concerning permanent
residence provided an opportunity for salvation. The majority of them
who were released, were successful due to this fact. Those who re-
mained, who had not been able to procure that permit, as well as drift-
ers and Jews, were killed in the spring of 1942.
“The Gypsy issue” was finally solved. The Roma were partly killed,
while the majority of them were administratively “turned into” Serbs.
The mechanism by which “the Gypsy issue” was being realized in-
dicates the specific role that quisling authorities in Serbia played in
genocide against the Roma.
Since the very establishing of Serbian local, city and national ad-
ministrations, at the start of the Second World War the issue of the
Jews and the Roma were seriously understood and were devoted effi-

cient attention, typical of administrative and police apparatuses. Ger-
man orders were assiduously carried out and respected strictly: by the
end of June 1941, i.e. two and a half months after the start of occu-
pation, Jews and Roma were fired from government service and reg-
istered, while yellow armbands were also assigned to them, so as to
make them visibly different from the remaining population.
At the moment of mass arrests in Belgrade, the domestic gendar-
merie was entrusted the task of arresting, in cooperation with Ger-
man army and police, all male Roma: within three days, it carried
out an extensive raid in various parts of the capital and surrounding
villages, proving once more to Germans their loyalty and efficiency.
What is more, the gendarmerie conducted the transfer of arrestees
to Topovske šupe camp and slightly over a month later, they repeated
their atrocities by arresting women and children, then transferring
them to the Sajmište camp. The participation of domestic forces in ar-
rests of the Roma in other Serbian cities, especially in Kragujevac and
Leskovac, confirms the responsibility that quislings had in the mass
killing of Roma: especially when taking into account that in all those
cases the fate of arrestees was to be execution. Domestic authorities
knew well how the Occupiers would treat their victims, for they knew
how Jews from Banat and Belgrade had been treated.
Nevertheless, the quislings’ responsibility does not relate only to
their thorough work on arresting and handing over the Roma, in
which they could have had an interest of their own, but which was in
any case the consequence of occupational authorities’ orders.
Several months before the raids in Belgrade and other Serbian
towns, at the moment when Turner issued the regulation whereby
travelers were to be separated from permanent Roma residents, a step
was taken by which the local, lowest authorities were entrusted with
a very serious responsibility: municipality governors had to confirm
whether each Roma applicant was a permanent resident or not. This
meant that municipality governors had immense power of making the
CONCLUSION │ 161
decisions as to who would be on the receiving end of anti-Roma meas-
ures and who would be spared; from October to December of 1941,
it also meant the power to decide whom to send to camp and proba-
bly into death, while from December onwards, whom to release from
Sajmište. In what manner they determined whether someone was a
permanent resident or not, it is difficult to ascertain, but, keeping in
mind all the obstacles and actual impossibility of accessing this data,
it can nevertheless be claimed that personal interest often played an
important role in the process.
The intervention by the Romanian Consulate is noteworthy, which
made it possible for “Romanian” Roma in Belgrade, probably else-
where too, to be saved by issuing them Romanian documents. What
the reasons were: why Romanian authorities intervened to save the
Roma and how many people were saved that way are questions that
will hopefully be clarified by way of other research studies.
Transferring responsibility to local authorities definitely indi-
cates that the Roma in Serbia, unlike Jews, weren’t the subject of up-
most concern of the German central authorities. The situation partly
changed in 1943, when, due to the new direction of Himmler’s policy
towards the Roma in Europe and their mass extermination at death
camps, German newspapers estimated the number of Roma in Ser-
bia at 115,000, and again “the Gypsy issue” in Serbia became an item
that needed to be solved as soon as possible.9 Turner’s words from July
1941, when he underscored that anti-Roma measures were not to ap-
ply to permanently residing Roma “for the time being”, seemed thus
like a threat at that moment. Still, it can be assumed that the diffi-
cult situation of Germany on all battlefields, as well as enormous dif-
ficulties the Germans had in Yugoslavia and Serbia, in the midst of a
thwarted battle against the People’s Liberation Movement, represent-
ed a severe obstacle to the implementation of mass measures of total
annihilation of the Roma people in Serbia.
9 Michael Zimmermann, The Wehrmacht..., p. 126.

The People’s Liberation Movement, which grew into a large politi-
cal and military structure by the end of war, gave rise to the authorities
of the new socialist Yugoslavia. Among them were the Commission
for Determining the Crimes of Occupiers and their Collaborators,
with all its branches, and national precincts, i.e. future city munici-
palities. Thanks to their thorough work, which was probably unique
in entire postwar Europe, (even though it had probably not been their
intention), data was collected, at least in Belgrade, about the suffer-
ing of the Roma, while damages for survivors were also determined.
Based on that material, without which the present paper would not
have been possible, further research should be embarked upon, not
only for the sake of memorialization, but also for determining and
claiming compensation rights for the victims.
CONCLUSION │ 163
VII. ARCHIVAL MATERIALS
AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
Archival materials
Archive of Yugoslavia
Fund 110, State Commission for Determining the Crimes of Occupiers and
their Collaborators
Historical Archive of Belgrade

City of Belgrade Administration
City of Belgrade Municipality
National precincts (INOO)
Horse-Drawn Cab and Ox-Drawn Cart Drivers Associations of Belgrade
Sajmište files
Military Courts
Military Archive of the Republic of Serbia

NediÊ’s archive
German archive
Military Courts
Published materials
German Secret Service, volume IV
German Secret Service, volume VIII
People’s Liberation War Collected Papers, volume I, book 1
People’s Liberation War Collected Papers, volume, book 2
People’s Liberation War Collected Papers, volume XII, book 1
People’s Liberation War Collected Papers, volume XIV, book 3
ARCHIVAL MATERIALS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY │ 165

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Newspapers
La difesa della razza
Narodne novine NDH (National Newspaper of Independent State of Croatia)
Novo Vreme (New Era)
Policijski glasnik (Police Gazette)

CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд
341.322.5-058.65(=214.58)(497.11)”1941/1945”
341.485(=214.58)(4)”1941/1945”
341.485(=214.58)(497.11)”1941/1945”
PISARRI, Milovan, 1980-

The Suffering of the Roma in Serbia
during the Holocaust / Milovan Pisarri ;
[translation Nataša Dinić]. - Belgrade :
Forum for Applied History, 2014 (Beograd :
Centar). - 171 str. ; 22 cm
Tiraž 400. - Napomene i bibliografske

reference uz tekst. - Bibliografija: str.
165-170.
ISBN 978-86-916789-2-0
a) Роми - Жртве рата - Србија - 1941-1945

b) Геноцид - Роми - Европа - 1941-1945 c)
Геноцид - Роми - Србија - 1941-1945
COBISS.SR-ID 210809100

A few days after the
first raid the policemen
returned to the houses
of the Roma in Jatagan
mala. Partly by force,
and partly by promising
that they would bring
us children and women
to our brothers and
husbands that had
allegedly been taken
to Ada Ciganlija to ‘cut
wood’, they collected
the remainder of us and
brought us to the camp
at Sajmište that had
previously only seen
Jewish captives.

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Milovan Pisarri

THE SUFFERING OF THE ROMA IN SERBIA

The project was supported by Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe.

Original title of the publication: Stradanje Roma u Srbiji za vreme Holokausta

II. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN EUROPE 17

III. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN SERBIA 35

IV. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN BELGRADE 77

V. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN OTHER SERBIAN CITIES:

VI. CONCLUSION 155

VII. ARCHIVAL MATERIALS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 165

In one of the ﬁrst substantial studies devoted to genocide against the

1 Christian Bernadac, L’holocauste oublié: les massacre des tsiganes, Éditions

2 │ THE SUFFERING OF THE ROMA IN SERBIA DURING THE HOLOCAUST

7 Cf.: Michael Stewart, Remembering without commemoration: The mnemonics and

4 │ THE SUFFERING OF THE ROMA IN SERBIA DURING THE HOLOCAUST

Nonetheless, the memory of the Roma victims of genocide is still

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11 Gilad Margalit, ibid., p. 188

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16 Jaša Romano, Jevreji Jugoslavije 1941Ω1945. Žrtve genocida i uËesnici Narodnooslo-

19 Dragoljub AckoviÊ, Ašunen Romalen! Slušajte ljudi!, Rominterpress, Belgrade,

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21 The chapter on genocide in Belgrade will provide more details on this.

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22 The interviews can be found at www.ushmm.org.

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1 Christian Bernadac, Zaboravljeni holokaust. Pokolj Cigana, Globus, Zagreb, 1981,

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18 │ THE SUFFERING OF THE ROMA IN SERBIA DURING THE HOLOCAUST

5 Christian Bernadac, ibid., p. 36

GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN EUROPE │ 19

8 Christian Bernadac, ibid., p. 35; Michael Zimmermann, The National Socialist

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11 Luca Bravi, ibid., p. 115

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15 Michael Zimmermann, The Wehrmacht and the National Socialist persecution of

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GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN EUROPE │ 23

22 Guenter Lewy, ibid., p. 127

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In collaborating countries: Italy, Romania,

26 Guenter Lewy, ibid., pp. 26Ω27

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27 The document is published online at www.porrajmos.it, last accessed: 21 March

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32 The document is published online at www.porrajmos.it, last accessed: 21st of

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51 M. Benjamin Thorne, ibid., p. 201; Michelle Kelso, ibid., p. 110

GENOCIDE AGAINST THE ROMA IN EUROPE │ 33

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The April War and instatement of authority

1 On the division of Kingdom of Yugoslavia, cf.: Ferdo »ulinoviÊ, Okupatorska po-

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