(2) REPUBLIC v SANDIGANBAYAN, 406 SCRA a) §33, Rule 130

190 (2003)
b) §3, Rule 133
BAR Q: The PCGG filed a petition to declare the
accounts in various Swiss banks as ill-gotten c) §§12 and 17, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
wealth of the deceased and former President (1) PEOPLE v COMPIL, 244 SCRA 135 (1995)
Wang and his family and that it be forfeited in
favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Before BAR Q: A was convicted of robbery with
it was set for pre-trial, B. Wang, son of homicide. Several days after, A was caught in
President A. Wang, answered that the Wang Quezon Province, where A was trembling. After
Family agreed to negotiate with the Philippine gaining composure, A admitted his guilt, he was
government in the hope of finally putting an brought to the police station, and further
end to the problems besetting their family investigated, he still confessed about his
regarding the Swiss accounts. Further, the participation to the crime. Is A’s extrajudicial
Wang Family contended that the funds were confession, be rendered inadmissible?
lawfully acquired by the former president and
ANSWER: YES. A was immediately subjected to
that it be placed in custodia legis. Subsequently,
interrogation upon his arrest, and the same
they disclaim the ownership thereof. Can the
goes upon his transfer. The police officers
answers of the Wang Family be considered
elicited incriminating questions and confessed
judicial admission?
to the commission of the crime, where he was
ANSWER: YES. Judicial admission may be made not assisted by counsel. Even the arrival of a
(a) in the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) in lawyer the following day, it will not cure the
the course of the trial either by verbal or defect.
written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in
(2) People v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182
other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the
(1996)
pre-trial of the case. Further, admissions of a
party in his testimony are receivable against BAR Q: X and Y together with the 9 tourists
him. If a party, as a witness, deliberately arrived at NAIA from Hong Kong. Upon
concedes a fact, such concession has the force inspection, 30 boxes of cereals containing white
of a judicial admission. Here, the Wang Family’s crystalline substance were allegedly recovered
willingness to agree to an amicable settlement from the baggages of the 11 accused. A customs
with the Republic only affirmed their ownership collector ordered them to sign on the masking
of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered
no person would acquiesce to any concession from them. At CAMP Crame, a NARCOM Officer
over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in immediately informed the 11 accused that they
fact own them. Moreover, they moved that the were under arrest and were asked to identify
accounts be placed in custodia legis. These were their signatures on the boxes and after having
doubtlessly an acknowledgment of ownership identified them, they were again made to sign
on their part. on the plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance inside the boxes bearing their
E. Confessions
signatures. They were charged with violation of
Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended and lawyer who signed it, and that he was forced to
charged with unlawfully transporting into the sign a confession. Is the Sworn Statement
country Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or admissible in evidence when it was executed in
shabu, respectively. In their appeal brief, X and violation of his right to counsel of his own
Y alleges that the court the lower court erred in choice?
not excluding the inadmissible evidence
ANSWER: YES. For an extrajudicial confession to
obtained in violation of appellants Miranda
rights. Are the signatures of the accused on the be admissible, it must be: 1.] voluntary; 2.]
boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing made with the assistance of competent and
shabu admissible in evidence? independent counsel; 3.] express; and 4.] in
writing. When, as in this case, “[a]n extrajudicial
ANSWER: NO, the signatures of accused on the statement satisfies the requirements of the
boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a high
shabu, are inadmissible in evidence. The law order because of the strong presumption that
provides that any evidence wrongfully obtained no person of normal mind would deliberately
from the accused in violation of their and knowingly confess to a crime unless
constitutional rights is inadmissible against prompted by truth and conscience. The defense
them. The fact that all accused are foreign has the burden of proving that it was extracted
nationals does not preclude application of the by means of force, duress, promise or reward.”
"exclusionary rule" because the constitutional Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are provides that “[a]n extrajudicial confession
given and extend to all persons, both aliens and made by an accused shall not be sufficient
citizens. By affixing their signatures on the ground for conviction, unless corroborated by
boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags, evidence of corpus delicti.” In this case the
accused in effect made a tacit admission of the prosecution presented other evidence to prove
crime charged for mere possession of shabu is the two elements of corpus delicti, to wit: a.] a
punished by law. These signatures of accused certain result has been proven, i.e. a man has
are tantamount to an uncounselled extra- died; and 2.] some person is criminally
judicial confession which is not sanctioned by responsible. Direct proof is not essential, for
the Bill of Rights. conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused prior to, during or subsequent to the
(3) PEOPLE v BASE, 329 SCRA 158 (2000) incident.
BAR Q: Y, a detention prisoner was charged (4) PEOPLE v ULIT, 423 SCRA 374 (2004)
with Murder with Direct Assault when he shot
the Brgy. Captain X in the head. According to BAR Q: A was found guilty beyond reasonable
the prosecution, the statement of Y shows that doubt for the charged of rape by the RTC. His
he admitted that he was with the assassins counsel argued that the admission by A of
surveilling the residence of X for murder. Y raping B to the barangay chairman is not
claimed he was tortured by the assassins to admissible as he was not assisted by counsel
help in the murder plot. Y also claimed that he and was forced to sign the said admission. Is it
was not read the written statement by the admissible?
prosecution, that he neither knew nor saw the
 Samar. As he is illiterate, he affixed only his
thumbmark on the statement above his printed
ANSWER: YES. The statement made to barangay
name. The interpreter, and Atty. R, as the
chairman is admissible in evidence because the
assisting counsel, also signed the statement.
defendant was not under arrest or under Atty. R signed again as the notary public who
custodial investigation when he gave his notarized the statement. The interpreter was
statement. The Barangay Chairman is not a law
not presented as a witness during trial. Is the
enforcement officer for purposes of applying confession admissible in evidence?
Art. III of the Constitution.
ANSWER: NO. An extrajudicial confession, to be
(5) PEOPLE v TOMAQUIN, 435 SCRA 23 (2004) admissible, must conform to the following
BAR Q: X was charged with murder. In the requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary;
police station, X told SPO2 M that he was willing 2) the confession must be made with the
to confess and asked for Atty. P (their barangay assistance of a competent and independent
captain) to assist him. Atty. P then called SPO2 counsel, preferably of the confessant’s choice;
M and told him that X was ready to give his 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the
extrajudicial confession. Is the confession confession must be in writing. In the case at
admissible in evidence? bar, X was illiterate and not well-versed in
Tagalog but there was no evidence that there
ANSWER: NO. The words “competent and was in fact an interpreter because none was
independent counsel” in the constitutional presented during trial. Further, although Atty. R
provision stresses the need to accord the signed the confession as X’s counsel and he
accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions himself notarized the statement, there is no
of a custodial investigation, an informed evidence on how he assisted X starting from the
judgment on the choices explained to him by a time he was taken to the police station.
diligent and capable lawyer. In the given case,
considering that Atty. P’s role as a barangay II. Conduct as Evidence
captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his A. Similar Acts/Unaccepted Offer
barangay and therefore in direct conflict with
the role of providing competent legal assistance a) §§34-35, Rule 130
to appellant who was accused of committing a
crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. P could not be b) Art. 1256, Civil Code
considered as an independent counsel of X, (1) U.S. v PINEDA, 37 PHIL. 457 (1918)
when the latter executed his extrajudicial
confession. BAR Q: P is a registered pharmacist who owns a
drug store. S, having some sick horses,
(6) PEOPLE v RAPEZA, 520 SCRA 596 (2007) presented a copy of a prescription obtained
BAR Q: X was charged with murder. X was then from Dr. X at P’s drug store. The prescription
held in the police station overnight before he was prepared by P and returned to S the
was taken to the house of Atty. R. It was alleged medicine. Under the belief that he purchased a
that an interpreter was provided because X was medicine, P gave such to his horses which died
shortly afterwards. It was found out by
not well versed in Tagalog being a native of
Chemists that the medicines given by P are (3) PEOPLE v IRANG, 64 PHIL. 285 (1937)
poisons. Thereafter, said chemists went to the
BAR Q: One evening, seven individuals armed
drug store of P and bought same medicine
with guns and bolos, went to the house of Sps.
which when analyzed was also a poison. S then
filed a suit against P. During trial, P argued that X and Y. X was killed, Y was struck by the butt of
the testimony of the chemists as to their a gun to her face, and from her was stolen by
the assailants, money and jewelry. Y was able to
purchase of medicine at his drugstore which
substance proved on analysis to be poison is not identify accused (A), when he was brought to
admissible under the doctrine of res inter alois her house for identification, which she
acta (the evidence of other offenses committed identified him having pockmarks, and a scar on
by a defendant is inadmissible). Is the argument his left eyelid. That same evening, the house of
Z was also assaulted by malefactors. Z also
of P tenable?
noticed that one of them had pockmarks, a scar
ANSWER: NO. There are instances where the on the left eyelid and was dressed in a maong-
doctrine of res inter alois acta does not apply, colored suit. After A was arrested, he executed
to wit: (a) that the effort is not to convict the an affidavit stating the events of the robbery in
accused of a second offense; and (b) that there the presence of the constabulary. However, he
is no attempt to draw the mind away from the later disputed the affidavit stating he merely
point at issue prejudicing the defendant’s case. affixed his thumbmark upon said document for
Here, the doctrine of res inter alois acta will not fear of the soldiers upon whom the affidavit
apply because the purpose of the testimonies of was executed. He further claimed that in the
the chemists is to ascertain P’s knowledge and afternoon of the day of the commission of the
intent, and to fix his negligence is intensified. crime, he was in his rice field washing a fishing
Therefore, P’s argument is untenable. basket. Should A’s alibi be given credence?

(2) PEOPLE v ASINAS, 53 PHIL. 59 (1929) ANSWER: NO. Jurisprudence provides, while
evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not
BAR Q: A, was allegedly killed by his children, B,
admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is
C, and D. Upon trial, the accomplice, E, testified admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as
against the latter children. The trial court, in where it tends to identify defendant as the
convicting the 3 accused, considered the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to
testimony of the accomplice E. May the show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity
accomplice’s testimony be admitted?
of the crime at the time charged, or when it is
ANSWER: NO. It is elementary law that a evidence of a circumstance connected with the
defendant in a criminal action cannot be crime. In this case, defense of alibi is
convicted on the evidence of the accomplice contradicted by the above-stated testimony of Z
only, and that to sustain such a conviction, and by the accused-appellant's own admission
there must be other evidence corroborating under oath. Y’s testimony corroborated by Z’s
with the accomplice, which tends to show the testimony proved accused’s identity and guilt of
guilt of the defendant. In this case, the 3 the crime of robbery with homicide.
accused cannot be convicted on the basis of the
testimony of the accomplice E.
(4) NICOLAS v ENRIQUEZ, 97 PHIL. 286 (1955) demand for want of the prepared deed of
conditional sale to be signed. OBM thereafter
BAR Q: A and B were accused of concubinage by
continued the operation of the sale of the lots.
C, A’s wife. The court ruled out testimony of
The property was then acquired by Commercial
three prosecution witnesses tending to show Bank of Manila (CBM). CBM demanded Manalo
that a boy a son was begot and was born in Jr. to stop any construction and improvement in
Cavite on September 17, 1949 by both of the
the questioned lot. CBM, which later on
defendants. The said testimony was objected to changed its name to Boston Bank filed an
as immaterial, but the objection was sustained unlawful detainer case against Manalo Jr. Was
on the ground that inquiry into the paternity of there a valid agreement between the parties for
a natural child is forbidden except in actions for the manner of payment of the disputed
forcible acknowledgment. Is the evidence
lot/property?
immaterial?
ANSWER: NO. For a perfected contract of sale
ANSWER: YES, the evidence is immaterial
or contract to sell to exist in law, there must be
because it appears from the order containing an agreement of the parties, not only on the
the questioned ruling that the boy was born five price of the property sold, but also on the
years before complainant's marriage to one of manner the price is to be paid by the vendee.
the defendants. This means that the previous There is no showing on the records that the
sexual relations sought to be proved were far schedule of payment was agreed upon by the
removed in point of time from the illicit act now parties. Jurisprudence is that if a material
complained of, and having, moreover, taken element of a contemplated contract is left for
place when there was as yet no legal future negotiations, the same is too indefinite
impediment to the same, they furnish no to be enforceable. It has to be noted that a
rational basis for the inference that they would conditional sale was supposed to be executed
be continued after complainant's marriage to
by the seller in favor of the buyer but it was
one of the defendants had created such never perfected.
impediment and made continuance of sexual
relations between the defendants a crime. Here, even if there is a business pattern or habit
of payment between Xie and the other buyers,
(5) BOSTON BANK v MANALO, 482 SCRA 108 such terms cannot be adopted since the
(2006) respondents failed to allege and prove in the
BAR Q: (Xie) Estate sold parcels of subdivision lower court.
lots to Overseas Bank (OBM). Xie, as agent of III. Hearsay Rule
OBM continued the sale of the lots. Xie sold
certain lots to Manalo Jr., however, the manner A. Testimonial Knowledge (§§36-47, Rule 130)
of payment was not clearly agreed upon by Xie
(vendor/agent) and Manalo Jr. (buyer) despite (1) RICHMOND v ANCHUELO 4 PHIL. 596 (1905)
the fact that the down payment and the BAR Q: Mr. B is a blind man who went to Mr. D,
purchase price was known. Xie demanded for a doctor, to treat his eyes. Mr. D tried his best
the payment of the remaining amount of the but still without success. Mr. D is now claiming
down payment but Manalo Jr. rejected the payment for the services rendered. He claimed
that he was to receive 200 pesos in any event, was used in preparing the Final Adjustment
and if he effected a cure he was to receive 500 Report conducted by their company. Thus, the
pesos more. On the other hand, Mr. B argued report amounts to hearsay and is not
that if a cure was effected, Mr. D was to receive admissible. Is J’s report admissible as evidence?
200 pesos, but if no cure was effected he was to
receive nothing. At the trial, Mr. B presented a ANSWER: YES. That witnesses must be
examined and presented during the trial, and
witness, Jose Pastor, to prove his claim. The
judge excluded this evidence. Is the court that their testimonies must be confined to
correct? personal knowledge is required by the rules on
evidence, as stated under Section 36. An
ANSWER: YES. According to the provisions of exception to this rule, however, is on
section 276 of the Code of Civil Procedure (old “independently relevant statements”, wherein
rule), the statement made by the witness is a report made by a person is admissible if it is
hearsay and such is inadmissible. The witness intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of
did not offer to testify to anything which the the statements. Independent of the truth or the
plaintiff had said, but offered to testify to what falsity of the statement given in the report, the
the defendant said that the plaintiff had said. fact that it has been made is relevant. Here, the
The witness did not know that the plaintiff had hearsay rule does not apply. In this case, the
made these statements; he only knew that the survey report was admitted only as part of the
defendant said that the plaintiff had made testimonies of MM, since its referral was in
them. relation to the preparation of S’s adjustment
report. Evidently, it was the existence of the
(2) LEA MER INDUSTRIES, INC. v MALAYAN Survey Report that was testified to. Thus, the
INSURANCE CO., INC., 471 SCRA 698 (2005) evidence is admissible.
BAR Q: XX entered into a contract with LL for (3) ESTRADA v
the shipment of silica sand from Palawan to
Manila. During the voyage, the vessel sank, DESIERTO, 356 SCRA 108 (2001)
resulting in a loss of cargo. MM, as insurer, paid
BAR Q: X, who was then President of the
XX the value of the lost cargo, subsequently
demanding reimbursement from LL. LL refused Philippines, pursuant to his resignation, left the
Malacanang, and his seat was taken over by W
to pay, thus MM filed a complaint. LL claims
that the cause of the loss of the vessel was due his then Vice President. X now goes to the court
to a fortuitous event, hence LL didn’t need to to contest the legitimacy of W’s Presidency,
reimburse the amount. MM claims that the arguing that he never resigned as President,
vessel was not seaworthy when it sailed for and hence, claims to still be the lawful President
Manila, hence the loss of cargo was due to LL’s of the Philippines. Among the pieces of
fault. MM relied on the report of J, the cargo evidence offered to prove that X had indeed
surveyor, whose report showed that the barge resigned from the Presidency is the Angara
was not seaworthy. LL claims that J’s report is Diary which was an account of his last few
moments of being present in the Malacanang. Is
not admissible in evidence, since he did not
testify during the trial. The report was only the Angara Diary inadmissible as evidence for
presented by S, who testified that the report being hearsay?
ANSWER: NO. The statements cannot be ANSWER: YES. Under Rule 130, Section 37 of
regarded as hearsay evidence because the same the Rules of Court, the declaration of a dying
can be properly categorized as independently person with the consciousness of impending
relevant statements. Independently relevant death may be received in any case wherein his
statements are those which are “independent” death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of
from the truth of the statements. the cause and the surrounding circumstances of
Independently relevant statements may be such death. There are four requisites which
classified into statements which consist of the must concur in order that a dying declaration
very facts in issue and those which are may be admissible: (1) it must concern the
circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue, crime and surrounding circumstances of the
such as the statements of a person showing his declarants death; (2) at the time it was made,
state of mind or statements of a person from the declarant was under the consciousness of
which an inference may be made as to the state an impending death; (3) the declarant was
of mind of another. Pursuant to this, it may well competent as a witness; and (4) the declaration
be said that the entries in the Angara diary may is offered in any criminal case for homicide,
be regarded as containing statements regarding murder or parricide in which the declarant was
the state of mind of X, hence constituting the victim. (1) The first requisite is present in
circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. the ante-mortem statements of deceased PO3
XX . (2) The declarant, at the time he gave the
dying declaration, was conscious of his
B. Specific Exceptions impending death. PO3 Pastor knew at the time
he was being questioned that his chances of
1. Dying Declaration (§37, Rule 130) recovery were nil. In fact, he uttered the words,
“I might die, I might die,” to signify his
(1) PEOPLE v CAMILING, 424 SCRA 698 (2004)
perception that death was forthcoming. (3) PO3
BAR Q: X,Y, Z robbed MG store, armed with Pastor, at the time he uttered the dying
firearms and hand grenade and took and declaration, was competent as a witness. (4)
carried away cash and pieces of Chinese gold The dying declaration of PO3 Pastor was offered
necklace worth, and after which X,Y, Z on their as evidence in a criminal case for robbery with
way out to escape with their loot, shot and hit a homicide in which the declarant was the victim.
responding policeman, PO3 XX mortally Indubitably, PO3 Pastors dying declaration is
wounding him on his face, however in the complete in the sense that it was a full
emergency room of a District Hospital, PO3 XX expression of all that he wanted to say with
moaned I might die. I might die. in the presence regard to the circumstances of his death. An
of SPO1 YY and SPO4 ZZ. Hence, PO3 XX ante-mortem statement is evidence of the
statements were taken down by SPO1 YY who highest order. It is doctrinal that, when a person
assisted PO3 XX in affixing his thumb mark with is at the point of death, every motive of
his own blood wherein he identified X shot him. falsehood is silenced.
Is the declaration of SP03 XX admissible in
evidence of the cause and the surrounding
circumstances of such death?
(3) PEOPLE v SABIO, 102 SCRA 218 (1981) was in doubt as to whether he would die or not.
The declaration fails to show that the deceased
BAR Q: Papu was charged of the crime of
believed himself in extremis, "at the point of
robbery with homicide. Catalino, the victim,
death when every hope of recovery is extinct,"
died three days later but the circumstance of which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of
his death narrated by the victim himself was declarations as an exception to the hearsay
recorded by the responding policeman. Defense
rule." It may be admitted, however, as part of
argued that there is no evidence showing that the res gestae since the statement was made
when the declaration was uttered the declarant immediately after the incident and the
was under a consciousness of an impending deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time
death. Is there dying declaration? to concoct a charge against the accused.
ANSWER: YES. That death did not ensue till (5) People v. De Joya, 203 SCRA 343 (1991)
three days after the declaration was made will
not alter its probative force since it is not BAR Q: When A reached home from school, he
indispensable that a declarant expires saw his grandmother, E, lying down prostrate
immediately thereafter. It is the belief in and drenched with her own blood. He
impending death and not the rapid succession immediately threw his bag and ran towards her.
of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo,
declaration admissible. Apo, what happened?" E held his hand and
after which said: "Si P". After saying these
words, she let go of A's hand and passed away.
(4) PEOPLE v LAQUINON, 153 SCRA 91 (1985) DJ thereafter was charged before the RTC with
the crime of robbery with homicide. At
BAR Q: Samama, the barrio captain heard arraignment, DJ pleaded not guilty. After trial,
gunshot and went to the crime scene. He saw a the court a quo rendered a decision convicting
man who identified himself as Pablo. Pablo took DJ of the crime charged relying heavily on the
an ante mortem statement that he was shot by circumstances surrounding the death of the
Laquinon. The Vice mayor also went to the victim as testified to by the witnesses and
scene and asked Pablo who shot him to which proven during the trial, also the most
the latter pointed Laquinon. Pablo died later convincing is the dying statement of the
that day. Laquinon denied the allegations. He deceased. When A was asked during his
claimed that it was Cabardo who shot Pablo. testimony who is this Paki, he identified the
Laquinon argued that the dying statement of accused. The accused during his testimony
Pablo is inadmissible in evidence because it was never denied that he is called P. Is the dying
not executed under a consciousness of an statement of the deceased admissible?
impending death and that the deceased was
not a competent witness. Is the contention ANSWER: NO. It has been held that a dying
tenable? declaration to be admissible must be complete
in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean
ANSWER: YES. The dying declaration of the that the declarant must recite everything that
deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as constituted the res gestae of the subject of his
an antemortem declaration since the deceased statement, but that his statement of any given
fact should be a full expression of all that he from her house to her husband’s side upon
intended to say as conveying his meaning in seeing him sprawled on the ground and
respect of such fact. bloodied. She shouted several times, “Kapitan,
ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana.”To his
The reason upon which incomplete declarations defense, he claimed that he was asleep in his
are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded home which was 250 meters away from XX’s
little or no weight, is that since the declarant
store. During the trial of the case, YY positively
was prevented (by death or other circumstance) identified ZZ as her husband’s assailant. This
from saying all that he wished to say, what he positive identification is corroborated by BB’
did say might have been qualified by the testimony and expert witness Dr. CC, a
statements which he was prevented from medicolegal officer, that the gunshot wound in
making. That incomplete declaration is not
the body had been caused by a bullet that is of
therefore entitled to the presumption of the same size as that fired from an M-14 Rifle.
truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon However, the same expert witness testified that
which dying declarations are received. In this ZZ’s hands do not contain gunpowder nitrates.
case, it is clear to the Court that the dying Is the prosecution’s evidence credible?
declaration of the deceased victim here was
incomplete. The deceased was cut off by death ANSWER: YES. To be admissible, a dying
before she could convey a complete or sensible declaration must 1) refer to the cause and
communication to A. The trial court simply circumstances surrounding the declarant’s
assumed that by uttering the words "Si P", the death; 2) be made under the consciousness of
deceased had intended to name the person an impending death; 3) be made freely and
who had thrust some sharp instrument through voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of
and through her neck just below her ears. But E improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal
herself did not say so and we cannot speculate case, in which the death of the declarant is the
what the rest of her communication might have subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a
been had death not interrupted her. We are declarant competent to testify as a witness, had
unable to regard the dying statement as a dying that person been called upon to testify The
declaration naming the appellant as the doer of dying declaration of the victim was complete, as
the bloody deed. it was "a full expression of all that he intended
to say as conveying his meaning. It [was]
(6) MARTURILLAS v PEOPLE, 487 SCRA 273 complete and [was] not merely fragmentary."
(2006) Testified to by his wife and neighbor, his dying
BAR Q: After BB had served his wife C and A declaration was not only admissible in evidence
with lunch, A returned to his store which was 5 as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was
meters away from BB house. Evening of that also a weighty and telling piece of evidence.
day, BB was eating lunch in his house when he 2. Declaration Again Interest (§38, Rule 130)
heard a gunshot. XX had been shot on the
chest. He shouted at BB “Tabangi ko pre, gipusil
1. PAREL v
ko ni kapitan.” BB saw a man running away PRUDENCIO, 487
from the direction of XX’s store, but he wasn’t SCRA 405 (2006)
able to see his face. XX’s wife, YY, came running
BAR Q: The Court of Appeals declared Z as the statute of limitations. A formally demanded
the sole owner of a two-storey residential from X that he vacate said portion and
house. X filed for a Petition for Certiorari. X surrender its possession to him; that this
argues that the CA erred in finding the demand was not heeded by X, who, instead,
affidavit of Y, petitioner’s father declaring Z
executed, the deed, confirming the sale. X
as owner of the subject house as conclusive
argues that the lower court was in violation of
proof that Z is the true and only owner of the
house since the affidavit should be read in section 25 of said Rule 130 — the admission of
its entirety to determine the purpose for Y, to the effect that, although the land in
which it was executed. Is Y’s affidavit dispute was physically in the possession of her
should be given weight as conclusive proof now deceased husband, he and she recognized
of Z’s sole ownership. A as the owner of said land. Is the admission of
Y binding upon X?
ANSWER: YES. SEC. 38. Declaration
against interest. – The declaration made by a ANSWER: YES. The said testimony of Y and this
person deceased, or unable to testify, against recognition by the now deceased husband —
the interest of the declarant, if the fact which were confirmed by the public
asserted in the declaration was at the time it
document Exh. G — constitute a declaration
was made so far contrary to the declarant's
own interest, that a reasonable man in his of Mr and Mrs Y adverse to their interest, which
position would not have made the is admissible in evidence pursuant to Section 32
declaration unless he believed it to be true, of Rule 130. Such admission maybe received in
may be received in evidence against himself evidence," not only against the party who made
or his successors-in-interest and against it "or his successors in interest," but, also,
third persons. "against third persons.” Indeed, X’s main
argument, apart from the aforementioned
Here, based on the affidavit, it is safe to
inaction of A, is that he had never been in
presume that he would not have made such
possession of the land in question, and that the
declaration unless he believed it to be true,
as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his same had remained in the name of Y for tax
children’s interests as his heirs. A purposes. It should be noted, however, that,
declaration against interest is the best although the disputed land was actually held by
evidence which affords the greatest certainty Y, the latter executed the deed, whereby he, in
of the facts in dispute. effect, acknowledged A as owner of the land
and A granted Y the right to possess it. And this
was confirmed by Mrs. Y on the witness stand.
As a consequence, A came to be in constructive
possession of said land.
(2) VIACRUCIS v COURT OF APPEALS, 44 SCRA
176 (1972) (3) FUENTES, JR. v COURT OF APPEALS, 253
SCRA 430 (1996)
BAR Q: In an action to establish title to land,
spouses A and C allege that it is part of a bigger BAR Q: M together with B,C,D was at a benefit
lot sold to them by virtue of a deed of sale. X dance. E called M and placed his right arm on
attested, however, that such deed was a the shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw
simulated one; and that this action is barred by you with a long hair but now you have a short
hair." Suddenly E stabbed M in the abdomen verified pleading, and that his family, relatives
with a knife. M fell to the ground and his and neighbors have signified his true birth date
companions rushed to his side. E fled. Before wherein it all indicated that he has not yet
the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on reached the age of 65 at the time he was forced
his abdomen he muttered that E stabbed him. E to retire. If you were the judge, will you receive
claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Z the declaration of X’s brother in a prior case as
who stabbed M. E was found guilty of murder. evidence?
Is the declaration admission as evidence?
ANSWER: YES. Section 39, Rule 130 provides
ANSWER: NO. There are three (3) essential that the act or declaration of a person
requisites for the admissibility of a declaration deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the
against interest: (a) the declarant must not be pedigree of another person related to him by
available to testify; (b) the declaration must birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and where it occurred before the controversy, and
(c) the circumstances must render it improbable the relationship between the two persons is
that a motive to falsify existed. In the instant shown by evidence other than such act or
case, we find that the declaration particularly declaration. Here, the declaration of X’s brother
against penal interest attributed to Z is not contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral
admissible in evidence as an exception to the case way back in 1924, about X’s age, cannot be
hearsay rule. The discrepancy is ignored. It is a clear indication that he has not
inconsequential. What is material is that M was yet reached the compulsory retirement age at
stabbed to death and that three (3) prosecution the time he was separated from work. Made
witnesses positively identified petitioner as the ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this
knife wielder. It must be stressed that these statement is at once a declaration regarding
witnesses had known petitioner for quite some pedigree within the intendment and meaning of
time and never had any personal Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
misunderstanding nor altercation with the
latter as to create any suspicion that they were
impelled by ill motives to falsely implicate him.

3. Pedigree (§39, Rule 130)

(1) GRAVADOR v MAMIGO, 20 SCRA 742 (1967)

BAR Q: The superintendent advised X of the